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Land-based SM-3 concept
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Early intercept program; European politics; SAR report; Aegis Ashore contract. (Aug 24/10)

In July 2008 the US Missile Defense Agency was considering a land-based variant of the naval SM-3 Standard missile – largely due to specific requests from Israel. The SM-3 is hosted aboard US Navy ships for for ultra-long range air defense, including ballistic missile defense. Israel currently fields the medium range Arrow-2 land-based ABM system, supplemented by Patriot missiles for point defense. The Arrow has performed well in tests, however, and an order for more was placed as recently as February 2008. What could Israel’s rationale have been for an SM-3 request?

In the end, Israel seems to have bowed out, but the USA thought about it and decided that adding SM-3 missiles on land was a really good idea. There’s a big role for them in the USA’s future missile defense architecture…

• The SM-3 Option
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: Israel’s Possible Rationales
• Appendix B: Additional Readings [updated]

The SM-3 Option

SM-3 seeker: target!
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With a maximum range of about 300 miles/ 500 km, the Standard Missile 3 Block I (SM-3) has a longer range than mobile options like THAAD. SM-3 has 4 stages. The booster motor and initial stage launch the missile, and take it out of the atmosphere. Once it goes “exo-atmospheric,” the 3rd stage is used to boost the missile higher, and also corrects its course by referencing GPS/ INS locations.The final stage is the LEAP kill vehicle, which uses infrared sensors to pick out the target, and guides itself to ram it. That target is expected to be an enemy ballistic missile, but America’s shoot-down of its own ailing satellite showed that the same technology can also be used against low earth orbit objects.

The introduction of the SM-3 Block II variant will widen the missile’s diameter from 13.5” to 21”, greatly extending its range and speed, in order to boost the its effective range against fast-moving incoming missiles. It is currently expected to debut circa 2015, and at present the program is on schedule.

A land-based SM-3 option is likely to be attractive to several countries. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic, whose geographic location and land mass cannot be properly defended by naval SM-3 Block 1s, and would require many THAAD batteries for proper coverage, are currently slated to begin receiving meaningful missile defense via land-based SM-3s around 2015. Even SM-3 Block 1s can be useful from land bases, but the Block II weapon will add the ability to handle longer-range, higher-flying IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, usually 3,000-5,000 km range), and even offer some hope against global-strike threats like ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) warheads.

In the Pacific, Japan is already deploying SM-3s at sea, and may find land-based counterparts useful. Its neighbor South Korea also worries about North Korea’s evil and semi-stable regime; the ROK has stated an interest in loading shorter range SM-2 Block IV variants on its AEGIS destroyers, is buying and deploying Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ missiles, and has contracted with Israel for “Green Pine” air and missile defense radars. Its KDX-III AEGIS destroyers could be modified for a ballistic missile defense role, but land-based SM-3s linked to air and naval systems offer an option that doesn’t require naval upgrades.

The other country that has been linked to land-based SM-3s has a more complicated set of choices, and possible rationales. See Appendix A for details.

Contracts & Key Events

SM-3 Evolution:
next step, land?
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Aug 24/10: Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors (LM MS2) in Moorestown, NJ, is being awarded a sole-source, not-to-exceed $69.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee letter contract to serve as the “Aegis Ashore” Engineering Agent. In accordance with the AA Program of Record. Contract finalization is expected to be complete by Nov 19/10. The work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and the performance period is from August 2010 through April 2011.

Aegis ashore is an effort to move the naval AEGIS BMD anti-ballistic missile capability onto land sites in allied nations. LM MS2 will provide the engineering and necessary material to support the design of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex; the deployment sites; the integration of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System (AAMDS) into the removable deckhouse; the installation, test and checkout of the AAMDS at these sites; and initial site maintenance and logistics support during site transfer to the lead service. This unfinalized contract will allow LM MS2 to assist in the development of the AA Combat System (AACS) requirements, to include supporting program planning, element capability specification, and concept of operations development. LM MS2 will begin the AACS adaptation, design efforts associated with the configuration of the AAMDS in the removable structure, and designing the enclosures for transport.

LM MS2 will begin those activities associated with validation and verification of the deckhouse requirements and will facilitate system requirements review in September 2010, and system design review in January 2011. FY 2010 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be utilized to obligate $10.1 million for this effort. The Missile Defense Agency manages this contract (HQ0276-10-C-0003).

April 1/10: The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009:

“Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) – Program costs decreased $10,068.9 million (-9.7%) from $102,912.4 million to $92,843.5 million, due primarily to the following: cancellation of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Multiple Kill Vehicle Program (-$5,304.2 million); cancellation of the Airborne Laser Program (-$2,634.7 million); elimination of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System follow-on constellation (-$1,972.0 million); transition of the sensor content to procurement (-$1,223.7 million); general infrastructure reductions (-$1,216.7 million); revised estimates for special classified programs (-$1,155.4 million); application of revised escalation indices (-$1,169.1 million); reduced Ground-Based Interceptor inventory due to the change of European site architecture (-$88.0 million); and infrastructure reductions (-$1,216.7 million). These decreases were partially offset by the change in European architecture to Aegis Ashore (+$2,493.5 million) [emphasis DID’s] and the consolidation of targets and revised Integrated Master Test Plan (+$1,646.4 million). In addition, procurement costs of $9,520.3 million, which were previously excluded from the SAR due to its pre-Milestone B Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)-only status pursuant to section 2432 of title 10, United States Code, were added as an adjustment to the program in accordance with Congressional direction. RDT&E and Military Construction (MILCON) costs of $14,340.1 million were also added as adjustments to reflect the addition of two years to this program, which is considered Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) limited and has been allowed to add two years of cost to the program with each biennial budget. These adjustments are not considered to represent cost growth.”

Dec 7/09: Aviation Week notes several undercurrents involved in discussions around Europe’s missile defense.

One is “consequences of intercept,” which are certainly less than the consequences of a missile strike, but could well fall outside the launching country. Another is the compressed time frames, which means authority will reside in the commander – who will that be, and where will that commander be based?

A 3rd question is how the proposed SM-3 phases mesh with European NATO plans, including NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program command and control hub, and proposed land-based radars. Which are going to be an issue all their own, since the system requires them, and the American TPY-2s may not be the only players. Finally, there’s the question of whether European navies will join the program, which would further blue the question of whether this is an American system with NATO ancillaries, or a NATO system with American assets.

Nov 17/09: Northrop Grumman announces a 3-month $4.7 million task order from the US Missile Defense Agency, under an indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity Joint National Integration Center Research and Development Contract. Under the Sept 29/09 task order, the firm will help the MDA integrate and demonstrate an early-intercept capability using existing SM-3 and GBI missiles. This kind of capability is especially relevant for forward-based SM-3s.

The Early Intercept effort aims to address renewed focus by the U.S. Department of Defense on dealing with large raids and countermeasures. Early Intercept will demonstrate an integrated architecture of early warning sensors, including space, airborne, land and sea; regional fire control and battle manager systems; and secure communications. This integrated architecture will enable current systems to engage threats earlier in the battle space to improve protection against large raids and facilitate “shoot-look-shoot” opportunities.

Northrop Grumman will begin by assessing existing sensor and battle management systems’ ability to support missile interception in the difficult boost phase, including technology developed for programs like the now-canceled Kinetic Energy Interceptor and battle management projects. The firm will plan demonstration experiments, leading toward the design and development of an experimental, plug-and-play architecture for battle management, command and control.

Sept 17/09: The Obama administration announces revised plans for its European missile defense architecture. Instead of positioning Boeing’s Ground-Based Interceptors, which could intercept even the longest-range ballistic missiles, they choose an architecture based around the SM-3.

According to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, the new plan begins with the current deployment of Patriot PAC-3 point defense systems in Europe, which may be adjusted. Those adjustments will bear watching, as early indicators of seriousness.

• In 2011, the US Navy is expected to have naval SM-3 Block 1A missiles and ships fully in place, on an expanded fleet of BMD-capable ships versus the 2 Atlantic Fleet destroyers available today. Unfortunately, naval SM-3 Block 1 missiles cannot cover the Czech Republic at all, and can offer only limited coverage for Poland. This will be the only option until 2015, which is beyond the Obama administration’s current term of office.

• 2015 would see progress on 2 fronts. One is SM-3 Block 1B missiles, and an improved AEGIS BMD system that will expand the range of coverage for American ships. The other would be land-based SM-3s in an easily-deployable configuration, based in Europe, instead of the longer-range Boeing Ground Based Interceptors. Political support for that land-based deployment is likely to become a political flash point, again.

• The final iteration would take place in 2018 or so, with deployment of the much larger SM-3 Block II missile, on ships and (if deployments have been accepted) on shore. Gen. Cartwright stated that no more than 3 SM-3 Block II locations would be able to cover all of Europe, but cautions that it’s an earlier-stage R&D effort, with all the expected implications for dates and certainty of capabilities.

Cartwright and Gates also added several additional considerations that affected their decision. One was Russian concerns about having large X-band BMD radars that could peer deeply into Russia. By using shorter-range, directional TPY-2 radars deployed in the Caucasus, Iranian aggression can also be hedged without covering Russia so deeply – something that allies like Poland may not necessarily see as a plus. The other, more significant Russian concern was that the GBI missile was powerful enough to be fitted with a nuclear warhead, and become an offensive MRBM with very low warning time. American denials did little to dissuade the Russians of this belief, since one must plan on the basis of capabilities. That concept becomes technically ridiculous with an SM-3, removing that issue from the table.

Another issue for the USA was cost and flexibility. Gen. Cartwright cited a cost-per-missile of $3.3 million for a Patriot PAC-3, about $9 million for THAAD v1, $9.5-10 million for SM-3 Block I, about $13-15 million estimated for SM-3 Block II… and $70 million for the GBI interceptors. In a global environment that was seeing rapid growth of medium-range offensive missiles, that cost disparity had implications for strategic flexibility, as well as budgets. According to Gates and Cartwright, the GBI deployment was really designed to deal with 3-5 incoming intercontinental missiles, rather than larger salvos of medium-range missiles that are now possible. GBI is also silo-based and so immobile, as opposed to mobile ships and redeployable land-based SM-3s. The question is whether the USA will actually increase its planned buys of SM-3 in response, something that Information Dissemination’s report suggests hasn’t really been thought through yet. The US Navy’s next 5-year budget plan will tell the tale.

With that cost and architecture change comes a 3rd consideration: greater capacity for allied burden-sharing. Several other nations deploy and will deploy AEGIS ships that could be upgraded to SM-3 BMD capability, including Japan (Kongo class, being upgraded), South Korea (KDX-III), Spain and Australia (F100), plus the non-AEGIS F124 frigates fielded by Germany and the Netherlands. The SM-3 missile has already been exported, and could easily be exported more widely. Gen. Cartwright cited the potential for development of a common architecture linking land and naval systems, which would be deployed in Europe, Asia, Israel, and elsewhere. The architecture is being developed to incorporate non-American systems, and Israel’s IAI/Boeing Arrow was specifically cited. Gates added that talks along these lines had begun with Arab Gulf states, who are already developing their own missile defense preparations based on regional command and control systems, Patriot missiles, and possibly THAAD and MBDA’s comparable Aster-30 SAMP/Ts.

Meanwhile, THAAD missiles are still scheduled to deploy to Europe in 2009, as part of operational testing, and the system is still planned for roll-out as the Army’s area-defense weapon. The USA is also still interested in adding 2-stage capability to its GMD/GBI interceptors in Alaska and California, in order to improve their speed and increase their range. The big winner in these changes, however, is unquestionably Raytheon’s SM-3. Pentagon: Gates/ Cartwright press conference | Pentagon: DoD/ Czech MoD press conference | Aviation Week | Aviation Week Ares | Defense Tech called it early | Information Dissemination | Lexington Institute.

August 18/09: In a presentation at the 2009 Space and Missile Defense Conference & Exhibition in Huntsville, AL, Raytheon announces that it is developing a land-based system SM-3 system that would work with THAAD’s Raytheon-made AN/TPY-2 long range radar, and could be ready as early as 2013.

The presentation states that this solution could provide Israel a near-term solution to counter ballistic missiles from Iran, given the deployment of TPY-2 radars in Israel by the US government. It is also reportedly under consideration for use in Europe as the missile component of planned deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.

It’s no accident that this comes just as Boeing announces a “mobile GMD” proposal for Europe by 2015, and Lockheed Martin has gone farther by submitting a modified THAAD proposal to the US Missile Defense Agency for consideration in the 2011 budget. Lockheed Martin has already invested privately funded R&D into a 21” wide THAAD variant that would nearly double the Army interceptor missile’s range. Current SM-3s are 13.5” in diameter, current THAADs are 14.5”, and the proposed SM-3 Block II being developed in partnership with Japan will also be 21” in diameter. It would appear that a competition for the forward-deployed theater defense role may be brewing. Arutz Sheva | Reuters | Aviation Week re: shifts in doctrine | Aviation Week re: THAAD | Jerusalem Post re: Boeing’s “mobile GBI”.

April 27/09: Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun reports that the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has started studying a new missile defense system capable of launching the Standard Missile-3 from the ground.

Aug 4/09: Colin Clark of DOD Buzz publishes a short video interview with Raytheon VP of advanced missile defense and directed energy Mike Booen. The interview took place at the 2009 Paris Air Show, and the topic is the $50 million FY 2010 US military budget request to study land-based SM-3 deployment.

July 17/08: Aviation Week reports that the US Missile Defense Agency is considering a land-based variant of the SM-3 Standard missile, at Israel’s request:

“SM-3 prime contractor Raytheon is examining a range of options—including a moveable, but not highly mobile, system that could fill Israel’s needs. Very few modifications would be needed for the missile and some tweaks would be required in the command and control system. The system would employ the same vertical launch modules, in an eight-pack configuration, used in the Aegis ship-based system.”

Appendix A: Israel’s Possible Rationales

Arrow test concept
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Statements from Raytheon indicated that Israel was already doing research into a land-based SM-3, despite its existing Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ and Arrow-2 architecture. In the end, however, Israel maintained of its focus on an improved “Arrow-3” interceptor, and America agreed to support that program in the FY 2010 budget. Those developments leave dim odds for land-based SM-3s in Israel.

The question is why they were interested in the first place. Several possibilities exist that might justify Israel’s retention of an active Arrow missile program, and still deploy the SM-3s.

One is the naval defense option. While Israel has apparently decided on a different direction, its proposed LCS-I frigates would have possessed the ability to fire SM-3 missiles, and their proposed MEKO derivatives might still have that if they’re equipped with strike-length Mk. 41 VLS launchers. The Arrow missile would not be an option for either platform.

The second possible justification for an Israeli SM-3 buy revolves around and command-and-control developments. Like the LCS-I, any new Israeli frigates firing an SM-3 would need to link to an anti-ballistic capable radar for guidance. Israel already fields ABM-capable land radars like its “Green Pine” system, and the USA has reportedly moved manned AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars into Israel as additional insurance against a Second Holocaust perpetrated by Iran. Linkage of a naval missile’s guidance to those kinds of land platforms would involve many of the same modifications required by a fully land-launched and controlled SM-3, and statements by America’s General Cartwright say that the USA’s land-based anti-missile command and control systems that will work with land-based SM-3s are being developed to include the Arrow as well.

The third possible justification is range. The SM-3 boasts a range about 5x longer than the Arrow-2, at 300 miles vs. 50-60 miles. A tripartite system of SM-3, Arrow-2, and Patriot missiles would effectively cover the 3 layered tiers required by a country Israel’s size: national defense/ first line of defense, defense of key regions/ second shot, and defense of specific sites/ final attempt.

Fourth, deployment would coincide with a growing shift in the USA to focus on “ascent-phase intercept” of medium (MRBM) and intermediate-range (IRBM) missiles. If the launchers are deployed close enough to the firing missile, interceptions become possible some time between the boost and mid-course phases during the entry into space, right before the target missile can begin deploying decoys. The Middle East’s compressed distances are a threat, due to low warning times and the resulting hair-triggers, but might also be an opportunity with sufficiently capable defensive missiles.

Finally, the SM-3 is an active production item for the USA and Japan, which leverages the infrastructure created by a large-scale, full-rate production set of programs. This means that SM-3s can be produced far faster than additional Arrow missiles. If developments in Iran are leading Israel to conclude that it needs to deploy many more theater-range defensive missiles within a short period of time, the THAAD and Arrow-2 programs are unlikely to be able to handle that request due to the stage they’re at, and the industrial framework around them. That leaves the SM-3 as Israel’s only realistic rapid plus-up option.

Appendix B: Additional Readings

• DID FOCUS – Raytheon’s Standard Missile Naval Defense Family

• Aviation Week (Dec 7/09) – No Easy Answers To Missile Defense

• Commentary Magazine (December 2009) – The Missile Defense Betrayal. The revised European missile defense plan was not universally well-received on the political front, with many conservatives sharply critical. Commentary Magazine’s article includes coverage of the political dynamics at work in Poland and the Czech Republic.

• Lexington Institute (Nov 5/09) – Aegis Ashore: The Navy’s New Missile Defense Mantra