Sen. Leahy’s [D-VT] worked in the mid-2000s to keep the Hydra 70mm rocket family alive through special appropriations, just in time for the Hydras’ potential on the battlefield to rise again. The key was the addition of low-cost precision guidance, which would expand the number of precision weapons carried by helicopters, aircraft, and even UAVs.

Over the last few years, the US Army’s 2nd attempt at an APKWS 70mm guided rocket had a near-death experience, before righting the program with Navy funding. Meanwhile, private development efforts from Lockheed Martin, Thales TDA, and a raft of international partnerships involving major defense firms and partners in Korea, the UAE, Canada/Norway, and Israel are introducing new competitors into the precision-guided rocket space. This DID FOCUS article covers the most prominent competitors within the guided rocket trend. Their products will sit between full anti-armor missiles like Hellfire, TOW, and Brimstone, and an emerging class of ultra-small precision attack weapons like Northrop Grumman’s Viper Strike, Raytheon’s Griffin, etc.

APKWS II: “To be, or not to be…”

APKWS
(click to view full)

“APKWS II “Hellfire Jr.” Hydra Rockets Enter SDD Phase” is DID’s FOCUS article for the APKWS II program, noting updates and developments related to the BAE/ General Dynamics/ Northrop Grumman partnership and its project.

APKWS II’s seeker has a much narrower “cone” than Lockheed Martin’s DAGR competitor (+/- 4 degrees, vs. +/- 15 degrees), and BAE’s APKWS II system found itself “zeroed out” in the FY 2008 budget appropriations. Despite the emergence of privately funded competitors and allied partnerships, The US Navy elected to stick with APKWS-II, and stepped in as the main funding source in 2008. That move secures BAE and Northrop Grumman’s place in the market, even as offerings that are or will be fully developed are changing the competitive landscape.

Lockheed Martin: Is this a DAGR I see before me…?

DAGR concept
(click to view full)

Leveraging existing Hellfire and Joint Common Missile technology, the semi-active DAGR guided rockets offer functionality comparable to the popular Hellfire missile, including lock-on-before-launch, lock-on-after-launch, target location handoff, enhanced built-in test, programmable laser coding, and flexible fly-out modes. DAGR rockets’ +/- 15 deg sighting cone offers a wider field of view than competitors. They can also be launched from any platform that currently supports the Hellfire weapon system, removing any requirements for additional integration, training, or infrastructure if that platform is already compatible.

Lockheed Martin says that DAGR has customers, but will not name them.

May 8/12: Tests. Lockheed Martin touts a set of 4 successful DAGR tests from an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, all of which hit within 1 meter of the laser spot. A truck moving at 25 km/h was hit from 3.5 km was hit using lock-on before launch, and the other tests included a lock-on after launch shot, a 5 km strike, and a launch from 5 degrees offset.

This makes over 30 test flights so far, from AH-64D Apache, AH-6 Little Bird and OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopters.

June 20/10: Customers. Lockheed Martin tells Battlespace magazine that its DAGR system has 2 initial customers, and will enter low-rate initial production “early next year.”

Jan 8/09: DAGR succeeds in its first live warhead launch, and penetrates the side of the target vehicle before exploding. Lockheed Martin says that the weapon is now 12 for 12 in tests.

Feb 28/08: Lockheed Martin announces 3 successful tests (2 guided flight, 1 multi-purpose sled) of the DAGR semi-active laser guidance kit for 2.75-inch/70mm rockets. The tests were designed to demonstrate the system’s accuracy, wide sighting capability, and delayed fuzing mode. Lockheed reports that DAGR is now 6-for-6 in control vehicle and guided test vehicle flights, which began in February 2006.

DAGRs & Hellfires
(click to view full)

Sept 17/07: Flight International reports that a land-based version of DAGR could be deployed to Iraq soon. Randy Thomas, business development manager for DAGR, told them that the US Army wants to network DAGR rockets and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles with a network of tower-based sensors (very likely the RAID towers) at army bases in Iraq. The system would be used as a surveillance and suppress/ instant reply option against enemy mortar teams. Lockheed is also pushing for DAGR integration onto helicopters and UAVs.

If they succeed in these efforts, Lockheed Martin could wind up losing the formal competition, but winning the procurement competition by pre-empting their rival’s R&D cycle with a working solution whose initial deployment sidesteps the original competition. That doesn’t happen very often in US military procurement, which is another reason the “Guided Hydroids” competition is worth following closely.

Sept 11/07: Lockheed formally unveils the DAGR as a finished, for-sale at Britain’s DSEi defense show. The rockets can be fired from existing M299 and M310 Hellfire launchers, with 4-packs of DAGRs mounted to each Hellfire missile rail. As the maker of the Hellfire missile and launcher, they are uniquely positioned to offer this level of integration.

This clears the way for DAGR rockets to be employed immediately on larger unmanned aerial vehicles like the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, MC-1C Sky Warrior, and MQ-8B Fire Scout; on AH-1 Cobra, AH-64 Apache, H-60 Seahawk, OH-58 Kiowa, and Eurocopter Tiger helicopters; and on the ARH-70A Armed Reconnaissance helicopter if and when it is delivered.

That kind of flexibility also positions Lockheed Martin for any situation in which APKWS II is shut down and turned into a “fly-off” competition, because of the extra flexibility their launcher options create.

March 7/07: Lockheed may have lost the APKWS II competition, but it didn’t give up. The DAGR (70mm Direct Attack Guided Rocket, not to be confused with DAGR hand-held GPS locators) completed development with company funding. Lockheed especially touts its wider boresight/ off-axis capability, which allows it to launch within a wider “flight cone” and still find its way to the target.

February 2007 flight tests demonstrated objective maneuverability capability for minimum range engagements. The DAGR rocket supports launch from unmanned aerial vehicle platforms; later in 2007, Lockheed Martin will complete a full test flight matrix for unmanned aerial vehicles and helicopters, as well as perform platform launch. See Lockheed Martin release.

LOGIR: “…the heavenly-harnessed team/ Begins his golden progress in the east…”

LOGIR/LCITS
(click for video)

From NAVAIR weapons development’s “Arming the Fleet” publication:

“The LOGIR project began in 2000 and is still under way. Its primary objective is to significantly improve the warfighter’s ability to address moving and fixed targets with an emphasis on moving targets. LOGIR allows the warfighter to designate the target using the existing targeting FLIR. Once designated, the pilot can fire the rocket and leave the area. LOGIR will use the FLIR(Forward-Looking Infa-Red) targeting data to fly to the target, and acquire and track the target to weapon impact.”

Using FLIR/ Imaging Infrared enables 1 platform with LOGIR rockets to simultaneously engage many small naval targets across a wide (90 degree plus) sighting cone, instead of having to use individual laser designation. That makes it a better weapon against threats like small boat swarms, though it does increase the price a bit. Testing of various components has continued, slowly. The 2007 US-ROK memorandum of understanding should help to accelerate program efforts through to completion, and may help to guarantee a floor for orders and production.

Until May 2011, LOGIR was formally part of the Office of Naval Research’s Future Naval Capabilities Low-Cost Imaging Terminal Seeker (LCITS) program, as executed by NAVAIR Code 4.7′s Emergent Weapons Concepts Division. Test GR #3 officially shifted the LOGIR project from LCITS into the Medusa JCTD (Joint Capability Technology Demonstration) phase, which will integrate the rocket onto the USN’s MH-60 helicopters. As of November 2011, LCITS has been fired from shore, and from an AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter, including tests against moving targets.

LOGIR & APKWS
(click to view full)

Nov 3/11: Twin test-firings of LCITS by the US ONR:

“In the Nov. 3 test, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division engineers used a shore-based launcher to fire two LCITS rockets, one inert and the other with an explosive warhead. Using inertial guidance, they flew to a point where the infrared terminal guidance system took over. Onboard imaging infrared seekers identified their intended targets among five maneuvering small boats. The rockets adjusted trajectories to intercept and eliminate two of the boats.”

May 11/11: The US Office of Naval Research provides an update on the LCITS/LOGIR program, and touts its capabilities against small boats. Outside observers wonder what other applications might be found for the seeker. ONR | The Register.

May 1/10: LOGIR completes its concept demonstration phase with a successful launch from an AH-1W helicopter and a direct hit on a moving fast boat, at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD) in Point Mugu, CA. NAWCWD Weapons and Energetics Department Precision Guidance Office head Howard McCauley says the test marks LOGIR’s technology as being mature enough to transition into a Navy program of record.

Until this test, LOGIR was part of the Office of Naval Research’s Future Naval Capabilities Low-Cost Imaging Terminal Seeker (LCITS) program, as executed by NAVAIR Code 4.7′s Emergent Weapons Concepts Division. Test GR #3 officially shifted the LOGIR project from LCITS into the Medusa Joint Capability Technology Demonstration phase. A Military Utility Assessment will be conducted during Medusa, to further LOGIR along the path to a buy decision and fleet introduction. US NAVAIR.

March 2/07: Korea and the United States have agreed to cooperate in developing guided air-launched rockets, signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for “LOGIR” (Low-Cost Guided Imaging Rocket) development. The budget for this project is reportedly more than $60 million.

“The LOGIR project is a main joint project for weapons development between South Korea and the U.S.,” said Park Young-wook, director of South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s (ROK DAPA) technology acquirement department. A ROK DAPA official added that “Korea will bear only several million won and the U.S. will be responsible for the rest amount… The allies will cooperate in development of running gear, guidance system, and detector on the base of LOGIR.” See KOIS report | DynamicKorea.com report.

Sources indicate that LOGIR involves a Hydra 70 2.75-in. rocket with an inertial + infrared guidance kit added to the front. The kit consists of a low-cost uncooled imaging infrared focal plane array that can match a target profile with a pre-programmed (or transmitted) “image” in its memory, a low-cost micro electro-mechanical inertial measurement unit to track current and relative position and get the rocket near its target, a control actuation system for maneuvering, and computer electronics to tie it all together.

At the time, this combination seemed to be staking out the lower end of the guided rocket market. Costs haven’t come down quite that far, and the final product looks like more like a different approach aimed at a different niche. LOGIR won’t be quite as effective against mobile targets as a more expensive system that might use ongoing laser designation or millimeter-wave seekers. Instead, it offers fire-and-forget capability, works well against the relatively stationary targets that still make up a large percentage of precision attack missions (a building, a parked vehicle, an enemy machine-gun position, etc.), and has good enough effectiveness against moving targets to offer advantages against swarming tactics.

Raytheon and the UAE’s TALON: “Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie…”

Hydra family
(click to view full)

On May 7/08, a new competitor entered the fray. Hussain I. Al Hammadi, Emirates Advanced Investments’ chief executive officer:

“The Laser Guided Rocket project with Raytheon is a very important defense industry initiative for the United Arab Emirates… that will provide future benefits for the armed forces of both our countries. It is designed to destroy targets ranging from tactical armored vehicles to high-speed naval craft and will provide a very affordable precision weapon for attack helicopters.”

Richard Janik, Raytheon Missile Systems’ Laser Guided Rocket program manager points out a side-effect that has been the case before with other weapon programs, most notably Iran’s rescue of the USA’s F-14 Tomcat fighter program. At this point, the APKWS program was stalled headed for cancellation, so he made the point that:

“This program is also intended to benefit the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps… because they would be able to obtain a fully qualified laser guided rocket that meets or exceeds all the guided 70 mm rocket requirements of the United States, without expending tens of millions of dollars of investment in research, evaluation, and testing.”

Unfortunately, the US Navy stepped in and adopted APKWS in August 2008, and the consortium hasn’t even been able to secure the UAE as a TALON customer, either. After successful testing from 2009 – 2011, the UAE placed a laser-guided rocket order with Turkey’s Roketsan in February 2013.

Nov 15/11: Testing. Raytheon announces that its partnership with Emirates Advanced Investments (EAI) Group has completed a TALON operational demonstration, going 3-for-3 from a UAE AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter against stationary and moving targets. This marks the final step leading to production of TALON LGRs in the U.S. and the United Arab Emirates.

Sept 13/11: Testing. Raytheon announces a successful finish to additional testing of production configuration TALON rockets on the AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter. The AH-64D is the UAE’s main attack helicopter, though it will soon be joined by UH-60M Black Hawks fitted with Level 3 Battlehawk kits. TALON test firings included hovering and moving platforms, at engagement ranges between 1.2 km/ 0.74 miles to 6.0 km/ 3.7 miles. Raytheon believes the rocket is now ready to begin full-rate production.

April 16/10: Testing. Raytheon and Emirates Advanced Investments (EAI) announce the end of 4 ground-based guided flight tests of the TALON Laser-Guided Rocket, after the rounds were “preconditioned” at extreme temperatures to test their reliability. The tests pave the way for TALON LGR airborne testing, including a series of live firings from the AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter. Raytheon release.

Dec 22/09: Testing. The U.S. Army fires 2 TALON Laser-Guided Rocket guided test vehicle rounds from an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, and hit targets at 3,500 meters (2.17 miles). The Raytheon release adds that “this exceeded accuracy requirements for the Department of Defense’s Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II program. In September, the U.S. Army clearly stated the need for a guided munition capable of being launched from the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior…”

Oct 8/08: Testing. Raytheon announces the completion of wind tunnel tests for the Laser Guided Rocket in Buffao, NY’s Calspan Transonic Wind Tunnel. It’s the first testing step in a 24-month development and qualification program, providing simulations and data that will help with autopilot design.

Other Entries: “Come unto these yellow sands…”

Moore’s Law continue to produce more powerful computer processors, and parallel developments in other technologies are driving down the cost of laser and infrared detectors. It’s hard to escape the conclusion that eventually, most unguided rockets will introduce guidance options over the next decade. Here are a few of the other contenders.

Turkey: Roketsan’s CIRIT

CIRIT from AH-1W
(click to view full)

Turkey’s relationship with both Israel and the USA continues to deteriorate under the Islamist AKP party. At the same time, the government is embarking on wide-ranging military modernization projects, and working to export local defense products and services to surrounding states. Cirit is intended to have a range of 8 km, with a reduced-smoke motor, and a tri-mode (fragmentation/ HEAT/ incendiary) warhead. It’s intended to fire from M- and LAU- launchers, as well as a MIL-STD-1760 launcher developed by Roketsan.

March 27/12: Turkey’s SSM procurement agency has unveiled their new 5-year strategic plan, with timetables for key acquisitions. CIRIT is to be integrated with the T129 by the end of 2013, The plan commits to begin delivery of CIRIT laser-guided 70mm rockets by 2016 for the ATAKs, and possibly for other platforms as well. Hurriyet Daily News

Sept 12/11: Goodrich Corporation announces its 1st production order from Turkey’s Roketsan Missiles Industries Inc., for its miniaturized, MEMS-reliant SiIMU02® inertial measurement unit (IMU). The production order follows successful customization and qualification of SiIMU02 package for CIRIT in 2011. The IMUs will be produced at Goodrich’s facility in Plymouth, UK.

May 16/11: The CIRIT project is shown at the IDEF 11 fair in Turkey. Roketsan adds that they are already working with Eurocopter on integration. Videos also show tests from an AH-1 Cobra helicopter, and they’ll need to work with AgustaWestland, whose T129 will by Turkey’s next attack helicopter. News.Az

Sept 23/10: Jane’s covers Roketsan’s display of its Cirit 70mm rockets and UMTAS/ OMTAS anti-tank missiles at AAD 2010. The 2.75in Cirit is now being qualified and will enter production “later this year.”

CRV7-PG

CRV7s from Harrier
(click to view larger)

Defense Review cites the Magellan Aerospace/Kongsberg Defence & Aerorspace (KDA) CRV7-Precision Guided (CRV7-PG) 70mm rocket (2.75″ rocket). The UK/Canadian firm Magellan has produced excellent 70mm CRV7 rockets for quite some time. They are providing the rocket technology. Kongsberg is handling the guidance system, which is derived from its work on the Penguin anti-ship missile and Naval Strike Missile (NSM).

This CADSI (Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries)
profile states that seeker options include semi-active radar, laser guidance, GPS, and anti-radiation; if so, the CRV-7PG would offer precision-strike 70mm rocket options for many existing fighter aircraft, as well as helicopters and UAVs. The development partnership was announced on June 15/06, at Eurosatory 2006.

GATR-L (Guided Advanced Tactical Rocket – Laser).

ATK on GATR
click for video

On July 9/08, Israel’s Elbit Systems Ltd. and American ammunition and rocketry expert Alliant Techsystems (ATK) announced a teaming agreement to develop the 70mm GATR-L for use on “fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) platforms.”

GATR uses the same semi-active laser seeker as the Laser JDAM bomb, and employs a digitally-fuzed, fully-qualified M282 multi-purpose penetrating warhead. It can be fired using lock-on before or after launch, as well as autonomous or remote laser designation. The warhead is programmed from the cockpit for either point detonation, or delayed fuzing against hardened targets. ATK promotes GATR as having a firing envelope that’s “50 percent greater than [the weakest] currently-fielded laser-guided rockets.” The system can be deployed against targets at ranges from 1.5 km – over 8 km.

May 22/13: SOCOM DAC. ATK announces a $3.2 million Defense Acquisition Challenge (DAC) contract to provide a low-cost, light-weight, precision guided missile for evaluation by U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). They’ll use their MH-60L/M helicopters as the operational evaluation platform.

ATK is submitting GATR and their Precision Guided Rocket Launcher (PGRL), which is available in 3, 7, and 19-tube variants. The PGRL works with current analog and digital fire control systems, and can provide digital stores management for weapons loaded into it. ATK.

June 24/10: Defense Review reports that ATK has teamed up with Northrop Grumman to market GATR-L in conjunction with NGC’s VENOM surveillance and targeting system, which can be mounted on ground vehicles.

That’s a nice fit for the Special Operations Forces Industry Conference 2010 venue, though the VENOM/GATR combination is also touted as working with manned and unmanned aircraft.

June 1/09: Successful flight tests in Israel. They include a test from a helicopter using lock-on before launch, in order to engage an off boresight target outside the rocket’s normal seeker cone, at a range of about 3 km. The tests validated flight worthiness, safe separation launch, and autonomous laser designated guided flight. ATK release.

Oct 6/08: Successful GATR-L flight tests at White Sands, NM, fired from an M261 launcher at ranges out to 6 km. Military Aerospace & Electronics report.

SYROCOT (Systeme de Roquette A Corrections de Trajectoire)

France is interested in this project, based on the ubiquitous SNEB 68mm rocket. Thales subsidiary TDA, who makes the SNEB, has experimented with both laser-guided and GPS-guided rockets, and plans to market a 70mm version of SYROCOT. News of this project has been quiet for some time, however.

Oct 8/08: Thales announces the first successful test-firing of its laser-guided SYROCOT, in cooperation with France’s DGA procurement agency.

Ugroza/Kor.

Russia’s AMETEX began touting its ‘Ugroza’ (Menace) guided air-ground guided rocket systems at MAKS 1999. Ugroza can reportedly be fitted to the 57mm S-5, 80mm S-8, and 122mm S-13 rockets, adding the suffix “Kor” to their designation.

Bigger Boom: 127mm Zuni rocket options

F/A-18C fires Zuni
(click to view full)

A Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD) project in response to a US Marine Corps request to retrofit its 127mm Zuni rockets for semi-active laser guidance, allowing aircraft to fire them from existing 4-rocket LAU-10 pods with no modifications required. That program is included in the 2007 Marine Aviation plan.

NAWCWD developed the WGU-58/B guidance system in cooperation with European missile giant MBDA. Other industry partners include Elbit Systems of America in Fort Worth TX; General Dynamics in Healdsburg CA; and Honeywell in Minneapolis MN.

Oct 6/09: MBDA announces the successful demonstration of its own Semi-Active Laser-Guided Zuni rocket at the US Navy’s China Lake test facilities, this time against a moving target.

June 22/09: MBDA Incorporated announces the successful demonstration of a Semi-Active Laser Guided 5-inch Zuni rocket at a static target, at the US Navy’s China Lake, CA test facilities.

Additional Readings & Sources

• GlobalSecurity.org – Hydra-70 Rocket System

• DID FOCUS Article – APKWS II “Hellfire Jr.” Hydra Rockets Enter SDD Phase. Focuses on the APKWS II competition, won by BAE Systems & Northrop Grumman.

• ATK – Guided Advanced Tactical Rocket (GATR). In collaboration with Israel’s Elbit Systems.

• Lockheed Martin – DAGR product page

• Magellan Aerospace – CRV7-PG Rocket Weapon System

• Roketsan – CIRIT | 2.75″ Laser Guided Missile

• US Navy ONR – Low Cost Thermal Imaging Seeker. LCITS is the broader development program that includes LOGIR, interfaces to the helicopter’s infrared sensors, and the launcher.

• StaretegyPage (Feb 9/11) – Images of Death. LOGIR, APKWS-II, and DAGR.

• Battlespace magazine (June 20/10, Vol.11, Issue 2) – The Race for the Guided 2.75 inch Rocket

• Aeronautics.RU (December 1999) – Unguided rockets get guidance. Mentions SYROCOT and Ugroza.

• US Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT, May 5/05) – Army Awards $900 Million Contract To Burlington’s General Dynamics. . . Leahy Instrumental In Securing Funds

In June 2006, the Slovenian Ministry of Defence picked Patria’s 8×8 wheeled Armored Modular Vehicle (AMV) as the preferred choice for its 135 vehicle armored personnel carrier program. The APCs would come in 4 different versions, including a variant with Patria’s new unmanned NEMO 120mm mortar turret. The deal was worth over EUR 275 million, with deliveries to take place from 2007-2013.

An ongoing bribery investigation led to the resignation of Patria’s President and CEO, and eventually to his arrest. A long-running controversy became a continuous distraction, and there were issues with sub-contractor performance along the way. In 2011, a new government cabinet unanimously voted to try and cancel the deal. In 2012, they succeeded.

The Slovenian Sale

Patria AMV w. NEMO turret
(click to view full)

The Slovenian “Svarun” award was a significant win for Patria in this context, and it was also significant as the first sale of their new single-barreled New Efficient MOrtar 120mm system, introduced in June 2006. Patria is better known for its twin-barreled and manned AMOS 120mm mortar turret, developed in partnership with BAE Hagglunds. Despite initial orders of 2 AMOS systems for the Finnish Army and 2 evaluation systems for Sweden, Defense Update describes AMOS as having an “inhibitive price tag.” This may create a market opportunity for the single-barreled NEMO, despite its lower rate of fire.

The AMV vehicles will be manufactured in Finland and in Slovenia with local co-operation partners. Industrial offsets will include 30% direct offsets within the contract, and 70% other Slovenian items exported globally. Production will gradually be transferred to Slovenia in 2007 and 2008, with Rotis and Gorenje in prominent roles.

Patria Oyj is owned 25%/75% by the Finnish State and EADS, and its AMV has been in serial production since 2004.

Contracts & Key Events

AMV “Svarun”
(click to view full)

May 15/13: Court. Time for some updates regarding the court proceedings associated with the Slovenian AMV contract. December 2012 saw Finnish charges of aggravated bribery laid against 5 people, with some of those defendants also charged with business espionage. Another 7 named individuals were not prosecuted, but just to make things really interesting, the Finnish prosecution will demand the questioning of all Slovenian defendants – including former Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa.

Preparatory hearings began today in the Finnish District Court of Kanta-Hame, based on the pre-trial investigation initiated by the National Bureau of Investigation in 2007. The actual hearing is expected to take place in early fall 2013, and the prosecutor is also pushing for a corporate fine. Patria has pleaded not guilty, and will argue that the evidence fails to show that anything unlawful would have taken place in the company’s operations.

Meanwhile, in Slovenia, a 3rd trial is underway in connection with these events. Painter Jure Cekuta and retired brigadier Peter Zupan are charged with bribery and unlawful leaking of information. Patria | STA | STA re: local trial.

March 25/11: Vote to cancel. Slovenia’s cabinet votes unanimously to cancel the AMV contract with Patria, who says it has not yet been formally presented with a demand. That is true, since the governing coalition will try to do it via lawsuit.

The move comes after the Ljubljana District Court turned down the government’s request for a temporary suspension, and STA says that the government will not appeal that March 15/11 decision. Reports indicate that the court indirectly encouraged a separate lawsuit instead, by mentioning that several legal arguments may exist in favor of an annulment suit, but not a preliminary injunction.

If an annulment suit does go through, the big question for the government is what damages it would still be liable for on the contract. Which is why even a successful lawsuit could simply end up being the starting point for new negotiations. Especially if the governing coalition changes again in the interim. Slovenia’s STA (Slovenska Tiskovna Agencija) | Slovenia Times re: court decision | Finland’s YLE News.

March 4/11: Lawsuit. The Slovenian government has asked a court to temporarily suspend the Patria contract, in light of bribery allegations. This is a more extreme response than contract renegotiation, but some local reports suggest that it’s really an attempt to evade a decision concerning the deal, by turning matters over to a court. The advanced state of the contract does suggest that termination costs would not be cheap, and there’s also the issue of what the Slovenian armed forces will do for APCs if the contract is canceled. Slovenia’s STA news | Finland’s YLE News.

March 25/09: Investigation. The Helsinki Times reports that Slovenian police “searched a number of premises” as part of an investigation into suspected corruption connected with the AMV deal. The suspects whose homes and offices had been searched were Slovenian citizens, and Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation participated under a 2008 joint agreement with the Slovenian police and prosecutor-general’s office.

ORCWS-30, fired
(click to view full)

Nov 13/08: Investigation. Patria’s former CEO Jorma Wiitakorpi is arrested by Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on suspicion of industrial espionage, aggravated bribery and bribery in business operation. The Helsinki district court also remanded Veijo Vartiainen, the operative head of Patria’s Land & Armament unit, on suspicion of bribery in business operations and aggravated bribery. Wiitakorpi in particular remains both firm and public about his innocence, and both men have been released pending further proceedings. Time will tell. Newsroom Finland | Helsingin Sanomat | YLE News | Patria statement.

Oct 13/08: The Slovenian Defence Ministry denies reports that weapons stations mounted on some of the Patria APCs would not be new. Slovenian Press Agency | Slovenian MoD [in Slovene].

Oct 9/08: Substitute deliveries. From the Finnish Ministry of Defence:

“The Army Materiel Command is selling 20 units of XA-360-APC [DID: XA-360 is the AMV's designation] Kongsberg Protector weapon systems. It is also renting 20 APCs to Patria for an approximate period of 7 months. The APC weapon systems will be used as part of Patria’s operation regarding Slovenia. Patria will deliver new similar weapon systems for the Finnish Defence Forces. The reason behind this provisional arrangement requested by Patria, has to do with the company’s aim to uphold the agreed time frame regarding deliveries.”

Sept 23/08: Election. Helsingin Sanomat’s international edition publishes “NEWS ANALYSIS: Patria scandal had little effect on Slovenia election.” It makes a persuasive case, adding that:

“[Social Democrat leader and future Prime Minister Borut] Prime ministerial candidate Pahor has said that the Patria case will be removed form the political agenda, and left to the lawyers.”

Sept 10/08: Investigation. Agence France Presse report:

“Slovenia’s parliament ended a marathon special debate on bribery allegations against Prime Minister Janez Jansa Tuesday night by passing a motion of support for the government. But after more than 11 hours of debate, lawmakers urged Slovenian police and the prosecution service to investigate with Finnish authorities and said Slovenia’s defence ministry should cancel a 278-million-euro (402 million dollar) deal with Finnish defence contractor Patria if corruption allegations were proved.

…The motion was backed by 41 MPs out of the 54 that were present in the 90-seat parliament at the end of the debate. Eleven lawmakers voted against the motion while two small parties — centre-left Zares and nationalist Lipa — boycotted the vote… Jansa urged lawmakers to “close the issue for the moment and reopen it as soon as any proof to these absurd accusations is published.”

Sept 5/08: Investigation. Agence France Presse reports on the Slovenian bribery charges:

“At the moment, as I have understood things, there is no fear that the deal will be cancelled,” Olli Happonen, Patria’s General Councel, told AFP. He acknowledged, however, that the deal could fall through if the bribery charges are proven [in court], due to an anti-corruption clause in the contract.”

Aug 20/08: Investigation. Another update re: the Slovenian investigation, from Patria:

“The Patria employee of the former Vehicles Business Unit previously held in detention in connection with the ongoing investigation of the Slovenian armoured vehicle project has been released upon proposal of the police. Yesterday the Helsinki District Court decided to continue the detention of the other Vehicles’ employee.

The National Bureau of Investigation stated yesterday that Jorma Wiitakorpi, former President and CEO of the Patria Group, was interviewed as a suspect in July, and that his position in the investigation has not changed since.”

Aug 18/08: Resigned. Patria Oyj’s President and CEO Jorma Wiitakorpi resigns. From the official corporate statement:

“The investigations by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) are likely to take months. I was Patria’s President and CEO when the customer made the decision regarding the Slovenian project in 2006. Neither Patria’s internal investigation nor the investigations by the NBI have brought up any written or oral evidence that would connect me to the suspected criminal activities. The CEO is, however, a significant aspect of the image of a company and the CEO is responsible for the firm’s entire operations.

At the moment various Patria units are negotiating new, significant projects in many different countries. At the same time our competitors are taking advantage of the situation to arouse suspicions among our customers. In these negotiations it is of vital importance that our customers have full confidence in Patria’s way of doing business also in the future. I have agreed with Patria’s Board of Directors that I renounce my position with immediate effect… I wish Mr. Heikki Allonen all the best in his new position as Patria’s President and CEO.”

Wiitakorpi will remain with Patria as Senior Advisor to the new President and CEO. See also Questions abut the CEO changeover | Heikki Allonen appointed as the new CEO of Patria.

May 20/08: Scandal? A release from Patria discusses allegations that the company bribed senior political figures, in order to secure the Slovenian APC deal:

“The National Bureau of Investigation started on 13 May, 2008 a preliminary investigation concerning Patria’s vehicle deal in Slovenia. The suspected crime is bribery. In the preliminary phase some persons involved in Patria’s deal in Slovenia have been questioned. Three have been arrested for questioning. Two of them have been released and one imprisoned. Also, some other Patria employees have been questioned.

Patria cooperates with the NBI in order to clear the open questions. Patria’s understanding is that its personnel have followed all relevant legislation both in Slovenia and Finland.”

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts.

LCS: Concept & Needs

LCS-I missions
(click to view full)

Ultimately, the US Navy is trying to replace 30 FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, 14 MCM Avenger Class mine countermeasures vessels, and 12 MHC-51 Osprey Class coastal mine hunters (TL = 56), with about 55 Littoral Combat Ships.

The LCS requirement has been identified as part of a broader surface combatant force transformation strategy, which recognizes that many future threats are spawning in regions with shallow seas, where the ability to operate near-shore and even in rivers will be vital for mission success.

That requires the ability to counter growing “asymmetric” threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. It also requires intelligence gathering and scouting, some ground combat support capabilities, and the ability to act as a local command node, sharing tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units.

At the same time, however, the US Navy needs ships that can act as low-end gap-fillers in other traditional fleet roles, and operate in the presence of missile-armed enemy vessels and/or aerial threats.

Given the diversity of possible missions in the shallow-water and near-shore littoral zones, and the potential threats from forces on land, any ship designed for these tasks must be both versatile and stealthy. History also suggests that they need to be able to take a punch. Meanwhile, the reality of ships that are expected to remain in service for over 30 years gives rise to a need for electronic longevity. As the saga of the USA’s cost-effective but short-lived FFG-7 frigates proved, “future-proofing” and upgradeability for key systems, electronics, and weapons will be critical if these small surface combatants are to remain useful throughout their mechanical lives.

While a ship’s hull and design makes a number of its performance parameters difficult to change, the Americans believed they may have a solution that lets them upgrade sensors and key systems. Denmark’s Standard Flex 300 corvettes pioneered a revolutionary approach of swappable mission modules, based on ISO containers. In contrast to the traditional approach, which is to cram a wide-ranging set of bolted-in compromise equipment into fixed installations, “flex ships” can radically changes the ships’ capabilities, by swapping in a full breadth of equipment focused on a particular need.

Swappable modules also give the Navy new options over time. One option is technology-based, via spiral development that focuses on rapid insertions of new equipment. This creates a long series of slight improvements in the mission modules, and hence the ship’s capabilities. Over time, the cumulative effect can be very significant. The 2nd benefit is cost-related, since upgrades require far less work and cost to install when mission technologies evolve. The 3rd benefit is risk-related. The ability to do low-cost, spiral upgrades encourages frequent “refreshes” that remain within the existing state of the art, rather than periodic upgrade programs that must stretch what’s possible, in order to handle expected developments over the next 25 years.

LCS: Designs & Teams

There are currently 2 different LCS designs being produced and procured as part of the competition.

USS Independence
(click to view full)

The first team is offering a futuristic but practical high-speed trimaran, based on Austal designs and experience with vessels like the US Marines’ Westpac Express high-speed transport and the Army and Navy’s TSV/HSV ships. It offers an especially large flight deck (7,300 square feet) and internal mission volume (15,200 square feet mission bay) for its size, with a 3,500 square foot helicopter hangar. The hull is aluminum, but the trimaran design offers additional stability options, and may help with hits to the ship’s sides.

The Independence Class will carry a General Dynamics designed combat system, and standard LCS weapon fittings. The RAM defensive missile launcher sacrifices some size, but the 11-round SeaRAM is a self-contained unit with its own radar. If the LCS should require a full suite of naval weapons in future, export designs based on the this class tout “tactical-length” vertical launch cells that are limited to shorter weapons like RIM-162 ESSM and SM-2 air defense missiles, and VL-ASROC anti-submarine missiles.

Not anymore…

The initial teaming arrangement was led by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipbuilder as prime integrator, with Austal of Mobile, AL (a subsidiary of Austal Ships of Australia) as the main design partner and ship-building site. That alliance was broken by the requirements of the 2010 RFP, which demanded a 2nd builder for the designs that was unaffiliated with the first.

Austal is now the sole prime contractor for the LCS-2 Independence Class design. GD subsidiaries remain heavily involved, including General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products Division in Burlington, VT; General Dynamics Electric Boat Division in Groton, CT; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems in Fairfax, VA; and General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Ontario. Other key participants include:

• Boeing in Seattle, WA
  
• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD
  
• L3 Communications Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA
  
• Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD
  
• Maritime Applied Physics Corporation in Baltimore, MD
  
• GE (LM 2500 gas turbines)
  
• MTU (8000 Series diesel engines)
  
• Saab (Sea Giraffe AMB radar)
  
• Wartsila (water jets)

The ships will have an open-architecture combat system based on existing market offerings. Bofors (gun) and Ericcson (radar) are among the minor partners whose equipment will be featured on the Austal Team’s proposed design.

Team Lockheed Martin’s LCS-1 Freedom Class offers a proven high-speed semi-planing monohull, based on Fincantieri designs that have set trans-Atlantic speed records. The design will use the firm’s COMBATSS-21 combat system as the fighting electronic heart of the ship, has shock-hardened the engine systems, and uses a combination of a steel hull and aluminum superstructure. USS Freedom has required additional bolt-on buoyancy fittings at its stern, however, and there have been persistent reports of weight and stability issues.

Team Lockheed LCS Concept
(click for cutaway)

The ships have a smaller flight deck than the Independence Class at 5,200 square feet, but a larger 4,680 square foot helicopter hangar. The Freedom Class’ LCS mission bay is the biggest difference – it’s under half the size, at 6,500 square feet. On the other hand, its RAM missile launcher is the 21-round Mk.49, and if the ships need weapon upgrades, export designs stemming from the Freedom Class mount full strike-length Mk.41 vertical launch cells. These can handle any vertically-launched system in the fleet, including SM-3 long-range air defense missiles, and Tomahawk long-range precision attack missiles.

Lockheed’s core team includes various Lockheed divisions, plus naval architects Gibbs & Cox of Arlington, VA; shipbuilder Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA; and shipbuilder Marinette Marine of Marinette, WI. Niche providers and related partnerships include:

• Angle Incorporated
  
• Argon ST (threat detection systems)
  
• Blohm + Voss
  
• Data Links Solutions
  
• DRS Technologies
  
• EADS (TRS-3D radar)
  
• Fairbanks Morse (Colt-Pielstick PA6B-STC diesel engines)
  
• Fincantieri (diesel generators)
  
• Izar (now Navantia)
  
• L-3 Communications
  
• MAAG Gear AG
  
• MacTaggart Scott
  
• Raytheon
  
• Rolls Royce (MT30 gas turbines, shaftlines, bearings, software, Kamewa waterjets)
  
• Sensytech
  
• Sperry
  
• Terma
  
• Unidynamics
  
• United Defense, now BAE Systems

LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Packages…

LCS Flight 0 Basics
(click to view full)

At 115 – 127 meters in length and 2,800 – 3,100 tons of displacement, the USA’s competing LCS ship designs are almost the size of a Britain’s Type 23 frigates. They might well be classified as frigates, were it not for their shallow water design and employment. For whatever reason, high speed has also been identified as an important ship characteristic. As such, both the GD/Austal trimaran and Lockheed’s racing-derived monohull offer potential top speeds of 40-50 knots over short distances.

No matter which mission modules are loaded, the ship will carry a BAE Systems Mk.110 57mm naval gun with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute, and Mk.295 ammunition that works against aerial, surface or ground threats. The ship will also carry .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine guns, plus defensive systems including automated chaff/flare dispensers and a launcher for Raytheon’s RIM-116 RAM Rolling Airframe Missile. RAM is designed to handle anti-ship missiles, aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, and even small boats, but its range of just 9 km/ 5 nm will only protect its own ship. Unlike larger missiles such as the RIM-162 ESSM, RAM systems cannot perform fleet defense.

LCS ships will also rely on their onboard MH-60 helicopters and/or MQ-8B Fire Scout helicopter UAVs, plus other robotic vehicles including a variety of Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV). The terms have changed over time, but the US Navy has downgraded the term “mission modules” to mean individual components plus their support equipment. Integrated packages of weapons, sensors, robotic vehicles, and manned platforms that can be switched in and out depending on the ship’s mission are now called “mission packages.” They include all task-related mission modules, onboard aircraft, and their corresponding crew detachments.

The ships’ first and most important mission package is not officially listed. It consists of a small but very cross-trained crew. LCSs were intended to operate with a core crew of 40 sailors, plus a mission module detachment of 15 and an aviation detachment of 25. Each ship has a pair of 40-person crews (Blue and Gold), which will shift to 3 crews over time that can deploy in 4-month rotations.

There are concerns that this is a design weakness, leaving the LCS crew at the edge of its capabilities to just run the ship, with insufficient on-board maintenance capabilities, and too little left over for contingencies such as boarding and search, damage control, illnesses, etc. USS Freedom’s addition of 20 more bunks before her 1st Asian deployment indicates that the Us Navy may be about to concede this point – but to do that, the LCS manning plan must also change.

Beyond the human element, the LCS program will initially draw upon packages for Mine Warfare (MIW: 24 planned), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW: 16 planned) and Surface Warfare (SUW: 24 planned). The LCS Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) packages a variety of technologies to these ends, many of which are produced by other program offices and delivered as elements of a particular mission module. Costs per module have gone down over time, but that hasn’t been from any genius in planning and fielding. Rather, it results from a high program failure rate of individual components, and their replacement in the program by less expensive items.

LCS: Controversies & Cautions

Into battle
(click to view full)

The cost and size of LCS ships are now comparable to other countries’ high-end naval frigates. As the US Navy’s primary low-end vessels in the future fleet, they will be expected to perform many of the same roles. The cargo hold’s size has created some challenges in fitting all of the required equipment into the mission modules, without compromising high-end performance at the modules’ particular tasks. Even so, LCS ships can be expected to perform the mine countermeasures role very well, and the frigates’ traditional anti-submarine role reasonably well, thanks to their helicopters, array of robots, and rapidly upgradeable systems.

Other traditional roles for frigate-sized vessels are more controversial. The biggest controversy surrounds the ships’ one area of severe inflexibility: their weapons fit.

Present LCS designs don’t even carry torpedo tubes, or vertical-launch systems (VLS) that could accommodate present and future attack and/or defensive missiles. Even with the Surface Warfare module installed, LCS ships will carry a very light armament set for a major naval vessel: a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system; RIM-116 SeaRAM short range defensive missiles; 30mm cannons that would replace very short range Griffin launchers if installed; 12.7mm machine guns; plus any missiles or 70mm rockets carried by its accompanying helicopters (up to 2 H-60 slots or up to 4 MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV slots).

That armament is closer to a support vessel than a naval surface combatant, and larger high-speed support designs like the JHSV would offer far more mission module space for reconfigurable specialty support ships. Naval analyst Raymond Pritchett has pithily described the current compromise as:

“…3000 ton speedboat chasers with the endurance of a Swedish corvette, the weapon payload of a German logistics ship, and the cargo hold of a small North Korean arms smuggler.”

LCS-I components
(click to view full)

The LCS weapons array also compares unfavorably with comparable-sized frigates that can perform the full array of anti-submarine, fleet air defense, and naval combat roles. The new Franco-Italian FREMM Class, or even Britain’s much older Type 23/Duke Class, outclass it considerably. So do smaller corvettes like Israel’s US-built, $260 million Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class, and Sweden’s ultra-stealthy Visby Class. Even the tiny Danish Flyvefisken Class, whose swappable “flex ship” modules helped pave the way for the LCS idea, has a Mk 48 vertical launch system that can handle longer-range air defense missiles, and mounts launchers for Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

LCS’ lack of weaponry may not matter against small boats like the “Boghammers,” fielded by the Iranians during their late-1980s guerrilla warfare at sea against the US Navy in the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, many nations field larger Fast Attack Craft equipped with anti-ship missiles. Despite being 1/3 the LCS’ length and far less than 1/3 of its displacement, their employment would create a threat that could attack an LCS from beyond its range of reasonable retaliation, with weapons that the LCS’ may not be able to stop or survive.

It’s telling that brochures for the International LCS versions offered by each team feature a major radar capability boost via the small SPY-1F AEGIS system or other radar upgrade, and are armed with torpedo tubes, anti-ship missiles and vertical-launch system (VLS) cells.

USS Stark, 1987
(click to view full)

Meanwhile, survivability has become an issue on 3 fronts. One is the slim margins created by a very small crew, leaving little margin for tasks like damage control if automated systems are damaged or fail. The other issues involve questions of shock/survivability testing, and of aluminum structures. The original concept for LCS was a ship whose damage resistance could save the crew, but not the ship, in the event if a significant strike. That was upgraded slightly to potentially saving the crew and the ship, but not continuing to fight while doing so. As the Exocet missile strikes on the HMS Sheffield (sank) and USS Stark (survived, barely) proved, even steel warships designed to keep fighting after a strike may find it challenging to meet their design specifications. Navy revelations that the LCS ships would not meet even Level I standards, let alone the OPNAVINST 9070.1 Level II standard of the frigates they’ll replace, has caused some consternation.

So, too, has the use of aluminum in ships exposed to hostile fire. The LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure, while the LCS-2 Independence Class is primarily an aluminum design. While both ships have had to certify to the same fire-proofing standards asked of other ships, aluminum conducts heat very well, and melts or deforms easily. If the ancillary fire-fighting systems, resistant coatings, etc. fail, or cannot handle a given situation at sea, structural integrity problems and secondary fires could become fatal concerns very quickly.

The emerging scenario in the USA is a cost for the base ships that continues to hover around $400-500 million each, plus weapons, electronics, and mission modules that bring the price per equipped ship to $500-650 million, even under the proposed new fixed-price contract. That’s no longer a cheap $220 million corvette class price tag. Instead, it’s a price tag that places the USA’s LCS at the mid-to-upper end of the international market for full multi-role frigate designs. Even as future procurement trends will make LCS ships the most common form of US naval power.

In that environment, unfavorable comparisons are inevitable. A versatile surveillance and special forces insertion ship whose flexibility doesn’t extend to the light armament that is its weakest point, and isn’t able to deal with anything beyond token naval or air opposition, won’t meet expectations. Worse, it could cause the collapse of the Navy’s envisaged “high-low” force structure if the DDG-1000 destroyers and CG (X) cruisers are priced out of the water, and built in small numbers. That domino has already fallen, as DDG-1000/ DD (X), production has been capped at just 3 ships, and CG (X) was canceled entirely in the FY 2011 budget. As Vice-Admiral Mustin (ret.) and Vice-Admiral Katz (ret.) put it in a 2003 USNI Proceedings article:

“Because the Navy has invested heavily in land-attack capabilities such as the Advanced Gun System and land-attack missiles in DD (X), there is no requirement for [the Littoral Combat Ship] to have this capability. Similarly, LCS does not require an antiair capability beyond self-defense because DD (X) and CG (X) will provide area air defense. Thus, if either DD (X) or CG (X) does not occur in the numbers required and on time, the Navy will face two options: leave LCS as is, and accept the risk inherent in employment of this ship in a threat environment beyond what it can handle (which is what it did with the FFG-7); or “grow” LCS to give it the necessary capabilities that originally were intended to reside off board in DD (X) and CG (X). Neither option is acceptable.”

Especially if the low end has grown to a cost level that makes it equivalent to other countries’ major surface combatants, while falling short on key capabilities that will be required in the absence of higher-end ships.

The LCS Program

In 2009, the CBO estimated LCS shipbuilding costs at around $30.2 billion, with a fleet average of 1.2 mission modules per ship bought separately at about $100 million per module. This contrasts with the original hope of $22 billion total shipbuilding costs, at $400 million per ship ($220M construction + (3 x $60M) mission modules).

Despite these rising costs, the US Navy’s shipbuilding plan still envisions building 55 littoral combat ships until about 2040, accounting for about 18% of the Navy’s planned 313-ship force. The current plan also expects to buy 64 mission modules for the 55-ship program, or about 1.2 modules per ship, down from the originally-envisaged 3-4 modules per ship.

Technically, only 45 LCS ships would count toward Navy fleet totals. Because these ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the 10 ships bought from 2036 – 2040 would be replacements for the original ships of class. Even so, that number of LCS ships would almost certainly be more than 18% of the actual force. The US Navy has already sagged to under 300 ships, and unless major changes in course lie ahead for its budget or its chosen designs, it will not rise above that number again.

In July 2011, the Navy created PEO LCS to oversee the program, headed by Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch. Ship construction supervision was removed from PEO Ships, while mission module supervision was removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which was dissolved. It wasn’t the first big change in the program – and may not be the last.

It’s normal for programs to change elements like numbers ordered, but not to change the entire buy strategy. The Littoral Combat Ship program has shifted its entire buy strategy several times during its short lifetime – a sorry sequence of orders, budgets not spent, contract cancellations, etc. documented in Appendix A.

The last buy strategy has lasted long enough for a multi-ship contract. After buying 4 ships and taking bids under their 2009 revised strategy, the US Navy went to Congress and asked for permission to accept both 10-ship bids, buying 20 more ships for an advertised price that was about the same as the estimates for the 15 they had wanted. The GAO and CBO both have doubts about those estimates, in part because the Navy is still changing the designs; but the contracts were issued at the end of December 2010. Each contractor would get 1 initial ship order, then 9 more options, with the ship purchases spread across FY 2010-2011 (1 per year for each contractor); FY 2012-2015 inclusive (2 per year for each contractor). Cost overruns will be shared 50/50 between the government and contractor, up to a set cost cap.

By the end of FY 2013, the program is expected to be at about a quarter of total procurement, in units orders and dollars spent.

LCS: Ship Roster

Team Lockheed, Freedom Class

• LCS 1, USS Freedom. Commissioned Nov 8/08.
  
• LCS 3, USS Fort Worth. Commissioned Sept 22/12.
  
• LCS 5, Milwaukee
  
• LCS 7, Detroit
  
• LCS 9, Little Rock
  
• LCS 11, Sioux City
  
• LCS 13, Wichita

Team Austal, Independence Class

• LCS 2, USS Independence. Commissioned Jan 16/10.
  
• LCS 4, Coronado. Going to be a bit late.
  
• LCS 6, Jackson
  
• LCS 8, Montgomery
  
• LCS 10, Gabrielle Giffords
  
• LCS 12, Omaha
  
• LCS 14, Machester

LCS: Export Potential

MMCS
(click to view full)

Once one steps beyond small patrol craft, growing capabilities have made frigate-sized vessels the most common naval export around the globe. With many nations confronting challenges in the world’s littorals, which include the globe’s most important shipping choke points, one would expect some interest in the Littoral Combat Ship beyond the USA. A Dec 11/06 Austal release claimed 26 potential buyers worldwide for the ship and its companion equipment, “with two near-term contenders and four others that have expressed active interest.”

There are 2 interesting aspects to LCS export bids. One is their equipment, which is radically different from the US Navy’s set.

Lockheed Martin’s international Multi-Mission Combat Ship (MMCS) version, which attracted some interest from Israel before cost issues intervened, has a variety of configurations from OPV/corvette to large frigate size. In addition to their upgraded radars, torpedo tubes, and 8 Harpoon missiles, these ships offer between 4-48 VLS cells, some of which are full strike-length size.

General Dynamics’ trimaran adds torpedo tubes, plus 16 tactical-length vertical launch (VLS) cells for VL-ASROC anti-submarine launchers or up to 64 quad-packed RIM-162 ESSM anti-air missiles.

Turkish MEKO 200
(click to view full)

The other aspect worth noting is the failure to close any export sales over almost 7 years.

Israel did step up in July 2008, and confirmed its request for an LCS-I based on Team Lockheed’s design. Israel’s variant was very different from LCS 1 Freedom, however; it featured a fixed set of weaponry rather than full mission module spaces, and its weapons and proposed SPY-1 AEGIS or MF-STAR radar made it far more capable in critical roles like air defense and ship to ship warfare. As noted above, these changes have been a common theme among international LCS offerings, but an estimated ship cost of over $700 million eventually pushed Israel to rethink its plans. That country is now pursuing cheaper options based on Blohm + Voss’ MEKO family of corvettes and frigates, or South Korean designs.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has reportedly expressed interest in a fixed armament version of the General Dynamics/Austal design. That interest was reiterated in 2010, but they’re also evaluating Lockheed Martin’s design for the Arabian/Persian Gulf fleet. In 2011, it emerged that the Saudis might skip an LCS buy altogether, in exchange for a much more heavily-armed, versatile, and expensive option: the USA’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class multi-role destroyers, with ballistic missile defense capability.

At present, both LCS designs have reportedly received preliminary export inquiries, but Israel and Thailand are the only cases where it has gone farther than that, and the Freedom Class lost the Thai competition. Meanwhile, designs like the German MEKO family, the multi-role Franco-Italian FREMM, the modular-construction Dutch Sigma class, and refurbished 1980s-era NATO frigates continue to find buyers around the world.

LCS: Ship Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

To Singapore
click for video

May 7/13: USN Report. Bloomberg gets its hands on a March 9/12 confidential draft report prepared for CNO Adm. Greenert by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez. This document is separate from USN Commander of Surface Forces Vice-Adm. Copeman’s “Vision for a 2025 Surface Fleet”, which recommended a full set of weapon for LCS (q.v. March 18/13 entry). Perez’ report is broader, but his conclusions are similar: serious gaps between ship capabilities and the missions the Navy will need LCS to execute. Key areas of concern include:

Manning: “The minimal-manning level and subsequent fatigue result in significant operational and safety impacts, with notable degradation of crew readiness, performance levels and quality of life.” USS Freedom has since added 20 more berthings for its initial deployment, bringing total crew to 100 (40 core + 25 aviation + 15 mission package + 20).

Armament: Perez shares Copeman’s reservations about the LCS’ armament, and points out that Iran alone has 67 Fast Attack Craft that carry anti-ship missiles with a range of over 5 miles. Any one of them can strike LCS ships without direct retaliation, and deliver disabling hits.

CONOPS: He also cites the lack of a clear LCS concept of operations, and notes that getting all of the right people and equipment on station to swap a mission module can take several weeks, instead of the advertised 96 hours. As a result, the concept “no longer has the tactical utility envisioned by the original designers.”

Navigation: Finally, Perez points out that the Independence Class trimaran’s width “may be a navigational challenge in narrow waterways and tight harbors,” though Bloomberg’s account doesn’t quantify that in any way.

The disturbing thing about these reports isn’t their conclusions. It’s the fact that these conclusions have been obvious for years, and have been pointed out for years, while US Navy leadership pretended that everything was fine. That’s still the Navy’s M.O., and CNO Greenert dismissed questions by saying that “study is over a year old – we’ve done a lot since then”. Which doesn’t address what they’ve done to change the conclusions of the study. In a number of critical areas, the answer is “nothing” or “not much.” Bloomberg.

Perez Report

April 25/13: Support. CACI Technologies Inc. in Chantilly, VA receives a $20.1 million contract modification for professional support services in support of PEO LCS (Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ships). They’ll help with program management and acquisition support, technical and engineering support, business and financial management support, and logistics support.

Work will be performed in Washington DC (89.9%); Norfolk, VA (4.2%); San Diego, CA (2.2%); Panama City, FL (1.8%); Newport, RI (1.3%); and Monterey, CA (0.6%), and is expected to be complete by October 2013. Just $362,308 are being committed immediately, and $181,334 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-13-C-6322).

April 15/13: General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.6 million contract modification, exercising Independence Class Design Services for LCS 6 and following ships. Work includes baseline design services, class documentation services, class engineering studies, cost estimating support, LCS ship transition, and a liaison role for ship construction and post delivery.

Work will be performed in Bath, Maine (52%); Pittsfield, MA (47%); and Mobile, AL (1%), and is expected to be complete by June 2014. It’s completely funded by the FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion budget (N00024-09-C-2302).

April 12/13: Naming. 2 LCS ships are among the 7 named by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, who actually stuck to class naming conventions this time instead of veering into political partisanship.

The Freedom Class LCS 13 Wichita is named in honor of Kansas’ largest city, while the Independence Class LCS 14 Manchester is named for one of New Hampshire’s industrial centers. Pentagon.

April 8/13: Arming LCS. Austal VP Craig Hooper says it’s quite possible to arm the LCS-2 Independence Class with effective anti-ship weapons and vertical launch cells, which isn’t exactly a surprise since that has been in Austal brochures:

“You want Harpoon? I can give you eight to 16. You want VLS, 75mm gun? OK we can do it…. but is that the right path? If we hand over all the available margin on LCS to legacy weapons… do we risk losing the opportunity to exploit the changes that are coming in the war at sea?”

As with all things, there is a balance point. It isn’t at all obvious why a quad Harpoon launcher topside, or a 76mm gun with the ability to launch long-range shells, or an 8-cell VLS, precludes mission module space in a class with a lot of it. USN Director of Surface Warfare Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden doesn’t see an armament problem at all, saying “I’m the keeper of the keys for requirements. And I am here to tell you that LCS meets the requirements.”

A more thoughtful response comes from Bryan McGrath at ID, who notes that the last US Navy surface ship built to fire anti-ship missiles was USS Porter [DDG 78], the last Arleigh Burke Flight I destroyer. Every Flight II/IIA destroyer all the way up to DDG 116 has omitted those launchers, and every FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigate in USN service has removed theirs. Meanwhile, fleets like China’s have invested heavily in anti-ship missiles that work at longer and longer ranges, and routinely carry them even on corvettes. As DDG-51 Flight I destroyers have to retire due to age, the problem will just get worse, and LCS is a contributor to the “out-sticked” problem rather than a solution. Military.com | Information Dissemination.

April 5/13: Review? Military.com reports that US Navy leaders plan to discuss the LCS and its fit in the future fleet at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space Symposium on April 8th. Word is that they’re considering a program review.

April 1/13: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin Mission System and Training in Baltimore, MD receives a $17 million cost-plus-award-fee order for USS Fort Worth’s post-shakedown work, including renewed post-repair trials. The ship was commissioned on Sept 22/12. This is in addition to the $12.7 million contract for post-shakedown planning (q.v. Oct 25/12).

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. The full amount is committed immediately, using FY 2006, 2012, and 2013 Shipbuilding and Conversion funding. The USN Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME manages the contract (N00024-12-G-2317).

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. GAO designates 16/19 critical LCS technologies as mature, and the 3 omissions are either minor differences (Freedom Class retrieval system) or unsatisfiable any time soon. If a 30-year ABS certification doesn’t satisfy the 20 year operational hull life requirement for “maturity,” the only solution seems to be “wait 20 years.” Ask us again in 2032.

For the Freedom Class, GAO says that the cracking problem “occurred either in high stress areas or were due to poor workmanship.” They’ve been repaired. The ship has also had corrosion problems in the mission zone due to a poor stern door seal, and class design changes were made in response to both issues. They do seem to be finding quite a few issues in this design (q.v. entries), but LCS 5 & 7 accomplished production readiness and integrated baseline reviews. LCS 5 is listed as 53% complete, and LCS 7 is listed as 37% complete.

For the Independence Class, “will now [add] a corrosion protection system similar to [the Freedom Class] to mitigate the corrosion and will backfit it on existing hulls.” That’s an unusual item to casually omit from 1 LCS class, but OK. LCS 4 has experienced construction delays to summer 2013, but the program office says that these issues are resolved now. LCS 6 & 8 accomplished production readiness and integrated baseline reviews: LCS 6 is listed as 49% complete, and LCS 8 is listed as 24% complete.

In October 2012, the Navy rescinded their requirement to conduct a Milestone C/ Low Rate Production LCS review. That means there will be 24 ships under contract before there’s a systematic review to support a production decision, in FY 2019.

March 29/13: YGBKM. There’s a lot poor reporting out there on defense issues, and we don’t always call it out, but sometimes the standards are so poor that it’s necessary. Former ballet dancer Allison Barrie’s FOX News “reporting” on LCS’ Pacific arrival is in that category. Where to begin? MH-60 helicopters can’t carry heavyweight torpedoes, or key mine clearance equipment. The mine warfare module touted in the article isn’t ready, and the surface warfare mission module is only effective against motorboats. And what does “Should a battle erupt, Freedom can act as a hub to tie together sea, air and land assets” even mean?

The article paints a picture of a ship that can perform a number of specialized missions at a high level, right now – and almost none of it is true. A dash of skepticism and about 15 minutes of Google searching would have revealed the many and serious holes in this piece, especially given recent coverage in several major media outlets. Unfortunately, no-one at FOX seems to have put in the time or oversight. Falling below even the New York Times’ standards on defense issues should be a source of shame. FOX News | “Someone Help Allison Please“.

March 19/13: 30mm Mk46s. General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. in Woodbridge, VA receives a $25.7 million contract option for eight 30mm MK46 MOD 2 gun turrets, including associated spares and shore based parts. It covers 2 gun weapon systems for the LPD 17 class, and 6 more to equip LCS 5, 6, and 7. The guns are part of the “surface warfare” mission package.

Work will be performed in Woodbridge, VA (43%); Tallahassee, FL (20%); Lima, OH (14%); Westminster, MD (11%); Sterling Heights, MI (10%); Scranton, PA (2%), and is expected to be completed by November 2014. All funding is committed immediately (N00024-10-C-5438).

March 15/13: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD received a $32.8 million contract modification for Freedom Class service efforts and special studies, analyses and reviews. “Lockheed Martin will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

All funds will come from US Navy FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion, and are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (32%); Marinette, WI (27%); Moorestown, N.J. (22%), and Washington, DC (19%), and is expected to be complete by March 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-2300).

March 15/13: Support. Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL received a $20 million contract modification for Independence Class Class service efforts and special studies, analyses and reviews. “Austal USA… will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

All funds will come from US Navy FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion, and are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (72%) and Pittsfield, MA (28%), and is expected to complete by March 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-2301).

March 4/13: LCS 4. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.3 million contract modification, exercising an option for post-delivery support of LCS 4, the Independence Class ship USS Coronado. Bath Iron Works will perform the planning and implementation of deferred design changes identified during the construction period, which are necessary to support Coronado’s sail-away and follow-on post-delivery test and trials.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (76%); Bath, ME (18%); and Pittsfield, MA (6%), and is expected to be complete by February 2014. The full amounts are committed immediately, using FY 2009 Shipbuilding and Conversion funds (N00024-09-C-2302).

Feb 21/12: New waterjets. Rolls-Royce delivers its new Axial Mk1 waterjet for use on the Freedom Class, offering 22MW of power per jet. Each Freedom Class ship has 4. This marks the successful completion of the Office of Naval Research’s (ONR) Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) program for “Compact, High Power Density Waterjets,” and the Axial Mk1s will be standard equipment on the Freedom Class going forward.

They’ll be made in the United States, with primary manufacturing activity at Rolls-Royce facilities in Walpole, MA and Pascagoula, MS. Rolls Royce.

Feb 8/13: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $6.9 million cost-plus award fee contract modification. They’ll provide engineering, management, advance planning and design work to support post shakedown work on LCS 2, the first-of-class USS Independence. Efforts will include program management, advance planning, engineering, design, material kitting, liaison and scheduling (see also May 21/12′s $7 million entry).

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (90%) and Pittsfield, MA (10%), and is expected to be complete by April 2013. All funds are committed, using FY 2013 RDT&E funding. The US Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME manages this contract (N00024-09-G-2301).

Jan 30/13: Thai competition. IHS Jane’s reports that Thailand is talking about buying 3 Chinese Type 054 Jiangkai-II frigates from Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, plus technology transfer to enable maintenance, repair, and overhaul and to locally produce unspecified components under licence. Thailand already operates some Chinese-built ships, and its 2 Nareusan Class frigates boast the very unusual feature of having American & European systems and weapons on board.

They see the Chinese ships as an option that could fit their total $1 billion budget, but Lockheed Martin has comnfirmed that they’re competing, too, with a variant of the Freedom Class LCS. Further competition can be expected from European manufacturers like TKMS (MEKO), Damen Schelde (SIGMA), and possibly DCNS (Gowind); and South Korea (FFX Incheon Class) adds a new international option in this category.

Jan 22/13: Industrial. Austal announces a strategic partnership with Sembcorp Marine subsidiary Sembawang Shipyard Pte. Ltd., in Singapore. “Austal and Sembawang Shipyard will together provide rapid, high quality support specifically tailored to the US Navy’s fleet of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV), both of which are expected to operate in the region.”

True, though the first example will be a Lockheed Martin ship.

Jan 10/13: Program update. Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden offers an update covering the LCS program and its mission modules.

USS Freedom is preparing for her Asian deployment, and LCS 3 USS Fort Worth is preparing to undergo a Post Delivery Test and Trials period. USS Independence is testing the Mine Counter-Measure module, and LCS 4 Coronado is under construction and slated for summer 2013 delivery.

On the mission module front, they’re now referred to as “mission packages.” The vestigal Surface Warfare MP is scheduled for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY 2014. USS Independence [LCS 2] has demonstrated successful launch and recovery of offboard vehicles for the Mine Counter Measures MP, which is also slated for IOC in 2014. The ASW MP is working on “[i]ntegration of the launch and recovery system into the hull, and won’t reach IOC until FY 2016. USN’s Navy Live blog.

Jan 10/13: PEO support. CACI Technologies Inc. in Chantilly, VA receives a $20.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to support PEO Littoral Combat Ships. All funds are committed immediately, but $4.4 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13.

Work will be performed in Washington ,DC (89.9%); Norfolk, VA (4.2%); San Diego, CA (2.2%); Panama City, FL (1.8%); Newport, RI (1.3%); and Monterey, CA (0.6%), and is expected to be complete by April 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, per the sole-source allowances in 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented in FAR 6.302-1 (N00024-13-C-6322).

Dec 26/12: LCS 1 fixes. Aviation Week reports that the US Navy has made a number of fixes to problems identified in their May report (q.v. April 23/12 entry), after vehemently denying that accounts of those problems were true.

Fixes include augmentation of the ship’s anti-corrosion system, complete repainting of the main machinery room and piping that had not been previously painted, non-destructive testing of piping that was then reviewed by the the American Bureau of Shipping, and changes to weld procedures and Non-Destructive Testing procedures on LCS-3 and subsequent Freedom Class ships. Fixes to the RIX air compressors don’t appear to have been effective, based on “ship sources.” They may be replaced with Sauer products. Program officials also supposedly redesigned the Isotta Fraschini ship’s service diesel engines (SSDGs) that have been causing power problems – but subsequent events indicate that it hasn’t fixed the problems. Maybe Finmeccanica shouldn’t have been given such carte blanche by Lockheed Martin to specify its own products.

Dec 26/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives $13.5 million for planning yard services to support LCS-2 and LCS-4, the first Independence Class ships. Services will include: vendor training and crew familiarization; in-service engineering support; trainer support; availability maintenance advanced planning; long lead time material planning and procurement; material warehousing; logistics product updates; and the class sustainment management.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME, and is expected to be complete by September 2013. $9.4 million is committed immediately, and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year on Sept 30/13 (N00024-12-G-4330).

Dec 20/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD receives a $12.1 million contract modification, exercising an option for Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship core class services. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (36%), Hampton, VA (30%), Washington, DC (23%), and Marinette, WI (11%), and is expected to be complete by December 2013 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Dec 20/12: Support. Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL receives an $8.1 million contract modification, exercising an option for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) core class services. They’ll assess engineering and production challenges, and evaluate the cost and schedule risks of affordability changes to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (51%) and Pittsfield, MA (49%), and is expected to be complete by December 2013 (N00024-11-C-2301).

Oct 25/12: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD receives a $12.7 million cost-plus-award-fee order to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design to support of LCS-3 Forth Worth’s post-shakedown availability.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. The USN supervisor of shipbuilding, conversion, and repair in Bath, ME manages the contract (N00024-12-G-2317).

Oct 5/12: Controversy. USMC Lt. Col. John Sayen pens an LCS article for TIME’s Battleland that minces few words, while comparing LCS to specific foreign ship classes:

“The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is not only staggeringly overpriced and chronically unreliable but – even if it were to work perfectly – cannot match the combat power of similar sized foreign warships costing only a fraction as much…. About the only threat the LCS might handle is the “swarms” of Iranian machinegun and RPG-carrying speedboats in the Persian Gulf…. When asked why the LCS has sacrificed so much for speed, Navy spokesmen tend to become vague.”

The US Navy fires back in short order, saying that:

“…the LCS was never designed to protect other ships or to support troops ashore. That’s not its job. Its job is to protect the sea base and high value naval units from swarming boats, hunt down and sink diesel submarines, and clear mines in littoral waters.”

Some of their other shots miss, but they’re right about a few things. In terms of major points, shipbuilding is to naval vessel standards, not commercial standards as Sayen claimed, a change that cost the Navy a good chunk of money on initial ships. That argument ducks the issue of lower survivability standards, however, which are a legitimate point of debate. The Navy’s contention re: superiority to 1980s-era FFG-7 frigates that have had all major weapons removed in a bit disingenuous, and it would be useful to understand the basis for their claims of superiority over much smaller and cheaper 1990s-era Osprey Class minesweepers. TIME Battleland | USN’s Navy Live blog | Military.com.

Sept 28/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Washington, DC receives an $8.5 million contract modification, finalizing the contract for Freedom Class FY 2013 engineering support services. Work includes technical library services, logistics and technical data and documentation, quality management services in preparing of test and inspection requirements, quality assurance inspection, collecting and analyzing test data, and otherwise working to standardize the class’ follow-on availability periods.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by September 2013. All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329).

LCS 4 launch
(click to view full)

Sept 28/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Washington, DC wins a $7.5 million modification, as part of finalizing the contract for Freedom Class FY 2013 engineering support services.

All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to complete by September 2013. The USN’s sSouthwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329).

Sept 28/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $7 million modification, finalizing the contract for LCS Independence Class FY 2013 engineering support services. Work includes technical library services, logistics and technical data and documentation, quality management services in preparing of test and inspection requirements, quality assurance inspection, collecting and analyzing test data, and otherwise working to standardize the class’ follow-on availability periods.

All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4330).

Aug 22/12: LCS Council. The US Navy convenes an “LCS Council” of high-ranking officers, in order to ensure that the LCS is ready to deploy to Singapore in 2013, per its commitments, and that the USN is ready to support it properly. “Addressing the challenges identified by [preparatory USN] studies necessitates” this high-level group, in order to drive fixes in multiple places across the Navy.

It’s filled with brass: Vice Adm. Rick Hunt, director of the Navy Staff, as its chairman, and the following senior officers also on board: Vice Adm. Mark Skinner, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, commander, Naval Surface Forces; and Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy, commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. The Plan of Action and Milestones are due no later than Jan 31/13. USN Memo [PDF] | POGO.

Aug 16/12: “Directional instability”. POGO and Aviation Week find documents that detail problems keeping LCS 1 on a straight course. While ships do need some directional instability to maneuver well, but “a source close to the LCS program told POGO that the directional instability affected the crew’s ability to operate the Lockheed ship.”

Worse, the problem occurred just before the Navy went to Congress, asking for permission to buy both ship types. The documents show the Navy instructing people to either not talk about this problem, or minimize it. POGO.

May 31/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.5 million cost-plus-fixed fee contract modification for LCS Independence Class design services. They’ll provide class baseline design services, class documentation services, class engineering studies, cost estimating support, LCS ship transition work, interim support services, and liaison for ship construction and post delivery with the class design agent for even-numbered ships from LCS 6 Jackson onward. This modification includes an option, which could bring its cumulative value of this modification to $25.1 million.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (54%), Pittsfield, MA (45%), and Mobile, AL (1%). Work is expected to be complete by June 2014 (N00024-09-C-2302).

May 31/12: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Bath, ME receives a $7 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design in support of LCS-2 USS Independence’s post-shakedown availability. Efforts will include program management, advance planning, engineering, design, material kitting, liaison, and scheduling.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME, and is expected to be complete by February 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by the USN’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME (N00024-09-G-2301).

POGO Presentation
click for video

May 11/12: Push for GAO. House Armed Services Committee member Rep. Jackie Speier [D-CA] is leading a push to have the Congressional GAO audit office to review the LCS program. Rep. Duncan Hunter [R-CA] is also active in submitting LCS-related amendments that are critical of the Navy and its lack of disclosure. Speier says that:

“…serious flaws…. threaten the operational capabilities of the ship…. it’s disturbing that the Navy would accept a ship that fails to meet the basic requirements for a tugboat. The future of the fleet is corroding before our eyes.”

See: Maritime Executive | AOL Defense | The Hill.

July 2/12: 20 more berths. Defense News reports that the Navy is acknowledging the obvious, and adding 20 more berths to USS Freedom. They’re not adding any more space, of course, but they will add 2 officer berths, 2 petty officer berths, and 16 enlisted berths. No decision has been made yet about USS Independence.

LCSs were intended to operate with a core crew of 40 sailors, plus a mission module detachment of 15 and an aviation detachment of 25. Each ship has a pair of 40-person crews (Blue and Gold), which will shift to 3 crews over time that can deploy in 4-month rotations. In order to use the additional berths, the manning plan also has to change.

Other LCS 1 Freedom Class upgrades will reportedly involve an Aqueous Film-Forming Foam system, improvements to stern ramp fender stanchions, removal of its retractable bitts; and more fire suppression sprinklers, tank level indicators, and pipe hangers. Those sorts of changes aren’t unusual for a ship at this stage.

May 22-24/12: Despite the PREINSURV report of May 7/12, The Special Trial takes place anyway with an overall good assessment. Because the Freedom was on the pier for repairs, its crew had spent too little time on it prior to the inspection, which explains some of the hiccups.

These repairs have addressed some problems like hull cracks (see April 11/11 entry) but other vexing issues remain unsolved since they have been spotted in 2008, such as water intrusion up the hawse pipe and through the aft stern doors. Navy Times.

May 7/12: A PRESINSURV report recommends not to proceed with a scheduled Special Trial, as they have found the crew unprepared with the inspection and unfamiliar with their ship. At least they had a positive attitude. It should be noted that a pre-inspection is supposed to find issues, in order to get all ducks in a row before the real deal. Gannett’s Navy Times | Information Dissemination has the verbatim memo.

April 8/12: Program unstoppable? The New York Times writes an article about the Littoral Combat Ship: “The Next War: Smaller Navy Ship Has a Rocky Past and Key Support.” The money paragraph:

“Analysts say an important factor driving the Navy and Congress is that the vessels the ships are meant to replace – frigates and minesweepers – are aging, and that there is little else in the pipeline. The combat ship is seen as too far along in production to be killed now. [Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-CA says] It’s one of those things that once the snowball goes down the hill, it just keeps rolling…. There’s no way I’m going to stop it.”

See: New York Times | DoD Buzz.

March 14/12: US NAVSEA issues a pair of contracts for a year of “special studies, analyses, review and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services… [to] assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.” Work will last until March 2013.

The award disparity between the Freedom (Lockheed) and Independence (Austal) classes is interesting, and calls to mind the AvWeek report that suggested the need for a fundamental redesign (Jan 30/12). Maritime Memos’ Tim Colton wonders what the heck the government is thinking with the whole award. “…[T]hese are fixed-price contracts: the contractors should be doing everything they can to reduce costs and schedule at their own expense.” Which is true, but lifecycle costs are a bigger fraction, and are entirely the Navy’s problem unless there’s a contract to address them. Of course, not picking 40+ knot speeds as a key requirement would have done a lot to reduce operating costs and boost range – but it’s too late for the Navy to do that now.

Lockheed Martin Corp in Baltimore, MD receives a $33.6 million option (N00024-11-C-2300), with work to be performed in Hampton, VA (32%); Marinette, WI (27%); Moorestown, NJ (22%); and Washington, DC (19%).

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $19.7 million option (N00024-11-C-2301), with work to be performed in Mobile, AL (72%) and Pittsfield, MA (28%).

Feb 15/12: LCS 11 & 12 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus names the next 2 Littoral Combat Ships. He keeps politics out of this naming set, naming the Freedom Class ship LCS 11 Sioux City, and the Independence Class ship LCS 12 Omaha. US Navy | Washington Times.

Feb 10/12: LCS 10 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus can’t seem to keep politics out of his ship names. He names LCS 10 after shot Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords [D-AZ], even though the naming convention for LCS ships has been cities. He did the same for Rep. John Murtha [D-PA] in the San Antonio Class LPDs.

Mabus’ politicized ship naming choices have drawn fire, to the point of sponsored bills and amendments that would add congressional oversight to SecNav’s traditional prerogative. Traditionally, there has been some level of politics in the process, but it has generally involved choices that had acceptance on both sides of the aisle. The Giffords naming would qualify, but coming after Mabus’ other choices, it’s raising the heat rather than dissipating it. US DoD | Austal.

Jan 30/12: Freedom Class a lemon? Aviation Week reports that after being given copies of Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN) briefings the findings of Navy and industry reports, the set of defense analysts it probed believe that the Freedom Class may need to be fundamentally redesigned.

“The analysts also call for an investigation into how the ship was accepted in such – in their view – questionable shape…”

Jan 14/12: LCS 4 launch. LCS 4 is christened Coronado, after the California city near San Diego. Note that she is not yet USS Coronado. US Navy.

Dec 19/11: Support. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives an $11.9 million contract modification, exercising an option for core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services until December 2012. They’ll assess engineering, and provide baseline and configuration management services during construction, post-delivery, test and trials for the Freedom Class.

Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (20%); Virginia Beach, VA (20%); Washington, DC (15%); Marinette, WI (13%); Moorestown, NJ (12%); Baltimore, MD (10%); Manassas, VA (7%); and Arlington, VA (3%). Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, DC, is the contracting activity (N00024-11-C-2300).

Dec 19/11: Support. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives an $11.9 million contract modification, exercising an option for core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services until December 2012. They’ll assess engineering, and provide baseline and configuration management services during construction, post-delivery, test and trials for the Independence Class.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (30%); Pittsfield, MA (30%); Malvern, PA (20%); Newport News, VA (13%); and various locations of less than 2% each, totaling 7% (N00024-11-C-2301).

Dec 19/11: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives a $15.2 million contract modification, exercising an option for LCS 3 (future USS Fort Worth) post-delivery support. Lockheed Martin will perform the planning and implementation of deferred design changes that have been identified during the construction period, and are deemed necessary to support Fort Worth’s sailaway and follow-on post delivery test and trials.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (39%); Marinette, Wis. (34%); Hampton, VA (18%); and Washington, DC (9%). Work is expected to be completed by December 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, DC, is the contracting activity (N00024-09-C-2303).

Dec 16/11: Philippines deployment? Discussions continue re: deployment of LCS ships to Singapore (vid. Dec 4/10), and reports suggest that the Philippines is also involved in discussions with the USA. The moves are said to be part of a broader US strategy to “pivot” its military focus toward the Pacific, and away from Europe. Reuters.

Oct 24/11: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin announces that LCS 3 Fort Worth has passed builder’s trials, and returned to Marinette Marine on Lake Michigan to prepare for Navy acceptance trials.

Oct 20/11: Cost is #1. LCS PEO Rear Adm. James Murdoch tells reporters that cost is now the overriding priority for the program, which means avoiding any changes unless there’s no choice. The flip side is that all of the 2 classes’ current weaknesses end up more or less frozen as is.

The mission modules will continue to evolve. He says that the Navy is still trying to reduce the Independence Class’ [LCS-2] preparation time to employ some of its mine-clearing mission package, so it can meet the Navy requirement to clear a (classified) area in a (classified) amount of time of a (classified) number of mines. They’re also taking steps to replace the anti-submarine USVs with simpler towed sonar arrays, which can be run at speed. Aviation Week.

Named.
(click for cutaway)

Sept 20/11: Sub-contractors. Saab and its American subsidiary Saab Sensis Corp. announce the official Sea Giraffe contract from General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, who is the Independence Class’ platform system engineering agent. Saab’s Sea Giraffe has always been the planned radar for the LCS-2 Independence Class, and has been ordered for the first 2 ships; this just makes it official for all ships under the new contract.

The 3-D Sea Giraffe AMB is used for aerial scans, water surface scans, and weapon guidance. Land-based counterparts can even back-track incoming rockets and ballistic projectiles to their firing point, and Saab confirms reports that the naval radar can do so as well. Saab Sensis manages the US technical baseline for Sea Giraffe AMB. They will provide US based program management hardware and software adaptations, system integration, testing, and total life-cycle support to in support of the radars on Austal’s LCS design.

Sept 8/11: LCS 2. USS Independence [LCS-2] arrives in St. Petersburg, FL. The question is now how the Navy will use it. GAO reports contend that USS Freedom’s previous deployment may have set the whole program back, by removing the ship’s use as a test bed for LCS mission modules. DoD Buzz discusses what they think we know:

“We can presume the ship’s corrosion issues are resolved since it was given the green light to leave Naval Station Mayport, Fla., and that it’s seaworthy because it made the trip around the state, and that it’s handling flight operations now – the ship stood into Tampa Bay with an MH-60 helicopter on its flight deck…”

Aug 29/11: Exports? Aviation Week quotes Lockheed MS2 VP of littoral ship systems, Joe North, who says that over 21 countries have expressed interest in their LCS design. He’s the first to admit that interest does not always equate to a budget, and the article notes that Chinese frigate designs are becoming thinkable alternatives to buying a ship like the Freedom Class.

Aug 22/11: LCS 5 begins. Lockheed Martin announces the start of construction on LCS 5 Milwaukee, at Marinette Marine. The ship is due for delivery to the U.S. Navy in 2014, and is the 1st of 10 Freedom Class ships awarded to Lockheed Martin under the December 2010 Navy contract.

Meanwhile, LCS 3 Fort Worth remains on track for delivery in 2012.

Aug 5/11: Freedom Class changes. Aviation Week’s “U.S. Navy Studies And Improves LCS-1” describes the post-shakedown process, which includes design and procedure changes that are incorporated into the class. Previous hull cracking issues aren’t on USS Freedom’s PSA list, but magazine modifications and a mooring configuration change are.

Aug 1/11: LCS 6 begins. The Navy authorizes the first cutting of aluminum for the Independence Class ship LCS 6 Jackson at Austal’s Modular Manufacturing facility in Mobile, AL. US Navy.

July 27/11: Rep. Duncan D. Hunter [R-CA-52] and Rob Wittman [R-VA-1] ask the GAO to update its 2010 audit of the LCS program. Full Letter [PDF].

July 22/11: LCS 2. General Dynamics – Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $10 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design in support of the post shakedown availability for USS Independence [LCS 2]. While Austal is the builder and contract owner, GD-BIW began the LCS competition as their bid partner, and would likely have served as the “2nd shipyard” for the trimaran design, if the Navy had pursued that requirement.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (72%); Pittsfield, MA (20%); and Mobile, AL (8%). Work is expected to be completed by February 2013. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, Maine manages this contract (N00024-09-G-2301).

July 15/11: LCS 9 named. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next Freedom Class ship, LCS 9, will be named USS Little Rock, in honor of Arkansas’ capital city.

The previous USS Little Rock began life as a Cleveland Class light cruiser after World War II [CL-92], and was one of 6 to be converted to a Galveston Class guided missile cruiser later on [CLG/CG-4]. She was decommissioned in 1976, and now sits in Buffalo, NY as a museum ship. US Navy.

July 13/11: Corrosion. A bipartisan group of 7 U.S. Senators sends a formal letter to the Pentagon’s Ashton Carter, asking for explanations about LCS certifications that had been waived by the Navy. Waived items included survivability-related certifications, an area that’s a known weakness for the type. Senators Webb [D-VA, former Secretary of the Navy], Begich [D-AK], McCaskill [D-MO], McCain [R-AZ], Brown [R-MA], Coburn [R-OK], and Portman [R-OH] question:

• An April 7/11 Office of the Secretary of Defense certification to move the LCS to Milestone B, while waiving several requirements, with no explanation of why.
  
• The use of Navy acquisition cost estimates, instead of those from the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) group.
  
• A waiver of the need to certify program tradeoffs, granted late in the program
  
• How the LCS program “will ensure reliability and minimize major cost growth in operations and sustainment costs” in light of LCS-2′s corrosion issue; they also want detailed information about the problem, and a response to the Austal CEO’s public statement.

See: Full text of letter | Gannett’s Navy Times.

July 11/11: PEO LCS Created. The US Navy formally establishes Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ships (PEO LCS), during a ceremony at Washington Navy Yard, in order to oversee the program. Ship construction supervision is removed fro PEO Ships, while mission module supervision is removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which is dissolved.

Per predictions made in May, Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch is placed in charge of the office, which is designed to bring all elements of the troubled program together under one roof. US Navy | Information Dissemination (May 2011) was not enthusiastic.

July 5/11: US Navy:

“The littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) is undergoing $1.8 million in maintenance while in dry dock at BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair. Freedom is scheduled to undock September 19, 2011.”

The accompanying picture clearly shows the single helicopter hangar, as well as the 2 boxy stern bustles, aka. “water wings,” which added at a late stage to address the type’s reserve buoyancy issues.

June 20-22/11: Corrosion. June 20-22/11: After USS Independence corrosion reports hit Austal’s share price, a company release addresses the issue. It notes the complete lack of such problems on all of Austal’s commercial and military ships to date, and suggests that the US Navy may have failed to follow basic procedures. Note that Westpac Express is a leased vessel, maintained by Austal:

“…having built over 220 aluminum vessels for defence forces and commercial clients around the world… galvanic corrosion has not been a factor on any Austal built and fully maintained vessel, and our technical experts are eager to support any request to identify root causes… The Westpac Express… has shuttled U.S. Marines throughout the Pacific Basin continuously for ten years, with a 99.7% availability over that period.

Austal has a well-developed methodology for the management of galvanic corrosion, which it has deployed globally… If selected to provide post-delivery support for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class Services program, it is a straight forward process for Austal engineers… deploy temporary sacrificial anodes every time the vessel is moored, and ensure that high-voltage maintenance equipment is properly grounded before use aboard ship.”

Reports that the US Navy’s temporary fix involves installing a cathodic protection system aboard USS Independence do tend to suggest several major lapses: in specifications and acceptance (US Navy), by the Design Agent (Austal), and by the contract prime (GD Bath Iron works). Information Dissemination has a different take, and thinks there are grounds for believing that Austal’s JHSV ships, which may not have a cathodic protection system either, could also be at risk:

“In the case of LCS-2, the problem was apparently accelerated by stray currents in the hull from the electrical distribution system problems the ship has been having since it was turned over to the Navy. LCS-4 doesn’t have [a cathodic protection system] either, but apparently CPS is part of the lessons learned process and was included in the fixed-price contracts for Austal versions of the LCS beginning with LCS-6. LCS-2 will have the CPS installed at the next drydock period, while Austal has said a CPS will be added to LCS-4 before the ship is turned over to the Navy. The question everyone seems to be asking is whether the JHSV could suffer the same issue… I’d be curious to know if Westpac Express has a CPS installed, or some other form of prevention is used at all.”

See: Austal release | Alabama Press-Register | Information Dissemination | WIRED Danger Room.

June 17/11: Corrosion. The US Navy has told Congressional appropriations committees that “aggressive” corrosion was found in the propulsion areas of USS Independence, which rely on Wartsila waterjets. The ship has been given temporary repairs, but permanent repairs will require dry-docking and removal of the water-jet propulsion system. The strong Australian dollar has hurt Austal’s commercial exports, so this blow to its defense business has added impetus. Bloomberg | Alabama Press-Register | Sydney Morning Herald.

Corrosion in new ships isn’t unheard of, though it’s never a good sign. Norway’s Fridtjof Nansen Class AEGIS frigates had this problem, for instance. The Independence Class runs some risks that are specific to its all-aluminum construction, however, as key subsystems with different metals create risks of galvanic corrosion. Interestingly, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) NGO notes that:

“The Senate Armed Services Committee’s markup of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, released today, gives the Pentagon $32.1 million to address “the DoD Corrosion Prevention and Control shortfall in funding requirements.” The Pentagon estimates that funding in this area yields an estimated 57:1 return on investment by reducing the costs for repairs and replacements of corroded systems and parts.”

June 16/11: WLD-1 launch testing. The US Navy Program Executive Office for Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) announces the successful first time launch and recovery of the WLD-1 Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) semi-submerged USV from USS Independence [LCS 2], while underway near Panama, FL. The vehicle went through 5 successful cycles of deployment, towed operations and recovery, while also testing things like vehicle stability in the wake zone and remote operation.

In active use, the RMMV will tow the AN/AQS-20A sonar, and the entire Remote Minehunting System is scheduled for further testing in summer 2011 as part of the LCS MIW mine warfare module’s core AMCM system. This test matters to the LCS program for other reasons as well. The effectiveness of LCS rear launch and recovery systems has been a concern for both designs. US NAVSEA.

June 15/11: Saudi Arabia. Defense News reports that Saudi Arabia may be shifting their focus away from a fully armed variant of the Littoral Combat Ship, carrying the smaller AN/SPY-1F radar and AEGIS combat system. In its place, they received May 2011 briefings concerning DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers displacing about 3 times the tonnage, with ballistic missile defense capability upgrades. The cost trade-off would be about 4-6 modified LCS ships, in exchange for about 2 DDG-51 Flight IIA BMD ships.

The unspoken threat here is, of course, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The unspoken concern is the security of a top-level defense technology, which is critical to defending the USA and its allies, in Saudi hands.

To date, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class has never been exported per se, though their AEGIS combat system and accompanying AN/SPY-1D radars have. Another possible option for Saudi Arabia would be used US Navy DDG-51 Flight I ships, upgraded with AEGIS BMD. That would allow the Saudis to field more ships for the same money, if an agreement was reached. The costs would lie in questions about hull life and length of service, and the Flight Is’ lack of a helicopter hangar. Helicopters have been shown to be essential defenses against speedboat threats, of the kind that Iran fields in the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Defense News | Information Dissemination.

June 4/11: LCS to Singapore. In a speech made at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates disclosed US plans to deploy new littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore. US Navy ships routinely stop in Singapore, but these would be the first US Navy ships permanently deployed there. SecDef Gates speech transcript | East Asia Forum.

June 2/11: Sub-contractors. Taber Extrusions LLC announces contracts to supply extruded aluminum products for JHSV 3 Fortitude, and LCS 6 Jackson, from its facilities in Russellville, AR and Gulfport, MS. Some structural extrusions for both ships will also be manufactured by Taber and supplied to Austal through a contract with O’Neal Steel Corp.

Taber has an 8,600 ton extrusion press with a rectangular container and billet configuration. The firm says that compared with smaller presses and round containers, their tool gives superior metal flow patterns with much tighter tolerances for flatness, straightness and twist; and better assurance of critical thickness dimensions. The resulting wide multi-void extrusions are friction stir welded into panels, and tight tolerances improve productivity while reducing downstream scrap. When finished, they make up some of the ship’s decking, superstructure and bulkheads.

April 11/11: Cracking. DoD Buzz relays US Navy LCS program manager Capt. Jeff Riedel’s words, from a briefing at the US Navy League’s annual Sea, Air Space conference. He says it isn’t a design issue – or is it?:

“Both Lockheed and the Navy are going through their final review that should be available in the next couple of weeks… The design is adequate, how I build it is a different story… If I was able to weld it as it was designed to be welded, it wouldn’t have been an issue. The real issue was, getting access to that area to be able to do the weld… We modeled the superstructure and we found that we had areas that were high stress areas, so we would expect, potentially, a crack to occur in that high-stress area… So we instrumented the superstructure and we used that instrumentation to validate the model and in fact, we’re now using that to better the design… for LCS-3 and following we’ve gone back and changed the design so we can reduce those stress areas.”

Beginning with LCS-3, Riedel says that the spot on the ship where the crack occurred was made easier for welders to reach, allowing them to lay an extra thick weld.

March 25/11: LCS 6 & 8 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the Freedom Class LCS 6 will be named the USS Jackson, after Mississippi’s state capitol, and LCS 8 will be named the USS Montgomery, after Alabama’s state capitol. US DoD

March 18/11: LCS 5 & 7 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next 2 Freedom Class ships built by Lockheed Martin will be named the USS Milwaukee [LCS 5] and the USS Detroit [LCS 7]. LCS 3 Fort Worth is said to be about 85% complete at the moment, and on schedule for 2012 delivery. LCS 5 Milwaukee will begin construction in the summer of 2011, while LCS 7 Detroit isn’t expected to begin construction until May 2012.

The last ship named USS Detroit was a Sacramento Class fast support ship, T-AOE-4. It was decommissioned in 2005. The last ship named USS Milwaukee was T-AOR-2, a Wichita Class oiler that was decommissioned in 1994. US Navy | Alabama Press Register | Detroit Free Press | Australia’s Herald Sun (Victoria/ Melbourne) | Green Bay Press-Gazette | West Australia Business News.

March 15/11: Support. Contracts to the 2 shipbuilders for Littoral Combat Ship class services, funding efforts to “assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives $34.1 million contract modification. Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (31%); Marinette, WI (25%); Washington, DC (24%); and Moorestown, NJ (20%); and is expected to be complete by March 2012 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $19.7 million contract modification. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (83%), and Pittsfield, MA (17%); and is expected to be complete by March 2012 (N00024-11-C-2301).

March 8/11: Controversy. The Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearings regarding the Navy’s FY 2012 Navy budget and longer-term plan. SecNav Ray Mabus outlines the Navy’s view of the approved multi-year buy strategy.

“With an average cost of $440 million per ship, and with the cost reductions we have seen demonstrated on LCS 3 and 4, the Navy will save taxpayers approximately $1.9 billion in FY12-FY16. More importantly, the fact that prices were so dramatically reduced from the initial bids in 2009 will allow us to save an additional $1 billion – for a total of $2.9 billion – through the dual award of a ten-ship contract to each bidder.”

On the other hand, ranking member Sen. McCain continues to express concerns re: the LCS acquisition plan, though the multi-ship buy has been approved:

“As you probably know, I continue to think the Navy made a big mistake in going forward with a dual-source strategy on the LCS program. I believe that the true lifecycle costs of buying and sustaining both ships will be considerably more than what the Navy told us. I do not believe it is wise for Congress to authorize what amounts to a ‘bulk buy’ on a program without proving that its key aspects will work as intended and that its sustainability costs are reasonable. In the case of LCS, the Navy could not tell Congress what its plans are for the two different combat systems for the two designs; and, the combined capability of the mission packages with the sea-frames, which gives the ships combat power, remains unproven. I am concerned that the costs of operating and sustaining both variants will eventually require moving to a single combat system or going to a common propulsion and mechanical system. If that is where affordability concerns drive the Navy, why are we buying two versions of this ship?”

See: SASC Hearings record | Sen. Levin (chair) floor statement | Sen. McCain floor statement.

March 7/11: Industrial. Fincantieri subsidiary Marinette Marine Corporation breaks ground for a new panel-line fabrication building to support construction of the U.S. Navy’s Freedom-class LCS. It will use more automation, improve raw material storage, and cut the distance ship modules have to travel during construction. It’s part of a 5-year, $100 million modernization plan by the shipyard’s new parent company, and builds on 2009 improvements that included higher-capacity overhead cranes, plasma-cutting tables and pipe-bending machines.

In addition to this groundbreaking, Marinette Marine also marked the opening of its professional center and the completion of a project to expand its main indoor ship construction building. This expansion project nearly doubles the building’s size, creating enough space to house 2 complete LCS hulls and parts for 2 additional ships. The firm’s counterpart, Austal, has also been investing in major facility improvements at its Gulf Coast shipyard. Marinette Marine [PDF] | Lockheed Martin.

Feb 1/11: Sub-contractors. EADS North America announces a contract from Lockheed Martin to supply its TRS-3D radar for up to 10 Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ships through 2015. Under the terms of its contract, EADS North America will deliver the 1st radar unit to Lockheed Martin for installation in 2012.

Within the US armed forces, the TRS-3D also serves aboard the Coast Guard’s new frigate-sized National Security Cutters. Austal’s Independence Class trimarans use Saab’s Sea Giraffe AMB radar instead.

Jan 17/10: Sub-contractors. Fairbanks Morse announces a contract from Lockheed Martin for 2 of its 17,000 bhp Colt-Pielstick 16-cylinder PA6B STC diesel engines, to power the Freedom Class LCS 5 ordered in December 2010. The engines will be manufactured and tested at the company’s facility in Beloit, WI, in accordance with American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Naval Vessel Rules.

Price is not disclosed. If the entire set of 10 ships is ordered, the firm would provide 20 diesel engines.

It may be presumed that Austal is busy working on contracts with its engine suppliers as well: GE (LM2500 turbines) and MTU (800 series diesel).

Jan 17/10: Sub-contractors. Rolls Royce Marine announces an immediate contract from Lockheed Martin for 2 more of its 36MW MT30 gas turbines, as part of a larger contract to equip up to 10 Freedom Class ships.

The MT30 is derived from the firm’s Trent engines that outfit large passenger jets. In the US Navy, the MT30 also serves on the forthcoming fleet of 3 DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyers. Each LCS-1 Freedom Class ship takes 2 turbines, so the total order would be 20 if all 10 Freedom Class ships are ordered. Price is not disclosed, and the release adds that:

“In addition to gas turbines and waterjets, a significant range of Rolls-Royce equipment is specified in the Lockheed Martin design, including shaftlines, bearings and propulsion system software.”

They have not been trouble-free, however: see esp. Sept 29/10 entry.

Build ‘em both!
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Dec 30/10: Dual Buy. Now that the provisional spending authority is approved along with the Navy’s revised dual-buy plan, the Navy issues 2010-2015 block buy contracts to Austal and to Lockheed Martin. The contract includes options for up to 9 additional vessels in the following 5 years, plus post delivery support, additional crew and shore support, special studies, class services, class standard equipment support, economic order quantity equipment. These contracts were competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with 2 offers received.

Freedom class monohulls: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives a fixed-price-incentive contract (vid. Dec 8/10 entry) for $491.6 million: $436.9 million for a Freedom class ship, and $54.7 million for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except FY 2010 RDT&E funds.

Fincantieri’s Marinette Marine Corporation will build the ships, and naval architect Gibbs & Cox will provide engineering and design support. Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Walpole, MA (14%); Washington, DC (12%); Oldsmar, FL (4%); Beloit, WI (3%); Moorestown, NJ (2%); Minneapolis, MI (2%); and various locations of less than 1 percent (7%). Work is expected to be complete by August 2015.

If all 10 Freedom class ships are bought, the given cumulative value is $4.07 billion. If the Navy exercises options according to the previous procurement approach instead, and looks in 2012 for a 2nd source to build 5 more ships, the contract could rise to $4.571 billion, including selected ship systems equipment for a 2nd source builder and selected ship system integration and test for a 2nd source (N00024-11-C-2300).

Independence class trimarans: Austal USA, LLC in Mobile, AL receives a fixed-price-incentive contract (vid. Dec 8/10 entry) for $465.5 million: $432.1 million to build an Independence class LCS, plus $33.4 million for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except FY 2010 RDT&E funds.

This brings Austal’s total order book to A$ 1.3 billion; the same shipyard is also building the US Navy’s JHSV fast-transport catamarans. Austal is beginning LCS-related preparation work beyond its investments to date, including a $140 million facility expansion and workforce development program over the next 12 months, which will more than double Austal’s workforce to 3,800 employees. Construction of the first LCS vessel will begin in early 2012, and it’s currently scheduled for delivery by June 2015. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50%); Pittsfield, MA (17%); Cincinnati, OH (3%); Baltimore, MD (2%); Burlington, VT (2%); New Orleans, LA (2%); and various locations of less than 2 percent each (24%).

If all 10 Independence class ships are bought, the given cumulative value is $3.786 billion. If the Navy exercises options according to the previous procurement approach instead, and looks in 2012 for a 2nd source to build 5 more ships, including selected ship systems equipment for a 2nd source and selected ship system integration and test for a 2nd source, the contract could rise to $4.386 billion (N00024-11-C-2301).

Note that these prices do not reflect the additional cost of Government Furnished Equipment, including all weapons, mission modules, etc. Those additional costs can be expected to be comfortably over $100 million per ship. See also US Navy | Austal | Lockheed Martin | Defense Tech.

Dual buy contract for up to 20 ships

Dec 22/10: Budgets. The US Senate passes H.R. 6523, the House’s Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. Having passed in identical form in both the House and Senate, it was introduced to the President to be signed on Dec 29/10. US Senate [PDF]. See also Aviation Week debate coverage | Sen. McCain’s [R-AZ] floor statement, against inclusion of the LCS.

Dec 21/10: Budgets. The US house of Representatives’ “lame duck” session of outgoing Congresspeople passes a new continuing resolution proposed by Senate Democrats to keep the government running through early 2011. The only arms-program-specific language in the legislation says that: “Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of the Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to 20 Littoral Combat Ships”.

On the other hand, the funding will not extend through the end of the fiscal year on Sept 30/11, as the incoming House and Senate will have full opportunity to pass their own budget. Gannett’s Navy Times.

Dec 14/10: GAO Report. The US Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearings regarding the proposed LCS program change. Reuters | See esp. the US GAO testimony: “Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of Risks,” which generally echoes their Dec 8/10 report.

Dec 13/10: Competition. Lockheed Martin and Austal extend their bid price offers to Dec 30/11, to allow extra time to finalize contracts at current prices. That’s necessary for 2 reasons. One is the funding uncertainty and turmoil created by continuing resolutions, as the 112th Congress tries to clean up the budgetless mess left by the last Congress. The other, related issue is that the latest LCS acquisition plan hasn’t been approved by Congress yet. Ranking Senate Armed Services Committee member Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] continues to oppose approval of that new acquisition plan, pending clarity on combat effectiveness and long-term costs. Green Bay Press Gazette.

Dec 10/10: CBO Report. The US Congressional Budget Office releases its report on the proposed program change: “Cost Implications of the Navy’s Plans for Acquiring Littoral Combat Ships” [PDF]. The CBO often has different cost estimates than the US Navy – and CBO’s higher estimates have a history of being right. In this case, however, they acknowledge that they’re handicapped by not seeing the shipyard bids.

They see the central issues as twofold. One is future operating and maintenance costs, which the GAO has also flagged as a serious issue. Maintaining 2 types is both a plus and a minus. That could really help the fleet if one design performs better, and right bow, data is limited. n the other hand, it also means additional spares, maintenance and training infrastructure, which may have to be duplicated on both coasts depending on deployment plans.

The other issue is the hardwired central combat systems, which are said to cost about $70 million per ship. They’re a topic of special attention in the report, as they’re different for the 2 ship designs. On the other hand, aligning them to allow common upgrades and maintenance would result in high retrofit costs down the road. Some estimates place the cost between $910 million – $1.8 billion. See also subsequent coverage of the combat system issue by Aviation Week | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Dec 8/10: GAO report on buy strategy. The US GAO releases its report – “Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program.” They still see the program as risky, and the risks are inherent in the design, concept, and execution, not the procurement strategy. The Navy doesn’t really understand operating and maintenance costs for the designs yet, which creates a big budget risk, though building both ships may hedge against the risks that one design turns out to be poor in this or other areas. Most significantly, the GAO points to a chronic and serious problem that has destroyed cost estimates for previous ship classes:

“In an effort to address technical issues on the first two ships, the Navy has implemented design changes for… LCS 3 and LCS 4… [that are] not yet complete. These changes are significant and have affected the configuration of several major ship systems including propulsion, communications, electrical, and navigation. In addition, launch, handling, and recovery systems for both designs are still being refined… contract modifications will need to be negotiated and priced. According to the Navy, it estimates funding requirements for these change orders to total 5 percent for all future follow-on ships produced… In addition, Navy officials stated that the seaframe solicitation includes a provision that agreed to design changes are “not to exceed” $12 million – a feature that Navy officials state will bound government cost risk due to design changes. Pending full identification and resolution of deficiencies affecting the lead ships, the Navy’s ability to stay within its budgeted limits remains to be seen.”

While the US Navy says that designs for LCS 3 & 4 are stable as built, the GAO points out that this is because key changes have been deferred until post-delivery. As testing reveals other issues, the amount of deferred work for follow-on ships “can reasonably be expected to grow.” See also Bloomberg.

Dec 6/10: LCS-2. USS Independence (LCS 2) arrives at BAE Systems Ship Repair in Norfolk, VA to begin its first industrial post-delivery availability. During the availability, the ship will complete the installation of needed components not installed during construction. US Navy.

Dec 4/10: LCS 3 launched. The 2nd Freedom-class LCS, USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), is launched at the Marinette Marine shipyard, on the Menominee River. Lockheed Martin | Argon ST [PDF].

Oct 26/10: Saudi Arabia. Lockheed Martin MS2 President Orlando Carvalho confirms that his company has supplied price and availability information on its version of the littoral combat ship (LCS) to Saudi Arabia, which is looking to buy 8 modern frigate-sized warships. Lockheed is proposing a very different LCS, configured as a frigate equipped with AN/SPY-1F radars, an AEGIS combat system, and set equipment instead of mission modules.

It remains understood the Saudi authorities are waiting to see which LCS version the U.S. Navy chooses, but the ship’s capabilities might be well suited to the Arabian/Persian Gulf’s shallow waters. At Euronaval 2010, a French official reportedly said that France is hoping to sell between 4-6 FREMM frigates for the Saudis’ western (Red Sea and Indian Ocean) fleet, while the LCS was seen as likely for the eastern (Gulf) fleet. Defense News | Shephard Group | Tactical Report.

Oct 14/10: CRS Report. The Congressional Research Service issues its updated report: “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” [PDF]. It offers details concerning the program’s history and current plans. Key issues examined include:

• Whether Congress had adequate time to review the latest procurement strategy in 2010
  
• Whether the Navy’s new plan gives it enough time to really evaluate how the initial ships of class perform
  
• Whether the price-focused RFP properly balances sticker price against life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs and ship capability
  
• What happens if the Navy picks a winner, and the winner can’t deliver to cost?
  
• How does the Navy plan to evolve the winning ship’s combat system to a configuration that has greater commonality with one or more existing Navy surface ship combat systems?
  
• What are the Navy’s longer-term plans regarding the 2 “orphan” ships from the LCS class that isn’t picked?
  
• What potential alternatives are there to the Navy’s new acquisition strategy? CRS cites block buys of both types, Profit Related to Offer bidding, and having the Navy buy the combat system separately.
  
• In light of the cost growth, is the LCS program still cost-effective? What is the LCS sea frame unit procurement cost above which the Navy would no longer consider the LCS program cost-effective?

Other concerns include survivability, and CRS quotes the December 2009 report from the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation:

“LCS was designated by the Navy as a Level I survivability combatant ship, but neither design is expected to achieve the degree of shock hardening as required by the CDD [Capabilities Development Document]… Only a few selected subsystems will be shock hardened… Accordingly, the full, traditional rigor of Navy-mandated ship shock trials is not achievable, due to the damage that would be sustained by the ship… The LCS LFT&E [Live Fire Test and Evaluation] program has been hampered by the Navy’s lack of credible modeling and simulation tools for assessing the vulnerabilities of ships constructed to primarily commercial standards (American Bureau of Shipping Naval Vessel Rules and High Speed Naval Craft Code), particularly aluminum and non-traditional hull forms. Legacy LFT&E models were not developed for these non-traditional factors, nor have they been accredited for such use. These knowledge gaps undermine the credibility of the modeling and simulation, and increase the amount of surrogate testing required for an adequate LFT&E program. The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment as evidenced by the limited shock hardened design and results of full scale testing of representative hull structures completed in December 2006.”

See the US Naval Institute blog’s take on the report as well, with a particular focus on survivability and the lessons of littoral naval combat. One excerpt from the full report discusses an important procedural point:

“The Navy had earlier planned to make the down select decision and award the contract to build the 10 LCSs sometime this past summer, but the decision was delayed and reportedly will now occur within 90 days of September 15 – the date by which the two industry teams were told by the Navy to submit new proposal revisions. On this basis, it would appear that the decision could be announced as late as December 14. On October 12, 2010, it was reported that a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review meeting on the LCS program that was scheduled for October 29 has been postponed to a later date that has not been set. The Navy states that it cannot announce its down select decision and award a contract to the winner until after the DAB meeting occurs.”

MT30 turbine
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Sept 29/10: MT30 improvements. Rolls-Royce Naval Marine, Inc. in Walpole, MA received a $9.8 million cost-plus fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for “engineering and technical services on the Rolls-Royce gas turbine engine product improvement program. This contract is being awarded to research potential improvements to Rolls Royce gas turbine engines. Delivery Order 0001 will be issued on the same day of contract award with initial contract funding in the amount of $800,000.”

Work will be performed in Walpole, MA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete by September 2015. $800,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, which is Sept 30/10. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Ship Systems Engineering Station in Philadelphia, PA (N65540-09-D-0016).

DID has not tied this contract directly to the LCS program yet, but a search through US Navy ship types didn’t reveal any ships using Rolls Royce gas turbines, except LCS 1.

Sept 15/10: Bids in. Final bids for the latest incarnation of the Littoral Combat Ship contract are in from Lockheed Martin and Austal USA. Lockheed Martin | Defense News.

Sept 14/10: Politics. The Senate defense appropriations subcommittee votes to fund just 1 Littoral Combat Ship in FY 2011, instead of 2. That’s a long way from being the final word on the matter, but chairman Sen. Daniel Inouye [D-HI] reportedly says that:

“…two ships funded in 2010 have not yet been contracted. Under the new plan, the Navy would seek to award four ships to a single contractor in the coming year. There is virtually no way that the winning contractor would be able to begin construction of four ships in 2011.” Funding for one ship in 2011 “is more than adequate,” he said. And it saves $615 million.”

See: Gannett’s Navy Times | Information Dissemination.

Sept 14/10: Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia may be interested in the LCS as part of its rumored $60 billion weapons package. Despite previous focus on Austal’s trimaran design, a Washington Post report says that:

“The official said the Saudis continue to have internal discussions about those purchases and are watching to see the outcome of a competition to build a new Littoral Combat Ship.”

Sept 9/10: LCS a Lemon? In a piece called “Red Flags Everywhere,” influential naval blog Information Dissemination, which has generally been mildly supportive of the program, says:

“There isn’t just one thing wrong with the Littoral Combat Ship program – every thing is wrong with this program. There are so many red flags waiving frantically in the face of Congress, the Navy, and any casual observer in regards to the Littoral Combat Ship I feel like I am standing roadside in Beijing during a Party propaganda parade… The Littoral Combat Ship has traded survivability, armor, endurance, weapon payloads, cost efficiency, and reduced operational capabilities across the board for the advantage of speed. What is this advantage of speed that makes the trade off worth it? What is 40 knots giving the Navy’s new small combatant that 28 knots can’t?”

The piece comes in response to a generally supportive Lexington Institute piece:

“More recently, the Navy seemed to have the LCS program under control… Understanding the importance of the LCS, the Navy responded to initial problems with the basic ships or sea frames with the necessary attention, expertise and resources. The same effort must now be devoted to the development of working mission packages. This also includes developing the desired unmanned systems, particularly for subsurface operations.”

Aug 31/10: GAO Report. US GAO report #GAO-10-523 on the LCS program sees problems. “Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities.” Key excerpts:

“The Navy plans to invest over $25 billion through fiscal year 2035 to acquire LCS. However, recurring cost growth and schedule delays have jeopardized the Navy’s ability to deliver promised LCS capabilities… technical issues with the first two seaframes have yet to be fully resolved… Challenges developing mission packages have delayed the timely fielding of promised capabilities, limiting the ships’ utility to the fleet during initial deployments… Key mine countermeasures and surface warfare systems encountered problems in operational and other testing that delayed their fielding…”

With respect to the ships themselves:

“The Navy has required LCS seaframes to meet Level 1 survivability standards. Ships built to Level 1 are expected to operate in the least severe environment, away from the area where a carrier group is operating or the general war-at-sea region… Current ships in the fleet built to the Level 1 standard include material support ships, mine-warfare vessels, and patrol combatants.”

“…In our work on shipbuilding best practices, we found that achieving design stability before start of fabrication is a key step… Addressing [LCS 1 and 2] technical issues has required the Navy to implement design changes at the same time LCS 3 and LCS 4 are being built… Our analysis of the procurement section of the LCS total ownership cost baseline found the estimate lacks several characteristics essential to a high-quality cost estimate.”

See also the LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events section for additional excerpts related to those areas, and “MH-60S Airborne Mine Counter-Measures Continues Development” for in-depth reports on the mine warfare mission module components. See also: Aviation Week | Information Dissemination on the larger cultural issues this report speaks to.

Aug 29/10: LCS 3s. DoD Buzz reports that “Lockheed Martin, with just a five-week head start, has completed 60 percent of LCS 3, compared to Austal, whose LCS 4 is only 26 percent complete.” Why is that? It’s partly because Lockheed Martin reused work done on the original LCS 3 contract, which was canceled mid-stride. Lockheed Martin MS2 business development director Paul Lemmo:

“Lemmo also pointed out that Lockheed Martin has kept parts and materials left over from the previously terminated LCS-3. The Navy originally terminated Lockheed Martin’s second LCS in April 2007… [but] the company decided to continue manufacturing about 50 to 55 systems all the way to their completion… “Those systems have been in storage either at the manufacturer or at some of our facilities and they will be brought to bear on the ship,” [Lemmo] said. “The value of that material is about at least half of the total value of the material on the ship. Half the material needed for Fort Worth was already purchased. Generically a lot of it is long-lead propulsion machinery–the engine, the gas turbines, diesels, gears, water jets, shafting, those kinds of things…what was on order.”

See: DoD Buzz | Defense Daily.

Aug 23/10: Selection delayed. The US Navy delays its final selection for the new Littoral Combat Ship contract. The decision appears to have been pushed back to Dec 30/10, but the exact date in unclear. Defense News.

April 12/10: Competition. Lockheed Martin announces that its industry team has submitted its proposal for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fiscal year 2010-2014 contract to the U.S. Navy today. The Navy will award the winning team a fixed-price incentive fee contract to provide up to 10 ships with combat systems, as well as combat systems for 5 additional ships, to be built at a second shipyard.

March 31/10: LCS 2. Aviation Week Ares describes the current state of USS Independence [LCS 2]. At this point, its captain says that she’s still in the pre-tactical risk mitigation stage. The crew is becoming familiar with the ship, and performing basic tasks like air defense testing, fast acceleration and deceleration, putting fast boats in the water while at sea, etc.

March 30/10: GAO Report. The US GAO issues report #GAO-10-388SP, its 2010 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.

With respect to the Littoral Combat Ship, the report places the program far below the desired level of technology and manufacturing knowledge for a program at this stage. Compared to its 2004 baseline, which was itself about 150% of original cost-per unit estimates, LCS R&D costs have increased by 169.2% of baseline. Procurement cost for the initial capability ships is up by a stunning 505.3%, total program cost for initial fielding has risen 285.9%, and acquisition cycle time rose 139% over the original baseline. The report also flags LCS weight increases that have led to LCS 1 stability issues due to a higher center of gravity, and mission modules that are only partially capable.

Mission Module findings are detailed in the Ancillaries section, but the key takeaway is that they’re not ready for effective service yet – and the ship’s chosen missile armament could become a serious problem.

March 22/10: Support. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD receives a $14.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-09-C-2303) to provide engineering, program, and technical support for LCS class ships. This includes class baseline design services, class configuration management services, class documentation services, ship interim support, ship systems development, and other technical and engineering analyses.

Work will be performed in Norfolk, VA (41%), Moorestown, NJ (16%), Baltimore, MD (15%), Marinette, WI (14%), Washington, DC (8%), Arlington, VA (6%), and is expected to be complete by December 2010.

March 20/10: Costs. Inside the Navy:

“The Navy does not ask competing Littoral Combat Ship builders Austal USA and Lockheed Martin to arrive at an exact dollar figure for how much each bidder’s ship will cost over its lifespan in the current request for proposals for what will be the winning LCS design, sources told Inside the Navy last week. Yet, the sea service wants the competitors to “qualitatively: explain how they will manage “total ownership costs” in the future…”

March 16/10: Cracking. Reuters reports on a recent US Navy SBIR research solicitation, aimed at more quickly and cheaply diagnosing cracking in aluminum ship structures. From US Navy SBIR N10A-T041: “Fracture Evaluation and Design Tool for Welded Aluminum Ship Structures Subjected to Impulsive Dynamic Loading” :

“A new analysis tool combined with an experimental validation protocol is needed to accurately characterize the dynamic response and fracture behavior of welded aluminum ship structures subjected to extreme loading events. The goal of this effort is to develop an explicit dynamic failure prediction toolkit for fracture assessment of welded thin-walled aluminum structures. To efficiently characterize a large size ship structure, innovative modeling techniques using fractured shell elements are needed along with a mesh independent crack insertion and propagation capability. In addition to innovative crack simulation in a shell structure, advanced constitutive models have to be implemented in the toolkit to capture the rate dependence and anisotropy in strength, plastic flow and ductility. Developing and demonstrating novel damage simulation and fracture prediction methods has significant potential impact on design and operation of current and future Navy welded aluminum, ship structural systems.”

US Navy Commander Victor Chen reiterated the Navy’s confidence in the JHSV and LCS ships; the JHSV catamaran is aluminum construction, as is the LCS-2 Independence Class, and the LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure on a steel hull. He adds that:

“We already have a level of confidence in how to work with aluminum. The Office of Naval Research is trying to expand the knowledge base and build on what we already know.”

March 16/10: Drug busts. On her initial deployment to the Caribbean, the US Navy highlights USS Freedom’s [LCS 1] conduct of drug busts. The fast boats were intercepted with help from Freedom’s embarked MH-60S helicopter – a capability that is not unique to the LCS, by any means. Aviation Week Ares.

March 13/10: Industrial. New Fincantieri subsidiary Marinette Marine Corporation in Marinette, WI breaks ground on an expansion that will nearly double the size of its main indoor ship construction building. The expansion will provide enough indoor space to simultaneously house 2 complete LCS hulls and parts for 2 additional ships. It will also allow greater use of more efficient modular construction processes. The expansion is part of parent company Fincantieri’s 5-year, $100 million plan to modernize its U.S. shipbuilding operations and support the LCS program. Green Bay Gazette | MarineLog.

LCS 1 & LHD 6
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March 3/10: CSBA Report. The USA’s non-partisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment puts out a paper: “Littoral Combat Ship: An Examination of its Possible Concepts of Operation” [PDF]. While the report is generally positive about the LCS, and even offers several operational scenarios that use the ship’s capabilities, it does raise a few issues. Crew size is one, but the other relate to the standard trio of speed, armament, and sustainability:

“The disadvantage is that speed requires great power. By choosing speed the Navy has consciously chosen to accept lower carrying capacity and endurance.49 The impact on endurance is illustrated by the fact LCS’s cruising range of around 4,000 nautical miles (nm) at 20kts reduces to 1,500 nm at 45kts. This compares to an endurance of around 12,000 nm at 9kts for the US Coast Guard’s Legend- class National Security Cutter. Consequently, any mission that requires extensive use of speed will significantly limit the ship’s unrefueled time on station. Restrictions on payload and fuel capacity (including aviation fuel) mean that the LCS will require considerable logistical support for the provisioning of fuel, ammunition, perishable foods and other consumables. The Navy will almost certainly need to give greater thought to how the LCS can be supported when operating at distance from base areas.

…While taking due account of the fact that none of these nations operate carriers or long-range strike forces, the ability of the LCS to defend itself when compared to similar ships designed to undertake similar tasks appears to be limited, especially against air attack, regardless of which mission package is carried… The ship currently lacks a torpedo detection capability. The Navy is now taking urgent steps to rectify this worrisome omission… consideration needs to be given to providing a “mother ship” or tender in support able to resupply not only fuel but also other consumables, such as ammunition, perishables and spare parts, and provide medical treatment and workshop facilities. The LCS is designed to be self-sustaining for between fourteen and twenty-one days but in circumstances when it is operating at high speed this could conceivably drop to as little as four days. Workshop access may be particularly important because, as part of the drive to restrict crew size, much of the maintenance generally conducted by a ship’s crew has, in the case of the LCS, been transferred ashore.”

…NWDC laid equal stress on “frequently conducted” or “continuous” missions including SOF support, maritime interception operations/ SLOC(Sea Lines of Communication) patrol, and logistics. It pointed out that in the 29-year period prior to 1999, 60 percent of all naval missions were of this type… The implication of these statements is that the primary use of the LCS is increasingly considered to be as a naval constabulary vessel (which all naval vessels are to a degree) that is also able to undertake most naval diplomacy tasks and selected missions at the middle and lower ends of naval war fighting.”

Note that many of the scenarios to illustrate the ships’ usefulness depend on sustained high-speed operations, against the backdrop of a US Navy that is already short on oilers. Another involves escorts through the Persian Gulf, against fast attack craft armed with anti-ship missiles whose range the LCS cannot match, and whose strikes the LCS is ill-equipped to survive.

March 3/10: Fuel & Range. Inside the Navy publishes data about the relative fuel efficiency of the 2 LCS contenders (Source). There’s a significant difference, with implications for both operating costs and range, but the Navy proposes to treat them as equivalent, vid. Feb 25/10 entry:

“The General Dynamics variant of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) uses less fuel per hour during higher rates of speed than the Lockheed Martin vessel, according to a Navy document. The one-page LCS Consumption Curves shows that both ships use about the same amount of fuel, or barrels, per hour between zero and 16 knots. At five knots, the General Dynamics aluminum trimaran uses 3.2 barrels per hour versus 3.9 for Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull [DID: +21%]. At 14 knots, the General Dynamics ship uses 11.3 barrels per hour while the Lockheed Martin ship uses 12.7 [DID: +12.4%]. At 16 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship uses 18.4 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 15.5 [DID: +18.7%], according to the document. At 30 knots, the General Dynamics trimaran burns through 62.7 barrels per hour, while the Lockheed Martin monohull uses 102.9 barrels per hour [DID: +64.1%] … At 40 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship burns through 138 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 105.7 barrels per hour [DID: + 30.5%].”

The LCS-1 Freedom Class’ weight issues could change these figures, especially when fully loaded. The LCS-2 Independence Class also has greater fuel capacity.

Feb 25/10: Competition. US Sen. Sessions [R-AL] questions criteria for Littoral Combat Ship RFP, pointing out the RFP’s cost as sole determinant approach, despite capability differences. The Navy responds that they consider both ships to be equivalent, and says that the ships will spend a low percentage of their time at high speeds. AL.com | YouTube video | Gannett’s Navy Times article.

Feb 19/10: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Kim Martinez says that the Fort Worth [LCS 3] “is being assessed to preclude the same tank design,” and may be modified to avoid the need for USS Freedom’s bolt-on rear “water wings.” Gannett’s Navy Times blog Scoop Deck adds:

“Neither LockMart nor the Navy will say the original LCS 1 design included too little reserve buoyancy, but Martinez stressed that Freedom “meets all the Navy’s requirements, including for reserve buoyancy.” So does that mean the Navy discovered problems with its own requirements after accepting delivery of the Freedom? “That’s a question best answered by the Navy,” Martinez said.”

Feb 16/10: Freedom Class change. Gannett’s Navy Times’ blog “Scoop Deck” notes an interesting change to USS Freedom [LCS 1]:

“There is one big change, however: In a yard period late last year, Freedom acquired two large oblong metal boxes on its transom, on either side of the stern gate its crew uses to launch and recover boats. The sailors call these “buoyancy tanks,” although they look almost like a baby’s water wings for the pool… Do water wings added after the fact mean the Freedom – and Lockheed Martin’s design for the LCS 1-class – suffered from too little reserve buoyancy? “I can’t really talk much more about that,” [Gold Crew skipper, Commander Randy] Garner said.”

Feb 2/10: GAO Report. The US Congress’ GAO submits official report GAO-10-257: “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.” Key excerpts:

“GAO’s analysis of the Navy’s 2009 estimates showed that the [LCS] operating and support costs for seaframes and mission packages could total $84 billion (in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) through about 2050 [divided $64.1B seaframes, $20.8B packages]. However, the Navy did not follow some best practices for developing an estimate… The costs to operate and support a weapon system can total 70 percent of a system’s costs… With a decision pending in 2010 on which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program, decision makers could lack critical information to assess the full costs of the alternatives. The Navy has made progress in developing operational concepts for LCS, but faces risks in implementing its new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that are necessitated by the small crew size… an average of 484 days of training is required before reporting to a [LCS] crew, significantly more than for comparable positions on other surface ships. Moreover, the Navy’s maintenance concept relies heavily on distance support, with little maintenance performed on ship. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new concepts… If the Navy cannot implement its concepts as envisioned, it may face operational limitations, have to reengineer its operational concepts, or have to alter the ship design. Many of the concepts will remain unproven until 2013 or later, when the Navy will have committed to building almost half the class… Navy officials from two divisions within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – the Surface Warfare Division and the Assessments Division – said they were unaware of any analysis supporting the total planned quantities for either the surface warfare package or its maritime security module. Also, Navy officials said that the Navy has not performed a force structure analysis on the antisubmarine package because the contents are under development.”

GAO’s core recommendation, among several:

“To improve decision making, we are recommending that the Navy conduct a risk assessment and consider the results before committing to buy LCS ships in order to link procurement with evidence that the Navy is progressing in its ability to implement its new operational concepts.”

Jan 20/10: No LVL 1 Survivability. Reuters offers conclusions from the Pentagon’s director of Operational Test and Evaluation. They include the failure of either design to meet Level I survivability criteria except among some sub-sections, and that neither ship could be expected to “be survivable in a hostile combat environment.”

Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class monohulls had problems in early air target tracking tests, which revealed deficiencies in the TRS-3D radar’s power supply and reliability, and serious problems with the combat system. The report added that the ship could face stability problems when fully loaded. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Jen Allen claims that stability is no longer a problem for this class, and Reuters reports that the Navy plans to install external tanks to effectively lengthen the ship’s stern, and increase its buoyancy.

General Dynamics/ Austal’s Independence Class trimaran had its builders trials delayed due to reported leaks at the gas turbine shaft seals, and more testing identified deficiencies in the main propulsion diesel engines. Reuters

Jan 11/10: Partnership break-up? Defense News reports that General Dynamics and Austal are set to break up their LCS partnership, which has GD Bath Iron Works as the prime contractor but most of the structural shipbuilding work done by Austal in Mobile, AL. Under the new procurement rules, the US Navy will require a second-supplier shipyard for the winning design, that can’t be associated with the primary builder. Before they take any final actions, however, the GD/Austal team is waiting to see the Navy’s latest RFP, which is a bit behind schedule but is still expected in January 2010.

General Dynamics had reportedly seen Bath Iron Works as the logical shipbuilding facility to take on shipbuilding work if their team’s trimaran design won, but there is some speculation that this may shift to T-AKE shipbuilder GD NASSCO in California, instead.

LCS 2 christening
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Dec 18/09: LCS 2 delivered. The General Dynamics Littoral Combat Ship Team delivers Independence [LCS 2] to the US Navy. USN Commanding Officer Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair Captain Dean Krestos officially accepted custody of Independence in Mobile, AL, where the ship will remain before its commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/10. That date will mark the first time a US Navy ship has been commissioned in Mobile since 1945. The ship will then prepare for its next set of trials, in the summer of 2010. US Navy | GD release.

Dec 17/09: LCS 4 keel. A brief keel laying ceremony is held in Mobile at Austal USA’s Assembly Bay 4 to record completion of the first major construction milestone for Coronado [LCS 4]. As one might expect, the centerpiece of the ceremony was the ship’s keel module, a large outfitted section of the aluminum center hull. GD release.

Dec 12/09: Coast Guard on USS Freedom. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that USS Freedom [LCS 1] will have US Coast Guard VBSS teams on board when it ventures into the Caribbean:

“The littoral combat ship Freedom is to take aboard a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment for part of its trial deployment early next year, Navy officials said, with the Coasties substituting for part of the Navy boarding team added to the LCS crew. Freedom is taking 20 sailors in two visit, board, search and seizure teams…”

Nov 13-21/09: LCS 1. USS Freedom [LCS 1] also conducts independent ship deployment training and certification at sea, operating with ships from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower [CVN 69] Carrier Strike Group during their Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX). That was part of the Maritime Security Surge certification for the ship’s Gold Crew, which will deploy aboard Freedom in early 2010 to U.S. Southern Command.

Nov 19/09: Testing. The US Navy announces that LCS 2 Independence has successfully completed acceptance trials, after completing a series of graded in-port and underway demonstrations for the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV).

Acceptance trials are the last significant milestone before delivery of the ship to the Navy. Ship delivery is expected to occur with the ship’s commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/09 in Mobile, AL.

Oct 18/09: Testing. LCS 2 Independence successfully completes builder’s trials in the Gulf of Mexico. The trials included more than 50 demonstration events in preparation for final inspection by the Navy, including stable flight deck performance and ship control in Beaufort Sea State 5 conditions, sustained speeds of 44 knots, tests of the ship’s open architecture OPEN CI electronic backbone, and detection and engagement of a simulated cruise missile fire by an small jet aircraft. Austal release | GD release | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Oct 14/09: USS Freedom to deploy. The Navy announces the decision to deploy the USS Freedom [LCS 1] in early 2010 to the Southern Command and Pacific Command areas ahead of her originally scheduled 2012 maiden deployment (see also June 9/09 entry). Military.com says that:

“In evaluating options for deploying the Freedom earlier than originally scheduled, the Navy took into consideration several key factors including combat systems testing, shakedown of the ship systems and overseas sustainment with a new concept of operations and crew training. To facilitate the early deployment, the Navy adjusted the Freedom testing schedule, prioritized testing events needed for deployment and deferred others not required for the missions envisioned during this deployment.”

LCS 2, builder’s trials
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Sept 16/09: LCS Plan #4. The Pentagon reiterates its commitment to 55 LCS ships, but changes the LCS program’s acquisition structure, again. There will be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

This timeline would not give the Navy enough time to fully evaluate the ships relative merits before it makes its selection, essentially removing the entire rationale for building 2 types of Flight 0 ships. It would also leave the ships’ overall operational utility an open question.

Colton Company’s Maritime Memos adds that the envisioned structure may face challenges, depending on which design wins. It sees Team Lockheed’s steel hull as biddable to Northrop Grumman Pascagoula, GD Bath Iron Works, and GD NASSCO, plus VT Halter Marine; and possibly Todd, Bollinger in a break-away bid, or anyone who buys Bender in liquidation. The GD Bath Iron Works/Austal aluminum-hull design requires a more specialized set of skills, however, and those ships are too wide to be built on the Great Lakes and shipped out through the seaway. Colton believes a shipbuilder would have to invest in a new yard, or partner with an established aluminum boatbuilder, such as Swiftships or megayacht builder, such as Trinity Yachts. Colton adds:

“In essence, there might not be any credible competition for a second-source contract. Since almost everyone now agrees that the Austal design is clearly superior to the Marinette design, this could give the Navy a new problem.”

It could certainly give the Austal/GD team a new problem. US DoD | The Hill magazine | Alabama Press-Register | Associated Press | Reuters | Information Dissemination op-ed: “The LCS is Still a Mess.”

Acquisition plan #4

July 30/09: Politics. At the House Armed Services Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee’s “Hearing on Efforts to Improve Shipbuilding Effectiveness,” Chair Gene Taylor [D-MS] states in his opening remarks that:

“The LCS program is still a disaster, there is no way to sugar coat it, the program is still a disaster. Those first vessels were constructed in the most inefficient manner possible, just like my house construction analogy, and now we are being told by both the contractors that the cost of these ships really is in excess of a half a billion dollars. I am not sure the Congress is willing to go forward with that program unless significant progress is made on cost control, and I do mean significant.

With the challenges being faced by all the Services in trying to reset from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Navy cannot count on additional funding for ship construction. We all need to figure how to rebuild our Fleet with the procurement dollars available. To do that all costs must come under control. Hard decisions need to be made. Soon.”

June 15/09: Inside the Navy, Vol. 22, No. 23:

“The House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee has proposed to restructure the congressionally mandated $460 million cost cap for the Littoral Combat Ship to solely include the price of each vessel [DID: and not its weapons, radars, and "mission equipment"], but if shipbuilders cannot meet the cost cap, lawmakers would require the Navy to rebid the ship.”

June 10/09: Testing. Austal announces “light off” of LCS 2 Independence’s 4 propulsion engines: 2 GE LM2500 22,000kW gas turbines, and 2 MTU 20V 8000 M71 9,100kW diesels. The light off followed fuel loading and testing of all 4 generators.

Activation and testing of the combat and other systems onboard Independence is continuing at Austal’s US facility in Mobile, AL. The beginning of sea trials is expected within a few weeks.

June 9/09: The Military Officers’ Association of America’s “Inside the Headquarters” blog says that the US Navy is thinking of deploying the LCS early:

“According to a source at Lockheed Martin, the Navy wants the USS Freedom (LCS 1) to deploy soon and well ahead of schedule. Apparently the chief of naval operations himself, Adm. Gary Roughead, has called for the move. Currently, the Freedom is not scheduled to deploy until 2012.”

The Somali coast would be the most likely destination. Efforts to move endangered weapons programs to the front lines, in order to secure a program’s future, have a long history in the US military.

June 9/09: Support. Alion Science and Technology Corp. in Washington, DC received an $8.6 million modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-09-F-B008) for support to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program office. This will include program planning and management, business and financial management planning and execution, systems engineering, test and evaluation engineering, life cycle engineering and support, logistics and operation support, configuration and data management engineering, and combat systems development.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC, and is expected to be complete by September 2009.

June 1/09: Costs. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that based on FY 2010 budget justification documents, the price to build, outfit and deliver Team Lockheed’s USS Freedom [LCS 1] now is $637 million, up from last year’s estimate of $631 million. The price tag for the GD/Austal ship Independence [LCS 2], however, rose from $636 million to $704 million. Most of the cost growth on the LCS 2 is listed under Basic Construction Cost.

LCS 1, builder’s trials
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May 22/09: Testing. The USS Freedom wasn’t able to perform a number of key Navy acceptance tests on Lake Michigan, where she was built. A 2nd round of INSURV testing was required, and the US Navy PEO Ships release states that:

“There were no major safety issues or operational restrictions determined during the trial, although the ship must complete a number of scheduled system certifications before it can conduct unrestricted operations.”

INSURV inspectors noted that since the August 2008 lake trials, the ship has made improvements to its propulsion plant, machinery control system, communication systems, and information systems. The new salt water tests allowed inspectors to check the ship’s cathodic protection, degaussing, and reverse osmosis system. Ocean conditions let them test surveillance and identification systems at a sufficient distance from land without border issues. And stepping out of a lake used for drinking water let them demonstrate the ship’s fire suppression and waste discharge systems. Other major systems and features demonstrated for INSURV this time included aviation support, small boat launch handling and recovery, fin stabilizers, in addition to the full-power run.

May 15/09: LCS for NFS? Aviation Week reports that US Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway is working with his Navy counterpart, Adm. Gary Roughead, to expand the concept of using the LCS as a naval fire support option for Marine landings.

Conway is quoted as discussing “a box of rockets” as the Marnes’ preferred option, which would seem to indicate the LCS surface warfare module’s planned NLOS-LS/NETFIRES “missile in a box” system. On the other hand, the report adds that:

“The services are still examining storage and elevator capacity aboard LCS, and Conway said “we don’t have [the] box we need.”

April 6/09: Budgets. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announces his FY 2010 budget recommendations, which include 3 LCS ships. Despite issues with the program, and concern about the ship’s combat capabilities, Gates reiterates the goal of eventually buying 55 of these $500+ million specialty support ships. The announcement bolstered confidence at Austal, which had been watching the budget deliberations closely.

March 12/09: LCS 4 named. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter announces that LCS 4 will be named USS Coronado. A 4th LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been allocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships. The Navy’s release has a picture of the GD/Austal trimaran design next to the announcement, but the announcement does not confirm that type as LCS 4.

Coronado, near San Diego, CA is home to Naval Air Base North Island (NASNI) and Naval Amphibious Base (NAB), Coronado, and has been home to the Navy since 1917. Coronado hosts 2 aircraft carriers, the west coast’s major SEAL special forces facility, and over 120 tenant commands between the 2 bases. US Navy.

March 11/09: Politics. Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week reports that one logical corollary of a “build to [blue]print” approach is that foreign shipyards might become eligible to compete for LCS construction:

“[Taylor] also noted to the conference that he’s visited other shipyards – Hyundai in Korea, Maersk in Finland – and concluded that “our yards have to get up to their [DID: highly automated] standards.” So if LCS goes to open bidding, would those shipyards be eligible to bid? “Traditionally the House has preferred to build our weapons domestically,” Taylor said, “but we’ve had a hard time getting it past Senator McCain. If I had my way I’d limit it to American shipbuilders. But I often don’t get my way.”

That statement can fairly be described as cryptic. Sweetman’s conjecture re: foreign construction is unlikely, for a variety of political reasons. Government funding for shipyard improvements, meanwhile, did not appear in the “stimulus” bill, and would be most likely to be funneled to the larger military shipyards if it was granted.

March 10/09: Politics. MarineLog reports that the Littoral Combat Ship program receives another bi-partisan rough ride at the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces. Chairman Gene Taylor [D-MS]:

“When I look at the plan from just two years ago, we should by now have at least 4 ships delivered, 3 more nearing completion from a fiscal year 2008 authorization, 6 under contract from a fiscal year 2009 authorization, and today we should be discussing the authorization of 6 more ships for fiscal year 2010. That would be a total of 19 ships. So instead of having 13 delivered or under contract with another 6 in this year’s budget, we have one ship delivered that will likely tip the scales well above two and a half times the original estimate and one ship that might finish this summer, with similar if not higher cost growth… Everyone should understand that the current situation of these vessels costing in excess of a half billion dollars cannot continue… There are too many other needs and too little resources to pour money into the program that was designed to be affordable.”

With respect to Taylor’s desire for a “build to print” approach, the answer appears to be that the government owns the rights to the ship’s physical design, but integration of all the sub-systems like the radar, Mk110 naval gun etc. is another matter. Rep. Todd Akin [R-MO] was critical of the Navy’s acquisition strategy, from the repeated changes over the last 2 years to the current strategy’s sustainability:

“We cannot reasonably expect the industry teams to make the investments in facilities and designs for affordability we demand, if we cannot articulate what we want to buy. Further, we cannot reasonably expect the taxpayers to continue to fund ships that we cannot definitively say we want… We need to be very cautious about increasing capacity for which the Navy lacks the volume to support… We must ensure that we are not creating two additional shipyards who rely on a sole customer for support. The strategy for building LCS at mid-tier yards was explicitly to avoid this phenomenon, since these yards had commercial work. Now, we hear that these yards may have turned away commercial work and are considering capital investments with the intent of constructing LCS only.”

See: MarineLog | Information Dissemination.

March 6/09: New LCS 3 named. US Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announces 6 that the LCS 3 will be named USS Fort Worth. A 3rd LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been allocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships.

The Navy says that the announcement continues the practice of naming the agile LCS vessels after American midsized cities, small towns and communities. Fort Worth, TX, near Dallas, is an especially important hub of aerospace manufacturing, but a number of other defense-related activities go on there. US Navy.

March 2/09: Industrial. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-03-C-2311) for “LCS program continuation efforts necessary to preserve production capability at its industry team shipyard facility.” Work is expected to be complete by April 2009, and will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Moorestown, NJ (13%); Clearwater, FL (11%); Brunswick, GA (10%); Washington, DC (8%) and Baltimore, MD (2%) under contract (N00024-03-C-2311).

Lockheed Martin has already delivered USS Freedom [LCS 1] to the Navy, and the Navy’s prior cancellation of LCS 3 has left that shipyard with a work gap. General Dynamics and Austal, meanwhile, continue to build LCS 2 Independence at their Gulf Coast shipyard. This award must be at least $5 million, or the Navy would not have announced it at all, but no figure was given. With respect to this award, the US Navy cites this justification for its lack of transparency:

“As this award represents efforts integrally related to Phase I of a competitive two-phased acquisition approach to procure FY09/FY10 LCS, with Phase II including potential award of up to three additional LCS Flight 0+ Class ships, the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time.”

That translates as “we’re still negotiating with Lockheed Martin and with General Dynamics for fixed-price awards, and are appropriating these funds to buy advance materials and avoid layoffs at Marinette.”

Feb 24/09: Politics. Senators McCain and Levin, who have authored legislation to reform the US military’s procurement system, single out the LCS program in their comments. CNN:

“Levin said the ships are “way beyond” their projected construction time of two years, and the program has grown from a cost per ship of about $220 million to more than $500 million, according to a November report from the Congressional Research Service. “We can’t have a ship that’s a small ship that’s supposed to be built in two years run completely out of control to double or triple or quadruple its original cost estimates,” McCain said.”

Jan 28/09: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received a $37.75 million basic ordering agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) of the USS Independence [LCS-2]. Work will include the ship’s PSA efforts, testing, and materials, from program management to advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List, and required fixes.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%); Norfolk, VA (24%); and Mobile, AL (23%), and is expected to be complete by December 2012. This contract was not competitively procured (N00024-09-G-2301).

Dec 29/08: NVR cert. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) in Houston, TX is a congressionally recognized agent of the government, and certification to set standards is one of their services. They receive a $55 million cost no fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinitely-quantity contract to provide for ship classification and classification-related services using Naval Vessel Rules (NVR), which form the core of the certification process for surface ships bought by US NAVSEA.

New construction contracts require the ships to be designed and constructed in accordance with ABS Rules for Building and Classing Naval Vessels, and other referenced ABS Rules and Guides as necessary to comply with the designated class notations. Readers of this brief will recall that the switch to NVR rules during LCS construction was one of the key factors that inflated the costs of the first ships, and raised costs across the board for the class. On the other hand, ships built to NVR standards can be expected to survive damage better than comparable non-NVR ships.

Approximately 46% of ABS’ services will be performed in support of new DDG ships in Bath, ME (GD-BIW); Pascagoula, MS; and Gulf Port, MS (NG-SS) and approximately 46% in support of future LCS new construction ships in locations to be determined. The remaining 8% of services will be performed in Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; and various worldwide points as specified in task orders to be issued. Work is expected to be completed by December 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Washington, DC (N00024-09-D-4208)

Dec 17/08: Weight. Information Dissemination relays an Inside the Navy report hat covers ongoing platform issues in “LCS Weight Issue Revisited“. From Inside the Navy:

“In October, Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss confirmed that initial tests by the Navy were showing the vessel to be six percent overweight, but maintained that it was not cause for concern… “There’s stuff on board that I don’t think we need,” Gabrielson said. “There’s some pretty big things on board that I think we could live without.”

Oct 31/08: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a $37.5 million Basic Ordering Agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) on the Littoral Combat Ship, USS Freedom [LCS-1]. The orders to be issued will encompass services include, but are not limited to program management, advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, and preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List. The orders will also encompass material and labor to perform the PSA for LCS 1, all testing, including post repair trials required to verify the accuracy and completion of all shipyard industrial work, non-standard equipment when approved, and technical manuals for non-standard equipment.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%) and Norfolk, VA (47%), and is expected to be completed by January 2011. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, D.C. (N00024-09-G-2300).

Oct 24/08: The Freedom [LCS 1] sails away from the Marinette Marine Corp. shipyard in Marinette, WI, en route to Duluth, MN for a four-day port visit beginning Oct. 27. This will be the first leg in the ship’s voyage of commissioning and transit to Norfolk, VA, where she will undergo fleet testing and evaluation away from the Great Lakes’ ice buildups. Maritime Reporter and Engineering News.

Oct 4/08: LCS 2 christened. The Austal/General Dynamics ship LCS 2 Independence is christened in a ceremony at Austal’s Mobile, AL shipyard. US Navy PEO Ships release | Austal release.

Team GD LCS Concept
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September 2008: The US Navy has the appropriated funds to build an additional LCS ship, but decides not to issue that contract. Source.

No FY 2008 ship

Sept 30/08: Infrastructure. R. A. Burch Construction Co., Inc. in Ramona, CA received $6.5 million for a firm-fixed-price task order under a previously award multiple award construction contract. They will be responsible for upgrading Building 57 for the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) squadron administrative headquarters at Naval Base San Diego. The task order also contains one option, which if exercised would increase cumulative task order value to $8.7 million.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by April 2010. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, and 3 proposals were received for this task order by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA (N62473-08-D-8607, #0005).

Sept 18/08: LCS 1 delivered. The Lockheed Martin-led LCS team delivers LCS 1 Freedom to the U.S. Navy. The delivery milestone marks the Navy’s preliminary acceptance of LCS 1.

Sept 4/08: CSBA Cool to LCS Concept. WIRED Danger Room’s post “Navy Already Shifting Away from Shallow Waters?” forwards an analysis by Bob Work, naval analyst at the respected, nonpartisan CSBA think tank in Washington. He sees the same pressures that turned the Navy against the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer program impinging on the future of the Littoral Combat Ship:

“The maritime area over which a strong coastal power can now influence with multidimensional, combined-arms naval reconnaissance-strike complexes is expanding. The combination of space-based sensors, over-the-horizon radars, maritime [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], patrol and strike aircraft, nuclear and [Air-Independent Propulsion] submarines armed with wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles, and now anti-ship ballistic missiles, poses severe threats to any surface ship. Under these circumstances, the Navy has to improve its ability to fight from range, in the open ocean.”

July 31/08: CRS report. In testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee, Dr. Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office discusses the LCS program to date [PDF]:

“The Navy’s 2009 shipbuilding plan envisions building 55 littoral combat ships between 2005 and 2019. Because those ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the Navy would need to begin procuring their replacements in 2032… The Navy expects to buy 64 mission modules for the 55-ship program.

…Originally, each sea frame was expected to cost about $260 million (in 2009 dollars, or $220 million in 2005 dollars). The Navy’s 2009 budget would allow the purchase of 18 LCSs during the 2009-2013 period, at an average cost of about $450 million per sea frame. That is 11 fewer than the 2008 plan envisioned… In the 2009 budget, the Navy estimates the cost of LCS-1 at $631 million and LCS-2 at $636 million… using the lead ship of the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate as an analogy… The first FFG-7 cost about $670 million to build (in 2009 dollars), or about $250 million per thousand tons, including combat systems. Applying that metric to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $600 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module… CBO estimates that the first two LCSs could cost about $700 million each, including outfitting and postdelivery costs… As of April 27, 2008, LCS-1 was 87% complete and LCS-2 was 72% complete. So, additional cost growth is possible…”

July 30/08: What happened to LCS? Naval Technology’s article “Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground” offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state. In brief, it states that:

“Distilling the story yields the following guide to botching development projects in five steps [...];

1. Make the goal as difficult as possible
2. Impose a management style ideally suited for commoditised products
3. When sourcing, be penny-wise and pound-foolish
4. Design and build simultaneously
5. When you’re in a hole, keep digging

[...] Perhaps the moral of the LCS story is this: the US can produce better ships, or produce ships better – but it can’t do both at the same time.”

July 28/08: Testing. LCS 1 Freedom begins builder’s trials on Lake Michigan. US Navy release | Reuters Aug 12/08 follow-up.

April 28/08: LCS 2 launched. Austal USA’s Mobile, AL shipyard launches LCS 2 Independence. The ship will be moored alongside the Austal USA facility for activation and testing of combat and other onboard systems is completed. Sea trials are expected to commence in late 2008. Austal release.

March 14/08: Controversy. The odds don’t look good for the US Navy’s FY 2009 request of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. The house Armed Services Committee’s Seapower & Expeditionary Forces subcommittee took testimony regarding that request, and the LCS request came under fire from both sides of the aisle. See “US Navy’s 313-Ship Plan Under Fire in Congress” for full links etc. Chairman Rep. Gene Taylor [D-MS], a strong proponent of more naval shipbuilding:

“So, instead of being asked to fund programs that are building ships on time and at projected cost, we are asked to fund programs which are not… [the LCS] will go into the textbooks to train future acquisition officials how not to run a program. The LCS will be at least twice as expensive as advertised, it has taken twice as long to build the lead ships, neither vessel has been underway on its own power, and the Navy cancelled two contract options last year, which were already funded, because of cost overruns.

Yet this year we are asked to authorize two more ships – why? What has changed between then and now that indicates that this program is in any way ready to build more ships? We have been told the answer to this question is that there is an ‘emergent need’ for these ships in the fleet. If that is true why did the Navy cancel two of the ships? At some point we must stop throwing money at this program until the Navy can prove that at least one of the ships can get to sea and do its mission.”

Ranking minority member Roscoe Bartlett [R-MD] was equally skeptical:

“And how much risk are we buying down if we procure two more Littoral Combat Ships, the year after we cancelled two, and the year in which the Navy plans to conduct an operational evaluation and possible downselect of LCS-1 and 2? Even if there is no downselect, the Navy has stated that there will be design changes made to the Flight One ships. So the two we buy now will be different than the remaining 50. Is that worth it, if those funds could keep a stable program like LPD-17 alive?”

Feb 4/08: Costs. FY 2009 budget documents released by the Navy give the expected final cost for its LCS-1 and LCS-2 ships: $631 million and $636 million, respectively. First-of-class ships usually cost more – but recall that prescient July 24/07 estimate of $630 million from the Congressional Budget Office.

Oct 11/07: Israel. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that the Israeli Navy “has launched a second study regarding the potential acquisition of the United States Navy’s (USN’s) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) focused on Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull design known as LCS-I (Israel). “That design appears to be the most suitable for our needs,” a senior IN source told Jane’s…”

See “An LCS For Israel?” for full coverage.

GD: Helicopter space
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Sept 27/07: Sub-contractors. Small business qualifier ALCOA Inc. in Alcoa Center, PA received an $8.3 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee completion contract to provide engineering services in support of the re-design of existing aluminum structures to improve performance and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) via weight reduction of selected assemblies or components. Work will be performed in Alcoa Center, PA (84%); Johnstown, PA (11%); Columbus, OH (3%); and various shipyards (2%), and is expected to be complete in September 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $3.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, West Bethesda, Md., is the contracting activity (N00167-07-D-0010).

This contract will fund the Alcoa Collaborative Design Approach (ACDA), a phased program approach in which the following tasks will be applied to the LCS: selection of candidate assemblies and components; development of conceptual designs and down selection of design concepts; evaluation of design concepts and final selection; development and evaluation of prototypes; and ship integration. The components for improvement may include hull sections, doors/hatches, load floors, foundations, large apertures or similar structures.

Alcoa has considerable expertise in this area, having worked closely with Lockheed Martin on a very similar effort re: the F-35B Lightning II STOVL fighter.

Still, one wonders why, exactly, this has become a priority for the LCS program? The Dec 17/08 entry suggests that weight reduction was the goal.

Sept 24/07: LCS 2 issues. Newhouse News Service reports that “Navy inspectors have documented numerous problems with construction of a next-generation vessel known as the littoral combat ship, or LCS, according to government records obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act.” They are referring specifically to the General Dynamics/ Austal ships, and proceed to detail these issues in “Navy Inspectors Find Numerous Problems With Ship Project.”

Some of these items are “normal” issues that inspectors exist to catch, others are less so. Note, especially the time frames of the issues raised, as many date from 2006 and predate subsequent reports.

Sept 21/07: LCS 4? Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the US Navy and General Dynamics are expected to meet next week to discuss the LCS program:

“GD spokesman Kendall Pease confirmed the Navy had asked for the meeting but provided no further details, other than to say a specific date had not been set. Other sources, however, said the meeting was to discuss slowing construction on LCS 4, the second ship GD is building at its Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, Ala.”

The Navy was forced to reimburse Team Lockheed for a number of expenses after canceling LCS-3, and they are reportedly trying to restructure the deal with the GD/Austal team to avoid paying those costs in the event that LCS-4 is canceled. If the parties cannot agree, the Navy could always choose to cancel LCS-4 on those grounds, and pay the minor reimbursement fees that would be involved at this early stage. The downside is that a second cancellation decision would leave the entire LCS program in tatters, either turning it into a 1-ship each “sail off” competition, or throwing the entire program back to the drawing board.

Aug 8/07: Cost growth. US Navy acquisition chief Dolores Etter said in an interview with Reuters that General Dynamics is about 54% done with its first ship [LCS-2], which is due to be delivered in mid-2008. She also stated that “We … continue to see challenges with the program and with each platform, specifically with the propulsion system on LCS-1 and systems integration on LCS-2.”

With respect to the GD/Austal team’s effort to rein in costs, she said that “We do have points at which our concern will go up. You can’t predict what will happen, but things are moving forward in a good direction” in terms of the firm’s efforts to rein in costs.

Meanwhile, Reuters adds that US Navy officials have asked lawmakers to approve a 55% increase in a cost cap for the 5th and 6th LCS ships, to $460 million. They also said costs for the first Lockheed ship and GD’s LCS-2 could be up to 75% higher than expected. Reuters article: “US Navy sees progress on General Dynamics LCS ship.”

July 24/07: CBO Report. In a statement before the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Congressional Budget Office representatives testify that [PDF format]:

“Experience had suggested that cost growth was likely to occur in the LCS program. In particular, historical cost-weight relationships – using the lead ship of the Oliver Hazard Perry class of frigates (FFG-7) as an analogy – indicated that the Navy’s original cost target for the LCS was optimistic. The first FFG-7, including its combat systems, cost a total of about $650 million (in 2008 dollars) to build, or about $235 million per thousand tons. Applying that per-ton estimate to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $575 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module (to make them comparable to the FFG-7). In this case, looking at cost-weight relationships produced an estimate less than the apparent cost of the first two LCSs but substantially greater than the Navy’s original estimate.

As of this writing, the Navy has not publicly released an estimate for the LCS program that incorporates the most recent cost growth, other than its request to raise the cost caps for the fifth and sixth ships. CBO estimates that with that growth included, the first two LCSs would cost about $630 million each, excluding mission modules but including outfitting, postdelivery, and various nonrecurring costs associated with the first ships of the class. As the program advances, with a settled design and higher annual rates of production, the average cost per ship is likely to decline. Excluding mission modules, the 55 LCSs in the Navy’s plan would cost an average of $450 million each, CBO estimates.”

DID background: The FFG-7 frigates are still widely touted as a successful example of cost containment. The Oliver Hazard Perry Class met their budget and performance targets and served successfully. The USS Stark even survived a hit from an Iraqi Exocet missile while patrolling the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. The ships paid a price in lower capability and lack of space for capability growth, however, and many were sold to other countries or retired early because upgrading them was too difficult. That experience was one of the inspirations for the LCS’ open-architecture, mission modules approach.

Feb 28/07: Costs. Reports surface that the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS design is also expected to face cost overruns, although the scope of the increases is not yet clear. Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter had said the first General Dynamics LCS ship would cost $350 million or more, but Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, Etter’s spokesman, said in an e-mail that:

“Etter mistakenly characterized the cost of LCS 2 to be $350 million or more. The estimated cost range of LCS 1 is $350 million-$375 million, as previously testified. That estimate is based on the best information to date. There is insufficient information to know precisely the final cost range of LCS 2… Although we anticipate some cost growth, it is premature to discuss specific numbers as they are unavailable at this time.”

Etter described Team Lockheed’s LCS-1 Freedom as 75-80% complete, and the GD/Austal team’s LCS-2 Independence as about 33% complete. Reuters report | Defense News report (March 20/07).

Jan 12/07: Stop Work on LCS 3. “The Navy issued a stop work order Jan. 12 to Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors unit, Moorestown, N.J., for the construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This stop work order will take effect immediately, and is for a period of 90 days. The stop work order was issued because of significant cost increases currently being experienced with the construction of LCS-1 and LCS-3, under construction by Lockheed Martin…”

The US Navy says they are “working closely with the contractor to identify the root cause of the costs growth… [and] reviewing the overall acquisition strategy for the LCS program…” At this point, the GD/Austal team’s trimaran design and build-out of LCS 2&4 are unaffected. See full DID coverage with all updates, not to mention the Lexington institute’s predictive December 2006 report “Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy.”

Oct 17/06: The FY 2007 defense budget is signed. LCS funding is not cut, but remains at $520.67 million

LCS 1 Freedom christening
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Sept 23/06: LCS 1 launch. The US Navy christens and launches LCS 1 Freedom, the nation’s first littoral combat ship, at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin. The ship will continue to undergo outfitting and testing at Marinette Marine; it will be commissioned in 2007 and eventually homeported in San Diego, CA. The ship’s sponsor is Birgit Smith, wife of the late Medal of Honor recipient U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul Ray Smith.

July 26/06: CRS report. The US Congressional Research Service releases its report “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress.” Meanwhile, as negotiations in Congress go forward, The House-reported version of the FY2007 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5631) recommends approval of this request. The Senate reported version recommends a 2-ship cut by funding just one LCS in FY 2007, and rescinding funding for 1 of the 3 LCSs procured in FY 2006.

April 13/06: Israel. Israel is considering Lockheed’s Littoral Combat Ship design. Specifically, they’re considering Lockheed’s monohull design as a potential replacement for their Saar Class corvettes and missile boats. A funded initial study is underway to assess feasibility, and integration with Israeli systems and weapons is critical.

Jan 19/06: LCS 2 keel. GD/Austal Lays Keel for LCS 2. Austal USA hosts a traditional US Navy keel-laying ceremony to signify the start of construction on the first Flight 0 General Dynamics/Austal LCS trimaran. The keel laying follows on the heels of the official November 17, 2005 opening of Austal USA’s ship construction facility in Mobile, AL. See also General Dynamics team lead press release.

Dec 2/05: The U.S. Navy announced that USS Freedom [LCS 1] will be homeported at Naval Station San Diego, CA when it enters service. The ship is expected to be delivered to the Navy in December 2006, and arrive in San Diego in early 2007. See US Navy release.

Skjold Class
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June 2/05: LCS 1 keel. Lockheed Lays Keel for LCS 1, USS Freedom. This is the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design, and the ceremony was attended by numerous dignitaries. This event is related the Dec 15, 2004 shipbuilding contract, of course.

April 11/05: Bath Iron Works prepares for construction. Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $16 million cost-plus-fixed-fee option to previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310 for the advance procurement of required Long Lead Material for the first “Flight Zero” models of General Dynamics’ trimaran Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design. The contract award for Long Lead Material includes a description of the items to be procured, the supplier, the required ordering date, supplier lead-time, in-yard need date and a breakout by month of the dollar amounts required. Work is expected to be complete in September 2005.

June 6/04: LCS 1 design. Lockheed unveils latest version of its LCS design.

Visby Corvette
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July 17/03: Preliminary Designs. The following 3 companies out of 6 offers won firm-fixed-price contracts for Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship Preliminary Design:

General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME (N00024-03-C-2310 – $8.9 million)

Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems, Surface Systems in Washington, DC (N00024-03-C-2311 – $10 million)

Raytheon Company Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI (N00024-03-C-2312 – $10 million).

Each contractor will perform a preliminary design effort to refine its proposed Littoral Combat Ship concept. Work is expected to be complete in February 2004. The 3 losing teams include Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Gibbs and Cox (who would join the Lockheed team), John J McMullen Associates, and Textron Systems Marine & Land Operations.

The biggest surprise is the absence of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, who was working from an already-proven littoral corvette design by Sweden’s Kockums AB, and its German parent Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG. Kockums designed and is building Sweden’s Visby Class littoral warfare corvettes, and Northrop Grumman planned to use the stealthy carbon fiber mono-hull as the baseline for its LCS program.

Preliminary design contracts

May 21/03: Lockheed Martin holds an Industry Day to solicit potential members for its LCS team. Its base design concept is then known as “Sea Blade.”

March 4/03: Lockheed lays foundation for LCS team. Lockheed Martin, naval architects Gibbs & Cox, Bollinger Shipyards and shipbuilders Marinette Marine formally partner on the LCS program. The Lockheed release contains details of their respective areas of responsibility and past work.

September 2002: Skjold. US Navy finishes studying Norway’s Skjold (“Shield”) Class air cushion catamaran littoral fast patrol boats. The ship completed a 13-month deployment in the USA, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea. The ship participated in a series of naval exercises and a number of tests with US Navy research establishments NAVSEA and the Office of Naval Research.

March 25/02: Sea SLICE. Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel participates in naval exercise. The vessel participated as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons, as does this GlobalSecurity.org Sea SLICE profile.

LCS Ancillaries: Equipment, Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events

Griffin launch
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Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

Some items are covered separately. The helicopter-based portions of the MCM module will be covered in full at “MH-60S Airborne Mine Counter-Measures Continues Development“, but notes and link entries may also appear here for some events, in order to provide an integrated timeline perspective or reference specific ships. The same is true for Raytheon’s RAM air defense and surface attack missile, and its Griffin missile.

Note that the structure of weapon contracts like the RAM, Mk-46, Mk-110, etc. may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship. Inclusions here should be considered illustrative, therefore, rather than comprehensive.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. The Navy owns 3 MCM (mine, 1st delivery Sept. 2007) and 4 SUW (“surface warfare”, 1st delivery July 2008) mission modules, and has completely re-started the ASW anti-submarine module. Several of the sub-systems in these modules are still experiencing performance problems, many components are still in development, and the Navy has yet to fully integrate these technologies and test them on board an LCS in a realistic environment. In October 2012, DOD delegated future decision authority to the Navy and requested an acquisition program baseline within 60 days – which was not delivered on schedule.

MCM: The Navy plans to accept 1 more in 2013, but it doesn’t meet requirements. The MH-60S helicopter can’t tow the AQS-20A sonar as planned, the WLD-1 USV has performance issues, the ALMDS laser system gets too many false positives from surface reflections, and the RAMICS gun and OASIS decoy are out. Nonetheless, the Navy describes recent MCM tests as “very successful”. The Navy plans to conduct developmental testing in FY 2014 and establish initial operational capability with 7 MCM modules in September 2014. Full operational capability isn’t expected until 2018, when the Navy is expected to have 21 LCS ships, of 30 ordered.

SUW: Does not meet requirements. At the moment it’s just the 57mm gun up front, a pair 30mm guns, a helicopter, and an 11m RHIB small boat for boarding teams. This is about what a coast guard cutter carries, and it still won’t reach initial operational capability before September 2014. Even the Griffin missile with its miniscule 3 nm range isn’t expected before 2015, and a competition for a missile with a more serious tactical range isn’t expected before 2019.

ASW: Canceled and has been restarted. The Navy plans for initial delivery in 2016, and full operational capability in 2018. The design is stripped down, involving a ship-based variable-depth sonar, towed array, and towed torpedo decoy for defense.

March 18/13: IOC delays. Jane’s quotes director of navy staff Vice-Admiral Richard Hunt says that the Continuing Resolutions have “delayed us probably a year for IOC [initial operational capability] for a couple of those different modules…”

March 15/13: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $28.6 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission packages. To date, those efforts haven’t gone very well, with many technologies failed out and no truly ready sets over 7 years after development began.

Work will be performed in Portsmouth, VA (32%); Huntsville, AL (25%); Bethpage, NY (21%); Manchester, NH (11%); Silver Creek, NY (10%); Hollywood, MD (1%), and is expected to be completed by September 2014. All monies are committed immediately, using FY 2012 Navy Operations & Maintenance funding (N00024-06-C-6311).

Jan 17/13: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The LCS mission modules still have a lot of issues. There isn’t anything left to test any more in the ASW anti-submarine module, for instance, so DOT&E didn’t report on it while the Navy considers a re-start.

Mine Warfare: Begin with the MH-60S helicopter, which isn’t powerful enough to safely tow the AQS-20A sonar or OASIS decoy under all of the required conditions. Both are being removed from AMCM, and OASIS is removed from the MIW module. This would seem to be the epitome of a forseeable/ easily testable problem, but it’s being “discovered” 7 years after development began. Why?

The AQS-20A will now depend on the WLD-1 RMMV snorkeling USV, which is trying to correct its reliability and performance issues by 2015. RMMV v4.1 is showing some improvements in limited testing, but the ships themselves need to make changes to launch and recover it while underway. The AQS-20A sonar has its own problems with contact depth calculations in all modes, and with false contacts in 2 of 3 search modes. The Navy hopes to find AQS-20 engineering fixes. Meanwhile, in order to reduce those errors, the Navy will have to slow its scan methods and reduce the area covered.

The AES-1 ALMDS laser mine-detection system doesn’t meet Navy requirements for False Classification Density or reliability, and the DOT&E expects to issue a formal test report in Q2 FY2013. The Navy hopes to find engineering fixes. Meanwhile, in order to reduce those errors, the Navy will have to slow its scan methods and reduce the area covered. Some reports suggest that ALMDS will be cut entirely, but the raft of other MCM system casualties may force the Navy to keep it.

Surface Warfare: Still useless against anything ut a lightly-armed motorboat, but that’s beyond GAO’s purview. What they do say is that the Navy hasn’t not finalized any tactical idea of how the ships will be used with the SUW mission module. Even within this limited set, the MK46 “30 mm guns and associated combat system exhibit reliability problems,” and the Freedom Class has performance deficiencies with its COMBATSS-21 combat system and TRS-3D radar that affect tracking and engagement of contacts.

Dec 28/12: RMS. Lockheed Martin in Riviera Beach, FL receives a $12.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to perform Remote Minehunting System/WLD-1 USV maintenance, testing and integration with the with Littoral Combat Ship. The WLD-1 is currently working on improving its reliability and performance, after falling short in these areas.

Work will be performed in Palm Beach, FL (87%), and Syracuse, NY (13%), and is expected to be complete by May 2013. $5.3 million is committed immediately, and $295,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-10-G-6306).

Dec 20/12: AMNS. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI receives a $7.9 million contract modification, covering AMNS’ Critical Design Review.

Work will be performed in Portsmouth, RI, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. All contract funds are committed immediately, and $4.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US NAVSEA in Washington DC in is the contracting activity (N00024-10-C-6307).

Feb 15/12: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives an $18.7 million contract modification to provide LCS Mission Module engineering and production planning services. “Mission package capabilities are currently focused on primary mission areas of mine warfare emphasizing mine countermeasures, littoral anti-submarine warfare, and littoral surface warfare operations, including prosecution of small boats.”

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (45%); Washington, DC (20%); Panama City, FL (20%); Ventura County, CA (10%); and Dahlgren, VA (5%), and is expected to be completed by December 2012. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract.

Feb 10/12: Armed USVs. US Navy expeditionary warfare division branch chief Capt. Evin Thompson says that they are looking to arm their MUSCL (Modular Unmanned Surface Craft Littoral) USV unmanned boats with RAFAEL’s Spike anti-tank missile. Navy officials initially tested the weapon’s performance during the Trident Warrior exercise, aboard a USV originally designed as part of the LCS anti-submarine warfare package.

RAFAEL’s Spike packs roughly equivalent range and punch to the LCS’ Griffin missiles, with some variants having longer reach. MUSCL does look a bit light for it, but could certainly carry DRS/NAWCAD’s Spike missile. At this point, despite the involvement of the LCS PEO, there are no plans to deploy a USV/missile combination on LCS. AOL Defense.

Dec 19/11: MIW – WLD-1. Lockheed Martin announces the end of the 1st of 3 planned development and testing cycles, involving 500 hours of reliability testing on the U.S. Navy’s WLD-1 RMMV. These efforts are aimed at improving the Remote Minehunting System’s reliability and operational availability, which have been a serious problem for the sonar-towing snorkeling USV. A recent $52.7 million contract will continue the program to improve its reliability until 2013. Read “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development” for more.

Nov 7/11: Griffin replacement? Inside the Navy reports [subscription] that the Griffin missile will be part of LCS’ initial surface warfare module, but a competition will begin in 2012, and:

“The program executive office for the Littoral Combat Ship has already identified capabilities that could replace the Griffin missile…”

IAI’s Jumper (vid. May 16/11 entry) comes to mind, and there appear to be others.

Sept 30/11: SMCM UUV. General Dynamics AIS in McLeansville, NC wins a $48.6 million contract with cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and firm-fixed-price line items for the engineering, manufacturing and development of the Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (SMCM UUV, aka. “Knifefish”).

This will be a new part of the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mine Counter-Measures package, and includes 2 of Bluefin Robotics’ large Bluefin-21 UUVs, launch and recovery equipment, a support container, spare parts and support equipment, and an advanced sonar payload developed by GD-AIS. Read “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development” for more.

Aug 25/11: A not-to-exceed $161 million contract modification to previously awarded contract for MK15 Mod 31 SeaRAM missile systems to equip the Independence Class ships LCS 6 Jackson and LCS 8 Montgomery, and Japan’s “DDH 2405 helicopter destroyer”; as well as Phalanx CIWS Block 1B class “A” overhauls, and land-based Phalanx Weapon System class “A” overhauls. See the linked article for further details.

Aug 1/11: RAM. A $7.4 million contract modification for 3 refurbished and upgraded RAM MK 49 Mod 3 Guided Missile Launch Systems with associated hardware, for use on LHA 7 (unnamed, America Class escort carrier, 2 systems) and LCS 5 Milwaukee (Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship, 1 system).

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete by March 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00024-11-C-5448). Note that the structure of RAM contracts may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship.

July 21/11: MIW – UISS. The US Navy announces the successful completion of shore-based and at-sea integrated system tests on the prototype Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) USV and payload in Panama City, FL. UISS is designed for the LCS as part of the mine countermeasures mission package, supplementing the helicopter-based AMCM system. The system consists of an unmanned surface craft that carries and tows the combined acoustic and magnetic minesweeping payload.

The Phase 1 Sweep Operational Checkout was very basic, testing that UISS can be deployed and retrieved from Textron’s Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), and that it tows the acoustic and magnetic Sweep Power Subsystem properly. The first phase of testing was completed on July 1/11; Phase II is currently ongoing, and the summer test program will include a full signature test and full mission profile that demonstrate minesweeping capability. US Navy | Textron Systems.

May 16/11: SUW. An Israeli answer for LCS missiles? Israel Aerospace Industries’ MLM Division announces that they’ll present a new maritime application for their Jumper missiles-in-a-box system at IMDEX Asia 2011, the Singapore International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference. Like Raytheon’s cancelled NLOS-LS, the Jumper missiles are launched from an 8-round Vertical Launcher Hive (VLH) mounted on a ship’s deck, a truck, or on the ground. The missiles then use GPS/INS and optional Laser guidance to hit targets at ranges of up to 50 km/ 30 miles, using fragmentation or penetration warheads.

Jumper had been showcased beginning in 2009, but as a land weapon. Its naval capability and good range is likely to draw interest from several quarters, but to play on the LCS, IAI would have to offer a lower-cost solution than Raytheon’s NLOS-LS PAM. IAI release | UPI | IAI’s Jumper page.

May 12/11: SUW – Griffin. Inside the Navy reports:

“The Navy may not have settled on the Griffin missile to replace the canceled Non-Line-Of-Sight missile on the Littoral Combat Ship, despite the service’s announcement in January that it planned to use the missile for both a short-term and long-term solution to the capability gap, officials told Inside the Navy last week…”

May 2/11: Alion Science and Technology announces a 3-year, $4.6 million contract from the US Naval Air Warfare Center Training System Division, to develop a PC-based training system for LCS-2 Independence Class Readiness Control Officers.

Alion will be developing the system based on its LCS-1 Freedom Class LCS RCO solution, but a number of changes are necessary because it’s a different ship design. It is intended that the LCS-2 RCO will ultimately integrate with the LCS Shore Based Training Facility in San Diego, CA.

April 13/11: Mk-110. BAE Systems announces a contract from Austal to supply various communications systems and its 57mm Mk 110 gun system, for use in the Independence Class as orders come in.

General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems has had BAE Systems as a major partner for LCS communications systems since 2004. The Mk110 gun is used in both LCS classes, along with its accompanying Mk 295 pre-fragmented, 6-mode programmable, and proximity-fused (3P) ammunition that makes it useful against aerial or surface targets. A corresponding January 2011 contract covered gun systems for Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class.

Feb 14/11: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman will assemble LCS mission packages at Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA. The mission module supplier team will comprise:

• Earl Industries in Portsmouth, VA (ISO TEU 20′ containers; Electrical systems)
  
• Excelco in Silver Creek, NY (WLD-1 RMMV capture spine)
  
• Granite State in Manchester, NH (RMMV cradles)
  
• Smith Brothers in Shelby Township, MI (Maintenance stand assemblies mission module hardware)
  
• Teledyne Brown, Huntsville, AL (gun mission modules).

The end items from each of those companies will be shipped to Port Hueneme, where a Northrop Grumman-Navy team will complete the assembly of each package.

Jan 24/11: MIW – RAMICS. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the RAMICS supercavitating 30mm cannon for killing shallow mines may be next on the chopping block, after performing poorly in testing. It would be replaced by the AMNS system, which would do double duty against both shallow and deep water mines using Archerfish towed kill vehicles, packing 4 shaped charges each.

The tradeoff would be one of greater performance certainty, cost certainty, timely delivery, and commonalty with AMNS; vs. the ability to engage more shallow water mines in far less time by using a RAMICS system that worked.

Jan 11/11: SUW – Griffin. Media report that the U.S. Navy is moving towards selecting Raytheon’s Griffin missile as the replacement for the cancelled NLOS-LS, instead of taking over that program’s development now that the Army has pulled out. USN surface warfare division director Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe told a Surface Navy Association convention audience in Arlington, VA that a 6-month review had settled on this Raytheon product, as something that can hit targets at “acceptable” ranges and cost.

That recommendation must be endorsed by the Navy before anything comes of this; if they do, the service would field the existing very short range Griffin by 2015, and try to develop a longer range version later. See “Raytheon’s Griffin Mini-Missiles” for in-depth coverage.

Jan 7/11: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a an $18.3 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission modules.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (20%); Ventura, CA (6%); and Dahlgren, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. $1,51 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00024-06-C-6311).

Jan 6/11: NLOS-LS canceled. As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and cost savings over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announces the proposed cancellation of NLOS-LS, among many other programs. The Army had pulled out by the point, and the Navy considered picking up the program, but apparently decided against it. Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | Pentagon release.

MK46 naval

Sept 28/10: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $28.8 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission modules. Work will be performed in Huntsville, AL (56%), and Bethpage, NY (44%), and is expected to be complete by September 2012 (N00024-06-C-6311).

Aug 31/10: GAO Report. US GAO report #GAO-10-523 on the LCS program sees problems. “Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities.” Key excerpts:

“Navy analysis of anti-submarine warfare systems has shown the planned systems do not contribute significantly to the anti-submarine warfare mission… Mission package delays have also disrupted program test schedules – a situation exacerbated by early deployments of initial ships… Further, the Navy has determined that an additional capability will be incorporated into future anti-submarine warfare mission packages. The existing anti-submarine warfare mission package procurement is temporarily suspended, and performance will be assessed during at-sea testing in 2010… To date, most LCS mission systems have not demonstrated the ability to provide required capabilities.”

With respect to USS Freedom’s [LCS 1] Surface Warfare module tests:

“The surface warfare mission package onboard LCS 1 has yet to be fully integrated with the seaframe and lacks key capabilities necessary to defeat surface threats. For example, the 30-millimeter guns have undergone testing with the LCS 1 seaframe, but have yet to be fully integrated with the ship’s combat suite. Also, while the guns provide a close range self-defense capability, Navy officials report LCS 1 is currently unable to automatically transfer tracking data from the ship’s radar to the 30-millimeter guns.”

Current plans involve just 8 partially-capable mission modules delivered by the end of FY 2012, instead of the 2007 plan of 11 partial and 5 fully-capable mission modules. As of August 2010, 5 partially-capable packages have been delivered: 2 Mine Warfare (MIW), 2 Surface Warfare (SuW), and one anti-submarine (ASW). The planned changes by end FY 2012 break down as follows:

MIW: From 3 partial and 1 full capability by FY 2012 to 3 partial.
SuW: From 6 partial and 3 full capability by FY 2012 to 4 partial.
ASW: From 2 planned and 1 full capability by FY 2012 to 1 partial.

One of the rationales behind the LCS mission module approach was precisely this decoupling of onboard payload development with ship fielding and development, so delays in one don’t create delays in the other. At the same time, the Navy now plans to purchase 17 ships and 13 mission packages between FY 2011 – 2015, which would leave the Navy with whose payloads and effectiveness are unproven.

Aug 5/10: SUW – Mk.46. The first MK-46 30mm gun module is installed aboard USS Independence [LCS 2]. US Navy PEO-LMW.

July 2/10: ASW – towed sonar. DRS Sonar Systems, LLC in Gaithersburg, MD received a $9.7 million firm-fixed-price contract to develop a high search rate variable depth sonar (VDS) for installation on the littoral combat ship. This contract includes options which would bring its cumulative value to $12.7 million.

The VDS will include a rugged specialized handling system with an articulating arm and capture mechanism, that can handle a towed body the size and weight of a small car. The towed active subsystem consists of a hydro-dynamically stable tow body, a tow cable, handling and stowage equipment, and acoustic transmit assemblies. The sonar must be able to survive high sea states, work in deep water while being towed at flank speed, and possess enough power to detect submerged submarines.

Work will be performed in Gaithersburg, MD (10%); Panama City, FL (20%); and Stockport, UK (70%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. This contract was competitively procured, with 3 offers received by the US Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division in Newport, RI (N66604-10-C-0675).

June 2/10: Mk-46. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. in Woodbridge, VA receives a $22.3 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed fee contract for the MK46 MOD 2 gun weapon systems (GWS) and associated hardware, spares and services.

There are several Mk46s in the US Navy, but this one is a 30mm enclosed turret packing a Mk44 Bushmaster chain gun and advanced sights. It equips the US Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (Mk46, MOD 0), LPD-17 San Antionio Class amphibious ships, and the Littoral Combat Ship surface warfare package. This contract covers both naval platforms, where the turret is operated from a console inside the ship.

Work will be performed in Woodbridge, VA (69%); Tallahassee, FL (12%); Lima, OH (12%); Westminster, MD (4%); Scranton, PA (2%); and Sterling Heights, MI (1%). Work is expected to be complete by May 2013. $812,412 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10. This contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Sea Systems Command, in Washington, DC (N00024-10-C-5438).

April 2/10: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Bethpage, NY received a $17.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission packages and “improve mission capability in identified mission areas.”

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (12%); Hollywood, MD (12%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by March 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $1.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

April 1/10: ASW – WLD-1 out. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009. One of the changes is to the Remote Minehunting System (WLD-1) in the Mine Warfare suite:

“The PAUC (Program Acquisition Unit Cost) increased 79.5% and the APUC(Average Procurement Unit Cost, no R&D) increased 54.6% to the current and original [baselines] as a result of a reduction in production quantities, the use of an incorrect average unit cost as a basis of estimate in the 2006 program baseline calculation, and an increase in development costs needed to address reliability issues. The Navy re-evaluated the capabilities of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and decided to eliminate the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) from the ASW Mission Package. This decision reduced the total number of RMMV production units from the program baseline quantity of 108 to the current quantity of 54. The increase in development costs was needed to address reliability problems, which arose during an operational assessment in 2008.”

This level of overage is a critical breach, a.k.a. Nunn-McCurdy breach for the legislation that forces the Pentagon to certify the program’s fitness to continue, and provides for potential Congressional involvement.

March 30/10: GAO update. The US GAO issues report #GAO-10-388SP, its 2010 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. Regarding the LCS’ mission packages, the mine countermeasures package is either yet to be tested in a realistic environment (Surface USV, OASIS towed emitter, RAMICS cannon), or cannot meet system requirements (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System USV). With respect to other modules:

“The Navy has accepted delivery of partially capable Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Surface Warfare (SUW), and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) mission packages. Overall, operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW packages requires a total of 22 critical technologies, including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 5 weapons.

…The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable SUW(SUrface Warfare) mission package in July 2008. This package included two engineering development models for the 30 mm gun, but did not include the Non-Line-of- Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) launcher or missiles. Integration of the gun with LCS 1 was completed in January 2009… The program expects delivery of the second SUW mission package in March 2010. It will include the 30 mm gun module and the NLOS-LS launcher, but no missiles.

The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable ASW mission package in September 2008, but plans to reconfigure the content of future packages… recent warfighting analyses showed that the baseline ASW package did not provide sufficient capability to meet the range of threats… The first package underwent end-to-end testing in April 2009 and will undergo developmental testing in fiscal year 2010. During the 2009 end-to-end test, the Navy found that the USV and its associated sensors will require reliability and interface improvements to support sustained undersea warfare.”

See also DefenseTech re: NLOS-LS issue.

Feb 26/10: SUW glitch. The NLOS-LS PAM missile Limited User Test (LUT) run from Jan 26/10 – Feb 5/10 at White Sands Missile Range, NM has 2 direct hits, 2 misses with causes known and corrected, and 2 misses still under investigation. That reportedly makes 23 PAM missiles fired with 14 direct hits so far, though not all firings were designed to hit a target. A Pentagon Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting in March 2010 is expected to discuss this issue, and determine a way forward.

If the missiles cannot be made to work as advertised, the Littoral Combat Ship’s existing problems with poor armament would become far more severe. Since it lacks a built-in Vertical Launch System, such as the Mk.41 VLS with ExLS adapters for NETFIRES missiles, substituting other missiles for the NETFIRES launcher package would require ship redesign and modifications. Aviaiton Week Ares | Defense News | Defense Tech.

Jan 25/10: ASW – VDS. FBO solicitation #N6660410R0675 for a variable-depth towed sonar to equip the LCS:

“The Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport has a requirement to develop and field a high search rate tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability in the form of a Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) for installation on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). A major component of the VDS System is the Towed Active Subsystem (TAS) consisting of a hydro-dynamically stable tow body, tow cable, handling and stowage equipment and acoustic transmit assemblies. The TAS shall be an existing product that is modified to meet the LCS integration and installation constraints identified in the performance specifications. The objective of this procurement is to fabricate, install, test and support the TAS and its integration with the VDS system.”

Feb 9/09: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY received a $16.6 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311). They will continue to provide integration services for the ships’ mission module packages.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%), Washington, DC (26%), Panama City, FL (12%), Hollywood, MD (12%), San Diego, CA (2%), and Dahlgren, VA (1%) and is expected to be complete by September 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $3.3 million will expire on Sept 30/09.

NETFIRES Concept

Sept 19/08: ASW rollout. The Navy rolls out its new Anti-Submarine Warfare mission module package in a ceremony at Naval Base Point Loma Naval Mine & ASW Command Complex in San Diego, CA. US Navy release

Aug 13/08: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., in Bethpage, NY receives a $16.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311). This continues funding for mission module integration services, using a spiral development approach of rapid, incremental improvements.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (32%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (15%); Hollywood, MD (15%); San Diego, CA (5%); Dahlgren, VA (5 percent); and Newport, RI (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2009.

Aug 10/08: Northrop Grumman Corporation announces that the NGC/US Navy team has completed the successful installation of the Mission Package computing environment into LCS-1 Freedom in June 2008. Northrop Grumman employees installed and tested the computing environment itself, which comprises 4 racks of processing hardware and the classified and operational software that runs the package. A system check indicated that the computing environment was operating properly, and that communication with the ship’s infrastructure was complete.

Each mission package needs only 15 personnel, plus 23 aviation detachment personnel for the helicopters.

July 21/08: Launch & Recovery. General Dynamics Robotic Systems announces a contract from the USA’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) to develop the LCS’ Common Launch and Recovery System (CLRS) for unmanned boats and other watercraft. The firm is already designing and building the 11m USV that is slated for use as part of the ships’ anti-submarine mission module.

Oct 22/07: Defense News reports that Lockheed Martin is testing the LCS-1 Independence’s ability to load containerized mission modules and other equipment into the mission bay area. On Oct 10/07, their Moorestown, NJ facility ran a successful test of their COMBATSS-21 combat system’s ability to load the mine warfare mission package software. NAVSEA is continuing work on software for the other 2 initial mission packages: anti-submarine, and anti-surface warfare.

The article also covers Israel’s ongoing interest in the Lockheed Martin LCS design. See “An LCS For Israel?” for more details regarding that spin-off program.

Oct 12/07: MIW – issues. The US GAO audit office has some news re: the mine warfare module, the LCS’ first mission module. It seems some changes will be required:

“…For example, operation of mine countermeasures systems is currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the [Littoral Combat] ship, which could affect the ship’s ability to execute this mission. In addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only limited capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However, because the Navy recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems from two to one per ship, operational availability for these systems may decrease below current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures mission package currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require the Navy to accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and the concepts of operation it can likely execute.”

Sept 26/07: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, N.Y. receives a $15.4 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This modification supports the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Module Program Office (PMS 420), Program Executive Office, Littoral and Mine Warfare.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2008. Contract funds in the amount of $113,338, will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Sept 25/07: SUW Go-ahead. The Navy announces that it is moving forward with development of the LCS Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package, which it describes as “designed to combat small, fast boat terrorist threats to the fleet.” The announcement lists the components as:

“…electro-optical/infrared sensors mounted on a vertical take off unmanned air vehicle to provide over-the-horizon detection; 30mm guns to kill close-in targets; four [4] non-line-of-sight launching system (NLOS-LS/ “NetFires”/ “missile in a box”) container launch units, with each system containing 15 offensive missiles; and the MH-60R armed helicopter for surveillance and attack missions. The SUW mission package has software that interfaces with the LCS command and control system to maintain and share situational awareness and tactical control in a coordinated SUW environment… The first two SUW mission packages assembled for developmental and operational testing use the Mark 46 30mm gun made by General Dynamics Amphibious Systems.”

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren division is the technical direction agent for the SUW mission package, with NSWC Port Hueneme division providing integrated logistics and testing support. NAVSEA release.

April 2/07: MK-110. BAE Systems in Minneapolis, MN announces its second contract from General Dynamics to supply a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system as the main gun fitted to the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship [LCS 4]. The contract is worth $7.2 million, and includes options such as spare parts and training. The gun is scheduled to be delivered in 2008.

The gun’s Mk 295 ammunition allows the system to perform against aerial, surface or ground threats, with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute. The Mk 110 is designed to have minimal deck penetration, and can be operated directly or by remote control. BAE Systems has now received 3 contracts from the LCS program contenders, for a total of 4 gun systems. Note that the structure of MK.110 contracts may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship.

Jan 5/07: GD’s Open Data Model. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems has delivered the Littoral Combat Ship Open Data Model to the U.S. Navy for inclusion in the Software Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository, with unrestricted rights for re-use by any other Navy program.

The Open Data Model is a critical open architecture component of the General Dynamics LCS computing environment. By using the Open Data Model, any company’s products can be integrated into the General Dynamics LCS quickly and efficiently, creating ease of integration and upgrade, as well as a continuous competitive environment that improves capabilities, lowers costs, and avoid’s platform lock-ins.

With this delivery, the SHARE repository now provides a vehicle for any company interested in bringing their technology to the General Dynamics LCS to gain access to the Open Data Model. In addition, the Open Data Model is now available as the basis of a published open architecture solution for any other Navy programs looking to reap the benefits afforded by open architecture, advancing the Navy’s growing focus on open architecture ship systems. EE Times report.

Oct 20/06: MIW – WLD-1. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors (MS2) Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY received a $13.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-05-C-6327) for in the development, demonstration and integration of the Remote Mine-hunting Vehicle (RMV) with the anti-submarine warfare systems mission module, and for production of 4 installation and checkout kits with supporting equipment for 4 RMV units. This module will is part of the Littoral Combat Ship ASW mission package, and the RMVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91-96 and LCS Class ships.

The RMV is also known as the WLD-1, a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines; with slight adjustments, the system can perform active anti-submarine scans as well. Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY (80%) and Riviera Beach, FL (20%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington in Washington, DC issued the contract.

Oct 19/06: ASW – USVs. a $12.7 million contract for 4 Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), for the Littoral Combat Ship’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Module. General Dynamics Robotic Systems will develop them. This contract follows a similar May 1/05 contract for up to 4 USVs; see below for further details, or just flip to DID’s dedicated coverage – and some of GDRS’ competitors in the USV field.

Oct 13/06: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Bethpage, NY receives a $15.5 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The US Navy’s plan is to use spiral development to improve mission capability on an ongoing basis, which is much easier since LCS mission packages can be developed and acquired separately from the ship itself. Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. See also DID’s Jan 5/06 entry.

(click to view full)

Aug 25/06: SUW – NETFIRES. Netfires LLC of Grand Prairie, TX received a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for $54.8 million as part of an estimated $1.15 billion contract to procure the NLOS-LS Naval Littoral Combat Ship Integration, System Development and Demonstration. Work will be conducted in Tucson, AZ and Baltimore, MD, and will be complete by Aug. 31, 2010. The U.S. Army Aviation & Missile Command issued the contract (W31P4Q-04-C-0059). See also Raytheon’s Aug 29 release.

Aug 22/06: Engines. Rolls Royce announces that its Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines will power LCS 3, the second Lockheed Martin-designed Littoral Combat Ship. The order also includes 4 of its Kamewa waterjet systems. These systems were also installed in Team Lockheed’s LCS 1 Freedom, so the only surprise would have been a change.

July 31/06: MIW – WLD-1. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY receives $23.4 million as part of the remote minehunting system (RMS) program (N00024-05-C-6237) to service 3 WLD-1 remote minehunting vehicle (RMV) UUVs. As noted above, the WLD-1 is a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines. The RMV/UUVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91 through DDG 96 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, as well as the LCS.

April 10/06: Israel. Lockheed Martin announces a $5.2 million NAVSEA study studied Team Lockheed’s LCS hull, mechanical, and engineering systems’ ability to accommodate the systems and weapons the Israelis want, while avoiding the need for major redesign of the USA’s basic configuration.

The final answer was that it could, with some obvious modifications to accommodate better radars and vertical launch systems for missiles. See “A Littoral Combat Frigate For Israel?” for more.

April 4/06: SeaRAM for Independence. Raytheon Company announces that it will install the SeaRAM anti-ship missile defense weapon system on General Dynamics’ trimaran design for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). SeaRAM combines upgraded Phalanx Block 1B close in weapon system radar & infrared sensors and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1A Helicopter, Aircraft, and Surface (HAS) guided missiles. Raytheon will work with General Dynamics to integrate SeaRAM with the LCS combat management system.

Note that the structure of RAM contracts may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship.

April 2006: ASW – Sea Talon. The Navy’s Sea Talon Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) system successfully completes a series of testing milestones offshore from Lockheed Martin’s Riviera Beach, Fla., facility.

Sea Talon is part of the LCS the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission module. Using 2 Remote Minehunting Vehicle (RMV) semi-submersibles developed under the AN/WLD-1 Program, Sea Talon creates an unmanned, distributed, underwater sensor network that uses unmanned vehicles for sensor deployment and sensor data communications. For Sea Talon, the RMVs are being fitted with the Remote Towed Active Source (RTAS) and the Remote Towed Array (RTA). Once fitted with these sensors, Sea Talon rapidly detects, tracks, classifies and localizes quiet diesel submarines in littoral waters, while conducting above-water persistent situational awareness and transmitting real-time data to U.S. Navy ships.

Sea Talon involves no new major technology development, but leverages already developed technologies from the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System, the AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 surface sonar program, towed array sonar development, and common software baselines. The April tests demonstrated that the RTA and RTAS could be towed at multiple depths, and that the RMV’s stability was not affected during the towing of the active source and passive source receiver at various speeds and depths. July 15/06 PEO-LLMW release.

Jan 5/06: Mission modules integrator: NGC. Northrop-Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY is awarded a 10-year, cost-plus award-fee/ award-term contract serve as mission package integrator for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Modules program. The contract has a potential dollar figure of $159 million, and the FY 2006 portion of the contract award is $4.5 million. DID covers N-G’s mission modules integration contract in more depth.

July 6/05: COMBATSS-21, Flight 0. Lockheed Martin announces that they’ve completed their COMBATSS-21 combat management system’s software. COMBATSS-21 supports the FORCEnet initiative within the USA’s Seapower 21 doctrine, and uses an open architecture system that reuses proven components from Lockheed Martin, the US Navy, domestic industry and international industry. By leveraging off-the-shelf components, Lockheed Martin claims to have achieved greater than 95% software reuse, completing the Flight 0 COMBATSS-21 software well ahead of ship installation and below budget.

Lockheed Martin says they will continually evaluate new components for COMBATSS-21, which they’ll use for the Navy’s LCS, DD (X) Destroyer program, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program, and other US and international ships.

May 1/05: ASW USVs. GD gets an order for up to 4 ASW USVs. An $8.5 million contract covers the first 2 vehicles, with options for raising that contract to 4 USVs and $11.3 million. The USVs will be used as part of the LCS Anti-Submarine Warfare module, employing towed arrays, dipping sonar sensors and acoustic sources as payloads.

General Dynamics Robotic Systems is a subsidiary of General Dynamics Land Systems. The company plans to adapt its land robotics command and control system for the new USVs; indeed, Scott Myers President Scott Myers cited this expertise as a key reason the Navy chose them.

June 29/04: GD announces core missions systems & software team. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems announces the open-architecture core mission systems team for the General Dynamics design of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Core mission systems infrastructure is a flexible information technology backbone for operating the ship as a whole that allows “plug and play” integration of custom-designed software modules for specific functions. GD AIS’ focus is on making it easy to integrate new modules by using non-proprietary standards and commercial middleware software as the key interface:

• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD is responsible for the ship’s internal and external communications systems, as well as topside antenna modeling and mission module interface coordination.

• CAE USA Inc. Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA, is responsible for the ship automation and control system. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD is responsible for the Integrated Combat Management System (ICMS).

• General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products in Charlotte, NC is responsible for “all of the weapons and effectors.”

• General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Canada is responsible for the above- and below-water sensors.

Appendix A: LCS’ Yo-Yoing Budgets & Program Structures

LCS 1, final construction
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In July 2011, the Navy created PEO LCS to oversee the program, headed by Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch. Ship construction supervision was removed fro PEO Ships, while mission module supervision was removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which was dissolved. It wasn’t the first big change in the program – and may not be the last. Indeed, in August 2012 the Chief of Naval Operations added a council tasked to come up with a plan.

It is normal for programs to change elements like numbers ordered, but not to change the entire buy strategy. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what the LCS program has done. Several times.

Early plans for much cheaper ships would have built them from 2005 – 2019, but the extent of the program’s timeline and budgetary issues can be inferred from the current production timeline: 2011-2040.

How the US Navy arrived at that plan is a very tangled, but very instructive, story of goals not met, budgets changed or not spent, and an acquisition plan that has now been changed several times.

The LCS program’s budget mess has reflected their yo-yoing underlying program structure. LCS budgets are not even suitable for inclusion as a table, because the program’s structure has changed repeatedly. For several of those years, program turmoil was so great that it prevented budgeted funds from being spent. As such, each year’s budget can only be understood in light of the program’s shifting plans.

Plan #1: 13 ships. Under the original vision, Team Lockheed and the General Dynamics/Austal consortium would each produce a number of fully operational, competing Flight 0 ships. The idea was that experience with these ships is the best teacher and evaluator, ensuring that the Navy selects the right winning team for the overall program. It would also begin an immediate expansion of the US Navy’s falling numbers, since all of the Flight 0 ships would be available after the testing phase was complete. The design approach for the winning team’s second generation Flight 1 LCS ships would be flexible, and was envisioned as changing somewhat in light of the experience gained with the Flight 0 designs. Initially, 4 Flight 0 ships and 9 Flight 1 ships were contemplated, along with a purchase of various mission modules.

In FY 2005, Congress approved the Navy’s plan to fund the construction of the first 2 competing LCS sea frames, funded LCS-1, required LCS-2 to be built to a different design when funded in FY 2006, and added other basic stipulations.

The FY 2006 budget was $1.054 billion ($470.3M procurement, $584.1M RDT&E). The Navy had initially asked for LCS-2, but shipbuilding supporters in Congress funded LCS 2-4. As the program progressed, however, new Navy shipbuilding standards, and other shifts in specifications, caused LCS ship prices to rise sharply. As ship costs doubled, and then continued to rise, political scrutiny grew. In response, legislators inserted an adjusted $220 million cost cap on LCS 5-6, and made that buy and any others contingent on Navy certification of a stable LCS design.

Plan #1a: The FY 2007 budget was $926.6 million ($597.2M for ships & mission modules, $329.4M RDT&E). Congress funded LCS-5 and LCS-6. Austal’s Dec 11/06 press release even implied that more early-build ships might enter US Navy plans:

“Recent Navy reports have speculated on an expanded acquisition strategy, from 4 to a possible 17, for the Flight 0 fleet of LCSs that also includes an alternate monohull ship design. Commenting in September, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Dr Delores Etter, told Reuters, ‘The U.S. Navy hopes to finalize its acquisition strategy for a new class of shore-hugging combat ships by mid-December [2006].’ “

Plan #2: Bailing out. In March 2007, however, the US Navy canceled Team Lockheed’s LCS-3 due to cost growth. In November 2007 (technically, FY 2008), the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS-4 joined it. A Navy policy of requesting fixed-price contracts, coupled with specifications and designs they could keep changing at will, created a gap too large for negotiations to bridge. Contracts for LCS 5 & 6 were never issued.

Under the Navy’s revised approach, planned FY 2007-2008 procurements would be channeled into getting LCS 1 & 2 built, rather than buying additional ships. Instead of buying 3 more LCS ships in 2008, and then ramping up to 6 ships per year in 2009 – 2012, amended procurement plans proposed to buy 1 ship in 2008 and 2 ships in 2009. Under that Plan B, the 2 consortia would compete for orders, with 2 ships contracted to the winning builder and 1 for the loser. A down-select to 1 design would take place in 2010.

The FY 2008 request was set at $1.208 billion ($990.8M for 3 ships + 2 mission modules, $217.5M RDT&E); but the Navy’s cancelations and revised procurement strategy led to $337.1 million in funding for a single LCS – a contract the Navy never issued. Meanwhile, Congress had raised the per-ship cost cap to $460 million, and required fixed-price-type contracts for LCS ships bought from here on.

Where to now?
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Plan #3: Fog of war. The FY 2009 request was $920 million, for 2 LCS ships. The final 2009 defense bill increased that funding to $1 billion. Once again, however, the Navy’s LCS procurement plan changed. Now, it planned to buy 2 LCS ships in 2009, with an option for Phase II that could involve up to 3 more LCS Flight 0+ Class ships on the same terms in 2010. Those Phase II ships would likely be split between the contractors, but could be issued for just 1 design.

Congress added some relief by delaying the implementation of the LCS cost cap to FY2010, but contract negotiations must have been interesting. Neither manufacturing team had demonstrated the ability to deliver an LCS ship for $500 million, and the Navy was insisting on fixed-price contracts that transfer all risk to the shipbuilders. Both contracts (LCS-3 and LCS-4) were eventually signed in 2009, but the Navy decided that their terms needed to be kept secret.

That seems likely leave just 2 Flight 0 LCS ships in the water before the revised LCS program was supposed to pick one final design. Or not. Under terms that remained unclear.

Additional reports added even more uncertainty. First came reports that that final selection might even feature a design competition that would be separate from the build competition, which means the ship’s design team may not be the final builders. That kind of competition is called “build to print,” in which the government buys the blueprints and then contracts for construction separately. Of course, handing a new ship design to a firm that hasn’t built it before carries cost-inflation risks of its own. The question is whether the potential threat of switching suppliers creates enough added incentives to keep costs down, in order to justify the increased time, overhead, and added program risk inherent in running 2 serial competitions instead of 1.

The FY 2010 budget requested $1.877 billion ($1.38 billion for 3 more ships, $136.7M for mission modules, plus $360.5M RDT&E which includes $75.5 million to cover cost growth on LCS 1-2). The program ended up with $1.579 billion: $1,157 million for all procurement of 2 ships and mission modules, and $422.0 million for RDT&E.

Plan #4: 10 + 5. In September 2009, while the House and Senate were working on reconciling their FY 2010 defense bills, another major change to the program’s structure was announced. There would be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

Assuming that this program would remain intact, the FY 2011 request was for $1.819 billion with RDT&E would be $226.3 million, while $1.592 billion for procurement would fund 2 ships ($1.2 billion), advance orders for FY 2012-14 major hull and propulsion components ($280 million), and mission modules (remainder, about $112 million).

Plan #5: Dual-build 20. Naturally, the proposed procurement approach changed again. Upon examining the bids, the US Navy went to Congress and asked for permission to accept both 10-ship bids, buying 20 ships for an advertised price that was about the same as the estimates for the 15 they had wanted. The GAO and CBO both have doubts about those estimates, in part because the Navy is still changing the designs; but the contracts are underway. For better or for worse, the Navy finally has an approach that is actually buying ships.

The Navy’s FY 2011-15 plan called for 17 ships total in a 2, 3, 4, 4, and 4 sequence, though that may rise to 20 ships. The Navy’s longer-range shipbuilding plans would buy 3 LCS hulls per year from FY 2016-19, dropping to 2 per year from FY 2020-24, then dropping again to a 1-2-1-2 pattern for FY 2025-33. The program would finish up at 2 per year from FY 2034-40.

Because these ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the 10 ships bought from 2036 – 2040 would be replacements for the original ships of class.

Unless, of course, the entire acquisition plan changes again. The graph below shows how estimates of the total program cost have fluctuated as the Navy changed its procurement structure, again and again:

FY12 Forecast: US Navy Comptroller
No such data released in May 2009 document

The projected costs and cost/unit, include outfitting and post delivery costs, which explains why they’re above the widely-used Total Obligational Authority (TOA) numbers. At more than $1.3 billion over the life of the program, these extra costs are hardly pocket change

Additional Readings & Sources

The Littoral Combat Ships: Basic Program & Ship Background

• U.S. Navy LCS site

• FedBizOpps.GOV (Jan 27/10, #N0002410R2301) – 19–Fiscal Year 2010 through 2014 Littoral Combat Ship Construction. The current RFP.

• General Dynamics/ Austal – LCS mini-site.

• Austal – Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS-2 Independence Class. There’s also a team site, but parts of that aren’t current.

• Austal – Advanced Seaframes for Littoral Security [PDF] http://www.austal.com/Libraries/Newsletters-Presentations-Presentations-and-Publications/Advanced-Seaframes-for-Littoral-Security.pdf

• Lockheed Martin – LCS Team. LCS mini-site.

• Lockheed Martin – Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS-1 Freedom Class.

• Naval-Technology.com – Littoral Combat Ship LCS High-Speed Surface Ship

• GlobalSecurity.org – Littoral Combat Ship.

• USN – Littoral Combat Ships – Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package

• USN – Littoral Combat Ships – Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package

• USN – Littoral Combat Ships – Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package

• Information Dissemination (July 10/07) – The US Navy’s PF-109 “Patrol Frigate” Program. Which led to the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, as the low end of US surface combatant force structure during the 1970s and 1980s. Says the LCS program isn’t imitating the FFG-7′s successes. Then again, compare this contention with the CBO’s July 24/07 testimony, which compared the first-of-class ships of each type in FY 2008 dollars, and found that LCS was cheaper.

• NDIA’s National Defense Magazine (March 2010) – Builders of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Pull Out All the Stops. Offers a good side-by-side comparison of the 2 ship types.

• DID (March 19/07) – Cost Growth Puts the Brakes on the USA’s Littoral Combat Ship Program. And causes both cancellation of Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, and a revised LCS program plan. Not to mention a continued threat to the overall program, if costs remain near $400 million while weapon capabilities remain so limited and inflexible.

• International Hydrofoil Society (Sept 23/04) – NAVSEA Presentation re: Littoral Combat Ship Program [PDF format]. Includes visuals ad information related to mission modules, program structure & timelines, and the two competing teams.

• DefenseLINK (May 28/04) – Special Department of Defense Briefing re: Littoral Combat Ship Program. Good discussion of the program as a whole and procurement approach, as well as how the modules were envisioned to work.

• US Naval Institute, Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS. But note esp. Vice-Adm. Mustin & Katz’ warnings about the possibility of a failed “high-low” force mix. By 2013, that warning had come true.

LCS Exports

• General Dynamics – international variant brochure, dating from when they were teamed up with Austal [PDF].

• Lockheed Martin – Multi-Mission Combat Ship. LCS for export, but with real weapons and an improved radar. Comes in varying sizes: 85m (corvette), 118m (light frigate, like LCS), and 150m (full frigate). See also their older LCS-Israel brochure [PDF, 4.27 MB], offering a design that removes the Mk110 gun while adding a 30mm gun system like the Typhoon, Harpoon missiles, Barak anti-air missiles, and strike-length Mk41 vertical launch cells.

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/multi-mission-combat-ship.html

• DID Spotlight – A Littoral Combat Frigate for Israel? The Israelis wanted a very different approach. No mission modules. Full fleet defense capabilities, including vertical launch cells and a SPY-1F AEGIS radar. Anti-ship missiles, and torpedo tubes. Problem was, the ship was too expensive for them.

• Aviation Week Ares (Oct 18/08) – Lockheed Martin Pushes Export LCS. With a long list of offered and potential changes to armament, layout, and even propulsion. Market demand in the rest of the world appears to be delivering some design verdicts.

Official Reports

• USN Undersecretary Robert Work (January 2013: DRAFT) – The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why. Scribd copy of the early draft.

• US Congressional Research Service (Aug 10/12 update, #RL33741) – Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress.

• DOTE – FY2011 Report: LCS [PDF]

• US Congressional Budget Office (Dec 10/10) – Cost Implications of the Navy’s Plans for Acquiring Littoral Combat Ships [PDF]

• US GAO (#GAO-11-277T, Dec 14/10) – Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of Risks

• US GAO (#GAO-11-249R, Dec 8/10) – Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program

• US GAO (#GAO-10-523, Aug 31/10) – Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities

• Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (March 3/10) – Littoral Combat Ship: An Examination of its Possible Concepts of Operation” [PDF]. CSBA is one of Washington’s most respected think tanks, and lives up to its non-partisan billing.

• US GAO (#GAO-10-257, Feb 2/10): “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.”

• Information Disemination (Jan 11/10) – Streetfighter 2010: The New Navy Fighting Machine. See also full study GoogleDoc. NNFM is an ONA funded study in which 9 members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty attempted to develop a force structure that reflected the vision in the USA’s “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” by building an illustrative fleet on paper.

• US Naval Postgraduate School, John P. Baggett Thesis (March 8/08) – Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) operating independently in the Pacific.

• US GAO (#GAO-08-13, Oct 12/07) – Report to the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities” [PDF]

• US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces (July 24/07) – Congressional Budget Office, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security and Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst: The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs [PDF format]

• US GAO (#GAO-07-943T, July 24/07) – Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs.

• US GAO (#GAO-07-406SP, March 30/07) – Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. LCS is one, and this study is an annual release. Here is the March 30/06 version.

• US GAO (#GAO-06-587T March 30/06) – Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range Shipbuilding Plans

LCS Program: Analysis and Stories

• Naval Technology – Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground.” Offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state. Written in July 2008.

• Harold Lee Wise – Inside the Danger Zone: the US Military in the Persian Glf, 1987-1988. An excellent book that outlines the kind of situation LCS was supposedly built for. Unfortunately, gaps in the required mine warfare capabilities, low damage tolerance, and station/support capacities leave doubts concerning the LCS’ ability to handle the same situation as well as the less expensive cobbled-together solutions used at the time; esp. the very successful converted barge Hercules.

• G2mil – Diesel Electric Corvettes. Highly critical of the LCS program. Core of the criticism: “The LCS is the size of modern frigate and bigger than destroyers of World War II, yet has the armament of a patrol boat in order to accommodate the mysterious ultra high-speed requirement… The US Navy should scrap the current LCS plan in favor of slower, smaller, and more capable DE [diesel-electric] corvettes based on the Visby class corvette design and supported by tenders [vid. Yellowstone Class AD-41]“

• Information Dissemination – Evolving towards a 21st Century Surface Action Group. He suggests a set (LPD/LSD Mothership + DDG-51 + T-AKE + 2 frigates/ 4 corvettes + 2 LCS as support for the flotilla) derived in part from some of the principles laid down by Sir Julian Corbett. “Ultimately, I do not see the LCS as is capable of meeting the requirements the Navy is demanding from it. The LCS is too expensive to buy the number of littoral ships needed to dominate that battlespace. The LCS is too big to be risked in the littorals during wartime, not to mention having survivability problems if thought of or treated as a warship. The LCS is too small to deploy the number of unmanned vehicles necessary to be effective, and cannot repair those systems when they break. That does not make the LCS a poor addition to the flotilla, rather it would be a smart addition, if utilized in a way that supported a credible approach to littoral warfare.”

• WIRED Danger Room (Jan 4/11) – Navy’s New Warship: Bargain, Death Trap or Both?

• Aviation Week (Jan 3/11) – Common LCS Combat Systems Debated

• US Naval Institute blog (Jan 2/11) – The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment… Also discusses the lessons of past naval littoral combats.

• Gannett’s Navy Times (Dec 19/10) – Analysis: Navy mum on multiple LCS system issue. Refers to the combat systems.

• James Hasik (Dec 10/10) – Is buying two types of littoral combat ship good for the US Navy?

• Defense Tech (Sept 27/10) – Is LCS Dying a Slow Death?

• Information Dissemination (Sept 9/10) – Red Flags Everywhere”

• Information Dissemination (Sept 3/10) – What the GAO LCS Report Reveals. In his opinion, systemic and serious cultural problems in the Navy.

• Lexington Institute (Sept 7/10) – Littoral Combat Ship: It’s The Mission Packages, Stupid:

• Reuters (Jan 20/10) – EXCLUSIVE: Early tests show Lockheed LCS problems-report. The Pentagon’s testing reports say that neither LCS design will meet requirements for survivability in a combat environment. The report also details other class issues.

• Defense News (Jan 17/10) – Failing the Littoral Challenge: LCS Capabilities, Cost Miss the Boat. By Charles W. Robinson. “To counter these limitations, we urge testing of a littoral mission unit (LMU) by activating a military transport, the Cape Mendocino, which, with minor modifications, could transport four or more Street Fighters to areas of threat. This vessel would also serve as their mother ship.”

• Defense News (Jan 8/10) – Aluminum Glitters Inside 2nd Littoral Combat Ship Variant. Chris Cavas takes a tour.

• US Naval Institute’s Proceedings Magazine (September 2009) – No Need for High Speed. Contends that over-emphasis on speed has gravely damaged the LCS’ ability to carry out several necessary missions.

• Information Dissemination (Sept 29/09) – The Day the LCS Was Promoted to Warship With AEGIS ships sliding toward missile defense roles, but naval action groups needing protection, the current LCS leaves the US Navy with no in-between options that ca pick up the slack.

• Information Dissemination (July 17/09) – May 10th, 2019: Missing Nelsons Cruisers. Scenario illustrates the hole in US Navy force planning.

• Mobile, AL Press-Register (April 15/09) – LCS could be a pirate’s nightmare. But the article adds appropriate caveats.

• WIRED Danger Room (Nov 9/08) – Rosy Future for Navy’s Troubled Shoreline Fighters? Based on conversations with CSBA’s Bob Work.

• Armed Forces journal – Think Small. “A force of the new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), when they enter service in the next decade, will not significantly increase the Navy’s capabilities in conducting littoral warfare. This bad situation can be changed by building or acquiring a force composed of multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft.”

• Information Dissemination (Sept 13/07) – Littoral Combat Ship: 2 + 2 +3 – 4 = 2 plus 1

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral combat ship could slip behind schedule as price tag nears $500 million. “As Congress battles over the Defense Department’s budget, lawmakers have signaled their displeasure at LCS cost overruns and delays. The number of littoral combat ships that policymakers allow the sea service to buy in 2008 could portend whether the program uprights itself in the next few years, say analysts.”

• Lexington Institute (Nov 28/06) – Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy [PDF format]. Washington think-tank offers an in-depth look at the LCS as the Navy’s most transformational program, and the key program challenges that must be overcome in order for the LCS program to be successful.

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral Combat Ship Troubles: Opportunity for Small Boat Companies? “The Navy’s really trying to think, ‘do we need a vessel in between the LCS and the riverine,’ and I think in the end, they’re going to say, yes they do,” says Robert Work, senior naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” The Stiletto experimental ships are cited as one likely gap-filler.

• DID (April 12/06) – The Lion in Winter: Government, Industry, and US Naval Shipbuilding Challenges. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter discusses US shipbulding plans and challenges. The LCS is referenced as an important trend and exemplar.

• The Fourth Rail (April 27/05) – Of Pirates and Terrorists

• Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (June – Sept 1992) – The Value of Warship Attributes in Missile Combat

LCS Ancillaries & Auxilliaries

• Anthony G Williams – Naval Armament: The MCG Problem. MCG = medium-caliber gun. There has been a global divergence of views re: what 55mm-155mm naval guns should be for, and therefore which characteristics should be stressed. BAE’s 57mm gun, which will equip the LCS, falls firmly on one side of this debate.

LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development. Covers AMCM and the MIW package. DII Spotlight article.

• Lockheed Martin – COMBATSS-21 Combat Management System. Used in the Freedom Class, based in part on Lockheed’s Aegis. The Independence Class has a different system.

• DID – Raytheon’s Griffin Mini-Missiles. The NLOS-LS replacement, with just a 3 nautical mile range. Has already been mounted on some Cyclone Class patrol boats.

• DID – Cheap, Fast, Deadly: The NETFIRES “Missiles in a Box” Program (updated). DII FOCUS on NLOS-LS. Canaceled.

• DID – RAM Missiles: Contracts & Events. Will provide the LCS’ primary defense against aircraft and missiles.

• Military.com (Nov 1/07) – LCS to Carry Marines?

• Lockheed Martin (July 10/06) – Lockheed Martin Sea Talon Program Achieves Key Milestones Toward Deployment As Littoral Combat Ship ASW Mission Module. Since abandoned.

• DID (May 4/06) – $8.5M for 2 Littoral Combat Ship Anti-Submarine USVs. Since abandoned.

• DID (Jan 9/06) – N-G Gets $159M Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Integration Contract. Covers the mission module program’s structure, and the MIW, ASW, and SUW modules as envisioned back then. Much has changed since.

• Seapower Magazine (December 2005) – Navy Custom Tailors Crew Training for Littoral Combat Ship.

• DID (Dec 2/05) – Sub-Finding Sensor Nets Get A Step Closer. Covers the ADS, or Advanced Deployable System. Abandoned due to technical issues, and realizations that static nets were not the way to go.

• DID (Oct 20/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. Updated to include a number of related anti-submarine warfare technologies, most of of which will find their way onto the LCS fleet or will interface with it.

• DID (Oct 17/05) – The Fire Scout UTUAV Program: By Land and By Sea (updated)

• DID (Sept 23/05) – Navy Launches Final Development of Bluefin 21 UUV. It would appear in the LCS years later, as the mine warfare module’s “Knifefish”.

• DID (Sept 20/05) – Raytheon Receives $55M to Put New Mine Detection Sonar Into Production. The WLD-1 UUV and AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar are still the expected combination, but WLD-1 RMMVs aren’t expected to be ready until 2015 – and as of 2013, the AQS-20 still has some serious kinks of its own.

• DID (Sept 15/05) – $124.5M for 3 Airborne Laser Mine Detection Systems (Updated). These will be carried on the LCS, which will become an operational center for up to 5 MH-60S helicopters equipped with the AN/AES-1 ALMDS system. As of 2013, ALMDS is still having serious problems with false positives.

• DID (May 18/05) – Spartan USVs for Singapore’s Navy. These sorts of developments helped shape the USN’s thinking.

• C4ISR Journal (July 2004) – Design Work Proceeds on LCS Mission Modules: Suites will allow quick switches for pressing threat

Related American and International Programs

• Danish Navy – Flyvefisken Class (1989-), aka. Standard Flex 300

• Naval Technology – Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) Multi-Role Vessels, Denmark

• Danish Navy – Absalom Class (2004-). These multi-role ships can act as frigates, minelayers, command ships, hospital ships, or even as small roll-on/ roll-off landing ships thanks to their “Flex-Deck” and other features.

• Naval Technology – Skjold (“Shield”) Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats, Norway. One of these air cushion catamaran ships completed a 13-month deployment in the USA before the LCS program got underway, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea.

• Naval Technology – Visby Class Corvettes, Sweden

• DID FOCUS – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward

• US Navy PEO Ships – FAQ: JHSV vs. LCS

• DID – Dead Aim, Or Dead End? The USA’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Program. FOCUS Article.

• DID – Russia & China Building Littoral Warships. The Chinese Type 022 wave-piercing catamaran fast attack craft is a potential littoral opponent. The Russian Project 2038 Steregushchiy (“Guarding”) Class, on the other hand, may well represent a true export competitor.

• Boston Globe (April 19/09) – The (smaller, faster, cheaper) future of sea power. Which may be significantly smaller and cheaper than the LCS.

• Defense News (Oct 25/05) – Ship Shows Off Danish Navy’s ‘Transformation’ Re: Absalom Class ships.

• DID (March 4/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines is forcing doctrinal changes, as well as new technology programs. Quite a few of these new programs will find their way onto the LCS, or interface with it.

• Sea Classics, via FindArticles (November 2004) – Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Contracts Awarded – What Does It Mean To The US Navy?

• Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey (Dec 2003) – “Sea Swat”: A Littoral Combat Ship for Sea Base Defense

• Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS

• Melana Zyla Vickers at FOXNews (Oct 14/03) – High Seas Robbery. Covers the need for the LCS program.

• Melana Zyla Vickers at TechcentralStation (May 6/02) – Naval Overkill. She thinks the DD (X) is, but the LCS and Streetfighter programs aren’t.

• Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine (November 2003) – Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII – Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet. Gives good background re: the releationship of the links that follow to the LCS program, and how that kind of effort fits in with the US Navy’s new naval doctrine.

• GlobalSecurity.org – HSV Program for high speed troop carrier vessels (incl. WestPac Express and TSV ships TSV-1X Spearhead and HSV-2 Swift). Given that “HSV-2″ is also a designation for a variety of Herpes Simplex STD, it is possible that this designation will change to a TSV variant once the ship class is firmly established.

• DID (Nov 24/05) – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward

• DID (Sept 27/05) – UAVs, Blimps, and HSV-2, Oh My! It would not surprise us at all if the semi-autonomous, long-endurance ScanEagle surveillance UAV were to find itself added to the LCS’ onboard options in future. These UAVs are valued very highly by the US Marines as combat surveillance UAVs, and testing them on the HSV-2 seems explicitly designed to pave the way for LCS integration.

• DID (July 22/05) – U.S. Marines Extend Westpac Express TSV Ship Charter. The success of Austal’s HSV 4676 has also helped to shape US military thinking about potential LCS designs. The article also discusses Austal’s new Mobile, AL facility, which will be a key participant in LCS construction for the General Dynamics team.

• Naval Sea Systems Command (April 2004) – HSV-2 proving to be Prototype for Littoral Combat Ship Program

• US Navy Fact File – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel

• HowStuffWorks.com – How the FSF-1 Sea Fighter Works

• Navy Marine Corps News (June 4/05) – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel: Initial Deployment News Video

• Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel. The vessel participated in a US naval exercise as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons.

Tag: LCSFOCUS

The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program began in 1995, and it has taken a very long time. Its MoU was late, its contract will be both late and smaller in scope, and it won’t meet even a revised 2012 – 2014 fielding window. At long last, however, one can be assured that it will exist.T his is DID’s in-depth FOCUS Article covering the AGS program, from its platforms to its program structure to its long-awaited contracts.

The original AGS plan involved an Airbus A321 counterpart to Northrop Grumman’s E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), a Boeing 707 derivative whose powerful ground-looking Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) offers American commanders combat-changing battlefield surveillance and communications. AGS would be a pooled NATO asset, adding 7 RQ-4B Global Hawk UAVs and dedicated ground stations to complement the manned planes. It has since been reduced to just 5 RQ-4 Block 40 Global Hawk UAVs and dedicated ground stations, but could expand again if countries decide to make some of their national surveillance assets part of the program.

The Need for AGS

AGS CONOPS
(click to view full)

AGS was envisioned as a core component for the NATO Response Force. The war in Libya was a concrete example that didn’t involve regular ground forces, but the usefulness of land surveillance platforms was so keenly felt, that Northrop Grumman’s graphic at the beginning of the article overlays AGS on a not-so-subtle a map of Libya. The AGS fleet will also support a variety of new mission requirements for NATO, including domestic security operations and humanitarian relief.

Writing in (the now-defunct) eDefense Online, Polish Air Force and military intelligence veteran Michal Fiszer had this to say:

NATO re: AGS
click for video

“The key to victory in modern conflict is informational superiority. The side that enjoys the highest degree of information superiority can maneuver its forces quickly and decisively to achieve tactical and operational advantage over its enemy. It can also precisely and effectively engage every vital element of the enemy’s forces to reduce their fighting capabilities to nil. To make a comparison to chess: Imagine that the side that achieves information superiority can see the chessboard and the pieces of both sides, whereas the other side has to play seeing only some of own pieces and having fragmentary information about the positions of his opponent’s pieces – mainly information about where they were a turn or two ago, as opposed to were they actually are.

Five elements are needed to achieve and exploit information superiority. The first is ability to see, and this requires effective intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities across the depth of the enemy’s echelons, seven days a week and 24 hours a day. The second element is the command, control, and communications (C3) network, built in accordance with the concept of network-centric warfare, with the ability not only to carry and distribute tremendous amounts of information to users in a timely way but also with the ability to merge (fuse) the collected information to create a common, recognized situation picture in all necessary areas: tactical, operational, logistic, personnel, etc., so that all friendly commanders are aware of all own and enemy forces. The third element is the ability to maneuver, to use the speed of ones own forces to take advantageous positions over the enemy, who is constantly observed. The fourth element is ability to conduct precision strikes against observed and tracked assets of the enemy’s forces that are the most vital to his war-waging capabilities and that pose the biggest threats to friendly forces. And the last but certainly not least element is properly trained personnel – especially commanders and planners who understand the rules of the game and can exploit them fully to their advantage. All these elements are links in the same chain, and if any of them are lacking, then the system is degraded, perhaps to the point of ineffectiveness.”

NE-3A AWACS
(click to view full)

At present, European countries lack many of these key capabilities. By creating a NATO pool that can be built up over time, countries whose small defense budgets could not afford the required investment now have a way forward. This is why Fiszer referred to AGS as “the most important European military program since the end of the Cold War.”

Despite the project’s supposed importance, it has been a long slog. The AGS program began in 1995, when the NATO Defence Ministers endorsed the NATO Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) recommendation for “a NATO-owned and -operated core capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets.” NATO even had a ready-made model for a program like that, in its very successful pooled E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System) program.

Over a decade later, they were just beginning to make procurement decisions. It would take almost 15 years to get a Programme Memorandum of Understanding. It would be almost 2 decades before the AGS program saw anything like a contract.

NATO AGS: Program & History

On April 1/04, the AGS Steering Committee decided to sign the design and development contract with the TIPS consortium – a decision endorsed by NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors on April 16/04. In addition to Northrop-Grumman and EADS, the winning 2004 Trans-Atlantic Industrial Proposed Solution (TIPS) team included General Dynamics Canada, French defense firm Thales, Spain’s Indra and Italy’s Galileo Avionica (now SELEX Galileo). Their solution would combine Airbus’ A321 single-aisle passenger jet, a new ground-looking radar, RQ-4 Global Hawk UAVs as supplements, and a set of ground stations.

The losing CTAS Consortium was led by Raytheon, and included AMS, Bombardier, Siemens, and 23 other firms. It would have offered AGS a design based on Bombardier’s Global Express jet, used in Britain’s similar ASTOR Sentinel R1 program.

The initial award proved that the nearly two dozen member nations could agree on funding for the program. After that, however, things got rocky.

Not anymore.
(click to view full)

NATO was due to decide by early 2006 whether the alliance would go ahead with the full EUR 4 billion ($5.2 billion) program, and the program was cut slightly but survived. The next estimate for a pared-back program was EUR 3.3 billion (about $4.1 billion) for R&D and initial fielding. Optimism remained, as Northrop-Grumman officials noted that its $250 million per plane E-8C J-STARS ground surveillance aircraft also began as a small 5-6 plane order in 1985. Northrop-Grumman eventually delivered 17 of the modified Boeing 707-300s due to customer demand, and the E-8 JSTARS performed well in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and beyond. Indeed, their capabilities were so valuable that they were the catalyst for NATO’s own AGS program.

The design and development phase for AGS was to last for 2 years, from 2005 – 2007, to be followed by the acquisition phase between 2007 – 2009.

In mid-2007, however, Europe’s declining defense budgets resulted in a program change. NATO chose to move forward with a UAV-only solution. It would be based on an off-the-shelf RQ-4 Block 40 Global Hawk, dropping the A321 and its radar entirely. Alliance member nations were expected to agree to a Program Memorandum of Understanding based on this new plan in early 2008. That didn’t happen until late 2009, and the EUR 3 billion, 20-year program plan wasn’t actually finalized until 2012.

AGS’ core industrial team is still led by Northrop Grumman from its Melbourne, FL facility, but the TIPS team was replaced by a new group. EADS, Finmeccanica’s SELEX Galileo, and Norway’s Kongsberg are listed as the major European players. Participating nations have also changed, and full AGS members now include:

• Bulgaria
  
• Canada
  
• Czech Republic
  
• Denmark (rejoined)
  
• Estonia
  
• Germany
  
• Italy
  
• Latvia
  
• Lithuania
  
• Luxembourg
  
• Norway
  
• Poland (applying)
  
• Romania
  
• Slovakia
  
• Slovenia
  
• United States of America

This list is more than enough to make AGS a key NATO capability, but it’s also worth noting that several countries aren’t included. Denmark pulled out in 2010, as part of defense budget cuts, but rejoined in 2012. Canada did the same in 2011, but hasn’t rejoined. Britain and France are missing from that list, as are Greece, Spain, and Turkey.

All alliance members will be eligible to participate in AGS, however, by contributing to the cost of operating the UAVs and accompanying systems.

AGS Initial Operating Capability was initially scheduled for 2010-2011, but since the contract award took until May 2012, IOC isn’t expected before November 2016. Full Operational Capability was scheduled for 2012-2014, and is now likely to be closer to 2018-2020.

Sigonella Air Base, Italy will be AGS’ Main Operating Base, hosting the 5 RQ-4B Block 40 UAVs and the fixed ground segment. AGS will share that base with USAF RQ-4B Global Hawks, and with the USN’s MQ-4C BAMS counterparts.

NATO AGS: Platforms & Technologies

AGS: The Aerial Component

Click this text for full 1.9 MB [PDF]:

Global Hawk AGS
c. Northrop Grumman

AGS has changed, leaving a core of just 5 RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40s, bought more or less off-the-shelf. They will be combined with ground control stations that would be developed through the AGS program, via collaboration between Canadian and European firms.

The full AGS was originally slated to include a mixed fleet of both manned and unmanned aircraft. The manned portion initially called for 5 Airbus A321 aircraft, hosting the developmental Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR). It aimed to create is a high-performance, side-looking, wide area, multi-mode ground surveillance radar, to be developed under an agreement between France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States. TCAR would reside in the sausage-shaped portion above the Airbus airframe, which beat out the smaller but longer-range ASTOR Sentinel R1/ Bombardier Global Express platform offered by Raytheon’s CTAS consortium.

The A321 TCAR’s unmanned companion set was initially set to consist of 4 Northrop-Grumman RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 unmanned aerial vehicles, equipped with new AN/ZPY-2 MP-RTIP (Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program) radars. MP-RTIP is a high-resolution synthetic-aperture ground surveillance radar made by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, using next-generation Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) technologies. Block 40 and MP-RTIP were already part of the USA’s Global Hawk program, handing NATO the unusual combination of a low-risk developmental program. MP-RTIP may also retrofit some E-8C JSTARS aircraft, and is reported to have a resolution that could improve the current E-8C radar’s rumored 12-14 foot resolution to 1 foot or less.

When the A321 TCAR was removed, therefore, AGS became just 5 Global Hawk Block 40 UAVs. As NATO wrangling continued into its final stages, however, an interesting thing happened. AGS began to become a UAV pool – and may even re-introduce the very manned Sentinnel R1 option that lost the original competition.

AGS: Go Jump in the Pool

Astor Sentinnel R1
(clickto view full)

Germany is on board for AGS, and also has its own 5-UAV Eurohawk program. It’s based on earlier model RQ-4B Block 20 UAVs, fielded with the standard Global Hawk ground-scanning radar instead of MP-RTIP, but enhanced with added communications and electronic signals intercept (COMINT and SIGINT) capabilities. Eurohawk isn’t formally in the AGS pool, but its likely to connect to the same intelligence processing and distribution infrastructure over time. The combination of AGS and loaned Eurohawks could give NATO a small but full-spectrum battlefield monitoring option.

The agreement that other members could join AGS by contributing to its operating costs may make Germany’s Eurohawks a more explicit AGS component in future. If so, it would follow a trail blazed by France and Britain, who are expected to participate operation via contributions of their own equipment. This will diversify the AGS pool even further.

Britain has already deployed its 5 manned Astor Sentinel R1 aircraft, whose design lost to the AGS TIPS consortium’s initial A321 bid. Like the USA’s Global Hawk UAVs, it proved very popular during the 2011 campaign in Libya. That left the British looking for reasons to keep their new jets, instead of scrapping them per the 2010 strategic review. Britain doesn’t field any high-end UAVs yet, which makes flight-hours for its Sentinel jets a natural fit as the UK’s AGS contribution. Since Britain will usually be participating in any NATO operation that needs AGS, the inclusion of their jets’ flight-hours would mostly serve as double-counting accounting for Britain, while providing extra airframes to NATO. Integrating the Sentinel R1s’ feeds into AGS’ ground systems for common distribution, however, may require some work.

France is currently embroiled in a political battle over the replacement of its IAI Heron-derived Harfang UAVs, and the official choice is a derivative of IAI’s larger Heron TP. That UAV was officially offered to NATO as France’s AGS contribution, and a joint French-British drone program may add more options after 2020.

AGS: The Ground Component

On the ground, the AGS Mobile Ground Stations are designed to support Rapid Deployment and dynamic field situations. The idea is that by sharing common mission equipment with the air segment, full system functionality (including Mission Planning and Control) may be exercised from any authorized source. As usual, the contractors are touting the use of computing and data standards, and promising an AGS that will send its data to national intelligence distribution systems, as well as NATO’s own C3I systems. As usual, the proof will come only with a working ground system, and corresponding national investments, that demonstrates advertised performance.

The ground segment was to be divided into 3 levels:

1. Fixed Ground Station configuration. Available for an office type environment, command center, etc. This will be deployed at Sigonella, Italy.
2. Transportable Ground Stations. Retains common physical and functional capabilities packaged in flexible protective casing, and is suitable for a variety on vehicles or ships.
3. “Software Grounds Stations” Share common software with the Mission Equipment, and brings some of the functionality of a System Workstation to authorized computing systems.

NATO AGS: Key Events & Contracts

AGS Contract Partners
(click to view full)

April 26/13: France. France has reportedly agreed to join part of the AGS program, and is working out the details of a financial contribution to AGS’ ground systems component. That would be pretty important if France wants to also contribute UAV hours, using its own platforms.

Before they can go ahead, the French General Staff has to validate a draft of France’s joint ISR concept, and an MoU will be required with the USA. TTU [in French]

April 10/13: US FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage. US contributions to AGS continue, from $82.9 million in FY 2012, to $210.1 million in FY 2013, to $264.1 million in FY 2014 – a total of $557.1 million over those 3 years.

The news is not good for the Global Hawk 40, however, whose budget lines do not initially appear to involve further USAF buys. There’s no initial reaction from the AGS partners concerning the threat of an orphan platform.

March – April 2013: Certification. Reports in the French and German media highlight the problems that Germany’s RQ-4 EuroHawk has been having with airspace certification, and say that its cost could end the program entirely. Parliamentary State Secretary of Defense Thomas Kossendey says the program is having problems furnishing the documentation it needs for flight certification in shared airspace, and that those efforts could end up costing EUR 500-600 million on top of the EUR 1.3 billion already spent on development, UAVs, sensors, basing, etc.

AGS’ choice of Sigonella AB should help them avoid similar problems, but this sort of certification hangup will still be an issue if AGS members want the system to help with missions like local disaster surveillance. A worse problem comes from rumors that the USA will abandon the Global Hawk Block 40 in the 2014 budget. If AGS becomes the only Global Hawk Block 40 system in operation, it could become very expensive to support. Shz.de [in German] | TTU [in French] | UASVision re: RQ-4B Block 40.

Jan 4/13: Sub-contractors. General Dynamics Canada receives a C$ 32 million [about the same in USD] contract from Northrop Grumman, to provide the software that will control the AGS Communications Ground Control System (CGCS).

The CGCS will manage radio and satellite communications between the AGS RQ-4B UAVs and the main operating base in Sigonella, Italy. General Dynamics Canada will also deliver ruggedized computer workstations, and the Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) intercom systems for communications among operators at the operating base and between mobile command centers. As the final part of its contract, the firm will provide engineering support for the integration of its software and systems at Northrop Grumman’s facilities in the United States, and at the joint base in Sigonella.

Canada has bowed out of the AGS program, but GD Canada won anyway. The firm will be using technology that has been deployed in Canadian P-3/CP-140 fleet upgrades, and on the MH-92/CH-148 maritime helicopter. Their final product is likely to see deployment in Canada’s long-range UAVs, if and when the JUSTAS program ever buys some. GD.

May 21/12: Sub-contractors. Norway’s Kongsberg Defence Systems details its AGS sub-contract:

“KONGSBERG signed a EUR 28 million contract with Northrop Grumman ISS International Inc for the development of… solutions for storing, searching and retrieval of advanced sensor data from the RQ-4 Global Hawk. The contract extends over the next 3.5 years.”

Feb 15/12: AGS Set. Reports surface that NATO will spend EUR 3.0 billion (about $3.9 billion) on the AGS program over 20 years, including at least EUR 1 billion for the 5 RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 UAVs, plus all of their ground and onboard equipment, which includes the new MP-RTIP radar. The other EUR 2 billion is expected to cover 20 years of operating costs. While the Global Hawks drones are being bought by 13/28 eligible nations, tasking will be open to all NATO allies who will contribute to the cost of operating them.

NATO appears to have bowed to France and Britain here, who will mostly contribute by providing their own UAVs to the pool. France has said that its future Heron TP variants would be made available to AGS as their contribution. That way, they can avoid having to pay cash, while justifying an expensive local UAV adaptation program. Britain doesn’t have any high-end UAVs. What they do have, though, is the ASTOR Sentinel R1 jets that proved so useful over Libya, and which they’ve been looking for a reason to keep.

Meanwhile, this still isn’t a contract to Northrop Grumman. All of this information was provided by an “anonymous NATO official.” Or maybe not so anonymous. From NATO:

“We have with us Ludwig Decamps, Director of Strategy and Smart Defence, in the NATO’s Defence Investment Division and he will update us on NATO’s future Alliance Ground Surveillance – as you know, the final details of this key programme were agreed earlier this month by NATO Defence Ministers and Ludwig will be speaking on background as a “NATO Official.”

Thanks, Ludwig. Aviation Week | Defense News | Reuters.

Feb 13/12: The USA’s FY 2013 budget documents include a set-aside to buy 3 RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40s, for the NATO AGS program:

“The FY 2013 budget requests funding for 3 NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) systems. The NATO AGS, which is based on the Block 40 version of the RQ-4B Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, will enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from 4-8 high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances and in any weather or light condition. Using advanced radar sensors, the NATO AGS will continuously detect and track moving objects throughout observed areas, and provide radar imagery of areas and stationary objects. Funding is $0.2 billion in FY 2013 and totals $0.9 billion from FY 2013 – FY 2017.”

Jan 16/12: France. Defense News reports that France is offering the modified Heron TP drones as its contribution to the NATO AGS program – which wants cash as promised, in order to buy the program’s 5 larger and more capable RQ-4B Block 40 Global Hawk jet-powered UAVs.

The move may be prompted in part by estimates that the bill for France’s proposed Heron-TP UAVs, with additions like satellite communications and de-icing gear, might even reach EUR 620 million total. Having the resulting drones serve double-duty may be appealing to the French, but introduces compatibility and budget issues for the rest of the project. Which is reportedly still stalled:

“The AGS package is still being discussed at NATO,” an alliance press officer said. “It is a topic to be discussed in the February meeting of defense ministers.”

Aug 18/11: Canada out. Canada’s conservative Party government also withdraws from AGS, as a follow-on to their June 2011 withdrawal from NATO’s E-3 AWACS pool. NATO’s official blog | NAGSMO statement.

No Canada

July 21/11: MP-RTIP. The RQ-4B Block 40 Global Hawk completes its 1st full system flight with the high performance AN/ZPY-2 MP-RTIP radar, at Edwards Air Force Base, CA. Northrop Grumman.

Feb 22-24/11: NAGSMA:

“Italy hosted an AGS Infrastructure meeting at Sigonella AFB… The main objective of the meeting was to facilitate the authors of the AGS Capability Package (CP) amendments to finalise the Infrastructure and Investment amendments and present them to the AGS CAPCO, for Bi-SC staffing & ultimately for submission to the authorities at NATO HQ.”

Dec 1/10: MP-RTIP. The first production MP/RTIP radar has been delivered to Edwards Air Force Base, CA for integration on the Global Hawk Block 40. Northrop Grumman.

June 7/10: RFP response. Northrop Grumman formally submits its proposal for NATO AGS, with a contract award expected in October 2010. Their industry team contains “more than 25 companies from the 15 nations participating in this program,” and is based on the RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 with MP-RTIP radar. Other major industry participants in the final bid include EADS, SELEX Galileo, General Dynamics Canada, and Kongsberg. The NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Management Agency (NAGSMA) will manage the acquisition.

Spain’s Indra had been part of the AGS TIPS consortium, but Spain is not an AGS participant, and Indra wasn’t named as a major partner.

The proposal also includes the required mobile and transportable ground stations, and a mission operation support center at the main operating base in Sigonella, Italy. Those elements will be wholly produced by European industry, and Northrop Grumman believes that this offers the potential for national re-use in other programs, as a common UAV control/ data distribution solution. Northrop Grumman.

Revised AGS
(click to view full)

Sept 25/09: PMoU. The 15 nations participating in NATO’s AGS program finish signing the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). The PMOU, along with the AGS Charter, sets the legal, organizational, and budgetary framework for AGS, and launches both the NATO AGS Management Organisation (NAGSMO) and NATO AGS Management Agency (NAGSMA). NATO | Northrop Grumman.

AGS PMoU

Feb 20/09: The NATO nations participating in the AGS program begin the process to sign the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). Once the signature process is complete, the NATO AGS Management Agency (NAGSMA) will be established to expeditiously prepare for the award of the AGS contract. Source.

Nov 22/07: Basing. NATO has pushed back a main operations base decision for the 4-8 Global Hawk UAVs that will operate under the AGS program, as it evaluates the various proposals.

Italy offered Sigonella air base in Sicily, which hosts a U.S. Naval Air Station and became a base for US Global Hawks and future USN BAMS Global Hawk variants. It eventually won.

Germany proposed Schleswig-Jagel Air Base in its northernmost province. Their big selling point was commonality benefits for spares, training, maintenance, etc., as it will also host Germany’s Eurohawk RQ-4 derivatives beginning in 2010.

Greece proposed Aktion Air Base, which is currently a forward operating base for NATO’s fleet of E-3A AWACS.

Other offers on the table included Poland’s Powidz AB, Portugal’s Beja AB, Spain’s large air base outside Zaragoza, and Slovenia’s Cerklje AB. Closer to the middle east, but also closer to ballistic missile range, are Romania’s Timisoara AB, and Turkey’s Corlu AB. Aviation Week Ares report.

Old AGS: A321 & RQ-4B
(click to view full)

Nov 19/07: A321 out. The USAF announces new studies to define the NATO AGS “core capability resulting from a UAV-only based approach,” and explore options for greater program integration with the USAF’s RQ-4 Global Hawk program. A 2-phase acquisition approach is reportedly still planned, starting with a design, development and demonstration effort and subsequent full-scale production. A week later, a corresponding Flight International report confirms that :

“…[the A321] manned aircraft was deleted from the programme in mid-2007 because of affordability issues and NATO is now pursuing an AGS solution based on Global Hawk with the MP-RTIP sensor.”

Airbus 321… 0

Oct 26/06: NATO reports that the CNAD(Committee of National Armament Directors) agreed to enter into negotiations for the design and development of an Alliance Ground Surveillance system, on the basis of a proposal recently submitted by ASG Industries, while continuing to address a number of important issues in parallel.

Oct 16/06: Proposal. The renamed AGS Industries GmbH partnership announces the submission of its NATO AGS Proposal for the Design and Development Phase. The major objective of the AGS-I Design and Development proposal was to achieve full design maturity for the AGS system, to include the conversion of the Airbus A321 into a high performance mission aircraft.

AGS Industries’ proposal response confirms a EUR 3.3 billion procurement cost ceiling for a NATO AGS core capability, and now places the programme start as an agenda item for action at the upcoming Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) meeting at the end of October. The new cost ceiling is achieved by limiting the number of Global Hawk UAVs to 4 (from 7), limiting the number of ground stations, and additional system-wide reductions. See corporate release.

May 26/06: The TIPS consortium formally becomes AGS Industries GmbH, with its main office in EADS Ottobrun, Germany facilities and a second office in Brussels, Belgium near NATO HQ. See corporate release [PDF format].

June 18/04: Sen. Partty Murray [D-WA] represents the state of Washington, where Boeing is a significant force in the economy. She issues a release:

“Senator Patty Murray today expressed concern about the Department of Defense’s handling of the Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS) program at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The AGS program is the largest single NATO contract in history. With American taxpayers primed to contribute up to 45 percent of the funding for the new program, Senator Murray called on the Department of Defense to follow their established policy of pursuing more interoperable, more coordinated weapons systems and to consider the consequences to the U.S. aerospace industry of militarizing the Airbus aircraft for the AGS and future NATO requirements.

…Great Britain has opted out of paying for the program, and France and Germany may opt out as well. “Our allies haven’t committed to paying for the AGS program but that hasn’t stopped them from convincing the DoD to fund the largest contract in NATO’s history and new jobs at Airbus. Why would we agree to pay up to $2 billion dollars to militarize an Airbus aircraft for the first time at NATO when the Europeans themselves have not agreed to fund the AGS program,” Senator Murray said.”

Additional Readings & Sources

• NATO – NAGSMA program office page

• NATO (December 2004) – Briefing: Improving capabilities to meet new threats; Item #7: Improving Ground Surveillance

• Northrop Grumman – NATO AGS

• Kongsberg – Alliance Ground Surveillance Program. Note that the presentations and other collateral are all dead links.

• GlobalSecurity.org – Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program. Will include some E-8 JSTARS retrofits, as well as a smaller version on the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV. Was also designed for use of the E-8 JSTARS/ E-3 AWACS successor E-10A, but that program was canceled.

• Northrop Grumman – Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP)

• Alliance Ground Surveillance This TIPS consortium site is now defunct.

• DID Spotlight – RQ-4 Euro Hawk UAV Readying for Takeoff. Germany’s SIGINT/ELINT RQ-4B Block 20 variant.

• GlobalSecurity.org – E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS / JSTARS).

• US Air Force Fact Sheets – E-8 JSTARS

• Strategic Review (Fall 2000) – Brittle Swords: Low-Density, High-Demand Assets [42k, PDF]. Helps to explain why systems like AGS that use less expensive platforms for high-demand missions may be a very good idea over the long run.

• Lexington Institute (Sept 10/09) – New Global Hawk Undercuts Insurgent Advantages. Discusses the Block 40 in the context of the USA’s own budget wars.

• AGS Industries GmbH (Oct 16/06) – AGS Industries Submits NATO AGS Proposal for Design and Development Phase

• DID (May 23/06) – Euro-Hawk MoU Signed in Berlin. This covers the Global Hawk derivative Euro-Hawk, which will also add new sensor packages.

• DID (May 17/06) – E-10′s MP-RTIP Ground Surveillance Radar to Test Aboard Proteus.

• eDefense Online (Feb 22/06) – The Eyes of Europe. Subtitled “NATO’s AGS: Europe’s most important military program.” Regrettably, eDefense Online has folded and its archives with it; this article was not archived in Google or the Wayback Machine.

• DID (Oct 27/05) – NATO TIPS-AGS “Eye In the Sky” Consortium Submits Initial Risk Reduction Study

• FloridaToday.com (April 29/05) – Northrop takes first step toward NATO spy plane

• Reuters – NATO Signs Initial ‘Eye in the Sky’ Contract

• Raytheon – (Jan 21/04) – CTAS Consortium Delivers its Report Addressing NATO’s Air to Ground Surveillance Requirements. Its report was delivered from Los Angeles, CA to Brussels onboard a Bombardier Global Express aircraft, which the CTAS consortium recommended as the primary manned platform for AGS. Britain’s ASTOR Sentinel R1 surveillance and electronic eavesdropping aircraft is already based on the Global Express, which has a longer range than the Airbus A321 but less internal volume.

America’s M1 Abrams tanks come in a number of versions. In addition to the M1A1 that is now standard, the US Army is beginning to field its M1 TUSK for urban warfare. It also operates the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP), currently the most advanced standard variant.

This Spotlight article covers the M1A2 Abrams SEP upgrade program, and will be updated and backfilled as new contracts are issued and key events take place.

M1A2 SEP: Additional Background

Some SEP upgrades
(click to view full)

The M1A2 SEP is builds on the digitized M1A2 platform with an improved armor package of third generation steel-encased depleted uranium armor, a new command and control system, second-generation FLIR thermal sights that include a Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) for “hunter-killer” operation, the Under Armor Auxiliary Power Unit (UAAPU) that lets crews run key electronics without running the engine, and a Thermal Management System (TMS – i.e. air conditioning for crew & electronics). The M1A2 SEP also features enhanced electronics like color maps and displays, improved networked communications, high-density computer memory and increased microprocessing speed, a more user friendly “Soldier Machine Interface (SMI)”, and an open operating computing system that will make future upgrades and additions easier.

The M1A2 SEP’s advanced FLIR/thermal sights are part of the US Army’s Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared (HTI SGF) sighting systems program, which creates commonality with other vehicles like the M2/M3 Bradley IFVs.

The M1A2 SEP is a formidable upgrade package, but it was missing a small but crucial item. Troops in Iraq and elsewhere are also clamoring for a phone on the outside of the tank that will let them talk to the vehicle crew. This was common as far back as World War 2, and its lack is hampering coordination on the modern battlefield – especially in urban areas. A General Dynamics representative noted that future M1A2 Abrams TUSK (Tank Urban Survivability Kit) vehicles will have this feature, but the SEP v1 tanks did not.

M1A2 SEP Version 2 configuration, which is just beginning to appear, fixes this. It adds improved displays, sights, and power systems compared to earlier SEP versions – plus the tank-infantry phone. Recent orders also added a CROWS-II top-mounted machine gun with advanced sights. The CROWS system can be controlled from inside the tank using a joystick and screen, removing the need to open the hatch and expose the crews to snipers. SEPv2 is the most technologically advanced digital Abrams tank, and is also positioned for future communications and other technology updates.

Recent budgets for M1A1 enhancements, including both M1A1-Situational Awareness and M1A2 tanks, include:

• FY 2010: $278.8 million for 22 tanks ($93.8M RDT&E, $185.0M procurement)
  
• FY 2011: $294.4 million for 21 tanks ($93.6M RDT&E, $182.0M procurement, $18.8M spares)
  
• FY 2012: $583.9 million for 63 tanks ($9.3M RDT&E, $567.4M procurement, $7.2M spares)
  
• FY 2013 Request: $300.8 million, ($97.3M RDT&E, $203.5M procurement) meant to “complete the final [SEP] production, fielding, and training” – 20-24 tanks by some reports.
  
• FY 2014 Request: $297.4 million ($101.3M RDT&E, $178.1M procurement).

M1A2 SEP: Related Contracts

Commander’s Display Unit

The Armor Site notes that:

“A multi-year contract for 307 M1A2 Abrams Systems Enhancement Program (SEP) tanks was awarded in March 2001 with production into 2004. The current Army plan allows for a fleet of 588 M1A2 SEP, 586 M1A2 and 4,393 M1A1 tanks. The potential exits for a retrofit program of 129 M1A2 tanks to the SEP configuration between 2004 and 2005… The US Army decided to cancel future production of the M1A2 SEP from FY2004, but in June 2005 ordered the upgraded of a further 60 M1A2 tanks to SEP configuration.”

That program has now grown very substantially, and a 2007 contract added 435 more more M1A2 SEPs. Orders have continued to come in, and General Dynamics says that the current multi-year award set will complete the modernization of all M1 tanks in the active-duty army to M1A2 SEP standard. By 2014, however, their interest in keeping the facility running led supportive members of Congress to continue spending money on the program, over the Army’s objections.

Unless otherwise specified, all contracts are awarded by The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI; and the recipient is General Dynamics Land Systems in Sterling Heights, MI.

April 29/13: Congress is looking to spend funds over and above the Pentagon’s request, in order to keep General Dynamics Land Systems running at a higher rate. The Lima plant is reportedly producing about 5 M1A2S upgrade kits per month for Saudi Arabia, and 4 M1A1M kits per month for Egypt, plus production of Israeli Namer ultra-heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicles. Of the Army’s 2,400 tanks, about 1,500 – 1,600 have reportedly received the $7.5 million MA2SEPv2 upgrade. The US Army had wanted to stop buying tanks until 2017, using funds for R&D to produce an updated M1 variant.

Congress has other ideas, and $468 million is a consistently-used figure for the extra spending, but that isn’t broken down clearly. What is clear is that the US Army has said it doesn’t want or need more M1A2s, and wants to spend the money elsewhere at a time when its reducing training and maintenance. Congress disagrees for a combination of industrial reasons involving the restart costs of drying up the sub-contractor chain (and killing some of their firms), and political reasons involving jobs in a state with powerful representatives and outsize significance in Presidential politics. AP | CS Monitor.

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage. With respect to the M1 fleet, the budget would spend $279.4 million ($101.3M RDT&E, $178.1M procurement) to:

“…maintain the armor facility at a sustainable level and minimize loss of skilled labor. It also procures numerous approved modifications to fielded M1A2 Abrams tanks, including the Data Distribution Unit (DDU) to enable network interoperability, the Vehicle Health Management System (VHMS), loader tray modification to improve safety and the Commander’s Remote Operating Weapon Station (CROWS).”

April 25/12: General Dynamics Land Systems in Sterling Heights, MI wins a $31.1 million firm-fixed-price contract to create 46 Abrams M1A2 SEPv2 vehicles from existing stocks, by installing the upgrade kits.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH; Scranton, PA; Anniston, AL; and Tallahassee, FL, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/14. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W56HZV-12-C-0198).

Dec 23/11: A $59.9 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Packages and CROWS weapon stations. Based on past contracts, this will cover 21 M1A2 SEPv2 kits, and finish funding for the planned 435 tanks under the program, though an installation contract may still be forthcoming.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH; Tallahassee, FL; Anniston, AL; Scranton, PA; and Sterling Heights, MI, with an estimated completion date of June 30/13. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

March 1/11: A $59.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for up to 21 Abrams M1A2 SEPv2 upgrade tanks. That means full materials and labor for the upgrades.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH; Tallahassee, FL; Anniston, AL; Scranton, PA; and Sterling Heights, MI, with an estimated completion date of June 30/13. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

March 5/10: A $62.1 million firm-fixed-price contract covers Program Year 4, Increment 2 of the Abrams multi-year contract. The Army is buying full materials and labor for 22 M1A2 SEPv2 upgrades.

General Dynamics Land Systems says that before this recent “call-up” of 22 kits, 371 of the 435 total vehicles had been funded. Now, only 42 vehicles require funding, and they expected to be taken care of in the next 2 increments around January 2011 and 2012. These “funding years” are different from “program years”, and PY 4 is expected to cover 39 M1A2 SEPv2s.

Work is to be performed in Lima, OH (75%); Tallahassee, FL (10%); Anniston, AL (9%); Scranton, PA (3%); and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/12. TACOM in Warren, MI issued the contract (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Sept 14/09: An $18.2 million unfinalized Change Order Modification firm-fixed-price multi-year contract to buy up to 370 Commanders Remote Operated Weapons Stations version 2 kits (CROWS II) for M1A2 SEPv2 upgrade vehicles. Work is to be performed in Lima, OH with an estimated completion date of Aug 31/12 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

March 2/09: A $9.8 million firm-fixed-price, firm fixed price level of effort, cost plus fixed fee contract to provide parts for the reset material necessary to allow Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) to reset 5 Battle Damaged M1 SEPv1 tanks to a SEPv2 configuration, with a 100% option to RESET another 5.

Work is to be performed at Sterling Heights, MI, with an estimated completion date of Aug 31/10 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Feb 24/09: A $32 million firm-fixed-price contract change order issued to RESET 129 of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s Abrams SEPv2 tanks.

Work is to be performed at Lima, Ohio, (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/10. One bid was solicited and one bid received (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Feb 3/09: A $5.9 million firm fixed price contract change order to buy improved ammunition racks, as part of a RESET program for 90 M1A2 SEPv1 tanks that are being upgraded to SEPv2.

Work is to be performed at Lima, OH (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/10 (W56HZV-06-C-0006).

Jan 27/09: An $80.7 million firm-fixed-price contract for the Abrams Multi-Year Contract’s program year 2, increment 2. This contract buys 24 M1A2 SEPv2 upgrades, and funds 6 more tanks in program year 3, increment 1, for a total of 30.

Work will be performed at Sterling Heights, MI, with an estimated completion date of June 30/12. One bid was solicited and one bid received (W56HZV-06-G-0006). GDLS release.

Nov 20/08: A $63.7 million firm-fixed-price contract, exercising an option to RESET 180 Abrams M1A2 SEPv1 to SEPv2 tanks. Work will be performed in Tallahassee, FL, Anniston, AL, Scranton, PA, and Sterling Heights, MI, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/10. One bid was solicited and one bid was received (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

See also Aug 5/08 entry, and the GDLS release.

Aug 29/08: General Dynamics Lands Systems Division in Sterling Heights, MI received a $30.8 million cost-reimbursable contract to procure long-lead-materials. These materials will be bought in as a prelude to upgrading 129 Third Armored Cavalry Regiment Abrams tanks to the M1A2 SEP configuration.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH; Tallahassee, FL; Anniston, AL; Scranton, PA; and Sterling Heights, MI, with an estimated completion date of Oct 31/09. One bid was solicited, and one bid was received (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Aug 5/08: A $613.5 million Firm Fixed Price, contract for Award Program Year One increment 2, in a multi-year contract for Abrams M1A2 SEPv2 upgrades. The contract will upgrade 235 M1A1 tanks to this configuration.

The order was made under a multi-year contract (see Feb 7/08 entry) which authorized the modernization of 435 M1A1 tanks that have been in the Army’s inventory for more than 20 years. An additional 180 tanks remain to be upgraded through the program, which will complete the conversion of all tanks in the Army’s active component to the M1A2 SEP V2 configuration.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH; Anniston, AL; Tallahassee, FL; Sterling Heights, MI; and Scranton, PA, and is expected to be complete by Oct 31/11. There was one bid solicited from the manufacturer on Oct 5/07, and one bid was received (W56HZV-06-G-0006). See also GDLS release.

June 3/08: A $19.8 million cost-reimbursable-no-fee contract for the procurement of long lead material to support maintenance of 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment Abrams M1A2 SEP tanks. Work will be performed primarily in Lima, OH and is expected to be complete by Oct 30/09. One bid was solicited on April 29/08 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

April 28/08: A $28.2 million cost-no-fee contract for long lead materials, which will be used in the recapitalization of M1A2 SEPv1 tanks. Work will be performed primarily in Lima, OH and is expected to be complete on Nov 28/08. One bid was solicited on Jan 18/08 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Feb 7/08: Multi-Year SEP contract. A $39.5 million firm-fixed price contract to upgrade 20 Abrams tanks to M1A2 SEPv2 standard. Work will be performed in Anniston, AL; Tallahassee, FL; Sterling Heights, MI; Lima, OH; and Scranton, PA. The upgrade program is expected to be completed by June 30/13. One bid was solicited on Oct 5/07, and 1 bid was received by the U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-06-G-0006). General Dynamics says that this award is in addition to the Jan 15/08 award to fund parts for the upgrades.

General Dynamics announces that this is just the first increment of a $1.5 billion multi-year contract to upgrade 435 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks to M1A2 SEPv2 configuration. They add that this multi-year procurement contract “will complete the modernization of all remaining M1A1 tanks which have been in the US Army’s inventory for more than 20 years.”

Jan 15/08: A $12.4 million cost-no fee contract “for system enhancement package upgrade vehicles.” Work will be performed in Lima Army Tank Plant, OH, and is expected to be complete by April 30, 2008. One bid was solicited on Oct 5/07, and 1 bid was received (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Dec 19/07: General Dynamics Land Systems announces a $257.8 million award for procurement of materials and labor required to RESET 180 Abrams tanks under the Abrams Improved SEP Reset (ISR) program. The program could total more than $320 million if all options are exercised. As part of the Improved Systems Enhancement Package (SEP) Reset program, M1A2 SEP Version 1 tanks are modified to the SEP Version 2 configuration.

Deliveries begin in September 2009, and are expected to be complete by September 2010. Work will be performed by existing employees in Anniston, AL; Tallahassee, FL; Lima, OH; Sterling Heights, MI; and Scranton, PA. There was 1 bid solicited on Feb 13/07, and 1 bid was received (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Nov 19/07: General Dynamics Land Systems received an $88.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for reset of 240 M1A2 Abrams tanks. Work will be performed in Lima, OH and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2009 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

As part of the reset program, M1A2 SEP Version 1 tanks are upgraded to the SEP Version 2 configuration. GDLS release.

Oct 3/07: A $16.5 million delivery order as part of a $24 million firm-fixed-price contract to provide parts for the reset of battle-damaged SEPv1 Tanks to a SEPv2 configuration. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI, and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 14, 2007 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Oct 1/07: A delivery order amount of $20.1 million as part of a $510.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for reset of Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Packages to the M1A2 Tanks. As part of the Improved Systems Enhancement Package (SEP) reset program, M1A2 SEP Version 1 tanks are modified to the SEP Version 2 configuration, which includes improved displays, sights, power, and a tank-infantry phone. It is the most technologically advanced digital Abrams tank and is positioned for future technology insertions for compatibility with the Army’s Future Combat Systems.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), and is expected to be complete by Sept. 30, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct. 20, 2006 (W56HZV-06-G-0006). GD release.

M1A2, getting the range
(click to view full)

Aug 13/07: A delivery order amount of $5.7 million as part of a $6.3 million firm-fixed-price contract for spare parts for the M1A2 System Enhancement Program Tank. Work will be performed in Lima, OH and is expected to be complete by July 31, 2010. This was a sole source contract initiated on May 14, 2007 by the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-02-G-0009).

Aug 8/07: The full delivery order amount of $270.6 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for system enhancement package for the Abrams M1A2 Tanks. Work will be performed in Lima, OH (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), and is expected to be complete by July 31/10. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This was a sole source contract initiated on March 16, 2007. The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich., is the contracting activity (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Aug 8/07: The full delivery order amount of $139.3 million for retrofit of M1A2 Vehicles to M1A2 SEP Version 2 configuration. Work will be performed in Lima, OH (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), and is expected to be complete by Jan 31/10. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 21/07 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Specific details re: numbers et. al. are usually present in General Dynamics’ follow-on releases; not this time.

April 18/07: The full delivery order amount of $9.1 million as part of a cost contract for long-lead material for RESET for battle damaged M1A2 System Enhancement Package tanks. Work will be performed in Anniston, AL (40%), Lima, OH (20%), Sterling Heights, MI (10%), and Scranton, PA (30%), and is expected to be complete by June 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on April 10, 2007 (W56HZV-06-G-0006). GDLS release.

Dec 4/06: A delivery order amount of $305 million as part of a $351 million cost contract for RESET of Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Package (SEP)v1 to M1A2 SEPv2 tanks, and long lead material for the additional RESET of M1A2 SEPv1 and M1A2 SEPv2 tanks. A GDLS representative confirms that the contact covers 312 tanks returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), and is expected to be complete on Sept. 30, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on Oct. 20, 2006 (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

Nov 27/06: The full $379.8 million delivery order amount of a firm-fixed-price contract to upgrade 180 M1A2 tanks to Abrams M1A2 SEP Version 2 status, along with total packing fielding material for initial fielding. Work will be performed in Lima, Ohio (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%), and is expected to be complete by Nov. 30, 2009. This was a sole source contract initiated on August 29, 2006 (W56HZV-06-G-0006). See also GDLS press release, and a subsequent release which gives the number. A GDLS representative confirmed that the conversions involved M1A2 tanks.

Nov 27/06: GM subsidiary Allison Transmission in Indianapolis, IN received an $11 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Zero-Timed X1100-3B Transmissions in Support of the System Enhancement Package RESET Program. This would be the RESET maintenance program for M1A2 SEP tanks. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN and is expected to be complete by Nov. 30, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on Aug. 22, 2006 (DAAE07-01-C-N040).

Nov 27/06: GM subsidiary Allison Transmission in Indianapolis, IN received a $32.6 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Zero-Timed X1100-3B Transmissions in Support of the Improved System Enhancement Package RESET Program. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN and is expected to be completed by Dec. 31, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Sept. 29, 2006 (DAAE07-01-C-N040).

Nov 27/06: GM subsidiary Allison Transmission in Indianapolis, IN received a $24.2 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Zero-Timed X1100-3B Transmissions in Support of the System Enhancement Package Retrofit Program. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Aug. 18, 2006 (DAAE07-01-C-N040).

Nov 27/06: GM subsidiary Allison Transmission in Indianapolis, IN received a $16.1 million modification to a firm-fixed-price contract for Upgraded X1100-3B Transmissions with Refurbished Containers in Support of the System Enhancement Package Program. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN and is expected to be complete by April 30, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Jan. 25, 2006 (DAAE07-01-C-N040).

M1A2 Abrams

Aug 4/06: General Dynamics Land Systems in Sterling Heights, MI received the full delivery order amount of $134.7 million as part of a firm-fixed-price contract for Abrams M1A2 SEP (system enhancement package) retrofits to 60 existing M1A2 Abrams tanks, along with total package fielding material for initial fielding. The M1A2 SEP is the latest, most technologically advanced Abrams variant, and the contract also includes a $145 million option to upgrade 60 more M1A2s, bringing the total to $280 million if all options are exercised.

Work on this SEP upgrade contract will be performed in Lima, OH (75%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Anniston, AL (9%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Sterling Heights, MI (3%). Delivery of the first 60 vehicles is slated to begin in November 2007 and is expected to be complete by Nov. 30, 2008. Delivery of the 60 option vehicles would begin in November 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Feb. 1, 2006 by the Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-06-G-0006).

July 8/05: An estimated $7.3 million firm-fixed price contract for 90 commanders display units for the M1A2 Abrams System Enhanced Program (M1A2 SEP) Tank. The work is to be performed at the company’s Tallahassee, FL location and is to be completed Sept. 20, 2007. The Tank-automotive Armament Command in Rock Island, IL issued the contract (DAAE20-02-G-0009 delivery order 0109).

June 20/05: A $141.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for M1A2 Abrams Upgrade Tanks to the System and Continuous Enhancement Program Configurations. Work will be performed in Lima, OH (75%), Imperial Valley, CA (1%), Tallahassee, FL (1%), Sterling Heights, MI (1%), Scranton, PA (3%), and Anniston, AL (9%), and is expected to be complete by Jan. 31, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on March 1, 2003 (DAAE07-01-G-N001). See GDLS press release, which places the number of tanks upgraded to M1A2 SEP at 60. It adds that vehicle deliveries to General Dynamics are scheduled for January through October 2007, with vehicle hand-off to the U.S. Army expected in January 2008.

April 29/05: An $8.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee and cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for unique spares for the M1A2 SEP Abrams Tank, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Work will be performed in Killeen, TX (85%); Sterling Heights, MI (10%); and Southwest Asia (5%), and is expected to be complete by April 30, 2010. This was a sole source contract initiated on April 14, 2004 by US Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command in Rock Island, IL (W52H09-05-C-0089). See also GDLS press release.

Sept 2/04: A $22.4 million firm-fixed-price contract for repair and modification to 111 M1A2 SEP Tanks. Work will be performed in Lima, OH and is expected to be complete by July 30, 2005. This was a sole source contract initiated on July 14, 2004 (DAAE07-01-G-N001). A subsequent GDLS press release clarified that this is a contract “to repair and modify 111 M1A2 Abrams System Enhancement Package (SEP) tanks that have recently returned from the war zone.” Work will be performed at the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio, and is expected to be complete by July 30, 2005. The total value for this effort is actually about $70 million, allocated between TACOM ($40 million, to include major component repair by Anniston Army Depot), and GDLS ($29.9 Million).

May 6/04: General Dynamics Land Systems announces a $121 million delivery order as part of a contract valued at $244 million, to retrofit 65 M1A2 Abrams tanks to the M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Program) configuration. The tanks are being retrofitted to modernize the U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment.

Work will be performed with the existing workforce at General Dynamics’ facilities in Lima, OH (74%); Tallahassee, FL (10%); Anniston, AL (9%); Scranton, PA (3%); Imperial Valley, CA. (1%); Muskegon, MI (1%); and Sterling Heights, MI (1%). Work will also be done at Fort Carson, CO (1%).

May 15/03: A delivery order amount of $26,029,150 as part of a $26,055,258 firm-fixed-price contract to retrofit 14 M1A2 Abrams Upgrade Tanks to the M1A2 SEP configuration. Work will be performed in Lima, OH (75%), Imperial Valley, CA (1%), Tallahassee, FL (10%), Sterling Heights, MI (1%), Scranton, PA (3%), Anniston, AL (9%), and Muskegon, IL (1%), and is expected to be completed by Dec. 31, 2004. This was a sole source contract initiated on April 29, 2002 (DAAE07-01-G-N001).

Nov 29/02: A delivery order amount of $5.8 million as part of an $8.8 million firm-fixed-price contract for 10 gigabyte solid state removable memory cartridges for retrofit into M1A2 Abrams SEP tanks. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights (0.2%) and Bloomington, MN (99.8%), and is to be complete by Aug. 31, 2003. This was a sole source contract initiated on Nov. 15, 2002 (DAAE07-01-G-N001).

May 16/02: A delivery order amount of $2.9 million as part of a $5.8 million (cumulative total) un-priced contractual action for 9 lines of spare parts in support of the M1A2 SEP Abrams Tank. Work will be performed in Lima, OH (10%); Imperial, CA (40%); Tallahassee, FL (40%), Anniston, AL (10%), and is to be complete by Oct. 30, 2003. This is a sole-source contract initiated on Feb. 14, 2002 by the U. S. Army Tank and Automotive Command in Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-97-G-0002).

Feb 9/01: A $142 million modification to firm-fixed-price, multi-year contract DAAE07-95-C-0292. This procurement is an equitable adjustment to change-order modification P00110, that incorporated the System Enhancement Package (SEP) into 240 M1A2 Abrams Upgrade Tanks. This modification adds first article tests for the SEP into 240 tanks, adds material and testing for Under Armor Auxiliary Power Units that are to be retrofitted onto M1A2 Abrams Upgrade Tanks with the SEP.

Work will be performed in Lima, OH (80%); Scranton, PA (3%); Imperial Valley, CA (1%); Anniston, AL (4%); Tallahassee, FL (10%); Muskegon, MS (1%), and Sterling Heights, MI (1%), and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2001. Of the total contract funds, $97.3 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This is a sole source contract initiated on Jan. 18, 1995.

Jan 16/01: The Research Triangle Institute in Research Triangle Park, NC received a $6 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract N61339-95-C-0015, exercising exercise an option for the production of one M1A2 Tank System Enhancement Package and one Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Maintenance Training System, Trainer Unique Modification Kit.

Work will be performed in Research Triangle Park, NC (60%) and Daytona, FL (40%); and is expected to be complete by September 2001. The Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division in Orlando, FL issued the contract.

Feb 10/2000: The Research Triangle Institute in Research Triangle Park, NC received a $5 million modification to previously awarded contract N61339-95-C-0015 for the design, refurbishment, documentation, fabrication, integration, testing, manufacture, delivery and installation of the M1A2 system enhancement package maintenance training systems. Work will be performed in Research Triangle Park, NC (60%) and Daytona, FL (40%), and is expected to be complete by November 2000. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division in Orlando, FL issued the contract.

Dec 22/99: A $24.9 million modification to cost-plus-fixed-fee contract DAAE07-96-C-X195, to exercise the option for system technical support for the Abrams Tank Program, a system enhancement package M1A2 retrofit for the Abrams Tank. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI and is expected to be complete by July 30, 2001. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This is a sole source contract initiated on May 2, 1996.

Nov 23/99: A $5 modification to cost-plus-fixed-fee contract DAAE07-96-C-X195, to exercise priced options for system technical support for the Abrams Tank Program, the M1A2 retrofit System Enhancement Package. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI and is expected to be complete by Aug. 30, 2001. This is a sole source contract initiated on May 2, 1996.

May 4/98: A $9.1 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for various spares in support of fielding of the System Enhancement Package (SEP) of the M1A2 upgrade tank. Work will be performed in Tallahassee, FL (75%); Lima, OH (10%); Imperial Valley, CA (10%); and Scranton, OH (5%), and is expected to be complete by Dec. 31, 2000. This is a sole source contract initiated on Dec. 8, 1997 by the U.S. Army Tank-automotive & Armaments Command at Rock Island, IL (DAAE20-97-G-0002/0008).

Sept 26/97: A $7.3 million increment of a $24.3 million modification to a $127.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for research and development for the Abrams System Enhancement Package (ASEP) that will be incorporated into the M1A2 Abrams Tank. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI and is expected to be complete by Feb. 28, 1999. Of the total contract funds, $14,757 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This is a sole source contract initiated on Nov. 23, 1994 (DAAE07-94-C-0727).

Aug 8/96: A $10 million modification to a cost plus fixed fee contract for two Heavy Assault Bridge Pre-Low Rate Initial Production Pilot/Test vehicles in Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Package (SEP) configuration. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, MI and is expected to be complete by February 28, 1998. This is a sole source contract initiated on May 29, 1996 (DAAE07-94-C-0727).

Additional Readings & Sources

• The Armor Site – M1A1/2 Abrams. Simply the best Abrams tank reference.

• NBC News (July 28/12) – The M1 Abrams: The Army tank that could not be stopped

• US Army – (Feb 19/08) – Modified M1-A2 Abrams Tanks Improve Safety, Precision. Describes the TUSK modifications.

• US Army Logistics Management College, ALOG Magazine (Jan-Feb 1996) – Keeping M1A1′s in Action. A new way to employ the Army’s M1A1 full-up power pack (FUPP) saves time and money and helps ensure a combat-ready tank unit. A FUPP consists of a Honeywell AGT-1500 turbine engine, which contains four modules, and an Allison X1100-3B transmission.

When moving whole units, shipping is always the cheaper, higher-capacity option. Slow speed and port access are the big issues, but what if ship transit times could be cut sharply, and full-service ports weren’t necessary? After Australia led the way by using what amounted to fast car ferries for military operations, the US Army and Navy decided to give it a go. Both services leased Incat TSV/HSV wave-piercing catamaran ship designs, while the Marines’ charged ahead with very successful use of Austal’s Westpac Express high-speed catamaran. These Australian-designed ships all give commanders the ability to roll on a company with full gear and equipment (or roll on a full infantry battalion if used only as a troop transport), haul it intra-theater distances at 38 knots, then move their shallow draft safely into austere ports to roll them off.

Their successful use, and continued success on operations, attracted favorable comment and notice from all services. So favorable that the experiments have led to a $3+ billion program called the Joint High Speed Vessel. These designs may even have uses beyond simple ferrying and transport.

The JHSV Ships

Austal concept
(click to view full)

The design specifications established for the JHSV described an ocean-going vessel 450 feet in length or less, capable of carrying 600 short tons of cargo up to 1,200 nautical miles at a speed of 35 knots. It must also have seats for at least 312 passengers, and must be able to provide long-term berthing and galley facilities for at least 104 of those passengers in addition to the vessel’s 41 crew.

A single firm was ultimately selected to produce all planned JHSV ships, and Austal beat their rival Incat for the contract. Austal’s design ventured slightly beyond the program’s specifications. Length is just 103.0m/ 337.9 ft, with a Beam of 28.5m/ 93.5 ft, and a miniscule Draft of just 3.83m/ 12.57 ft.

The ship’s 4 Wartsalia WLD-1400-SR waterjets are powered by the same MTU 8000 class diesel engines used on Austal’s Independence Class Littoral Combat Ship, and the Hawaii Superferries. Specifically, JHSVs use 4 MTU 20V8000 M71Ls, rated at a maximum of 9.1 MW each. These engines can push the ships to the required 35 knots at full cargo load, or 43 knots unloaded, out to the required range of 1,200 nautical miles.

Austal’s design offers embarked troop berthing for 150 (104 permanent, 46 temporary) and airline-style seating for 312 troops, in addition to the crew of 41. Cargo capacity is up to 700 short tons/ 635 metric tons, in a usable cargo area 1863 m2/ 20,053 ft2, with a clear height of 4.75m and a turning diameter of 26.21m. The cargo area also has 6 ISO TEU (20′ ISO container) interface panels, for containers that need power. The Austere Loading Ramp Arrangement can support M1A2 Abrams tanks, per requirements, and a telescoping boom crane can lift 18.2 metric tons at 10m, dropping to 12.3 metric tons at 15m.

The JHSV’s flight deck can support all current Navy helicopters up to and including the Marines’ current med/heavy CH-53E Super Stallion, though it hasn’t yet been certified for the CH-53E. Flight operations will be handled by Kongsberg Maritime’s night-capable Helicopter Operations Surveillance System (HOSS).

HSV-2 Swift, frontal
(click to view full)

As NAVSEA noted:

“[JHSV] will be capable of transporting Army and Marine Corps company-sized units with their vehicles, or reconfigure to become a troop transport for an infantry battalion. Its 35-45 nautical miles per hour speed allows for rapid deployment and maneuver of conventional or special operations forces.

The JHSV will not be a combatant vessel. Its construction will be similar to high-speed commercial ferries used around the world, and the design will include a flight deck and an off-load ramp which can be lowered on a pier or quay wall – allowing vehicles to quickly drive off the ship.

JHSV’s shallow draft will allow it access to small austere ports common in developing countries. This makes the JHSV an extremely flexible asset ideal for three types of missions: support of relief operations in small or damaged ports; as a flexible logistics support vessel for the Joint Commander; or as the key enabler for rapid transport of a Marine Light Armored Reconnaissance Company or an Army Stryker unit.”

The JHSV Program

Incat JHSV concept – lost
(click to view full)

The Joint High Speed Vessel’s Initial Capability Document received approval from the Department of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council on Nov 1/05, with all 4 military services concurring. The initial goal was 5 Army vessels, and 3 Navy vessels, for a program worth about $1.6 billion, but the Navy’s interest has continued to grow. The contract signed in November 2008 called for up to 10 ships, split evenly between the Army and Navy. An initial Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) allowed the U.S. Navy to use its surface ship acquisition expertise to buy these vessels on the Army’s behalf, with Army participation – until program changes moved all of these ships to the Navy’s procurement budget and operation.

All of the JHSVs were then transferred to Maritime Sealift Command under a May 2011 agreement. The first 4 / 10 projected vessels will be crewed by civil service mariners. JHSV 5-10 are slated to be crewed by contracted civilian mariners working for a private company. Military mission personnel will embark with either set, as required by mission sponsors.

The goal is for JHSV to achieve Initial Operational Capability in 2012, and JHSV 1 seems close to that goal. JHSV ship names to date are:

• JHSV 1 USNS Spearhead
  
• JHSV 2 USNS Choctaw County
  
• JHSV 3 Millinocket
  
• JHSV 4 Fall River
  
• JHSV 5 Trenton Resolute
  
• JHSV 6 Brunswick
  
• JHSV 7 Carson City Courageous
  
• JHSV 8 ?
  
• JHSV 9 Sacrifice (Army name, likely to be replaced)
  
• JHSV 10 ? (under contract, but slated for termination)

The Pentagon’s April 2011 Selected Acquisition Report placed the program at 18 ships, and its total cost at about $FY08 3.5 billion. That changed as FY 2013 budget plans cut all ships beyond the 10 in the current contract, and the US Navy is negotiating over cancellation of its JHSV 10 contract due to sequestration cuts. Annual budgets to date have included:

FY 2008: $231.9 million, 1 ship funded.
Navy: $18.4M RDT&E
Army: $5M RDT&E, $208.6M production, 1 ship

FY 2009: $364.2 million, 2 ships funded.
Navy: $11.6M RDT&E, $181.3M production, 1 ship
Army: $3.0M RDT&E, $168.3M production, 1 ship

FY 2010: $391.1 million, 2 ships funded
Navy: $8.2M RDT&E, $202.5M production, 1 ship
Army: $3.0M RDT&E, $177.4M production, 1 ship

FY 2011: $390.1 million, 2 ships funded.
Navy: $3.5M RDT&E, $203.9M production, 1 ship
Army: $3.0M RDT&E, $179.7M production, 1 ship

FY 2012: $376.4 million, 2 ships funded.
Navy: $4.1M RDT&E, $372.3M production, 2 ships

FY 2013 request: $376.4 million, 1 ship funded.
Navy: $1.9M RDT&E, $189.2M production, 10th & final ship

Note that advance materials purchases for future years are included in each year’s procurement budgets. After FY 2013, JHSV budgets are very small, reflecting only minor post-shakedown work.

Supplements: From Leased to Bought

Hawaii Superferry
(click to view full)

At present, 2 leased vessels remain in military service: Incat’s HSV-2 Swift wave-piercing catamaran with the Navy, and Austal’s HSV 4676 Westpac Express catamaran with the Marine Corps. Westpac Express is primarily a troop and cargo transport, which is what the Marines wanted. Swift is aligned with Navy requirements to carry cargo, while serving as a testbed and bridge to JHSV operations.

HSV-2 Swift had supported relief operations in Indonesia post-tsunami, and in the Gulf Coast region following hurricane Katrina. In both cases, Swift’s high speed and shallow draft combined to make it an ideal platform for the delivery of relief supplies and support of other platforms operating in the area. During operations following Katrina, Swift was able to use ports that were inaccessible to other ships of the logistics force. It has also been a platform for UAV and aerostat experiments.

Westpac Express continues to enjoy success and contract renewals as it operates in the PACOM area of Guam, Okinawa, and Japan.

JHSV’s program shrinkage may help get these charters renewed, but it’s likely that both charters will be replaced by a purchased alternative with many similarities to the JHSV.

After its ferry service was forced into bankruptcy by environmental lawfare, the Hawaii Superferries Huakai and Alakai were pressed into service by their main creditor: the US Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD). They were called into service in the wake of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and these Austal-built ships were very successful in that role. Both ferries were ultimately bought by the US Navy in 2011, for just $35 million. Once their $35 million conversions are done, they’re likely to replace Westpac Express and Swift as USNS Guam (ex-Huakai) and USNS Puerto Rico (ex-Alakai, slightly smaller). The superferries will offer more troop-carrying berths than their similar JHSV counterparts, in exchange for less military flexibility.

Contracts & Key Events

JHSV 2 Launch
(click to view full)

April 27/13: Aerostat experiment. The Miami Herald reports that the chartered catamaran HSV 2 Swift is currently testing an interesting combination for the US Navy. An aerostat (tethered blimp) mooring system has been attached to the starbord rear at the helicopter deck, and sailors are deploying hand-launched Aerovironment Puma mini-UAVs to investigate targets cued by the aerostat’s radar and optical sensors. When fully deployed to 2,000 feet, Raven Inc’s TIF-25K gives Swift a sea surveillance radius of 50 miles at almost zero operating cost, roughly doubling a warship’s surveillance radius, and increasing Swift’s by 10x.

The JHSV ships and Hawaii Superferries (esp. USNS Puerto Rico) are natural fits for this configuration, given their similarity to HSV 2. If weight and other issues can be worked out, the USA’s Littoral Combat Ships like the trimaran Independence Class could also be an option, and so could amphibious LSD and LPD ships. Still, Swift needs to work out a coherent concept of operations in these trials, including the question of barrier vs. mobile surveillance approaches.

If all goes well with the operational tests, the US Navy will consult with drug enforcement agencies, including the Key West, FL Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF) that oversees Operation Martillo in the Caribbean. If the system is deployed, the biggest losers would probably be expensive-to-operate P-3 quad-turboprop sea control planes. US personnel have also begun promoting the concept to other nations, including Colombia, though those countries would almost certainly use their own ships.

April 20/13: JHSV 3 christened. The Millinocket is christened at Austal’s Alabama shipyard, named after 2 Maine towns. No word on negotiations concerning JHSV 10, though Austal’s release does make a point of noting 10 JHSV vessels under contract. US MSC | Austal.

April 12/13: Naming. 3 JHSV ships are among the 7 named by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, who actually stuck to class naming conventions this time instead of veering into political partisanship.

JHSV 5 will become USNS Trenton, after New Jersey’s capital city. JHSV 6 will become USNS Brunswick, after the seaport in Georgia. JHSV 7 will become USNS Carson City, after Nevada’s capital city. Pentagon.

March 15/13: JHSV 2. Choctaw County completes builder’s trials, reaching speeds of more than 41 knots. Delivery is expected this summer. Austal.

March 2/13: JHSV 10. The US Navy’s guidance regarding sequestration budget cuts involves negotiations to cancel JHSV 10′s contract. They have to hold negotiations, because the contract is already live. The question will be cancellation costs.

Dec 20/12: JHSV 10. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $166.9 million contract modification, exercising the construction option for JHSV 10. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (48%); Pittsfield, MA (9%); Franklin, MA (3%); Philadelphia, PA (3%); Henderson, Western Australia (3%); Atlanta, GA (2%); Chicago, IL (2%); Gulfport, MS (2%); Slidell, LA (1%); Iron Mountain, MI (1%); Houston, TX (1%); Dallas, TX (1%); Chesapeake, VA (1%); Milwaukee, WI (1%); Brookfield, WI (1%), and various sites inside and outside the United States each below 1% (21% tl.), and is expected to be complete by June 2017. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-08-C-2217).

JHSV 10 bought

Oct 1/12: JHSV 2 launch. Choctaw County is launched in Mobile, AL.

Austal JHSV concept
(click to view full)

Sept 15/12: JHSV 2 christened. USNS Choctaw County is christened during a ceremony at Austal USA in Mobile, AL. US MSC | Pentagon.

May 30/12: Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next JHSV will be named the USNS Millinocket. Pentagon.

May 8/12: The US Navy re-names the Hawaiian Superferries, which will becomes USNS Guam and USNS Puerto Rico.

They do not say, but it’s likely that the larger Huakai, tabbed to replace the Westpac Express and move Marines to and from Okinawa and Guam, is the future USNS Guam. The smaller Alakai was being considered for missions in Latin America and/or Africa, so it’s likely that she’ll become USNS Puerto Rico.US DoD.

April 25/12: The first of 43 modules for JHSV 3 have been successfully transported from the Module Manufacturing Facility (MMF), and erected in the final assembly bay on the waterfront, in preparation for the May 3/12 keel-laying ceremony. The 46 tonne, 20.4m x 8.3m x 9.4m module will be part of one of the catamaran akas. Austal.

April 19/12: JHSV-1 trials. The future USNS Spearhead completes builder’s trials of the ship’s propulsion plant, communication and navigational systems, ride control systems, pollution control systems; and first-of-class maneuverability and stability trials. The ship reached speeds of more than 35 knots, exceeding the program’s requirements.

Next steps include INSURV inspection, and commissioning. US Navy acceptance is scheduled by the end of 2012. USN PEO Ships | Austal.

Oct 10/11: JHSV 3 begun. Austal announces the official beginning of fabrication for JHSV 3 Fortitude. Austal USA President and COO, Joe Rella:

“The race is on… The world is about to learn just how much value Austal’s investments in modular ship fabrication offers our Navy and Military Sealift Command customers. We challenge ourselves every day to build each ship faster and more efficiently than the one before.”

Oct 7/11: JHSV 6 named. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus names JHSV 6 as USNS Choctaw County. He grew up in that Mississippi county, though there are also Choctaw counties in Alabama and Oklahoma. Ray Mabus said that “I chose to name JHSV after Choctaw County to honor those men and women who represent rural America.”

The name eventually migrates to JHSV 2. US MSC.

Sept 10/11: JHSV 1 christened. JHSV-1 Spearhead is launched at Austal USA’s yard in Mobile, AL. The formal christening ceremony is held on Sept 17/11. The ship is reported to be slightly over budget, but not badly so – a welcome departure for a USN first ship of class. US MSC | Austal | Alabama Press-Register | Maritime Executive.

June 9/11: Inside the Navy reports that a June 14/11 Defense Acquisition Board meeting will determine the Navy’s readiness to procure JHSV ships 6-10. Defense officials may opt to fast-track the decision as a “paper DAB,” granting approval without requiring a meeting.

June 2/11: Sub-contract. Taber Extrusions LLC announces contracts to supply extruded aluminum products for JHSV 3 Fortitude, and LCS 6 Jackson, from its facilities in Russellville, AR and Gulfport, MS. Some structural extrusions for both ships will also be manufactured by Taber and supplied to Austal through a contract with O’Neal Steel Corp.

Taber has an 8,600 ton extrusion press with a rectangular container and billet configuration. The firm says that compared with smaller presses and round containers, their tool gives superior metal flow patterns with much tighter tolerances for flatness, straightness and twist; and better assurance of critical thickness dimensions. The resulting wide multi-void extrusions are friction stir welded into panels, and tight tolerances improve productivity while reducing downstream scrap. When finished, they make up some of the ship’s decking, superstructure and bulkheads.

JHSV 1 construction
(click to view full)

Sept 28/10: JHSV 2 begins. Austal announces that they’ve begun construction of JHSV 2 Vigilant for Maritime Sealift Command. A subsequent release fixes the start date at Sept 13/10.

July 22/10: JHSV 1 keel-laying. Keel-laying for the first JHSV ship, Spearhead, at Austal’s Mobile, AL facility. Austal | Press-Register advance report.

June 3/10: #4-5 lead-in. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $99.6 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-08-C-2217) for JHSV 4 and 5 long lead time materials, including main propulsion engines, aluminum, waterjets, reduction gears, generators and other components, beginning in fall 2010.

Work will be performed in Detroit, MI (38%); Chesapeake, VA (18%); Henderson, Australia (13%); Gulfport, MS (10%); Ravenswood, WVA (9%); Ft. Lauderdale, FL (4%); Mobile, AL (3%); Auburn, IN (2.6%); Winter Haven, FL (1%); Gardena, CA (1%); and Davenport, IA (0.4%), and is expected to be complete by December 2011. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages this contract. See also Austal release.

May 26/10: Sub-contract. Kongsberg Maritime has successfully delivered the first JHSV Helicopter Operations Surveillance System (HOSS) to General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems. The sub-contract was awarded in November 2009.

The JHSV HOSS system will provide comprehensive flight deck coverage for helicopter operations, even in very low light conditions, on a MIL-S-901D shock qualified 19″ SXGA liquid crystal display (LCD) monitor in the JHSV control room. The monitor’s Night Vision Device (NVD) optical filter makes it suitable for night operations in ship compartments directly overlooking the flight deck. defpro.

March 25/10: JHSV 4 named. US Navy Secretary Ray Mabus officially names the 2nd US Navy ship under the JHSV program: USNS Fall River [JHSV 4]. US Navy | Gannett’s Navy Times.

March 16/10: Support. Reuters reports on a recent US Navy SBIR research solicitation, aimed at more quickly and cheaply diagnosing cracking in aluminum ship structures. From US Navy SBIR N10A-T041: “Fracture Evaluation and Design Tool for Welded Aluminum Ship Structures Subjected to Impulsive Dynamic Loading” :

“A new analysis tool combined with an experimental validation protocol is needed to accurately characterize the dynamic response and fracture behavior of welded aluminum ship structures subjected to extreme loading events. The goal of this effort is to develop an explicit dynamic failure prediction toolkit for fracture assessment of welded thin-walled aluminum structures. To efficiently characterize a large size ship structure, innovative modeling techniques using fractured shell elements are needed along with a mesh independent crack insertion and propagation capability. In addition to innovative crack simulation in a shell structure, advanced constitutive models have to be implemented in the toolkit to capture the rate dependence and anisotropy in strength, plastic flow and ductility. Developing and demonstrating novel damage simulation and fracture prediction methods has significant potential impact on design and operation of current and future Navy welded aluminum, ship structural systems.”

US Navy Commander Victor Chen reiterated the Navy’s confidence in the JHSV and Littoral Combat Ships; the JHSV is aluminum construction, as is the LCS-2 Independence Class, and the LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure on a steel hull. He adds that:

“We already have a level of confidence in how to work with aluminum. The Office of Naval Research is trying to expand the knowledge base and build on what we already know.”

May 13/10: Crewing plans. The US Navy and Military Sealift Command announce the crewing plan for USN JHSVs (even numbers, JHSVs 2-10). Because the ships are new and could conduct a wide variety of missions, MSC determined that the best course of action is to institute a pilot program where JHSV 2 Vigilant and JHSV 4 Fall River will be crewed by 21 civil service mariners each, in order to create a base of experience and knowledge. Delivery as USNS Vigilant is scheduled for FY 2013, but the crews arrive beforehand; while USNS Fall River’s delivery is scheduled for FY 2014. JHSVs 6, 8 and 10 will be crewed with 21 civilian contract mariners each, with specifications developed based on experience with the first 2 ships.

The Army Transportation Corps officers have apparently won their argument to crew the Army’s JHSVs as USAV ships, involving larger crews of soldiers. Within a year, however, that victory would be undone. US MSC.

Feb 11/10: Superferries. The former Hawaii superferries Huakai and Alakai are pressed into service by the USA’s Maritime Administration (MARAD), in the wake of the disaster in Haiti. The ships are managed by Hornblower Marine Services (HMS), and the deployment is seen as an earl concept test of the similar JHSV design’s operations. Haiti’s lack of port infrastructure has not, to date, been a major problem for these ships.

Maritime Executive magazine has the full report, and see also July 30/08 entry.

Feb 3/10: JHSV Boost? Defense News reports that the JHSV program may be about to get a very big boost. Navy Undersecretary Bob Work:

“There was a big debate within the [Navy] department on patrol craft, PCs… People said these are very good for irregular warfare. But when we looked at it we said we wanted to have self-deployable platforms that have a lot of payload space that you can take to the fight whatever you need – SEALs, Marines, riverine squadrons. So we decided to increase the Joint High Speed Vessel program.” Work said the Navy now envisions buying up to 23 of the ships for its own use, in addition to five being built for the Army. “We like their self-deployability aspects,” Work said. “They can be a sea base, they can be an Africa Partnership Station, they’re extremely flexible.”

Dec 18/09: Industrial. Austal announces success in the US Navy’s Production Readiness Review (PRR), which allows their Mobile, AL facility to immediately begin construction of Fortitude [JHSV 1]. US Navy Program Manager George Sutton referred in part to Austal’s recently-competed Module Manufacturing Facility (MMF) when he said that:

“Considerable investments in the Austal shipyard coupled with the implementation of proven commercial technology gives me high levels of confidence in the shipyard’s ability to execute the program.”

Nov 10/09: Industrial. Austal officially opens its new $88 million state-of-the-art Modular Manufacturing Facility (MMF) in Mobile, AL, equipping its US shipyard with the ability to build up to three 100 metre-plus vessels each year. Phase 1 facility boasts 35,000 m2 of manufacturing space under one roof, including a 7,900 m2 warehouse, as well as paved parking for more than 2,000 vehicles.

The MMF will increase Austal USA’s capacity to assemble and outfit unit modules before consolidating them into the full vessel, automating component manufacture, including pipe runs, from a 3D model. This approach is widely used in advanced European and Asian shipyards, but is less common in the USA. Austal’s MMF is equipped with routers for the precise cutting of aluminum plate, as well as automated pipe and plate benders. Test constructions are currently underway at the new facility, with work on the first 103 meter JHSV scheduled to commence before the end of 2009. The facility will also build LCS-2 Independence class trimarans for the Littoral Combat Ship program. Austal release.

July 17/09: Ship names 1-3. The Pentagon announces names for the first 3 JHSV ships. The Army will field Fortitude [JHSV 1] and Spearhead [JHSV 3], while the Navy’s first JHSV will be named Vigilant [JHSV 2]. the names for JHSV 2 and 3 eventually change.

Spearhead would later become the name for JHSV 1 instead. US Navy Team Ships | MarineLog.

June 19/09: #2-3 lead in. Austal USA in Mobile AL receives a $99.6 million modification to their JHSV contract (N00024-08-C-2217), covering long lead time materials needed for JHSV 2 and JHSV 3. These materials include items like aluminum for the hulls, main propulsion engines, waterjets, reduction gears, generators, and other components that need to be on hand before construction begins in June 2010.

Work will be performed in Detroit, MI (38%); Chesapeake, VA (18%); Henderson, Australia, (13%); Gulfport, MS (10%); Ravenswood, WVA (9%); and Ft. Lauderdale, FL (4%); Mobile, AL (3%); Auburn, IN (2.6%); Winter Haven, FL (1%); Gardena, CA (1%); and Davenport, IA (0.4%), and is expected to be complete by July 2013. US Naval Sea Systems Command manages the contract

Once construction contracts are awarded for the 2 ships later in FY 2009, these materials will be moved with their associated costs into their respective ship construction line items.

April 6/09: US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates takes the unusual but approved step of making his FY 2010 defense budget recommendations public. They include another 2 high speed ship charters from 2009-2011, until JHSV ships begin arriving.

Westpac express,
loading in Australia
(click to view full)

July 30/08: Austal announces its its final Phase II JHSV submission to the US Navy, following an extensive detailed design and review process. The firm expects that a single Phase II contract for up to 10 JHSV ships will be awarded in late 2008.

Austal’s release adds the interesting tidbit that the firm was recently awarded a new contract to provide additional features and equipment on Hawaii Superferry’s second commercial 107 meter catamaran, in order to allow its use by the military if required.

April 23-27/07: Representatives of the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the shipbuilding industry meet at at Quantico Marine Corps Base, VA, to discuss the JHSV’s current status of the Joint High Speed Vessel and update prospective contractors on the vessel’s design requirements. US Army release.

November 2005: Initial Draft. The JHSV program office’s Initial Capability Document received approval from the Department of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council in early November. All four military services concurred with the decision. The Analysis of Alternatives for this program is scheduled to report out before the end of the 2005 calendar year, and procurement of the lead ship is planned for FY 2008. NAVSEA release

Appendix A: The US Military’s HSV/TSV Experience

Westpac Express
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Instead of arising from a drawing board or a notional requirements sheet, the JHSV’s requirements were based on 7 years of experience operating similar leased vessels, from 2001-2008. The core concept is based on an Australian innovation: fast catamaran ferries from Austal and Incat that are in widespread civilian use. Each ship has a carrying capacity equal to about 20 C-17 heavy airlifters, and their waterjets can power these aluminum catamarans through the water at a consistent 35-40 knots in calm seas. Robert Kaplan, in “Hog Pilot and Blue Water Grunts“:

“Who thought up the idea of using car ferries to get Marines to a combat zone and then link up with pre-positioning ships?” I asked a Marine chief warrant officer. “No-one at the Pentagon. Just a bunch of guys brainstorming here,” the chief replied.”

It was more than just brainstorming. Incat’s HMAS Jervis Bay had been used very effectively by Australia during East Timor’s 1999 independence referendum and subsequent operations, and its demonstrated capabilities attracted American interest.

The chartered vessels quickly lived up to their billing. Normal transit for a Marine battalion from Okinawa, Japan to South Korea aboard ferry or amphibious shipping is about 2-3 days, and moving it by air would take 14-17 “lifts” from C-17 aircraft, a process that might require several trips unless that many planes were available. The same deployment could be carried out by Austal’s chartered WestPac Express catamaran in 24-30 hours; which is to say, at about half the time of conventional naval options, and at about 25% of airlift’s costs. One ship can carry a complete battalion of up to 970 Marines, along with 663 tons of vehicles and equipment. If the Marines must deploy from Guam, where many are being moved from Okinawa, the added distance makes JHSV an even more timely and cost efficient option.

“I Serve With HSV-2!”
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Austal’s ships weren’t the only high speed vessels in operation. The Army operated Incat’s HSVX-1 Joint Venture in conjunction with the Navy, and TSV-1X Spearhead was under sole Army control until its 2005 return to commercial service. Both ships saw extensive Army use in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as supporting operations in the Pacific, Atlantic, Mediterranean, Horn of Africa, Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia.

In one operation, TSV-1X Spearhead moved the 101st Airborne Division’s military police and their equipment from Djibouti, Africa to Kuwait in the Persian Gulf. The fast catamaran made the 2,000 mile trip in just 2.5 days. Its naval LSV predecessor would have needed 10 days to make the voyage, and would only have carried the equipment, forcing the troops to fly separately.

HSVX-1 Joint Venture was even used by Special Operations Command as a proof-of-concept platform for a special operations force afloat in the western Pacific. Its modifications included a helicopter landing deck and hangar, along with a small military command, control and communications suite. Modifications to its complement also included ScanEagle UAVs, letting US Navy experiment with UAVs, blimps and related vehicles in a persistent surveillance role. The combination of high speed transport, persistent surveillance, and advanced communications may prove to be very complementary.

A 3rd Incat ship, the 112m HSV-2 Swift, was contracted to serve as an interim Mine Warfare Command and Support Ship (MCS), supporting R&D into new mine warfare modular payloads. From 2004 onward, its scope of use became far broader, and Swift’s geographic range expanded to include Africa, Asia, and recovery efforts in the USA after Hurricane Katrina. It remains in American service as of 2013, and continues to trial new approaches like aerostats and UAVs.

If HSVX-1 and HSV-2′s experiences sound a lot like the USA’s forthcoming Littoral Combat Ships, the similarity is no accident. Experience with these high-speed catamarans has played an important role in developing the LCS concept of operations, though the US Navy may not have taken the experiments to their logical conclusion. Given the emergence of naval unmanned vehicles, some observers believe that JHSV’s size and lower cost make it a better choice than the smaller LCS as a “robotic swarm mothership”.

Additional Readings & Sources

• US Navy PEO Ships PMS-325 – Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV)

• US Navy NWDC – Naval Concept Development – High Speed Vessel

• JHSV Program (Sept 28/06) – Joint High Speed Vessel Program Overview: SNAME SD-5 & IHS

• US Military Sealift Command – WESTPAC EXPRESS, MV

• US Navy Fact File – High-Speed Vessel – HSV

• US Military Sealift Command – HSV SWIFT

• Soldiers Magazine (August 2007) – Launching the JHSV

• US Army (April 30/07) – Services Chart Course for New Vessel

• Inside the Navy via Military.com (July 13/06) – Joint High-Speed Vessel Taking Shape

• Seapower Magazine (May 2006) – In the Shallows: The Joint High-Speed Vessel will bring a new dimension to U.S. forces

• National Defense Magazine (November 2005) – Navy’s High-Speed Vessel Aids Relief Effort

• US Armed Forces Press Service (Oct 21/02) – “Joint Venture” Craft Cruises to the Future

• Thanks to DID reader and long-serving US MSC vet Lee Wahler for his assistance with this article.

The US Army’s Heavy Brigade Combat Teams have relied on BAE’s 30+ ton Bradley family of M2/3/6/7 vehicles for a variety of combat functions, from armed infantry carrier and cavalry scout roles, to specialized tasks like calling artillery fire and even short-range air defense. The Bradley first entered US Army service in 1981, however, and the fleet has served through several wars. Even ongoing RESET, modernizations, and remanufacturing cannot keep them going indefinitely.

The Army’s problem is that replacing them has been a ton of trouble. Future Combat Systems’ MGV-IFV was terminated, along with the other MGV variants, by the 2010 budget. A proposal to replace it with a “Ground Combat Vehicle” (GCV) program raised concerns that the Army’s wish list would create an even less affordable solution. Now a revised GCV program is underway. Can it deliver a vehicle that will be effective on the battlefield? Just as important, can it deliver a vehicle that the US Army can afford to buy and maintain, in the midst of major national budgetary problems and swelling entitlement programs?

GCV: Concept & Requirements

GCV concept
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The GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle is not a simple competition among existing vehicle types, though the global armored vehicle industry could easily have offered that. Instead, it was decided to run GCV as a clean sheet design for a new armored vehicle that would incorporate all of the lessons learned in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.

“All” can be a dangerous goal for a military that needs on-time, on-budget, reasonably priced solutions. The initial GCV RFP resulted in design submissions that were reportedly in the 60-70 ton range. That’s almost double the weight of a 33 ton Bradley family vehicle, or of new designs like Korea’s K-21 KNIFV; and 50% higher than even heavy IFVs like Germany’s Puma and Britain’s FRES-SV. Indeed, it’s equivalent to a heavy main battle tank like the M1 Abrams.

The August 2010 GCV RFP cancellation resulted in a new RFP that emphasized use of “mature” technologies, but didn’t change some of the key requirements driving issues like weight, size and cost. Nor did it change the Army’s insistence on big performance increases in a number of areas.

Under the terms of its revised RFP, the GCV Program is driven to achieve a set of primary imperatives called the “Big Four”. These “Big Four” imperatives are defined as follows:

• Force Protection: Including protection against IED land mines. This is not a traditional strength of tracked vehicles lighter than main battle tanks, due to their flat bottoms.

• Capacity: vehicle crew and a fully-equipped 9 soldier Infantry squad. That’s relatively large. The Bradley carries just 6, and survivability needs and “space under armor” are the 2 requirement sets that do the most to determine vehicle size and weight. Which in turn affect costs.

• Full Spectrum: “A versatile platform able to adapt and/or enhance capabilities through configuration changes of armor and network while providing for growth over time in terms of size, weight, power and cooling.” This has been a steady trend in current IFVs over time, including the Bradley.

• Timing: A design that can have the 1st production vehicle delivered and accepted within 7 years of the TD phase contract award.

Under the revised September 2010 RFP, some requirements were “Tier 1″: specifically defined, and must be met. Tier 2 and Tier 3 requirements must be addressed, but the vendors are responsible for making tradeoffs among them. Vendors that DID talked to believe this left the Army with better solutions than they would otherwise have received.

GCV: Controversies & Comparisons

Armor Evolution & GCV
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Intelligent tradeoffs within the RFP may have resulted in better design choices, but they won’t necessarily ensure a successful program. If the original requirements end up as major obstacles to fielding an affordable, tactically-relevant vehicle on time, as was the case with the recently-canceled USMC Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle IFV, there are no competition rule changes that can fix it.

The key question for the program is whether the GCV fits that category.

The initial GCV RFP resulted in design submissions that were reportedly in the 60-70 ton range, and that has continued. The Army has retained the key specifications driving it toward that weight class.

That level of size certainly ensures the versatility that comes with added space and heft, as Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Chiarelli explained in 2010:

“It is important to note that within the RFP you are not going to see a weight requirement. What you will see and what we are emphasizing is the Ground Combat Vehicle has to be a versatile vehicle. This will probably be one of the most versatile vehicles that the Army has ever designed. If you look at survivability or armor protection, we are going to have a modular design, meaning we can have scalable armor kits so the commander can decide how protected that vehicle needs to be for the mission… We are giving commanders the capability to tailor survivability for a given situation.”

If “versatility” means only tailorable armor kits, that is well underway in current American vehicle fleets, and in new offerings like KMW’s Puma IFV. On the other hand, if one is talking about functions and requirements, “versatility” has traditionally led American programs to very high cost solutions, and in some cases to program failure. The Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle IFV is just the most recent cautionary example.

Puma IFV, Modular armor
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Beyond purchase and operating costs, which both increase in tandem with size and complexity, there is also a penalty in supporting costs. A C-17 airlifter can carry 2 Bradley vehicles, but looks likely to handle just 1 GCV. That doubles the time for crisis response using airlift. Higher fuel and operating costs also mean a longer, larger logistics tail behind, which must be paid for.

South Korea controlled requirements for its 28 ton K-21 KNIFV. They appear to have a vehicle with some performance improvements and some tradeoffs vs. the Bradley, at a cost of under $5 million per vehicle. Germany’s new 36-46 ton Puma IFV, which is considered to be a top-end system, is much closer to the GCV’s target price, at around EUR 7.65 million ($11 million) each under Germany’s July 2009 contract for 405 vehicles.

Namer
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Israel has a vehicle in the GCV’s weight class: its 60 tonne Namer APC/IFV, built on the hull of their Merkava 4 tank. The difference is that the Israelis aren’t looking for the same level of strategic mobility, and pursued much more of a ‘quick and dirty’ approach in order to keep costs down. The Israeli MoD is hired General Dynamics to produce some of their Namer vehicles in the USA, in order to take advantage of US aid dollars.

With the GCV, the USA appears to be hoping to deliver a much larger IFV than the Puma, with more sophisticated capabilities and systems than the Puma or Namer, at about the same or less cost than either alternative. Skepticism may well be warranted.

GCV: Program

At present, the US Army intends to order 1,874 GCVs, plus 30 test vehicles. The government’s average Unit Manufacturing Cost target for the GCV IFV Program is now $9 – $10.5 million per unit in FY 2010 constant dollars, which means that actual purchase costs will be higher due to inflation etc. That’s far lower than the original competition, whose limit was over $20 million. The targeted Operation & Sustainment cost is FY10$ 200 per mile, which is about 2x higher than the current Bradley family.

In a coming era of military budget cuts, both of those prices risk creating problems, even if the winning contractor meets the Army’s targets. If there are overruns, in either area, they are likely to cause budget and political problems in short order. Unfortunately, analysis done by the Pentagon’s own CAPE (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) office is closer to $16 – $17 million per unit, and examination of comparable vehicles and their costs gives credence to that view.

Planned Schedule

Meanwhile, the GCV Technology Development (TD) phase began issuing contracts in August 2011, and so began collecting political constituencies with a vested interest in continuing the program.

The TD Phase has 3 stated goals: 1. Create a basic vehicle design; 2. Refine and test key protective designs; and 3. Ensure a smooth handover for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Contractors are responsible for 100% of TD Phase overruns, but can keep 20% of any unspent contract monies.

Once a basic design is created, protective designs to be submitted and tested include the a Mine Blast Subsystem Prototype Test Article, and a Rocket Propelled Grenade Protection Subsystem Prototype.

The TD Phase’s key milestone is the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), to be held by February 2013. Upon completion of the PDR, TD phase contractors will continue to work on their designs, while refining the Unit Manufacturing Cost (UMC) estimates.

In preparation for EMD, TD Phase contractors will submit an Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) that contains planning packages through delivery of the Early Prototype vehicle, 12 months from award of the EMD contract. they also submit an Integrated Master Plan (IMP) through delivery of the First Full-Up Prototype Vehicle, which happens 30 months from winning the EMD contract.

The 4 year EMD Phase was planned to be solicited in FY 2013. It will focus on completing the detailed design, building integrated GCV IFV prototypes, and conducting key tests including Production Qualification Testing (PQT), a Limited User Test, and ballistic survivability testing. The original plan was to pick up to 2 contractors based upon price, schedule and technical performance, with awards going to both TD participants. Instead, a January 2013 change shifted the competition to a single winner, with the Army still waiting to decide whether it will be an entirely new design, or a modification of an existing vehicle.

GCV: Competing Teams

Team BAE

CV90, urban camo
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The GCV competition attracted 3 teams of competitors, but the Army took an important step to level the playing field. The cancelled FCS Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) program data, referred to as the MGV Body of Knowledge, was made available to all qualified TD Phase bidders.

One team is led by Bradley IFV manufacturer BAE Systems, who also makes the popular CV90 IFV, and had a major role in Future Combat Systems’ MGV. They are partnered with:

• Northrop Grumman – C4ISR (command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance) integrator.
  
• iRobot – Integration of the SUGV ground robot, and other robotics, into the vehicle. SUGV is one of the few survivors of the Future Combat Systems program. Longer term contribution may include GCV autonomous driving capability.
  
• MTU/ Tognum America – Power pack (MTU engine, transmission & generator – Series 880?). Parent firm Tognum AG is in the process of being controlled by Daimler AG and Rolls Royce plc.
  
• QinetiQ North America – E-X-Drive electric drive propulsion system. Same partnership as MGV.
  
• Saft – Hybrid drive’s energy storage system. Same partnership as MGV.

The firm has conducted tests with Artis downward-firing Iron Curtain active protection system. Technically, the GCV doesn’t require an APS. In practice, the Congressional Research Service says that both qualifying teams are including APS systems on their designs.

Team BAE’s design has an extraordinary 70-ton base weight, which can rise to 84 tons with all add-on kits. By comparison, an M1A2 Abrams tank is 68 tons. Beyond the 360-degree protection levels and personnel carriage requirements that drove much of the GCV’s weight, BAE personnel told DID that the Army’s change of direction to emphasize mature technology, while requiring more than incremental increases in performance, was the key push behind their own design. Those requirements are forcing a very heavy system – but could BAE draw on experience with a wide variety of armored combat vehicle programs, including SEP and FCS MGV, to match mature best-of-breed technologies and give the Army what it wanted?

BAE’s most visible and daring choice involved a diesel-electric hybrid drive. It pays off in some weight savings, in superior power export capabilities, and especially in survivability and space under armor. A diesel-electric drive can mechanically decouple the drive shafts from the engine, creating tremendous layout flexibility for protective features like v-hulls, and better arrangement of internal space. The team touts its design as having better blast resistance than existing Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles like its RG-31 and RG-33.

The flip side of a hybrid drive involves technical risk and reliability, but in conversations with DID, BAE personnel explained why they didn’t see that as much of a risk. Civilian heavy equipment in industries like mining etc. is already using hybrid drive technology as a matter of routine, offering both a mature technical base, and a known path for scaling these systems up for very heavy vehicles. BAE provides hybrid drives for some civilian vehicles, and felt that their experience with MGV, SEP, etc. gave them a solid base to work from.

On the electronics side, Northrop Grumman has been working with the US Army’s “VICTORY (Vehicular Integration for c4isr/electronic warfare inTerOpeRabilitY) Architecture” of standards and specifications, in order to deliver a suite of internal electronics and sensors that can be upgraded easily over time.

Team General Dynamics

ASCOD-2 Scout
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The 2nd team is led by General Dynamics, who 40-45t ASCOD 2 was picked in 2010 as Britain’s forthcoming FRES-SV infantry fighting/ scout vehicle. They’re also producing Israel’s 60t Namer IFV, in order to take advantage of US military aid dollars that must be spent in the USA. General Dynamics Land Systems is the prime contractor, with GD C4 systems responsible for network integration, communications, computing and information assurance.

The GDLS design for GCV is only marginally lighter than BAE’s, at 64 tons for the base vehicle (still a ton heavier than an M1A1 Abrams main battle tank), and 74 tons when all of the optional protection packages are added. Major subcontractors include:

• Lockheed Martin – Turret, lethal and non-lethal effects and embedded training. This is broadly the same partnership as FRES, though it may not be the same turret.
  
• Raytheon – RPG protection system, indirect-vision systems, and sensor integration. Raytheon’s “HTK” system received development contracts as the Active Protection System for FCS MGV.
  
• MTU/Tognum America – Power pack (MTU engine, transmission & generator – Series 890?). Parent firm Tognum AG is in the process of being controlled by Daimler AG and Rolls Royce plc.

Out? Germany’s Puma

Puma IFV
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A 3rd team, which did not receive an award, was led by Future Combat Systems’ Lead Integrator SAIC. It was explicitly based on Germany’s new Puma IFV, which weighs about 33 tons for the base vehicle, and 42 tons if all add-on protection kits are included. Their team included SAIC, plus:

• KMW and Rheinmetall – Puma IFV
  
• Boeing – C4ISR integrator. SAIC’s fellow FCS Lead Integrator.

Assembly in America was the team’s big capability gap, but the team proposed to fill it with small and medium sized manufacturing firms. SAIC’s GAO protest failed, but the Puma will get a 2nd look.

Contracts & Key Events

CSIS event
click for video

April 29/13: APS. Defense Update reports that BAE’s GCV team has successfully tested Artis’ downward-firing Iron Curtain active protection system (APS), defeating all threats fired against the substitute M-ATV wheeled vehicle. Iron Curtain coiples their high-speed processor to an optical sensor, downward-firing “bars” arranged around the vehicle’s perimeter, and a DARPA-developed radar by Mustang Technology Group in Plano, TX. Firing its projectiles downward makes the system safer for accompanying troops.

Technically, the GCV doesn’t require an APS. In practice, The US Congressional Research Service says that both teams are incorporating them into their design.

April 23/13: TD. A pair of contracts to extend the GCV Technology Development phase by 6 months, using FY 2013 Army RDT&E funding. US TACOM Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI manages the contracts.

BAE Systems Land and Armaments LP in Sterling Heights, MI receives $159.5 million more under their fixed-price-incentive contract (W56HZV-11-C-C001, PO 0019).

General Dynamic Land Systems Inc. in Sterling Heights, MI receives $180.4 million more under their fixed-price-incentive contract (W56HZV-11-C-C002, PO 0019).

TD Phase extended

April 17/13: CRS Report. The US Congressional Research Service issues its latest version of R41597: “The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.” DID’s Google Drive service has the latest version. FAS [PDF] | OpenCRS (currently behind).

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. For the GCV, the FY 2014 budget announces the restructuring terms, and requests $592.2 million, with plans to move into the EMD system development phase in Q3 2013. To get a sense of the changes, the FY 2012 justification expected program spending of $1.963 billion in FY 2014.

Previous GCV budgets have included $435 million in 2012, and a request for $639.9 million in 2013. All funds to date have been for Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation.

Under the new arrangements, GCV’s Technology Development (TD) and Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phases will be stretched by 12 months. See also DoD Buzz | DID budget coverage.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. With respect to the GCV, their 1-page quick briefing says that the Analysis of Alternatives is due by March 2013, with a Preliminary Design Review for the TD Phase designs by June 2013:

“….at that point, according to an Army official, should be ready to determine whether GCV will be an entirely new vehicle or a modified existing vehicle. The Army plans to begin procuring GCV while also procuring other new and costly combat vehicle programs such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle.”

Total program: $37,923.5 million
RDT&E: $7,025.6 million
Procurement: $25,365.8 million
GCVs: 1,904 = 30 development + 1,874 procurement

March 20/13: Army expectations. CSIS runs the “Ground Forces Dialogue: Major General H.R. McMaster /Ground Force Maneuver: Why It Still Matters” event with the US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence’s commander. He mentioned the advantages and limitations of existing M2 Bradleys, and some of the expectations for the GCV. Among them, it should be able to carry a squad of 9 (not 11 cut down to 6). See: Event video | Army doctrine documents.

Feb 15/13: EMD draft. The US Army’s Contracting Command-Warren publishes draft documents for the Ground Combat Vehicle Infantry Fighting Vehicle (GCV IFV) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, including a draft Capability Development Document (CDD). Access is restricted with export controls and other conditions. They expect feedback from industry by March 13. The date for the GCV EMD RFP is not set yet.

November 2012: The Congressional Budget Office releases Working Paper 2012-15: “Technical Challenges of the U.S. Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program.” From the rationale for full squad carriage of 9 dismounts, to the key issues faced in defending against various kinds of threats from EFP mines to anti-tank missiles, this paper’s explanations are lucid, clear, and enhanced by informative illustrations. It also deals with the GCV’s key tradeoffs, especially around weight and cost. Highly recommended.

Mobility compared
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May 8/12: DoD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) FY11 report [PDF] dates from February but was only released publicly today. Though the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is exempt from DFARS regulations, CAPE has started independently assessing the cost of their programs. They have focused so far on regular major programs (MDAPs) while they have worked mostly on the IT programs (MAIS) deemed to be in the worst shape. Also of note:

“There were two notable pioneering cases (the Ohio Replacement and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)) where CAPE prepared independent cost estimates early in the program development as part of the Materiel Solution Analysis phase leading to a Milestone A DAB review. The Materiel Solution Analysis phase presents the first substantial opportunity to influence design through trade-off studies that balance requirements, performance, technology choices, schedule, and cost considerations. The CAPE independent cost estimate is now an important element of this process.”

CAPE is estimating a cost per vehicle around $15-16 million.

March 1/12: New entrants? Aviation Week Ares reports that the Army is using some of its technology development phase funds to invite more competitors to test at White Sands, NM. They include BAE’s existing M2 Bradley (A3 and turretless) and its popular CV90-035; and General Dynamics’ Namer (partnership with Israel) and new wheeled, v-hulled Stryker DVH. SAIC’s GAO protest was rejected, but its Puma will also get another look. Just not at White Sands. In addition:

“The Army has also confirmed to AvWeek that it is looking to conduct assessments of two other tracked European vehicles: the BMP, made by the Russian company JSC Kurganmashzavod; and the VBCI infantry fighting vehicle, produced by France’s Nexter [DID: which is wheeled, not tracked]… The Army requested $640 million in fiscal year 2013 to continue work on the technology development phase… the GCV program has been ordered to work two separate analyses of alternatives along with an additional non-developmental evaluation, all while BAE Systems and General Dynamics continue to refine their designs.”

The betting odds are that this is more of a “data to back our claim that existing gear isn’t good enough for us” exercise, rather than an effort to really rethink the direction of this program. Aviation Week later strengthens that belief by reporting on March 12/12 that:

“An official at the GCV office tells DTI that the data gathered during the NIE [exercise with the various platforms] will be used to validate existing capabilities against the planned capabilities of the GCV – especially potential capability trade-offs as the program drives toward Milestone B. Ultimately, an award is expected by the end of 2013.”

Aug 26/11: Protest. The SAIC team is launching a bid protest with the Congressional Government Accountability Office. That protest puts the release of contracted funding on hold, until it is resolved, which must happen within 100 days. AOL Defense:

“We believe the government relied on evaluation criteria outside its published request for proposal,” Koskovich said. “We also believe several aspects of the bid may have been discounted because of a lack of familiarity with their non-American origins.”

They didn’t win.

Aug 24/11: Sub-contractors. Tognum America announces that its Series 880 (880 – 2,016 kW) and Series 890 (410 – 920 KW) engines will be used in the BAE and GDLS designs. They do not say which engine is in which design, but BAE’s use of a hybrid drive strongly suggests that they’re the ones using the higher capacity V12 Series 880.

June 30/11: DAB Review coming. Defense News reports that GCV program will receive another Defense Acquisition Board Review on July 21/11, adding that even the cost target drop from $24 million (original RFP) to $10.5 million (current RFP) may not save GCV from budget issues.

March 9/11: Hard questions. U.S. Rep. Roscoe Bartlett [R-MD], the Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, releases a statement for the subcommittee’s hearing on the Administration’s FY 2012 budget request for the equipment modernization programs for the U.S. Army. Excerpts:

“In terms of this year’s budget request, the Army’s top two modernization priorities are the tactical network and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) programs… the committee has and continues to support the Army’s goal of pursuing a modernized combat vehicle. However, the committee needs to understand the rationale as to why the Ground Combat Vehicle should proceed as scheduled… How do we know that the GCV is the full spectrum vehicle that the Army needs? Why did the Army not complete an analysis of alternatives before it issued the original requests for proposals as this committee had encouraged? Can the Army afford to launch another program that could cost up to $30 billion to procure a vehicle that carries a squad of nine instead of the current six? Why not consider as an alternative option, continuing to upgrade Abrams, Bradleys and Strykers; focus on the network and take part of the funds and apply it to lightening the load of the soldier?… To be clear, I am not saying that I don’t support the GCV program… However, as was the case with the FCS program, it is this committee’s responsibility to ask the hard questions now, so that we don’t learn in five years that the Army can’t afford the GCV or that it is based on ‘exquisite’ requirements.”

Jan 21/11: Bids in. The BAE/NGC team submits its RFP bid. Major sub-contractors include iRobot, MTU, QinetiQ North America, Saft.

MTU, now known as Tognum America, is also supplying the engine for General Dynamics’ team, which evidently submitted its own proposal.

SAIC’s “Team Full Spectrum” submits a Puma-derived design again. Boeing, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall Defence will be the key subcontractors. BAE Systems | Boeing.

Jan 18/11: ADVS out. Advanced Defense Vehicle Systems (ADVS) announces that it will withdraw as a competitor for the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program:

“Under the current program, the contracting efforts have been divided into three stages. The first stage will not require producing a prototype demonstration vehicle and, in fact, the Army will wait a total of seven years to field a weapon system… While ADVS supports the Army’s concept, they encourage the U.S. Department of Defense to review the ADVS strategies and past performance and consider ways of developing and fielding vehicles quicker and more economically. Such a rapid process is counter to the current GCV strategy; though supportive of the philosophy of Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.”

Dec 3/10: Costs. Aviation Week quotes Gen. Cartwright says the US military must begin to value scale and numbers, not just capabilities. Even as the proposed GCV to replace the M2/M3 Bradleys has an expected price of up to $10.5 million per GCV – and a target of twice the Bradley’s per-mile operating cost.

Nov 30/10: TD competition. The US Army releases modified rules [PDF] for the GCV-IFV competition. Army GCV Program Manager Colonel Andrew DiMarco is quoted as saying that the Army expects to award up to 3 technology-development contracts, under a fixed-price model with incentives, in April 2011. Companies would get 20% of any money saved if they beat their budget.

Current plans call for eventual construction of 1,874 of the new vehicles, beginning in 7 years. Reuters.

Oct 26/10: BAE. The BAE/NGC team adds iRobot Corp:

“iRobot Corporation will serve as the unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) integrator and enhance the capability to detect pedestrians and obstacles of interest with growth towards an autonomous driving capability for the GCV. iRobot will also be responsible for integration of the U.S. Army’s Brigade Combat Team modernization program Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) robotic platform so that it can be operated from inside the GCV.”

Oct 1/10: The US Army holds its GCV Industry Day. FBO.gov.

RFP v1.0 plan
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Sept 22/10: The US Army issues Solicitation # W56HZV-11-R-0001: “10–Ground Combat Vehicle Technology Development Phase Solicitation.” This is a renewed RFP, following the cancellation of the Feb 25/10 issue. See also US Army TACOM page. Bottom line?

“The solicitation will seek to award up to three cost reimbursement contracts for the TD phase focusing on mature technologies in order to reduce significant developmental risk over a seven year schedule culminating with the first GCV production vehicle.”

GCV RFP v2.0

July 26/10: The BAE/NGC team adds QinetiQ and Saft. QinetiQ North America will provide the E-X-Drive electric drive propulsion system, while Saft will provide the energy storage system. BAE Systems.

May 24/10: Puma bid. Future Combat Systems’ two Lead Systems Integrators, Boeing and SAIC, team with KMW in a bid for the US Army’s next-generation IFV: The Ground Combat Vehicle program. Boeing’s release states that:

“The team’s offering draws from the experience gained from the Manned Ground Vehicle and the Puma programs and will be built in the United States with a team of experienced American small and mid-tier supplier businesses.”

May 21/10: Bids. The BAE/NGC team, and the GD/Raytheon team, submit their bids for the GCV Technology Development phase. BAE Systems | GDLS.

March 10/10: BAE Systems teams up with Northrop Grumman Corporation, who will be the C4ISR systems integrator for their GCV team. They have a similar relationship with respect to the JLTV program to replace existing HMMWV jeeps. BAE Systems.

Oct 19/09: After the Pentagon terminates Future Combat Systems’ Manned Ground Vehicle program, the US Army releases solicitation #W56HZV-GCV-Spec_CDD: “Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Draft Specification/CDD”

Additional Readings

The GCV

• US Army TACOM – W56HZV-11-R-0001 Ground Combat Vehicle. Competition/ RFP site.

• US Army Stand To! (April 12/10) – Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle

• US Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Command (TARDEC) – Vehicle Electronics and Architecture

• BAE – Ground Combat Vehicle. 70+ tons. This is progress?

Other News & Background

• CSIS (March 20/13) – Ground Forces Dialogue: Major General H.R. McMaster /Ground Force Maneuver: Why It Still Matters. The commander of the US Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence.

• COTS Journal (May 2011) – Open Standards and Phased Approach Benefit Ground Vehicle Modernization

• Defense Systems (2010) – PEO C3T Program Review & Vision Guide: VICTORY Over “Bolt-On” Integration

• DID – I Beg to Differ: The US GAO’s Bid Protest Process

Official Reports

• US CRS, via OpenCRS (#R41597, last update April 17/13) – The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress.

• US CBO (April 2/13) – The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program and Alternatives

• US CBO (Nov 6/12) – Technical Challenges of the U.S. Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program. Outstanding: accessible, clear, and informative.

• US GAO (June 16/11, #GAO-11-502) – DOD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews

• US GAO (March 9/11, #GAO-11-425T) – Key Questions Confront the Army’s Ground Force Modernization Initiatives

• US GAO (April 15/10, #GAO-10-603T) – Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities and Challenges for Army Ground Force Modernization Efforts

Under the SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer program, Australia plans to replace its retired air defense destroyers with a modern system that can provide significantly better protection from air attack, integrate with the US Navy and other Coalition partners, offer long-range air warfare defense for Royal Australian Navy task groups, and help provide a coordinated air picture for fighter and surveillance aircraft. Despite their name and focus, the ships are multi-role designs with a “sea control” mission that also includes advanced anti-submarine and surface warfare capabilities.

The Royal Australian Navy took a pair of giant steps in June 2007, when it selected winning designs for its keystone naval programs: Canberra Class LHD amphibious operations vessels, and Hobart Class “air warfare destroyers.” Spain’s Navantia made an A$ 11 billion clean sweep, winning both the A$ 3 billion Canberra Class LHD and the A$ 8 billion Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer contracts. The new AWD ships were scheduled to begin entering service with the Royal Australian Navy in 2013, but that date has now slipped to 2016 or so.

SEA 4000: The Program

AWD Concept
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The estimated total program cost for the Hobart Class has grown from A$ 6 billion to A$ 8 billion, from the time project funding began in 2004 to the announcement of the winning design and contract in 2007.

That’s alarming. On the other hand, it’s likely to be less expensive than blindly accepting lowball estimates, then having to make changes part-way through the build stage. The latter situation is normal in places like the USA, but Australia has undertaken some major defense reforms intended to surface problems, and their likely costs, before the build contracts are placed. That seems to have paid off, as A$ 8 billion remains the project’s quoted figure as of September 2012.

The first of these “Air Warfare Destroyers,” HMAS Hobart, was to be delivered in late 2014, but the current schedule has been pushed back to March 2016.

HMAS Brisbane was supposed to enter service in early 2016, but its delivery date in now November 2017.

HMAS Sydney was planned for delivery in mid-2017, but its current date is now March 2019.

There was an option for a 4th ship, but it was declined by the government. See Appendix B for more details concerning the SEA 4000 project’s phasing and timelines.

The Hobart Class

The AWD is needed because Australia’s ANZAC Class (Meko 200 derivative) and Adelaide Class (FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class) frigates have limited air defense capabilities, and would be hard-pressed to survive against modern anti-ship missiles.

Planned ANZAC upgrades will deliver a big leap ahead in capability, but their capabilities will not make them suitable for protecting an entire task force by themselves in high threat areas. Nor will they have the potential to grow into ballistic missile defense roles, which are acquiring new urgency in the 21st century.

Australia’s approach began with a decision about the radar and combat system they wanted, and they chose America’s AEGIS radar and combat system combination. It wasn’t the most modern choice, but it has a very strong foothold in the Pacific Rim, with a clear path to BMD capabilities, and a mature trump card called Co-operative Engagement Capability. Australia’s ships will have full interoperability with the US Navy’s most advanced ships, and CEC even offers them the ability to fire from another ship’s target cue. Even if the Australian ship cannot yet see that target.

Beyond the US Navy, Japan’s Kongo Class AEGIS destroyers have already proven themselves to be BMD capable, and their newer Atago Class derivative may follow suit. Korea’s cruiser-size KDX-III AEGIS destroyers face a missile-armed North Korea, and may yet see similar upgrades. If those navies also adopt CEC technology, the result will be a powerful pool of interoperable, top-tier air defense ships around the Pacific Rim.

For purposes of comparison, however, it’s worth looking beyond the Pacific Rim, in order to assess a number of non-AEGIS designs as well:

SEA 4000: The Process

The AWD was meant to be the product of several competitions – not just one. Rather than taking the conventional approach of securing a prime contractor and having them do the integration and deliver the ship, the Australian government broke up the process into a series of contracts, with each subsequent decision building on the previous ones.

Australia calls the proposed acquisition strategy a “Design Driven” approach, where it contracts separately for design and construction. A designer is contracted to produce a ship design to meet specified requirements, and that design was competed among several shipbuilders offering their platforms as a base, plus one contracted ship design based on the American DDG-51. A winner is chosen, and then a shipbuilder is contracted to build that design.

In theory, the potential contracting strengths of the “Design Driven” strategy include:

• The potential to design to a budget;
  
• Greater assurance that the final product will meet the user expectations;
  
• Maximized competition in equipment supply and construction;
  
• More standardization across future shipbuilding projects by having the government instead of the contractor set the key standards;
  
• Maintain a long-term relationship to ensure that through life support considerations are taken into account, and vet this before making a design choice.

Navantia’s modified F100 Alvaro de Bazan Class AEGIS frigate won the competition, beating Blohm + Voss’ F124 frigate, and an “Evolved Design” based on the larger American DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyer. See Appendix A for more details concerning that competition, and the offered platforms.

SEA 4000: Industrial

AWD Project management will be performed by the Air Warfare Destroyer Project Office, located in Canberra, Australia. They are using structured project management methodologies and input from an Integrated Product Team (IPT) drawn from the Defence Materiel Organisation, Capability Systems, DSTO and the Royal Australian Navy.

The Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance includes these entities plus ASC Pty Ltd. in Adelaide as the lead Australian shipbuilder, and Raytheon Australia as the combat system integrator. BAE Australia (formerly Tenix) in Melbourne and Forgacs in Newcastle are major shipbuilding sub-contractors within the program. After consultation with Australia’s DoD, we are able to provide the following modified work summary for the 93 blocks involved in all 3 ships:

• Navantia: 8 blocks… 3 sonar block assemblies, 5 reallocated blocks for Brisbane (expected cost: A$ 40 million)
  
• ASC: 25 blocks… 9 Hobart, 8 for Brisbane & Sydney.
  
• BAE: 7 blocks… 7 Hobart.
  
• Forgacs: 40 blocks… 14 Hobart, 13 for Brisbane & Sydney.

BAE will complete the structural steel and initial outfitting work on the 7 Hobart blocks currently in its yard. Up to 13 BAE blocks (6 construction, 7 blast/ paint/ advanced outfitting) from Hobart & Brisbane are to be reallocated “among the 3 Australian shipyards,” but this is likely to mean ASC & Forgacs in practice. At least 2 have already been shifted. A decision on BAE blocks for HMAS Sydney (implicitly: 2) will be made later in the AWD project.

BAE will, however, keep all 14 ship blocks for the 2 Canberra Class amphibious ships’ superstructure and integration work.

Key component and weapon providers include:

• BAE Systems – Mk. 45 MOD 4 127/62 mm gun; Mk.41 VLS components; Mk.53 Nulka missile decoy.
  
• Boeing – RGM-84 Harpoon Block II anti-ship and land attack missiles, with GPS/radar guidance.
  
• Curtiss-Wright – ASIST helicopter handling systems and modular lightweight tracks, for use in rough seas.
  
• GE – LM2500 gas turbines, 2 per ship.
  
• ITT-EDO Reconnaissance Surveillance Systems – Electronic warfare systems, incl. ESM.
  
• L-3 Communications Nautronix Ltd. – L-3 X-Band Navigation Radar; DEBEG 4300 Voyage Data Recorder; and Protec-S Automatic Identification System.
  
• Lockheed Martin – AEGIS combat system; AN/SPY-1D(V) S-band fire control radar; Mk.41 Vertical Launch System (48 cells per ship, Baseline 7 configuration); MH-60R mission systems integrator.
  
• Northrop Grumman – AN/SPQ-9B search radar.
  
• RAFAEL – Typhoon Mark 25 Mod 2: 25mm, stabilized, remotely-operated gun and optics.
  
• Raytheon – “Australianize” the combat system around the AEGIS Baseline 7, Phase I core; Cooperative Engagement Capability; MK99 MCFS, incl. AN/SPG-62 I/J-Band illuminators for terminal missile guidance; Mk.15 Phalanx Block 1B 20mm CIWS; SM-6 air defense missiles; RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow air defense missiles.
  
• Sagem DS – VAMPIR IRST long range passive day/night surveillance system.
  
• Sikorsky – MH-60R naval helicopter.
  
• ST Production Systems – AN/ALQ-25 Nixie towed torpedo decoy.
  
• Terma A/S – Counter Measure Launcher for chaff etc.
  
• Thales Australia – SATCOM equipment integrator.

SEA 4000: Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise specified, US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contracts, on behalf of their Foreign Military Sale client.

RAN AWD Concept
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April 19/13: Weapons. Raytheon announces that they’ve delivered the 2nd Phalanx Block 1B CIWS system for last-ditch, close-in defense on board the future HMAS Brisbane. The first Phalanx 1B was delivered for Hobart in late 2012, and Sydney’s system will be delivered and installed in 2014.

April 2/13: Sub-contractors. MG Engineering loads Hobart’s 22m mast on a barge, and floats it up the Port River to Techport Australia. See also July 4/12 entry. Adelaide Now.

Jan 17-20/13: Industrial. BAE ships its 8th and 9th keel blocks to ASC, who accepts them. This completes all of BAE’s blocks for Hobart and Brisbane. Block 415 is a 117t hull block, while Block 111 is a 112t keel block.

BAE’s release emphasizes their focus on securing future work, which has been in jeopardy every since the yard’s high-profile workmanship problems in 2010. Unsurprisingly, the rest of the release spends time discussing improved processes for work planning, welding quality, dimensional control, and inspection and acceptance. BAE Systems.

Oct 30/12: Torpedoes. Australia’s government announces that Hobart’s triple-tube Mk32 MOD 9 torpedo launchers successfully completed testing in June 2012, and Brisbane’s launchers successfully completed their own test with an MU90 torpedo mockup.

July 4/12: Sub-contractors. The Australian government awards an A$ 3.25 million contract to MG Engineering in Adelaide. Over the next 2 years, the firm will build 25 tonne, 22 meter long central masts for all 3 Air Warfare Destroyers.

The masts have to be built in 6 sections, joined together on a jig, then transported by barge to Techport. MG engineering will hire another 10 staff to do this work, raising their total to 40 people. AWD Alliance.

July 4/12: AEGIS. The first 2 radar faces for Hobart’s AN/SPY-1D (V) phased array radar arrive in Australia. Each SPY-1D radar has 3 “faces” to offer radar coverage all around the ship. Australian DoD.

MH-60R Seahawk
click for video

Oct 18/11: Sub-contractors. The Australian government awards Hunter subsidiary Forgacs another 2 AWD blocks (1 each for Hobart and Brisbane), worth around $80 million. This brings their total to 40, up from 29 when the project started.

The work will create about 150 more jobs, and Forgacs will open another shipyard line at Carrington, which currently employs 50 people. Another 450 are working on the AWD at Tomago. Work has already begun on all 14 Hobart blocks, and 2/13 Brisbane blocks. The new hires will bring Forgacs to its envisioned maximum of 650 people working on AWD, across both shipyards. Australian DoD.

Aug 12-15/11: BAE Systems ships the first Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) block to the ASC facility at Osborne in South Australia. This first block weighs around 180 tonnes, and is 18 x 16 x 5 meters. In light of past problems at the Williamstown shipyard, BAE Systems Director of Maritime, Harry Bradford, tried to reassure by saying that:

“We are now at a stage where we have the right people and the right skills to meet the challenges this project will bring. As an international shipbuilder BAE Systems also has the added advantage of global reachback and can draw on our experiences in other markets.”

Aug 6/11: Guns delivered. The AWD Alliance announces the arrival of 6 RAFAEL Typhoon Mark 25 Mod 2 guns, which will equip 3 Hobart Class destroyers at a cost of around A$ 15 million. These 25mm, stabilized guns are operated from within the ship using a joystick and screen, with imagery provided by the Typhoons advanced Toplite day/night optics. Each AWD will be equipped with 2 Typhoon guns, located on the Port and Starboard Bridge wings of each ship.

The guns will be stored in a secure Adelaide warehouse until they are installed on HMAS Hobart, Brisbane and Sydney during construction.

July 27/11: Guns delivered. The AWD Alliance has taken delivery of the Hobart Class’ 3 Mk.54 MOD 4 gun mounts, which include the 127/62 mm gun, turret, and associated below-decks systems for handling ammunition. The BAE Systems gun mounts were manufactured in the United States, per the Sept 17/08 contract, and are valued at A$ 80 million (conversion rose from USD $63.5 – $88 million in the interim). They will be placed into a controlled storage facility in Adelaide, until they are installed in their respective ships. Australian MoD.

May 27-31/11: Shipbuilding issues. BAE Australia doesn’t react officially, but reports begin to surface in the Australian press that suggest problems with the AWD Alliance as the root cause, via poor quality drawings and incorrect specifications. The claim is that more than 2,400 faults have been discovered in the data, said to include wrong dimensions for the hull shapes, inconsistent assembly instructions, missing measurements, and faulty welding guides. It has reached the point that BAE has rejected the ASC’s design pack for Brisbane, the 2nd ship of class. The ASC has rejected BAE’s criticism, and refused to agree to BAE’s request for an improved design package.

There’s also controversy over reports that the Gillard government was warned of these problems in February 2011, and was very slow to act.

The Australian government eventually fires back. While they agree that there have been thousands of technical queries, and that lead shipbuilder ASC and BAE are in dispute over the designs, they note that the other 2 contractors, and Navantia haven’t had the same problems. DMO chief executive Dr Stephen Gumley tells an Australian Senate committee that experts will look into the drawings issue, but adds that BAE may have taken on more work than it had skilled personnel to handle, and did not inform the DMO about problems in a timely way. The state of AWD industrial team relations seems poor, at best. The Australian, re: drawings dispute, re: Government notice | Adelaide Now re: DMO testimony.

May 15/11: Infrastructure. ASC in Adelaide invites the public to its shipyard from 12noon -3:00pm, to tour progress on the construction of Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD). The event is jointly hosted with the AWD Alliance, and is the 1st time ASC’s shipyard has ever been open to the public.

This week also marked the start of blast and paint work at a new A$ 8 million facility at ASC’s Shipyard to paint steel blocks under construction. ASC.

April 27/11: AEGIS. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives an $18.3 million not-to-exceed contract modification for command team trainer efforts to build the Aegis Weapon System baseline for Australia’s Hobart Class. The firm will provide necessary combat systems engineering, computer program development, ship integration and test, logistics technical services, technical manuals and staging support.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (89%); Clearwater, FL (9%); and Adelaide, Australia (2%). Work is expected to be complete by December 2014 (N00024-10-C-5125, FMS case AT-P-LCQ).

April 1/11: Shipbuilding issues. Lead yard ASC hands Forgacs in Newcastle, Australia a new A$ 40 million contract from ASC for another 3 hull blocks, as a result of problems with work at BAE systems (formerly Tenix) in Victoria, Australia.

The contracts comes on top of Forgacs’ original A$ 150 million contract, and the firm is set to employ an extra 70 workers, but they’re having trouble recruiting enough skilled tradespeople at the Tomago shipyard. They’ve already gone from about 15 people at Tomago to around 300, and adding the additional boilermakers, welders, riggers, dogmen and scaffolders s proving to be a challenge. Australia Broadcasting Corp.

Spain’s F101, 2005
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Dec 20/10: AWD Alliance. The Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance officially appoints acting CEO Mr. Rod Equid, BE (Electrical), M.Sc Engg (Aerosystems) as its new CEO. Before his step up to acting CEO in April 2010, he had been the alliance’s General Manager Business. His previous background includes 15 years as a RAAF engineer officer, 5 years as a senior Defence public servant, and nearly 14 years with Raytheon Australia.

“Mr Equid said hull construction is in the start-up phase on the way to peak production. Block production is currently underway in three shipyards, ASC in Adelaide, BAE Systems in Melbourne and Forgacs in Newcastle. “The combat system production is well advanced, combat system integration is on track and the AWD Alliance has signed contracts for nearly all major equipment and material,” Mr Equid said.”

Oct 27/10: Shipbuilding issues. The Australian reports that ASC has asked shipping experts from Lloyd’s Register Asia to visit BAE’s Williamstown shipyards, in order to “ensure the blocks are being built to internationally recognised standards.”

“ASC is believed to have asked Lloyd’s to become involved about four weeks ago when it became aware of the gravity of the keel bungle. The Lloyd’s advisers are likely to visit the shipyards once a week for at least the next six months to help oversee the construction. Spokespeople from ASC and Lloyd’s declined to comment yesterday.”

Oct 8/10: We’re hiring! The AWD Alliance announces a national recruitment drive to fill up to 60 vacancies in skilled positions.

The current focus on hull fabrication is leading to a demand for more welders at all three shipyards, as well as sheet metal workers, stores and warehouse positions, schedulers, procurement specialists and business analysts, pipe fitters, and boilermakers. In total, the 3 shipyards will also employ about 200 apprentices.

The Combat System team is moving to the management and test phase, creating demand for production engineers, integrated logistics support (ILS), systems engineers, and operations managers.

Sept 17/10: AEGIS. Lockheed Martin Mission Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $197.5 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, contract with performance incentives, for post-Critical Design Review (CDR) Aegis Combat Systems Engineering to finalize and implement the Aegis Weapon System baseline for the Government of Australia. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $211.4 million.

Naval Sea Systems Command contract N00024-09-C-5104 supported these efforts through Aegis Combat System Critical Design Review, but a new contract is needed for post-CDR efforts. Work will include the necessary combat systems engineering, computer program development, ship integration and test, logistics technical services, technical manuals and staging support.

The AWD AWS baseline will be derived from a technology refreshed variant of the U.S. Navy’s AWS Baseline 7, Phase I.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (86%), and Adelaide, Australia (14%), and is expected to be complete by December 2014. There’s only one Aegis supplier, so this contract was not competitively procured (N00024-10-C-5125 for FMS case AT-P-LCQ.

June 16/10: Block transport. The AWD Alliance signs a A$ 25 million contract with Toll North Pty Ltd. The firm will make 23 trips of a barge towed by a tug boat, in order to move 66 destroyer hull blocks by sea from BAE Systems in Newcastle (15 trips) and Forgacs in Melbourne (8 trips), to ASC in Adelaide. Each destroyer is composed of 31 hull blocks, which are assembled at the AWD Alliance’s Techport site in Adelaide.

Minister Combet adds that the SEA 4000 project is currently on track to deliver HMAS Hobart in December 2014. HMAS Brisbane is scheduled for delivery in March 2016, and HMAS Sydney in June 2017. Australia DoD.

April 23/10: AWD Alliance. CEO John Gallacher retires as chief executive of ASC Shipbuilding and the Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance, returning to Western Australia after 5 years as the head of the company. Adelaide Now.

April 15/10: Update. Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) Alliance CEO John Gallacher offers some updates, as the AWD Alliance holds a formal ceremony to launch the project’s construction phase:

“At ASC in Adelaide work is well advanced on two blocks including decking and superstructure components a total of 35 metres long and weighing a total of more than 200 tonnes.

At BAE Williamstown, Victoria work is underway on building the four main ‘keel’ blocks that, when consolidated at ASC, will be 69 metres long and weigh a total of 450 tonnes; and

At FORGACS Newcastle, New South Wales work is underway on three central blocks, including super structure, with a total length of 36 metres and weighing a total of more than 200 tonnes… At the three shipyards some 500 people are now working directly on building the blocks with the total workforce on the project of 1000.”

AWD Alliance | Adelaide Now

April 1/10: Radars. Northrop Grumman Systems, Inc. in Garden City, N.Y., is being awarded a $41.5 million modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-10-C-5343) for the delivery of AN/SPQ-9B radar sets and combat interface kits for use on U.S. Navy ships. Work will be performed in Melville, NY (91.2%); Norwalk, CT (5.5%); and Baltimore, MD (3.3%), and is expected to be complete by April 2011. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages this contract.

A subsequent corporate release confirms that this purchase covers 6 radar shipsets, including the 3rd radar of a 3-system order for the Royal Australian Navy’s Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers; and 3 antenna groups. The follow-on order is part of a five-year $281.5 million contract awarded in October 2009. See also May 5/08, July 9/08, and Oct 30/09 entries in this FOCUS article, as well as the free-to-view article: “NGC Contracted for USN/RAN SPQ-9B Radars & Support”

March 10/10: Infrastructure. The AWD announces contracts worth more than A$ 4 million for the fit-out of the new Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) Systems Centre at Techport Australia, Adelaide, South Australia. The new AWD headquarters will have a 5 Star Green Star rating from the Green Building Council of Australia, and will accommodate 300 staff including personnel from the Commonwealth, ASC, Raytheon Australia, Navantia, Bath Iron Works, Lockheed Martin and the US Navy. Move-in is expected later in 2010.

Member firm ASC signed a contract with the ISSI property services group, for infrastructure, equipment and services in the Systems Centre. This includes work stations; custom joinery; electrical, mechanical, hydraulic and fire protection services; graphics and interior design; equipment; and project management.

Member firm Raytheon Australia signed a contract with Synergy for work audio visual systems (including interactive whiteboards, LCD screens, projectors and audio systems), video conference systems and a voice telephony system. Many of the audio-visual items will be provided by Adelaide’s Leedall Presentation Systems.

Woods Bagot, designers of the fit-out, will provide expert consultancy services to the AWD Alliance. More than 1,300 pieces of loose furniture have been ordered from 6 Adelaide office furniture suppliers, including Living Edge and Schiavello.

RGM-84 Harpoon launch
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Dec 8/09: Harpoon Block II. Minister for Defence Personnel, Materiel and Science Greg Combet provides an update regarding the AWD program, and notes both Lockheed Martin’s “pull the plug” ceremony, and an A$ 20 million (currently $18.3 million) contract with Boeing for the Advanced Harpoon Weapon Control System.

Its accompanying missiles, expected to be RGM-84 Harpoon Block IIs with dual radar/GPS guidance “…will allow our three Air Warfare Destroyers to engage surface and land targets at ranges well beyond the horizon.”

Dec 1/09: Testing. Lockheed Martin hosts a “pull-the-plug” ceremony at its Moorestown, NJ facility, marking the end of acceptance tests for the 1st Australian AEGIS system. The AWD-1 system is now ready for installation on Hobart, it will now be packed and shipped to ASC Shipyard in Adelaide, South Australia. The ship is still scheduled for delivery as HMAS Hobart in 2014. Lockheed Martin.

Oct 30/09: Radar. A $26.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for 4 AN/SPQ-9B radar sets combines purchases for the US Navy (56%) and the government of Australia (44%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. They will deliver 2 horizon search AN/SPQ-9B radar sets to each customer, including above and below deck hardware, and combat interface kits.

This contract includes options which would bring the duration to 5 years, and the cumulative value of this contract to $281.5 million. Those options encompass U.S. Nimitz Class aircraft carriers, Ticonderoga Class cruisers and amphibious assault ships; as well as the U.S. Coast Guard’s Bertholf Class National Security Cutters and the Australian Navy’s Hobart Class.

Northrop Grumman will perform the work in Melville, NY (91.2%); Norwalk, CT (5.5%); Baltimore, MD (3.3%), and expects to complete it by April 2011. This contract was not competitively procured. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC, is the contracting activity (N00024-10-C-5343). See also NGC release.

Oct 30/09: Radar. A $7.9 million cost- plus-fixed fee contract for continued design agent and technical engineering support to AN/SPQ-9B radars during installation, integration, testing, and refurbishment. This contract includes options which, if exercised, would bring the cumulative value to $39.3 million. It combines purchases for the US Navy (71.8%) and the government of Australia (28.2%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program.

Work will be performed in Melville, NY (96.9%); Baltimore, MD (2.4%); Norwalk, CT (0.7%), and is expected to be completed by October 2010. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, D.C. (N00024-10-C-5341).

Oct 20/09: Update. The Rudd government’s Minister for Defence Personnel, Materiel and Science, Greg Combet, provides some updates regarding the program and recently-awarded contracts.

• ASC in Adelaide has begun work on the “pilot block”, one of its 27 assigned 200-tonne ship sections.
  
• Similar fabrication of blocks will begin at BAE’s facilities in Williamstown, Victoria in November 2009.
  
• Similar fabrication of blocks will begin at The FORGACS Group’s facilities in Newcastle, NSW in December 2009.
  
• South Australia’s Ferrocut has successfully tested its steel plate cutting capabilities.
  
• The AWD Alliance signed an A$ 12 million (about EUR 7.4 million) contract with Eurotorp to provide 3 shipsets of torpedo launch systems.

The AWD Alliance also signed 6 contracts worth approximately A$ 18 million (about $16.7 million) with Australian companies:

• Scientific Management Associates has won a contract initially worth A$ 13 million to supply a range of integrated logistic support services to the project.
  
• Ottoway Engineering in Adelaide, has won a contract potentially worth up to $3.7 million.
  
• United Fasteners, Priority Engineering Services, Century Products and Whyalla Fabrications have also won work on the AWD project to provide a range of materials and services.

Aug 20/09: Sub-contractors. The Australian government announces a pair of AWD contracts worth about A$ 39 million.

Taylor Bros Slipway and Engineering in Tasmania won a tendered contract worth “more than $25 million” to deliver parts for sailor accommodation, including cabin and sanitary modules, on-board furniture and galley, pantry and scullery equipment. This contract will create 20 new jobs.

The AWD Alliance has also signed a contract to provide Australia’s biggest crane, which will help with construction of ship “blocks” weighing up to 250 tonnes. Manitowoc Crane Group Australia will supply the 900+ tonne capacity crane under an A$ 14 million contract. Minister’s announcement | AWD Alliance.

Aug 13/09: Testing. The AEGIS Weapon System destined for HMAS Hobart begins a 4 month testing program at Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Production Test Center. The center replicates a ship’s superstructure, and allows for initial integration of the SPY-1D(V) radar, illuminators, all computing hardware, and the cabling that will be used in the final ship installation. Once testing is complete, the system will be shipped to ASC Shipyard in Adelaide, Australia for installation. Lockheed Martin release.

June 30/09: AEGIS. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ received a $44.9 million cost-plus award/ fixed-fee contract for combat systems engineering to support the government of Australia’s Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) Program. Under Foreign Military Sales Program – Case AT-P-LCQ, LM MS2 will support efforts through AEGIS Combat System critical design review (CDR).

LM MS2 will provide the necessary combat systems engineering, computer program development, ship integration and test logistics technical services, NSCC/CSEDS equipment, and staging support to design and build an AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) baseline for the program, derived from a technology refreshed variant of the US Navy’s AEGIS baseline 7 Phase I.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (97%) and Australia (3%), and is expected to be complete by June 2010. This contract was not competitively procured, under the authority of 10 U.S.C. (c)(4), International Agreement. As such, this procurement was not synopsized in Federal Business Opportunities (N00024-09-C-5104).

May 11/09: ASIST. Curtiss-Wright Corporation announces a “multi-million dollar contract” from ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty. Ltd. to supply Aircraft Ship Integrated Secure and Traverse (ASIST) helicopter handling systems and modular lightweight tracks for 3 Hobart class ships. The contract contains an option for a 4th shipset of equipment, with a potential award in 2009. The total contract value, including all follow-on options, is expected to be in excess of $15 million.

Curtiss-Wright Flow Control will perform the work at its facility in Ontario, Canada, with initial deliveries scheduled to begin in late 2009.

The ASIST system is a state-of-the-art deck handling solution for shipboard helicopter operations that allows all deck handling operations to be accomplished without the need for personnel on the flight deck. The ASIST system uses advanced positioning data and displays inside the helicopter to help achieve safe helicopter handling in all operational weather and sea conditions. The system will initially operate with the Australian Navy legacy S-70B helicopters, and will be compatible with future helicopter designs.

March 30/09: AEGIS. Lockheed Martin announces that 4 antennas destined for HMAS Hobart were recently installed in the firm’s Aegis Production Test Center. Testing on the first Air Warfare Destroyer Aegis shipset will begin in early May 2009, and complete in November 2009. When testing concludes, the
entire AEGIS System will be shipped to ASC Shipyard in Adelaide, Australia, for installation.

March 6/09: Engines. India’s Business Times reports that an overzealous US State Department bureaucrat appears to have created a 3-4 month delay in the Project 17 program, after ordering GE to stop work on the LM2500 turbines it was supplying for India’s Shivalik Class frigates. The given reason? A 3-4 month internal State Department review of American relationships with other countries. The article reports that “GE has been told to stop work even with close US allies like the UK and Australia.”

As the Feb 25/09 entry notes, GE’s LM2500s also power the Hobart Class. Read “US State Dept. Throws A Wrench Into Exports, Allied Shipbuilding” for more.

Feb 15/09: Adelaide newspaper The Advertiser reports that the current draft of Australia’s Defence White Paper will recommend against building a 4th Hobart Class destroyer, and also includes plans to mothball 1-2 of the RAN’s Collins Class submarines. When asked for comment, Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon refused to discuss any recommendations until the White Paper’s recommendations could be approved and released.

Those submarines are currently inactive anyway, due to recruitment difficulties that have left the RAN short on submarine crews. A decision to build only 3 Hobart Class destroyers has larger industrial implications, however, because the 4th ship was expected to form a bridge of work to the next-generation submarine that would replace the Adelaide-built Collins Class. That project may be headed for big political trouble of its own, however, which would force some very difficult industrial decisions by the Australian government.

Mk.45 MOD 4 Naval Gun

Dec 2/08: Sub-contracts. The Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) Alliance announces contracts for 3 more component sets within the Hobart class ships, totaling about USD$ 20 million.

$10 million will go to SAFRAN Group’s Sagem Defense Securite Australasia for its VAMPIR NG (Veille Air-Mer Panoramique Infrarouge Nouvelle Generation/ New Generation Infrared Panoramic Air-Sea Surveillance) infrared surveillance systems. VAMPIR NG offers high-resolution panoramic images in visible light and/or infrared, providing short range surveillance and warning of incoming UAVs, fast boats, or even missiles – without creating traceable radar emissions. It calls on state-of-the-art image processing technology, and deploys 3rd-generation gyrostabilized infrared sensors for maximum efficiency. VAMPIR NG will be integrated with the ships’ combat system, and an also be used as a helicopter landing aid. It is already present on Australia’s upgraded ANZAC-ASMD Class frigates, and had been chosen for the Canberra class LHDs, giving it a huge advantage in this selection process. Sagem’s VAMPIR NG data sheet [PDF].

$5 million will go to Terma A/S of Lystrp, Denmark for the ships’ Counter Measure Launcher system, which fires decoys in automated sequences that are designed to confuse inbound anti-ship missiles and acoustic-homing torpedoes. The system includes 4 deck mounted MK-137 130 mm decoy launchers, a launch control computer, and a launcher interface unit. The system will support both passive and active decoys, and is prepared for further DL-6T upgrade if required. The system can be operated from the dedicated control units, or via the Australian Tactical Interface (ATI). Terma decoy systems equip Australia’s upgraded Adelaide Class frigates, the USA’s Littoral combat Ships, and vessels of the Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, and Romanian navies. Terma release.

$3 million will go to L-3 Communications Nautronix Limited in Fremantle, Australia for the ships’ Navigation Radar, Voyage Data Recorder, and Automatic Identification System. the ships will use L-3 X-Band Navigation Radar, the DEBEG 4300 Voyage Data Recorder, and Protec-S AIS. L-3 SAM Electronics of Germany and L-3 Communications Aviation Recorders Division of the USA will act as sub-contractors.

These follow contracts earlier this year for the Australian Tactical Interface Phase One (A$ 4 million), sonar (A$ 85 million) and the MK 45 5-inch gun (A$ 80 million). Australian Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Procurement Greg Combet adds that further contracts worth a total value of more than A$ 100 million are also likely to be signed by the end of the year. The Alliance intends to complete a number of purchases by the end of the year, including the RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile launcher and control system, the Very Short Range Defence capability, torpedo launch system and tubes, and satellite communications antennas. AWD Alliance | Australian DoD.

Sept 15/08: AWD Alliance. Australia’s Minister for Defence announces his appointment Mr Michael Roche as the new Chair of the Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance Principals’ Council. Other members include Dr Stephen Gumley, CEO of the DoD’s Defence Materiel Organisation; Vice Admiral Matt Tripovich of the RAN; Mr John Prescott, Chairman of ASC Pty Ltd; and Mr Dan Smith, President of Raytheon Company.

Mr Roche is a former Under Secretary for Defence Materiel in the Department of Defence and, before that Deputy CEO of the Australian Customs Service with responsibilities for Border Control, Intelligence, Information and Communications Technology and Internal Affairs.

“I have discussed the Air Warfare Destroyer project with Mr Roche, and made it clear that I expect him to closely monitor the progress of the project and the AWD Alliance… to ensure that it is kept on track.”

Sept 10/08: 4th ship? The Liberal Party of Australia, now Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition in Australia, issues a public call for Australia to build a 4th Hobart Class destroyer:

“If Mr Rudd wants a naval build-up, he should immediately order a fourth air warfare destroyer. The contract option for a fourth AWD expires in October but we have heard no word from the Government on that option being extended. “

The release follows a Sept 9/08 speech by Labor Party Prime Minister Rudd at Australia’s Returned Veteran and Services League’s national congress.

July 29/08: AEGIS. Lockheed Martin announces that it has completed production of 2 of the 4 SPY-1D-V radar arrays for Australia’s first Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer. These updated S-band radars perform a number of tasks including long-range volume search, fire control-quality tracking and ballistic missile defense. They will be paired with the new Aegis Open Architecture (OA) combat system.

March 7/08: Infrastructure. Construction on the $100 million upgrade of ASC’s Osborne shipyard begins with the explosive demolition of an outdated amenities building, and a traditional soil-turning next to Techport Australia’s Common User Facility.

See June 27/07 entry; the upgrade will include state-of-the-art AWD production facilities, new office accommodation for 400 employees and a wharf support building with office space and workshops. ASC release.

Jan 31/08: Training. ASC announces that it will be offering a number of its employees spaces in a new Master of Project Management program, to be delivered through the University of South Australia and funded by the Australian Defence Materiel Organisation’s “Skilling Australias Defence Industry” (SADI) program. Courses will take place at the South Australian Government’s new Maritime Skills Centre, which is part of the Techport Australia precinct at Osborne where the Hobart Class will be built.

AN/SPY-1 emitter

November 2007: New government. Australia’s general election results in a change of government. Howard’s Liberal Party is eclipsed by Rudd’s Labor Party. Dr. Brendan Nelson becomes the Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.

Oct 4/07: 4th ship? In a “doorstop interview,” Minister for Defence Dr. Brendan Nelson discusses the option for a 4th AWD ship, and hints that it may be a pre-election announcement:

“More than 3,000 Australians will get jobs from this. More than 1,000 contractors throughout Australia will be undertaking work to help build the ships. More than $4 billion of that will be invested directly in Australia… Well I certainly am disposed to seeing a fourth destroyer being built. Obviously we have kept the option open. We will need to make that decision before the end of next year. But we’d be talking about [A$] 1.5 billion, which is a lot of money… We’ve kept the option open… the decision as to whether we do have a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer… does not have to be made until the end of next year, because Raytheon, which [inaudible] Aegis combat system, which is the fighting part of the ship, will have a production line going until then.”

Raytheon Australia is the overall electronic systems integrator on the Hobart Class, which includes integrating the AEGIS system. Properly speaking, however, Lockheed Martin makes the AEGIS radar & combat system. The USA is reaching the end of DDG-51 class production, and has no other ships under construction that will carry AEGIS systems. They are also producing AEGIS systems for South Korea’s KDX-III destroyers, Spain’s F100 frigates, Norway’s Nansen Class frigates, and any future Japanese Kongo Class destroyers, though the volume of these orders is not large.

June 27/07: Infrastructure. ASC Ltd Pty announces that it has awarded its first major AWD contract for construction of the Program’s A$ 100 million shipyard. Work will include the development of dedicated AWD production facilities, new office accommodation for 400 employees, a wharf support building with office space and workshops, and a significant upgrade to existing facilities. South Australian firm Hansen Yuncken has been selected to design and construct the shipyard.

These facilities will be located adjacent to Techport Australia’s Common User Facility in Osborne. ASC will work in an alliance with Hansen Yuncken to develop the infrastructure master plan, design and manage the entire construction. Final designs are scheduled to be completed in September 2007, with construction to commence in October 2007 and be completed by October 2009. Upon satisfactory completion of the design phase, Hansen Yuncken will again be contracted to perform the associated shipyard construction.

John Gallacher, Chief Executive Officer of ASC Shipbuilding, said development of the shipyard held unique challenges not often found in local construction programs:

“Our shipyard production facilities and infrastructure will need to be capable of handling and transporting ship components weighing up to 1,200 tonnes each – this is no common development project.”

June 13/07: AEGIS. General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products in Burlington, VT received an $8 million firm-fixed-price modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-07-C-5103) for production, assembly and testing of 8 sets of AEGIS MK 82 Mod 0 Guided Missile Directors and MK 200 Mod 0 Director Controllers, major components of the AEGIS Weapons Systems. This modification supports the governments of Australia (75%, 6 sets for AWD) and Spain (25%, 2 sets for F105) under the Foreign Military Sales program. Work will be performed in Burlington, VT and is expected to be completed by February 2013.

The MK82 mounts the antenna assembly on an elevation-over-train pedestal and provides space stabilization for the AN/SPY-1 radar’s line of sight (LOS). The assembly is capable of motion on two axes, train and elevation (parallel to and normal to the base plane of the director), and is unmanned with start, stop and reset controls remotely located. The director, which is not limited in train or traverse positioning, supplies train and elevation position data and radar LOS rates in traverse and elevation for use by the fire control system computer.

May 30/07: Infrastructure. Defence Minister the Hon Dr Brendan Nelson and South Australian Deputy Premier Kevin Foley gave the official green light to construction of the Maritime Skills Centre. The $6 million purpose-built facility will support the Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance as a centre of excellence in maritime construction training. The Maritime Skills Centre will be located adjacent to ASC Shipbuilding at Techport Australia. Construction will commence in the June-July 2007 and conclude in February 2008, in readiness for the AWD Alliance to commence training at the facility from March 2008.

Techport Australia will not only build the state-of-the-art AWDs but also attract other shipbuilding and repair opportunities. Their investment includes:

• Common user shipbuilding facilities, including wharf, transfer system and Australia’s largest shiplift
  
• More than 35 hectares for suppliers to establish operations, and
  
• The future home of the high tech AWD Systems Centre – headquarters for the AWD program.

“Where capacity permits, the Skills Centre will also be able to be used for training to benefit wider industry,” Mr Foley said. The South Australian Government has invested over $20 million in workforce development programs to support the skill growth required by modern shipbuilding, and is investing over $250 million to develop Techport Australia as a world-class shipbuilding precinct at Osborne, with approximately $60 million worth of contracts awarded to date. These developments are part of the South Australian state government’s plan to double the contribution of the defense industry to their economy, and increase defense industry employment to 28,000 people by 2013. Official Australian DoD announcement.

March 28/07: AEGIS. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury MA received a $184.9 million firm-fixed-price definitization modification for production of 4 AEGIS Transmitter Groups. AWS is the primary anti-air warfare defensive weapons system onboard surface ship combatants. The transmitter group is part of the AN/SPY-1D radar; 3 of the transmitter groups are for the Commonwealth of Australia’s Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer shipbuilding program, with one designated for the Government of Spain’s next Alvaro de Bazan Class frigate, designated F105. The so-called “definitized” contract reflects the fully negotiated firm-fixed-price, and includes an increase in funding over the original $72 million contract awarded June 26/06.

Under this Foreign Military Sales contract, Raytheon IDS will manufacture, integrate and test AN/SPY-1 D(V) system transmitters and MK99 Fire Control Systems for the AWD program and F105. Each ship will mount 3 SPY-1 transmitter plates, and 2 MK99 illuminators. Work is expected to be complete by April 2010, and will be performed at Raytheon IDS’ Surveillance and Sensors Center in Sudbury, MA; the Integrated Air Defense Center in Andover, MA; and the Maritime Mission Center in Portsmouth, RI. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-06-C-5118). See also Raytheon’s April 24/07 release.

AEGIS Combat Control
(click to view full)

March 27/07: AEGIS. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors in Moorestown, NJ received a $260.4 million fixed-price incentive modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-5120) for production of 4 AEGIS Weapon Systems (AWS).

This contract modification specifies AWS Long Lead Material requirements, and modifies a June 30/06 award of $85 million for Australia’s AWD long lead material items. It combines support of the Commonwealth of Australia (75%) and the Government of Spain (25%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and is expected to be complete by February 2013.

The heart of the AWS is Lockheed Martin’s AN/SPY-1D Radar System, a 3-dimensional, air/surface search and tracking radar; there is also a software combat system component. The 4 will be next-generation Aegis Weapon Systems – among the first to include 100% commercial off-the-shelf hardware and a fully open architecture computing environment. Lockheed Martin will synchronize production of the systems for Australia and Spain with the U.S. Navy’s AEGIS modernization program, which calls for delivery of the first fully open architecture Aegis Weapon System to the USS Bunker Hill [GC 52, Ticonderoga Class cruiser] in 2008.

March 13/07: MK-41. Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime System and Sensors – Marine Systems in Baltimore, MD received a $16.1 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-98-C-5363) to provide MK 41 Baseline VII Vertical Launching System launcher ship sets for 3 Royal Australian Navy Air Warfare Destroyer Class (Project SEA 4000) ships and Spain’s new F100 Alvaro de Bazan Class frigate [F105, unnnamed at present] under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.

The modification combines purchases for the governments of Australia (73%) and Spain (27%), and includes the labor associated with production of installation and checkout (INCO) spares, INCO special tools and test equipment, onboard repair parts and other ancillary equipment. Work will be performed in Baltimore, MD and is expected to be completed by December 2009.

Jan 30/07: MK-41. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD received a $5.6 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-04-C-5453). It exercises options for technical engineering services in support of MK 41 Vertical Launching System Integration for the Governments of Spain (60%); Australia (37%); Germany (2%); and Korea (1%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Work will be performed in Baltimore, MD (80%) and Ventura, CA (20%), and is expected to be complete by October 2008.

Jan 11/07: AEGIS. General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products in Burlington, VT received a not to exceed $9.9 million firm-fixed-price letter contract for long lead material items to support assembly and testing of the AEGIS MK 82 Mod 0 Guided Missile Directors and MK 200 Mod 0 Director Controllers in support of Australian Foreign Military Sales case AT-P-LCQ for the amount of $3.7 million (75%) and Spanish Foreign Military Sales case SP-P-LGB for the amount of $1,237,500 (25%). The actual AEGIS equipment being assembled and tested will be installed at a later date aboard the Australian Air Warfare Destroyer and the Spanish F100 Frigate Class F105. Work will be performed in Burlington, VT, and is expected to be complete by January 2009. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC (N00024-07-C-5103).

The MK82 mounts the antenna assembly on an elevation-over-train pedestal and provides space stabilization for the radar line of sight (LOS). The assembly is capable of motion on two axes, train and elevation (parallel to and normal to the base plane of the director), and is unmanned with start, stop and reset controls remotely located. The director, which is not limited in train or traverse positioning, supplies train and elevation position data and radar LOS rates in traverse and elevation for use by the fire control system computer.

MK 41 VLS
(click to view full)

Nov 9/06: MK-41. Lockheed Martin Maritime System and Sensors/ Littoral Ships and Systems in Baltimore, MD received a $60.7 million firm-fixed-price modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-98-C-5363) for procurement of 4 MK 41, MOD 15 Baseline VII, Vertical Launcher Ship (VLS) Sets. This work is taking place on behalf the Governments of Australia (73.2%) and Spain (26.8%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program.

Lockheed will also provide launcher support equipment and the associated labor for establishing material requisitions, program scheduling requirements, and establishment of purchase orders with suppliers and performance of necessary business and production operations. Work will be performed in Baltimore, MD (52.7%), Minneapolis, MN (22%), Aberdeen, SD (8%), Aiken, SC (7%), Ft. Totten, ND (5.2%), and East Elmhurst, NY (5.1%), and is expected to be complete by December 2008.

July 12/06: AEGIS. Raytheon announces a $72.8 million U.S. Navy contract for the advanced procurement of radar equipment for the Royal Australian Navy’s Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD). Under the contract, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) will provide system transmitters, associated hardware and spares for AN/SPY-1D(V) radar for the first three Australian ships. Work will be performed at IDS’ Surveillance and Sensors Center in Sudbury, MA the Integrated Air Defense Center in Andover, MA and the Maritime Mission Center in Portsmouth, RI.

June 30/06: AEGIS. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors, Moorestown, NJ receives an $85.3 million fixed-price letter contract for long-lead material items and critical work center efforts to support the production of 3 AEGIS Weapon Systems (AWS) for the Commonwealth of Australia’s Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) Shipbuilding Program. The AWS comprises the core command and control system, the phased array radar, and missile launch system. See March 27/07 entry for the final cost figure.

Award of this contract is designed to eliminate the risk and increased costs associated with a break in production, and minimize the risk of delay in the 2013 delivery date for the first Air Warfare Destroyer. This award is for Australia (100%) under the Foreign Military Sales Program. $64.6 million will be obligated at time of award. Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ, and is expected to be complete by March 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington DC (N00024-06-C-5120).

June 26/06: AEGIS. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Sudbury, MA receives a $72.8 million firm-fixed-price letter contract for long-lead material items and Critical Work Center efforts in support of SPY-1D (V) AEGIS Weapon Systems (AWS) Transmitter Group production for the Government of Australia (GOA) Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) Program. This contract supports the GOA under the Foreign Military Sales program. Long lead-time items will, at a future date, be used by contractor to manufacture key components of the AWS for Australia’s $6 billion AWD shipbuilding project.

Work will be performed in Andover, MA (80%), and Sudbury, MA (20%), and is expected to be complete by February 2009. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC (N00024-06-C-5118). See also May 23/05 DSCA announcement, and also the March 28/07 entry, which represents the final figure for this work.

Early DoD concept
(click to expand)

October 11/05: Infrastructure. South Australia will be home to the new headquarters of the Air Warfare Destroyer project, creating up to 200 additional jobs there, as well as generating specialized design work for contractors throughout Australia. Australian DoD announcement.

Aug 16/05: Evolved. The Australian government chooses Gibbs & Cox as the preferred designer for the AWD Evolved Design, which will be based on the USA’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers. This concludes Phase 1C of the SEA 4000 project. See DID coverage.

May 2005: Existing. The Spanish firm Navantia is chosen as the preferred designer for the AWD Existing Design. It will be based on a version of the 5,800t F100 Alvaro de Bazan Class AEGIS frigate, with Australian systems replacing some of the original equipment.

Dec 23/04: Bids to Build Air Warfare Destroyers Announced. Proposals were received from ASC Shipbuilding, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and Tenix Defence. At this stage, Australia’s DoD is evaluating the 3 ship designer proposals from Blohm +Voss, Gibbs &Cox, and Izar; and responses from BAE Systems, Raytheon Australia and Saab Systems for the Combat System-System Engineer.

Appendix A: The SEA 4000 Design Competition

Sachsen Class
(click to view full)

The biggest influence on the SEA 4000 program sits below the surface, in more ways than one.

The difficult Collins Class submarine project delivered some of the world’s most advanced conventional submarines – and something extra, besides. The submarines were late, significantly over budget, and are still receiving electronic refits to replace the original combat systems. In response, the Australian Government’s Defence Procurement (Kinnaird) Review strongly recommended spending more money and time on up front design activities, in order to reduce overall project risk. This would be more expensive in the short term, with the hope of making large overruns or schedule issues less likely later on.

That philosophy was implemented in the SEA 4000 program, which moved from a 3-platform shortlist, to detailed design of 2 different options, to the final selection. After a long campaign, the somewhat surprising winner was an ‘Australianized’ F100 AEGIS frigate.

One of the contenders was ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ F124 Sachsen Class air defense frigate, currently one of the world’s few operational ship classes with an X-band Active Phased Array naval radar. Its thousands of electronically-focused emitters offer improved performance and phenomenal multitasking ability, giving it exceptional capabilities against a sudden saturation missile attack with supersonic cruise missiles. This design was eliminated from the shortlist, however, by Australia’s stated requirement for the AEGIS naval air defense system. While AEGIS’ AN/SPY-1D is a previous generation passive phased array radar, the AEGIS combat system software and the potential for cooperative engagement capability proved decisive.

That left an “Existing Design” based on Spain’s in-service F100 Alvaro de Bazan Class AEGIS frigates, which would compete against a larger “Evolved Design” option from naval architects Gibbs & Cox. The latter would be a new ship design, albeit based on the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class AEGIS destroyers they had designed for the US Navy.

AWD Evolved Design
(click to view full)

The first images of the Evolved Design for Australia’s Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project were unveiled on August 3/06 by Minister of Defence Brendan Nelson at the opening of the new AWD Systems Centre in Adelaide. At 7,370t/8,100t full load, they would have been much closer in size to the 8,300t full load DDG-51 Flight I ships than the 9,200t tons full load Flight IIA ships, with 64 vertical launch missile cells (vs. 90-96 cells for DDG-51 variants), 2 Phalanx close-in defense weapons, 2 helicopter hangars, extended range, and good future growth capabilities. As an additional basis for comparison, Britain’s forthcoming Type 45 Daring Class anti-air warfare destroyers reportedly weigh in at 8,000t full load.

The F100 frigates, in contrast, are smaller ships, weighing in at only 5,800t. This places it somewhere between the boundaries of in-service destroyers and frigates, a boundary that has become fuzzier due to evolving designs, and European reluctance to label ships as destroyers. Regardless, the size difference requires sacrifices in armament and growth capability. Key differences between the contenders included 64 VLS missile cells for the Evolved Design vs. 48 for the F100 frigates, 2 Phalanx-type close-in defense weapons instead of 1 for the F100s, and a hangar for 2 naval helicopters instead of 1. In Australia’s case, it will be the MH-60R.

Australian government Q&A sessions immediately after the selection, however, said that in their opinion, the overall operational capability, maximum speed, range and endurance were all “very similar.” Their evaluation was that the 2 designs had “basically the same” surface warfare, undersea warfare, communications, and electronic warfare capabilities, and both also shared a growth path to ballistic missile defense (via the AEGIS BMD system), and strategic land strike capability (via Mk 41 vertical launchers that can accommodate BGM-109 Tomahawk Cruise missiles). In exchange for the Evolved Design’s size advantages, detailed analysis by the AWD Alliance showed that the Evolved Design would cost A$ 1 billion more over 3 ships, offer less certainty regarding schedule and cost, and deliver the first ship at least 4 years later.

Spain’s F100 Frigate
(click to view full)

Others had seen this coming earlier. Back in April 2007, Forecast International cited internal sources to say that Navantia had won, and said:

“Common wisdom has often suggested that the Navantia bid was simply a stalking horse for Gibbs and Cox… the information we were receiving from Australia from the start of the project was consistently that the F100 was the preferred candidate and that the Gibbs and Cox design was a back-up in case the F100 class hit serious problems on its trials. This did not happen, the Alvaro de Bazan proved to be a great success and this eliminated the DDG-51 derivatives last hope of winning this contract.

It may well be that the appointment of Gibbs and Cox as preferred designer in 2005 was not a sign of preference for their design but the group’s last chance to make its case.

A key handicap for Gibbs and Cox was that its proposed warship existed only in its preliminary design phase, increasing the technical risk for a local builder. Australia’s experiences with new and untried designs has been disappointing…”

They also said:

“Although supporters of the Gibbs and Cox-designed DDG-51 derivative promoted the greater weapons carrying capacity of their design, including 64 rather than 48 vertical launch tubes and two rather than one helicopters, the advantages of the F100 were so strong that a debate between supporters of the two designs was a complete wipeout according to one senior Australian defense source.

The financial benefits resulting from the selection of the F100 are so great that they will go a long way towards funding (some estimates are that they will almost completely accommodate) a fourth Air Warfare Destroyer. The Australian Cabinet’s National Security Committee will consider an option to buy a fourth F100 destroyer when it makes a final decision on a go-ahead for the project in June.”

Those hopes proved to be unfounded, but the comments remain illustrative of the thinking behind Australia’s decision.

Appendix B: SEA 4000 Program Phase Organization

SEA 4000 is managed as a period of preliminary studies, plus 4 distinct phases. These phases are; Phase 1 (Project Definition), Phase 2 (Design), Phase 3 (Build) and Phase 4 (Test and Acceptance).

Phase 0: Preliminary Design Studies

Phase 0 was used to conduct a series of higher order studies leading to the Preliminary Capability Options Document (PCOD).

Phase 1: Project Definition

The aim of the Project Definition Phase is to quantify performance, schedule, cost and risks for capability options. Ran July 2002 to late 2005. Key outcomes were development of detailed operational requirements specifications; whole-of-ship, costed concept designs; decision on combat system architecture and selection of alliance industry participants. Total cost about A$ 43 million.

Once selected, the shipbuilding entity would be engaged in later stages of Phase 1 to assist the Commonwealth with the assessment of other responses and to prepare for the later construction phases.

Phase 1 is further broken down into four sub-phases which are described below:

Phase 1A: Non Design Related Studies. Involves the development of the Capability Definition Documents (CDD), including the Operational Concept Document (OCD), the Function and Performance Specification (FPS) and the Test Concept Document (TCD);

Phase 1B: Combat System Design Studies. involves the development of combat system architecture options, including risk reduction work. In April 2005, Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd. was chosen as the prime integrator for the ship’s combat systems, beating rivals BAE systems and Saab systems to become the Project Combat System-System Engineer. This made them part of the AWD Alliance with the DMO.

Phase 1C – Whole of Ship Design Studies . involves the identification of whole-of-ship concept options for presentation to Government. Whole-of-ship options will be developed through the consideration of an Existing Design currently in-service with another navy and through an Evolved Design Study.

Shipbbuilder candidates included ASC Shipbuilder (who had built the new Collins Class submarines for the RAN), Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, and Tenix Defence (who had built the joint Australia/ New Zealand Anzac Class frigate). ASC was unanimously chosen in May 2005 by the selection board, and joined the AWD Alliance with Raytheon and Australia’s DMO procurement agency.

Navantia was selected as the Existing Design partner in May 2005. Gibbs & Cox was chosen to undertake the Evolved Design in August 2005.

Phase 1D: Combat System Integration and Risk Reduction Study – A follow-on from Phase 1B. Overall, the combat system design team comprises Defence (DMO, Capability Development and DSTO), the US Navy and their AEGIS Combat System Engineering Agent, as well as the Australian AWDCSSE. Phase 1D produced detailed information about combat system design options to support First Pass Approval, and moved the design forward towards the joint ADO-USN Combat System Design Review (SDR).

To that end, Raytheon designed integration processes and strategies for the non-AEGIS elements of the Combat System, and developed complete ship and integrated support systems with the Platform Systems Designers (Navantia, and Gibbs & Cox, Inc.) and the Shipbuilder (ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd).

Phase 2 – Design

The aim of the Design Phase was to develop Acquisition Business Cases for Government consideration at Second Pass for the Evolved Design and Existing Design capability options. The approved budget was A$ 455 million.

This phase began in mid-2005 and finished with Government approval of the Navantia design as their final choice in June 2007.

Phase 3 – Build

This phase has now begun, and will finish with delivery of the final ship. The aim of the Build Phase is to deliver AWD ships and shore support facilities from the contract design data produced in Phase 2.

The ships will be consolidated at ASC’s shipyard in Adelaide, with major hull “blocks” built in other shipyards around Australia. Australian industry will also design and build various sub-systems and equipment for the AWD’s combat system, which will lay the foundations for long-term support. The government’s release adds that Australian Industry will deliver products and services worth around:

“…[55% of the A$ 6.6 billion AWD Program] over the next 15 years, which will be followed by high value through life support contracts into the middle of the century. While Adelaide based ASC will conduct the final assembly of the AWDs, around 70 per cent of the ship modules will be built at other shipbuilding sites around Australia, potentially including sites in Western Australia, Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania. The AWD Programme will eventually employ around 3,000 Australians in a variety of engineering and related fields working for a range of companies and suppliers throughout Australia.”

The shipbuilding, electronics and engineering industries will engage more than 1,500 shipbuilding jobs in South Australia, and another 1,500 jobs will be created throughout Australia with the outsourcing of approximately 70% of hull block and module fabrication. The ships will require the assembly of approximately 500,000 components. About 1,000 suppliers will be required to complete the shipbuilding task, which will take more than 3 million man-hours to complete each ship.

The first of these “Air Warfare Destroyers” will be delivered in late 2014 (originally supposed to be 2013), followed by the second and third ships in early-2016 and mid-2017 respectively.

Phase 4 -Test and Acceptance

This phase will begin in parallel with the build phase, culminating with the operational release of the third ship once the government has verified that the ships satisfy operational requirements, including supportability. The Phase 4 deliverable is the ships and shore facilities being formally accepted into naval service.

Full Operational Release of the lead ship has always been scheduled for 2015, with subsequent ships accepted in 2016 and 2017. These dates may still be achievable, but the year’s delay in delivery of the first ship will put pressure on them.

Additional Readings & Sources

• Australia Defence Materiel Organisation – SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer: Official Program Site and MoD page.

• Air Warfare Destroyer Alliance web site. The AWD Alliance is a collaborative set of arrangements between the Commonwealth of Australia, Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd and ASC subsidiary ASC AWD Shipbuilder Pty Ltd. See especially the AWD Roadshow, which covers aspects like the combat system, shipbuilding, et. al. in more depth.

• ASC Pty Ltd – Air Warfare Destroyers

• ASC Pty Ltd – Multimedia page. Includes Flash format videos depicting the AWD in action within an envisaged scenario [Windows Media, 2 MB], and the process of building an AWD depicted week by week [Windows Media, 5.6 MB].

• Lockheed Martin – AWD Air Warfare Destroyer

• Lockheed Martin – AWD Air Warfare Destroyer – Industrial Cooperation

• Naval-Technology.com – F100 Alvaro De Bazan Multi-Purpose Frigate, Spain

• Sea Power Centre Australia – Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations

• DID – MH-60R Wins Australia’s Maritime Helicopter Competition. And will serve on the Hobart Class.

• DID – Australia and USA Collaborating on New Small-Ship Radars. They won’t serve on the Hobarts, but the smaller active-array CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT radars are a generation ahead of the SPY-1/SPQ-9B combination, giving upgraded ANZAC-ASMD frigates some impressive radar capabilities of their own.

• DID – Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrade. Their FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class ships were a nightmare to upgrade. This 4-ship fleet is the tier below the ANZACs.

• Royal Australian Navy’s Navy News (June 28/07) – A great day for Navy. Includes preliminary information about the 2 ship classes.

• Australian Ministerial Release (Aug 4/06) – The Hon. Dr Brendan Nelson, Minister for Defence – Doorstop Interview: Air Warfare Destroyer Systems Centre, Adelaide.

• Australian Defence Association, Defender Magazine (Autumn 2005) – Going Down to the Sea in Big Enough Ships [PDF format]. Includes considerable discussion of the “jointness” angle, which they believe has received insufficient attention in public debates. The ADA is generally seen as an organization of defense system reformists oriented toward the conservative side of the political spectrum.

• Australian DoD (Aug 17/04) – Delivering the Defence Capability Plan – Hobart briefing.

• Australia Defence Today (June 2004) – SEA 4000 – The Air Warfare Destroyer. Notes the growth of anti-ship missiles in the region and the potential to face saturation attacks from supersonic anti-ship missiles launched and flown below the radar horizon. If the key threat is multiple supersonic missiles that pop up on radar only within 25 miles (line of horizon), the article argues in favor of the most modern AESA ship radars instead of the AEGIS’ SPY-1, and explains why.

The US Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) program is designed to streamline and update shipboard networks to improve interoperability across the fleet. It will replace 5 shipboard legacy network programs to provide the common computing environment on board for command, control, intelligence and logistics. The primary goal of the CANES program is to build a secure shipboard network required for naval and joint operations, which is much easier when you consolidate and reduce the number of shipboard networks. That consolidation can also lower costs and maintenance requirements and reduce training needs, if good choices are made. The intent is to build it as an Infrastructure and Platform as a Service (IaaS / PaaS) and field it on a rolling 4-year hardware baseline and a 2-year software baseline.

In 2010, the US Navy awarded 2 contracts, with a potential value of $1.7 billion, for the design and development of the CANES common computing environment. Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin are competing, and a single prime contractor was expected to be picked in 2011. It took until early 2012, but Northrop Grumman won.

Contracts and Key Events

Note that CANES is about covering ships’ IT systems and networks, not core naval functions. Combat systems, and machinery control networks, are not included in CANES.

CANES is currently in production, after Northrop Grumman beat Lockheed Martin in February 2012. Introduction to the fleet was to begin with installs in 2012 on unit level ships with 2 Engineering Development Model installations, followed by Limited Deployment installations in 2012 that cover force level ships, shore sites, and additional unit level ships. That’s a bit behind now. Installations started at the end of 2012, but budget issues have created delays. 2013 will see operational testing, and there are plans for a follow-on re-compete in 2014. If the program recovers its schedule, CANES would ultimately be deployed to more than 190 ships, submarines and Maritime Operations Centers by 2021.

March 27/13: The Space and Naval Warfare System Command (SPAWAR) releases draft RFP N00039-13-R-0013 for the procurement of CANES full deployment production units in order to promote the early exchange of information. The core contract would be a firm fixed price (FFP) complemented by FFP and cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) CLINs for associated analysis and assessment support services. The draft documents are available from a secure Navy website for authorized US DoD personnel and contractors.

Feb 21/13: Delays. Inside Defense reports that uncertainty regarding fiscal sequestration has delayed 8 CANES installations, just as it’s delaying a number of other ship maintenance plans.

Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). CANES is mentioned peripherally, mostly with respect to carrier integration:

“The Navy conducted developmental testing on the unit-level CANES configuration used on Aegis destroyers in the lab from July 11 – 24, 2012. The Navy has scheduled developmental and follow-on testing of the force-level CANES configuration used on the Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford [aircraft carrier] classes for the 4QFY14.

Currently, the ALIS [F-35 fighter maintenance support] system has provided all required parametric information to interface properly with CANES, but CANES is not fully developed yet, as the contract was awarded in August 2012. ALIS is expected to undergo Application Integration Process testing in FY13 to ensure proper interface with CANES. DOT&E will be able to better assess the impact on JSF operations aboard CVN-78 [the Gerald R. Ford] after the test. Currently, data are planned to be exchanged manually until ALIS and CANES properly interface.”

March 4/12: On second thought… That was fast: Lockheed Martin dropped its GAO protest.

Feb 13/12: Protest. Lockheed Martin files a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), claiming “flaws in the evaluation process preclude consideration of the best solution for the customer”, without elaborating further.

Feb 13/12: The US Navy announces its FY13 plans to procure 21 afloat units, 6 ashore units, 1 unit of technical training equipment (TTE), integration, with associated costs for pre-installation design and activity drawings, and installation. Funds are also requested for continued development on Platform Set 3 and 4 baselines, Developmental Testing and Initial Operational Testing & Evaluation on a unit level platform in support of Full Deployment Decision in FY 2013.

The Navy is asking for $435M (CANES + CANES Intell P-40s) for the year. This boils down to an average unit cost of about $10.9M. Installation costs that can vary from less than $5M to more than $12M apiece, depending on ship class, level of the platform, variant of predecessor system the hull currently has installed (ISNS Alpha/Charlie/Delta/Legacy), and geographic location of the installation. Spending for following years through the current FYDP stays in the $450M ballpark.

In FY12 CANES is procuring for: DDG (11), LHD (1), CVN (1). In FY13 CANES is procuring: DDG (18), CG (3), LHD (2), LSD (2) CVN (2). FY13 PB Navy Highlights | Justification book [PDFs].

Sept 12/11: Lockheed Martin has submitted its final CANES proposal to the US Navy. Lockheed Martin.

July 27/11: US Navy SPAWAR provides an update on CANES, which has just completed its Critical Design Reviews for both competing systems. A Test Readiness Review will be followed by formal Contractor System Integration Test, and selection of a single CANES winner.

The failure of the last Congress to pass a budget has delayed CANES by 5 months, and forced it to change its schedule. They still believe that the major milestones set out in the Milestone B approval can be achieved; the 1st CANES installation on a fleet destroyer is now planned for late in FY 2012 (late summer 2012).

Aug 16/10: Northrop Grumman announces a successful 2-day Preliminary Design Review at its CANES program office in San Diego, CA. The PDR and subsequent approval of the CANES design are milestone along the way to the CANES critical design review later this year, and planned shipboard installation of the first system in fiscal year 2012.

Northrop Grumman team members contributing to the Navy PDR included IBM Global Business Services, as Northrop Grumman’s major technology and services partner on CANES; and small-business partners Atlas Technologies, Beatty and Company Computing, Juno Technologies, Syzygy Technologies, and CenterBeam.

Additional Readings

• US Navy SPAWAR – CANES Application Integration

• RAND – CANES Contracting Strategies for Full Deployment

• US Navy CHIPS Magazine (December 2007) – The CANES Initiative: Bringing the Navy Warfighter onto the Global Information Grid [PDF]

• Northrop Grumman – CANES Brochure [PDF]

The US Navy’s AN/SLQ-32 ECM (Electronic Countermeasures) system uses radar warning receivers, and in some cases active jamming, as the part of ships’ self-defense system. The “Slick 32s” provides warning of incoming attacks, and is integrated with the ships’ defenses to trigger Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff (RBOC) and other decoys, which can fire either semi-automatically or on manual direction from a ship’s ECM operators.

The “Slick 32″ variants are based on modular building blocks, and each variant is suited to a different type of ship. Most of these systems were designed in the 1970s, however, and are based on 1960s-era technology. Unfortunately, the SLQ-32 was notable for its failure when the USS Stark was hit by Iraqi Exocet missiles in 1987. The systems have been modernized somewhat, but in an era that features more and more supersonic ship-killing missiles, with better radars and advanced electronics, SLQ-32′s fundamental electronic hardware architecture is inadequate. Hence the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP).

SEWIP Blocks

“Slick 32″ screen on
USS Iowa, 1984
(click to view full)

Though SLQ-32 is a Raytheon system, SEWIP began in 2003 with General Dynamics as the lead integrator. Blocks 1A, 1B2, and 1B3 all utilize the improved control and display (ICAD) console, which is a GD-AIS developed upgrade based on the commonly used Lockheed Martin AN/ULQ-70 computing and display console.

Block 1A adds the improved displays and a modern interface noted above, along with some hardware switchouts that add modern commercial-off-the-shelf hardware to drive the new display, and handle some signal processing (Electronic Surveillance Enhancements, or ESE).

SWEIP Block 1B1 made more changes to replace obsolete SLQ-32 electronics, some of which aren’t even manufactured any more, and improved the system’s ability to locate the source of incoming radar signals. SEWIP Block 1B1 provides a AN/SSX-1 stand-alone specific emitter identification (SEI) subsystem to ships with the active AN/SLQ-32(V) variant.

SEWIP Block 1B2 couples signal processing and display upgrades, and integrates the SEI subsystem with the improved control and display software for ships with the passive AN/SLQ-32(V) variant.

SEWIP Block 1B3 adds additional display upgrades, and a High Gain High Sensitivity (HGHS) subsystem, to help ships deal with modern missiles that announce their presence less boldly and offer less warning time.

SEWIP-2 concept
(click to view full)

Those low-cost, low-risk inserts deal with some of the SLQ-32 system’s issues, but not all. Over the longer term, the system’s fundamental receiver/emitter electronics need to be updated to modern technologies. Its software needs improvements that let ships take better advantage of the new hardware’s capabilities, make it easier to share SEWIP information with their own ship’s combat system, and allow sharing with other ships.

Block 2 is described as an upgrade, but it’s more like a major home renovation. It replaces the old SLQ-32 receivers and antennas with modern digital technologies, adding new capability, flexibility, and signal processing muscle. Block 2 also modifies the software, creating a single, unified interface to the combat system in place of multiple interfaces to individual components of the combat system. This makes future upgrades simpler, and may also have the effect of improving performance. Lockheed Martin’s ICEWS materials touted under 200ms end-to-end latency, a low false alarm rate, and good high-pulse throughput for cluttered environments.

The Block 2 contract was awarded to a Lockheed Martin/ ITT partnership at the very end of FY 2009. June 2010 was the next key milestone, and a July 2010 contract continues development. The system passed its Critical Design Review in early 2011, and the partnership was scheduled to deliver 2 prototypes in 2012. Testing is now scheduled for FY 2014.

SEWIP Block 3 and beyond could look very different. A US Navy program called “Integrated Topside” aims to take all of the little bolt-ons and antennas used for communications, basic radar functions, and electronic warfare, and make them all part of 1 unified architecture. That could help improve ships’ anti-radar profiles, increase their communications bandwidth, and resolve electromagnetic interference and compatibility issues between different devices. New-generation AESA radars have already demonstrated communications and electronic jamming potential, and current research is focused on that technology as the way forward.

Contracts and Key Events

March 26/13: Block 2, LRIP-1. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Liverpool, NY receives a $30.6 million contract modification, exercising firm-fixed-price options for low-rate initial production SEWIP Block 2 units.

Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY (68%), and Lansdale, PA (32%), and is expected to be complete by September 2014. All funding is committed immediately, and will be managed by US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC (N00024-09-C-5300). See also Lockheed Martin.

March 22/13: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Liverpool, NY received a $27.4 million modification and restructuring of the SEWIP Block 2 contract. The restructuring converts fixed-price with incentive-options for Block 2′s System long-lead time pre-production material to firm-fixed-price options. All funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY, and is expected to be complete by March 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5300).

Block 2 contract restructured, 1st LRIP order

Jan 17/13: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). SEWIP Block 2 is included only in passing:

“At present, there exists only one each of the Kappa, Uniform, and Gamma EW simulators. These simulators are flown on Lear Jets against shipboard EW systems. SEWIP Block 2 is the latest EW system under development. Two of these simulators are needed (one for each Lear Jet) so that threat-realistic stream raid profiles can be used to adequately test the SEWIP Block 2 in FY14. An estimated development/procurement cost is $5 Million.”

Aug 1/12: Block 3. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon demonstrate their proposed SEWIP 3 solution during the multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercise near Hawaii. It went to sea aboard Lockheed Martin’s mobile Integrated Common Electronic Warfare System (ICEWS) test bed. Lockheed Martin.

Feb 13/12: The USA’s FY 2013 budget documents include documents that don’t break SEWIP spending out specifically, but do discuss some past SEWIP activities and future plans, as part of a larger suite of research:

“[2011] Continued the Enhanced Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Transmitter FNC effort by starting system architecture design and Low Voltage Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) High Power Amplifier (HPA) Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit (MMIC) purchases. This effort develops affordable and reliable solid state transmitter technologies to engage anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile RF seekers.

[2013] Complete Enhanced SEWIP Transmitter – Conduct a final test of the enhanced Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) transmit array in the anechoic chamber…. Complete Enhanced Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Transmitter – Demonstrate full enhanced SEWIP array performance in a relevant field environment.”

Jan 31/12: Block 3. Lockheed Martin (SEWIP Block 2) and Raytheon (original SLQ-32) announce that they’re teaming to compete for SEWIP Block 3, whose details aren’t clear yet. Lockheed Martin | Model of their proposed solution [JPG graphic, 2.3 MB].

July 18/11: Block 1. General Dynamics Advance Information Systems (GD-AIS), Inc.in Fairfax, VA receives cost-plus-fixed fee job orders estimated at $9.9 million to continue systems engineering and system software/firmware support for SEWIP Blocks 1A, 1B1, 1B2, and 1B3.

Work will be performed in Fairfax, VA, and is expected to be complete by January 2015. The basic ordering agreement was not competitively procured because the US Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, IN determined there was only one responsible source, and no other suppliers will satisfy the agency requirements (N00164-11-G-PM04).

March 16/11: FY 2011 Block 1. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems in Fairfax, VA receives a $7 million contract modification, exercising firm-fixed-price options for FY 2011 SEWIP Block 1B1 and 1B2 full-rate production and spares.

Work will be performed in Fairfax, VA, and is expected to be complete by July 2012. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, DC manages the contract (N00024-09-C-5396).

Aug 11/10: Testing. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Tewksbury, MaA receives a $36.1 million contract modification (N00024-05-C-5346) for mission systems equipment (MSE) that will be used on the US Navy’s Self Defense Test Ship, in support of the Anti-Air Warfare Self Defense Enterprise Test and Evaluation Master Plan. The equipment will support the DDG 1000 and CVN 78 classes of ships, which use the new Dual Band Radar. Raytheon will also conduct follow-on operation test and evaluation efforts for the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (RIM-162 ESSM) and Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP).

March 25/10: Block 1. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Inc. in Fairfax, VA received a $12.4 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-09-C-5396), exercising a cost-plus-fixed-fee option for FY 2010 SEWIP Block 1B engineering services. It also exercises firm-fixed-price options for FY 2010 SEWIP Block 1B1 production units and spares, and for Block 1B2 production units, modification kits, and spares.

Work will be performed in Fairfax, VA (65%), and Annapolis Junction, MD (35%), and is expected to be complete by December 2012. The Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages this contract.

March 31/09: Block 1. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Inc. in Fairfax, VA received a $40 million not-to-exceed contract for Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 1B research and development, and production requirements. This contract includes the continued design and development of SEWIP Block 1B3, with a specialized HGHS (High Gain High Sensitivity) subsystem, to enhance the SLQ-32′s detection capabilities against emerging threats, and full rate production of SEWIP Block 1B2 units.

GD-AIS has been the SEWIP program’s lead integrator since 2003. Work will be performed in Fairfax, VA (60%) and Syracuse, NY (40%), and is expected to be complete by July 2011. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC (N00024-09-C-5396).

Dec 3/08: Block 2 competition. Defense Daily offers a roundup of the SEWIP Block 2 program competition between GD/BAE, Lockheed/ITT, and Northrop Grumman, who’s thinking about adapting the system it’s developing for the Navy’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyers. Read: “Industry Readying For Navy’s Release of SEWIP Block 2 RFP.”

Dec 1/08: Block 1. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors wins a contract from General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Inc., to develop and produce SEWIP Block 1B3′s High Gain, High Sensitivity (HGHS) sub-system. The contract includes the topside antenna systems, the below decks signal processor, and the processing algorithms that accompany the processor. It is valued at up to $36 million including options, and was awarded after a competitive bidding process. GD-AIS.

Dec 1/08: Block 2 competition. Lockheed Martin and ITT announce that they’ve teamed up to compete for the SEWIP Block 2 contract. Lockheed Martin.

October 23/08: Block 2 competition. General Dynamics and BAE Systems announce that they’ve teamed up to compete for the SEWIP Block 2 contract. Their solution is called “Sea Lightning.” BAE Systems.

Additional Readings

• DID – InTop: Sorting out Ships’ Topside Mess. Northrop Grumman has explicitly said that these efforts will lay the hardware and controller foundations for SEWIP 3.

• Lockheed Martin – Electronic Warfare. Naval EW page, includes SEWIP.

• Lockheed Martin – Integrated Common Electronic Warfare System (ICEWS) Brochure [PDF]. ICEWS forms the basis for SEWIP Block 2.

• Raytheon – AN/SLQ-32 (V)

• Global Security – AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare (EW) system

• Harold Lee Wise – Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988. Includes what is very probably the best public account of the attack on the USS Stark.