• Rear Adm. Richard Breckenridge, the US Navy’s Director of Undersea Warfare, says they have enough SSBNs at the moment to fulfill deterrence goals, and will need at least 10 operational SSBNs to continue to do so in the future. And to do that until the introduction of the new SSBN “we must complete refueling overhauls of all 14 Ohio SSBNs and operate the 12 newest of them to their full 42-year extended life.” On background: 2010 nuclear posture review [PDF] | Finite deterrence.

• The Pentagon is proposing to amend Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) in order to clarify contractor responsibilities in the detection of counterfeit electronic parts. Send comments on the proposed rule by July 15.

• South Korea’s Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) is agreeing with estimates from the US government that size the number of mobile missile launchers operated by North Korea to about 200. Earlier

• The US GAO finds the services could better align their anti-corrosion goals and policies with those set by DoD. DoD and GAO agree to disagree.

• The final RFP for full production of the US Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) is expected to be released on May 24.

• The US Army’s Project Management Soldier Weapons (PM SW) will hold an Industry Day on June 27 at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, to discuss target acquisition and precision targeting for small firearms.

• The UK’s National Audit Office has added a “Defence Value for Money” section to their website where they are gathering material covering the root causes of successful projects, contracting practices, and collaborative relationships.

• US Navy flight deck operations use color coding, which scratches DID’s Obsessive Compulsive Disorder just the right way. Smartly, there is no Mr. Pink, and bright colors beat blue/grey camo. Video below, whose lack of metal music was probably filed under “diversity” by the Navy’s recruiters:

The world’s P-3 Orion fleets have served for a long time, and many are reaching the end of their lifespans. In the USA, and possibly beyond, the new P-8 Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft will take up the P-3′s role. While the P-8′s base 737-based airframe offers strong service & maintenance arguments in its favor, the airframe is expensive enough that the P-3s cannot be replaced on a 1:1 basis.

In order to extend the P-8 fleet’s reach, and provide additional capabilities, the Poseidon was expected to work with at least one companion UAV platform. This DID FOCUS Article explains the winning BAMS (Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) concept, the program’s key requirements, and its international angle. We’ll also cover ongoing contracts and key events related to the program, which chose Northrop Grumman’s navalized MQ-4C Triton Global Hawk variant.

Next-Gen Maritime Patrol Systems: Issues and Options

USN ERJ-145 ACS concept

The P-3 fleet’s heavy use in both maritime surveillance and overland roles points up a potential problem with its successor the P-8A Poseidon. The 737-based aircraft will be bought in fewer numbers than the aircraft it replaces, but its high end Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS) capabilities could quickly turn it into a sort of “mini-JSTARS,” making it a platform with strong maritime and land surveillance capabilities like NATO’s similar sized Airbus 321-based AGS battlefield surveillance aircraft.

As an expensive but in-demand asset, the P-8′s coverage scope could easily translate into a fleet run ragged by high flight hours per airframe, and forced into early retirement. See the Strategic Review article “Brittle Swords: Low-Density, High-Demand Assets” [PDF] for more background on this phenomenon.

The logical response is to pair the P-8s with a lower cost counterpart.

Hence the P-8 Poseidon’s companion Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV program, run by NAVAIR’s PMA-263 program management office.

BAMS: Requirements and Missions

NGC on BAMS
click to play video

The BAMS UAV is formally designated MQ-4C Triton: “M” as a multi-mission aircraft, even though all of its missions are ISR/reconnaissance missions.

The name fits. In mythology, Triton was Poseidon’s son, and the messenger of the sea. Tritons will work with the P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft on missions that will include maritime surveillance, collection of enemy order of battle information, battle damage assessment, port surveillance, communication relay; plus support for maritime interdiction, surface warfare, battlespace management, and targeting for maritime and strike missions. MQ-4C Increment 3 UAVs and beyond are slated to add SIGINT capabilities, to capture enemy communication and radar transmissions. They would begin replacing the current EP-3 fleet in that role.

The MQ-4C UAV’s required capabilities definitely placed it at the high end of today’s UAV spectrum. BAMS had to be capable of a completely pre-programmed mission track, communication plan, and sensor employment plan, with manual override possible to support real-time control and/or re-tasking. The baseline requirement for operation with the P-8A is currently Level II control (receipt of sensor data to/from), with a proposal to quickly increase to Level IV (full control except landings) in the P-8A’s first improvement cycle. It also needed the ability to land on its own if necessary, however, using pre-surveyed and pre-programmed air fields.

Many of those capabilities are already present in existing medium UAVs. The requirements that follow are not.

BAMS: expected ‘orbits’
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BAMS had to have a minimum mission radius of 3,000 nautical miles, with a 10 hour time to on-station at 2,000 nm mission radius, and autonomous flight through moderate icing or turbulence. More to the point, the requirements were expressly crafted for persistence. They included an 80% Estimated Time On Station (ETOS) for a group of BAMS platforms, over a period of 1 week (168 hours). That means UAVs in the air, within their assigned patrol zones at an estimated 900 nm distance from launch, for 134 hours out of 168. That’s the minimum – the goal is 95% ETOS, or almost 160/168 hours.

The Navy saw BAMS UAVs employed within 5 “orbits” around the globe, with no more than 3 UAVs operating at the same time within each orbit. While this may make BAMS seem like a tiny program, consider the fact that all aircraft have fatigue lifespans measured in flight hours. Many fighters have lifespans of 10,000-12,000 hours. Transport aircraft can reach 30,000-40,000 hours, with major rebuilds along the way. Now consider the number of UAVs required to support flight profiles within those orbits, which are estimated to sum to 43,800 on-station flight hours/year, plus flight times to and from station for each mission. Over an expected program operational lifetime of about 20 years.

BAMS also has an unlisted, but critically important, program requirement. As UAVs proliferate in this role and begin undertaking long-range missions, they’ll require enough secure bandwidth to transmit large first-pass processed data sets to accompanying aircraft or ground stations. That cannot be provided from within the BAMS program, though communications relay packages on high-altitude BAMS UAVs will help military commanders on the surface. BAMS is in turn reliant on the USA’s Global Information Grid’s future security and capacity, in order to reach its full potential.

BAMS Options

BAMS/P-8 mission sets
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Some nations use smaller business jet derivatives for maritime surveillance, and this option was closely considered by the Navy. The joint ACS (Aerial Common Sensor) program had potential dual-use features that could have made it a maritime surveillance supplement, as well as a SIGINT/ELINT (Signals & Electronic Intelligence & intercepts) platform to replace the Navy’s aging EP-3 Aries II fleet. The ACS program’s demise has taken that option off of the table for now. As it happens, however, the Navy had already chosen a different kind of companion for its P-8.

While business jets offered economy and numbers, the US Navy believed that unmanned UAVs could bring more to the long and oft-times tedious job of maritime surveillance. They can undertake very long-endurance flights of 30 hours or more, in part because they don’t have to carry processing stations and crew, or worry about aircrew endurance.

Northrop Grumman was always the favorite to win the BAMS competition. Its unarmed RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV had already proven itself in battlefield surveillance roles around the globe, and had been used as the Navy’s GHMD/BAMS-D maritime surveillance UAV testing and concepts research.

In contrast, the General Atomics MQ-9N Mariner’s main offered efficiency at much lower flight ceilings, up to 3,000 pounds of integrated weapons, and commonality with the Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper strike UAV.

Boeing’s manned/unmanned G550 business jet was the 3rd major entry, offering the largest payloads, twin-engine redundancy, and compatibility with a civilian fleet.

BAMS: The MQ-4C Triton

MQ-4C Triton rollout
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The “RQ-4N” system chosen by the US Navy was based on the USAF’s RQ-4B Block 20 Global Hawks, but it incorporated a wide range of changes on the way to its unveiling as the MQ-4C Triton.

Sensors received the biggest overhaul. MQ-4Cs will have a more rounded belly housing for Northrop Grumman’s own 360-degree coverage AN/ZPY-3 AESA radar, as part of their Advanced Integrated Sensor Suite (AISS). Unlike conventional mechanically-scanned radars, AESA radars offer the ability to zoom in on several targets of interest, and they can do this without stopping the broader scan. That shift from Raytheon’s side-looking AESA radar used in the RQ-4B could have become a major risk factor, which was a big reason behind Northrop Grumman’s decision to field their new radar on a Gulfstream II BAMS test bed during the competition.

Beyond the radar, “Electronic Support Measures” systems that can pick-up, map, and identify radar emissions initially relied on Northrop Grumman’s LR-100, but Sierra Nevada’s Merlin ESM system was substituted in order to meet the program’s requirement for 360-degree, 300 nm/ 555 km coverage. In the visual spectrum, AISS includes an optical day/night surveillance and targeting turret.

Other sensors expected for the MQ-4C include collision avoidance and other systems that let them operate safely through civil airspace, Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) in various modes, and of course sensor packages with additional SIGINT/ELINT equipment and other specialty mission packages. The UAV must be able to perform “first pass” processing of any data it receives, before sending it on to other ships, aircraft, and/or ground stations.

RQ-4N concept
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Communications. A Ka-band Wideband Gapfiller satellite link will replace the commercial Ku-band link used by the USAF, in order to ensure 100% accessibility over long stretches of water. In addition, a pair of Ku-band and X-band datalinks have been added to the fuselage sides, to act as communications relays. Those relays, plus the addition of dual Common Data Links instead of single-CDL, and Link 16 capability UHF/VHF radios with HAVE QUICK and SINCGARS capability, will allow real-time data feeds to other Navy ships and aircraft. The US Air Force is reportedly considering this upgraded set for its own Global Hawks.

On the MQ-4C, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver will allow the detection, identification, geo-location, and tracking of cooperative ships equipped with AIS transponders.

Mechanical. The need to have Navy UAVs descend and rise from altitude during over-water missions requires de-icing systems on the MQ-4C’s engine inlet, wings and tail. Strengthened wing structures were also deemed to be necessary.

One final mechanical issue concerns the Global Hawk design’s single turbofan engine. To cope with possible engine outages without losing these ultra-expensive UAVs, the USAF reportedly uses a combination of modified control software and alternate “glide-to” landing bases. When flying over vast ocean expanses, high altitude flight will be required, in order to keep the “glide-to” option alive.

BAMS: The Program

In April 2008, NAVAIR’s PMA-263 selected Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4N Global Hawk, which has since been re-designated MQ-4C. The FY 2014 budget cut the program from 70 (5 test + 65 operational UAVs) to a total of 66: 5 test + 61 operational UAVs.

BAMS Budgets from FY 2009 include:

Industrial team members include:

NGC performs Global Hawk sub-assembly work at its Unmanned Systems Center in Moss Point, MS, and anticipates performing final assembly at its St. Augustine, FL manufacturing center.

BAMS: The International Angle

Mariner UAV
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The US Navy has been using the RQ-4 Gobal Hawk as a demonstration and proving platform to refine requirements and concepts of operations for BAMS, under the GHMD(Global Hawk Maritime Demonstrator) program. Even so, UAVs aren’t widely used for maritime surveillance just yet.

Beyond America’s shores, India has successfully used Israel’s Heron and Searcher II UAVs for coastal patrol as well and overland surveillance; UAVs from their 2005 follow-on Heron order have also been pressed into service along the coasts. To the southeast, Australia has undertaken successful trials with the General Atomics’ Mariner UAV for Coast Guard duties along its resource-rich Northwest Shelf. In the Great White North, Canada is evaluating UAVs for a maritime surveillance role under its JUSTAS program; Phase 2 could even include arctic surveillance out of Goose Bay, Labrador. IAI/EADS’ Eagle UAV, and General Atomics’ Altair high-altitude UAV derived from the MQ-9 Reaper, have already been tested as part of requirements definition.

Every one of these countries could eventually end up involved in the BAMS program.

P-8i test flight
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India’s MPA competition chose the “P-8I” as their next maritime patrol aircraft. With BAMS integration already scheduled for their chosen platform, a nation that sees its responsibilities stretching across the Indian Ocean from the Straits of Malacca near Singapore, to the Persian Gulf, and down to Madagascar, has obvious uses for the compatible Triton long-range, long-endurance UAV platform.

India seems to agree with this logic, but a treaty that it hasn’t signed is in the way. MTCR was originally aimed at limiting cruise missile exports, but a jet-powered UAV shares enough characteristics to create problems. Discussions are ongoing.

The Canadians have also been approached as possible partners in the P-8A Poseidon program, as a future replacement for their P-3/CP-140 Auroras. Thus far, they have made no commitments. Meanwhile, Northrop Grumman is offering them an RQ-4 variant called “Polar Hawk” for Arctic patrol, incorporating some MQ-4C features like de-icing. The vast expanses of Canada’s north make the speed of a jet-powered UAV very attractive, Northrop Grumman will have to beat General Atomics, which is offering its jet-powered Predator C as well as its slower MQ-9 UAV. If NGC can win, adding more Global Hawks for other missions would become easier.

AP-3C: who’s next?
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Australia went even father, and made itself a partner in BAMS via its AIR 7000 program. First Pass Approval was given in September 2006, and a Project Agreement was signed on Jan 13/07. Australian Embassy personnel have attended NAVAIR PMA-263 industry days, Australian technical experts are part of the BAMS integrated project teams, and and NAVAIR’s BAMS RFP now includes an “Australian Unique Option” section. BAMS had passed its Milestone B “go/no-go” decision, and was analyzing unique Australian requirements before an expected Australian second-pass approval decision that could begin Australian BAMS production in 2012, and achieve Initial Operating Capability in 2015.

In 2009, however, Australia chose to drop out of the BAMS program, with sources citing both operational stress over the P-8A’s similarly-timed introduction, and fiscal pressures. They could still choose to drop back in, and their May 2013 Letter of Request for technical information is a step in that direction. The trade-off is that they’ll be looking at more of a finished product, with less scope for free-of-charge changes.

BAMS: Contracts & Key Events

BAMS cutaway
(click for full PDF)

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts originate with the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD.

BAMS-D Crash
click for video

May 16/13: Australia. Australia’s government announces that they’re sending a formal Letter of Request to the USA for the MQ-4C Triton UAV. The letter will become a Foreign Military Sales Technical Services Case with the United States Navy to obtain detailed cost, capability and availability information.

They emphasize that they haven’t picked the MQ-4C yet for AIR 7000 Phase 1B, but they didn’t announce letters of request for any other platforms that might compete with the Triton, like General Atomics’ MQ-9. Which may have separate opportunities of its own:

“As also outlined in the 2013 Defence White Paper, Defence will analyse the value of further investment in unmanned aircraft for focused area, overland intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, including for use in border security operations. This will include the potential expansion of the role of these assets in the ADF to include interdiction and close air support, subject to policy development and Government consideration.”

March 4/13: Australia. Aviation Week reports that Australia may want more P-8As, at the possible expense of its MQ-4C companion UAVs:

“The RAAF is quietly making a case for 12 Poseidons, arguing that eight would not be enough to cover the vast oceans surrounding the continent. And the unmanned requirement is now described as “up to” seven high-altitude, long-endurance aircraft, potentially reducing Northrop Grumman’s opportunity. At the same time the air force sees an argument for a supplementary drone, possibly the Predator, to take on some of the electronic-intelligence missions that would otherwise fall to the Poseidons and Tritons.”

This is a bit of a head-scratcher. The stated purpose of sustained ocean coverage would be better served by adding another orbit of 3-4 MQ-4Cs (to 10-11), using the P-8s as more of a fleet overwatch and contact response force. Likewise, it makes little sense to use a different UAV for ELINT/SIGINT collection, especially the slow and shorter-range MQ-9. Rather, one would use the MQ-9s in nearer-shore maritime and EEZ patrols, along the lines of the 2006 Northwest Shelf experiments, in order to free up MQ-4Cs for longer-range expeditions over strategic corridors, and the ELINT/SIGINT mission they will be equipped for as of Increment 3.

Feb 22/13: Australia. Australia may have officially dropped out of the BAMS development phase (vid. March 2/09 entry), but News Corp. reports that Defence Minister Stephen will sign a formal export letter of request for the MQ-4C at the 2013 Australian International Airshow. Australia has remained part of the P-8A program for a manned sea control jet, so the MQ-4C is a natural pairing.

The purchase budget is expected to be $A 2-3 billion, but it may be overshadowed by Australia’s expected announcement that they will buy another 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets. News Corp.

Feb 7/13: India. Northrop Grumman’s MQ-4C business development lead Greg Miller tells Shephard’s UV Online that India’s RFI for a High Altitude, Long Endurance maritime surveillance platform holds promise:

“They want to follow the US model; P-8 and Triton…. The Indian Navy agrees with the US’ requirements, which exactly fits our sweet spot.”

Their problem is the same problem facing South Korea: the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which bans the export of cruise missiles or unmanned vehicles with certain range and payload limits. India hasn’t signed MTCR, but the issue needs to be resolved at a government-to-government level. UV Online.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. With respect to BAMS, they say the design is stable, with 99% of drawings releasable to manufacturing. Software code is a challenge, as are the UAV’s new-design wings. Disruptions to the USAF’s Global Hawk programs aren’t expected to affect schedule, but fewer UAVs produced does drive up the cost per UAV. Excerpts:

“The second development aircraft, the first aircraft with a full sensor suite and the air-to-air radar subsystem, is nearing completion and is expected to begin testing in 2013…. However, the program poses a significant software development challenge, utilizing nearly 8 million lines of code, more than 20 percent of which will be new. Much of the remaining software is derived from Global Hawk; however, officials noted that integration and testing of this code is taking longer than expected. Officials also noted that delays in the manufacturing of the aircraft wing as well as corrections to software during integration of subsystems are the primary reasons for a delay in the program’s operational assessment and production decision….”

Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The MQ-4C Triton is included, and the program is falling behind. The plan was to conduct an Operational Assessment in June 2013, leading to a Milestone C decision in October 2013.

Unfortunately, a combination of UAV mission computer software stability problems, and radar performance issues identified in tests with Northrop Grumman’s radar-equipped Gulfstream-II jet, delayed flight testing from May 2012 to “at least” January 2013. The program has also “deferred development and testing of [unspecified] air vehicle and sensor capabilities until after Milestone C in order to reduce current test schedule pressures.”

The plan to reach Milestone C by October seems less and less likely, especially given additional “ground test delays encountered in [fall 2012].” Northrop Grumman will also need to resolve issues with software stability for both the mission computer and ZPY-3 MFAS radar, radar detection and tracking consistency, and radar image quality.

September 2012: Testing. A 2nd MQ-4C is added to ground test efforts, with a focus on control software and subsystems. NGC.

July 2012: Testing. 1st MQ-4C Triton begins ground tests. NGC.

June 11/12: BAMS-D Crash. An RQ-4A BAMS-Demonstrator Global Hawk crashes into a marshy tributary of Maryland’s Nanticoke River, during a routine training flight from Naval Air Station Patuxent River. There were no injuries to civilians and no property damage, but the crash site has been blocked to recreational boat traffic while the agency investigates. The crash leaves 4 UAVs in the program: 3 for testing, tactics, and doctrine development in the USA, and 1 deployed abroad with the 5th fleet. CNN | Wired Danger Room | WBOC.

May 30/12: Canada. Northrop Grumman Corporation and Canada’s L-3 MAS announce plans to offer Canada a “Polar Hawk” UAV for surveillance of Canada’s arctic land and seas.

As one might guess, it will need to share a number of structural features like strengthened wings and improved de-icicng with the MQ-4C Triton. Improved satellite communications, with specialized receivers for polar-orbit satellites, will also be necessary. Sensors aren’t discussed, but the accompanying picture shows a conventional Global Hawk shape, without the AN/ZPY-3 MFAS. NGC.

May 29/12: More SDD. Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems in Bethpage, NY receives a $32.8 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification, for BAMS system development and demonstration. This modification funds a maintenance concept change that will develop a logistics management I.T. system, and improve the transition from contractor logistics support to organic military maintenance by the Navy. Funding will be committed as needs arise.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY, (74.54%), Rancho Bernardo, CA (20.82%), Melbourne, FL (4.59%), and Palmdale, CA (0.05%); and is expected to be complete in September 2015 (N00019-08-C-0023).

Global Hawk
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April 25/11: ZPY-3. Northrop Grumman announces the start of system tests for the BAMS UAV’s Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) maritime surveillance radar. MFAS will use a 2-dimensional radar with both electronic and mechanical scanning.

Northrop Grumman’s Aerospace Systems sector facility in San Diego, CA is expected to take delivery of the 1st MFAS in June 2011, following ongoing radar software mode development and hardware synchronization and integration activities. A 2nd radar is slated for delivery in September 2011, and risk reduction flight tests on board the company’s Gulfstream II test-bed expected before year end.

March 16/11: Northrop Grumman Corporation completes the 1st of 3 BAMS fuselages under the SDD phase. The MQ-4C fuselage will undergo final assembly and system checkout at the company’s Palmdale, CA facility, ahead of its first flight in 2012. NGC.

March 7/11: CDR. Northrop Grumman announces that the BAMS program completed its system-level Critical Design Review (CDR) with the U.S. Navy in February 2011 – but it is not fully closed yet. The government and Northrop Grumman teams will be working to close out issues raised during the CDR, before it can be officially over.

The system-level full CDR sets the initial product baseline for the MQ-4C system, and was preceded by 10 subsystem and segment CDRs. Northrop Grumman VP and BAMS program manager Steve Enewold says that the SDD phase’s first 2 UAV fuselages are being built at Moss Point, MS, and the first will ship in April 2011 to Palmdale, CA for final assembly. The next major milestone is Test Readiness Review, planned for fall 2011. First flight is expected in 2012, and Enewold says the program continues to meet its acquisition baseline cost, schedule and performance requirements.

Feb 18/11: Sense & Avoid. Northrop Grumman Aerospace Sector’s Battle Management & Engagement Systems Division in Bethpage, NY receives a $25.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to develop an “airborne sense and avoid capability for the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aircraft system in support of the Navy and Air Force.” The goal is a TRL 7 system, i.e. a prototype tested in operationally-relevant conditions.

The wording is interesting, as it implies that USAF RQ-4A/B Global Hawks will also be fitted with this capability. As they should be. Sense and avoid technologies are used in commercial aircraft, in order to prevent mid-air collisions. While flying at 60,000 feet will go a long way toward zero collisions, the UAVs do not begin at that altitude, and BAMS in particular will not spend all of its mission time at that level. Throw in funded experiments like aerial refueling between 2 Global Hawk UAVs, and expectations that the stratosphere is likely to be more crowded in future, and the necessity of sense & avoid technologies becomes clearer. To this point, however, the US Navy and USAF have pursued different technology approaches: an ITT-supplied air-to-air radar and ADS-B cooperative surveillance for the Navy, and a multi-sensor “multi-intruder autonomous avoidance (MIAA)” USAF project that uses 3 electro-optical cameras, a low-power radar, and the civil TCAS traffic collision avoidance system.

Work to reconcile those approaches into a common prototype will be performed in Bethpage, NY (50%) and San Diego, CA (50%), and is expected to be complete in November 2012. $7,368,022 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-G-0004). See also: Aviaiton Week.

Feb 9/11: Northrop Grumman announces a $3.3 million contract to participate in the Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Control Segment (UCS) Architecture Working Group (UCSWG), sponsored by the Office Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) Unmanned Warfare Office.

The UCSWG is an open technical standards committee consisting of industry and government representatives from each UAS program of record, several emerging UAS programs and small businesses. The objective of the UCSWG effort is to define a common UAS control station architecture based on standard data models and service interface definitions to enable interoperability, scalability and adaptability of UAS ground stations.

Sept 1/10: New designation. A ceremony at Northrop Grumman’s Moss Point, MS manufacturing facility marks the beginning of RQ-4N BAMS UAV construction.

It is also the first official mention of the platform’s MQ-4C designation. Northrop Grumman spokesman Jim Stratford explains that “M” stands for “Multi-mission,” referring to planned expansion to communications relay and SIGINT missions. The “C” is because there are significant differences from the USAF’s RQ-4B Block 20/30/40, such as anti-icing and sense/avoid capabilities. The “RQ-4N” was Northrop Grumman’s designation during the BAMS competition, but it was never official. Northrop Grumman.

March 3/10: Sub-contractors. Curtiss-Wright Corporation announces a $25 million contract from Northrop Grumman Corporation to provide BAMS’ Advanced Mission Management System (AMMS). Curtiss-Wright will design, develop and manufacture BAMS UAV AMMS units at the company’s Motion Control facility in Santa Clarita, CA Hardware deliveries will start at the end of 2010 and continue through 2011.

Australian RQ-4N? No.
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Aug 13/09: USAF getting ideas? The Shepard Group reports that The United States Air Force is exploring a potential communications suite re-architecture for its RQ-4 Global Hawk fleet, based on the Navy’s RQ-4 BAMS set. The BAMS de-icing system has also attracted interest.

April 27/09: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems in Bethpage, NY received a $22.4 million modification to a previously awarded cost plus award fee BAMS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract (N00019-08-C-0023). This modification will add wing static and load testing for the BAMS RQ-4N UAS.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (90%) and Bethpage, NY (10%), and is expected to be complete in December 2012.

Feb 4/09: Delays. Aviation Week reports that the BAMS schedule has slipped, owing in part to delays created by Lockheed Martin’s protest. The first RQ-4N BAMS will begin testing in FY 2012 instead of FY 2011, with low-rate production beginning in FY 2013, and initial operational capability declared by FY 2016 instead of 2015. Full delivery is now expected by FY 2019.

Feb 4/09: Reports indicate that one of the Gobal Hawk Maritime Demonstration UAVs has deployed to CENTCOM’s theater of operations by the US Navy. Information Dissemination believes that its future will include pirate tracking off of Africa’s eastern coast. GHMD is a limited program that is both a predecessor to BAMS, and a way to experiment and learn how an advanced maritime patrol UAV can be used in real world operations (CONOPS).

Dec 23/08: Northrop Grumman announces that U.S. Navy’s Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX-20) gave the RQ-4 Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) team its Q2 2008 Test Team of the Quarter award. To date, the 2 GHMD demonstrator aircraft have flown more than 1,350 hours.

The team’s accomplishments included performing more than 1,000 hours of flight operations over an 18-month period, troubleshooting issues with the communications system, integrating the automatic identification system into the aircraft so it can be used in civilian air space, conducting tests with the ocean surveillance initiative, and developing tactics and guidelines for unmanned patrol systems. From January to June 2008, the team also supported various operational activities, including the Southeastern Anti-Submarine Warfare Initiative 08-2, the USS Iwo Jima Group Sail, and the Commander Carrier Strike Group 8. The team’s successes during this period culminated with the Trident Warrior exercise in June 2008, when the team flew more than 113 hours over a 5-week period, including an unplanned 23-hour humanitarian mission in which a GHMD was re-tasked to assist in the Northern California wildfires. July saw the UAVs participate in the Rim of the Pacific 2008 fleet exercise, which saw the team finish 4 missions totaling more than 92 hours.

Sept 29/08: Rolls Royce puts out a release confirming that Northrop Grumman has selected their AE 3700H engine to power the RQ-4N BAMS UAV. This is hardly a surprise, as Rolls Royce was part of the bid team and those same engines power non-naval Global Hawks. Rolls Royce release.

Aug 8/08: The Congressional Government Accountability Office (GAO) denies a protest from the Lockheed Martin MS2/ General Atomics team, which offered its MQ-9 Reaper derived Mariner UAV for BAMS. The grounds of that denial were interesting, and included improvement in Northrop Grumman’s contractor performance in comparabe programs. An improvement that was not matched by similar corrective successes at General Atomics.

The BAMS program had been frozen while the appeal went forward, but it is now free to begin in earnest. US Navy NAVAIR announced on Aug 11/08 that the program would resume. See: GAO decisions #400135.1/2 | NAVAIR announcement | NGC release | Aviaiton Week.

Jan 31/08: An 18-month, $15 million cooperative agreement between the United States and Australia becomes part of the pre-system development and demonstration processes for the US Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System program. DC Military.

NGC’s Gulfstream II
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Sept 4/07: General Atomics talks about their BAMS efforts, which they are undertaking in conjunction with Lockheed Martin. The firm announces successfully completion of wind tunnel testing at the San Diego Air & Space Technology Center on a 1/10 scale model of its Mariner, which “exceeded our expectations… Preliminary evaluations validated key competitive capabilities of the aircraft and suggest that Mariner’s design is even more efficient than originally assumed.”

Basically, the testing enabled a specific set of configuration changes to be evaluated at a lower cost and faster pace, while generating important data regarding performance and statistical sensitivities.

Aug 6/07: Northrop Grumman promotes its “sense and avoid” approach, which is intended to meet the BAMS requirement of safely operating alongside manned military and civilian aircraft.

Though they rely in part on high-end capabilities like the Global Hawk’s radar, UAV deconfliction is a major industry issue and the underlying algorithms used are likely to be significant beyond BAMS – in its X-47B UCAS-D unmanned naval fighters, for instance.

June 18/07: Boeing enters the fray. The BAMS 550 would create a manned/unmanned version of the Gulfstream G550 business jet (already in service with the Navy) with fully integrated sensor and communications suites and an advanced mission control system. The Boeing BAMS 550 industry team consists of Boeing, Gulfstream, Raytheon, Rolls-Royce and Honeywell, and touts “an offering that significantly improves upon the historically low reliability, limited payload and extensive support requirements of legacy unmanned aircraft systems.” The Register | Boeing handout [PDF]

May 24/07: Northrop Grumman Corporation discusses its BAMS offer and proposed approach. Their offer is based on an RQ-4N maritime-configured RQ-4B Global Hawk, that will meet “all of the threshold and more than 90% of the Navy’s objective requirements.” The RQ-4N will benefit from the GHMD contracts and efforts already undertaken with the US Navy.

Northrop Grumman’s approach is called Head Start, and is organized around step by step risk assessment that concentrates on on system elements, sensor effectiveness, and demonstrating a ForceNet-compliant communications system. Head start will also use a specially modified Gulfstream II business jet as a flying test bed, equipped with the radar sensor that Northrop Grumman is offering as part of its BAMS system. Bill Beck, BAMS Head Start program manager, says: “The test-bed will be used to perform end-to-end communication functionality testing using the Advanced Mission Management System for network, bandwidth and sensor control. It will be tied to a company-built prototype of the Mission Control System (MCS), located at our Hollywood, Md., facility.” The prototype MCS contains off-the-shelf commercial software and hardware components, in keeping with the US Navy’s drive toward upgradeable open architecture approaches.

Carl Johnson, NGC’s vice president of the BAMS program, claims that. “This approach creates a significant program schedule margin which ensures an initial operation capability well ahead of threshold requirements.”

The Northrop Grumman RQ-4N BAMS team includes Northrop Grumman as prime contractor and team leader, unmanned aerial vehicle supplier and developer of the Multi-Function Active Sensor active electronically scanned array radar and the Night Hunter II electro-optical infrared sensor; L-3 Communications providing communications integration; Raytheon supporting the Mission Control System segment; and Rolls-Royce providing the jet engine.

May 8/07: Lockheed Martin discusses its BAMS proposal, which involves the modified Mariner version of General Atomics MQ-9/Predator B. The firm has partnered with EDO, FLIR Systems, Honeywell, LSI, and Sierra Nevada Corp., and its entry will offer an Electro Optical Infrared (EOIR) high definition camera, Automatic Identification System (AIS) to identify ships at sea, a communications relay capability, and Link 16 among its systems.

The Mariner shares its avionics, fuselage, flight controls, and engine (Honeywell TPE-331-1OT turboprop) with the MQ-9/Predator B, but adds enhanced wings (88 foot wingspan) and tails to support the increased takeoff weight, plus 2,000 pounds of additional fuel, 34 antennas for communications, anti-icing and deicing capability, and a retractable EO/IR surveillance turret as part of its 1,350 pound internal payload. The design has an extra 800 pounds of internal payload to offer, plus 4,000 pounds of external payload, which can be carried up to 50,000 feet. Maximum range would be 7,100 nautical miles, albeit at a rather slower speed than the jet-powered RQ-4. The flip side is that the Mariner would be able to cruise for long periods at low altitudes, and do so efficiently. Defense Daily.

May 3/07: The Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System source selection process formally begins, with receipt of proposals from aerospace manufacturers. A winner is expected to be announced this fall following BAMS Milestone B approval, with a System Design and Development (SDD) contract award following soon after.

Cdr. Bob Dishman, the BAMS Integrated Product team lead, is quoted in a NAVAIR release as saying that “This is a full and open competition and we are satisfied with the number, breadth and technical maturity of the proposals we have received.” See full NAVAIR release.

Jan 29/07: Flight International reports that the US NAVAIR is delaying the release of tenders for its broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS) unmanned air system requirement until mid-February, in order to enable modification of bid documents to meet unique Australian requirements for the system.

Additional Readings & Sources

• DID FOCUS Article – P-8 Poseidon MMA: Long-Range Maritime Patrol, and More

• US NAVAIR – Persistent Unmanned Aerial Surveillance Program. Despite the name, PUMAS appears to be more of an overarching concept of Navy-related ISR(Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems and operations that includes various manned and unmanned platforms. See also “Northrop Grumman Wins U.S. Navy Contract to Study Maritime Surveillance Concepts.”

• US NAVAIR – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAS

• Northrop Grumman – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System (BAMS UAS)

• GlobalSecurity.org – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS).

• Boeing – Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) [PDF]

• DID FOCUS – The Wideband Gapfiller Satellite Program. BAMS’ initial control link.

• Australia DMO – AIR 7000: Phases 1B and 2B. Phase 1B is the unmanned portion, phase 2B will involve the manned P-8A aircraft. Phase 1B has now been shelved.

• DID – Australia’s Coastwatch: A Public-Private Model for Coast Guards and CBP. Has included UAV trials with the MQ-9.

• C4ISR Journal (May 31/07) – BAMS Battle

• Flight International (Feb 9/09) – RQ-4N spreads Global Hawk brand to maritime patrol

• DID (Dec 2/05) – Global Hawk UAV Prepares for Maritime Role (updated). These efforts are relevant to BAMS/PUMAS.

• DID (Aug 24/05) – Follow-Up: Rear Adm. Michael L. Holmes on The USA’s P-3C Force. Excellent in-depth interview, which discusses plans for the P-3 fleet, changes underway in the Navy, and the P-8/BAMS role.

• Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest (2003; Volume 24, Number 3) – Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft Survivability in Modern Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Missions [PDF format]

• American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics [AIAA], Aerospace America Magazine (April 2002) – Maritime patrol market: Escaping the doldrums. By the Teal Group, an aerospace industry analyst firm. Very good at outlining the contours of the P-8′s market, as well as some of the turboprop vs. jet trade-offs in the maritime patrol role.

Could the words “Brazilian fighter” begin evoking images unrelated to the Gracies? Recent boosts to Brazil’s defense budget could be on its way to accomplishing that and more. The Navy and Army have already received funds to replace broken-down equipment, and new fighters will be a critical centerpiece of the Forca Aerea Brasileira’s efforts.

Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, France’s Dassault’s Rafale, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG were picked as finalists. But after repeated stalling, the question is whether Brazil will actually place an order, or fold up the competition like the ill-fated 2011 F-X process.

This free-to-view DID Spotlight article covers Brazil’s reborn F-X2 competition, adds its assessment of the competitors’ relative strengths and weaknesses, and covers ongoing events.

F-X2: FAB Foreshadowing

Brazil
(click to view full)

Brazil can depend on its sheer size, and the barrier created by its geography, to shield its population centers from many threats. The same isn’t necessarily true of its military installations or economic interests, which require either air superiority, or air denial from mobile and effective defensive missiles. Airpower’s flexibility also makes it a uniquely useful as a deterrent and response to threats and coercion, and is uniquely suited to the job of patrolling vast areas.

Much of that patrol work falls to the mid-tier of Brazil’s its air force, and its specialty fleets. Those are in good shape, which makes sense in a region where most threats are internal. Brazil’s 43 or so upgraded Brazilian-Italian AMX subsonic light attack jets, and 99 indigenous Super Tucano COIN/surveillance turboprops, are quality offerings within their respective niches. Their performance is very well suited to basic policing duties, especially when backed by a small but advanced set of airborne, ground looking and maritime R-99/ P-99 radar derivatives of Embraer’s ERJ-145 business jets. The ERJ derivatives will be augmented by 12 refurbished P-3 Orions, bought to patrol Brazil’s huge coastlines and maritime economic zone.

Unfortunately, the high end of the FAB’s fighter fleet is inferior even when judged by regional standards.

After its existing Mirage IIIs simply wore out and had to be retired at the end of 2005, FAB Command worked out a plan to find an emergency interim replacement. The final choice was 12 second-hand French Mirage 2000Cs. The airframes selected by Brazil were produced for France between 1984 -1987, and began arriving in Brazil in 2006.

A parallel F-5 upgrade program is underway to keep those 1960s-era lightweight fighters in service for another 15 years, while modernizing them to a level of effectiveness that’s slightly below the Mirages.

FAV SU-30MK2
(click to view full)

Inducting 20 year old aircraft was not a long-term solution. Especially for a country that reportedly had about 37% of its 719-plane air force grounded, due to a combination of age and the toll of Brazil’s environments. Upgrading the F-5s is useful, but can’t even be described as a short-term solution to the gap at the high end of their force. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s large military buys, and especially its FAV’s recent purchase of long-range, 4+ generation SU-30MK2 fighters, appear to have had the effect of triggering counter moves around Latin America. So, too, have Venezuela’s actions around Latin America, as the line between external and internal threats blurs. In Brazil’s case, interference within key Brazilian natural gas provider Bolivia was not seen as a friendly act.

Publicly, Brazil has been careful to stress that this is not about an arms race. Defense Minister Nelson Jobim said in a 2007 public speech that:

“Brazil has well established, peaceful relations with all South American nations … one of our political priorities is economic and structural integration of the region … (and in 2008) we’ll also be strengthening our military links… [Brazil cannot] neglect its defense. Therefore, we will increase our budget outlays and investment in the army, navy and air force by more than 50 percent… [Brazil] is elaborating a national strategy defense plan that will determine each military branch’s mission and the equipment it needs for its activities”.

The reassurances are meant to be sincere. So, too, are the plans referred to in the second half of the quote. Brazil has shaken off its sloth and taken wide-ranging steps to revive its military. Including its fighters.

In January 2008, Brazil’s President Lula authorized Brazilian Air Force Commander Juniti Saito to restart the long-delayed F-X fighter replacement program. “F-X2″ aimed to acquire 36 next generation fighters for the Brazilian Air Force. A previous 2001 F-X competition was put on hold in 2003, and then canceled in February 2004 due to budget difficulties and political issues. The initial budget for the current iteration is said to be $2.2 billion, but is likely to end up being 2x-3x that figure. The RFP leaves the door open for future buys, which could raise that total to 120 aircraft.

F-X2: The Industrial Angle

AMX light fighter
(click to view full)

President Lula da Silva’s administration had larger plans than just equipment recapitalization when it took those steps, saying that “we must overcome the lack of strategic planning and the technological dismantling of the last two decades.” The new National Defence Strategy group is designed to plan and execute the recovery of the “capability of our armed forces and the technological edge we once had in certain fields.”

Brazil maintained an impressive niche capability during the 1970s and 1980s in areas like tank and armored vehicle design, rockets, missiles, and of course aircraft. Unfortunately, in a world divided by cold war allegiances, there was often little room for a non-aligned 3rd party exporter. While some projects like the Tucano succeeded, and others like the AMX enjoyed qualified success, many promising projects saw limited exports or failed.

The world is no longer divided into cold war camps, which may offer the Brazilian defense industry a second chance if it partners well and executes smartly. According to the main guidelines of the da Silva’s long term strategy, Brazilian defense industry should look to become a player again in the export of missiles, aircraft and other equipment. UAVs, with their long endurance surveillance capabilities and natural connection to Brazil’s aviation industry, are likely to also become a priority. The overall thrust of Brazil’s policies is certainly clear: “We must convince ourselves that we can become a world power this century,” said President Lula da Silva.

Military Review, 1999
(click to view full)

On the one hand, these statements remind one of the old joke that goes: “Brazil is the nation of the future – and always will be.”

On the other hand, anteing up with a 50% hike to the defense budget certainly displays seriousness, and Brazil has already set up a key partnership to develop the 5th generation A-Darter short range air-air missile with South Africa. A similar deal with Israel for its Derby/Alto radar guided missile is also expected at some point, and RFPs went out for a handful of medium transport helicopters (AW EH101, Russian Mi-171V, EADS EC725 – which won) and some attack helicopters (AW-TAI A129, EADS Tiger, Russian Mi-35M – which won).

The giant may be stirring again. A handful of fighters and helicopters, plus ships to patrol its coasts, won’t exactly make anyone a world power. Budgetary resources will also have to address an urgent need for transport aircraft, which is pushing resources toward Embraer’s KC-390. Still, these buys may go a long way toward ensuring the nation’s ability to patrol and enforce its long borders. The right deals may also allow Brazil to re-establish its faded indigenous defense industry on the world stage.

While the January 2011 suspension of the F-X2 competition is a setback for Brazilian industry, and for Brazil’s ability to safeguard the nation’s borders, it doesn’t stop this defense industrial drive. In the air, Embraer’s KC-390 medium transport has become a serious contender for global orders, even as the EC725 partnership with Eurocopter is giving Brazil much-improved helicopter manufacturing and servicing. The A-Darter missile program is ongoing, and on the ground, a major partnership with Iveco will produce hundreds of VBTP 6×6 wheeled armored personnel carriers. Cooperation with France will produce 5 submarines, including 1 nuclear attack sub; and a major naval tender to buy frigates, patrol vessels, and supply ships has attracted bids from Britain, Korea, France, and elsewhere. A clever buy of 3 Scarborough Class 90m patrol boats from BAE, with options to build 5 more in Brazil, has begun that process.

F-X2: The Competition

Dassault Rafale:
Takeoff at last?
(click to view full)

The 36+ aircraft under consideration for F-X2 were mostly the same set of 4+ generation fighters that were considered for the canceled F-X competition: Boeing’s F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, EADS’ Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Block 60, Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG, and Sukhoi’s SU-35.

The FAB was also said to be interested in the Lockheed-Martin F-35, but the finalized nature of the Lighting’s industrial production partnership program was likely to keep the program from delivering the industrial offsets Brazil seeks. Meanwhile, a pair of competitors from earlier rounds faded out. Dassault’s Mirage 2000 production line was closing, and Brazil did not mention the F-16 as a contender – or advance Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR Block 70 offer to the finals.

Reporter Tania Monteiro of the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo writes that technology transfer will be an essential part of any deal, and quotes influential Workers’ Party Deputy (PT is Lula’s party, Deputy = MP or Congressman) Jose Genoino as saying:

“France is always the better partner. Concerning Russia, everyone knows the difficulties and we don’t know what is going to happen in ten years so that we will be able to guarantee our spare parts. The USA, traditionally, does not transfer technology… We want to seek the lowest price with the most technology transfer.”

If his assessment of Brazil’s priorities remains true, that country could represent a critical last chance for France to get some export momentum and success behind its Rafale, which has lost every competition it has entered thus far (Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, UAE, et. al.). To win, France will need to come up with a strong package. According to reports, the indications are that technology transfer will be more important than cost in terms of the final choice. Defence minister Nelson Jobim:

“Whatever the final contract it must be closely linked to national development, to help advance in the creation of a strong defense industry and therefore the technological edge we are requesting.”

Analysis: F-X2 Competitors

Some quick handicapping follows. The F-X2 finalists are Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, France’s Rafale, and Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet; but if the competition is re-started, new possibilities will present themselves. Beyond the air force, the Marinha do Brazil eventually intends to buy 24 fighters of its own, to operate from the carrier that replaces NAe Sao Paulo beginning in 2025. They’re watching the competition closely, and would prefer to buy the same aircraft.

Saab JAS-39 Gripen NG

Gripen: air show
(click to view full)

Pros: The JAS-39 Gripen Next Generation program offers key industrial opportunities, along with a high-performance fighter whose price and operating costs are both low. Gripen is likely to be Brazil’s cheapest option over its service life. The JAS-39BR’s avionics suite will be sourced entirely from Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary AEL, giving it commonalities with the FAB’s other fighters. JAS-39BRs would also give Brazil’s Air Force a fast integration track for the cooperative A-Darter air-air missile that Brazil is developing with JAS-39C/D customer South Africa, and deploying on its own modernized A-1M AMX fighters.

Saab offers strong industrial partnerships, and has a record of successful technology transfer agreements.

Grey Areas: The JAS-39 NG includes the Raven AESA radar developed with Selex Galileo, whose long history with Brazil’s FAB includes the F-5BR (Grifo-F) and AMX (Scipio) fighter programs. The Raven is an unusual combination of an AESA radar that can be mechanically pivoted, offering more points of failure but widening the radar’s scanning cone versus other competitors. That’s a strong plus, but the Raven isn’t as tested and proven as the AESA radars equipping the Super Hornet and Rafale.

Brazil combines vast over-water areas and even vaster wilderness areas to patrol, which usually translates into a focus on range and 2-engine safety. While the other 2 Brazilian finalists are both 2-engine planes, it’s worth noting that most of Brazil’s other fighters (Tucano ALX, AMX, Mirage 2000) have just one engine. The F414 engine that Gripen shares with the Super Hornet offers the advantages of certain performance and a broad long-term customer base, but it’s subject to US export approvals if that’s an issue for Brazil.

Gripen NG Demo
(click to view full)

Weaknesses: Saab’s biggest handicap is the industrial and geopolitical weight of its rivals from France & the USA.

Another handicap involves its lack of a naval variant, or even a flying prototype of same. Conversion of land-based aircraft for naval aviation is often unrealistic, but Sweden’s insistence on short take-off and landing performance from surfaces like highways gives Gripen a strong base to work from. Saab began serious work on a “Sea Gripen” in March 2011, and could offer Brazilian industry the unique opportunity to be involved in developing the modified aircraft in time for 2025. It’s still a weakness, but it’s a weakness with a hook that might prove attractive.

Offer: The JAS-39NG reportedly ranked 1st in the FAB’s technical trials, had strong support from Brazilian aerospace firms, and offered a complete package worth about $6 billion (about 10 billion Reals), of which $1.5 billion was for maintenance. Saab has even begun working with a number of Brazilian firms in advance of any contracts, discussing sub-contracting possibilities, and working to improve their industrial proficiency with key technologies like advanced composite materials.

Dassault’s Rafale F3R

FAB Rafale-B concept
(click to view full)

Pros: The Rafale has a lot of advantages in this competition. It’s a twin-engine fighter with good range and ordnance capacity, and much better aerial performance than the F/A-18 Super Hornet. It can also play the carrier-compatible card very well, since the NAe Sao Paulo was once FS Foch, and Brazil’s next carrier may well be a variant of DCNS’ PA2 design.

It also comes from a trusted supplier. Experience with the Mirage 2000 offers a common technological and training base, and France is seen as a good supplier who avoids political interference and makes good on technology transfers. Brazil is already embarked upon a broad set of major defense projects with French firms, and President Lula’s administration clearly favored the Rafale as part of that relationship.

Rafale-M
(click to view full)

Grey Areas: Thales new RBE2-AA AESA radar has been installed in French Air Force fighters, so it’s mature by the barest of margins, but it hasn’t been used in combat.

The Rafale confines Brazil to French weapons and sensors, unless Brazil spends its own money to add some locally-developed ordnance. On the other hand, Brazil has bought French Mirage aircraft a few times before, and seems unfazed by that requirement. Offers to partner in expanding the Rafale’s options might serve to hit 2 targets at once, by allaying concerns and playing the tech transfer card more strongly.

The Rafale’s January 2012 pick as India’s preferred fighter softens the type’s biggest negative, but India hasn’t signed a contract yet. The Rafale remains the only plane in this competition without an existing export customer, and it has lost a lot of international competitions.

Weaknesses: The Rafale’s biggest performance weakness is its lack of a Helmet Mounted Display, which keeps it from reaching its full potential in close-range air combat. Its biggest contest weakness is probably its price.

Offer: Subsequent events would bear out both the Rafale’s strengths, and its weaknesses. Folha de Sao Paolo reports that it was the most expensive of the 3 finalists, with a price tag of about $8.2 billion US dollars (13.3 billion Reals), plus $4 billion in maintenance contracts over the next 30 years. Dassault reportedly offered the best technology transfer package, and Defence Minister Jobim claims a subsequent $2 billion price reduction, but details remain unclear. The plane remains a strong contender, and may yet win.

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet

F/A-18E, Parked
(click to view full)

Pros: The Super Hornet’s biggest advantage is a huge user base, with guaranteed future funding for upgrades that Brazil won’t have to invest in to benefit from. The Block II’s combat-proven AN/APG-79 AESA radar offers Brazil an attractive technology, volume production lets Boeing start at a price comparable to the single-engine JAS-39′s, a weaker American dollar makes American exports even more affordable, and the potential to turn these planes into EA-18 electronic jamming fighters is a unique selling point for the type. The Super Hornet shares the carrier-compatible card with Dassault’s Rafale, but it offers a much wider range of ordnance to choose from.

Boeing’s passenger aircraft division gives them an attractive magnet for industrial offsets, and in April and June 2012, Boeing strengthened its position by signing a broad cooperation deal with Embraer. Their offering will use wide-screen displays and some other avionics from Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary AEL.

Grey Areas: The Super Hornet is an American jet, and the vast majority of its equipment and weapons are also American. The USA’s influence in Latin America can help their lobbying, but their image in Latin America can hurt them at the same time. Much will depend on what kind of relationship Brazil has with Washington around the time the decision is made, and where they want that relationship to go.

The other grey area for the Super Hornet is technology transfer and customization. Exactly how much technology Boeing and the US government are willing to transfer isn’t clear, though they promise that their offer is competitive. Source code transfer is a related point, and it affects the ease with which Brazil will be able to add its own equipment if the Super Hornet is chosen.

F/A-18E International
(click to view full)

Weaknesses: The Super Hornet offers poorer aerodynamic performance than other competitors, falling behind in areas like maneuverability, acceleration, sustained Gs, etc. Concerns about America’s propensity to use arms export bans as a political lever add a final complication to the Super Hornet’s odds, and take away some of the advantage created by its broad arsenal of American weapons and sensors.

Offer: After being the long-shot finalist for most of this competition, heavy lobbying by the US government and Boeing appears to have put the Super Hornet back in the running. Folha de Sao Paolo reports that Boeing’s package was worth $7.7 billion dollars (about 12.9 billion reals), of which $1.9 billion was for maintenance. Rousseff has reportedly pressed Boeing to improve its industrial participation offer. Sen. McCain reportedly pledged to get a Congressional commitment that the US Congress would not block the sale or transfer of technologies, but that cannot be binding, which would leave the issue of future spare parts interference etc. as an open question. There have been reports that Rousseff is interested in moving Brazil closer to the USA in the international arena. If they are true, that could make a big difference to the Super Hornet’s chances.

Non-finalists

RAF Typhoon & ASRAAM
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Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS/European): Technology transfer may prove to be an issue, but price was always the biggest stumbling block. Eurofighters consistently sell for $110-130 million, which doesn’t square well with $2.2 billion for 36 planes. The most capable air-air choice in the group would provide unquestioned regional air superiority, but ground surveillance and strike performance is still provisional (Tranche 1 v6), or unproven (Tranche 2+). This has been fatal in competitions like Singapore’s, and may have been a handicap here.

On the plus side, EADS Airbus offered a potent option for industrial offsets, and other EADS subsidiaries had footholds of their own. Airbus Military’s A400M medium transport may create additional military interest in a long term industrial partnership, and EADS Eurocopter’s Cougar has just become the medium-lift mainstay of Brazil’s future helicopter fleet.

X-35B STOVL
(click for landing)

F-35 Lightning II/ F-16BR (Lockheed Martin) The F-35 would have offered a clear set of performance benefits over competing aircraft. No aircraft in this group could have matched the Lightning’s advanced surveillance capabilities, and surveillance is a big need in Brazil. The F-35B STOVL variant also offered Brazil the ability to operate from small, dispersed runways, and it would have been perfect for aircraft carriers like the Sao Paulo. Unfortunately, technology transfer issues weren’t the F-35′s only problem. Other barriers to an F-35 win included limited opportunities in its industrial structure, questions surrounding air-air performance, the low likelihood of deliveries before 2016 (a concern that was more than vindicated by events), a single engine design – and the potential cancellation of the F-35B variant, which would be most useful to Brazil.

Instead, Lockheed Martin offered Brazil an F-16BR. It was expected to resemble the F-16E/F “Block 70″ variant offered to India, with an AESA radar and built-in IRST/targeting sensors, an uprated engine, etc. Both India and Brazil are fond of Israeli avionics and weapons, and Lockheed Martin has a long history of including those items for Israel and for other customers.

The F-16BR offer shareed many of the Super Hornet’s perceived benefits and drawbacks: AESA radar and sensors and weaker American dollar on the plus side, poorer aerodynamic performance and distrust of America on the minus side. The F-16 cannot play the carrier-compatible card like the Super Hornet, and offers only a single-engine design. On the other hand, it did offer wide compatibility with other regional and global air forces.

SU-35
(click to view full)

SU-35 (Sukhoi/ Rosoboronexport) This was the aircraft Russia offered in the last round, and the design has matured into a production aircraft since then. Russian tech transfer is trusted. Lack of political interference is trusted absolutely. The aircraft itself would offer an option that’s better than Venezuela’s SU-30MKs, while still presenting itself to the region as an equivalency move. The price would be good, and Sukhoi had some support in the FAB.

On the other hand, service and parts delivery were almost guaranteed to be bad. That gave the FAB real pause. One way around that might be to offer licensed local production. In order to solve the Russian service problem[1], it would also have to extend to the aircraft’s NPO Saturn engines and fitted avionics. In the end, it didn’t matter. The SU-35S was not a finalist.

Contracts and Key Events

Sea Gripen Concept
(click to view full)

May 15/13: Sea Gripen. Saab remains serious about its “Sea Gripen NG,” and has been working on the idea since their May 2011 announcement. Brazil’s Navy is expected to buy its own fighters to equip a new aircraft carrier, which is expected to replace NAe Sao Paulo around 2025. They expect their 24 new fighters to be the same type as the FAB’s F-X-2 winner, which leaves Saab competing against 2 proven naval fighters: Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornets and Dassault’s Rafale-M.

To help build their case, former Brazilian naval aviator Comte. Romulo “Leftover” Sobral is invited to flight test a JAS-39D, in order to verify the design’s basic suitability for naval conversion. Sobral liked the aircraft’s intuitive flight controls, ground handling, stability at low airspeeds, acceleration response, handling at the high angles of attack used in carrier landings, and good visibility. He even liked the flight suit. The plane landed in 800m, and Comte Sobral believes that the plane does have the basic requirements to become an effective naval fighter. The Sea Gripen’s lack of proven status, and absence of even a flying prototype, will still hurt the JAs-39. On the other hand, the time lag from F-X2 to a naval buy gives Brazilian industry a unique opportunity to participate in designing the Sea Gripen. Saab Gripen Blog | Full article at Defesa Aerea & Naval [in Portuguese].

April 15/13: Rafale. Defense World reports from LAAD 2013 that Dassault’s F-X2 offer will be the Rafale F3R, which includes a major software upgrade that allows the aircraft to take fuller advantage of the new Thales RBE2-AA AESA radar, improves their Thales SPECTRA self-defence systems, adds Mode-5/Mode-S capable Identification Friend or Foe, and allows the Rafale to deploy MBDA’s Meteor long range air-to-air missile.

Given Brazil’s insistence on an AESA radar, Dassault could hardly avoid offering the F3R.

April 10/13: Gripen. Saab executive Eddy de la Motta is quoted as saying that Brazilian JAS-39 Gripen NGs would use AEL’s avionics, creating a forked version under the wider development effort. This will help Saab meet industrial offset obligations, and also create commonality for Brazil’s fighter fleet, but integrating all of those components with the plane’s mission computers, OFP core software, weapons, etc. is not a trivial task. Elbit subsidiary AEL’s avionics are used in many Brazilian aircraft, with the exception of the Mirage 2000s that will retire as F-X2 fighters enter the FAB.

A less comprehensive suite of AEL avionics will also be used in Boeing’s F/A-18 International, which offers AEL’s wide-screen display and some other components to all potential customers. Defense News.

April 3/13: Embraer. Embraer’s CEO Luiz Carlos Aguiar talks to Defense News about F-X2 and other subjects. Regarding the fighters:

“I think [the decision is] going to be in the next months, this year, I would say. Our role in that depends… on who is going to win. We have a memorandum of understanding with all three of the contenders. Each of them offers an offset program, but we prefer not declaring publicly our preference…. Whatever they choose, we’re going to be in the process. They need to make this decision because Brazil needs that…. With the F-X, we can even go further in terms of technology, and even some new products could come up with one of these three contenders. That’s what I can tell you, I can’t go further than that.”

Given Embraer’s dominant position in the Brazilian aerospace industry, it would be shocking if any of the contenders had chosen not to sign industrial partnership MoUs with Embraer. In light of the April and August 2012 agreements, the “new products” comment suggests that Boeing may have replaced Saab (q.v. Sept 28-29/09 entries) as Embraer’s preferred choice. That isn’t at all certain, however – as Aguliar surely intended. Defense News.

March 8/13: More delays. Brazil has asked the 3 F-X2 finalists to extend their bids for another 6 months from the March 30/13 deadline, as the Brazilian commodity economy remains mired in a 2-year slump. Boeing, Dassault, and Saab has hoped for a decision in time for Brazil’s April 2013 LAAD defense expo.

The length of the cumulative delays could create changes for the bids, and it effectively squashes any faint hopes that the new jets would be able to fly in time for the 2014 World Cup. Given required production and training times, those hopes started to become awfully faint by around mid-2012. Reuters.

Rafale
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Dec 11/12: Still no deadline. In a joint press conference with French President Hollande, Brazil’s President Rousseff remains very non-committal regarding F-X2. On the one hand, the timing will depend on Brazil’s economy, which is commodity based and so subject to the effects of global slowdowns. On the other hand, she says that the government expects enough growth in the coming months to resume the selection process. French President [in French] | YouTube press conference video | Les Echos [in French].

Dec 7/12: Super Hornet. The Brazilian news weekly Istoe publishes an article claiming that the FAB’s formal analysis had preferred Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. The report was shelved by the government, which favored France’s Rafale. The air force’s preference is reportedly due in part to the fact that the Super Hornet has the widest variety of integrated weapons and equipment, and partly because it’s available immediately and could be delivered very quickly. The FAB is reported to be concerned about both the age of its fleet, and its regional competitiveness.

The Super Hornet’s cost was in the middle, at $5.4 billion rather than the Gripen’s $4.3 billion, or Rafale’s $8.2 billion. So, too, were estimated operating costs, at about $10,000 per flight hour vs. $7,000 for Gripen, or $20,000 for the Rafale.

The government’s thinking is still opaque, though Boeing’s technical cooperation agreements with Embraer (vid. April 3-9/12 and June 26/12 entries) add a bit more weight to the industrial side of the equation. Istoe [in Portuguese, and note that their picture is an F-15] | Defense World.

Aug 9/12: Delayed, again. Brazil may need a 5th consecutive extension. Defence Minister Celso Amorim tells Dow Jones that:

“The project is not being abandoned. There will be a decision in the right time. But, today, I would prefer not to give a date… The economic situation has taken a less favorable turn than expected and it naturally requires caution.”

With China’s economy appearing to slow, and the EU debt crisis as an ongoing drag on their economy, a commodity-based economy like Brazil could find itself in tight straits for a while unless something changes. Fox News.

July 7/12: Extension. The FAB has asked the 3 bidders to renew their fighter offers. It’s the 4th consecutive 6-month extension, while Brazil dithers over its choice and the timing of the buy. France24.

June 26/12: Boeing & Embraer. Boeing and Embraer announce an agreement to share some specific technical knowledge regarding the KC-390, and to evaluate markets where they may join their sales efforts for medium-lift military transports. It’s part of a broader agreement signed in April 2012 (vid.), and its immediate significance is limited.

On the other hand, it has the potential to turn Boeing into a medium transport rival to C-130 maker Lockheed Martin, while extending Embraer’s marketing reach to match Lockheed Martin and Airbus. That’s the sort of thing that could change the KC-390′s global prospects, but it’s still too early to tell. Boeing | Embraer.

June 14/12: Boeing & AEL. Boeing picks Elbit Systems and its AEL Sistemas subsidiary to provide a low-profile head-up display (LPHUD), as part of the Advanced Cockpit System for Boeing fighter jets. This follows the March 5/12 pick to supply the ACS’ Large Area Display (LAD) offered as an option for new F/A-18 Super Hornets and F-15s, including the F-15SE Silent Eagle. Boeing.

May 19/12: 2012 decision? Mercopress reports that Rousseff’s government intends to make its F-X2 decision by the end of 2012. That’s a good way to reduce those tiring lobbying meetings.

April 3-9/12: Boeing & Embraer. Boeing announces its new Sao Paulo facility, Boeing Research & Technology-Brazil. It is the firm’s 6th global advanced research center, after Europe, Australia, India, China and Russia. Areas of research focus for the new center will include sustainable aviation biofuels (Brazil is a leading biofuel producer), advanced air traffic management, advanced metals and bio-materials, and support and services technologies.

That announcement is followed by a broad business agreement with Embraer to cooperate in these areas, as well as in commercial aircraft. The broader announcement by Embraer and Boeing was made on the same day as the signing by the Brazilian and United States Governments of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Aviation Partnership, to expand and deepen cooperation between the 2 countries on civil aviation. Boeing re: facility | Boeing re: cooperation.

March 5/12: Boeing & AEL. Boeing Company and Elbit Systems announce a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cooperate in Brazil. As part of the MoU, Elbit has committed to investing in its AEL Sistemas S.A. subsidiary. Elbit’s 11″ x 19″ Large Area Display has already been picked for next-generation F/A-18 Super Hornet and F-15 Eagle variants & upgrades, and the implication is that AEL would help develop and integrate this capability in any Brazilian F/A-18 Super Hornets.

Per Elbit’s investments, AEL will participate in LAD software & hardware development, and establish an Advanced Cockpit Technology Center of Excellence in Brazil. They’re already the Brazilian military’s top avionics supplier, and the firm hopes to expand its cockpit avionics market reach to other fixed-wing and helicopter platforms. Boeing.

Feb 10/12: Reuters reports that Boeing has frozen its 2009 bid price, as the same price for any new tender. In effect, it’s a price reduction of the cost of inflation over that time; the Reuters article offers estimates of a 12% real discount.

Jan 31/12: Rafale in India. Dassault’s Rafale is picked as India’s preferred plane for its 126+ plane M-MRCA fighter contract. A subsequent article in India’s newspaper The Hindu, by Brazilian Prof. Oliver Stuenkel, notes that Brazilian defense minister Amorim’s recent trip to India, immediately after the Rafale had been picked, included an agreement “to share with Brazil some of its experiences of carrying out the open tender evaluation to select the best aircraft… The big question now is how the decision to have Brazil study documents about India’s selection process will affect the tender process in Brazil.”

Training for what?
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Dec 21/11: Boeing announces Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with MSM Powertrain Ltda. (logistics services, ground support equipment, engineering support) and Pan Metal Industria Metalurgica Ltda. (assembly, subsystem installation, machined parts, processing, heat treatment) to explore work opportunities with Boeing and its industry partners if Boeing wins F-X2. MSM and Pan Metal join more than 25 other companies throughout Brazil that Boeing and its industry partners have already identified.

Sept 30/11: Brazil’s new Defense Minister Celso Amorim says that:

“By the end of 2013, none of the 12 Mirage (aircraft) at the Anapolis air base will be in full flying condition. This [fighter buy] is something that is really urgent, very important… The need to defend the Amazon, the borders – We need to have adequate combat aircraft…”

He reiterated Brazil’s position that the “transfer of technology” is the key sticking point, but earlier comments from Brazil’s government indicate that a larger sticking point may involve the parlous and unstable state of the global economy. If the EU’s inability to enforce its membership terms triggers a global economic crisis, Brazil may find it difficult to field the fighters it needs. AFP | TheLocal.se (note that Saab the carmaker is not Saab aerospace).

Sept 22/11: MercoPress reports that Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota has given French President Sarkozy a possible 2012 date to resume F-X2 – but that comes with a large caveat:

“Depending on the evolution of the global economic situation, if the crisis turns out to be less severe than some imagine, then those plans can resume next year.”

Aug 5/11: Personnel is policy. Brazilian defense minister Nelson Jobim is forced to resign, after public reports of critical comments concerning fellow ministers. He’s the 3rd minister to resign since President Rousseff took office in January 2011, which is creating strains in her governing coalition.

Mr. Jobim will be replaced by the former Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim. Amorim is a high profile figure. Some have called him anti-American, but Wikileaks cables suggest that this may have been a reaction to the activities of other figures in his department. It remains to be seen if, and how, his selection may affect the fighter competition. Mercopress | BBC | Amorim July 2011 interview, incl. video.

July 20/11: Boeing holds an industry forum in Brazil to outline opportunities available as part of the company’s F/A-18 Super Hornet offering.

May 24/11: Sea Gripen starts development. A Saab Group release states that Saab AB will open new UK headquarters and a new Saab Design Centre in London. The engineering center:

“…will capitalise on the UK’s maritime jet engineering expertise and is scheduled to open in the late Summer. Initially staffed by approximately 10 British employees, its first project will be to design the carrier-based version of the Gripen new generation multi-role fighter aircraft based on studies completed by Saab in Sweden.”

Sea Gripen was initially pushed for India (q.v. Dec 28/09 entry), but with Gripen out of M-MRCA unless something changes, the likely target would appear to be Brazil’s suspended F-X2 program.

May 18/11: Saab. Official opening of the Swedish – Brazilian centre of research and innovation (Centro de Inovacao e Pesquisa Sueco-Brasileiro, CISB) in Sao Bernardo de Campo, Brazil, which grew out of the Saab CEO’s September 2010 visit to Brazil. So far, the centre has attracted over 40 partners from academia and industry, who will be active partners in the specific projects. Areas of focus will be in Transport and Logistics, Defence and Security, and Urban development with a focus on energy and the environment.

Saab President & CEO Hakan Buskhe cites a coastal surveillance radar project with Atmos and a datalink development project with ION as examples, and the firm sees many opportunities in Brazil beyond the Gripen project. Civil security will get special attention, as Brazil is hosting both the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games within the next few years. Saab Group.

Feb 22/11: U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere affairs, Frank Mora, stands by the technology transfer offer made to Brazil in the event of an F/A-18 Super Hornet buy, calling it “a significant technology transfer” that “would put Brazil at par with our close partners.” The question is whether the Brazilians will consider that enough, if an when they make a decision. UPI.

Feb 20/11: Agence France Presse:

“Major daily O Estado de Sao Paulo cited four unnamed government ministers as saying new President Dilma Rousseff saw no “climate” for the acquisition in 2011, and that such a move in the midst of a $30-billion slash in the year’s budget would be an “inconsistency.”

Jan 17/11: President Rousseff leaves the F-X2 competition in limbo, in light of concerns about the financing of the purchase, how much to borrow for the initial fighter purchase, and inter-agency disagreements. The exact commitment is a decision later in 2011, but no contract until 2012. In practice, however, there is no firm timeline or deadline for a decision, and domestic spending priorities loom large in Rousseff’s agenda. Which makes this a de facto suspension.

If it is a suspension, it leaves the situation of every contender in play. Rousseff has said she wishes to re-open the arguments between the air force (Gripen preferred) and the ministry (Rafale preferred), via an inter-ministerial group, and also wishes to open a dialogue with industry. Both of those moves would have the effect of adding weight to Saab’s bid. She has also reportedly pressed Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] to secure a clear written commitment that the U.S. Congress would not veto the transfer of technology and fighter components, and has reportedly pressed Boeing to improve its industrial participation offer. There have been reports that Rousseff is interested in moving Brazil closer to the USA in the international arena. If they are true, that could make a big difference to the Super Hornet’s chances. Folha de Sao Paolo [in Portuguese] | Defense News | Defense Update | Flight International || Americas Society (AS-COA) | Bloomberg | BusinessWeek re: Rafale program overall | Le Figaro [in French] | Reuters | UPI.

Rafale: Takeoff?
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Dec 6/10: End of F-X2? Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva confirms that he won’t sign a fighter deal before he leaves office. An excerpt published by state news agency Agencia Brasil said:

“It’s a very big debt, it’s a long-term debt for Brazil. I could sign off on it and do a deal with France, but I’m not going to do that…”

A number of analysts expect his successor, former Marxist guerilla Dilma Rousseff, to cancel the program altogether. With inflation beginning to rear its head in Brazil, Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega is promising a program of government spending cuts, in order to help deal with it. Unfortunately, the used Mirage 2000s that Brazil bought are unlikely to last much beyond 2014, and French officials remain confident – in public, at least. Agence France Presse | Bloomberg | DefenseWorld | Sweden’s The Local | Reuters || Folha de Sao Paolo [Portuguese, subscription].

Dec 1/10: Saab inaugurates a new Swedish-Brazilian research and innovation center in São Bernardo do Campo, Brazil, with a 2-day workshop. The center’s main foci include aerospace, defence and urban innovation/ civil security. Saab will work in close co-operation with local industry and universities including UFABC (Universidade Federal do ABC) and FEI (Centro Universitário da FEI), per a 2009 bilateral Government agreement to extend innovative high technological industrial co-operation between Brazil and Sweden.

Nov 3/10: Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva says that:

“We are going to talk over the issue of the fighters – me, [his successor and lieutenant Dilma Rousseff] and [Defense Minister Nelson] Jobim.”

The clear implication is that Rousseff’s win will lead to Brazil confirming Lula’s pre-evaluation choice, and picking the Rafale. Agence France Presse.

April 7/10: AFP reports that Brazilian prosecutors have agreed to open an inquiry into the F-X2 competition, with prosecutor Jose Alfredo de Paulo Silva approving the request from an opponent of Lula’s, who complained that:

“The Brazilian government, because of external political factors, has decided to choose the Rafale, ruling out the Gripen and Super Hornet which were put forward at a lower price. That is against economic principles…”

A spokesman for Brazil’s interior ministry reportedly told AFP the prosecutor would now gather information, and decide if a civil case was possible, and said the inquiry could take up to a year. President Lula’s term ends in January 2011, however, and the election is set for October 2010, so even a 6-month delay would leave the fighter decision for Lula’s successor. See Jan 11/10 entry for the implications of that change.

Other reports quote Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, who says that Brazil’s air force prefers France’s Rafale jet despite the plane’s higher price tag, on industrial grounds. They also indicate that Lula intends to take his proposal to the defense council in the first half of May 2010, with an official decision expected soon after. A competition that is already very political, is becoming even more so. AFP | Avio News | Expatica | Usine Nouvelle [in French].

March 19-25/10: O Estado de Sao Paolo reports that the Brazilian air force certified all 3 fighter jet finalists as meeting Brazil’s technical specifications, and says that relevant reports have been delivered to the defense ministry. Brazil’s defense ministry said it would release final details during the week of April 5/10.

During a subsequent meeting with Sweden’s King Carl XVI Gustaf on March 25th, President Lula is quoted as saying that he’s waiting for the “definitive” technical report on the contenders. Saab CEO Aake Svensson reportedly told the Swedish news agency TT that the Gripen had come out on top in the Brazilian air force’s price and technical evaluation, but previous reports in this competition have been left “unfinalized” and then changed for political reasons. Agence France Presse | UPI | China’s People’s Daily.

March 9/10: Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva claims in his weekly column that his government hasn’t made a decision yet on Brazil’s next fighter aircraft. That’s unlikely to be believed. Associated Press.

Feb 24/10: Agence France Presse says that Brazil’s government has officially denied a Folha de Sao Paulo report re: revised bids from the 3 competitors.

If that unsourced report is accurate, the Rafale’s price dropped from $8.2 billion to $6.2 billion, plus another $4 billion dollars in maintenance over the next 3 decades. The JAS-39NG Gripens were reportedly priced at $4.5 billion dollars plus $1.5 billion dollars in maintenance, while the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets would reportedly cost $5.7 billion plus $1.9 billion in maintenance.

Jan 11/10: An unidentified Brazilian cabinet member tells Reuters that President Lula will choose the French-made Rafale jet as Brazil’s next-generation fighter plane, but wants to negotiate a lower price.

In the background, the political clock is ticking. Lula is constitutionally required to step down after 2 terms in office, and the election to succeed him is set for October 2010. If a deal cannot be done before then, Lula’s successor may have less invested in extending Brazil’s defense partnership with France. Given the apparent preferences within industry and the air force, that could change the likely favorite in an unfinished F-X2 competition.

Jan 8/10: Brazil’s Estadao de Sao Paulo says that the official Air Force report has been modified. It reportedly no longer ranks the 3 finalists, treats the strengths of the Rafale and F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters as established, treats the Gripen NG’s strengths as developmental, and emphasizes the advantages of a twin-engine fighter. With the F/A-18 E/F apparently a political non-starter, it’s expected that these changes will lower the barriers to selecting France’s Rafale. As President Lula intends. Estadao de Sao Paulo | defense-aerospace translation.

Jan 5/10: The Brazilian air force’s Comissao Coordenadora do Programa Aeronaves de Combate (FAB COPAC) has produced its technical evaluation, based on aircraft performance, purchase and lifetime costs, and industrial benefits. The report was ratified by FAB command on December 18th, and media reports from the Folha de Sao Paulo claim that FAB’s executive summary had Saab’s Gripen as the preferred choice, with Boeing’s Super Hornet in 2nd place, and the Rafale last.

The final decision will be President Lula’s, but despite a MdD statement that the report has not been formally delivered, it’s likely to raise the political cost of going ahead with the Rafale deal. The dates involved also shed new light on the government’s mid-December 2009 decision to postpone their final decision, as FAB commander Brigadier Juniti Saito was with Defense Minister Jobim on end-of-year trips to China, Ukraine, and Paris, and COPAC Brigadier Dirceu Tondolo Noro was reportedly called to join them in Paris at the last minute.

Lifetime cost is a very significant issue for the FAB, which understands the inevitable swings that accompany military budgeting in a commodity-driven economy. Saab claims a price of around $70 million (currently around EUR 50 million), which would be 60-70% of the Rafale’s offer price, depending on which sources one believes. Dassault has sort of denied that the Rafale would be 40-50% more expensive (q.v. Nov 12/09 entry), and also contests Saab’s claim that the Gripen NG’s operating and maintenance cost per flight-hour would be just 25% of the twin-engine Rafale’s, but the French firm has not publicly offered any detailed figures. In terms of the politicians’ most important benchmark, the FAB also reportedly gave Gripen NG the edge in industrial benefits, siding with Brazilian industry in believing that a project in development offers greater opportunities to expand Brazilian technologies and skills than a finished product like the Rafale. FAB release [Portuguese] | Folha de Sao Paulo [Portuguese] | Poder Aero [Portuguese or Google's amusing auto-translation] | Reuters.

Gripen Demo rollout
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Dec 28/09: Sea Gripen. Reports confirm that co-development of a carrier-capable “Sea Gripen” design was part of Saab’s response to India’s M-MRCA fighter competition RFI, adding that Brazil’s future fighter requirements were also targeted. Key changes are outlined, and Gripen VP of Operational Capabilities Peter Nilsson tells StratPost that the Sea Gripen is intended for both CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery) as well as STOBAR (Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery – “ski jump”) operations:

“There will obviously be differences in the MTOW (Maximum Take-Off Weight). In a CATOBAR concept, the Sea Gripen will have a MTOW of 16,500 kilograms and a maximum landing weight of 11,500 kilograms. In a STOBAR concept it depends on the physics of the carrier. Roughly, the payload of fuel and weapons in STOBAR operations will be one-third less than the payload in CATOBAR operations. There will be no differences in ‘bring-back’ capability,” he says.”

See: StratPost | Gripen India

Dec 15/09: FX-2 Postponed. Brazilian President Lula da Silva elects to postpone the F-X2 decision until the spring. MercoPress | UPI.

Nov 18/09: A small political kerfuffle erupts as 9 ex-Assistant Secretaries of State for the Western Hemisphere send a letter to Sen. George LeMieux [R-FL] and Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, asking LeMieux to join Sen. Jim DeMint [R-SC] in lifting his hold on career diplomat Thomas Shannon’s nomination as Ambassador to Brazil. This is a fairly common practice by both parties, and it takes only 1 senator to place a hold on key nominations. This often leaves key posts unfulfilled for long periods of time.

The letter says that Boeing’s efforts to sell its F/A-18F to Brazil will be placed at risk by the continuing lack of an accredited ambassador. That probably won’t help, but a long history of restrictive American arms export policies, and the fact that the fix appears to be in at top levels to expand defense industrial cooperation with France, are both far more consequential. Bloomberg News.

Nov 12/09: France’s Dassault hits back at its competitors, sort of. Dassault’s Brazilian subsidiary of the French company held a hastily called news conference in Brasilia to defend the aircraft, and sort of deny reports of a 40% higher price than the lowest bid.

Dassault executive Jean-Marc Merialdo would not offer figures, or even deny the reports directly. He did say that claims the Rafale was more expensive by such a margin were “unfounded” and asserted that it was “comparable to other aircraft of the same class.” Defense News.

Oct 4/09: Bids in. Brazil’s FAB confirms that revised bids are in from all 3 short-listed contenders, and Saab’s offer clearly has significant support from the Swedish government.

Gripen International’s revised bid offers a wide range of elements, including: Full involvement in the Gripen NG development program; Complete technology transfer and national autonomy through joint development; Independence in choice of weapons and systems integration; Production in Brazil of up to 80% Gripen NG airframes, via a full Gripen NG assembly line; and Full maintenance capability in Brazil for the Gripen NG’s F414 engine. That last offer would largely remove the threat of future American interference, and it would be interesting to see how Gripen International proposes to achieve it. Gripen International touts “significantly lower acquisition, support and operating costs” for its plane, and all this would be backed by a firm proposal for full long-term financing from the government’s Swedish Export Credit Corporation.

The additional offers are equally significant. Brazil will have the sales lead for Gripen NG in Latin America, with joint opportunities elsewhere. Saab would join the KC-390 program as a development and marketing partner, and Sweden will evaluate the KC-390 for its long term tactical air transport needs, as a future replacement for its recently-upgraded but aging C-130 Hercules aircraft. Saab also proposes to replace Sweden’s aged fleet of about 42 SK60/ Saab 105 jet trainers with Embraer’s Super Tucano, but it received a SKr 130 million ($18.8 million) deal in September 2009 to upgrade the planes’ cockpit systems, and current Swedish plans would see the SK60s continue in service until mid-2017. FAB release [in Portuguese] | Gripen International release.

Sept 29/09: Who, us? Embraer release [PDF format]:

“Regarding the article published in the Valor Econômico newspaper, dated September 28, 2009, Embraer clarifies that it is not directly participating in the selection process of the new F-X2 fighter for the Brazilian Air Force and, contrary to what was stated, it has no preference among the proposals presented. Embraer reaffirms its unconditional support of this process, always in close alignment with Brazil’s Aeronautics Command and the Ministry of Defense.”

Sept 28/09: Embraer drops a political bombshell, when Embraer’s Deputy Chief Executive for the defense market, Orlando Jose Ferreira Neto, tells Valor Economico that the firm was asked to advise the Air Force re: industrial proposals, and concluded that participating in the JAS-39NG Gripen’s development offers Brazil’s aerospace industry the best long-term benefits. Embraer reportedly saw the JAS-39NG as offering the opportunity to participate in the design process, rather than just producing parts. The opinion is a shock, as France’s interest in buying Embraer’s KC-390 transports was expected to leave Brazil’s top aerospace firm solidly on-side for the Rafale bid. T-1 Holdings executives (see Sept 17/09 entry) were also quoted in the article.

In response, Defence Minister Jobim fires back to say that the government will make these decisions, not Embraer. Dow Jones | Defense Aerospace translations (note: links will not last) | Valor Online, via Noticias Militares [in Portuguese] | Defesa Brazil [in Portuguese] | O Globo [in Portuguese].

Sept 17/09: Saab announces that over 20 engineers from the Brazilian firms Akaer, Friuli, Imbra Aerospace, Minoica, and Winnstal are already working on the Gripen NG project in Linkoping, Sweden, with the Swedish government’s authorization. The 5 firms will participate as the T1 holding, and would be responsible for projecting and manufacturing the JAS-39BR’s central and rear fuselages and wings. If all goes well, Akaer predicts that as of 2010 a team of at least 150 engineers and technicians from the T1 holding will start working in Brazil, alongside 20 Swedish specialists.

Beyond Gripen production, the holding’s goal is to form a new Brazilian aeronautical center in Brazil, and some technology transfer in the area of composite materials is reportedly underway already. Shaping the wing of a supersonic craft requires higher quality levels than civil applications, as well as manufacturing challenges owing to thicker and more resistant parts. Management and integration training within a holding structure of this type will also be required.

Sept 15/09: Boeing kicks off a 2-day conference in Sao Paulo with 140 potential partner and supplier companies, as it reaffirms its Super Hornet offer in advance of the Sept 21/09 submission date. Bob Gower, vice president of the Boeing F/A-18E/F Program stated openly that the Super Hornet’s price “is considerably lower than that of the Rafale.” Boeing’s release also addresses reports of incomplete technology transfer for its product:

“Boeing delivered an offer to the Brazilian Air Force in August that included full technology transfer… [defined as] the option of Super Hornet co-production in Brazil and the sharing of technology that would allow Brazil to integrate its own weapons.”

Sept 14/09: MercoPress reports remarks by CGT union leader Dominique Richard at Dassault, who is concerned about the extent of technology transfer that may be offered. Dassault, meanwhile, denies that there will be any effect on French jobs. Richard:

“There’s something which troubles us in this contract and is the fact that Brazil wants to have its own military air industry and that the agreement with Dassault, the French government and the Brazilian government includes the transfer of technology.”

See also AnsaLatina [in Spanish].

Sept 13/09: Flight International’s “Closer political ties raise prospects for renewed alliance between Dassault and Embraer” covers the market possibilities.

The 2 firms have very little overlap. Dassault is strong in the high-end executive jet market, but Embraer brackets those offerings with bigger regional jets and lower-end Phenom light and very light jets. Some form of consolidation could make sense. Embraer is also looking to field competition with the Boeing 737 and Airbus A319/320 series, and could benefit from Dassault’s engineering expertise. On the flip side, the KC-390 tactical transport would add a new product category for Dassault, improving and eventually replacing the Rafale could take a wider set of resources than France and Dassault are willing to supply, and the closure of the Mirage 2000 line leaves a hole in Dassault’s offerings at the light end of the spectrum.

Sept 11/09: Brazil’s MdD announces a Sept 21/09 deadline for Dassault to submit its Rafale business proposal, adding that the other 2 firms can also choose to submit. Defense Minister Nelson Jobim is quoted as saying [translated]:

“Now we have to evaluate the proposals. The commitments that President Sarkozy made will have to be confirmed by Dassault’s offer… there has been a political decision of the President to expand the strategic alliance with France… for this policy decision to come into effect, it depends on Dassault and also the others, because there needs to be a comparative evaluation.”

The Brazilian air force (FAB) still expects to complete the technical review process by the end of October 2009, for delivery to the Minister of Defense and the President. The final decision will be the President’s – and Lula has already expressed his clear preference, unless Dassault does something to change it via adverse pricing and financing terms or issues with technology transfer. “>MdD release & defence aerospace translation | Folha de Sao Paolo re: tech transfer [in Portguese].

Sept 9/09: …or not. Aftermath, and clarifications. Brazil’s President and MDD reaffirm their intended defense partnership with France, while the US Embassy correctly notes – and Brazil’s MdD confirms – that no formal decision has been taken yet. This is technically true, but there is no question that the Rafale has been given preferred bidder status. Negotiations would have to fail badly before any other contender had a chance. The Brazilian newspaper Folha de Sao Paolo:

“The expectation is that the deal will be concluded with France, but only if it offers a lower price for the Rafale, the most expensive of the competitors, and a more favorable interest rate. According to [reporting by] Folha de Sao Paulo, Lula rushed into dinner with Sarkozy on Sunday night and skipped several steps of the selection process, which angered the Air Force Command and left Jobim in the crossfire.”

There are also widespread reports that Brazil’s unwillingness to be subject to the USA’s potential ITAR restrictions and technology transfer limits was a key factor in their rejection of the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and of Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen NG (whose F414 engine is American). Brazilian President’s Office | MDD clarification | US Embassy in Brazil | Folha de Sao Paolo & translation via defense aerospace | Gripen International confirms its continued participation.

Sept 7/09: Winner!? Brazil’s Ministerio Da Defesa announces that Dassault Aviation is now the F-X2 competition’s preferred bidder, and the country will order 36 Rafales subject to further negotiations. The announcement also says that Brazil has secured French cooperation to develop Embraer’s KC-390 medium transport, and possibly buy 10-12 of the aircraft when they’re introduced.

This sale would be France’s 1st export order for its Rafale fighter, after numerous attempts spanning more than a decade. French technology transfer across a broad range of projects was reportedly the critical factor in the deal, and Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim reportedly said that the decision to begin talks with Dassault “was not adopted in relation to the other two” competing companies. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, meanwhile, described the move as “definitively consolidating a strategic partnership we started in 2005.” Brazil will now produce helicopters (EC725), submarines (nuclear-powered and diesel-electric), transport aircraft (KC-390) and possibly fighters (Rafale) in cooperation with France, under a broad strategic partnership in the defense arena. MDD announcement [Portuguese] | Agence France Presse | France24 | CS Monitor | L.A. Times | Reuters.

Sept 5/09: Brazil’s Defesa@NET explains the expected way forward:

“A Brazilian military expert who runs a specialist magazine titled Defesanet, Nelson During, told AFP that Brazil’s decision should be known in October. “The air force should send its evaluation of the three aircraft to the government on October 23 — Day of the Aviator — indicating its choice. Then, the National Defense Council should ratify that choice pretty quickly,” he said.”

Sept 3/09: Brazil’s Defesa@NET refers to an exclusive interview that Agence France Presse conducted with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and offers key quotes:

“A country of Brazil’s importance cannot buy a product from another country without technology transfer… France has shown itself to be the most flexible country in terms of transferring technology, and evidently, this is an exceptional comparative advantage… France is the only important country ready to discuss with us technology transfers in all these domains [helicopters, submarines, and fighter jets]… Brazil has drawn up a strategic defense plan. We are convinced … that because of the Amazon, our deep-water offshore oil deposits, Brazil should have a defense industry in keeping with its size and import.”

Aug 21/09: The Brisbane Times covers stepped up lobbying in Brazil, as the decision date is reportedly pushed from September to October 2009.

Aug 6/09: F/A-18 filing. Per US laws, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announces [PDF] Brazil’s formal request to buy up to 36 F/A-18E/F Super hornets and related equipment. The DSCA release is careful to stress that Brazil has yet to select its future fighter; the notice simply gives Brazil full assurance that all aspects of the sale can proceed smoothly if the Super Hornet is selected. This may be why no estimated cost has been given – a departure from DSCA norms.

Industrial offset agreements associated with this proposed sale are expected, but would be defined during negotiations between the purchaser and contractor. The equipment would include:

• 28 F/A-18E Super Hornet Aircraft,
  
• 8 F/A-18F Super Hornet Aircraft
  
• 76 F414-GE-400 installed engines: 72 installed, 4 spares
  
• 36 AN/APG-79 AESA Radar Systems
  
• 36 M61A2 installed 20mm Gun Systems
  
• 44 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS)
  
• 144 LAU-127 Launchers
  
• 28 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)
  
• 28 AIM-9M Sidewinder short range air-air missiles. AIM-9M is the most common current version in US service, but not the most advanced; that distinction belongs to the AIM-9X. Brazil is collaborating with South Africa on the A-Darter SRAAM, which is intended to be an AIM-9X peer.
  
• 60 GBU-31/32 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)
  
• 36 AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) precision glide bombs
  
• 10 AGM-88B HARM anti-radar missiles. Brazil produces its own missile, but the HARM is already integrated with the Super hornet and Brazil’s weapon is not.
  
• 36 AN/ASQ-228v2 Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) surveillance and targeting pods.
  
• 36 AN/ALR-67v3 Radar Warning Receivers
  
• 36 of BAE’s AN/ALQ-214 Radio Frequency Countermeasures systems
  
• 40 of BAE’s AN/ALE-47 Electronic Warfare Countermeasures systems
  
• 112 AN/ALE-50 Towed Decoys
  
• Plus the Joint Mission Planning System, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, ferry and tanker support, flight test, software support, publications and technical documents, and other support.

The principal contractors were listed as:

• The Boeing Company St. Louis, MO (Super Hornets, JDAM)
  
• General Electric Aircraft Engines in Lynn, MA (F414-400)
  
• Northrup Grumman Corporation El Segundo, CA (Super Hornets)
  
• Raytheon Corporation El Segundo, CA (ATFLIR pods, APG-79 radar, AGM-88, JSOW, AIM-120, AIM-9, ALE-50 towed decoys)
  
• Lockheed Martin in Bethesda, MD

Implementation of this sale will require approximately 8 contractor representatives to provide technical and logistics support in Brazil for 2 years. U.S. Government and contractor representatives will also participate in program management and technical reviews for 1-week intervals twice semi-annually.

July 13/09: MercoPress reports that deals are in the works between F-X2 contenders and Brazilian companies.

According to MercoPress, Boeing IDS President & CEO Jim Albaugh said agreements have been signed with 27 Brazilian companies that are capable of producing parts for the F/A-18, including Embraer. The move could reportedly translate into 5,000 jobs throughout the entire supply chain.

Saab Gripen’s marketing chief Bob Kemp was reportedly quoted as saying that Gripen International was prepared to shift up to 50% of future production to Brazil.

The report adds that Brazilian President Lula da Silva has invited French President Sarkozy to its independence day celebrations on September 7th, as a guest of honor. Da Silva reportedly said that he hopes to sign new defence accords at that time. This is taken by some as an indication that Dassault’s Rafale is currently the favored candidate. France is Brazil’s most significant defense supplier on a broad range of fronts, however, and so the promise of new accords is not definitive.

May 4/09: Revised offers. Brazil’s FAB(Forca Aerea Brazileira) issues a release, announcing that revised offers from the participating companies were submitted to F-X2 Project Management (GPF-X2). The companies are listed, and it’s the same list as the finalists and original submissions listed on Feb 2/09: Boeing, Dassault, and Saab. No Russian firms listed.

GPF-X2 has held clarification meetings held since March 2/09. On March 30/09, it began verification visits to see the firms’ facilities, maintenance, R&D labs, and active squadrons; and will make evaluation flights. FAB release [in Portuguese]

April 6/09: Russia’s RIA Novosti quotes Alexander Fomin, deputy director of Russia’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation:

“We are actively participating in the Brazilian tender, which has been reopened. It involves over 100 fighter planes. Russia has made a bid in the tender with its Su-35 multirole fighter. The tender has stiff requirements, involving not only the sale, but also the transfer of technology. It is a key condition of the deal and Russia is ready to satisfy it… We are discussing with the well-known Brazilian company Embraer the transfer of technology and the construction of facilities for the future licensed production of the aircraft…”

Fomin reportedly added that such a facility could also produce the 5th generation PAK-FA fighter being developed in conjunction with India. Experiences with the American F-22 and F-35 suggest that this would depend on the sophistication of the facilities. Stealth fighters require new equipment and techniques that go beyond normal aircraft construction standards, and a facility set up to produce even 4+ generation fighters may not be adequate.

March 30/09: The Brazilian Air force announces [in Portuguese] that it is beginning visits and technical evaluation of the 3 finalists. This evaluation will include test flights, and evaluation of the bids’ technical, industrial and maintenance offerings.

March 24/09: Gripen AESA. Dassault’s acquisition of a large stake in Thales led to Thales’ refusal to sell Saab the RBE2-AA AESA radar beyond the Gripen Demo stage. In response, Saab and SELEX Galileo sign an agreement to develop an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar for the JAS-39NG. The arrangement is initially aimed at Brazil’s fighter competition, where it leverages Selex Galileo’s strong pedigree equipping Brazil’s F-5BR fighters (Grifo-F radar) and AMX light attack jets (Scipio radar). Once integrated and proven, however, the AESA upgrade would be available to any Gripen customer.

Per Aviation Week’s March 10/09 report from Aero India, the radar will use a Vixen 500 AESA front end, with “back end” modules from the existing PS-05/A. Using those back end modules simplifies integration, and also avoids the control issues inherent in American alternatives. As it happens, the 2 firms have a long history of radar partnerships. Ericsson (now Saab’s) partner on the original PS-05/A was Ferranti, which became GEC-Marconi, then BAE Systems, and now Selex Galileo. Selex was also Saab’s partner in the recent M-AESA R&D project.

The Vixen 500 AESA radar is currently used in the USA by border surveillance aircraft, but it has yet to see service on a fighter. Korea’s F/A-50 was recently barred from using the Vixen 500E, under an agreement with co-developer Lockheed Martin that did not allow the F/A-50′s capabilities to surpass the ROKAF’s F-16s. Saab | Gripen International.

Feb 2/09: Bids are in. Boeing confirms that it has submitted a bid involving 36 F/A-18 Super Hornet Block IIs, with the APG-79 AESA radar.

Gripen International confirms a bid involving 36 JAS-39NG aircraft, with longer range, AESA radars, and other enhancements. Their release adds that Brazil will have “direct involvement in the development, production and maintenance of the platform but it will also generate transfer of key technology including access to Gripen source codes.”

It is presumed that Dassault also submitted a 36-plane bid for its Rafale fighter. Boeing release | Gripen International release.

FAB Mirage 2000s
(click to view full)

November 2008: Russia and Brazil sign a series of agreements on military technology cooperation. As is customary, the agreements set out protocols for the protection of intellectual property rights and technology secrets, which make joint ventures and local production easier to manage. Source.

Oct 30/08: RFP. Brazil’s FAB formally issues the RFP to the short-listed competitors. The 3 firms will have until Feb 2/09 to present their proposals, which must include operational, logistic, industrial, commercial, technical, commercial compensation (offset) and technology transfer details. FAB release [Portuguese].

Oct 1/08: Finalists picked. Brazil has decided on its 3 finalists: Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Aviation’s Rafale, and Saab/BAE’s JAS-39 Gripen.

EADS Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin’s F-16BR, and Sukhoi’s SU-35 all failed to make the cut. Brazilian FAB release [Portuguese] | Reuters | Boeing release | Gripen International release.

Aug 27/08: Defesanet reports that Lockheed Martin will be offering an F-16BR for Brazil’s F-X2, rather than the F-35. The report adds that barriers to technology transfer of some F-35 systems played a role in this decision. Defesanet [Portuguese] | Forecast International.

July 30/08: Boeing delivers a detailed proposal July 30 offering its advanced F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet to the Brazilian Air Force. The aircraft would be similar to the F/A-18Fs ordered by the Royal Australian Air Force, and would include Raytheon’s APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar. Boeing release.

June 12/08: Boeing (and presumably other manufacturers) receive the Brazilian RFP. The stated initial requirement is for 36 aircraft, with the potential for up to 120 aircraft. Boeing release | FAB statment (Brazilian air force).

January 2008: Brazil’s President Lula formally authorizes Brazilian Air Force Commander Juniti Saito to restart the F-X program.

November 2007: Brazil’s decision to hold an “F-X2″ competition is announced by the Brazilian press.

Footnotes

(1) Russian firms tend to partner due to local political necessity, or to gain technologies/ quality level they do not have, rather than as a strategic option for penetrating new markets. In Brazil’s case, one logical option would have been a partnership with India to offer the thrust-vectoring, canard-winged SU-30MKI, which is arguably superior to the SU-35. The aircraft are partly produced in India, and already have obvious slots for tech transfer because that was built into the Indian program.

A 3-way deal leveraging India’s HAL, and setting up an NPO Saturn engine plant in Brazil, would have offered several benefits. It would offer India and other SU-30 customers a welcome 2nd engine source, offer Brazilian aerospace a critical additional puzzle piece in engine construction, offer the FAB removal the biggest historical problem with Russian planes, and offer Russia a substantially strengthened lobbying effort.

On the avionics and electronics front, Elbit Systems avionics could be sourced from the Brazilian subsidiary AEL to offer fleet commonality, and some can be found in the SU-30MKI already. Indian electronics used in the SU-30MKI would offer additional options for international cooperation and license production, alongside Israeli options that already equip Brazilian aircraft.

The question is whether the Russians were ever good enough at partnering to pull something like that off, or were even willing to try.

Additional Readings

• GlobalSecurity – F-X BR

• Scramble – Brazilian Air Arms. there are several. The Forca Aerea Brasileira (Air Force), Comando da Forca Aeronaval (Naval air arm, which includes the carrier Sao Paolo – once France’s Foch – and its A-4M Skyhawks), and the Aviacao do Exercito (Army aviation).

• MILAVIA – Brazilian Air Force FAB – Forca Aerea Brasileira

• MILAVIA – Military Aviation Specials – The Mirage 2000 in Brazil

• DID – South Africa, Brazil to Develop A-Darter SRAAM

Contenders

• Eurofighter GmbH – Eurofighter Typhoon official site

• DID Spotlight article – The UAE’s F-16 Block 60 Desert Falcon Fleet. This is currently the most advanced F-16 variant in the world.

• Air Force Technology – F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Maritime Strike Attack Aircraft, USA

• DID FOCUS article – EA-18G Program: The USA’s Electronic Growler

• DID FOCUS article – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

• DID FOCUS article – The JAS-39 Gripen: Sweden’s 4th Generation Wild Card

• DID – France’s Rafale Fighters: Au Courant In Time?

• Air Force Technology – Rafale Multi-Role Combat Fighter, France

• DID – Russia’s SU-35: Mystery Fighter No More. The MAKS 2007 air show is Moscow appears to have clarified the issue at last – it’s closer to Venezuela’s SU-30MKs than India’s more advanced SU-30MKIs.

• Foreign Policy Centre (Sept 27/09) – The choice of French fighter aircraft in Brazil and its impact on Latin America. The FPC is based in Britain.

• Flight International (Sept 13/09) – Closer political ties raise prospects for renewed alliance between Dassault and Embraer

• Flight International (March 13/07) – Ultra Hornet. Describes the updates to create the Hornet Block 30/Block II; the performance enhancements are all electronic rather than aerodynamic. Interestingly, future enhancements may include a limited electronic attack function for all APG-79 AESA radars.

Other News, Developments & Commentary

• Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Sept 9/09) – The Brazilian Military Is Back, As It Fleshes Out Its Weaponry And Strategies. COHA’s point of view is left-wing.

• Info LatAm (Sept 6/09) – Carrera Armamentista en América Latina: armas, armas, armas [in Spanish]

• Council on Hemispheric Affairs (Sept 1/09) – Embraer: Brazilian Military Industry becoming a Global Arms Merchant? COHA’s point of view is left-wing.

• Defense News (April 16/09) – IAI Casts Lot for Future Growth with Brazil. “Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) looked around the world for its future growth and signed up for Brazil and India, said Yair Shamir, chairman of the diversified aerospace and defense group…”

• Forecast International (Aug 26/08) – Brazil Restarts Big-Ticket Procurement with an Eye to the Future. Sees the 2 biggest ticket items as the F-X2 program, and Brazil’s renewed push to design a nuclear fast attack submarine, in conjunction with the French.

• DID (July 2/08) – Brazil Signs $1B+ Production Deal for Cougar Helicopters. The medium helicopter competition is decided.

• Defesanet (Nov 7/07) – Lula reaparelha Forças Armadas de olho na transferência de tecnologia [in Portugese]. Reprinted from O Estado de Sao Paolo.

• Mercopress, Uruguay (Nov 6/07) – Brazil to boost defense industry and acquire 36 fighter jets

• Bloomberg (Nov 4/07) – Brazil Plans to Buy $2.2 Billion of Fighter Planes, Estado Says

• News Ltd., Australia (Oct 29/07) – Brazil boosts military spending more than 50 percent

• Council on Hemispheric Affairs (March 20/07) – The Russian Arms Merchant raps on Latin America’s Door

• DID Spotlight – Venezuela Buying SU-30s, Helicopters, et. al. From Russia. Covers those deals and updates.

• DID (Nov 22/05) – F.I. Looks At Latin American Arms Market, Sees Venezuelan Buildup. Forecast International valued Venezuela’s military modernization program at up to $30.7 billion through 2012, which would make the country the leading arms buyer in the region through the rest of the decade.

• Jane’s (April 15/05) – Brazil: On a shoestring

• Frost & Sullivan (March 29/07) – Future Fighter Aircraft Requirements in Emerging Economies

• Defesanet (Feb 24/05) – Cancelado o Programa F-X BR

• Defesanet – (Jan 7/05) – F-X is Dead – Long Live F-X

• Rosoboronexport will deliver more Mi-17 helicopters to Afghanistan before the end of the year despite concerns raised in the US Congress, reports RIA Novosti.

• The Electric Ships office within the US Navy’s PEO Ships update its technology development roadmap [PDF] for naval power systems, which had last been published in 2007 [PDF].

• Intelsat President Kay Sears lists recommendations for the Pentagon to improve its procurement of satellite communications services.

• The RAND Corporation explores to what extent cyberattack capabilities could be brandished as a detterent, including in a nuclear context.

• DARPA wants to improve the awareness of dismounted infantry squads. Obligatory branding right out of the 1990s: Digitizing SQUAD X RFI.

• The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently eased notification requirements for exporters dealing with exceptions to the arms embargo for Libya. US State Dept note [PDF].

• As China, Japan, and South Korea all changed their top political leadership in recent months, it is hard to keep up with diplomatic dynamics in the region. The latest Comparative Connections is a good way to catch up with the web of bilateral relations in East Asia.

• US Defense Undersecretary Frank Kendall spoke earlier this week at the Joint Warfighting Conference about acquisition damage control. Video below:

India’s submarine fleet currently consists of 16 boats: 10 Russian SSK Kilo (Sindhugosh) Class, 4 locally built SSK U209 (Shishumar) Class, a leased nuclear-powered Improved Akula Class SSN from Russia (INS Chakra), and its own INS Arihant SSBN. Most of the Kilos have been modernized, but readiness rates for India’s existing submarine fleet sits below 40%, and the U209s will have trouble lasting much beyond 2015. With Pakistan acquiring modern submarines, and Chinese submarine building exploding, expanding India’s submarine fleet became an obvious national priority.

In 2005, India confirmed that it would buy 6 Franco-Spanish Scorpene diesel submarines, with an option for 6 more and extensive technology transfer agreements. Unfortunately, 7 years after that deal was signed, “Project 75″ has yet to field a single submarine. A poor Indian procurement approach, and state-run inefficiency, are pushing the country’s overall submarine force toward an aging crisis. This DID FOCUS article covers the Scorpene deal and its structure, adds key contracts and new developments, and offers insights into the larger naval picture beyond India.

The Scorpene Class

Scorpene
click for video

The SSK Scorpene Class diesel-electric fast attack submarine was jointly developed by DCN of France and Navantia of Spain, and incorporates advancements that stem from being developed about 10 years later than DCN’s Agosta 90 Class. Many of the Scorpene’s internal systems and weapons, however, are shared with Pakistan’s Improved Agosta 90B.

Displacing 1,565 metric tonnes, the standard CM-2000 Scorpene Class is 71.7m (219 feet) long with a submerged speed of over 20 knots, and submerged range at 100% battery usage and 4 knots speed of 134 hours or 536 miles. This new submarine class incorporates a high level of system redundancy to achieve an average 240 days at sea per year per submarine, and the endurance to undertake a 50 day patrol before being resupplied. In addition, its maximum diving depth is 300 meters (about 1,000 feet), giving the commander good tactical freedom for a conventional submarine.

SUBTICS CCS

The Scorpene’s SUBTICS combat management system, with up to 6 multifunction common consoles and a centrally situated tactical table, is co-located with the platform-control facilities. The vessel’s sonar suite includes a long-range passive cylindrical array, an intercept sonar, active sonar, distributed array, flank array, a high-resolution sonar for mine and obstacle avoidance and a towed array. Each Scorpene submarine features 6 bow-mounted 533mm torpedo tubes, and stores 18 weapons divided between torpedoes, missiles, and mines (stacked, up to 30).

India was leaning toward Finmeccanica’s Black Shark, the same heavyweight torpedo used in Chile’s Scorpene subs, but that decision has been put on hold by corruption allegations. Fortunately, a contract for the MBDA SM-39 Exocet was signed along with the original submarine contract. The Exocet SM 39 variant is launched from a submarine’s torpedo tubes using a VSM (Vehicule Sous Marin), a self-propelled and guided container that will maneuver before surfacing so as not to reveal the position of the submarine. Once it surfaces, the Exocet missile leaves the VSM and proceeds to the target like a normal surface variant of the missile.

In addition to these regular weapons, the Scorpene platform also offers advanced capabilities for mine warfare, intelligence gathering and special operations.

Scorpene subs can hold a total company of 31-36 men, with a standard watch team of 9. The control room and the living quarters are mounted on an elastically supported and acoustically isolated floating platform, really a ship within the ship.

The India order brought the number of committed Scorpene submarine sales on the international market to 10. Scorpene orders worldwide now sit at 14, and include Chile (2 O’Higgins class CM-2000 with split Navantia/DCN production, both delivered); Malaysia (2 with split Navantia/DCN production); and now India (6 from DCN-Armaris and local manufacture, 3 each CM-2000 and AM-2000 AIP, delivery expected 2015-2020). Brazil would later undertake its own project, which will build 4 SSK Scorpenes and 1 nuclear-powered SSN fast attack submarine.

India’s Submarine Programs

Current Project 75 figures:

• Submarines: 6 CM-2000 Scorpene Class, #5-6 may have AIP, but that’s unlikely.
  
• Contract signed: 2005
  
• Schedule: Delivery from 2015-2018. Likely to go later.
  
• Cost: INR 235.62 billion

Project 75 has an pre-priced option for 6 more Scorpenes. A follow-on “Project 75i” is a separate program, which intends to field another 6 submarines with a very different design. The sections below provide more details.

Schedule, Cost & Plans

Final construction
(click to view full)

The Scorpene deal had simmered on the back-burner for several years, and media reports touted a deal as “close” in 2004, but nothing was finalized until late 2005. The cost had been subject to varying estimates over the life of those multi-year negotiations, and continued to change after the contract was awarded, but the final figure for the first 6 boats is now generally accepted as being about $4.5 billion.

India’s long-term objective is full made-in-India design, development and construction of submarines. Construction is the first step, and “Project 75″ Scorpene submarines will all be built in India at state-owned Magazon Docks Ltd. (MDL).

That insistence on local production, rather than having the first couple built at their home shipyard with Indian workers present on exchange, has cost India. There have been issues involving technology transfer and negotiations, but it’s also true that MDL simply wasn’t ready. Expected delivery dates for the first 6 were set at 2012-2017, until everyone had to bow to the obvious and begin promising 2015-2018. Given the record to date, and the difference between schedule slippage of 1st vs. final deliveries, it’s reasonable to expect deliveries stretching beyond 2018. Recent reports are even suggesting that deliveries may not begin before 2017.

Costs are slipping, too.

Planned costs for the Project 75 deal had a range of reported figures, until a contract was signed. In the end, the reported figure was Rs 15,400 crore, or $3.5 billion converted equivalent at the time. Subsequent auditor reports indicated that the program would actually cost about Rs 18,798 crore (about $4 billion), and escalations to Rs 20,798 crore/ $4.38 billion and then Rs 23,562 crore/ $4.56 billion have followed. That makes for about a 25.4% cost increase from the auditors’ baseline.

Tracking actual contracts is more difficult. Contracts signed as of August 2009 totaled INR 207.98 billion/ Rs 20,798 crore. The contracts were signed at different times, and will be paid over different periods, so a true currency conversion is difficult. A weakening American dollar and Euro have cushioned the increases somewhat, but most of the project’s cost involves local currency purchases. Contracts reportedly include:

• Rs 6,315 crore contract with DCNS’ predecessor for transfer of technology, combat systems and construction design.
  
• Rs 1,062 crore contract with MBDA for sea-skimming Exocet missiles and related systems
  
• Rs 5,888 crore contract with MDL for local submarine construction
  
• Rs 3,553 crore set aside for taxes
  
• Rs 2,160 crore for other project requirements
  
• Rs 2,000 crore added in March 2010 to cover added finalized costs of the “MDL procured material (MPM) packages”
  
• Rs 2,764 crore unaccounted for yet in public releases, but envisaged in final INR 235-237 billion program costs.

Timeline & Industrial Arrangements

Project 75 & 75i Timelines

A March 8/06 release from the Indian Ministry of Defence gives the long history of this contract’s genesis. After numerous delays, final negotiations were held with vendors in 2005. This reportedly cut INR 3.13 billion from the 2002 negotiated position, and involved other concessions. Even so, India’s program budget had to rise in order to accommodate the final contract.

As is often true in India, some of this was self-inflicted. In 2009, India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) reported that the government’s delays in finalizing a deal had probably raised the project’s cost by 2,838 crore, or about 15% of the project’s total cost – and that was before the additional Rs 2,000 crore contract to DCNS was finalized in 2010.

Industrial

Scorpene
click for video

On the industrial front, the Scorpene deal will enable India to reopen its submarine building assembly lines. The initial plan was for all 6 boats to be built entirely in India by Mumbai-based Mazagon Dock Ltd. (MDL), whose submarine lines had been shut down since the finished the licensed manufacture of German HDW Type 209 diesel subs in 1994. That plan has remained fixed, despite delays created by MDL’s work.

The French firm DCNS (Thomson CSF became Thales, which became the Armaris naval JV, then DCNS) was set as the overall industrial prime contractor for this program. DCNS is also in charge of the technology transfer and delivery of all services and equipment, and DCNS subsidiary UDS International will supply the combat systems with help from Thales. An ancillary contract signed between DCNS’ predecessor Armaris and MDL provides for a team of French technical advisers during the construction of the first 2 submarines.

Tracking contract value for foreign firms is challenging.

The key foreign contractors for the Project 75 Scorpene buy are DCNS and Thales, who will provide the “MDL procured material (MPM) packages” of propulsion, sensors, weapons systems etc. that fit into the hull. When the initial contract was signed in 2006, Thales revealed that India’s Scorpene contract was worth nearly EUR 600 million (USD $736 million) to their company, in return for key subsystems for the submarines’ 6 UDS International SUBTICS integrated combat systems, underwater sensors, communications and optronics, and electronic warfare equipment. A corresponding DCN news release put the total value to all members of the DCN Group at EUR 900 million, but did not address possible overlaps with Thales.

Finalized supplier contracts changed overall totals, which increased by EUR 300 million to about EUR 1.8 billion total. The allocations also changed, since Thales sold part of its naval business to DCN in 2007, creating DCNS. Some of the Thales products destined for the Scorpene became part of the DCNS Group when the merger took place.

A variety of Indian subcontractors, such as SEC, Flash Forge, Walchandnagar Industries, et. al. are involved in the submarines’ construction, manufacturing and delivering specific parts for incorporation into the vessels.

By late 2010, delays at MDL led to reports that Scorpene construction might be altered to include other Indian shipyards, and even DCNS in France. That shift to other shipyards hasn’t happened for Project 75, but it is planned for the follow-on Project 75i. Whether that plan can survive rent-seeking lobbying by India’s state-owned industries remains to be seen.

The AIP Option

MESMA AIP section

Like many modern diesel-electric submarines, the Scorpene class is exceptionally quiet. It can also be equipped with an additional MESMA brand AIP (air-independent propulsion). A CM-2000 Scorpene can operate underwater for 4-6 days without surfacing or snorkeling to get oxygen to recharge its batteries. An AM-2000 Scorpene AIP, in contrast, will be able to operate underwater for up to 18 days depending on variables like speed, etc.

Each AIP system costs around $50-60 million, as they require adding a new 8.3 meter (27 foot), 305 tonne hull section to the submarine. The resulting AM-2000 Scorpene AIP is 70m long, and displaces 1,870t.

Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash has said that the agreement gives India the option of incorporating AIP technology after delivery of the 3rd submarines. India’s Navy appeared to be opting for this choice for Scorpenes 4-6, but decided in typical Indian fashion to try to develop their own AIP “hull plug” for the Scorpene. They’re now talking about fielding only submarines 5 & 6 as AIP boats, if the technology is ready. India’s past history suggests that it won’t be, even as Pakistan fields all 3 of its Agosta 90B boats with mature French MESMA AIP technology inside.

India’s Submarine Plans

U209 Shishumar class
(click to view full)

Most of the Project 75 delays, and many of the cost increases, are attributable to India’s slow decision making and lack of readiness. Meanwhile, India’s existing fleet continues to age, and the size of India’s submarine fleet will become a serious concern by 2016 or so.

“Project 75″ had options for another 6 submarines, but that option has been replaced by a 6-boat “Project 75i” competition. Introducing another competition sloows India to add improved technology, including an Air-Independent Propulsion module and the ability to carry supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles. On the other hand, it also adds industrial disruption from a new design.

India’s deeply flawed procurement process adds even more risks. The risk of delay has already materialized. Despite initial solicitations in 2008, the 75i RFP still pending in 2013, and India is unlikely to field any Project 75i submarines before 2023. The second risk is that a new competition will become bogged down in allegations and/or protests like so many other Indian projects, and fail to deliver anything.

If India can overcome its government’s own obstacles to fielding an effective submarine force, reports by Indian media describe a long-term desire to manufacture up to 24 submarines in a phased manner. Admiral Prakash confirmed that target, and used the objective of “24 subs in 30 years.”

DID reminds our readers that long term plans for major capital acquisitions have a way of shrinking over time as budgetary tradeoffs are made – 32 DD (X) destroyers for the USA became 12, and then 3. Nevertheless, options and/or future schedule delays could easily keep submarine production for India going to 2030 or beyond, and the buildup of China’s forces in particular is likely to keep submarines high on India’s defense priority list.

Time will tell if actual budgets and shipbuilding performance can match the Navy’s appetites.

India’s Scorpene Project: Contracts & Key Events

BrahMos
click for video

May 14/13: The Hindustan Times illustrates the dire situation facing India’s navy, due to mismanagement of India’s submarine programs:

“As reported first by HT on April 9, a confidential defence ministry report had warned that India had never before been poised in such a vulnerable situation and its undersea force levels were “at a highly precarious state.” …China operates close to 45 submarines, including two ballistic missile submarines. It also plans to construct 15 additional Yuan-class attack submarines, based on German diesel engine purchases.

The size of India’s submarine fleet will roughly be the same as that of the Pakistani Navy in two years…. merely six to seven submarines, including India’s first and only nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant.”

That may be a bit pessimistic. The 4 U209s will need to begin retiring, leaving 10 Sindhugosh (Kilo) Class submarines that began entering service in 1986. At least 8 of those have been refitted under Project 08773, and can be expected to serve for several more years. That makes 9 submarines, but at Indian operational levels, that leaves just 3-4 boats available for missions. On the other hand, China’s fleet is venturing into the Indian Ocean more often, and bases like Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan will make that easier and easier. Keeping up with Pakistan won’t be enough, and the article is correct to point out that India is barely clearing even that low bar. Hindustan Times.

April 15/13: More delays and costs coming. The Times of India reports that bureaucratic delays by the Ministry of Defence may force Scorpene submarine deliveries to start in 2016, even as costs are set to rise again:

“According to sources, Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) has informed the Navy that the project would be delayed by another 18 months…. Consultants from Navantia, the Spanish shipbuilding company, left the project in the last few days. The technical assistance pact for Navantia and DCNS, the French partner in the consortium, expired on March 31, sources said. With MDL failing to get the defence ministry’s approval in time, about 10 Spanish consultants working on the submarine project left India…. DCNS leadership is expected to meet with MDL top brass this week in Mumbai and present their own demand for additional technical assistance fee.”

Every problem listed here was preventable, and so is the crisis coming to India’s submarine force. A contract that built the first 2 boats abroad, with Indian engineers and specialists working at the foreign shipyard before transferring home to build the last 4 at MDL, would have cut technical assistance requirements, while delivering working submarines to the navy on time. India’s Navy has learned that lesson, and is lobbying hard for an analogous arrangement under Project 75i. Based on reports to date, the ministry hasn’t learned anything, and is resisting. Its political leaders would rather have the vote bank of state run jobs, and their associated financial arrangements up and down the supply chain. Even if that costs more, and leaves India strategically vulnerable. Somehow, that isn’t corruption.

March 20/13: BrahMos underwater. India successfully tests its supersonic PJ-10 Brahmos Mach 2+ cruise missile from a submarine. BrahMos joint venture CEO A Sivathanu Pillai describes it as the 1st underwater firing of a supersonic cruise missile anywhere in the world, and the missile successfully hit its target 290 km / 156 nm away.

Here’s the catch: none of India’s current submarines can fire the new submarine-launched missile. It’s too big to launch from a torpedo tube, and will need to use a vertical launch tube with the correct diameter. India’s Project 75i submarines are nearly certain to add this modification, but they won’t be ready until 2023 at the earliest, a decade after a submarine-launch Brahmos conducted its 1st test firing.

New Indian Express editorial director Prabhu Chawla attributes this disconnect to poor planning in the MoD. The truth is that there has been no shortage of planning, or lead time. Solicitations for the follow-on Project 75i reportedly began in 2008, and there is still no RFP. Likewise AIr-Independent Propulsion was discussed in 2006, but the ball has been dropped and it’s unlikely to appear in any of the 6 ordered Scorpene submarines. What has been in short supply is timely execution, thanks to a combination of delays stemming from MoD practices, industrial failures, and hindrances put in place by politicians. No amount of planning can trump that. Times of India | Chawla op-ed.

March 18/13: Legal. India PIB:

“A complaint was received alleging financial irregularities against the then Director in-charge of Scorpene Submarine project ina Defence Shipyard. The complaint is under enquiry.”

March 11/13: Torpedoes. Defense minister Antony offers a written Parliamentary reply to say that India still hasn’t finalized a contract for torpedoes. A Special Technical Oversight Committee (STOC) was convened to review the complaints about the proposed Black Shark buy, and approved it as fair and to procedure. The high-level political Defence Acquisition Committee accepted the report in September 2012 (6 months ago), and has done… nothing. The purchase has now been delayed for over 3 years.

Welcome to India. Part of the reason involves allegations that WASS’ parent firm Finmeccanica paid bribes to secure a contract for 12 AW101 VVIP helicopters. In Italy, its CEO is facing bribery charges, and has been deposed. That sort of thing could get the parent firm blacklisted, which would also scuttle the torpedo buy, and could make it difficult for India to build its Vikrant Class indigenous aircraft carriers. As of March 11/13, Finmeccanica subsidiary AgustaWestland has been given a ‘show cause’ notice regarding cancellation of the AW101s, but had not had the contract cancelled, or been blacklisted. See also Jan 12/10, Jan 31/11, Oct 28/12. India PIB.

March 8/13: China. An analysis piece in The Hindu by Vladimir Radyuhin points out that China continues to build a modern submarine fleet – including the most advanced conventional subs from Russia. The problem may be a pervasive one, stemming from poor Russian delivery and support on one hand, and India’s red-tape slowness and inability to make decisions on the other:

“At the end of last year, Russia concluded a framework agreement with China for the sale of four Amur-1650 diesel submarines…. It will also mark the first time that Russia has supplied China with more powerful weapon platforms compared with Russian-built systems India has in its arsenals. In the past, the opposite was the rule…. India risks being eclipsed by China on the Russian radar screens. As Russia’s top business daily Kommersant noted recently, even today, Russian officials from top to bottom tend to look at India with “drowsy apathy,” while Mr. Putin’s visit to India last year was long on “meaningless protocol” and short on time and substance.”

Jan 4/13: Investigation. India’s Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has launched an inquiry against Commodore (ret.) Gopal Bharti, who heads up Project 75. The inquiry is in response to an unnamed internal whistleblower. the financial irregularities which include train fare reimbursement and taking his son abroad at public expense, aren’t earth-shattering. On the other hand, the CVC is investigating allegations that Bharti deliberately refused to place orders for 170 critical items, and are curious about the disappearance of 15 high pressure specialized underwater valves from his department.

Innocent until proven guilty, but the range of allegations are pretty broad. Times of India.

Pakistan’s A90Bs
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Dec 4/12: AIP. StratPost offers an AIP system update from Indian Navy chief, Admiral D.K. Joshi

“AIP plugs for the fifth and sixth of (Project) 75 are under consideration. [DRDO's Naval Materials Research Laboratory (NMRL)] has been tasked to develop that. It is doing so. What is to be seen is whether the… timeline Matches the delayed production timelines of (Project) 75. In case this comes online in conformity with the fifth and sixth ones they will be put into place, but if for some reason they are not ready at that point in time we would not delay the production timelines…. This would [also] become an option for any of the subsequent indigenous options [Project 75i]…. The next line will have an AIP plug.”

Meanwhile, all 3 of Pakistan’s comparable Agosta 90B submarines will include DCNS’ mature MESMA AIP technology.

Dec 5/12: Project 75i. India’s cabinet Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AON) for buying “Project 75i”, India’s next 6 submarines. A global RFP is reportedly due “very soon,” and the Indian government has reportedly decided to spend up to $10 billion/ Rs 55,000 crore on India’s future submarine force.

Project 75i diesel-electric SSK subs will have air-independent propulsion, and India is also looking to equip them with conventional land attack missiles. DCNS could offer the AIM-2000 Scorpene with the MESMA AIP, and might be able to offer integration of MBDA’s developmental MdCN cruise missile. The MdCN is already slated for DCNS’ SSN Barracuda Class nuclear fast attack submarines, and the right electronic commonalities could give any French proposal a notable advantage over German and Spanish competitors.

If India prefers its own BrahMos missile, on the other hand, 2 things will happen. One is that the playing field will be level. The other is that any submarine chosen would have to be a modified design, with vertical launch tubes sized for BrahMos. Indian government | Zee News.

Oct 28/12: Torpedoes. More headaches for India’s Black Shark torpedo buy. As if their direct competitor’s complaint wasn’t enough, a probe is now underway into India’s EUR 560 million purchase of 12 AW101 VIP helicopters. AgustaWestland is also a Finmeccanica company, and there are several cases of India’s blacklist laws being invoked against firms on the basis of mere corruption allegations, with no available proof.

The Rs 1,700 crore buy of 98 torpedoes for the Scorpene fleet was expected to be followed by a similar buy for Project 75i’s 6 submarines, and possibly a 3rd buy to plus up stocks and equip the new SSBN Arihant Class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. That could mean a total of up to Rs 5,100 crore, or about EUR 733 million / $947 million at risk given current conversions.

As for Atlas Elektronik’s claims that the torpedo bid was rigged (vid. Jan 31/11 entry), the Indian MoD’s Acquisitions Wing, Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), and Minister of State for Defence MM Pallam Raju have all rejected the claims, despite strong circumstantial evidence. India MoD | India’s Business Standard.

July 17/12: Sub-contractors. SEC Industries and DCNS today officially inaugurate new 1,500 m2 of workshop facilities at SEC’s Hyderabad facilities, and formally deliver cofferdam door coamings after successful Factory Acceptance Tests. The work was done under a September 2011 sub-contract between SEC DCNS India Pvt Ltd., and a second sub-contract for additional work was signed in 2012 (vid. March 23/12 entry). DCNS.

June 23/12: Kilo Class. Russia completes its set of 7 mid-life refits and modernizations of India’s Kilo Class submarine fleet, which were delivered from 1986 – 2000. Russia handled repairs and modernization for 7 boats, while Indian shipyards have delivered 1 and are working on another 2.

This last boat, INS Sindhurakshak ended her mid-life refit in Zvezdochka about 15 years after she was built. A submarine’s expected safe lifetime is usually about 30 years, but India may be forced to contemplate a 2nd refit series. Ortherwise, they may not be able to keep their overall submarine fleet at acceptable levels, while they wait for Scorpenes and Project 75i boats arrive. Additional refit efforts generally cost more for each additional year of safe service delivered. The Hindu.

June 11/12: Industrial. DCNS signs a strategic partnership for bringing DCNS technologies, methods and skills into India’s private Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Company Limited. Pipavav is a shipbuilder, repair & dry-docking firm, and were recently chosen by MDL to form a Joint Venture to build warships for the Indian Navy. DCNS.

March 23/12: Sub-contractors. DCNS India announces a Scorpene sub-contract and transfer of technology with SEC Industries Pvt Ltd of Hyderabad, India. The deal for hull hatches, cofferdam doors, knuckle hoses, ballast vent valves, High Pressure air cylinders, weapon handling and storage system is worth about Rs 310 crore/ EUR 50 million. To make this work, DCNS will provide SEC with full plans for the components, training for over 40 SEC personnel at DCNS facilities during 2012-2013, plus 5 years of on-the-job training and support for manufacturing and quality control at SEC in Hyderabad.

SEC is known in Indian defense circles as a manufacturer of missile airframes and components, and signed a deal with Israel’s IAI back in 2008. The company’s previous experience had been with heavy pump set and road-roller equipment. DCNS.

March 19/12: Delays. The 1st Indian Scorpene sub is now confirmed as scheduled for delivery in June 2015, barring further delays, and program cost is now confirmed at Rs 23,562 crore (currently about $4.56 billion).

The original schedule was for delivery by December 2012, with submarines arriving each year until December 2017. The new official schedule has deliveries beginning 2.5 years later in June 2015, with submarines arriving every 9 months until September 2018. Costs are up about 25.4% from the original CAG-audited cost of Rs 18,798 crore after the deal was signed, or 87% over the program’s initial 2002 figure. Indian MoD | New Kerala | PTI

Sept 13/11: Industrial. Private shipbuilder Pipavav Defence & Offshore Engineering Company (PDOL) and state-owned Mazagon Dock (MDL) agree to form India’s first public-private partnership venture to build warships and submarines for the Indian Navy.

Mazagon Dock Pipavav Ltd will be held 50/50, and it will help MDL fulfill existing orders while competing for future defence contracts in India. Pipavav chairman Nikhil P Gandhi is quoted as saying that it’s “primarily to fast-forward the process of warships and submarine contracts held currently by the MDL.” India’s Financial Express | Indian Express.

July 29/11: Rear Admiral MT Moraes takes over as the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Submarines) at Delhi, to look after the planning and acquisition of submarines.

Rear Admiral Srikant is also slated to take over as Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM) based at Visakhapatnam, this is the indian Navy’s class authority on submarines, responsible for defining standards, policies and procedures for their operations and maintenance. Rear Admiral G Ashok Kumar will take over as Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) at Kochi. India MoD.

June 8/11: Sub-contractor. DCNS India Pvt. Ltd. signs an undisclosed contract with Flash Forge India Pvt. Ltd., an ISO 9001:2008 certified manufacturer of customized special material forgings based in Visakhapatnam.

This first contract with Flash Forge for the manufacturing of mechanical equipment is the conclusion of a long process for DCNS, which involved identification of potential partners, audits of the manufacturing and quality processes, qualification, and then a competitive Request For Proposal (RFP). With a lot of the advance work out of the way, DCNS expects to announce other local contracts in the near future. DCNS.

June 6/11: IANS relays a report in the May 2011 issue of India Strategic, quoting DCNS India Managing Director Bernard Buisson to say that 2 Scorpene combat systems have been delivered to Mazagon Docks Ltd. (MDL). They’re in the process of integrating the first one.

Buisson reportedly said that there are about 20 – 25 French engineers assisting in technology transfer, and added that DCNS has had technical discussions with the Indian Navy on installing MESMA air independent propulsion (AIP) systems on board the last 2 submarines. That move would raise the subs’ cost, and DCNS said they are (still) awaiting the Navy’s response. IANS | India Strategic.

May 18/11: Delays. The Times of India reports that 2 Indian naval crews will be going to France “after some months” to train for operating the SSK Scorpene fast attack submarines. The article notes that by 2020, India’s fleet will comprise just 5 Kilo Class and 4 U209 Shishumar class boats available, and quotes an unnamed official:

“We now hope to get the first Scorpene by August 2015. Each submarine will have just a 36-member crew since automation levels in them are very high,”… “The first Scorpene will be ‘launched’ into water in 2013, and will be ready for commissioning by August 2015 after extensive harbour and sea trials,” said a top DCNS official. “The target is to deliver the sixth submarine by 2018, one every nine months after the first one in 2015. The third and fourth submarines are already under construction at MDL…”

April 6/11: Stretch the Shishumars? The Scorpene project’s lateness, and uncertainties around Project 75I award and delivery dates, have led India’s Navy to talk with Germany’s HDW about upgrading the capabilities, and extending the lifespans, of its existing U209 Shishumar Class boats, inducted from 1989-1994. Zee News.

Feb 16/11: P75i. Indian media quote Indian navy chief Admiral Nirmal Verma, who reiterates that the follow-on program to the Scorpene deal is already cleared by India’s government. The result could add 6 more Scorpenes to the order books, or it could result in a parallel program to build another model. With 7 of India’s 14 active submarines due for retirement by 2015, and the Scorpene program 3 years late because of self-inflicted delays, the Indian government’s unwise choice to avoid building any Project 75 Scorpene submarines in France has created a looming crisis for the Navy.

Verma says that the Navy is going through responses to the September 2009 RFI, and hopes to be able to issue a tender in 2011. Responses have reportedly included DCNS (Scorpene AIP), Germany’s HDW (U214) and its Swedish Kockums subsidiary (several options, incl. the forthcoming A26 design), Navantia (S-80), and Russia’s Rosoboronexport (Amur 1650), He adds that Project 75i is looking for an improved combat management system, better sensors and detection range, and the certain inclusion of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology. Reports place the order total at $11 billion, but that seems high even if it includes both the current $4.38 billion for Project 75′s 6 subs, and a Project 75i program for another 6 diesel-electric boats. Time will tell.

The current plan is for India to order 2 submarines built at the winning foreign shipyard, and build 3 at Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL) in Mumbai, and 1 at Hindustan Shipyard in Visakaphatnam. That’s similar to the Project 75 plan pushed by India’s Navy, who wanted 2 boats built abroad because they feared that delays and performance issues might create problems for the Scorpene. Political favoritism overruled that request, and the feared scenario has come to pass. This time, the government is showing slightly more flexibility, by approving the plan to have 2 submarines built abroad in order to avoid a complete crash in fleet numbers. On the other hand, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) refused to accept the recommendation the Project 75i avoid MDL, due to that shipyard’s existing workload. Instead, the government assumes that it would be able to build 3 more submarines, which may even be of a different type, on an accelerated production schedule, while still delivering all 6 Project 75 Scorpene boats to the revised schedule. Yeah, right. IANS | Times of India.

Jan 31/11: Torpedo trouble? India’s Central Vigilance Commissioner has opened an inquiry into Project 75′s planned buy of 98 heavyweight torpedoes, after Atlas Elektronik GmbH executive director Kai Pelzer reportedly lodged a direct complaint. The complaint refers reportedly refers to irregularities in the conduct of the procurement process, including specific charges of corruption. The CVC inquiry was ordered in December 2010.

Atlas Electroniks’ complaint is straightforward: the competition was rigged. The RFP makes the torpedo vendor responsible for seamless integration and/or interface of the torpedo with the SUBTICS combat system. The Finmeccanica/DCNS Blackshark is the Scorpene’s default torpedo, but Atlas had to have their plan approved by the MoD’s Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). That approval was given, but Atlas’ integration proposal was failed in the user trials. India’s DPP, Para 13, doesn’t allow requirements that “prejudice the technical choices by being narrow and tailor made.” The TEC’s approval escaped that trap, but Para 70a allows only one remaining vendor after trials. Atlas says this was the Navy’s intent all along.

The inquiry suspends India’s planned buy of Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes from Finmeccanica subsidiary Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquel (WASS), until this can be sorted out. Atlas Elektronik Gmbh was offering their DM2A4 Seahake. Both torpedoes feature advanced seeker heads, and can be controlled by a trailing fiber optic cable. Defense World | Economic Times of India | Subsequent Business Standard coverage.

Jan 18/11: Industrial. India’s Economic Times sums up the latest revisions to India’s Defence Procurement Policy, amid hopes that the stranglehold of state-run firms on major Indian defense contracts might be loosened:

“…(DPP) 2011 has made it clear that the state-owned companies will get preference while awarding major defence contracts. Private sector will get certain concessions, but the situation has not gone down well with the players… According to DPP 2011, foreign defence vendors can now discharge their offset obligations in the civil aviation, internal security and training sectors, compared to the earlier mandate of discharging the same in the defence industrial sector only… The minister also brushed away concerns that the new policy guidelines related to the capital intensive shipbuilding industry favoured the defence PSUs, in spite of the demonstrated ability of private sector companies, such as Larsen and Toubro (L&T) and Pipavav Shipyard in recent years… L&T, which has invested millions on its state-of-the-art shipbuilding facility at Hazira, was promised a critical role in developing and manufacturing India’s second submarine line, Project 75I, along with the state-owned PSU Mazagon Dock, but was later sidelined… The new policy – which has divided procurement into two different sections – mandates that the DPSU shipyards will be given contracts on a nominated (non-competitive) basis, while the private shipyards will have to participate through a competitive bidding process. Further, it remains the government’s call to decide which contract should be open to competitive bids in the first place, raising questions of whether the government is queering the pitch further.”

December 2010: Torpedoes, etc. WASS (Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei) has launched its first subsidiary in India: Win Blue Water Services (WBWS)/ It will focus on naval equipment, market research and analysis, supporting offset and supply chain management, and creating a service hub for the Middle East and Asia.

WASS has operated in India since 1975. Their A244/S light torpedo recently received an Indian contract to upgrade their stocks to Mod 3, and their Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) partnership is producing the C303 anti-torpedo countermeasures system, which is already 50% indigenized. The firm sees opportunities in artificial underwater targets, underwater surveillance systems for strategic areas and offshore energy production, etc. The more work it does, the more value it can count toward Indian requirements for industrial offsets, and the more it can compete with “indigenous” products for the Indian Navy. WBWS is planning to start joint ventures for its different domains, and is in the process of discussions with Indian companies including Larsen & Toubro. India Strategic.

Dec 2/10: Delays. The headline reads “After delays, Scorpene submarine now on track: Navy chief.” Unfortunately, the IANS article doesn’t offer many specifics to support that contention, so it’s hard to evaluate.

Nov 30/10: P75i. India’s PTI reports that Russia’s Rosoboronexport will offer the latest Amur-1650 class submarines to India for Project 75i, the follow-on tender for 6 new submarines that will either extend or complement the current Scorpene contract.

The Amur is known as the Lada class in Russia, and renaming it the “Amur” for export is probably a good idea, in case anyone still remembers those infamous Lada automobiles. The new class was developed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval Technology as an improvement to the Project 636 Advanced Kilo-class diesel-electric fast attack submarines, and is said to be even quieter. The 1,765t Amur 1650 variant is larger than the Amur 950 model, and has an option for air independent propulsion. It lacks the 950′s 10 vertical launch tubes, relying instead on 6 reloadable torpedo tubes.

Sept 29/10: Industrial. An Asia Times article, “Leaks in India’s submarine strategy,” says that the submarine construction program has changed:

“India is in the process of getting six Scorpene subs… to be built at the Mazagon facility in Mumbai… but this procurement is experiencing a slowdown. Mazagon Docks in Mumbai will construct three of the six, Hindustan Shipyard Ltd in Visakhapatnam will construct one, and the other two may be procured from foreign sources or built by another private shipyard in India.

“The delivery of the first of the French Scorpenes, which was supposed to enter service in December 2012, has been delayed. Antony addressed this situation in parliament only a few weeks back. This will clearly impact upon India’s undersea force levels,” said [Observer Research Foundation senior fellow Dr. Rajeswar] Rajagopalan. “India has about 35 private shipyards, of which L&T [Larsen & Toubro Ltd] and Pipavav are believed to be competing to build the two submarines, of the six planned.”

The report adds that shrinkage of India’s operational submarine fleet may even force 2 submarines to DCNS shipyards, so they can be delivered and become operational in time. As of March 2012, however, India has done none of these things – just added more overhead and reports, and pushed delivery back.

April 26/10: Delays. Sify News quotes a Parliamentary response by defence minister Antony regarding the Scorpenes:

“A programme of construction of six Scorpene submarines is currently underway at Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL) under transfer of technology from a French company. As per the contract, the first submarine was scheduled to be delivered in December 2012 and thereafter one each every year till December 2017… There has been a delay due to initial teething problems, absorption of technology and augmentation of MDL purchased material. The first submarine is now expected to be delivered in the second half of 2015… The delay in scheduled delivery of submarines is likely to have an impact on the envisaged [submarine] force level… However, the gap in submarine capacity has been addressed by modernisation with the state-of-the-art weapon and sensor fit on the existing submarines…”

See: Sify News | Indian MoD – less detailed.

March 30/10: WIL partnership. An Indian PR Wire release by Walchandnagar Industries quotes DCNS Chairman Patrick Boissier, who was speaking after the unveiling of the “Vinod Doshi Technology Center”:

“Said that the company which was Europe’s leading company in , ship building , off shore patrol vessels and Submarine manufacturing and valued at Euros 2.5 billion had signed an MOU with WIL last year manufacturing of critical technical parts for Scorpene” submarines for the Indian Navy… Walchandnagar Industries was identified for the project after we scouted for strategic partners and we were convinced that they would provide us the with High level technology for critical manufacturing components, he added “Talking about our future plans is premature, but it is possible in the long term to work with Walchandnagar Industry for world markets after our project in India is completed as we have a 30 % market share in Submarine manufacturing.”

While the release adds a piece to the industrial puzzle, careful reading of Mr. Boissier’s statement shows no commitment made.

Dec 2/09: Delays. The Indian government confirms earlier reports, via a written reply to a Parliamentary question:

“As per contract signed with Mazagaon Docks Limited (MDL), first Scorpene submarine is scheduled to be delivered in December 2012 and thereafter, one each every year till December 2017. On account of some teething problems, time taken in absorption of technology and delays in augmentation of industrial infrastructure and procurement of MDL purchased materials (MPM), slippage in the delivery schedule is expected. Delay in scheduled delivery of submarines is likely to have an impact on the envisaged submarine force levels [for the Navy as a whole]. Loss on account of the delayed delivery is difficult to quantify at this stage.

This information was given by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in a written reply to Shri Prabhat Jha and Shri Prakash Javadekar in Rajya Sabha today.”

Aug 29/09: Costs. The Times of India reports that the Defence Acquisitions Council has decided to approach the Cabinet Committee on Security to approve a EUR 300 million (about Rs 2,000 crore) cost spike for the French ‘MDL procured material (MPM) packages,’ from a EUR 400 in 2005 to EUR 700 million now. The MPM packages go inside the hulls being produced by Magazon Docks Ltd., and reportedly include virtually all major systems connected with sensors, propulsion, and other systems.

Contracts signed to date include the October 2005 Rs 6,315 crore contract with DCNS’ predecessor for transfer of technology, combat systems and construction design; the October 2005 Rs 1,062 crore contract with MBDA for sea-skimming Exocet missiles and related systems; a Rs 5,888 crore contract with MDL for local submarine construction; Rs 3,553 crore set aside for taxes; and Rs 2,160 crore for other project requirements. Total: Rs 18,798 crore. India Comptroller and Auditor General reports that the government’s 9-year delay in finalizing the deal has probably raised the project’s cost by 2,838 crore, or about 15% of the project’s total cost before this price rise.

Jan 13/09: Sub-standard force. A CNN-IBN TV program highlights the case of the Kilo Class submarine INS Sindhukirti, whose repair schedule reportedly ran for 10 years, and which “has been in dry dock at Vizag for a refit programme for close to five years now.”

A confidential Indian CAG report is said to have found that only 7 of India’s 16 submarines are available for combat at any time. That’s not an unusual percentage for a submarine force, but if 10 of the 16 are due for phase-out by 2012, the impact on force levels is obvious. To maintain current numbers, one submarine would need to be inducted every 2 years, but there have been no additions since 2001. Source.

May 28/08: Delays. The Hindustan Times reports India’s navy may not be able to induct the first Scorpene submarine by the 2012 deadline, as the French have yet to part with crucial details including design and drawing documentation. “A senior navy official confirmed to HT on Tuesday that the project had been delayed by a year.”

The Scorpene project is not the only Indian naval project with delivery issues, and these situatons have begun to create combat power issues for India’s navy. The article states that by 2015, India’s fleet will have shrunk from 16 submarines to 10 Kilo Class plus the Scorpenes. See also subsequent Financial Express report.

March 22/06: Costs. India’s MoD responds to Scorpene-related financial and security breach allegations:

“No contract or contracts were signed with French firms for Rs. 16,000 crore for the Scorpene project. The total cost of the two contracts signed with the two French firms, M/s ARMARIS and MBDA, for the project is Rs. 7,197 crores.

The Government did not pay an extra amount of Rs. 4,500 crore than what was negotiated earlier. On the contrary, after the present Government came to power, it re-examined the project even though all negotiations had been completed in 2002 and the Ministry of Finance had accorded approval to the project in 2003. The present Government held negotiations and was able to achieve a reduction of Rs. 313 crore in the contracts with the two French firms from the negotiated position in 2002… As a result of the negotiations, the Government was also able to achieve several long-term concessions. These included the revision of the escalation formulae to the advantage of the Indian side by adjusting the fixed element in the ARMARIS contract and placing a cap on escalation in the MBDA contract. A cap was also placed on the Exchange Rate Variation (ERV) for calculation of profit for the Public Sector Undertaking, Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL).

Besides the contract with the two French firms, the only other contract that was signed was with the Defence Public Sector undertaking, Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL), for Rs. 5,888 crores for the indigenous construction of the submarines. Therefore, even taking into account the value of contract signed with MDL, the total value of all contracts signed for the Scorpene project is Rs. 13,085 crores out of the sanction accorded for Rs. 18,798 crores towards the project. Out of the balance amount of Rs. 5,713 crores, Rs. 3,553 crores is for payments towards taxes and Rs. 2,160 crores towards other items to be acquired during the project period for which only preliminary steps have been taken. No contract or contracts have been signed for the items under this head. A Technical Agreement was also signed between India and France to ensure the continued support of the French Government to the “project.

The Integrity Pacts signed to ensure transparency of the project, contain, severe penalties in case of breach of any of its provisions. The safeguards include cancellation of the contract, recovery of all advances with interest at a rate of 2% higher than the European Inter Bank Offered Rate or EURIBOR, non-payment by the buyer of any dues on any other contract to make such recoveries, imposition of Liquidated Damages and the recovery of all sums paid to any middleman or agent… The French company that has been accused of committing to pay commission to the alleged middleman has denied all the allegations and has stated that all the e-mails published in the articles in a journal that carried this story are fake and fabricated… The French company has since been reported to have filed a case in the Delhi High Court on 24th February 2006 against the journal which first made the allegations.

…Some press reports also sought to establish a link between the Scorpene project and the breach of security that had occurred in the Directorate of Naval Operations in the Naval Head Quarters… However, the leaked information did not pertain to the Scorpene project.”

March 1/06: AIP? “India Looks to Modify Scorpene Subs With MESMA AIP Propulsion.” Submarines 4-6 will include the MESMA system, according to reports. Those reports are contradicted by later reports, which make it clear that no AIP submarines are contracted yet.

The article also includes information about competing AIP systems.

Appendix A: India’s Current Submarine Force, and Rival Navies

Chinese SSK Project 636
(click to view full)

India’s two most prominent competitors are Pakistan and China.

Pakistan currently owns 5 submarines. Their 4 French Daphne submarines (Hangor Class) were retired in 2006. A pair of French Agosta 70 submarines (Hashmat Class) acquired from the French Navy were modified to fire Harpoon anti-ship missiles in 1985, but they won’t last much longer. Three updated Agosta 90Bs (Khalid Class) are also in service, commissioned in 1999, 2003, and 2008, respectively. PNS Hamza has a MESMA Air-Independent Propulsion system that lets the submarine stay underwater for much longer periods of time, and the other two Agosta 90B boats are getting MESMA retrofits. On balance, this will make them slightly more advanced than India’s new Scorpenes.

Pakistan had an opportunity to add to its diesel-electric fleet, but they’re reportedly pursuing nuclear submarine technology, while shelving a plan to more than double their advanced SSK fleet. On balance, that’s good news for India.

As of 2008, China owned about 66 submarines; 18 of them were Type 035/33s, which are Chinese derivatives of the 1960s-era Romeo Class. The Romeos were based on 1944 U-Boat designs, and even the 17 Type 35s aren’t expected to last much longer, or retain much of a role beyond training. If one leaves out all SSBN/SSGN nuclear missile submarines, all 5 of China’s problem-plagued Type 091 Han Class SSN nuclear powered attack subs, and all of the Romeo derivatives, China’s attack sub force alone still stood at 36 boats in 2008: 4 Type 093 Shang Class SSNs, 12 Kilo (Project 636) & Advanced Kilo Class (Project 877) SSKs, 13 Type 039 Song Class SSKs, and 7 Type 041 Yuan Class improvements of the diesel-electric Song Class.

China continues to build Shang Class SSNs and Yuan Class SSKs, which means that overall fast attack fleet numbers can be expected to grow.

As noted above, India currently operates 16 submarines, but only 12-14 can be said to be in service, and the fleet could face a noticeable decline beginning in 2015 or so:

Shishumar Class: 4 German Type 209 SSK submarines, built locally and delivered between 1984 – 1994. The vessels are expected to reach their end of service life between 2016-2024. The United News of India (UNI) reported on Sept 6/04 that Siemens of Germany has offered the Indian Navy an upgrade for the Shishumar Class submarines, which will involve the installation of their Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system. As of 2012, India hasn’t done anything about it.

Sindhugosh Class: 10 Russian Kilo Class/ Project 877 SSKs, built (1986-1991, 1997, 2000) under a contract between Rosvooruzhenie and the Indian Defense Ministry. They’re very quiet submarines, but there are reports that the Indian Navy considers them underpowered. Most of these subs have received mid-life refits in Russia, but the quality of those refits has been a subject of dispute. Key components of these mid-life refits and upgrades have include tube-launched Klub-S cruise missiles, plus a hydro-acoustic “USHUS” complex, a CCS-MK radio-communication system, and Porpoise Electronic Support Measures to locate radar emissions. A couple of these submarines are still undergoing work in India.

Scorpene Class: 0 built or in service. Earliest expected in-service date is now 2015 for the 1st boat, and that date could slip again. The entire fleet of 6 may not be operational until after 2020.

INS Chakra: 1 Improved Akula Class nuclear-powered fast attack submarine, owned under a 10-year lease from Russia. Its primary purpose is to train nuclear submarine crews for the Arihant Class, but INS Chakra is fully capable, and could be pressed into operational service. The former K-152 Nerpa was handed over in January 2012, but as of January 2013, the boat had issues with readiness.

Arihant Class SSBN. 1 boat in trials, with 3 others under construction. Designed and built in India, this nuclear-powered submarine has a limited ability to launch nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Arihant was launched in July 2009, and conducted her 1st K-15 missile firing in March 2012, but hasn’t been commissioned yet. The Indian Navy hopes to do so in 2013. See “India’s Nuclear Submarine Projects” for further details.

Additional Readings & Sources

Submarines and Platforms

• Naval-Technology.com – Scorpene Class SSK

• Deagel.com – Scorpene Basic, or CM-2000 | Scorpene-AIP , or AM-2000 | Scorpene Compact-AIP

• Rediff.com (Sept. 12/05) – What is the Scorpene?

• GlobalSecurity.org – Project 75/Scorpene

• Bharat-Rakshak – Shishumar {Type 209} Class

• Bharat-Rakshak – Sindhugosh {Kilo} Class

• Bharat-Rakshak – Foxtrot Class

• Wikipedia – Exocet missile

• DID FOCUS – India’s ATV SSN Submarine Project

• GlobalSecurity.org – Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV)

• DCN – MESMA AIP

• Undersea Warfare Magazine (Fall 2001) – Air Independent Propulsion:
  

• Navy League of the United States, Seapower Magazine (December 1999) – The AIP Alternative

Additional Readings: News and Events

• Rediff News – Scorpene project archive

• India Strategic (June 2012) – Indian Navy to select Wake Homing Torpedo

• India Strategic (May 2011) – Indian Navy’s second Submarine Line will witness strong competition. Discusses the decline of India’s subamrine force, and Project 75i.

• Asia Times (Sept 29/10) – Leaks in India’s submarine strategy

• BBC (Oct 23/09) – Crucial Indian defence deals delayed. These include the Navy’s submarine and aircraft carrier projects, advanced trainers for the air force, and coastal surveillance plans. “For its part, the government has been slow in responding to criticism – even from its auditing organisation. When it comes to defence issues in India, speed does not seem to be of paramount importance.”

• CNN-IBN (Jan 13/09) – Are We Battle Ready: Submarine repair that takes forever. Describes an overhaul of INS Sindhukirti, one of the Navy’s Kilo Class subs. It has been drydocked for 5 years, and the reapirs at Hindustan shipyards, which has no experience in this area, are expected to take a total of 10 years instead of the 1-2 years that would be expected elsewhere.

• IBN Live (Oct 25/08) – Indian Navy’s submarine fleet in poor health: CAG. “The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)… states that no more than 48 per cent of India’s submarine fleet is available for waging war, should India be attacked… “The Indian Navy currently hold just 67 per cent of the force level envisaged in its 1985 plan,” the report says.”

• India Defence (Oct 19/08) – Indian Navy Project-75A: RFIs Issued for Six Advanced Submarines; Rosoboronexport, Armaris, HDW in the Fray. These would be a follow-on to the original Scorpene purchase. AIPs and land-atack capability are both requirements.

• Rediff News/PTI (Oct 7/05) – India signs Scorpene submarine deal

• The Indian Express (Oct 7/05) – Scorpene Deal Inked in Delhi

• Times of India (Sept 13/05) – Scorpene Ahoy! Also contains a paragraph concerning India’s intention of building a nuclear submarine.

• DCN Release re: India (Sept 13/05) – New Success for Scorpene

• Rediff.com (Sept 12/05) – India to Buy 6 Scorpene Submarines

• Times of India (Sept 12/05) – Scorpene: India’s Latest Weapon

• Thales Release (Sept 12/05) – Success for Thales in India on Scorpene Submarine Programme

• DCN Release re: Chilean Navy (Sept 12/05) – DCN Delivers First New-Generation Submarine to Chilean Navy

• The Tribune of Chandrigarh (Aug 11/05) – Admiral Arun Prakash: Scorpene Deal Awaits Cabinet Nod. Good set of additional naval updates in this article. Note that the Scorpene deal discussed here of 2 buy, 4 build is different than the deal being reported now.

• DID (Dec 14/04) – India Close to Deal on Scorpene Sub Technology. Maybe depending on what the meaning of “close” is…

Additional Readings: Rival Navies

• Naval-Technology.com – Agosta 90B SSK

• Official Pakistani Navy Site – Submarines (Hashmat Class, ex French Agosta 70)

• GlobalSecurity.org – Hangor Class (Fr. Daphne)

• Pakistani Post Office – A History of Submarine Construction in Pakistan

• GlobalSecurity.org – China/ Ships

In August 2005, “Team Warrior” leader General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in San Diego, CA won a $214.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of the Extended Range/ Multi Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System (ER/MP UAS). That was just the first step along the US Army’s $5 billion road to fielding a true Medium Altitude, Long Endurance, armed UAV, modified from the USAF’s famous MQ-1 Predator.

The ER/MP program was part of the US Army’s reinvestment of dollars from the canceled RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program, and directly supports the Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan. Its position got a boost when a 2007 program restructuring cut the Future Combat Systems Class III UAV competition, in favor of ER/MP. Next, the US Air Force saw this Predator derivative as a threat and tried to destroy it, but the program survived the first big “Key West” battle of the 21st century. Now the MQ-1C “Gray Eagle” is moving into full production, as the US Army’s high-end UAV. This FOCUS article offers a program history, key statistics and budget figures, and ongoing coverage of the program’s contracts and milestones.

The MQ-1C Gray Eagle, and its Band of Brothers

Predator landing -
1 Hellfire fired?
(click to view full)

The Army wanted its ER/MP UAV to fill both surveillance and attack roles. General Atomics’ Sky Warrior, derived from their famous MQ-1 Predator, beat the Hunter II system offered by Northrop Grumman, Aurora Flight Systems, and IAI. With General Atomics Predators, Sky Warriors, and MQ-9 Reaper UAVs all headed for the skies above the conflict zone, our readers have asked us to help them tell the difference.

The MQ-1 Predator is 27 feet long, with a 55 foot wingspan. Its maximum gross takeoff weight is 2,300 pounds, and it can carry 625 pounds of fuel, 450 pounds of internal payload (sensors), and another 300 pounds on its wings for up to 2 AGM-114 Hellfire anti-armor missiles or equivalent loads. Its service ceiling is 25,000 feet, which can keep it well above the 10,000-15,000 ft ceiling above which most guns are ineffective. The piston engine is a Rotax 914 turbo that runs on aviation fuel, and pushes the Predator at a slow speed of 120 KTAS. It’s controlled by UHF/VHF radio signals, and is designed to be flown by a pilot – without automated takeoff and landing.

The USAF also had an MQ-1B Block X/ YMQ-1C project underway, to develop a Predator system that would run on heavy fuel and carry up to 4 Hellfires. That project, and questions of cross-service compatibility, died when the USAF stopped buying MQ-1 Predators, and shifted its focus to the larger MQ-9 Reaper instead.

MQ-9 w. Paveways
(click to view larger)

The MQ-9 Reaper, once called “Predator B,” is somewhat similar to the Predator. Until you look at the tail. Or its size. Or its weapons. It’s called “Reaper” for a reason – while it packs the same surveillance gear, it is much more of a hunter-killer design than its counterparts. The Reaper is 36 feet long, with a 66 foot wingspan. Its maximum gross takeoff weight is a whopping 10,500 pounds, carrying up to 4,000 pounds of fuel, 850 pounds of internal/ sensor payload, and another 3,000 pounds on its wings. The MQ-9 has 6 pylons, which can carry GPS-guided JDAM family bombs and other MIL STD 1760 compatible weapons, Paveway laser-guided bombs, Sidewinder missiles for air-air self defense, and AIM-114P Hellfire missiles or laser-guided Hydra rockets. With that arsenal the Reaper becomes the equivalent of a close air support fighter with less situational awareness, less speed and less survivability if seen – but much, much longer on-station time.

MQ-1 vs. MQ-9
(click to view full)

The Reaper’s service ceiling is 50,000 feet unless it’s fully loaded, which can make a lurking MQ-9 very difficult to find from the ground. That wouldn’t have been as useful to the other aircraft due to the Hellfire missile’s short range, but the ability to drop GPS and laser-guided bombs makes precision combat strikes from 50,000 feet perfectly plausible. The engine is a Honeywell TPE 331-10T, which pushes it along at a rather speedier clip of 240 KTAS. Not exactly an F-16, or even an A-10, but the extra speed does get it to the problem area more quickly when a call comes in from the troops.

Several MQ-9 variants exist. US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) also flies the MQ-9 Reaper, and has its own MQ-1 Predator program, too. Both UAVs are referred to as Medium Altitude Long Endurance Tactical (MALET) platforms. If SOCOM has to bring the MALET to hammer a target down, or soften it up, they fly in enhanced variants with improved video transmission, infrared modifications, signals intelligence payloads, and “delivery of low collateral damage weapons.” The latter presumably includes precision mini-missile options like Raytheon’s Griffin, and precision glide bombs like Northrop Grumman’s GBU-44 Viper Strike and Lockheed Martin’s Scorpion, all of which allow a single Hellfire rail or weapon station to carry multiple weapons.

General Atomics’ Mariner maritime surveillance UAV and FAA-certified high-altitude Altair research UAV are both derived from the MQ-9 Reaper. So, too, is NASA’s Ikhana.

The Army’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle

The MQ-1C Sky Warrior/ Gray Eagle looks a lot like the Predator, but it’s a little bit bigger, can carry more weapons, and has a Thielert Centurion 135hp engine that can run on the same “heavy fuel” that fills up the Army’s land vehicles. Maximum operating altitude is 29,000 feet, at a speed of up to 135 knots. The sensor turret payload was initially Raytheon’s AN/DAS-2, but has shifted to the final “Army Common Sensor Payload” AN/AAS-53 variant. The Army also added a communications relay, and has been working to give the UAV “sense and avoid” capabilities, in order to operate safely in crowded airspace.

There is some confusion over the exact name, with at least one notable Army spokespeople spelling it out as “Grey Eagle,” and other Army sources and General Atomics using “Gray Eagle.” DID will be using “Gray Eagle” throughout.

Sensors and Add-Ons

ZPY-1 STARLite
click for video

Beyond its standard equipment, the US Army is also developing and qualifying new payloads for the MQ-1C fleet, thanks to efforts by Product Manager RUS (Robotic and Unmanned Sensors) and PM-ARES (Airborne Reconnaissance and Exploitation Systems).

AN/AAS-53 CSP+. Raytheon’s base Common Sensor Payload (CSP) is being upgraded, and CSP High Definition (HD) is planned for production cut-in in FY 2013. It adds high-definition Full Motion Video (FMV) in both the Electro-optical and Mid-wave IR spectrums. A retrofit plan will begin in FY 2014 to convert all MQ-1Cs to CSP HD. The Army sees CSP Target Location Accuracy (TLA) as the final upgrade, upgrading targeting accuracy to allow timely use of GPs-guided bombs and missiles. All Gray Eagles will eventually be equipped with CSP TLA.

AN/ZPY-1 STARLite-ER. Northrop Grumman’s Small Tactical Radar – Lightweight (STARLite) Synthetic Aperture Radar/ Ground Moving Target Indicator (SAR/GMTI) is a lightweight, high performance, all weather radar that can track small moving ground targets, down to small car size, even in bad weather. It cross-cues with the UAV’s cameras, and enhancements have been approved to extend its range, and detect man-sized targets. STARLite ER (Extended Range) has been cut into production since FY 2011, and will begin fielding and retrofitting in FY 2012. The Army plans to buy 1 STARLite ER system per UAV.

Sense and Avoid. Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) is a system designed to be aware of other aircraft, especially in civil airspace, and help avoid collisions with the MQ-1C. The Phase 2, Block 0 system will provide the operator with an air traffic display, color-coded to reflect the highest-priority potential conflicts. The Block 1 system will add recommended maneuvers to avoid crashing into others. That isn’t the full sense-and-avoid you’d see on a commercial jet, but by 2015 it will let the Army fly the UAVs from Fort Hood, TX; Fort Riley, KS; Fort Stewart, GA; Fort Campbell, KY; and Fort Bragg, NC, through Class D military airspace, to nearby test ranges without a manned chase plane. As the acronym suggests, making this work requires certain equipment in place on the ground at those locations.

Traveler Pod. BAE’s pods are designed to find and eavesdrop on electronic emitters, identify them (enemy radio communications? radar? etc.), then offer aerial precision geolocation (APG) and copying. SIGINT/ELINT pods and equipment can already be installed in larger UAVs like the USAF’s RQ-4 Global Hawks, and aboard light surveillance planes like the Beechcraft King Air MC-12Ws. The challenge is to shrink them and their supporting systems within the MQ-1C’s weight and size limits.

NERO pod. Provides electronic jamming that can prevent remote detonation of land mines, giving the UAV a very useful convoy overwatch role. It can also disrupt enemy communications. Raytheon’s NERO is adapted from the CAESAR pod that equips manned C-12 (Beechcraft King Air) turboprops. Initial deliveries took place in 2013.

The Army’s ER/MP Program

Prep for flight
(click to view full)

A few years after the ER/MP program began, General Atomics-ASI’s Steve May was already saying that “The Army is now as large a customer for us as the Air Force.” At the time, the firm saw a potential market for as many as 540 “Sky Warrior” UAVs – 45 sets of 12 UAVs each for each brigade, plus accompanying ground stations and crews. The production program grew five-fold, but it hasn’t approached that level.

The Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of GA-ASI’s multi-year ER/MP contract called for 17 MQ-1C UAVs, and 7 One System Ground Control Stations (OSGCS). Those pre-production Block 0 and Block 1 Gray Eagles have begun flying on the front lines, in Quick Reaction Component (QRC-1, 1R, and 2) deployments which began in December 2009, and continue to the present day. As noted above, QRC drones are unarmed, and lack other key capabilities. Even so, the Army has been very enthusiastic about their performance.

In 2010, the Army officially changed the planned number of MQ-1C Gray Eagle Block I+ production systems from 13 company-sized units of 12 aircraft, to 31 independent “UAS Platoons” with 4 UAVs each, plus the MQ-1C’s Standard Equipment Package (SEP), and Ground Equipment. The main production program will also buy 21 UAVs to replace those lost, and 7 training UAVs, for a total of 152.

Excel
download

As the MQ-1C transitioned into production, Pentagon documents began breaking the program out from its USAF counterparts. The total program, including both the initial development contract and follow-on production, looks like it will be worth almost $5 billion. Budgets from 2004-2017 include:

There’s also a manpower equation for the Army, which affects ongoing operating costs. Those aren’t found in these budgets, but they make up well over half of a program’s actual lifetime cost. Fully automated take-off and landing (ATLS) systems are becoming more common among UAVs, and the MQ-1C’s ATLS an important difference from the USAF’s MQ-1 Predators, which have all flight operations handled by pilots. While the initial batch of Gray Eagle UAVs will be flown by Army aviators, the Army plans to assign future MQ-1Cs to non-pilot warrant officers with UAV training. That’s a less expensive proposition, in terms of both salary and training costs. It’s also less expensive in terms of lost UAVs, as ATLS seems to lead to fewer crashes.

Key MQ-1C industrial partners include:

ER/MP UAS – Enter the Warrior: Contracts & Key Events

MQ-1C, Afghanistan
(click to view full)

May 14/14: NERO EW pod. Raytheon announces that they’ve delivered the first 2 Networked Electronic Warfare, Remotely Operated (NERO) pods, as part of a contract awarded by US NAVSEA-Crane in 2012 for use on the US Army’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle.

NERO is an airborne electronic attack system capable of jamming enemy communications systems, including remote detonators for land mines. It’s derived from the Army’s Communications Electronic Attack with Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CEASAR) program, which is mounted on MC-12W King Air manned turboprops. Moving to the Gray Eagle doubles or triples flight time, at a similar or lower operating cost. Raytheon.

May 7/13: Support. GA-ASI in Poway, CA receives a $110.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for MQ-1C support and fleet sustainment, driving the contract’s total cumulative face value to $354.7 million.

Work will be performed in Afghanistan, using FY 2013 Operations and Maintenance funds, and other Procurement fund. The US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (W58RGZ-12-C-0075, PO 0032).

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage. For the Gray Eagle, the budget requests $627.1 million, of which just $10.9 million is RDT&E. That’s a cut of about $151.8 million from previous plans, and when combined with 2015 plans it cuts the program by $337.8 million. They’re still ordering the same number of UAVs, though.

The FY 2014 request covers continued development of the Universal Ground Control Station, a Ground Based Sense-and-Avoid system for flights at several US based locations (vid Aug 10/12 entry), 15 UAVs, 8 AN/ZPY-1 STARLite ER radars, 8 AN/AAS-53 Common Sensor Payload surveillance & targeting turrets, 16 Tactical SIGINT (TSP for signals interceptions) payloads, and 3 modular platoon sets of equipment.

April 2/13: What now? Defense News aptly summarizes the key question facing the USA’s large drones:

“On the one hand, the work in Mali shows that the signature weapon of the U.S. war in Afghanistan is outlasting that conflict. On the other, the detachment is a tiny fraction of the Predator/Reaper fleet – and just where are the rest of them going to go?”

With flights below 60,000 feet heavily restricted within the USA, there aren’t that many options stateside, and most of the MQ-9 fleet’s $8,000 per flight hour operations are funded by wartime OCO appropriations. AFRICOM may have the best combination of circumstances abroad, thanks to growing trouble in the Gulf of Guinea to the West, as well as the Indian Oceantp the East. Even a massive increase in surveillance can’t absorb all of the UAVs, and the $6,000 per flight hour manned MC-12s are a natural competitor.

Gray Eagle in Iraq
(click to view full)

Unless otherwise specified, the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL issues the contracts to General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) in Poway, CA.

Oct 2/12: Support. A $102.6 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for services to support the Gray Eagle UAS.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of May 7/13. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0075).

Oct 2/12: Engine retrofits. A $10.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to retrofit MQ-1C Block 0 UAVs with an alternate heavy fuel engine.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA with an estimated completion date of Sept 26/13. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0001).

Aug 27/12: A $25.9 million fixed-price-incentive contract modification will add “a platoon set of ground equipment.” Note that for these UAVs, a “platoon” is 12 MQ-1Cs.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA with an estimated completion date of June 30/15. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0057).

Aug 27/12: An $11 million fixed-price-incentive contract modification, to buy more universal ground data terminals. Work will be performed in Poway, CA with an estimated completion date of April 30/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-11-C-0099).

Aug 10/12: Civil airspace. The U.S. Army has validated the design and functionality of a Phase 2 ground-based sense and avoid (GBSAA, see above) radar system that will support training flights of MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs in unrestricted airspace, beginning in 2014.

The baseline GBSAA system was demonstrated in June 2012 at Dugway Proving Ground’s unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) testbed, and the Army’s UAS Rapid Integration and Acceptance Center. The 2-week demonstration covered several “vignettes” involving live RQ-7 Shadow and RQ-5 Hunter UAVs as well as simulated UAVs and intruder aircraft. The testing also replicated the airspace over other military installations and used live and recorded air traffic data from Salt Lake City, UT and Boston’s Logan airports. AIN Online.

July 18/12: A $19 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for MQ-1C contractor logistics support. Work will be performed in Poway, CA with an estimated completion date of July 15/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-11-C-0001).

July 11/12: A $411 million fixed-price-incentive contract for Gray Eagle systems, initial spares, and additional hardware. Work will be performed in Poway, CA with an estimated completion date of March 31/15. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with one bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0057).

Looks like they got that authorization to continue Low-Rate initial Production.

June 27/12: Reliability & report. The US Army has some good news, and some bad news.

The bad news is that Gray Eagles are flying at about 80% availability rates after 24,000 combat flight hours, instead of their target 90%. The problems are mostly traceable to software issues that arise when new sensors are added.

The good news? The program is under budget. The UAVs have added weapons, ground-looking radars, and communication relays to their payload. The Army likes them a lot, and thinks they’re making a big difference, so they’ve decided to focus on expanding Gray Eagle capabilities for now, rather than trying to reach 90% availability rates. Right now, there are a pair of platoon-size 4-UAV QRC units in Afghanistan, and the “Fox 227″ full-size company of 12.

May 29/12: IOT&E funds. An $8.5 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification supplies incremental funding to support MQ-1C operational test and evaluation. The program’s IOT&E was moved back from October 2011, and is now expected in August 2012.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

May 10/12: A $141.8 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, for services in support of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of May 7/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0075).

April 4/12: Plans. The US Army discusses its plans for the MQ-1C, which includes the addition of a new Synthetic Aperture Radar with Ground Moving Target Indicator, and the development of a Universal Ground Control Station, or UGS that can show video feeds from Gray Eagle, Shadow and Hunter UAS on a single system.

A full company of 12 Gray Eagle UAS have now deployed as part of a full-spectrum Combat Aviation Brigade, and a Pentagon Defense Acquisition Board meeting is planned for mid-May 2012, to approve another Low Rate Initial Production buy. Initial Operational Test & Evaluation is scheduled for summer 2012.

March 30/12: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” for 2012. With respect to the MQ-1C, it mentions that the Army will be modifying the UAV’s tail rudder and elevator, and the GAO is now satisfied with the automatic take-off and landing system’s technical maturity:

“However, the tactical common data link is still not fully mature… its air data relay capability has been deferred until fiscal year 2012. The March 2011 accident involving an MQ-1C in testing has delayed several key program events… The Army now plans to start [IOT&E] operational testing in August 2012 [instead of October 2011, and a]… full-rate production decision was postponed from August 2012 to March 2013. The Army has already awarded two low-rate production contracts in 2010 and 2011 for 55 aircraft. To avoid a break in production, the Army is planning to seek approval to award a third low-rate contract for 29 aircraft in May 2012. Based on the current program schedule, the Army will procure more than half of the total planned aircraft before the system’s operational effectiveness and suitability is fully tested…”

Jan 26/12: Preliminary FY 2013 budget materials discuss coming shifts in Pentagon priorities, as the defense department moves to make future cuts. The USAF will get fewer MQ-9 Reapers, but the Army’s MQ-1C is protected:

“Unmanned Air Systems – fund enough trained personnel, infrastructure, and platforms to sustain 65 USAF MQ-1/9 combat air patrols (CAPs) with a surge capacity of 85; the Predator aircraft was retained longer than previously planned, allowing us to slow the buy of the Reaper aircraft and gain some savings; we also protected funding for the Army’s unmanned air system, Gray Eagle.”

See: Pentagon release | “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” [PDF]

Jan 17/12: A $30.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to support the MQ-1C Gray Eagle Quick Reaction Capability drones in theater. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of May 7/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0153).

Jan 5/12: SIGINT Pods. BAE Systems in Nashua, NH receives a $12.3 million firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for T-Pod SIGINT Systems. on the MQ-1C Unmanned Aircraft System. A December 2011 expression of interest stated that the US Army was looking for up to 5 tested and calibrated Traveler Pods within 4 months for integration work on the MQ-1C, and within 6 months for deployment. The pods are designed to find and eavesdrop on electronic emitters, identify them (enemy radio communications? radar? etc.), then offer aerial precision geolocation (APG) and copying. Pods and equipment can already be installed in larger UAVs like the USAF’s RQ-4 Global Hawks, and aboard light surveillance planes like the Beechcraft King Air MC-12Ws. The challenge is to shrink them and their supporting systems so that it falls within the MQ-1C’s weight and size limits.

Work will be performed in Nashua, NH, with an estimated completion date of Dec 27/12. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received by US Army Contracting Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD (W15P7T-12-C-C009). See also FBO.gov.

Jan 5/12: A $20.5 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to pay for operational test and evaluation. It does not specify further, but the contract is the MQ-1C’s.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Dec 30/11: A $12 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for Warrior A/Block 0 support services. These are the Quick Reaction Capability drones. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, until Dec 17/13. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-12-C-0001).

Dec 23/11: An $18 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract. “The award will provide for the modification of an existing contract to allow for incremental funding of previous change order”; it does not specify further, but the contract is the MQ-1C’s. Work will be performed in Poway, CA; Hunt Valley, MD; Salt Lake City, UT; and Lake Forest, CA, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/11. One bid was solicited, with 1 received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Nov 10/11: A $15.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee and cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification, to support the MQ-1C QRC contingents. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Jan 7/12. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0153).

Nov 9/11: An AH-64D Apache Block III attack helicopter fitted with the Unmanned Aerial Systems Tactical Common Data Link Assembly (UTA) atop its mast has controlled the payload and flight of an MQ-1C Grey Eagle UAV, while both are in flight. This marks the 1st time an unmanned vehicle has been controlled from the cockpit of an Apache helicopter.

Lockheed Martin says that the test program proved the UTA’s design, adding that: “All goals of this phase of UTA testing were completed with 100 percent success.”

Oct 17/11: A $30.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for additional MQ-1C engineering services. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Aug 30/12. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0136).

Oct 7/11: WIRED Danger Room reports that a “keylogger” virus has infected the USAF’s MQ-1A/B Predator and MQ-9 Reaper fleets:

“The virus, first detected nearly two weeks ago by the military’s Host-Based Security System, has not prevented pilots at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada from flying their missions overseas. Nor have there been any confirmed incidents of classified information being lost or sent to an outside source. But the virus has resisted multiple efforts to remove it from Creech’s computers, network security specialists say… “We keep wiping it off, and it keeps coming back,” says a source familiar with the network infection, one of three that told Danger Room about the virus. “We think it’s benign. But we just don’t know.”

Unlike the USAF, the Army’s philosophy is to operate its MQ-1C Gray Eagles in-theater. The virus doesn’t compromise Army UAVs, therefore, but it may indicate a similar vulnerability point in the Army’s network.

Oct 5/11: An $8.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract will fund RESET efforts for the Warrior A/Warrior Block 0 Unmanned Aircraft Systems. RESET is a program for worn vehicles and aircraft, involving tear-down and comprehensive inspections, followed by replacement of any worn parts, and restoration to “like new” condition. The question is whether these initially-fielded “Quick Reaction Capability” UAVs will be upgraded to full operational MQ-1C Block 1 status, complete with weapons.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of June 30/13. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-11-C-0001).

QRC-1 sunrise, Taji
(click to view full)

May 20/11: An $8.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, that buys additional spare hardware under the MQ-1C Gray Eagle’s logistics support contract. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Jan 18/12. One bid was solicited, with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0153).

April 25/11: An $8.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, providing incremental funding to cover an extension of the ER/MP system development and design contract. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/11. One bid was solicited with 1 bid received by U.S. Army AMCOM Contracting Center in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

April 12/11: +26. $173.5 million of a $354 million fixed-price-incentive-fee contract, for MQ-1C Gray Eagle low rate initial production. Queries to GA-ASI indicate that the contract covers 2 Gray Eagle systems: 26 UAVs (12 aircraft per system, plus 2 spares for losses), 15 of AAI’s OneSystem Ground Control Systems, L-3 Communications’ Satellite Communications equipment, and other peripheral equipment to support the systems.

GA-ASI says that part of this contract is for FY 2010 buys, and part is FY 2011. Work will be performed at Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of April 30/14. One bid was solicited and one received (W58RGZ-11-C-0099).

March 7/11: A $64.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification for MQ-1C Gray Eagle product support, logistical support and sustainment operations.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA; Adelanto, CA; Palmdale, CA; Salt Lake City, UT; and Hunt Valley, MD, with an estimated completion date of Nov 7/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0153).

March 2/11: +30. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in Poway, CA receives an announced $335.5 million fixed-price-incentive-fee contract for MQ-1C Gray Eagle systems. In-depth discussions with General Atomics place the order in its full context, which is somewhat complex.

In February 2010, General Atomics says the US Army placed a not-to-exceed $399 million contract, but did not appropriate any money. Their first step was the $195.5 million 49% funding contract in the May 19/10 entry. According to the firm, this award funds the remaining contract with another $115.1 million, to make a total of $310.6 million. This will include the LRIP Lot 1 order for 2 systems (24 UAVs + 2 attrition), plus the FY 2009 supplemental funding of 8 UAVs, and a sizable quantity of plus-up air, ground and communication equipment.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W56RGZ-10-C-0068).

Feb 14/11: Budget request. The Pentagon releases its FY 2012 budget request, which includes breakout information concerning the MQ-1C Gray Eagle program. The FY 2012 request is $805.8 million for 36 systems, which includes $137 million in RDT&E(Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation) funds.

Jan 18/11: Program ramp-up. A US Army release quotes Tim Owings, deputy project manager for Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems:

“We’re going to accelerate Gray Eagle yet again. We’re accelerating from two systems per year to three systems per year, which will result in seventeen systems being procured by FY 2014… Defense Acquisition Board in February of this year is expected to confirm the addition of two more Low Rate Initial Production Gray Eagle systems – each consisting of 12 air vehicles, five ground control stations and five additional attrition vehicles… The Army has already deployed two Gray Eagle “Quick Reaction Capabilities.” One QRC is now flying with Army Soldiers in Iraq and another is with U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan”

Nov 28/10: Iraq T&P work. A posting from the 1st Infantry Division discusses [Pentagon DVIDS | US Army] some of the work that goes into the Gray Eagle’s Quick Reaction Capability 1-Replacement 1 (QRC-1/R1) deployment in Iraq, which is working to pioneer Gray Eagle tactics, techniques and procedures before the UAVs are deployed throughout the Army. Some excerpts:

“The QRC1-R1 operators are working with aviators from the brigade’s Apache battalion to integrate their mission… The unit has flown nearly 7,000 accident free hours, more than 350 combat missions, produced over 16,000 surveillance-type images, and maintained a systems operational readiness rate of about 93 percent [in its first 6 months].

“…One of the biggest things we try to do is educate other units about our capabilities,” said [unit commander Capt. Michael] Goodwin. “A lot of units have the ability to use our assets, but they don’t know what we can do.” One of the most useful tools the unit offers ground troops is education on a portable system known as the OSRVT, or One Station Remote Viewing Terminal. “We’re finding that a lot of units have the OSRVT, but don’t know what it does for them,” said Goodwin. “Our company helps train the ground guys on the system, on how to access our feeds and use our aircraft to support them.” …The unit is working to prepare the aircraft to carry hellfire missiles, and is scheduled to conduct a live test of the missiles in Iraq this January.

Sgt. Brent Randal, a Gray Eagle operator deployed with QRC1-R1 and a native of Las Vegas, Nev., said that one of the aircraft’s best features is its new Synthetic Aperture Radar, or SAR. Mounted underneath the Gray Eagle’s nose, the SAR can compare high resolution images of a location taken at different times to determine whether objects have been removed from or placed at a scene… The Gray Eagle can also help ground troops communicate with their headquarters over long distances. The success of [Predator drones he flew for Task Force ODIN] helped pave the way for the Army’s acquisition of the Gray Eagle, said [former scout Staff Sgt. Raymond] Ballance.”

Nov 19/10: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in Poway, CA receives a $31.9 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, providing incremental funding to cover an extension of the ER/MP system development and design contract. Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/10. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army AMCOM Contracting Center in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Announced System Development & Demonstration contracts covered here, not including any UAV buys or any support contracts, now stand at $253.4 million.

Nov 8/10: STARLite radar. Northrop Grumman announces a contract for 40 more AN/ZPY-1 STARLite synthetic aperture ground-looking radars, bringing announced orders to 73. These lightweight radars include Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) capabilities, and will equip the Army’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs,. Under the terms of the contract option, deliveries to the Army’s Product Manager Robotic & Unmanned Sensors Program Management Office will begin in March, 2011 and conclude in March, 2012.

Pat Newby, vice president of Weapons and Sensors for Northrop Grumman’s Land and Self Protection Systems Division. “STARLite completed all first article and government testing requirements, which led to this award. These systems are ready now for immediate deployment.” See Feb 11/10, Apr 28/08 entries for more.

Oct 27/10: TRACER radar. Lockheed Martin’s tree-penetrating Tactical Reconnaissance and Counter-Concealment-Enabled Radar (TRACER) flies for the 1st time aboard NASA’s Ikhana MQ-9, because the Army Gray Eagle MQ-1C fleet that will eventually host the external unpressurized TRACER pods are all busy on operations.

TRACER is a dual-band synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), designed to detect vehicles, buildings and other man-made objects that are buried, camouflaged or concealed under trees and other foliage. The flight tests on Ikhana focused on the radar’s performance in the harsh environment of the unpressurized pod, as the TRACER system will eventually be installed on a variety of manned and unmanned aircraft. Lockheed Martin.

Oct 4/10: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in Poway, CA received a Sept 28/10 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for $5.8 million, covering ER/MP sub-engineering services for engineering and integration support, integrated logistics support, and program management.

Work will be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0136, P00018).

MQ-1C test flight
(click to view full)

Sept 10/10: A $7.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for ER/MP Quick Reaction Capability contractor logistics support replenishment sustainment spares. Work is to be performed in Poway, CA with an estimated completion date of June 6/12. One bid was solicited with 1 bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0153).

May 24/10: A $38.5 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification that pays for new contractor logistics support; a transition to performance-based logistics for the Quick Reaction Capability 1 (see December 2009 entry), QRC-1R, and QRC-2 UAVs; and a UAS training base in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

Work is to be performed in Adelanto, CA (34%); Hunt Valley, MD (24%); Poway, CA (18%); Palmdale, CA (17%); and Salt Lake City, UT (7%). The estimated completion date is May 19/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0153, #P00011).

May 19/10: +26. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in Poway, CA received a $195.5 million fixed-price-incentive-fee contract for MQ-1C supplemental hardware and low-rate initial production. Work is to be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Nov 30/12. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W58RGZ-10-C-0068).

General Atomics tells us that this is for the first half (49%) of the LRIP Lot 1 contract, and covers 2 full Sky Warrior systems (24 UAVs) and FY 2009 supplemental hardware (2 attrition UAVs). The rest of the funding is expected in a few months, and could drive this contract set to about $399 million for 34 Sky Warrior aircraft, 16 of AAI’s One System Ground Control Stations, L-3 Communications West’s airborne and ground Tactical Control Data Link (TCDL) equipment, and various other items to include automatic landing systems, spares, and ground support equipment. Beginning in December 2011, the company is scheduled to deliver over 2 MQ-1C aircraft a month through the end of 2012.

This award comes at the same time that the U.S. Army is celebrating the achievement of 1,000,000 flight hours for its entire unmanned aircraft systems fleet, of which GA-ASI Sky Warrior Alpha and Sky Warrior UAS have logged 145,000 flight hours. See also July 8/10 release.

May 7/10: Lynx radar. General Atomics announces that its Lynx Block 30 Synthetic Aperture Radar with Ground Moving Target Indicator (SAR/GMTI) has achieved over 1,000 collective mission hours on their 4 Sky Warrior Block 1 UAVs in Iraq. The radar has a broad area GMTI scanning mode for detecting moving vehicles in front and to either side, can cue the camera payload to things it “sees” by using the CLAW payload control software, and features very fast Coherent Change Detection (CCD) algorithms.

The US Army’s Quick Reaction Capability-1 (QRC-1) deployment began in December 2009. A second group of 4 Lynx Block 30 radars is scheduled to begin Limited User Testing with the Army later in May 2010, in support of this summer’s planned QRC-2 deployment. In addition to supporting QRC-1 operations with the Lynx radar, GA-ASI is providing full Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), including radar operation, image analysis, and maintenance support.

May 7/10: A $5.8 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for continued performance of the ER/MP’s SDD phase. Work is to be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/10. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command, AMCOM Constructing Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

May 6/10: A $15.2 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, exercising an option in support of the ER/MP production readiness test asset. Work is to be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of April 09/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received by U.S. Army Contracting Command, AMCOM Constructing Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-09-C-0151). Asked about this contract, General Atomics spokespeople said that:

“…this is not the other half of the [April 22/10] PRTA contract, this is an additional amount for spares and ground support equipment.”

On other topics, they add that the ER/MP’s name change from General Atomics’ Sky Warrior designation to the US Army’s Gray Eagle designation is not official – yet.

April 29/10: 1,000,000 UAV hours. The US Army announces that April 2010 saw the 1,000,000th flight hour for its UAV fleets. That’s a dramatic change from the handful of Army RQ-7 Shadow and RQ-5 Hunter systems in 2001, to roughly 1,000 UAVs by 2010 that are logging up to 25,000 of UAV flight hours per month. It has taken 13 years to put together the first 100,000 hours, followed by 8.5 years to add the next 900,000. About 88% of these flight hours are from time in combat.

The Army now operates 6 MQ-5 Hunter systems that have recently been armed, 87 RQ-7 Shadow UAS systems that are likely to become armed MQ-7 variants son, 9 MQ-1C ER/MP variants, 1,300 Raven mini-UAV systems and 16 RQ-18 gMAV systems. Each system includes several UAVs, plus launch platforms if needed and associated ground control station and communications equipment. Tim Owings, deputy program manager, Army UAS:

“Ninety-five percent of what the Army has in its inventory today did not even exist at the beginning of the war… A lot of people liken Vietnam to a helicopter war – I liken these two wars as the unmanned systems wars because these are the wars where these systems hit the central axis of the way we fight and became part and parcel to the way the Army prosecutes wars… It has been absolutely amazing, no matter how many we have built there has always been a need for more.”??

A Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) of 4 unarmed MQ-1C Block 0s were deployed to Iraq in 2009 – and another ERMP QRC is slated for Afghanistan later in 2010, armed with Hellfire missiles. The idea of the QRC is to field technologies in service of the ongoing war effort as they are available while simultaneously developing a system as a program of record.

April 22/10: +4. A $17 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to finalize a contract for ER/MP production readiness test assets. Work is to be performed in Poway, CA, with an estimated completion date of Sept 30/11. One bid was solicited with one bid received (W58RGZ-09-C-0151). In response to a query, General Atomics tells DID that the contract includes:

“…4 Sky Warrior ER/MP aircraft, 2 ER/MP One System GCS, TCDL/GDT, SGDT, TALS, etc.). The [equipment is] to be used for the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) phase that follows SDD.”

The other $23.4 million part of this contract, plus the May 6/10 contract, leaves the final price at $55.6 million for systems and support.

MQ-1C Sky Warrior
(click to view full)

March 30/10: GAO report. The US GAO audit office delivers its 8th annual “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs report. With respect to the ER/MP:

“…a Secretary of Defense memorandum to field the capability as soon as possible… affected the program in several ways. According to program officials, it extended system development and demonstration by about 2 years and delayed the award of the low-rate initial production contract by over 1 year. In accordance with the Secretary’s direction, the Army fielded one “Quick Reaction Capability” system in 2009 and plans to field another in 2010. These systems lack the full capabilities planned.”

“…All four critical technologies are now mature and have been demonstrated on the final version of the unmanned air system… The ER/MP is expected to enter low-rate initial production in early 2010 with all its manufacturing processes demonstrated in a production representative environment… the program was approved in February 2010 for low-rate initial production, and they now anticipate changes in cost, quantity, and schedule. However, official, detailed information was not available in time for inclusion in this report… the Air Force has determined it will no longer acquire the MQ-1C Predator. The Army now anticipates a DOD acquisition memorandum closing the [DoD's earlier] direction to combine the programs.”

Feb 19/10: General Atomics Aeronautical System in Poway, CA receives a $36.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, covering in-theater support for ERMP Alpha and Block 0 UAVs for the Iraqi and Afghan theaters of war. The contract will run until Nov 15/11. One bid was solicited, with one bid received (W58RGZ-10-C-0044).

Feb 18/10: Tests, and Milestone C. The US Army announces that the ER/MP has successfully completed a series of tests with the HELLFIRE II UAS missile variant, whose 360-degree targeting ability, allowing UAVs that lack a helicopter’s instant maneuverability to put missiles on target faster. Testing began on Nov 22/09, and took place at Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, CA, following cooperation from General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems, Inc.’s Software Integration Laboratory, the company’s El Mirage Flight Test Facility in El Mirage, CA, and Edwards Air Force Base, CA..

The tests began with dry runs and an inert test missile, followed by a successful “cold” pass using a live missile to verify lock-on, followed by “hot pass” firing. November and December involved testing in various conditions, from varying altitudes, against stationary or moving targets. Tests recorded 9 successful shots, which helped pave the way for the UAV’s February 2010 Milestone C approval.

Feb 13/10: The US military issues a FedBizOpps notice as it conducts market research seeking sources to provide in-theatre logistical support, to include field service representatives and maintainers to support sustainment of the AN/DAS-2 payload and the AN/AAS-53 sensor and target designation turrets. The usual winner in these cases is the contractor, especially when, as in this case, “The government does not own the technical data package for these payloads.”

The AN/DAS-2 equipped initial SkyWarriors. The day/night sensing and targeting turret contains a continuous zoom day camera, a thermal imager, a visible imager, a laser designator, and an eye-safe laser rangefinder, all packaged within a stabilized gimbal. The AN/AAS-53 “is planned to replace the AN/DAS-2 beginning in fourth quarter 2009.” FBO solicitation.

Feb 11/10: STARLite, express. Northrop Grumman announces the recent delivery of the first 2 production AN/ZPY-1 STARLite radars for the US Army’s ER/MP, under a compressed 18-month schedule. The STARLite radar [PDF] is a 65 pound synthetic aperture radar (SAR) with ground moving target indicator (GMTI) capabilities. In SAR mode, the radar provides images along the aircraft’s flight path or along a path independent of the flight path. It can also provide a high-resolution image of a specific area on the ground. In the GMTI mode, the radar provides moving target locations overlaid on a digital map. It can see through battlefield obscurants at all times of day, and in all weather. It also has software that connects with the Army One Common Ground Station.

Northrop Grumman is working under a $78.5 million contract with the Army’s Robotics and Unmanned Sensors Product Office at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD, to provide a total of 33 STARLite radar systems by April 2011.

Feb 1/10: The Pentagon releases its FY 2011 budget requests. For the ER/MP program, Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation would jump 45% to $123.2 million. Purchases would jump about 5% to $506.3 million for 29 UAVs, including 3 UAVs under OCO/war funding purchases.

Dec 11/09: Arming begins. Aviation Week reports that the Army is beginning to arm its MQ-1Cs as its pushes toward a “Milestone C” production decision. Tests at China Lake, CA began with 2 Hellfire shots in late November, and will continue until Dec 18/09.

“The soon to be re-designated Gray Eagle UAV, currently called the extended range/multi-purpose (ERMP) unmanned aircraft system by the Army, is being rushed into service with newly-formed quick reaction capability (QRC) units in Iraq and Afghanistan… the initial QRC-1 unit is now deployed in Iraq with four unarmed aircraft… The current weapons tests… form part of preparations to arm QRC-2 aircraft which will be deployed to Afghanistan in July [2010].”

Army UAS project manager Col. Gregory Gonzalez confirmed to Aviation Week that QRC-2 will have the first real weaponized MQ-1C system.

Oct 27/09: The DEW Line highlights a Raytheon Program Manager job ad that discusses possible improvements to the MQ-1C fleet:

“[Raytheon] has proposed a significant upgrade program to the baseline CSP configuration to include High Definition (HD) EO/IR capability and Target Location Accuracy (TLA) enhancements. This position is the program manager (PM) of the CSP TLA/HD (approx $30M) development program. The selected individual will be responsible for managing all aspects of the development program including start up, gate reviews, customer reviews, customer daily interface, supplier management, build of 6 integration and test systems, quality testing and flight testing. It is anticipated the CSP TLA/HD development program will result in retrofit of up to 100 baseline CSP systems and this position would manage the follow-on retrofit business. The TLA/HD upgrade program will be run in parallel with the CSP IDIQ base program and will require integration and leveraging with the on-going CSP production program.”

MQ-1C, Block 0
(click to view full)

August 2009: QRC-1 deploys. Deployment of Sky Warrior Block 1 (ER/MP program version), as the Quick Reaction Capability-1 (QRC-1). Feedback from the field will be incorporated into the QRC-2 deployment as software and hardware upgrades, and tactical changes. Source.

March 2/09: +8. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in San Diego, CA received a $35 million cost plus incentive fee, definitization of a letter contract to acquire 8 ERMP Quick Reaction Capability UAVs, and associated support equipment. This acquisition is directed by the Joint Chief of Staff to accommodate a surge of UAVs in theater.

Work is to be performed at San Diego, CA (46%); Adelanto, CA (14%); Palmdale, CA (8%); Salt Lake City, UT (18%); and Hunt Valley, MD (14%), with an estimated completion date of Jan 15/10. One bid was solicited and one bid received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Feb 5/09: No SAR. Jane’s Defence Weekly [site] reports that:

“The US Army is suspending a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) requirement for Warrior unmanned aerial systems (UASs) in order to… speed the Warrior’s deployment to theatre, where intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are in great demand.”

USAF MQ-1A/Bs currently carry the AN/APY-8 Lynx ground-looking synthetic aperture radar, which gives them the ability to notice certain kinds of objects more prominently, and to see through some obscurants like low clouds, smoke, etc. On Feb 5/09, General Atomics tested a Lynx II dual-beam variant, with a Space Time Adaptive Processing (STAP) upgrade developed in cooperation with BAE Systems. The modifications cancel the main beam’s GMTI (ground moving target indicator) clutter, which helps the radar detect slow-moving objects more accurately and at longer ranges.

Sept 18/08: General Atomics Aeronautical System in San Diego, CA received a $37.2 million cost plus incentive fee price contract for incremental funding for systems development and demonstration (including integration of the Hellfire Missile) for the ER/MP. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, Adelanto, CA, Palmdale, CA, Salt Lake City, UT, Hunt Valley, MD, and Huntsville, AL, with an estimated completion date of Aug 31/09. One hundred and twenty bids were solicited and 3 bids were received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Aug 19/08: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received a $7.9 million cost plus fixed fee contract to acquire 3 ERMP Block 0 Unmanned Aircraft in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA with an estimated completion date of March 31/10. One bid was solicited and one bid received (W58RGZ-06-C-0208).

Aug 8/08: GA-ASI issues. A US GAO decision denies Lockheed Martin’s bid protest over the BAMS maritime surveillance UAV contract – and cites ongoing performance issues with its key partner General Atomics as the reason. The GAO summary for Bid Protest B-400135 states that:

“Agency reasonably determined, in procurement for unmanned maritime surveillance aircraft, that awardee [DID: Northrop Grumman] had significant advantage over protester [DID: Lockheed Martin] with respect to past performance where: protester’s subcontractor [DID: General Atomics], responsible for approximately 50 percent of contract effort, had recent past performance history of being unable to resolve staffing and resource issues, resulting in adverse cost and schedule performance on very relevant contracts for unmanned aircraft; record did not demonstrate that protester’s subcontractor had implemented systemic improvement that resulted in improved performance; [in contrast] operating division of the awardee also had performance problems on very relevant contracts for unmanned aircraft, many had been addressed through systemic improvement; and overall performance of awardee’s team on most evaluated contract efforts was rated better than satisfactory, while the overall performance of protester’s team on 11 of 26 contract efforts was only marginal.”

The BAMS bid in question has been based on General Atomics’ Mariner, a variant of its larger MQ-9 UAV. The GAO decision then goes on to discuss these issues in more detail, including this passage:

“In contrast, however, GA-ASI’s contract performance was a matter of great concern to the agency. Specifically, while recognizing that GA-ASI had demonstrated a willingness and ability to respond on short notice to evolving Global War on Terror (GWOT) warfighter requirements, the SSEB found that GA-ASI’s performance demonstrated: inadequate staffing, resulting in performance problems on SDD contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper (a second-generation, Predator B model) and the MQ-1C Extended Range/Multipurpose (ER/MP) UAS (a second-generation Predator model); unfavorable schedule performance on four of seven relevant GA-ASI contracts, including very relevant contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper, UAS ground control stations, MQ-1C ER/MP, I-GNAT Extended Range UAS (a version of the Predator with some differences for the Army), and MQ-1 baseline Predator; poor performance in meeting technical quality requirements on three of seven GA-ASI contracts, including contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-1C ER/MP, and I-GNAT Extended Range UAS; and workload exceeded the firm’s capacity on five of seven GA-ASI contracts, including contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper, UAS ground control stations, MQ-1C ER/MP, I-GNAT Extended Range UAS, and MQ?1/MQ-9 maintenance support. In summary, the SSEB found the overall performance of GA-ASI on its very relevant contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper (most delivery orders), UAS ground control stations, MQ-1C ER/MP, and I-GNAT Extended Range UAS to be marginal.”

May 17/08: Theilert scandal. Thielert Engines insolvency administrator Dr. Bruno M. Kubler discusses the current situation in a release, including some revelations with implications for customers like General Atomics. The statement notes that attempts are being made to keep Thelert as a an operating concern, with some flexibility shown by creditors and Frank Thielert may not be CEO, but he remains the personal holder of key permits and therefore remains involved. Meanwhile:

• German insolvency law does not permit the assumption of warranties or guarantees free of charge for products and services supplied prior to the declaration of insolvency. Parts supplied after insolvency can be warrantied, but the firm is in no position to do so. Dr. Kubler hopes that aircraft manufacturers will step in.

• Higher prices will be charged for engines and spares.

• Payment in advance is now required, but assurances are made re: delivery once payment is made.

• The firm’s #1 customer, Diamond Aircraft, has pushed for concessions and preferential deals with Thielert, using both private negotiations and public tactics. Relations are deteriorating, but the firms are still negotiating.

April 28/08: STARLite radar. Northrop Grumman announces that its STARLite has been selected by the U.S. Army Communication-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command to equip ER/MP UAVs. The initial $42 million contract will finalize development, and deliver 10 radars.

The ground looking SAR/GMTI (Sythetic Aperture Radar with Ground Moving Target Indicator) fills the niche that General Atomics’ own AN/APY-8 Lynx radar occupies on USAF MQ-1A/B Predators.

April 16/08: +8. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA receives $38.5 million cost-plus incentive fee contract for the acquisition of 8 ER/MP quick reaction capability unmanned aircraft vehicles and assorted support equipment.

Work will be performed primarily in San Diego, CA and is expected to be complete on May 15/09. One bid was solicited on March 17/08 (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

April 10/08: Theilert insolvency. SkyWarrior engine maker Thielert issues a release concerning their “urgent liquidity crisis.” The act is not an isolated incident, but rather a culmination of trends that include formal charges of accounting fraud and falsification of documents.

It is followed by a declaration of insolvency in May 2008.

March 31/08: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. flies the first Sky Warrior Block 1 UAV from the company’s El Mirage Flight Operations Facility in Adelanto, CA. GA-ASI release.

March 3/08: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received an $18.7 million cost-plus incentive fee contract that provides incremental funding for system development and demonstration of the ER/MP UAV. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA; Adelanto, CA; Palmdale, CA; Salt Lake City, UT; Hunt Valley, MD; and Huntsville, AL; and is expected to be complete by Aug 31/09. There were 120 bids solicited on Sept 1/04, and 3 bids were received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Feb 14/08: Raytheon announces 2 U.S. Army orders totaling $17.2 million for 18 common sensor payloads, as system design and development continues. The article does not give details that would confirm the Nov 7/07 entry as one of those contracts, but it is possible. The firm states that they’ve delivered 10 AN/DAS-2 sensors so far.

Nov 7/07: Raytheon Co. in McKinney, TX received a delivery order amount of $11 million as part of an $800 million firm-fixed-price and cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for common sensors for the ARH-70A helicopter and the MQ-1C Sky Warrior ER/MP UAV. Work will be performed in McKinney, TX and is expected to be complete by Oct. 31, 2016. Bids were solicited via the World Wide Web on April 24, 2007, and 5 bids were received by the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command in Fort Monmouth, NJ (W15P7T-08-D-S602).

Raytheon’s release adds that the program calls for design and development, testing and air vehicle integration of a variant of Raytheon’s Multi-spectral Targeting System, in a project could be worth up to $1.2 billion for 875 units, if all options are exercised. See also Raytheon Feature | Common Sensor Platform product page. Raytheon’s CSP completes its Predator family trifecta; it also supplies the AN/DAS-1 system that equips MQ-1 Predator UAVs, and the AN/AAS-52 on MQ-9 Reapers. With respect to deliveries to the Sky Warrior program thus far:

“The company has delivered 10 AN/DAS-2 electro-optical/ infrared/ laser designator sensors under a system design and development contract let in May 2005. At the beginning of this year, the Army ordered seven more systems under a low rate production option.”

Oct 19/07: General Atomics Aeronautical System in San Diego, CA received a $20.8 million increment as part of a $231.2 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for system development and demonstration for the ER/MP UAV Vehicle, including integration of the Hellfire Missile.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (43%), Adelanto, CA (14%), Palmdale, CA (8%), Salt Lake City, UT (18%), Hunt Valley, MD (14%), and Huntsville, AL (3%), and is expected to be complete by Aug 31/09. There were 120 bids solicited on Sept. 1, 2004, and 3 bids were received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Oct 1-17/07: UAV Wars. DID talks to the US Army about the SkyWarrior program. Going forward, the USAF will manage the program according to jointly agreed requirements, but each service will maintain its own budget for the UAVs it wants.

A common version will be selected and approved by late 2008, but no decision has been reached re: which version will predominate: the MQ-1B Block X/MQ-1C with 4 missile pylons and a heavy fuel engine that can burn diesel, or the existing MQ-1 that burns aviation fuel and has 2 missile pylons.

Oct 1/07: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received a $27.5 million modification to a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for contractor logistics support for the Sky Warrior Block 0 Unmanned Aircraft System.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (80%); Hunt Valley, MD (10%); and Salt Lake City, UT (10%); and is expected to be complete by Sept. 27, 2008. This was a sole source contract initiated on Sept. 14, 2007 (DAAH01-03-C-0124).

MQ-1C Sky Warrior
(click to view full)

Sept 28/07: UAV Wars. In its Daily Report for this date, the Air Force Association’s Air Force Magazine Online discusses the UAV executive agency issue:

“Defending the recent Pentagon decision not to give the Air Force executive agency over medium- to high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, Army Secretary Pete Geren told defense reporters Thursday that the Army’s modernization goals don’t fit with an executive agent approach. “The need for control with UAVs fits close to the individual soldier,” Geren said. Part of the Army’s Future Combat Systems program is to empower soldiers and give them greater control over assets such as UAVs. He noted that Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley have met on the issue recently to work out disagreements. “Some of the disagreements have arisen because these issues have not been tackled at a high enough level,” Geren said. While sympathetic to the Air Force’s perspective, he noted that an executive agent approach that’s advocated by some would make sense if we were fighting a conventional war. “It’s a different debate when you’re talking about the kind of fight we are in today,” Geren declared.”

See also Military.com’s article re: the decision fallout.

Sept 13/07: UAV Wars. Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England rejects Air Force efforts to become the executive agent for all medium- and high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, over objections from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. In his memo, England directed the Pentagon’s acquisition office to create a task force on UAV issues to “enhance operations, enable interdependencies, and streamline acquisition” of the drones. He also directed Pentagon officials to take other steps to foster cross-service collaboration on the UAV programs.

The Predator and SkyWarrior programs, however, have been merged. The exact meaning of that move remains to be seen – either to standardize the Predator on a similar SkyWarrior/MQ-1C version, or eliminate the Warrior variant and use existing MQ-1As. Aviation Week | GovExec | The Hill.

Aug 22/07: A $5.15 million increment as part of a $215.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for system development and demonstration for the ER/MP UAV. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (43%), Adelanto, CA (14%), Palmdale, CA (8%), Salt Lake City, UT (18%), Hunt Valley, MD (14%), and Huntsville, AL (3%), and is expected to be complete by Aug. 31, 2009. There were 120 bids solicited on Sept. 1, 2004, and 3 bids were received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

According to DID’s calculations based on DefenseLINK public announcements, about $167 million of the $215.4 million ER/MP program’s contracts have been issued as of this increment.

Aug 6/07: +2 YMQ-1C. General Atomics in San Diego, CA received a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for $7.3 million to provide 2 Pre-Production YMQ-1C Block X aircraft. General Atomics has confirmed to DID that these are USAF versions of the Army Sky Warrior. See the May 7/07 entry and Appendix A for details; this award should be seen in the context of the USAF’s effort to take over UAV authority.

At this time, total funds have been obligated. Solicitations began in April 2006, negotiations were completed in July 2007, and work will be complete in January 2009 (FA8620-05-G-3028-0018).

July 5/07: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA received a $14.7 million increment as part of a $215.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for system development and demonstration for the ER/MP Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (43%), Adelanto, CA (14%), Palmdale, CA (8%), Salt Lake City, UT (18%), Hunt Valley, MD (14%), and Huntsville, AL (3%), and is expected to be complete by Aug. 31, 2009. There were 120 bids solicited on Sept. 1, 2004, and 3 bids were received (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

June 27/07: UAV Wars. Air Force Times report: With the question of whether there should be an executive agency in charge of medium- and high-altitude UAVs still hanging in the air, U.S. deputy defense secretary Gordon England wrote in a letter earlier in June to Army and Air Force leaders asking the services to collaborate on procuring and operating the Predator and Warrior UAVs. Army and Air Force officials were asked to submit briefings to England by the end of June 2007.

May 17/07: UAV Wars. The Congressional Government Accountability Office releases report #GAO-07-578, “Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems,” which explicitly discusses the possible merger of Warrior & Predator programs. It mentions that “The Air Force and the Army are currently working to identify program synergies in a three-phased approach:

• First, the Air Force will acquire and test two of the more modern Warrior airframes.

• Second, the two services will compare their requirements for ground control stations and automated takeoff and landing.

• Finally, the Army and Air Force plan to compare concepts of operation and training requirements for additional synergies.”

May 10/07: The JROC directs the USAF to flesh out its executive agency plan. No firm deadline is set, and no firm decision is taken.

May 7/07: “Predator Block X”. General Atomics in San Diego, CA received a $10.1 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract from the USAF’s Headquarters Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. This contract action will provide a series of required tasks to design, fabricate, integrate, and test the Predator MQ-1B Block X aircraft which will utilize a Heavy Full Engine (HFE), will support a 3,200 lbs gross take-off weight, and will carry 4 Hellfire missiles (2 on each wing). The Predator MQ-1B Block X shall leverage off technology from the existing Predator B (MQ-9) program, the Army’s ER/MP program, and on-going GA-ASI internal research and development efforts. At this time, total funds have been obligated. Solicitations began June 2006 and negotiations were complete April 2007 (FA8620-05-G-3028-0016).

It should come as no surprise to anyone that the ability to operate the engine on “heavy” fuels like diesel, and to carry 4 Hellfire missiles instead of 2, constitute the two biggest differences between the USAF’s MQ-1 Predator and the Army’s Warrior UAV. This award should be seen in the context of the USAF’s effort to take over UAV authority, vid. Appendix A.

May 7/07: UAV Wars. Officials with the DoD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) meet with Army and Air Force officials to discuss proposals to put all such UAVs under a single executive agency. See Appendix A for more background.

April 6/07: General Atomics Aeronautical System in San Diego, CA received a $5.3 million modification to a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for ERMP Block 0 UAVs. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (65%), Adelanto, CA (5%), Palmdale, CA (5%), and Salt Lake City, UT (25%), and is expected to be complete by Aug. 31, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 21, 2006 (W58RGZ-06-C-0208).

March 5/07: UAV Wars. US Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley’s circulates a memo, proposing to name his service as the Pentagon executive agent for UAVs. See Appendix A for more background.

Feb 14/07: 4 more. General Atomics Aeronautical System in San Diego, CA received an $11.7 million modification to a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for acquisition of 4 ERMP Block 0 UAVs, associated support equipment, and initial spares. This appears to be the initial installment on the test aircraft.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (65%), Adelanto, CA (5%), Palmdale, CA (5%), and Salt Lake City, UT (25%), and is expected to be complete by Dec. 18, 2007. This was a sole source contract initiated on June 21, 2006 (W58RGZ-06-C-0208).

Jan 9/07: FCS changes. The US Army restructures its $160+ billion Future Combat Systems program, and “delays”/ eliminates its Class II and Class III UAVs. The Warrior ERMP is expected to be one of the existing systems filling the Class III brigade-level gap.

Dec 22/06: General Atomics Aeronautical System, San Diego, CA was received a $63.1 million increment as part of “a $215.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for System Development and Demonstration for the Extended Range / Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.”

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (43%), Adelanto, CA (14%), Palmdale, CA (8%), Salt Lake City, UT (18%), Hunt Valley, MD (14%), and Huntsville, AL (3%), and is expected to be complete by Aug. 31, 2009. There were 120 bids solicited on Sept. 1, 2004, and 3 bids were received by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

March 13/06: DID – Warrior UAV Program Underway. $67 million increment received for the Warrior program, as part of a “$214.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for System Development and Demonstration for the Extended Range / Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” (W58RGZ-05-C-0069).

Oct 6/05: DID – AAI Takes Another UAV Ground Control Project. A $30 million subcontract for the Warrior UAV’s ground control.

Appendix A: US Army et. al. vs. USAF Over UAVs

US Army Air Corps

Faced with an aerial tanker fleet that’s 50+ years old, front line fighters under flight restrictions due to age and fatigue, and heavy strain on transport aircraft resources, the USAF has been making strenuous efforts to take over the UAV domain. At the moment, UAVs are bought by individual services: Army, Navy, USAF, Marines. The Army in particular has been using UAVs for reconnaissance and persistent fire support, as in-house assets that involve less organizational friction to deploy, and can be prioritized for purchase according to the needs of soldiers on the ground.

The USAF had asked for authority over all American UAVs before, but this was refused. The Pentagon’s JROC(Joint Requirements Oversight Committee) determined that an executive agent was not necessary. Instead, they created the Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Center of Excellence at Creech Air Force Base, NV to share operational tips; and the Joint Unmanned Aerial Systems Materiel Review Board in order to work out best practices for materiel. There is also a US Army UAV Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, AL.

The end of the argument? No, because of the organizational and budgetary threat that non-USAF UAVs represent.

Viper Strike
(click to view larger)

One measure of the potential threat can be inferred from usage figures. As of September 2007, MQ-1 Predator UAVs had reached 300,000 flight hours since inception around 2001, of which 80% were combat flight. Fully 1/3 of those flight hours were accumulated in the previous 12 months, and total fleet flying hours had risen to 10,000 hours/month. On Nov 9/07, Jane’s International Defense Review reported that by the end of the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2007, US Army UAVs had flown a total of 295,181 hours in Iraq, nearly 18% of the total hours flown by the army aviation fleet.

Well below a Predator’s size threshold, US Army RQ-7 Shadow battalion-level UAVs are racking up 8,000 flight hours per month in Iraq (almost equal to the Predators’ recent totals), accompanied by US Army RQ-5 Hunter aircraft that sit somewhere between a Predator and Shadow in size and are accumulating their own flight time. Smaller UAVs like the popular RQ-11 Raven, meanwhile, are racking up their own significant totals, with shorter flight times offset by much larger numbers in the field to produce 300,000 flight hours in 2007 alone. The Army reached 1 million UAV flight hours for its fleet of RQ-5 Hunter, RQ-7 Shadow, RQ-11 Raven, RQ-18 gMAV, and MQ-1C ER/MP UAVs in April 2010, and is adding to that at 25,000 hours per month.

The RQ-5 Hunters have been tested with Viper Strike mini-bombs, and the Shadows may be eligible as well if the Army wishes. Shadows will certainly be eligible for NAVAIR’s 5-6 pound Spike missile project (scheduled for an autumn 2007 UAV test), and all UAVs can provide targeting for M30 GPS-guided MLRS rockets, long-range ATACMS MLRS missiles, or the 155mm Excalibur artillery shells entering service in Q3 2007. Larger UAVs like the Sky Warrior add Hellfire II missiles, the 250 lb. Small Diameter Bombs, and 250 – 500 lb. GPS-guided JDAMs or laser-guided Paveway bombs to the mix.

With these fire support assets on the airframe or on call, most close air support functions encountered in counterinsurgency missions can be covered.

Manned fighters offer their own advantages: anti-air capabilities, a payload capacity several times a UAV’s, greatly improved panoramic visibility, no need for potentially vulnerable or limited-bandwidth long-range communications in order to fly, better intimidation presence via fast flyovers, and better survivability/ fewer crashes. In counterinsurgency scenarios, however, air threats are minimal to nonexistent, fighters are usually loaded with just a couple of weapons; and except for the A-10 or dedicated COIN (COunter-INsurgency) turboprops, the planes are moving so quickly that they must rely on targeting pods with the same narrow field of view as a UAV pilot’s. That still leaves intimidation and survivability advantages, but your average jet fighter is extremely expensive to buy, has a 7,000 – 10,000 hour airframe life, costs many multiples of dollars per flight hour to operate, and offers an on-station time that is usually less than half that of a Predator class MALE UAV.

Specialty close-support aircraft like the USA’s A-10, gunships like the AC-130s, and even COIN turboprops offer combinations of affordability and/or compelling advantages that keep them competitive in counterinsurgency scenarios. Can the same be said for the USAF’s F-16s, F-15… or its future F-35 Lightning II and F-22A Raptor fighters? In their January 2007 article “UAVs With Bite,” Air Force Magazine notes that:

“The Air Force now has provisional plans to buy some 170 Predator MQ-1s by 2010 and acquire 50 to 70 MQ-9s by around 2012, for a total of 220 or more of the combat-capable drones. At present, the service plans on retiring a comparable number of F-16s over the same period.”

MQ-1 Predator:
circling to kill?
(click to view full)

This calculus is why some observers saw the UAV fight as the “Key West Agreement” fight for the 21st century, with the outcome determining the future organizational backbone and role of the USAF – and other services besides.

Hence the USAF’s persistence. The USAF’s return foray in March 2007 involved a move to take over acquisition authority for all UAVs designed to operate at “medium or high altitudes.” Battalion-level UAVs like the RQ-7 Shadow 200 might or might not escape, but even so the maneuver would neatly strip away virtually all armed UAVs, and hence the bureaucratic threat of Army UAVs evolving toward the USAF’s close air support role. Besides, with the USAF re-organizing its ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) assets into their own dedicated function, they can always come back for the rest later under a “unified ISR” claim, once a large portion of UAV acquisition and prioritization are already under their control.

The ER/MP Warrior program is obviously a front-line target in this fight, given its derivation from the MQ-1 Predator UAVs the USAF had already bought in quantity, before switching future orders to the larger MQ-9 Reaper.

Three broad-brush outcomes were possible:

# The US Army and USAF retain separate control of their UAVs, and continue to work out standards et. al. through the established joint centers of excellence; Warrior program unaffected.
# The USAF does NOT acquire executive authority over UAVs, but there is consolidation between the US Army and USAF MQ-1 variants/programs to a common version. This is the current state. The Warrior program survives only if it becomes that common version.
# The USAF acquires executive authority over “medium to high altitude” UAVs. The ER/MP Warrior UAV program is almost certainly canceled, future USMC programs are under threat, and the Navy will have to fight to maintain control of its own programs.

In the end, the answer was solution #1, with a twist. The USAF also switched its future UAV production plans from the Predator to the MQ-9 Reaper, whose high altitude performance and 3,000 pound ordnance load give it dramatically different capabilities.

There’s obviously a larger debate going on here. The Kasserine Pass disaster in World War 2, where commanders in quiet sectors refused to turn over their aircraft to units under fire, provided the impetus for today’s TacAir system, which puts airmen in charge of managing and allocating air assets in response to the needs of the ground commander. At some level, the USAF arguments hark back to that concept, and to the 1948 “Key West Accords,” which ended up turning Army Aviation into a helicopter force. There’s also a procurement angle, as noted during coverage of USAF Chief of Staff Moseley’s testimony on this issue before Congress:

“Without an executive agency, the services will likely continue their separate design and procurement efforts, and the DOD will have forfeited the considerable savings it could have realized. Additionally, DOD will have lost an opportunity to create and harness the interservice synergies that would result from building upon — rather than duplicating — each service’s strengths, General Moseley said.”

On the other hand, the US Army hasn’t always felt well served by the USAF’s procurement priorities, which many feel have tended to emphasize high-end USAF assets at the expense of some key roles (forward observation, light transport, close support) needed by troops on the ground. That fact that UAVs serve in a couple of the roles that have previously received short shrift doesn’t make the Army feel any better. They also worry that a service run by fighter jocks is likely to steer unmanned systems away from anything that might intrude on their established roles, or call high-ticket platforms into question. The last 40 years of organizational and political theory tends to support that worry.

Tim Owings, deputy project manager for the Army’s unmanned aircraft systems:

“From our perspective, consistently what has come out of theater is the need for our commanders to have direct control and ownership of the UAV application. That has played out in every theater that we have been in.”

In 2010, director of the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Timothy Muchmore brought the issue into sharp relief, when he was quoted as saying that:

“The air power provided by our sister services has dominated the third dimension, but the Army is unable to leverage that third dimension… We’ve had two combat outposts overrun by superior forces [during the past year]. Those are losses that we consider unacceptable, because we couldn’t see what was going on around the outposts.”

Anyone who has worked in a large organization can see the shape of the bureaucratic battle here. On one side, you have the staff department, preaching the benefits and savings of centralization and standards, and urging central control over the function. Some of those benefits may be real. Some of the “joint” and “team” rhetoric may also be real. But the real issue is control. On the other hand, you have the front-line business unit managers who want resources that are dedicated to their needs – and under their clear authority, in order to ensure required accountability and service levels. Some of that may be required. Still, the key is not so much the promised dedication as the control that guarantees it. Throw in a central department that has sometimes placed business unit needs lower on the priority scale than their own long term plans, add a dash of politics, and stir.

The US Navy, with a long history of running its own aviation programs, and the qualifying UCAS-D unmanned strike aircraft and BAMS maritime reconnaissance UAV programs underway, will not be watching idly. Nor will the US Marines, who also operate integrated aircraft and have UAV plans of their own.

There’s always a proper balance point in any organization, and points beyond which either central control or local control of key functions can become dysfunctional. The thing is, there’s no set recipe. It’s different in each organization, and depends on the situation, past institutional performance, and (legitimately) on the personalities involved at the time.

Where is that balance point for the US military and UAVs? Because there’s a larger issue a-wing beyond the ER/MP program – and this time, getting the answer right really is a matter of life and death.

• = DID is aware that the US Army Air Corps no longer exists.

Footnotes

fn1. A communication from General Atomics to DID referred to the platform as the “MC-1C”, a designation DID subsequently used in the article. Andreas Parsch of the fine site Designation Systems asked some questions about that, and the investigation revealed that it had been a typo. DID has corrected the article accordingly. Danke schön, Andreas.

Appendix B: Who Controls the UAVs? Readings & Primers

• Associated Press – Rise of the Machines: UAV Use Soars. Very interesting facts and figures concerning UAV use.

• US Army (April 29/10) – Army surpasses 1 million unmanned flight hours

• National Defense Magazine (April 2010) – Army on a Fast Track to Build its Own High-Tech Air Force

• National Defense (February 2010) – Army to Air Force: We Won’t Give Up Our Surveillance Aircraft. They back that up with anecdotes about USAF UAVs leaving enemies to plant land mines, and Army UAVs saving lives.

• National Defense (January 2010) – Air Force to Army: There Are Better Ways to Deploy Surveillance Aircraft. The Army disagrees.

• C4ISR Magazine (Nov 1/09) – Different courses: New-style UAV trainees edge toward combat

• General Atomics (Sept 15/08) – GA-ASI War Fighter Support Reaches Historic Proportions.
  

“Predator-series aircraft have amassed over a half-million flight hours and will soon complete 50,000 total missions, with 85-percent of that time spent in combat… Predator-series aircraft are now flying over 20,000 hours a month supporting U.S. coalition forces in combat and homeland security requirements… In the past year alone, monthly flight hours have doubled. Over 300 Predator-series aircraft have been produced to date”

• DID (Aug 29/08) – UAMS Experiment Brings Deconfliction Closer for Smaller UAVs. If efforts like UAMS succeed, the argument for single-service UAV control suffers a major blow.

• US Army (July 3/08) – Leaders discuss new joint unmanned aerial operations. “Army and Air Force leaders met Monday to discuss developing a new joint unmanned aerial system concept of operations…”

• NY Times (June 22/08) - At Odds With Air Force, Army Adds Its Own Aviation Unit. Project ODIN includes both manned C-12s and UAVs like SkyWarrior. “The work of the new aviation battalion was initially kept secret, but Army officials involved in its planning say it has been exceptionally active, using remotely piloted surveillance aircraft to call in Apache helicopter strikes with missiles and heavy machine gun fire that have killed more than 3,000 adversaries in the last year and led to the capture of almost 150 insurgent leaders.” See also…

• CASR (June 22/08) – Counterinsurgency Legacy – US Army Aviation Supports its Own: US Air Force turns out to be too Tardy to be Tactically Useful. Excerpts and background the NYT article. The US Army is reportedly seeking money to raise a similar unit in Afghanistan by late 2008/early 2009.

• Military.com (March 18/08) – Army Embarks on Ambitious UAV Program. Discusses key tactical and operational differences between the Army and USAF’s use of UAVs.

• US Air Force Association, Air Force Magazine (October 2007) – The Big Squeeze. Describes steps the USAF is taking to improve its ISR capabilities, the challenges, and some of the platforms involved. As recapitalization of major assets is pushed back, UAV/UAS options will grow in popularity.

• Lexington Institute (Sept 5/07) – Army Plans For Reconnaissance Drones Misuse A Vital Asset. Loren Thompson’s analysis explains the drivers at both ends of the UAV controversy without really addressing the implications of each, and without securing some underlying assumptions re: employment. Both sets of drivers and assumptions may even be true as written, and the question then becomes one of priorities:

bq. “Only 34 of the 1,200 drones U.S. forces are using in Southwest Asia can operate beyond the line of sight of ground controllers, so sometimes the wait for access to that handful of planes can be quite lengthy… Under the Army plan, if five divisions were deployed in Iraq (as is presently the case), their combined inventory of 60 Predators would be able to keep 12-15 aloft at any given time. In contrast, the approach used by the Air Force can keep nearly three times as many drones in the air because the availability of the fleet is not tied to rotation patterns and concentrating all the drones at a few sites permits maintenance efficiencies.”

• Air Force Magazine (July 2007) – The Drone War [PDF, see also Greater Synergies Possible for DOD’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems

• Defense News (May 14/07) – USAF Pushes Plan To Handle Pan-Service UAVs

• USAF Aim Points (April 27/07) – JROC wants Air Force to flesh out its UAV ‘Executive Agent’ proposal

• In From the Cold (April 27/07) – An “Executive Agent” for UAVs?

• Shephard UVOnline (April 21/07) – US Air Force official testifies on UAV executive agent issue

• Shephard UVOnline (April 16/07) – US military officials discuss executive agency for UAVs

• Aviation Week & Space Technology (April 2/07) – U.S. Army faults Air Force in UAV debate

• Defense Tech (Dec 13/06) – So Long, Key West

• DID (March 27/06) – USAF’s 25-Year Take on UAV Operations & Management

• DID (Aug 29/05) – USA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 2005-2030. That roadmap is already changing.

Additional Readings

• Defense Update – Warrior ERMP UAV System

• GlobalSecurity.org – ERMP Warrior

• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems – Sky Warrior (MQ-1C ER/MP UAS)

• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems – Predator (MQ-1)

• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems – Predator B (MQ-9 Reaper)

• USAF (Oct 15/07) – Putting a Reaper in the skies over Afghanistan, a chain of successes. The aircraft was fielded 2 years early.

• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems – I-GNAT. The Predator’s predecessor.

• US Air Force Association, Air Force Magazine – UAVs With Bite. Places the Predator family, Reaper, et. al. in a larger context.

• Raytheon – AN/DAS-2 Common Sensor Platform product page | Feature

• Northrop Grumman – AN/ZPY-1 STARLite Small Tactical Radar – Lightweight

• Alter Net (Oct 16/11) – America’s Secret Empire of Drone Bases: Its Full Extent Revealed for the First Time

• US Army (Jan 18/11) – Army expanding UAS fleet, speeding up delivery

• Strategy Page (April 30/09) – Cylons 1, Humans 0. “The army uses automatic landing software for its larger UAVs [including the MQ-1C], while the air force does not [using human pilots instead]. Thus the air force has lost about a third of its UAVs to various equipment problems and operator errors, while the army loss rate was less than half that.”

• Thanks to DID correspondent Trent Telenko for his assistance.

• The Pentagon’s latest proposition for furloughs of its civilian employees is down to 11 days, spread between July 8 and the end of FY13 on Sept. 30. That’s half of their earliest estimate and the exact number of unpaid days might still get lower. Announcement | Background briefing.

• The US Department of Defense recently established policy 4140.67 [PDF] on counterfeit prevention. Briefly: don’t buy counterfeit components!

• The US Army Contracting Command in Warren, MI, has an RFI out to determine industry capability to develop systems that enable remote and semi-autonomous control of HMEE-1 excavators and RG31s. This would not be a proper MILSPEC RFI without an acronym, so here goes: this plugs into the Route Clearance and Interrogation System (RCIS). On background, an addendum [PDF] to an Unmanned Ground Systems roadmap published last year.

• French shipbuilders DCNS and Piriou are taking their partnership beyond the building of Gowind OPVs with the creation [PDF, in French] of Kership, a joint venture dedicated to ships for nonmilitary state actors (i.e. coast guards, customs, police…).

• Speaking of DCNS, Mer et Marine is less than convinced [in French] by a recent article from Defense News claiming (based on an anonymous source) that the French government wants to sell DCNS to Thales. It sounds more like a consolidation scenario among many than a sure thing, as the French government is struggling with a stalled economy and was recently lambasted by the Cour des Comptes (roughly a GAO/NAO) for weak management of its defense portfolio.

• French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will meet [in French] his British and American peers to present the country’s latest whitepaper. The full document is not available in English, but the MINDEF at least translated an exec summary [PDF].

• How many American troops will stay in Afghanistan after 2014 should be announced soon. That decision will shape what other allies such as Germany will do.

• Is the British MoD’s future equipment plan realistic based on future budgets? Some members of Parliament have their doubts, in today’s video:

This free-to-view DID Spotlight article offers an in-depth look at India’s troubled attempt to convert and field a full-size aircraft carrier, before time and wear force it to retfrb 21/08ire its existing naval aviation and ships.

India faced 2 major challenges. One was slipping timelines, which risked leaving them with no aircraft carriers at all. The other challenge involved Vikramaditya’s 3-fold cost increase, as Russia demanded a re-negotiated contract once India was deeper into the commitment trap. The carrier purchase has now become the subject of high level diplomacy, involving a shipyard that can’t even execute on commercial contracts. A revised deal was finally signed in March 2010, even as deliveries of India’s new MiG-29K naval fighters got underway – but now Russia still has to make good. This article tracks the changes India is making to its new aircraft carrier, key characteristics, and a full history of contracts and events affecting this carrier and its planned aircraft contingent.

INS Vikramaditya: India’s New Carrier

After.
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Russian naval doctrine saw the 45,000t Admiral Gorshkov as a missile cruiser, with a complement of aircraft. India wants a full-fledged aircraft carrier. Getting there requires extensive modifications.

The cruiser-carrier’s guns, anti-shipping and air defense missile launchers on the front deck are being removed. In their place, India wants a full runway and ski jump, a deck that has been widened in numerous places, and a bigger and stronger rear aircraft elevator.

Core ship systems are also slated for modernization. The boilers are being changed out to run on diesel fuel, for instance, and communications will be improved. One nasty surprise was that most of the ship’s old wiring had to be replaced. Adding more reliable, higher capacity wiring will help make Gorshkov a fully modern ship, but it has been very labor intensive and expensive.

INS Vikramaditya’s weakness will be defensive. An official Indian CAG report says that INS Vikramadirya will have no aerial defenses until 2017. The ship is scheduled to be retrofitted with a last-ditch close-in gun system at that point, which might be the Russian SA-N-11 Kashtan-M combination gun/ short range missile system.

Gorshkov-Vikramaditya: Aerial Complement

Ka-31 AEW
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Many of Gorshkov’s key modifications are aircraft-related, including the new arrester gear and ski jump. That’s just the down-payment on the final cost of an operational carrier, because the aircraft are bought separately.

The original cruiser-carrier’s complement was 12 Yak-38 Forger V/STOL(Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing) fighters, 12 Ka-28 helicopters, and 2 Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters. The removal of the Gorshkov’s forward missiles, addition of the ski ramp, and other modifications will improve the ship’s air complement, but the nature of its original design means that INS Vikramaditya will still fall short of comparably-sized western counterparts.

The 43,000t FNS Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is about the same size, with a 40-plane complement that leans heavily to fighter jets. In contrast, carriage ranges given for the refitted Vikramaditya seem to converge around 16 fighters and 10 compact Ka-28/31 helicopters.

The FS Charles de Gaulle will also have an advantage in surveillance coverage, thanks to catapults that let her operate E-2C Hawkeye 2000 airborne early warning planes. INS Vikramaditya won’t have that option, because it doesn’t have a launch catapult. India’s is reported to be interested in E-2C+/E-2D Hawkeyes, but they would probably operate from shore. The carrier’s AEW complement, if any, is almost certain to use India’s Ka-31 helicopters instead. That means a smaller radar, on a slower platform, offering much less coverage.

MiG-29K 3-view
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Vikramaditya’s fighters will also be Russian. Its air wing will draw on a fleet of 45 Indian MiG-29Ks, thanks to about $1.95 billion in contracts. The initial $740 million contract for 16 MiG-29K (12 MiG-29K, 4 two-seat MiG-29KUB) aircraft plus training and maintenance was confirmed on Dec 22/04. The contract’s option for another 29 planes, rumored to be worth another $1.2 billion, was signed in March 2010. The MiGs would be operated in STOBAR (Short Take-Off via the ski ramp, But Assisted Recovery via arresting wires) mode.

MiG’s design was reportedly selected over the larger and more-capable SU-33 naval fighter for several reasons. One is that India already operates a large fleet of MiG-29s, and has been improving its ability to maintain them in country. Another reason is that India also wants to operate naval fighters from its locally-built 37,500t – 40,000t “Project-71 Air Defence Ship” (Vikrant Class) STOBAR carriers. The SU-33s wouldn’t be an ideal choice for a carrier that size, Britain hadn’t yet put its Harrier feet up for sale, and India’s own Tejas Naval fighter project remained a high-risk option. That left the MiG-29K as India’s only rational choice, and Russia later decided to buy the type for use on its own carriers.

Waiting for Gorshkov – A History

On Jan 20/04 India and Russia signed a $947 million deal to refurbish and convert the Soviet/Russian Admiral Gorshkov into a full carrier, to be re-named INS Vikramaditya. The announced delivery date for INS Vikramaditya was August 2008 – an ambitious schedule, but one that would allow the carrier to enter service in 2009, around the time as their 29,000t light carrier INS Viraat (formerly HMS Hermes, last of the Centaur class) was scheduled to retire. The new carrier would berth at the new Indian Navy facility in Karwar, on India’s west coast.

That was the plan. Unfortunately, the Vikramaditya story is sadly typical of both Indian defense procurement, and of Russia’s defense industry.

Denial, Delay & Disagreement

Initial reports of delays sparked controversy and denials in India, but subsequent events more than justified them. Slow negotiations and steadily-lengthening delivery times quickly pushed delivery of the Gorshkov back to 2010, and then to 2012 or later, even as Russia’s asking price more than doubled. India’s sunk construction costs, Russian possession of the Gorshkov, the difficulty in finding a substitute carrier to replace the Gorshkov sooner than 2013, and the Chinese push with the Varyag, have all combined to give the Russians substantial leverage in their negotiations.

They have exploited that leverage to the fullest. Cost estimates and reports concerning the Gorshkov’s final total now hover in the $2.9 billion range, following the revised project agreement of March 2010.

As is customary with Indian defense procurement, transparency arrived only after after all other alternatives had been exhausted.

When reports first surfaced that this delivery date would not be met, India’s Ministry of Defence initially tried to deflect the issue with denials and obfuscation. In May 2007, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta said the ships will be delivered:

“…by late 2008 or early 2009… Our officials, who are stationed at the spot, have said that the work is going on as per schedule and we can have a month long delay once the work is completed as that part of Russia is frozen for a long time.”

Later comments on this issue included this May 1/07 quote:

“The work is only three to four months behind schedule and we can expect the aircraft carrier to be delivered by late 2008 or early 2009″

Neither assessment turned out to be true, and subsequent updates proved the critics to be correct. After the delivery delays could no longer be denied, the initial approach was to minimize their length. February 2008 news reports, however, began to give figures of up to 3-4 years before refurbishment and testing could allow the ship to enter service. Subsequent reports by Indian and Russian sources stressed 2012, or even later.

Those estimates, at least, turned out to be true. This leaves India’s Navy with a serious scheduling problem, and no significant carrier force. They hoped to induct Vikramaditya’s at the end of 2012, allowing them to field a credible carrier strike group some time in 2013. Instead, basic engineering flaws revealed during sea trials mean that the handover isn’t likely to take place until December 2013 or later.

India’s Carrier Collapses

INS Viraat
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Vikramaditya’s 5-year delivery delay leaves India’s navy without any carrier options.

INS Viraat’s retirement was scheduled for 2009, but Vikramaditya’s delays forced India into another refit, leaving the country without a carrier for 18 months until August 2009. Even with the refit, Viraat is nearing the limits of her mechanical life, and shortages of flyable Sea Harrier fighters are creating issues of their own. Subsequent refits and overhauls will try to keep the carrier, whose keel was laid in 1944, running until 2015. At present, however, the ship is out of service. When she does return after an unexpectedly long refit lasting 9 months – 1 year, she will only have 11 flyable Sea Harrier fighters available.

India’s other option was the locally-built Vikrant Class “Air Defence Ship” escort carrier project, which received formal government approval in January 2003. It was supposed to field a 37,500t – 40,000t carrier by 2013-2014. It won’t be a solution either, as Vikrant’s delivery date appears to have slipped beyond 2018.

Meanwhile, China was working hard to refurbish the 58,000t ex-Russian carrier Varyag, and began trials in 2012. By September 2012, reports surfaced that the ship had been re-named “Liaoning,” in honor of the province where it was retrofitted. She began sailing before the end of the year, and the ship has launched and recovered J-15 (SU-33 derivative) naval fighters. In May 2013, China declared an official naval aviation capability.

Contracts & Key Events

MiG-29KUB on carrier
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May 11/13: MiG-29K. India formally commissions the MiG-29K into the Indian Navy, beginning with the 303 Black Panthers Squadron at INS Hansa, near Goa. The squadron has 16 fighters and full on site training infrastructure now, as opposed to the 4 planes on hand when the MiG-29K was inducted for trials in February 2010.

The announcement comes 1 day after the Chinese formally announced the beginning of their own carrier aviation capability, on May 10. The Chinese fly larger and longer-range J-15 fighters, which are based on Sukhoi’s SU-33 design. The Diplomat | Business Standard | Economic Times | Hindustan Times | Times of India.

Sea trials begin
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Dec 24/12: The 2012 Russian-Indian summit in New Delhi features a number of military and civilian deals, but problems with the Vikramaditya also force their way onto the agenda. The statement itself doesn’t mean much; the meaning is contained in the fact that this statement was included at all. Over $4 billion in defense purchases weren’t specifically mentioned in paragraph 21 of their joint statement, which did find time to say that:

“Both sides discussed measures required to ensure expeditious delivery of the aircraft carrier «Vikramaditya» to India. The Russian side assured that requisite measures would be taken in this regard.”

Nov 3/12: INS Viraat. India’s lone aircraft carrier arrives for a refit at the Cochin Shipyard (CSL). The work is expected to last at least 3 months, and by March 2013, the projection for its return to service is July 2013 (9 months) – or later. India won’t have an operational carrier while the refit takes place, and at the end, they’re left with the carrier and just 11 Sea Harrier fighters. The Hindu | Economic Times | NDTV | Rediff | CDR Salamander.

Oct 10/12: Penalties? Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov confirms a 1-year delivery delay, as he arrives in New Delhi for high level talks.

Under the contract, India can impose a penalty of up to 5%, and Ministry of Defence officials have been quoted using a figure of Rs 600 crore (currently about $113.8 million). Russia’s argument is that India didn’t impose a penalty on DCNS for the 3-year delay in delivering Scorpene submarines, but India has acknowledged that its own industry was largely at fault in that case. Unless Russia successfully pushes India into citing required ship design changes as a similar “fault,” the 2 situations are distinct. India Today | Zee News.

July 16/12: ADS Watch. Vikramaditya and its air complement had better work well, and mesh swiftly, because there is no backup option. India’s Economic times reports that the 40,000 tonne Vikrant Class (aka. Indigenous Aircraft Carrier or Air Defense Ship project), being built at Cochin Shipyard has “slipped another three years.” The keel was laid in 2009, and it was prematurely floated out of drydock in December 2011, due to delays involving gearboxes and other systems. An anonymous MoD source is quoted as saying that:

“The fact is IAC will not be ready anytime before 2017. In a recent high-level meeting, the Cochin Shipyard was sharply pulled up for this huge delay… IAC is just about 14,000 tonnes at present [instead of the 25,000 tonnes it was supposed to be at launch].”

The original 2002-2003 period contract is already over its Rs 3,261 crore budget, and the follow-on contract to take it from “launch to completion” hasn’t been signed yet. The question isn’t whether the Navy will have 2 carrier strike groups by 2015, as planned; now it’s whether they’ll have that by 2020. Innovative thinking might be able to turn the existing INS Viraat into a useful helicopter and UAV carrier by 2015, if India moved swiftly – but that has never been the MoD’s forte. India’s Economic Times.

July 23/12: MiG-29K. A 2-seat MiG-29KUB naval fighter flown by Russian test pilots jet makes the 1st touch-and-go landings on Vikramaditya, during sea trials in the frigid Barents Sea. A touch-and-go isn’t really a landing, since the jet doesn’t stop. It comes in on approach, touches down on the flight deck, then revs the engines to full power and flies off the front. RIA Novosti.

May 24/12: The Sevmash shipyard says they’ll have to postpone the Vikramaditya’s naval trials in the White Sea and Barents Sea. The date is now early June – or later, if the weather continues to be bad. That far north, poor conditions means more than just rain and waves. Times of India.

May 14/12: Project update. Minister of Defence Shri A.K. Antony’s written reply to Shri Purnmasi Ram in Lok Sabha, adds nothing new about India’s upgraded Sea Harriers, but says that India has now inducted 15 MiG-29Ks, and plans to induct INS Vikramaditya in December 2012.

Feb 29/12: MiG-29K. India won’t be the type’s only customer, now that Russia has ordered 24 planes for its own naval aviation squadrons.

Navalized Typhoon concept
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Oct 16/11: Indian media report that Vikramaditya’s sea trials will be delayed 5-6 months, to February or March 2012, because open sea trials aren’t possible from Severodvinsk in northern Russia during the winters. Instead, the ship will do everything they can in the harbor, then hold sea trials when the ice is out.

PTI was told by “senior Defence Ministry sources” said the change in trial plans will not affect the delivery schedule of the aircraft carrier – but then, they have been wrong and even misleading before. The more puzzling question is why it took until October 2011 to realize that conducting sea trials in northern Russia, in November, is unworkable. PTI | Voice of Russia.

Aug 3/11: MiG-29K. RAC MiG CEO Sergei Korotkov places the number of MiG-29Ks delivered to date at 11, with the initial order’s other 5 slated to arrive by the end of 2011. Work of the 2nd MiG-29K order of 29 planes is just beginning. AFP | domain-b | Hindustan Times | Voice of Russia.

Aug 2/11: The Indian MoD offers an official update of progress on the Vikramaditya – and its smaller cousins:

“Consequent to signing of Supplementary Agreements in March, 2010, the Russian side has increased the manpower and material resources considerably for the Project. A majority of the equipment/systems have been installed on board the ship. The delivery of ship is scheduled in December, 2012.

Regarding the ‘Air Defence Ship’ [DID: 35,000t carrier] being constructed at Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL), 75% of hull work has been completed and is expected to be launched in December 2011, after which further works will be undertaken prior to commissioning… indigenous Aircraft Carrier-sized ships can [now] be built at CSL. Additionally, Indian-manufactures warship quality steel is now available, which will reduce dependence on foreign countries.”

May 30/11: MiG-29K. RAC MiG announces that they delivered a new batch of 5 MiG-29K/KUB carrier-based fighters to the Indian Navy in May, along with a flight training simulator and other technical equipment. That’s on top of the first 4 aircraft, which officially entered service with the “Black Panthers” naval squadron in February 2010, and makes 9 of 12 delivered on the initial carrier/aircraft contract.

The March 2010 contract for 29 more MiG-29K Fulcrum-Ds won’t begin delivery until 2012. Economic Times of India.

April 4/11: The Admiral Gorshkov is expected is to reach Murmansk in November 2011, as it heads to Murmansk ship-repair yard # 35 from Sevmash. The carrier is expected to undergo further upgrades and performance testing. Barents Nova.

Feb 21/11: Naval Eurofighter? Aero India 2011 sees Eurofighter and BAE unveil an interesting wrinkle: an initial design for a navalized Eurofighter than can operate from aircraft carriers, based on an internally-funded set of studies and simulations. In a direct nod to potential Indian sales, they tout the plane as being able to take off from “ski jump” carriers without catapults – a design that describes all of India’s current and planned carriers, but not the French carriers that launch the Rafale fighter.

Eurofighter GmbH descirbes the goal as 95% commonality with land-based aircraft, and required changes as “limited… include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and localised strengthening on some fuselage sections near the landing gear, as well as updates the EJ200 engines,” which could include thrust-vectoring in flight.

The Eurofighter and Rafale are later picked as India’s 2 finalists for its M-MRCA fighter competition. Eurofighter GmbH | India Defence.

Aug 9/10: Scandal. Indian Commodore Sukhjinder Singh, who was a key person in the Gorshkov refit program from 2005-2009, has reportedly handed in his resignation after reports of his illicit affair with a Russian woman (vid. April 12/10 entry). The inquiry by Indian naval HQ established the relationship with the woman, but ruled out court martial as they couldn’t establish the woman’s status as an agent, or anything untoward beyond a romantic relationship.

The findings of the Board of Inquiry will have to be acted upon by chief of naval staff Admiral Nirmal Verma, who must also decide whether and how to accept the Commodore’s resignation. On the bright side, at least he didn’t hire Jodie Fisher. See: DNA India.

Aug 3/10: MiG-29K. A CAG (Indian comptroller and auditor general) report says that Indian naval aviation has suffered in recent years, and the current state of the Sea Harrier fleet makes it clear that on-time induction of MiG-29Ks into the fleet will be critical. Read “India’s Sea Harrier Shortage” for more.

Feb 15/10: Russian deputy service director Alexander Fomin is quoted as saying that Russia and India will sign a supplementary agreement to finish upgrading the Admiral Gorshkov “in February-March this year.” Time will tell. RIA Novosti.

Jan 17/10: Reports surface that India will “soon” finalize a $1.2 billion deal with Russia to buy 29 more MiG-29K jets, which would bring India’s order total for the carrier capable STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Assisted Recovery) fighters to 45. Russia’s RIA Novosti | domain-b | India’s Economic Times | Press Trust of India | Times of India | UPI | Associated Press of Pakistan.

Jan 16/10: Admiral Admiral Nirmal Verma tells the media that there is still no final deal:

“I cannot speak anything about the final pricing till the government’s approval is announced. But, yes, for any of these major induction programs, we have a price negotiation committee, which has done its job and a mutually agreed price has been arrived at.”

See: Press Trust of India | Times of India | Barents Observer | China’s Xinhua.

MiG-29KUB: early flight
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Dec 5/09: Reports surface once again that India and Russia have reached an agreement on the Vikramaditya’s price. This time, they may even be true. Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said that during summit-level talks between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev:

“Both the leaders discussed the [Vikramaditya] issue and noted excellent progress on negotiations on price and technical issues which have been brought to a successful conclusion.”

The actual price in question is not discussed, and that political rapprochement may not be shared by the Navy. Defence Minister AK Antony has publicly distanced the Government from Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta’s recent public hard line regarding the Gorshkov’s price, and suggestions that India reassess its defense ties with Russia owing to quality issues. Adm. Arum Prakash also issued a warning, saying that: “The long-term price that we pay for 25 years of mischief, of twisting our arm will be much more than what we pay now.”

See: domain-b | Economic Times | Hindustan Times | IANS re: Rao quote | IANS re: Adm. Verma || Naval Spat: IBN Live | IBN Live quotes Adm. Mehta & Prakash.

Dec 4/09: MiG-29K. Ending a year-long wait, the first batch of MiG-29K naval fighter jets, purchased from Russia for the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, arrive in Goa in a “knocked down condition” packed in containers on board an AN-124 cargo aircraft. Press Trust of India.

Nov 30/09: Defence Minister Shri AK Antony, in a written reply to the Lok Sabha (India’s Parliament):

“The Russian side had submitted a revised Master Schedule indicating delay and increase in prices for repair and re-equipping of aircraft carrier ex-Admiral Gorshkov. The Government has agreed to conduct negotiations for finalizing a revised Repair and Re-equipping contract. Negotiations are in progress with the Russian side. Details of final prices would be known only after completion of these negotiations.

An exhaustive list of equipment to be fitted on the ship was included in the original contract. The Aircraft Carrier is scheduled to be inducted in December, 2012.”

Nov 16/09: Plan B from the UK? Amidst rumors of major British defense budget cuts, The Guardian reports that India has expressed formal interest in the 65,000t CVF/Queen Elizabeth class carrier program. The UK MoD is desperately looking for long-term budget savings, but canceling either of its full-size carriers at this point would be rival the cost of finishing them:

“According to senior defence sources, Whitehall officials are examining the feasibility of selling one of the carriers. It is understood they are planning to put forward the option as part of the government’s strategic defence review, which will start early next year… “Selling a carrier is one very serious option,” a defence source said this weekend, although the government is a long way from committing to any sale. It could take between six and 12 months to reach a decision, he added.”

Each Queen Elizabeth carrier costs about $3.5 billion, and the negotiating difference around the Admiral Gorshkov is currently around $2.2+ billion. The question is whether India would be able to buy one of the CVF carriers for less than the UK paid, in order to offer the Treasury monies that it could not otherwise obtain from the CVF program. If a refund could be forthcoming from the Russians, and a deal done with the British, investing the Vikramaditya’s $3 billion could net India a completely new ship rather than an old and refurbished one, with double the Gorshkov’s aerial complement. Key questions include whether those deals could be secured, and whether India is prepared to wait until 2016 for the British carrier, as opposed to 2013 (and sliding…) for Gorshkov.

Then again, $2.2 – $2.5 billion could also secure India an America class light carrier from Northrop Grumman, with a similar tonnage and aerial complement to the Gorshkov, but markedly better electronics and defensive systems. If India begins to look beyond Russia for options, Britain’s CVF program is not its sole alternative.

Nov 1/09: INS Viraat Watch. The Times of India reports that INS Viraat is now on the verge of completing its sea-acceptance trials and work-up phase, after an 18-month-long comprehensive refit and upgrade program in Mumbai and Kochi. This will give India an aircraft carrier again. The 28,000-tonne carrier will complete its 50th year as an operational warship in November 2009, having serves as both HMS Hermes and INS Viraat.

Oct 23/09: A British BBC report explains some of the hurdles on the road to Vikramaditya’s delivery:

“In this hurry [on both sides to sign a deal], fine points including the ones relating to what was expected of Russia were overlooked… India agreed to buy and get a ship refurbished without Gorshkov’s design [presumably means a detail design blueprint]… When the ship was ripped open, it was found that the wiring was ageing and needed to be redone. A Japanese contractor awarded the rewiring contract found the job overwhelming – given the costs involved – and left. Now a new contractor has been found for the purpose. Gorshkov’s steel plates and machinery, too, needed to be pulled apart and new ones fitted… With Gorshkov’s induction delayed, the government decided to refit its only aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, but it will not be operational till 2015. That leaves the Indian navy with no aircraft carrier for some time.”

Oct 15/09: Despite prior reports that an agreement on the Vikramaditya’s final cost would be reached during Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s 2-day visit to Moscow, India and Russia have failed to reach agreement. Negotiations will continue. India MoD | Indo-Asian News Service.

Sept 24/09: MiG-29K. Russia’s Vedemosti newspaper reports that the Russian Navy may decide to replace its 19 larger and longer-range SU-33 fighters on its Admiral Kuznetsov carrier with 24 MiG-29Ks, when the SU-33′s must be retired in 2015. Caution is advised, since the article is based on a source who sees a contract as possible in 2 years; that’s not exactly a rock-solid basis for concluding that India will avoid the potential trap of being the MiG-29K’s only operator. Vedemosti [in Russian] | Barents Observer.

Sept 3/09: Indian media report that a deal to finish the Vikramaditya refit is expected by mid-October 2009. Some caution is advised, as past reports and predictions in this area have later been proven false by events. India’s Business Standard | The Hindu | Hindustan Times.

July 31/09: India’s Business Standard conducts an interview with Russia’s outgoing ambassador to India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov. Excerpts:

“[VT] Not changing [the Gorshkov order], but the Indian Navy was eager to get the best, the most modern equipment [to insert into the hull].

[IBS] So the Navy’s appetite kept increasing, they wanted more and more..
[VT] Yes.

[BS] Reports are that it will cost around $2.2 billion?
[VT] It would be irresponsible of me to comment. Price negotiations are now entering the final stage. What is important for India is also the time of delivery. But the point is that if India wants additional equipment, the carrier will cost even more. So if both sides stop and decide, okay no request from India and no increase in price from our side, then we can finalise price and delivery.”

July 29/09: The CAG report begins to generate political opposition to the Gorshkov deal, as well as media op/ed calls for a re-think. In the course of one such op-ed, The Hindustan Times offers a report on the negotiating spread:

“The Russians now want $2.9 billion (Rs 14,500 crore) for the warship, while the defence ministry is bargaining for $2.2 billion (Rs 11,000 crore). [Defence Minister Antony said that] “The Russians have demanded a substantially huge amount. We are still negotiating the deal. No final decision has been taken.”

May 25/09: Indian media report that the government has decided to speed up renegotiation with Russia, after a recent Moscow trip undertaken by defence secretary Vijay Singh failed to break the long-standing deadlock. The government has reportedly scheduled 3 visits to Russia by Indian officials, in hopes of sealing the deal by the end of July 2009. During those visits, they will also discuss the larger subject of Indian-Russian defense relations.

Another senior official of the Controller of Warship Production and Acquisition will reportedly visit Russia in the middle of June 2009, to work out the warship’s hoped-for 2011 trials in Barents Sea. Assuming that a deal can in fact be reached this time. Times of India.

April 6/09: MiG-29K. India inaugurates the first phase of the MiG-29K maintenance and and training facility at the INS Hansa naval base in Goa. Vice-Admiral J. J. Bedi, Commander-in-Chief of India’s Western Naval command, is quoted as saying that:

“This is the first time in my service career of 40 years that I witness construction and availability of major infrastructure project prior to the induction of hardware in the Indian Navy.”

He expects the first batch of 4 aircraft to be “with us by middle of this year.” The Hindu.

March 16/09: MiG-29K. Still no agreement on the Gorshkov refit. Meanwhile, The Times of India reports a Russian decision to ground its MiG-29 fleet, following accidents caused by the disintegration of the planes’ tail fins. It quoted an unidentified “senior officer,” who said that:

“We continue to fly our MiG-29s… Our checks are stringent since we operate our MiG-29s also from coastal airbases (Jamnagar) and Russian metallurgy is susceptible to salinity.”

That’s a somewhat worrying assertion, in light of the MiG-29K naval buy. India is scheduled to finish its MiG-29A upgrades to MiG-29SMT status in 2014, thanks to a contract signed in March 2008. That effort will not be delayed by the news from Russia, but the news will reportedly delay delivery of the new MiG-29Ks to the Indian Navy.

Feb 28/09: ADS Watch. The keel for India’s first “Project-71″ 37.5t-40t indigenous carrier project is laid at the Cochin Shipyard in Kerala. The new carrier will be named INS Vikrant, after the 20,000t World War 2 era carrier HMS Herculaeus that was sold to the Indian Navy, and served as the Vikrant (from Sanskrit vikranta, “courageous/ victorious”) from 1961-1997. Ptoject-71 currently has a budget of INR 32.6 billion (currently about $650 million), but few observers believe that the final cost will remain on budget.

Delivery is scheduled for 2014-2015, and these carriers are expected to carry their own complement of MiG-29K fighters. Plans exist for a naval variant of India’s LCA Tejas lightweight fighters, but India’s history of extremely late and failed weapons projects suggests caution. Even a successful project is unlikely to induct a naval Tejas before 2016-2018, leaving both of India’s future carrier classes strongly dependent on Russian goodwill. The Hindu | Indian Express | Sindh Today.

Feb 23/09: Indian media report that Russia has demanded another $700 million, on top of their demand for an additional $1.2 billion which had been approved by India’s cabinet, on top of the original $947 million contract. The shipyard is also demanding $190 million immediately, in order to continue work. Delivery is still scheduled for 2012, but this assumes the schedule promises are kept, and that there are no work stoppages or other production delays owning to contract negotiations.

Assuming that this is in fact Russia’s final demand, it would bring the asking price for the Gorshkov to $2.85 billion. That figure could buy a similar 45.7t new-build America Class LHA-R medium carrier with funds left over, and might even buy one of Britain’s new 65t CVF Class carriers. Hindustan Times | Indian Express | Forecast International report/op-ed | Indian Express op-ed.

Feb 22/09: MiG-29K. The Hindu quotes UAC VP and RAC MiG Director-General Mikhail Aslanovich Pogosyan, who says that Indian naval pilots have been training in Russia since October 2008. The theory portion of the course is done, and:

“Indian pilots are already training to fly the MiG-29Ks from a shore-based facility. They have been doing even 15 sorties in a day during the winter. We expect the first four MiG-29Ks to arrive in India later this year, with the other 12 being delivered by 2010.”

So far, 4 certified MiG-29Ks have been transferred to the Indian project team in Russia, after Russian test pilots have conducted carrier landing check-outs. After the course is complete, India’s Navy hopes to continue their own pilots’ training by using a Shore-based Test Facility (SBTF), built with Russian help at INS Hansa in Goa.

Feb 12/09: RIA Novosti reports that Russia has delivered the first 4 MiG-29 naval fighters to India. Oddly, they use the designation “MiG-29 Fulcrum D,” which is the NATO reporting code and not Russian or RAC MiG nomenclature.

USS Vikramaditya?
(click to view larger)

Dec 3/08: Indian Express reports that India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on Tuesday “gave in to Moscow’s demands,” and will renegotiate the Vikramaditya upgrade on terms acceptable to Moscow.

Nov 22/08: Australia’s the Age newspaper reports that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has cut his December 2008 India visit to a single day, a signal usually associated with a strained geo-strategic relationship. The visit will now take place on Dec 5/08.

Nov 13/08: As negotiations regarding the Gorshkov continue to drag on, pressure for timely resolution is building on the Russian side, as well. Sevmash (Severodvinsk Machine Building Enterprise) shipyard Deputy General-Director Sergey Novoselov tells RIA Novosti new agency that:

“We are essentially constructing a new aircraft carrier at the open assembly berth of Sevmash. In the last two years, work has only proceeded thanks to internal loans…”

That cannot continue indefinitely – but Sevmash is not backlogged with projects, which means it needs to hang on to the Admiral Gorshkov refit. So, what if India proves unwilling to pay? Novoselov pointed out that even at $2 billion, a refitted Gorshkov costs only 50-67% of the $3-4 billion involved in building a medium sized carrier. Novoselov would not be pinned down to any firm figure, of course, but some Russian defense planners are either taking him seriously, or willing to help him put added pressure on India. RIA Novosti, via Forecast Interational:

“If India won’t pay the money [over the agreed $617 million], we will keep the aircraft carrier ourselves. It will be very useful to us, because the situation in the world is complicated. Vessels like that are needed to patrol the waters of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean,” noted a Russian defense industry official.”

If Russia did make that move, India would need compensation for costs incurred to date – reportedly about $400 million.

Nov 11/08: Russia now says that the delivery of Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier to the Indian Navy will be delayed till 2012. The shipyard also claims that New Delhi has not made any payments since last year, although extra work to the tune of $1.7 billion has been done by the shipyard. ITAR-TASS reportedly quoted a shipyard representative as saying that:

“At this juncture, the completion of work in 2010 would be realistic. Two more years would be required to complete the vessel’s sailing trials, including testing its aircraft in the severe conditions of Barents Sea.”

DID isn’t quite sure why arctic operations would matter to India. India Defence.

Nov 2/08: India’s finance ministry has for the second time rejected a proposal from the MoD to approve an additional $1.2 billion in funds, in order to complete the INS Vikramaditya retrofit project. The article reports that India has already paid Russia about 67% of the original program cost, but has made no further payments since January 2007. The India Defence report adds, cryptically:

“The finance ministry’s latest decision also stemmed from a request to allocate $60 million to perform sea trials of the refurbished vessel during 2011.”

Oct 18/08: The Hindu newspaper quotes Sevmash Shipyard’s deputy director for foreign defence contracts Sergei Novosyolov, who says that Gorshkov will be taken out of dry dock by the end of the month.

“The ship’s hull has been fully done and painted and scaffolding will be dismantled by the end of October…”

Sept 21/08: Still no firm deal on the Gorshkov refit, but India’s Defence Acquisition Committee (DAC) has given approval in principle to add another 29 MiG-29Ks to the original 16-plane, $1.5 billion deal.

No price negotiations have taken place, but the contract is expected to be worth close to $2 billion when it is signed. The Navy is reported to have set its sights on a 3-squadron goal for its MiG-29K/KUB force. Indian Express report.

Sept 19/08: Indian Express reports that after Indian officials expressed concern over the slow progress in overhauling Gorshkov at the Sevmash shipyard in North Sea, Russian asked South Block to immediately pay the cash-strapped shipyard $200 million, “without prejudice to the on-going price negotiations,” in order to speed up work.

The report adds that Russian Defence Minister A Serdyukov’s visit to Delhi later in September 2008 is expected to result in a revised price for the Gorshkov refit, which must then receive political approval in India.

June 3/08: Press Trust of India reports that Russia’s Sevmash shipyard has promised readiness by 2012 – maybe. RIA Novosti quotes Sevmash officials as saying that:

“The successful solution of all the financial issues will enable the shipbuilders to sail the aircraft carrier out into the Barents Sea for trials. In the winter of 2012, the ship is expected to be finally refitted and trials will continue in the summer of that year… At the end of 2012, the aircraft carrier is expected to be fully prepared for its transfer to the Indian navy in accordance with the schedule approved by the Russian Navy.”

Negotiations and maneuvering around the contract’s final details continue, and Sevmash’s history of delivery, detailed below, must also be considered when evaluating such statements.

June 2/08: MiG-29K. Defense News reports that India’s MiG-29Ks will be based on land, because the country has no operational carriers. With INS Viraat unavailable due to upgrades and Vikramaditya badly behind schedule, the MiG-29Ks will go to the Naval Aviation Centre at INS Hansa in Goa instead. Hansa is the base used to train naval pilots. Deliveries of all 16 MiG-29Ks are expected to be complete by 2009.

May 30/08: USS Kitty Hawk? Reuters reports that American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was asked about rumors that the USS Kitty Hawk might be sold to India at the at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum of regional analysts, defense and security officials. “I am aware of no such plans,” Gates replied.

May 9/08: ADS Watch. News Post India’s “Indian Navy To Order Another Aircraft Carrier” claims that the Indian Navy will supplement the Vikramaditya with 2 of its 37,500t indigenous “Air Defence Ship” carriers, instead of just one. The article also includes additional information about the Vikramaditya’s schedule and the potential risks.

April 9/08: Despite an agreement that was supposed to be finalized in March, Indian Defence Secretary Vijay Singh describes the parties as still “locked in intense negotiations over the price details,” adding that “technical assessment of the work needed on the carrier is still on…” The expected responses re: the deal being on track, and having a final price proposal to bring to the Cabinet “soon,” were also voiced. Zee News.

March 18/08: MiG-29KUB flies. During Chief of Naval Staff Sureesh Mehta’s visit to Russia, the first serially produced MiG-29KUB (tail number 113) performs its maiden flight at the RAC MiG test airfield in Lukhovitsy near Moscow. The MiG-29KUB is the 2-seat variant of the carrier-capable MiG-29K. RAC MiG release.

March 10/08: The Indian government’s DDI News reports that “India has reconciled to a price hike for procurement of Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov and the government has constituted an experts committee to work out the increase.”

Naval Chief Sureesh Mehta, who had opposed additional payments under the contract, said that: “There will be some price hike. We need to pay extra amount and whatever amount is due as per contracts we will pay.” This does not sound like an encouraging report from ongoing negotiations.

March 3/08: India caves. India opts to pay Russia more, in hopes of getting the Gorshkov ready in time. Figures given vary between $500 million and $1.2 billion; exactly how much more India will agree to pay will reportedly be decided later in March 2008, after 2 more rounds of negotiations. India’s Defence Secretary Vijay Singh is quoted as saying that:

“It should be completed by mid-2010. After that, it will undergo 18 months of extensive sea trials by the Russian navy to ensure all systems are working properly.”

Retired Admiral Arun Prakash was head of the Indian Navy in 2004 when the original deal was “laboriously and painstakingly negotiated for 11 months, and the contract sealed and signed.” He told BusinessWeek that he is disappointed by Russia “reneging on the deal” and says Russia “gifted” the Gorshkov to India in exchange for a $1.5 billion contract to buy planes and helicopters and “revive their terminally ill shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing industries.”

India will also reportedly send 500 shipyard workers, technicians and managers to Russia, to take direct charge of the work, cover Russia’s labor shortage, and keep an eye on quality control so that it’s caught immediately. Whether this will suffice, in the wake of Sevmash shipyard disasters like the Odfjell contract (q.v. Feb 21/08), remains to be seen.

What also remains to be seen at this point is whether India’s MiG-29K contract becomes the next bottleneck. India remains the only customer for this substantially different aircraft, and MiG will need to make production line changes that the existing contract may not adequately finance. Indian MoD, March 12/08 | Calcutta Telegraph | NDTV | Pravda | StrategyPage | Times of India

Meanwhile, BusinessWeek has its own speculation re: “Why India Talked Up A US Carrier Deal.” As an interesting second perspective on the larger Russia-India relationship, see also the Navhind Times March 4/08 article “India’s Defence: Looking Beyond Russia“.

March 3/08: Sea Harriers. India’s Defence Minister Shri A K Antony confesses that India’s Sea Harrier fleet has an availability problem, due to the rotation of aircraft through the current upgrade program.

“India’s Sea Harrier Shortage” looks at numbers and planned upgrades for India’s legacy naval aircraft, as the Navy prepares for future operations with MiG-29Ks. Given the amount of trouble the Harriers are in, it seems unlikely that they will be able to provide a Plan B if the MiGs have problems.

Feb 27/08: India’s Minister of Defence Shri A K Antony, asked about this issue, says:

“The overall progress of repair and re-equipping of the ship, ex-Admiral Gorshkov, in Russia is behind schedule. Execution of contract for construction of three ships of Project 1135.6 (follow-on-ships of Talwar Class) is on schedule. Russia has indicated an increase in price for repair and re-equipping of ex-Admiral Gorshkov. There is no proposal under the active consideration of the Government to contact some other country in this regard. The need for contacting other country does not arise as the existing contract with Russia is still valid.”

A fine politician’s reply. If another country contacted India instead, his denial would still be “true” in the strict sense of the term…

Feb 23/08: Progress on Gorshkov? According to the India Times’ Economic Times, Indian Defence Secretary Vijay Singh’s 5-day delegation visit to Sevmash Shipyard, and talks with Russian Energy and Industries Minister Viktor Khristenko, may have made progress. Russian senior officials reportedly assured Singh that the Russian government was making strenuous efforts to improve the situation.

F/A-18F over CV-63
(click to view full)

Feb 19-23/08: Crazy Sam’s Carrier Clearance Sale? As reports begin to suggest that Russia and India are too far apart to agree on the Gorshkov refit, speculation grows that the USA intends to solve India’s problem with a stunning offer during Defense Secretary Gates’ imminent visit to India. instead of retiring and decommissioning its last conventionally-powered carrier, the 81,800 ton/ 74,200t USS Kitty Hawk [CV-63, commissioned 1961], would be handed over to India when its current tour in Japan ends in 2008. The procedure would resemble the January 2007 “hot transfer” of the amphibious landing ship USS Trenton [LPD-14], which become INS Jalashva. The cost? This time, it would be free. As in, $0.

Naturally, there is a quid pro quo that accompanies these rumors. In return for an aircraft carrier that would be larger than its counterparts in every navy other than the US Navy, India would select at least 60 F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets in its MMRCA fighter competition, to serve as the carrier’s air wing. Unlike the Gorshkov, the Kitty Hawk is a purpose-built carrier whose full air complement is a whopping “75+” aircraft and helicopters. India has also expressed interest in the USA’s E-2 Hawkeye carrier AWACS aircraft, which would be a natural fit for its new ship.

As a number of sources point out, this is a multi-pronged move that would achieve several objectives at once. First, the offer removes all Russian negotiating leverage over India by removing the issues of sunk costs, foreign possession of the Vikramaditya, and any danger of being left without a carrier. The Indian Navy would be greatly strengthened, and its ability to police the Indian Ocean from the Straits of Malacca to South Africa would take a huge leap forward. Any additional work to upgrade or refurbish the carrier could be undertaken in India, providing jobs and expertise while maintaining full national control over the refit. The USA gains financial benefits of its own, as the Navy avoids the expensive task of steaming the Kitty Hawk home and decommissioning it. Americans would almost certainly receive maintenance contracts for the steam catapults, and possibly for some new electronics, but those economic benefits pale in comparison to the multi-billion dollar follow-on wins for Boeing (Super Hornet), Northrop Grumman (E-2 Hawkeye), and possibly even Lockheed Martin (F-16 E/F, F-35B). All of which works to cement a growing strategic alliance between the two countries, and creates deep defense industrial ties as well.

Then there’s the effect on Russia, whose relations with the USA currently border on outright hostility. With the MiG-29Ks no longer necessary for India, that contract would almost certainly be canceled. At which point, the commonality value of choosing the MiG-35 as a lower-cost secondary MMRCA buy drops sharply, opening the door for other MMRCA split-buy options that could include the Saab/BAE JAS-39 Gripen, or a complementary American offer of F-16E/Fs and/or F-35Bs. The combined effect of these blows would be a severe setback for Russia’s arms industry, though rising oil & gas revenues in Russia and other export opportunities may lead to less shrinkage and civilian re-purposing than publications like the Weekly Standard believe. The question now is: will this happen? Barents Observer | Weekly Standard | Information Dissemination: Feb 20th/ 23rd.

Feb 7/08: Russia – Let’s Change a Deal! Zeenews quotes an unnamed “Russian official” with interesting and somewhat unsettling arguments, in advance of a high-level delegation’s arrival led by Indian Defence Secretary Vijay Singh:

“Moscow feels that the agreement for supply of the 45,000 tonne warship was signed at a time when the Russian ship-building company was in bad shape and India “used” the situation to sign the contract at lower price. The ship-building company was facing closure and was ready to sign any kind of contract when the contract was signed.”

Defense Industry Daily needs to look up the exact definitions to be certain, but we believe this process is known as “shrewd negotiation,” followed by “a deal.” Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta appears to be using the same lexicon, and has publicly said that there should be no revision to the Goshkov contract. Still, India cannot receive the carrier she wants if the shipyard goes bankrupt, and Russia is holding the carrier. This gives the Russians considerable leverage in negotiations, unless India can find an alternate provider. There may be a way out, however:

“But Russia is willing to “compensate” for the cost of Gorshkov if it gets more military orders, which Moscow insists is not linked to 126 fighter planes that India is planning to buy but other defence purchases.”

Ka-28
(click to view larger)

Nov 19/07: India’s MoD confirms delays in the Gorshkov’s delivery and slow progress, without really answering any questions. It acknowledges that the Russian side has submitted a revised Master Schedule, attributing the delays to “Growth of Work.” In response, an apex level Indian committee under the Defence Secretary, and a Steering Committee under a Vice Admiral, have been set up. A team has also been stationed at the shipyard.

No word on the timelines or costs suggested; indeed, these are likely to remain under negotiation. Indian MoD release.

Nov 6/07: A top-level Indian Navy delegation is heading for Moscow to discuss the delay and price escalation in the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal. A detailed financial and technical plan outlining the specific justifications and amounts will be presented to the Indian side, who is there to listen rather than to negotiate.

The report pegs the original price quoted for refurbishing the carrier was just under $980 million, adding that the Russians are insisting on cost increases of at least $350 million. Indian officials reportedly fear that the final escalation may end up being much more once they are deep enough into the commitment trap of having paid for work. The report also adds that the Navy “had reconciled itself to the fact that the delivery of the ship would be delayed from the original deadline of August 2008 by a few years,” a surprising development given the limited service life of India’s remaining carrier. If the government is indeed prioritizing cost containment over delivery dates, reconciliation of the INS Viraat’s service life with Gorshkov’s entry may prove difficult. IDRW.

Oct 18/07: India’s MoD finally admits the obvious, as part of an announcement concerning an Indo-Russia fighter development deal. India MoD release:

“The Defence Minister described the Agreement on FGFA as a ‘major landmark’ and said that the Indo-Russian relationship is on a trajectory to reach new heights… Mr. Antony expressed satisfaction at the outcome of discussions on other important projects e.g., supply and licensed production of T-90 tanks, SU-30 MKI aircraft and other strategic issues. He admitted that there has been a delay in the delivery of the repaired and refurbished aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov [emphasis ours] along with supply of deck-based fighter aircraft MiG-29-K and said it was decided that some more studies by technical groups would be done to go through the details. He appreciated the efforts made by the Russian side to resolve issues relating to life cycle support of equipment of Russian origin.”

June 16/07: India Defence: High Level Indian Delegation In Russia To Re-Negotiate Defense Deals Pricing:

“With differences over prices delaying the delivery of upgraded Sukhoi multi-role fighters and Gorshkov aircraft carrier, India today rushed a high-level defence team to Russia with fresh proposals to break the logjam… The visit of the team assumes significance with Defence Minister AK Antony admitting that New Delhi was facing “problems” in acquisition of the carrier Gorshkov as well as in negotiating a new deal to buy 40 more upgraded Sukhoi-30 fighters for the Indian Air Force.”

May 17/07: India Defence: “No Delays in INS Vikramaditya Acquisition from Russia: Defence Minister.” With that said…

“However, sources from the Indian Navy had earlier confirmed reports being circulated in the Indian and Russian media regarding a possible two year delay in the acquisition of the Aircraft Carrier.”

Additional Readings

• Sevmash Shipyard

Equipment Profiles

• Bharat Rakshak – INS Vikramaditya

• Naval Technology – Kuznetsov Class (Type 1143.5) Heavy Aircraft Carrying Cruiser, Russia

• RAC MiG – MiG-29K/ MiG-29KUB

• Bharat Rakshak – MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum-D

• YouTube – Vikr. Russian report covers MiG-29K carrier landing trials in the Barents Sea.

• Air Force Technology – Ka-31 Radar Picket Naval Helicopter, Russia

• Bharat Rakshak – Kamov KA-31 Helix-B

• Air Force Technology – Ka-27/28 and Ka-29 Helix Naval Helicopters, Russia

• Bharat Rakshak – Kamov KA-28 Helix-A

Other Equipment

• Bharat Rakshak – INS Viraat (formerly HMS Hermes, last of the British Centaur Class). India’s current carrier.

• Bharat-Rakshak – Indigenous Aircraft Carrier. the forthcoming “Project 71 ADS”/ Vikrant Class.

• US Navy, CV 63 Kitty Hawk official site – Kitty Hawk Statistics

• Global Security – CV 63 Kitty Hawk

• DID FOCUS – India’s MMRCA Fighter Competition. This DII Q.V. entry is a public access article.

Related Developments

• DID – Russia’s Military Spending Jumping – But Can Its Industry? Provides interesting figures for the industry, and a deeper look at some of the drivers behind the failed Gorshkov refit as well.

• Asia Times (Dec 9/09) – India displays multi-vector diplomacy. Offers one take on the larger strategic background behind India’s ties with Russia. M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service whose assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

• BBC (Oct 23/09) – Crucial Indian defence deals delayed. These include the Navy’s submarine and aircraft carrier projects, advanced trainers for the air force, and coastal surveillance plans. “For its part, the government has been slow in responding to criticism – even from its auditing organisation. When it comes to defence issues in India, speed does not seem to be of paramount importance.”

• NewsMax (Dec 4/08) – Russian Military Misfires With Defects, Sales Lags. Points to RAC MiG as a firm with an especially problematic future, unless it can secure a big win very soon.

• DID (March 5/08) – India’s Sea Harrier Shortage. It isn’t just the Viraat that has to be maintained until a successor is ready…

• The Weekly Standard (Feb 22/08) – The Carrier Cold War

• Information Dissemination (Feb 20/08) – The Gorshkov Guessing Game and Feb 23/08 – Kitty Hawk To India Discussion Hits the US Media.

• Barents Observer (Feb 19/08) – India might not get its Russian aircraft carrier

• Asia Times (Aug 21/07) – India’s blue water dreams may have to wait. The Gorshkov isn’t the only carrier project in trouble. This article mentions the Gorshkov’s difficulties, and also details both the current state of the INS Viraat and difficulties with India’s smaller 37,500t indigenous carrier, which is reportedly slipping its schedule badly and will only be ready by 2015 at the earliest, instead of 2012.

• India Defense (April 26/06) – INS Vikramaditya: Aircraft Carrier Acquisition from Russia Delayed, Cost Overruns Expected. Heatedly denied at the time by India’s military; subsequently confirmed as quite true.

• DID (June 30/05) – U.S. & India Sign 10-Year Defense Pact

Alenia’s Aermacchi’s M-346 advanced jet trainer began life in 1993, as a collaboration with Russia. It was also something of a breakthrough for Alenia Aermacchi, confirming that the Finmeccanica subsidiary could design and manufacture advanced aircraft with full authority quadriplex fly-by-wire controls. Those controls, the aircraft’s design for vortex lift aerodynamics, and a thrust:weight ratio of nearly 1:1, allow it to remain fully controllable even at angles of attack over 35 degrees. This is useful for simulating the capabilities of advanced 4+ generation fighters like the F/A-18 Super Hornet, Eurofighter, and Rafale. Not to mention Sukhoi’s SU-30 family, which has made a name for itself at international air shows with remarkable nose-high maneuvers.

The Russian collaboration did not last. For a while, it looked like the Italian jet might not last, either. It did though, and has become a regular contender for advanced jet trainer trainer contracts around the world – including its biggest potential opportunity, in the USA. For now, however, its biggest customer is Israel.

Italy’s M-346: Fast Plane, Slow Aerospace

From Partnership to Solo Flight

Yak-130
(click to view full)

The original Italian and Russian partners partners on this project eventually went their separate ways, and Russia’s Yak-130 went on to limited initial success. It uses Russian equipment, avionics, radar, and weapons, and is powered by a pair of AI-222-25 or Povazske Strojarne DV-2SM (export option) turbofans. By 2006 the aircraft had beaten the MiG-AT and Sukhoi’s S-54 to be selected as Russia’s next advanced jet trainer, bagged an export order from Algeria as a trainer and light attack aircraft, and received interest from several additional customers.

Italy’s M346 didn’t develop the same light attack capabilities as its Russian counterpart, and it flies using Fiat Avio/Honeywell ITEC’s F124-GA-200 turbofans, and uses its own distinct set of avionics, training systems.

Some 3rd party data sheets for the aircraft state various weapons-carrying options, but the company has been silent concerning any weapons trials, while avoiding any mention of armaments in data sheets, and issuing releases that clearly place the light attack variant in the future tense as something that would happen if the UAE signs a contract. That hasn’t happened yet, and Finmeccannica companies have not been able to clarify its status; as such, DID must characterize the M-346 as a training-only aircraft, unlike its Yak-130 counterpart or other lead-in fighter trainer competitors.

Slow Aerospace & M-346 Exports

M-346 in Singapore
by Mark Chen
(click to view full)

Despite serious development work since 2000, and aid from the Italian Ministry for Economic Development, by the end of 2008, Alenia’s M346 had no confirmed customers at all.

The Italian Aeronautica Militare announced the plane’s first confirmed contract in November 2009, and their current trainer fleet of 102 MB-339s offers room for future M-346 sales beyond the initial 15. At present, only 30 of their existing trainers have been modernized to the MB-339CD variant.

Finmeccanica’s first real breakthrough abroad came at IDEX 2009, however, when the UAE selected it for a 48-plane order. That deal is estimated to be worth about EUR 1 billion, but has yet to become a contract. A more solid breakthrough took place in late 2010, when Singapore picked the M-346 over Korean Aerospace and Lockheed Martin’s supersonic T-50 Golden Eagle. Israel followed with a similar decision in 2012, citing future compatibility with the F-35. That can only be good news for future European sales, and The Italian Defence Ministry has been heavily involved in supporting the M346 Master’s bids round the world, even pledging a billion-dollar offset buy of Israeli defense equipment that secured an order for 30 planes.

Alenia Aermacchi has stated that their plane is currently seeking potential orders in Chile, Ecuador, Greece, Indonesia, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia; and Poland can also be added to that list.

T-38A Talons
(click to view full)

Alenia’s largest opportunity by far involves the USA’s potential T-X competition, which would replace about 450 Northrop Grumman T-38 Talon supersonic trainers with about 350 new aircraft, and dozens of accompanying simulators. The USAF is conducting an analysis of alternatives, and was expected to decide around 2011 whether to replace the T-38 fleet with a new aircraft this decade, or to extend their service lives and delay their replacement until after 2020. T-X is still waiting for that decision, and budgetary pressures are making the latter option steadily more likely.

If a T-X decision aims for new aircraft, the M-346 aims to compete for that role as the “T-100 Training System.” A win there would easily outweigh all other opportunities put together, but the challenge was be finding an American partner to compete against Lockheed Martin (T-50 Golden Eagle) and BAE Systems (Hawk 128). General Dynamics became that partner in January 2013. The next challenge is waiting. Even the current delayed 2016 decision date presumes that further budget costs, or escalating costs for programs like the F-35 and new bomber, won’t force further postponements.

M-346: Contracts and Key Events

“T-100″
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May 11/13: Crash. An M346 prototype crashes around 20 minutes after take-off from Turin-Caselle airport, in Val Bormida, Italy. There was only 1 pilot, who ejected safely. The crash was in a location that didn’t harm anyone or destroy anyone’s property. Alenia is not discussing possible causes of the crash.

This is the 2nd prototype to be destroyed in a crash, following the Nov 18/11 incident in Dubai. Details regarding the Dubai crash remain sketchy, but the technical problem was said to be confined to the prototypes. The accident leaves Alenia with just 1 prototype aircraft. ASN report | Alenia | Aviation Week.

Crash

April 11/13: Chile. Defense News reports that Chile is stepping back from plans to replace their 35 T-35 Pillan trainers and 23 A-36 Halcon light attack jets. These are actually local designations for CASA’s C-101 jets, which are no longer in production. The usual contenders were reportedly involved: BAE’s Hawk, KAI/ Lockheed’s supersonic T-50, and the M-346.

Chile is reportedly focusing on its F-16 fleet instead, and a Lockheed Martin representative at LAAD confirmed that they were discussing F-16 upgrades. Chile does fly 33 second-hand F-16A/B MLUs, alongside 10 more modern F-16C/D Block 52 fighters. A common configuration would be a logical step, but if Chile really wants to wait for the USA to sort out their T-X competition, as the article implies, they could be waiting a long time.

March 4/13: Alenia announces that the M346 passed its Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) Test to certify it for hose-and-drogue air-to-air refueling when configured with external tanks. When an air refueling probe approaches the tanker basket, it can generate a discharge higher than 100,000 volts. Bit of a risk around lots of jet fuel, so they tested the M-346 at Alenia Aermacchi’s Venegono Superiore plant. The British firm Cobham, who makes hose-and-drogue refueling pods, provided support. Alenia.

Jan 17/13: USA. Alenia Aermacchi and General Dynamics sign a Letter of Intent for the T-X trainer competition. General Dynamics C4 Systems will act as the prime contractor for purposes of this competition, offering the “T-100″. As the prime contractor, GDC4S will be responsible for managing Alenia’s delivery of the aircraft, integrating some specific components; and supplying flight simulation devices, multi-media classrooms and logistics support.

Boeing had an agreement with Alenia for sales beyond the USA (vid. May 28/08 entry), and this announcement makes it very unlikely that they’ll work together within the USA. Alenia North America | Alenia | General Dynamics.

M346
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July 19/12: Israel. Italy and Israel sign a set of 2-way defense deals. Israel will get 30 M-346 trainers, for delivery beginning in mid-2014. It’s a $1 billion deal, with Alenia’s share announced at around $600 million. Israel will join Italy and Singapore as M-346 operators.

Going the other way, Israel’s IAI will supply 2 Gulfstream 550 “Eitam” Conformal Airborne Early Early Warning & Control (CAEW) planes, which can monitor airspace and even maritime areas in a wide radius around the aircraft. Italy will join Israel and Singapore as G550 CAEW operators. The last component of the deal is a shared IAI/Finmeccanica project for a high-resolution Italian OPTSAT-3000 surveillance satellite. Read “Italy & Israel: A Billion-Dollar Offer They Didn’t Refuse” for full coverage and details.

Israel: 30

Feb 17/12: US T-X delayed. The USAF confirms that it won’t make a T-X selection until 2016, and doesn’t expect initial operational capability for its new trainers until 2020. Until then, they’ll continue to use 2-seat F-16s to bridge the gap from the T-38 to the F-22A and F-35.

The extra time could be bad news for Alenia, as their international sales partner Boeing is reportedly readying a design of their own. Flight International discusses a notional twin-tail, single-engine trainer, which sounds rather like ATG & IAI’s Javelin design. The magazine also reports that Northrop Grumman is considering its own entry, and a check reveals that their Sept 19/11 announcement of a T-X partnership with BAE no longer displays on BAE’s site or on Northrop Grumman’s. Flight International.

M-346/T-100
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Dec 18-22/11: HMD. Alenia Aermacchi performs flight tests using the Italian Air force’s 3rd series production T-346A plane, which includes night missions, as part of the plane’s certification program. The 7 flight tests took place at Torino Caselle airport, Italy, including night flights using the HMD in Night Configuration.

In the M-346, both student and instructor pilots wear the HMD, which is fully integrated with the avionics suite, in order to support training for Navigation and Attack modes. Color symbology can be projected to the eyepiece, and Alenia Aermacchi touts combination as “the only Advanced Trainer that [currently] comprises the HMD, in both Night and Day configuration.” The tests provide the final go-ahead for production deliveries of the systems to Italian Air Force. Alenia, via Al Defaiya.

March 31/11: Italy’s T-346A. The first M-346 aircraft produced specifically for the Italian Air Force (ITAF) has a successful first flight. The ITAF has designated the plane as the T-346A. Alenia Aermacchi.

Feb 24/11: UAE. Flight International reports that M346 negotiations between the UAE and Alenia Aermacchi have stopped, with no word on when they might resume. Unfortunately for KAI, this apparently does not indicate an opening for competitors, just a priority shift. Having said that:

“There have also been reports that there was a misunderstanding over the aircraft’s specifications, and that components wanted by the UAE were not included… “Political problems that are outside my domain have resulted in the delays,” says [Alenia's] Vincenzo Giangrasso… “We have discussed the technical issues with the end user, and the air force is very happy with the aircraft…” …The door appears to remain closed to KAI and the T-50, with officials from the South Korean company agreeing. “Obviously, we would love to get back into the competition and offer the T-50. But we have not had any discussions with the UAE officials about the T-50 since they picked the M-346, and we are not expecting that to change any time soon,” says a KAI official.”

Feb 23/11: UAE. IDEX 2011 is drawing to a close, with AED 11.8 billion ($3.21 billion) in contracts from the UAE alone, but still no M346 contract. Jane’s:

“This week there has been no comment on the Alenia Aermacchi M346 trainer aircraft deal announced here two years ago, but yesterday the Italian company was awarded a contract for four MB339 trainers [which also equip the UAE's aerobatic team].”

Jan 20/11: Sub-contractors. CAE announces a contract from Boeing Training Systems and Services to design and manufacture 2 M-346 full-mission simulators, as part of the plane’s ground-based training system for “an international customer.” Italy and Singapore would both qualify for that designation.

The simulators will be delivered in 2012, and will feature a cockpit configuration to train the pilot and weapon systems officer (WSO), as well as the capability to network the simulators for joint training. Boeing’s Constant Resolution Visual System (CRVS) will be powered by CAE Medallion-6000 image generators, running databases based on the CAE-developed Common Database (CDB) standard. The contract’s value is cloaked by its presence within a scattershot set of announcements worth a total of “more than $140 million.”

M-346′s HMD
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Dec 21/10: Italy unveiling. Alenia Aermacchi unveils the first 2 M-346 advanced trainers from Italy’s first batch of 6 aircraft, in a ceremony at Venegono Superiore.

These 2 planes will eventually be delivered to the Experimental Flying Unit at Pratica di Mare Air Force Base, near Rome, for operational evaluation testing. The Italian Air Force will receive the other 4 aircraft in 2011; they are already under construction at the Venegono Superiore factory. Alenia Aermacchi.

Sept 6-8/10: Poland, UAE & Singapore. Poland’s 18th International Defence Industry Exhibition MSPO is held in Kielce. Alenia brings the M-346 to Poland for the 3rd time, and its announcements include some interesting tidbits.

The first is a tacit admission that the M346 is currently only a jet trainer: “The development of the light attack version is already under way to meet specific requirements of individual customer Air Forces.” That’s a reference to a United Arab Emirates requirement, but the UAE isn’t an M346 customer yet.

The second point of interest is their confirmation that “The M-346 has also been selected by the Republic of Singapore for its Fighter Wings Course (FWC) requirement, which aims to replace its current advanced trainers fleet.” There is no contract yet, but its status as Singapore’s preferred bidder is a sharp blow to Korea’s KAI. Alenia Aermacchi. See also “Poland Seeks Advanced Jet Trainers” for full coverage of Poland’s trainer competition.

July 1/10: Singapore. Defense News reports that Singapore’s government has selected Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 as the preferred bidder in its $1.3 billion competition for 48 advanced jet trainers. The report adds that the UAE’s M346 deal remains in limbo over a stalled side deal to jointly develop UAVs, which may give KAI’s T-50 an opening.

May 2010: “T-100″ for USA. An online campaign by Alenia North America rebrands the Italian M346 as the “T-100 integrated training system (ITS)”. Alenia NA is actively seeking US partners to front its bid for the emerging T-X contract. The DEW Line.

May 18/10: HMD. Alenia Aermacchi announces initial flight tests of an M-346 equipped with a 1.6 kg Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) system to complement the traditional cockpit Head-Up Display. The HMD is fully integrated with aircraft avionics and with the Embedded Tactical Training Simulation system.

More and more advanced fighters are flying with HMDs, so an acceptable HMD option becomes an important feature for any advanced jet trainer.

April 26/10: AEJPT. Alenia Aermacchi has formally teamed with EADS to offer the M-346 Master for the 9-nation, 100 aircraft Advanced European Jet Pilot Training (AEJPT) program. Under their memorandum of understanding, Alenia Aermacchi would supply the aircraft while EADS would provide the ground-based training systems. Support would be split between the two companies.

The team is 1 of 7 that responded to the European Defence Agency’s AEJPT request for information. A formal RFP is expected by late 2011, with the winner to be under contract by 2014 and initial operational capability planned for 2017. The question is whether any of this will actually happen, given budget pressures in European countries. What this agreement does, is effectively spell the end of EADS’ Mako HEAT supersonic combat trainer concept. Alenia Aermacchi | EADS.

M-346 prototypes
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Nov 30/09: Sub-contractors. CAE in Montreal, QB, Canada announces that Alenia Aermacchi (AAEM) has awarded CAE a contract to design and manufacture a M-346 full-mission simulator and a M-346 part-task trainer as part of the M-346 ground-based training system for the Italian Air Force. The award flows from the initial Nov 10/09 ARMAEREO contract for 6 M-346 Master Integrated Training Systems (ITS), which include aircraft and their related flight simulators.

Within this contract, CAE has subcontracted the development and supply of simulation and instructor operator station (IOS) subsystems to Selex Galileo in Ronchi dei Legionari, Italy. The M-346 full-mission simulator and part-task trainer is scheduled for delivery to Galatina Air Force Base near Lecce, Italy during the second half of 2011. CAE.

Nov 12/09: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo discusses [PDF] its own participation in the M-346 program. Much of their work revolves around the plane’s Mission Core System (MCS), which includes a Mission Computer (MCSG) hosting the operational flight program, a “glass” (digital) cockpit with 6 AMLCD 5″x5″ smart multi-functional displays, and 2 HUD-100 Head Up Displays. The M-346 Mission Core System manages the databus and some communications links, symbology generation for displays, sensor data collection and Tactical Data Base management; and EICAS “Crew Alerting” control.

SELEX Galileo will do extensive work on the Ground Based Training System alongside CAE. SELEX Galileo will deliver the Instructor Operating Station (IOS) – a high-fidelity replica of the M-346 Cockpit, modeling and simulating the Avionics and most of the Aircraft Systems. Production will be carried out mainly at the Group’s sites in Pomezia (Rome), Nerviano (Milan), and Ronchi dei Legionari (Trieste).

Sept 21/09: Israel. Flight International reports that Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 Master and the Korea Aerospace Industries/Lockheed Martin T-50 have emerged as the leading candidates to replace the Israeli Cheyl Ha’avir’s TA-4 Skyhawk advanced jet trainers. See also full DID coverage: “Israel’s Skyhawk Scandal Leads to End of an Era.”

April 28/09: DOMA cert. Alenia Aermacchi receives D.O.M.A. (Design Organization Military Approval) certification for the M-346 Master, on the basis of the audits carried out by the DGAA for compliance with Regulation AER.P-10. The company release adds that:

“Alenia Aermacchi is the first Italian aeronautical industry which, following its DOMA certification, enjoys the privilege to manage directly and autonomously the homologation process and continuing airworthiness of the M-346 Master advanced trainer. The privileges presently apply to the ECS (Environmental Control System), Windshield & Canopy System, Lighting System and all equipment. This allows internal M-346 design and development processes to be made more efficient and to streamline its interface with the DGAA.”

M-346 Master
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Dec 19/08: Call me Master. The Examination Committee of the competition to name the M-346 trainer picks the name “Master.” The competition was launched on Oct 20/08, and over 4,000 entries were received from every corner of the world. In order to remove any questions of motivation, the Aermacchi release kindly explains what they say they were thinking:

“This international name is the succinct embodiment of what the M-346 represents: the ideal tool to train the future jet pilots of the latest generation and at the same time the maximum level of training that a student can attain.”

Naming

LRIP00 flies
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July 9/08: The first low-rate initial production M-346 trainer makes its maiden flight. Alenia Aermacchi.

May 28/08: Boeing partnership. Alenia Aermacchi and Boeing announce an agreement to jointly pursue the international trainer aircraft market. Aermacchi’s M-311 and M-346 are both covered, for efforts outside of Italy or the USA. For those pursuits, both companies will cooperate on marketing, sales, training and product support. Under the agreement, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems’ Support Systems division will be responsible for several aspects of the program’s spares and support work, and associated ground-based training. Alenia Aermacchi | Boeing.

April 23/08: Sub-contractors. CAE in Montreal, QB, Canada announces that Alenia Aermacchi (AAEM) has picked them as the M-346 program’s preferred full-mission simulator supplier, and awarded CAE a contract to design, develop and validate the simulator’s Initial Training Capability. As part of the overall ground-based training system, CAE will initially design and manufacture a prototype M-346 flight training device (FTD) – a high-fidelity replica of the M-346 cockpit with CAE’s Medallion-6000 image generator, driving a dome display that includes liquid crystal on silicon (LCoS) projectors. CAE will also provide a simulation-based development and validation environment so AAEM engineers and test pilots can perform a range of tests as the M-346 completes its development.

Finmeccanica’s Selex Galileo will partner with CAE for simulator development, delivery, and support, including responsibility for the instructor operating station and cockpit environment. CAE.

May 17/07: France. Aermacchi announces that an Evaluation Team of the French DGA procurement agency’s official CEV flight test centre carries out a flight evaluation of the Alenia Aermacchi M-346 advanced trainer in April 2007. The team evaluated the M-346 in terms of performance, handling, human-machine interface, powerplant system and logistic and maintenance considerations; and examined the engineering and flight data processing capabilities available at the Alenia Aermacchi flight test centre.

This appears to be a case of lending greater expertise to a partner state, in the context of bilateral cooperation agreements. France already flies Alpha Jet trainers, which it intends to keep flying for many years. At some point, however, a replacement will be needed, and early bridge-building never hurts.

May 3/07: Industrial. The first M-346 Low Rate Initial Production fuselage comes out of the jig at Alenia Aermacchi’s Venegono facility. LRIP 00 differs from the prototype and pre-series aircraft in a number of ways, including a new main landing gear optimized wiring, and a weight reduction program that made more use of advanced materials such as unidirectional carbon fiber, thermoplastic and titanium materials, etc. Alenia Aermacchi.

Feb 21/07: UAE. The United Arab Emirates shortlists 2 Alenia Aermacchi aircraft – the M-346 advanced trainer and M-311 basic trainer – among its candidates for a new advanced jet training system. Alenia Aermacchi.

Polish TS-11
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Oct 2-4/06: Poland. The M-346 performs 8 evaluation flights at the Polish Airbase of Deblin. Poland is looking for new trainer aircraft, to accompany its new fleet of F-16s. Read “Poland Seeks Advanced Jet Trainers” for full coverage.

May 30/06: Greece. The M-346 performs 9 evaluation flights at the Hellenic Air Force Training Base in Kalamata, including flights by HAF pilots. During the Kalmata missions, continuous monitoring of all flight parameters conducted by a data receiving station set up at the base, and by Alenia Aermacchi at Venegono, through a proprietary satellite telemetry system. Aermacchi.

May 2005: Testing. First flight of the 2nd M-346 prototype.

Dec 15/05: Greece. Aermacchi and Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) sign a Memorandum of Understanding that sets out the terms of their industrial cooperation in the M-346′s development program. HAI will be the Hellenic prime contractor, responsible for a planning, production and assembly of about 10% of the aircraft, including the posterior fuselage. HAI will also manage the contributions of the other Greek companies taking part in the program as sub-contractors. Aermacchi.

Additional Readings

DID thanks Mark Chen for authorized use of his Singapore Airshow photo.

• Aermacchi – M-346

• Alenia North America – T-100 Integrated Training System.

• Air Force Technology – M-346 Master Advanced Fighter Trainer, Italy

• Wikipedia – Alenia Aermacchi M-346

• Teal Group’s Richard Aboulafia – October 2009 letter. Discusses Italy’s “slow aerospace” industrial model counterpart to the “slow food” movement.

The USA’s T-X

• Defense News (Sept 8/10) – BAE Sees USAF T-X Contest as Foothold. “BAE is going it alone in its bid, despite its successful partnership with Chicago-based Boeing to supply the U.S. Navy with 223 T-45 Goshawk trainers… BAE would still use some U.S. firms as subcontractors…”

• Training & Simulation Journal (Aug 24/10) – The hunt for a jet trainer

• Flight International (Feb 9/09) – Three designs to contest USAF’s T-X deal, believes BAE. Hawk, M-346, and the T-50.

Competitors & Market

• Air Force Technology – Yak-130 Combat Trainer, Russia. Closely related to the Aermacchi M346; they were once a joint program. Currently serves with or ordered by Russia and Algeria.

• Air Force Technology – Hawk Trainer / Light Combat Aircraft, United Kingdom. Hawk is probably the world’s most popular trainer.

• Air Force Technology – Hawk Mk 127 / Mk 128 LIFT Lead In Fighter Trainer, United Kingdom

• Air Force Technology – L159 ALCA Advanced Light Combat Aircraft, Czech Republic. Now it’s also a 2-seat trainer version. Bought by Czech air force, which is trying to sell some of its fleet due to budget issues, but without much success.

• Air Force Technology – MiG-AT – Advanced Flight and Combat Trainer Aircraft, Russia. No market traction as yet.

• DID FOCUS – Korea’s T-50 Spreads Its Wings

• Forecast International (March 25/09) – Fighter R&M Market Facing Conflicting Priorities.

“In its new analysis entitled “The Market for Fighter/Attack/Trainer Retrofit & Modernization,” Forecast International estimates that nearly $20 billion will be spent on military aircraft upgrades during the 2009-2018 period. The United States alone is expected to earmark $9.5 billion for fighter/attack/trainer retrofit & modernization (R&M) programs, with the rest of the world kicking in another $10.3 billion… Caught between changing needs and tight budgets, militaries will seek upgrades for their air fleets that grant the greatest capability without being prohibitively expensive – literally, the most bang for their buck.”

• The centrist Stimson Center issued a report [PDF] compiling ideas for defense savings from a wide variety of sources. Whereas the Pentagon tends to point to billions of dollars of imaginary efficiencies lacking any specificity, this document enumerates actual, tangible options.

• The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Lockheed Martin successfully tested a prototype Extended Medium-range Ballistic Missile (eMRBM) air-launched target. Good news for the agency, as a report issued last month by the GAO pointed out the additional risk posed by the use of new targets for the forthcoming [PDF] Flight Test Operational-01 (FTO-01) meant to test the Ballistic Missile Defense System against several targets.

• EADS’ Q1 2013 revenue reached 12.4 billion euros (about $16.1B) or 9% higher than a year ago. Airbus Military was in better shape than last year, with sales of 612 million euros thanks to more tanker and transport aircraft billing. The outlier was Eurocopter with double-digit slides in both billings and bookings.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin said more snap exercises will come to properly assess troop readiness. Sudden large scale troop movements are also an effective tool to freak out neighbors such as Georgia.

• BAE will cut 100 jobs from the 5,000 or so in its Australian workforce, mostly in South Australia.

• Austal inked partnerships with shipyards in Thailand and Vietnam – after a similar deal in Singapore back in January – in order to be able to maintain LCSs and JHSVs to be deployed by the US Navy in Asia.

• Latest hotspot because of overlapping maritime claims in Asia: a ship from the Philippines’ coast guard shot at a Taiwanese fishing boat, killing one fisherman. The Philippines is now trying to avoid public escalation.

• Geoffrey Till, a professor of Maritime Studies in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, recently presented his book on naval expansion throughout Asia at the IISS think tank. Video below: