Bird Dogs for the Iraqi Air Force

IqAF Caravan ISR
Cessna 208B:
note ISR turret

Iraq’s air force has been very slow in getting to its feet. A handful of Seeker light observation aircraft with their distinctive bubble-shaped fronts, a few Comp Air light propeller aircraft, a couple of old, refurbished C-130E transports, and a slowly growing fleet of helicopters. A few Hawker Beechcraft King Air 350s have been ordered for transport and surveillance duties, and an RFP for armed counterinsurgency aircraft has only given Iraq a set of unarmed T-6B trainers. Even subsequent orders for F-16C/D fighters and L-159 advanced trainer and attack jets leave the Iraqi air force a long way from being able to secure Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. While it continues to grow< , the IqAF's primary duties remain troop/medical transport, light supply duties, and surveillance of roads and infrastructure.

That kind of surveillance doesn't require high tech, high-end aircraft. The USAF was using F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft at $15,000 per flight hour, plus recapitalization amortization. Iraq's solution takes a page from the US military's own past, and offers a significant contrast to the American approach.

The USA’s GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle: 3rd time the charm?

M2 Urban Range
Bradley puts on wear

The US Army’s Heavy Brigade Combat Teams have relied on BAE’s 30+ ton Bradley family of M2/3/6/7 vehicles for a variety of combat functions, from armed infantry carrier and cavalry scout roles, to specialized tasks like calling artillery fire and even short-range air defense. The Bradley first entered US Army service in 1981, however, and the fleet has served through several wars. Even ongoing RESET, modernizations, and remanufacturing cannot keep them going indefinitely.

The Army’s problem is that replacing them has been a ton of trouble. Future Combat Systems’ MGV-IFV was terminated, along with the other MGV variants, by the 2010 budget. A proposal to replace it with a “Ground Combat Vehicle” (GCV) program raised concerns that the Army’s wish list would create an even less affordable solution. Now a revised GCV program is underway. Can it deliver a vehicle that will be effective on the battlefield? Just as important, can it deliver a vehicle that the US Army can afford to buy and maintain, in the midst of major national budgetary problems and swelling entitlement programs?

Airbus’ A400M Aerial Transport: Delays and Development

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A400M rollout
A400M rollout, Seville

Airbus’ A400M is a EUR 20+ billion program that aims to repeat Airbus’ civilian successes in the full size military transport market. A series of smart design decisions were made around capacity (35-37 tonnes/ 38-40 US tons, large enough for survivable armored vehicles), extensive use of modern materials, multi-role capability as a refueling tanker, and a multinational industrial program; all of which leave the aircraft well positioned to take overall market share from Lockheed Martin’s C-130 Hercules. If the USA’s C-17 is allowed to go out of production, the A400M would also have a strong position in the strategic transport market, with only Russian AN-70, IL-76 and AN-124 aircraft as competition. To date, 174 orders have been placed by Germany (now 53 + 7 options), France (50), Spain (27), Britain (now 22), Turkey (10), South Africa (8), Belgium (7), Malaysia (4), and Luxembourg (1). Chile has expressed an unfinalized interest in 3 planes, but is now likely to buy Brazilian KC-390s instead.

EADS’ biggest issue, by far, has been funding for a project that is more than EUR 7 billion over budget. The next biggest issue is timing, as A400M delivery penalties and Lockheed Martin’s strong push for its serving C-130J Super Hercules cast a pall over the A400M’s potential future. The entire project was under moratorium for over a year as all parties decided what to do, but it’s now moving forward again. This DID Spotlight article covers the latest developments, as the A400M Atlas moves into production.

The USA’s E-6 Fleet: TAke Charge, And Move Out!

E-6B TACAMO
E-6B TACAMO

The USA’s E-6 Mercury (aka. TACAMO, as in TAke Charge And Move Out) “survivable airborne communication system” airplanes support their Navy’s SSBN ballistic missile submarine force and overall strategic forces. With the advent of the new “Tactical Trident” converted Ohio Class special operations subs, their unique capabilities become even more useful. The E-6B version also has a secondary role as a “Looking Glass” Airborne National Command Post, and in recent years they have seen use as communications relay stations over the front lines of combat.

Delivery of the first production E-6 aircraft took place in August 1989, with delivery of the 16th and final airplane coming in May 1992. This is DID’s FOCUS Article concerning the E-6 system, which includes details concerning the capabilities and associated contracts. The latest contracts involve important fleet upgrades, as the Navy tries to drag the jet’s systems into the 21st century.

MQ-9 Reaper: The First Operational UCAV?

Reaper Hellfires Paveways
Reaper, ready…

The MQ-9 Reaper UAV, once called “Predator B,” is somewhat similar to the famous Predator. Until you look at the tail. Or its size. Or its weapons. It’s called “Reaper” for a reason – while it packs the same surveillance gear, it’s much more of a hunter-killer design. Some have called it the first fielded Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV).

The Reaper UCAV will play a significant role in the future USAF, even though its capability set makes the MQ-9 considerably more expensive than MQ-1 Predators, whose price benefits from less advanced design and volume production orders. Given these high-end capabilities, and expenses, one might not have expected the MQ-9 to enjoy better export success than its famous cousin. Nevertheless, that’s what appears to be happening. MQ-9 operators currently include the USA and Britain, who have both used it in hunter-killer mode, and Italy. Other countries are also expressing interest, and international deployments are accelerating. Then the US Air Force’s FY13 President Budget cut its requested order pipeline, all of a sudden.

LCA Tejas: An Indian Fighter – With Foreign Help

LCA Tejas Underside
Tejas LCA

India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the bulk of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Most of India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft face similar problems.

In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s hope is that they can maintain an adequate force until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA competition delivers replacements, and more SU-30MKIs arrive from HAL. Which still leaves India without an affordable fighter solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21 Bison program adds years of life to those airframes, but even so, they’re likely to be gone by 2020.

That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the IAF’s future prospects. It’s also why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, the program’s delays are a growing problem for the IAF. Meanwhile, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market opens an opportunity, if India can seize it with a compelling and timely product.

Aussie Anti-Air Umbrella: The Hobart Class Ships

FFG F100 Visits Sydney 2007-03
F100 visits Sydney

Under the SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer program, Australia plans to replace its retired air defense destroyers with a modern system that can provide significantly better protection from air attack, integrate with the US Navy and other Coalition partners, offer long-range air warfare defense for Royal Australian Navy task groups, and help provide a coordinated air picture for fighter and surveillance aircraft. Despite their name and focus, the ships are multi-role designs with a “sea control” mission that also includes advanced anti-submarine and surface warfare capabilities.

The Royal Australian Navy took a pair of giant steps in June 2007, when it selected winning designs for its keystone naval programs: Canberra Class LHD amphibious operations vessels, and Hobart Class “air warfare destroyers.” Spain’s Navantia made an A$ 11 billion clean sweep, winning both the A$ 3 billion Canberra Class LHD and the A$ 8 billion Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer contracts. The new AWD ships were scheduled to begin entering service with the Royal Australian Navy in 2013, but that date has now slipped to 2016 or so.

LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development

MH-53E/Mk-105
Old school:
MH-53E & Mk-105 sled

The US Navy currently uses large CH-53/MH-53 helicopters and towed sleds to help with mine clearance work, but they hope to replace those old systems with something smaller and newer. The MH-60S helicopter’s Airborne Mine Counter-Measures (AMCM) system adds an operator’s station to the helicopter cabin, additional internal fuel stores, and towing capability, accompanied by a suite of carried systems that can be mixed and matched. AMCM is actually 5 different air, surface and sub-surface mine countermeasures systems, all deployed and integrated together in the helicopter.

While the US Navy develops AMCM, and complementary ship-launched systems for use on the new Littoral Combat Ships, new minehunter ship classes like the Ospreys are being retired by the US Navy and sold. All in an era where the threat of mines is arguably rising, along with tensions around key chokepoints like the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz.

This article explains the components involved (AQS-20, ALMDS, AMNS, OASIS, RAMICS; COBRA, RMS, SMCM), chronicles their progress through reports and contracts, and provides additional links for research.

JDAM: A GPS-INS Add-on Adds Accuracy to Airstrikes

B-2 Dropping JDAM
B-2 drops JDAM

Precision bombing has been a significant military goal since the invention of the Norden bomb sight in the 1920s, but its application remained elusive. Over 30 years later, in Vietnam, the destruction of a single target could require 300 bombs, which meant sending an appropriate number of fighters or bombers into harm’s way to deliver them. Even the 1991 Desert Storm war with Iraq featured unguided munitions for the most part. The USAF some laser and TV-guided weapons like Paveway bombs and Maverick missiles, but they were very expensive, and only effective in good weather. If precision bombing was finally to become a reality throughout the Air Force, a new approach would be needed. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) became that alternative, an engine of military transformation that was also a model of procurement transformation.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This DID FOCUS Article looks at the transformational history of the JDAM GPS-guided bomb program, the ongoing efforts to bring its capabilities up to and beyond the level of dual-mode guidance kits like Israel’s Spice and Raytheon’s Enhanced Paveway, and the contracts issued under the JDAM program since its inception.[updated]

Australia’s SH-2G Seasprite Helos: (Mis)Fortune Down Under

SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite Coastline
SH-2G: rocky shoals

In 1997, Australia signed an $A 667 million contract with Kaman to purchase 11 upgraded SH-2G(A) “Super Seasprites,” with modernized avionics. This compact helicopter design was thought to be well suited to operation from the RAN’s ANZAC Class frigates, and even from patrol boats with helicopter decks. The first SH-2G(A) was unveiled in 2003, but by 2005 up to 40 deficiencies had been identified, including inability to operate in bad weather and low-light conditions, and inability to meet Australian airworthiness certification standards. Placing modern avionics into a 1960s airframe proved challenging indeed: the helicopters were restricted to “passenger and supply transport in good weather” in 2005, then grounded entirely in May 2006.

By 2007, the project was 6 years behind schedule, costs had risen over 50% to $A 1.1 billion (about $900 million) for 11 helicopters, and the program was being used as a negative case study in the Australian Defence College’s leadership and ethics course. It was estimated that at least $A 45 million more and 29 months of work would be required to make them serviceable, with full operational status unlikely until at least 2010. In 2007, Australia’s Liberal Party government elected to continue the Super Seasprite program – but their successor Labor government reversed that decision in 2008, and come to an interesting agreement with Kaman. Who now has 11 helicopters and associated infrastructure to sell. Six year later, in 2013, they finally made that sale. And the winner is…

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