Lower tier:
Indian Do-228 MPA

India’s growing power is creating growing naval responsibility around the Indian Ocean, from the strategic chokepoint and shipping channel represented by Indonesia’s Straits of Malacca in the east, to anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and basing agreements with Madagascar in the west. Hence the January 2009 deal for 8-16 of Boeing’s 737-derived P-8i Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which will replace Russian-built TU-142’s as India’s long-range patrol aircraft.

Closer to home, however, India has its own long coastline to patrol, and nations like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan that represent existing or potential trouble spots along its borders. The P-8i will work in those problem areas, but less-expensive and shorter-range aircraft will be needed to supplement their coverage – and to replace India’s aging Britten-Norman Islanders. Inshore, new Dornier Do-228NG aircraft and UAVs will play a role, and India’s Israeli-built Searcher and Heron UAVs are already part of the mix. In between, medium sized manned aircraft must fill their own niches in India’s Navy and its Coast Guard. In January 2009, the wheels began turning on pair of follow-on buys covering short and medium range manned aircraft for India’s Navy and Coast Guard. That effort stalled out, but has now restarted:

• India’s MRMR and MMP Competitions [updated]
  • MRMR & MMP: Rumored Contenders [updated]
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
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G.222/ C-27A

The ultimate goal for Afghanistan’s air force is the ability to support the Afghan National Army against al-Qaeda/ Taliban elements that launch raids within the country, or from across the border with Pakistan. Given Afghanistan’s rugged terrain and sparse infrastructure, however, a decision has been made to make tactical transportation of troops and supplies the Afghanistan National Army Air Corps’ top priority.

That explains US NAVAIR’s efforts to buy more Ukrainian AN-32s, which offered familiar technology, even though the spares situation is less than ideal. On top of that, a 3-way deal has been made involving Italy, which will send some of its Alenia G.222 (C-27A) light transports to Afghanistan, under a refurbishment program conducted by Alenia North America:

• The ANAAF’s C-27A Program
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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Ultra APV demonstrator

In an age of non-linear warfare, where front lines are nebulous at best and non-existent at worst, one of the biggest casualties is… the concept of unprotected rear echelon vehicles, designed with the idea that they’d never see serious combat. That imperative is being driven home on 2 fronts. One front is operational. The other front is buying trends.

These trends, and their design imperatives, found their way into the USA’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, which aims to replace many of the US military’s 120,000 or so Humvees. The US military’s goal is a 7-10 ton vehicle that’s lighter than its MRAPs and easier to transport aboard ship, while offering substantially better protection ad durability than existing up-armored Humvees. They’d also like a vehicle that can address front-line issues like power generation, in order to recharge all of the batteries troops require for electronic gadgets like night sights, GPS devices, etc.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. JLTV certainly qualifies, and recent budget planning endorsements have solidifed a future that was looking shaky. Now, can the Army’s program deliver?

• JLTV: Program & Risks
  • The JLTV Family of Vehicles
  • JLTV: Goals and Constraints
  • JLTV: To Be, or Not to Be?
• JLTV: Participants and Platforms [updated]
  • Phase 2 Engineering & Manufacturing Development: Outside Entries [updated]
• JLTV: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
• Appendix A: Phase 1 Technology Development’s Losing Teams
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• Finmeccanica declared [PDF] a EUR 2.3 billion loss for 2011 (slightly more than $3B) on EUR 17.3B of revenue (-7% vs. 2010) because of high nonrecurring charges. Sales declined 22% to EUR 17.4B. Total backlog dropped 5% to 46 billion euros but from the company’s own admission it is “marked by a number of uncertain orders.”

• Turkey’s SSM procurement agency has unveiled their new 5-year strategic plan, with timetables for key acquisitions like the T129 ATAK helicopter and Altay tank.

• The Pentagon is on board with more support for Israel’s Iron Dome rocket defense systems. RAFAEL is partnered with Raytheon to market Iron Dome in the USA, and several NATO allies are interested in system.
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T129 ATAK

Turkey has been looking to modernize its attack helicopter fleet since the mid-1990s, but the process has mostly served as an object lesson in how not to buy defense equipment. This competition faced many difficulties; after numerous snafus, technology transfer and production issues, and canceled competitions, all 3 invited American manufacturers had abandoned the competition entirely.

Even the “final” round seemed imperiled, following reports of the Turkish military’s deep dissatisfaction with the choices; nevertheless, the competition survived long enough to pick a “winner”: an updated version of the A129 Mangusta. Now, signed industrial arrangements contracts with AgustaWestland allow the 12-year program to move forward at last. But Turkey didn’t just buy helicopters – they bought the model, lock, stock, and rotor:

• Program and Finalists
• T129: The Winner
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: “I Coulda Been A Contenda…”
• Appendix B: Additional Readings and Sources
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Scorpene cutaway

In 2005, India confirmed that it would buy 6 Franco-Spanish Scorpene diesel submarines, with an option for 6 more and extensive technology transfer agreements. The Scorpene deal had simmered on the back-burner for several years, before it became one of India’s largest-ever partnerships with France. DID reported that a deal was “close” as far back as 2004, but nothing was finalized until late 2005. The cost had been subject to varying estimates over the life of those multi-year negotiations, as well as project overruns; the final figure for the first 6 boats is now generally accepted as being about $4 billion.

India’s submarine fleet currently consists of 16 submarines, about 13 of which are operational. Its Foxtrot Class boats can no longer be counted on, and its U209 derivatives from HDW are unlikely to last beyond 2015. With Pakistan acquiring modern submarines, and Chinese submarine building exploding, serious thought to India’s future submarine fleet became an obvious priority. This DID FOCUS article covers the Scorpene deal and its structure, adds key contracts and new developments, and offers insights into the larger naval picture beyond India.

• India’s New Submarines: The Deal [updated]
  • Schedule, Cost & Plans
  • Timeline & Industrial Arrangements
• The Scorpene Class
  • The AIP Option
• Scorpene Project: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: India’s Current Submarine Force, and Rival Navies
• Appendix B: A Final, Nuclear Note
• Appendix C: Additional Readings & Sources [updated]
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NH90: TTH & NFH

The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AgustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow.

The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points. Its combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Certification and acceptance have also been slow, with very few NH90s in service over a decade after the first contracts were signed. Orders currently stand at 524 machines, on behalf of 14 nations…

• The NH90 Platform(s)
• The NH90 Production Program [updated]
• Contracts & Key Events, 1995-present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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C-27J Spartan

When the WALRUS super-heavy cargo airship was canceled, combat commanders complained that front-line airfields were often too short for the C-130 Hercules that make up the USAF’s tactical transport fleet. Delays in buying a small cargo aircraft to fill that role were making that problem worse. Starved of useful help due to USAF-sponsored delays, and the lack of appropriate aircraft in the USAF, the Army carried on with its aging C-23 Sherpas, and repurposed aircraft like the unprotected C-12 Hurons, in order to ferry troops, supplies, and/or very small vehicles within its theaters of operations. From the start the US Army and US Air Force expressed different levels of urgency and priority that led to Congressional SNAFUs and an initial contract award.

JCA could have been worth up to $6 billion before all was said and done, and the finalists were a familiar duo. After EADS-CASA’s CN-235 and a shortened version of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J were disqualified for failing to meet requirements, JCA became yet another international competition between EADS-CASA’s C-295M & Alenia’s C-27J. The C-27J team eventually won the delayed decision in June 2007, and prevailed in the subsequent contract protests from their rivals. What remained unclear was exactly what they had won. The joint-service decision and contract announcement didn’t end the inter-service and Congressional politicking, either, and the contractor side was equally fractious. This FOCUS article covers the JCA competition, and subsequent developments – including the Pentagon’s 2012 push to end the program, and sell its planes:

• Canned Feud: The Transport of Seville vs. the Spartan Salesmen
• Hello, My Baby, Hello, My Honey: The C-27J
  • Room And Bird: The National Guard Angle
• A Great Big Bunch Of You: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Stop, Look, and Hasten: Additional Readings
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NH90 NFH

In September 2001, the NH90 medium helicopter was chosen as the common helicopter for the Nordic Standard Helicopter Programme, serving the navies of Norway, Sweden and Finland. Norway’s share was up to 24 machines: 14 NFH naval variants (6 for Norwegian ships and 8 for the coastguard), with an option for 10 more Search & Rescue machines. The follow-on SAR contract would replace Norway’s aging Sea King helicopter fleet.

At the time, DID reader and correspondent Endre Lunde noted warnings from people in the rescue service that the mid-range NH90 lacked the range and capacity required. Some Norwegians also pointed to Denmark’s departure from the Nordic Standard Helicopter Programme, precisely because they felt they needed the larger EH101 for the SAR role. Norway certainly has a lot of territory to cover. Its own long and deep maritime economic zone over the treacherous North Sea includes shipping, fishing, and abundant oil; and the American withdrawal from Keflavik AFB Iceland is stretching Norway’s patrol zones toward that country. Sikorsky’s Norwegian agent “Aircontactgruppen” has even taken the Norwegian government to court twice, demanding an open competition for the SAR helicopter contract. In 2007, they received their wish. What no-one has received yet, is a contract:

• Competitors
• Contracts & Key Events
• Additional Readings
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Aborted landing

In January 2005, the U.S. Navy selected the US101 as the new “Marine One” baseline helicopter, for use by the President of the United States. The US101 is an American variant of AgustaWestland’s successful AW101 multi-mission medium helicopter; it beat out Sikorsky’s S-92 Superhawk, which is already in use as a government VIP transport in countries like South Korea.

That $1.7 billion victory was first endangered, and then destroyed, by ongoing changes from the White House staff. In 2008, the program’s ballooning costs and requirements got a temporary reprieve when US Navy agreed to proceed with the VH-71, despite a cost per aircraft equal or greater than the President’s Air Force One 747s. By June 2009, however, the VH-71 program had shot itself down.

Another round of competition is on the way, and the Pentagon wants to buy 2 different helicopters in the VXX follow-on program. First, however, the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense must agree on the new program’s foundations…

• The New Marine One Helicopter Programs: A History [updated]
• Marine One: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• VH-3/ VH-60 Refurbishment: Contracts & Key Events
• Additional Readings
• Appendix A: VXX 1.0 – The US101
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