What is it good for?

Northrop Grumman’s E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) uses a powerful ground-looking Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mounted on a Boeing 707-300 airframe, giving American commanders combat-changing battlefield surveillance and communications relay capabilities. The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system originally aimed to create a similar capability as a pooled NATO asset, based on a mix of smaller Airbus A321 airframes and RQ-4B Global Hawk UAVs, coupled with ground stations.

AGS started in 1995, and it has taken a very long time. Its MoU was late, its contract will be both late and smaller in scope, and it won’t meet even a revised 2012-2014 fielding window. At long last, however, one can be assured that it will exist. This is DID’s in-depth FOCUS Article covering the AGS program, from its platforms to its program structure to its long-awaited contracts.

• The Need for AGS
• NATO AGS: Program & History
• NATO AGS: Platforms & Technologies
• NATO AGS: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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P-8A Poseidon

Maritime surveillance and patrol is becoming more and more important, but the USA’s P-3 Orion fleet is falling apart. The P-8A emerged from the ashes of the P-7 Long Range Air ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) Capable Aircraft program that was begun in 1988. That program originally envisaged an improved P-3, but cost overruns, slow progress, and interest in opening the competition to commercial designs, led to the P-7’s cancellation for default in 1990. The successor MMA program was begun in March 2000, and Boeing beat Lockheed’s “Orion 21” with a design based on their ubiquitous 737 passenger jet.

Filling the P-3 Orion’s shoes is certainly no easy task. What missions will the new P-8A Poseidon face? What do we know about the platform, the project team, and ongoing developments? Will the P-3’s level of global customer coverage give its successor a comparable level of export opportunities? Australia and India have already signed on, but has the larger market shifted in the interim?

• P-8A Poseidon: Platform & Capabilities
  • The P-8’s BAMS Companion: Kicking It Up a Notch
• P-8A Poseidon: History & Program
  • US Program Budgets [updated]
  • Numbers & Basing
  • P-8A Industrial Partners
• P-8A Poseidon: Contracts & Events [updated]
• News & Analysis: India’s Interest, and Broader Export Potential
• Additional Readings & Sources
• Additional Readings & Sources: News & Updates
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• Who says you cannot make a U-turn with an aircraft carrier? Early media reports were right (it happens!), the UK officially confirmed [PDF] that it will switch its JSF order from the F-35C to the STOVL flavor:

“We expect HMS Queen Elizabeth to be handed over to the Navy in early 2017 for sea trials. We expect to take delivery of our first test aircraft in July of this year, and we expect the first production aircraft to be delivered to us in 2016, with flying from the Queen Elizabeth to begin in 2018, after her sea trials are complete.”

• Canada released its Report on Plans and Priorities 2012-13. It shows total expenses down 10.3% from last year to CAN $19.6B. Planned spending allocates 17.9% to land readiness, 11.6% to joint efforts, 11.4% to maritime readiness and 9.5% to aerospace. Land readiness is almost cut in half but is planned to go back above CAN $3.3B by 2013-14.

• DoD’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) FY11 report [PDF] dates from February but was only released publicly earlier this week. Though the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is exempt from DFARS regulations, CAPE has started independently assessing the cost of their programs. They have focused so far on regular major programs (MDAPs) while they have worked mostly on the IT programs (MAIS) deemed to be in the worst shape. Also of note:
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CC-130 over BC

The US military has been coming to the realization that its aging aircraft fleet will begin posing serious challenges in the coming years. Canada is experiencing similar problems. In 2005, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier said that:

“Our [CC-130 E/H] Hercules fleet right now is rapidly going downhill. We know that three years and a little bit more than that, the fleet starts to become almost completely inoperational and we will have to stop supporting operations – or else, not be able to start them.”

This Spotlight article offers additional details regarding the Canadian CC-130 recapitalization program, and the thinking behind it; some background that points up the parallels between the issues faced by the Canadians, and the experiences of other air services; and some insight into why the buy took so long, after the C-130J was declared Canada’s preferred choice in an “expedited” process. Canada has begun using the new planes on operations, and is preparing to accept the last “CC-130J.” This will shift its focus to issues of long-term support costs.

• The Transports and the Damage Done: Issues With the Fleet
  • Live Rust: What To Do Until the New Planes Arrive?
• Comes a Time: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A – Someday: Facing the Future, At Last?
  • Bite the Bullet: Canada’s Procurement Approach and Process
  • Are You Ready for the Country: Possible Competitors C-130J, C-130M, A400M… IL-76?
• Walk On: Additional Readings & Sources
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In October 2010, the Canadian government issued a Solicitation of Interest and Qualification to 5 short-listed firms, for the opportunity to be be part of the Conservative Party government’s 30-year National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. Up to 28 major ships would be built over that period, to equip the Canadian Navy and Coast Guard. One yard would build all combat ships, and the runner up would build the support ships. Up to C$ 33 billion in future work was at stake.

That set up a difficult political situation, in a country with deep regional divides and a high-quality but shaky shipbuilding industry. The USA’s Jones Act makes major sales to the neighboring American market virtually impossible, some foreign shipbuilders are subsidized by up to 40% by their home governments, and Canadian military needs are too small and infrequent to sustain an industry by themselves. In October 2011, the government announced their decision:

• Canada’s NSPS [updated]
  • Decision and Reactions, 2011
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
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MSVS MilCOTS 7400

Just before Canada Day 2006, Canada’s minority Conservative Party government outlined a C$ 1.2 billion (USD $1 billion) RFP for new medium-sized logistics trucks and associated equipment. These Medium Support Vehicle System (MSVS) trucks will become the new backbone of the Canadian Forces’ land transport capabilities, replacing the MLVW (really, US M-35/M-36 designs with some modifications) 1950s designs, built by Bombardier in the 1980s.

The MLVWs are reaching the end of their service lives, and can’t carry all of the extra armor required for survival in places like Afghanistan. This may explain why the Canadian forces in Afghanistan are relying on their HLVW heavy trucks instead, a set of 10-ton capacity Steyr vehicles related to the smaller US FMTV medium truck family.

Under the new plan, the Canadian Forces will purchase up to 2,300 new medium trucks. What are the requirements? The configurations and numbers? Is this a welcome arrival that fills a critical gap? A mistake that will leave Canada out of step with shifting trends? Or a politically-driven move that falls into the “something, and hence better than nothing” category? Or all 3? As of 2012, MSVS has made 1 truck purchase, bought containerized modules, and is still waiting on the contract for front-line military trucks…

• If You Could Read My Mind: Medium Truck Requirements [updated]
• Go-Go Round: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: It’s Too Late, He Wins – Issues and Analysis (July 1/06)
• Additional Readings & Sources
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LAV-III: stuck
(click to view larger)

In late November 2008, Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) announced its intention to combine 3 programs into one general set of upgrades to its armored vehicle fleets. The C$ 5 billion (about $4.3 billion) meta-program would include (1) a “close combat vehicle,” in order to perform as a tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle or Armored Personnel Carrier alongside Canada’s new Leopard 2A6 tanks; (2) a new “Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle”; and (3) upgrades the existing LAV-III wheeled APC fleet. In July 2009, A 4th “FME” project was added to field dedicated Armored Engineering Vehicles based on the Leopard 2, along with engineering-related attachments for Canada’s new Leopard 2 tanks.

The “Close Combat Vehicle” appears to be the most urgent purchase, but the stated procurement approach isn’t structured to deliver urgency. As things stand, all contracts are scheduled to take effect after Canada is slated to end its Afghan mission. The LAV-IIIs showed limitations in key terrain within Afghanistan, and keeping them in the field requires a lot of maintenance. Canada’s M113 tracked APCs have been used successfully as a supplement, but the Canadians appear to be leaning toward a heavier vehicle for their future CCV:

• The Close Combat Vehicle [updated]
  • Tracked Options
  • Wheeled Options
• The Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle (TAPV)
• LAV-IIIs, and the RESET/RECAP Imperative
• Force Mobility Enhancement: Heavy Engineering
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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C-212, hot & high

Presidential Airways, Inc. of Moyock, NC (now AAR Airlift) uses EADS-CASA 212 and Dash-8 transport aircraft for its work, which is short-haul supply flights in and out of remote locations – including combat zones. It also fields helicopters and other assets. The US military hoped that Presidential would be able to address some of the issues US combat commanders have raised with the need for transport aircraft that can use smaller runways, and land closer to zones of operations. Accordingly, the firm received several contracts from the US government for these services, covering a number of Central Asian countries.

They remain a major provider of fixed-wing, in-theater contract transport – but are no longer the only option, as the USA turns to contractors for both helicopters and fixed-wing support. This article chronicles fixed-wing contracts from 2004 – 2012.

• The GAO studied how the fast capability procured via joint urgent operational needs ended up being fielded. Such fulfillment amounted to at least $76.9B for FY 2005-10 according to DoD. Some programs such as the the MRAP Recovery Vehicle tow truck were fielded within 6 months of validation, while several other initiatives were delayed beyond the targeted 2 years because of requirement or contracting issues. You would expect off-the-shelf solutions to, well, fly off the shelves, but while they do get fielded faster overall, delays early in the process reduced the difference with custom efforts. See chart at the bottom of this entry.

• Northrop Grumman’s sales decreased by 8% to $6.2B in Q1 2012 vs. a year ago, a slight acceleration of the rate of sales decrease seen through 2011. Electronic Systems is the division that lost the least (-5%) and Technical Services the most (-10%). Among the factors explaining the decline in sales: low F/A-18 and F-35 deliveries from Boeing and Lockheed Martin respectively. The total backlog shrunk by $400M to $39.1B ($25B or 64% of which is funded) while new business awards amounted to $5.8B.

• Defense contractors in Canada have gripes about “vaporware” DND competitions that cost them millions to bid for yet never materialize.
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• The US and the UK have finalized a bilateral defense trade treaty that puts in place a new exemption (§126.17- the UK Exemption) to ITAR. See Frequently Asked Questions.

• QinetiQ touts BAE’s use of its Paramarine advanced marine design software for the Type 26 frigate’s early stage design and trade-off studies. It helps that the Royal Navy has designated Paramarine as its stability software, and uses it for certification.

• Canada’s DND published a backgrounder on their forces in the Arctic.
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