In March 2008, the Bell Boeing Joint Project Office in Amarillo, TX received a $10.4 billion modification that converted the previous advance acquisition contract (N00019-07-C-0001) to a fixed-price-incentive-fee, multi-year contract. The new contract now sits at $10.92 billion, and will be used to buy 143 MV-22 (for USMC) and 31 CV-22 (Air Force Special Operations) Osprey aircraft, plus associated manufacturing tooling to move the aircraft into full production.

The V-22 tilt-rotor program has been beset by controversy throughout its 20-year development period. Despite these issues, and the emergence of competitive but more conventional compound helicopter technologies like Piasecki’s X-49 Speedhawk and Sikorsky’s X2, the V-22 program continues to move forward. This DID Spotlight article looks at the V-22′s multi-year purchase contract from 2008-12 and 2013-2017, plus associated contracts for key V-22 systems, program developments, and research sources.

V-22 Budgets & Buys

MV-22
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The V-22 comes in 2 variants. The US Marines operate the MV-22, whose most current configuration is Block C. The current MV-22 Block C’s enhancements (software version C1.01) include forward-mounted AN/ALE-47 defensive systems, move the MV-22?s Ice Detectors, improve dust protection for the engines, and add a redesigned Environmental Control System (ECS) to keep devices and troops from overheating. A “Cabin Situational Awareness Device” displays essential mission information, including access to GPS updates for handheld devices, plus way points, flight plans, location, etc. for troop commanders inside. For the pilots, a Color Weather Radar System provides weather detection, ground mapping to 20 nm, and sea search. Electronic Standby Flight Instruments (ESFI) replace the analog standby instrument cluster, and a Day Heads-up Display (HUD) feeds its data to a helmet-mounted monocle. A Traffic Advisory System (TAS) was intended to warn MV-22 pilots of other aircraft that might hit them, but it doesn’t work properly.

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US Air Force Special Operations Command operates the CV-22, which adds more sophisticated surveillance capabilities, beefed-up defensive systems, extra fuel tanks, and useful capabilities like terrain-following flight. Its most current configuration is the CV-22 Block 20.

Budgets from 2002 – 2013 include:

V-22 MYP-II?

The US fiscal situation is almost certain to lead to serious defense budget cuts within the next 5 years. The V-22′s manufacturers have responded by trying to lock the government into a 2nd multi-year contract, whose cancellation penalties would make the expensive Osprey too expensive to cancel or seriously reduce. Enough contracts like that will end up gutting other USMC investments when cuts do hit, and could lead to even more serious problems if V-22 fleet operations and maintenance costs don’t start dropping very quickly (vid. Nov. 29/11 entry).

That isn’t the manufacturers’ concern, and at this point, it doesn’t seem to be the Navy’s, either. The FY 2013 budget included a submission to buy 98 more V-22 aircraft (91 MV-22, 7 CV-22) under a 2nd fixed-price multi-year contract, between FY 2013 – FY 2017. The MV-22s will be bought by the Navy for the Marines, while the CV-22s aircraft are a joint buy involving the USAF and SOCOM. To get approval for a multi-year buy, they must demonstrate at least 10% cost savings over buying the same number of platforms year by year. Their proposal hopes to save $852.4 million, or 11.6% of the total, at the price of less flexibility in the number bought over that period:

Contracts & Key Events

AFSOC CV-22
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Unless otherwise noted, US Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD issues the contracts, and the Bell-Boeing Joint Program tiltrotor team in Amarillo, TX is the contractor.

Note that “low power repairs” are triggered when an AE1107 engine’s Power Assurance Check (PAC) reads below 96%. It’s normal for aircraft engine performance to drop somewhat over time, and the fix involves engine removal for maintenance and tune-up.

CV-22 washing
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May 16/13: Lot 18. Bell-Boeing Joint Project Office, Amarillo, TX, is being awarded a $40 million contract modification for long-lead components associated with the manufacture and delivery of 19 USMC MV-22Bs in Production Lot 18 (FY 2014). Which is 1 more than the budget stated, but there are also OCO supplemental requests for wartime replacement. All funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (24.6%); Ridley Park, PA (19.2%), Amarillo, TX (10.4%), Dallas, TX (4.3%); East Aurora, NY (2.5%); Park City, Utah (1.7%); El Segundo, CA (1.3%); Endicott, NY (1.0%); Ontario, Canada (0.9%); Tempe, AZ (.8%); Rome, NY (0.7%); Torrance, CA (0.7%); Luton, United Kingdom (0.6%); Clifton, NJ (0.6%); Salisbury, MD (0.6%); Los Angeles, CA (0.6%); Cobham, United Kingdom (0.6%); Irvine, CA (0.6%); San Diego, CA (0.5%); Yakima, WA (0.5%); Brea, CA (0.5%); Rockmart, GA (0.5%); McKinney, TX (0.4%); Albuquerque, NM (0.4%); Whitehall, Mich. (0.4%); Wolverhampton, United Kingdom (0.4%); Tucson, AZ (0.4%); Erie, PA (0.3%); Vergennes, VT (0.3%); Kilgore, TX (0.3%); Shelby, NC (0.3%); Avon, Ohio (0.2%); Santa Clarita, CA (0.2%); Garden City, NY (0.2%); El Cajon, CA (0.2%); Corinth, TX (0.2%); Sylmar, CA (0.2%); Westbury, NY (0.1%); and other locations (21.8%). Work is expected to be complete in September 2016 (N00019-12-C-2001).

April 22/13: Israel. Secretary of Defense Hagel announces that Israel will order V-22s, as part of a package that includes KC-135 aerial tankers, AESA radars for their fighter jets, and radar-killing missiles:

“Minister Yaalon and I agreed that the United States will make available to Israel a set of advanced new military capabilities,… including antiradiation missiles and advanced radars for its fleet of fighter jets, KC-135 refueling aircraft, and most significantly, the V-22 Osprey, which the U.S. has not released to any other nation,” Hagel said…. Introducing the V-22 into the Israeli air force, he added, will give that service long-range, high-speed maritime search-and rescue-capabilities to deal with a range of threats and contingencies.”

“Has not released” is a nice way of saying that Israel was the 1st country to take its request to this level. Based on previous reports (q.v. Aug 2/11, June 8/11), it seems likely that Israel will either order CV-22s, or modify MV-22Bs on its own for special forces roles. Pentagon | Israel Defense | yNet.

April 10/13: FY 2014 Budget. The President releases a proposed budget at last, the latest in modern memory. The Senate and House were already working on budgets in his absence, but the Pentagon’s submission is actually important to proceedings going forward. See ongoing DID coverage.

The FY 2014 request is $1.867 billion to buy 21 aircraft: 18 MV-22Bs and 3 CV-22s. It represents the 2nd year of the V-22′s 2nd multi-year contract.

April 10/13: Ro-Ro Kits. Flight International reports that Boeing is working on a roll-on/roll-off kit for the V-22. The concept could apply to functions like surveillance, via kits designed for ground or even aerial surveillance. Their main focus, however, is reportedly an aerial refueller kit that would extend a hose out the back ramp. Customers like the USMC and SOCOM can use C-130 Hercules turboprops for that, but a V-22 kit would trade less fuel capacity for a refueller that could deploy from ships. There are many situations in which that’s a very useful trade. Flight International.

March 11/13: Support. A $73 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to repair 142 V-22 component types. Funding for this contract will be release through individual task orders.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (80%) and Ridley Park, PA (20%) until Sept 8/15. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 USC 2304 (c)(1) by US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-13-D-017N).

Jan 31/13: Engines. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives an $83.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercise an option for 38 AE1107C turboshaft engines (34 USN @ $74.9 million & 4 USAF @ $8.8 million).

This is part of the multi-year engine deal described on March 30/12, and it would equip most of Lot XVII: 17 MV-22s and 2 CV-22s. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN and is expected to be complete in December 2014. All contract funds are committed immediately from USN FY 2012 Aircraft Procurement, and USAF FY 2013 Aircraft Procurement budget lines (N00019-12-C-0007).

Jan 17/13: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The V-22 is included, aand critics are sure to take note of this paragraph:

“No additional flight testing or engineering analysis have been done indicating a change would be appropriate to DOT&E’s September 2005 assessment that the MV-22 cannot perform autorotation to a survivable landing.”

V-22 pilots seem to prefer glides instead, vid. the April 11/10 crash. DOT&E also confirms that the engine nacelles’ integrated wiring systems fail too often, due to internal chafing and wire insulation breakdown. PMA-275 has funded a program to try and fix it by replacing 13 wiring bundles, but this is another issue that’s closely connected to a tilt-rotor’s fundamental design.

Overall, MV-22 Block C upgrades have been helpful to the platform, improving reliability, availability, and maintainability. Some things aren’t quite 100%, though. The weather radar works, but only the right-hand pilot can use it, by dsacrificing 1 of the plane’s 2 multi-colored displays. Electronic Standby Flight Instruments have a 1 – 5 second lag in the Vertical Velocity Indicator, which makes it hard to handle aircraft altitude. The Traffic Advisory System (TAS) was a complete fail, triggering warnings when the V-22 entered formation flight.

Dec 28/12: Avionics. A $33.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order for engineering and technical support for V-22 flight control system and on-aircraft avionics software; flight test planning and coordination of changed avionics and flight control configurations; upgrade planning of avionics and flight controls, including performance of qualification testing; and integration testing on software.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA, (90%) and Fort Worth, TX (10%), and is expected to be complete in December 2013. All contract funds are committed immediately, but $10.9 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13 (N00019-12-G-0006).

Dec 21/12: MV-22 upgrades. A $19.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification exercises an option for 2 MV-22 Block A to B 50 – 69 series upgrade installs, and 3 MV-22 Block A to B kits.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (60%); Havelock, NC (20%); and Fort Worth, TX (20%), and is expected to be complete in June 2016. All contract funds are committed immediately (N00019-12-C-0091).

Nov 27/12: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $52.3 million firm-fixed-price contract option for AE1107C engine sustainment services, on behalf of the USMC and the USAF. It covers “low power repairs”, turboshaft engine support and fleet site support until November 2013.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN (80%), and Oakland, CA (20%), and is expected to be complete in November 2013. “Contract funds in the amount of $52,267,510 will be obligated on this award of which $50,378,962 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.” (N00019-10-C-0020).

Nov 5/12: De-icing. A $9.5 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to buy 51 V-22 central de-icing Distributor retrofit kits and 29 engine nacelle ice protection controller unit retrofit kits. Icing up has been a recurring issue for the V-22, due to its structure and the altitudes it flies at. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX and is expected to be complete in December 2014 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Oct 4/12: Crash whitewash? Brig. Gen. Don Harvel (ret.), who led the investigation into the April 9/10 CV-22 crash in Afghanistan, discusses the USAF’s efforts to whitewash his investigation, and prevent publication of a report that pointed to engine failure as the cause of the crash. WIRED Danger Room.

Oct 4/12: Support. A $204.9 million cost-plus incentive-fee delivery order for supply chain management of 170 components, over slightly more than 4 additional years, in support of the V-22 aircraft.

Work under the performance based logistics contract will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (80%), and Ridley Park, PA, (20%) and is expected to be complete by Dec 31/16. This contract was not competitively procured by NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304c1a (N00019-09-D-0008, #0006). See also US Navy.

MV-22, landing
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Sept 26/12: Paint me. An $8.8 million modification to a previously awarded fixed-price-incentive-fee, firm-target V-22 multi-year production contract, to add the HMX-1 paint scheme to 14 MV-22s: 7 Lot 15 and 7 Lot 16 aircraft.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (98%), and Philadelphia, PA (2%), and is expected to be complete in November 2014. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00019-07-C-0001).

Sept 25/12: Training. A $74.1 million firm-fixed-price contract for 7 MV-22 Block C Containerized Flight Training Devices (CFTD – simulators) including spares and a support period.

Work will be performed in Amarillo, Texas (39%); Chantilly, VA (30%); Salt Lake City, UH (13%); Clearwater, FL (11%); Orlando, FL (3%); Lutz, Fla. (2%); Huntsville, AL (1%) and Ann Arbor, MI (1%), and is expected to be complete in October 2016. NAWCTSD received one other bid. The Bell-Boeing team delivered a first batch of 6 CFTDs (q.v. Aug 16/10 entry) between 2007 and 2010 (N61340-12-C-0033). See also FBO #N61340-12-C-0033, initiated in December 2011.

Sept 25/12: Sub-contractors. Raytheon in Mckinney, TX receives a maximum $14.7 million firm-fixed-price, sole-source contract for CV-22 support. The firm does a lot of V-22 avionics work, and there was one solicitation with one response.

Work will use FY 2012 Navy Working Capital Funds, and continue to August 2014. The US Defense Logistics Agency Aviation in Philadelphia, PA manages this contract (SPRPA1-09-G-001X-1058).

Sept 21/12: Sub-contractors. US NAVAIR announces a $3 million cost-plus fixed fee award to Mound Laser & Photonics Center, Inc. in Miamisburg, OH for “Operational Readiness Improvement of V-22 Osprey via Wear Mitigation of Key Engine Components.” It’s a backhanded acknowledgement of a problem. FBO.gov.

September 2012: Japan. In press conference after press conference, the Japanese Ministry of Defense is hounded by journalists seeking to see who will get the last word, as local opposition to the Osprey deployment continued unabated (see July 2012 entries below). The mayors of Iwakuni and Ginowan continue to express their disapproval with ongoing, though smaller, protests going on for 3 months now, despite the authorities granting official safety clearance to the aircraft on September 18.

Aug 14/12: MV-22 post-crash. The USMC releases publicly a redacted report [PDF] on the April 2012 crash in Morocco. It concludes that the co-pilot lacked proper understanding of true wind speed during take off then made errors that led to losing and failing to regain control of the aircraft. The report also regrets that the two marines who lost their lives in the accident were not strapped to their seats.

Among recommendations, they want additions to NATOPS manuals to cover the type of tailwind circumstances under which the accident occurred. USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation Lt. Gen. Schmidle Jr. subsequently said during a press conference that other pilots will be briefed on what happened, and training and simulators will be updated.

July 26/12: Infrastructure. Barnhart-Balfour Beatty, Inc. in San Diego, CA receives a $35.5 million firm-fixed-price task order to demolish an existing aircraft hangar at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA, and build a new 2-bay MV-22 hangar with adequate space to support maintenance. The contract also funds interior furniture, fixtures, and equipment, and contains options that could raise its value to $35.7 million.

Work will be performed in Oceanside, CA, and is expected to be complete by August 2015. Nine proposals were received for this task order, under a multiple-award contract managed by US Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA (N62473-10-D-5407, #0004).

July 25/12: CV-22 SATCOM. A $22.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for engineering design, integration and testing of an improved CV-22 Block 20 communications system for “trans-oceanic air traffic control and tactical communications”.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (99%), and Amarillo, TX (1%), and is expected to be complete in December 2015. $79,188 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-08-C-0025).

July 23/12: Japan. Twelve MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft are off-loaded from the civilian cargo ship Green Ridge at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, which features both an airfield and a port facility. This marks the first deployment of the MV-22 to Japan. With their range and in-flight refueling capability, MV-22s would be able to transfer marines to disputed regions included the Pinnacle Islands, Taiwan and the South China Sea.

MCAS Iwakuni Marines will prepare the 12 aircraft for flight, but they won’t conduct functional check flights until the Government of Japan confirms the safety of flight operations. After their check-out flights, the Ospreys will fly to their new home at MCAS Futenma in Okinawa, Japan, as part of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265).

A 2nd squadron of 12 aircraft is scheduled to arrive at MCAS Futenma during the summer of 2013. However arrival of the aircraft has proven contentions with protests to its deployment making evening TV news in Japan. USMC | US Embassy in Japan | Want China Times | The Economist.

July 21/12: Japan. At a press conference in Tokyo, Deputy US Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter answered questions and described the compromise reached with the Japanese government concerning MV-22 deployment in Japan.

“…we are committed to providing your airworthiness experts with all of the data and all of the information about the entire flight history of the V-22, including the two recent incidents, and allowing them to analyze that data and take every step they need to make to reconfirm the airworthiness of that airplane… This is a process, a technical process of assessing airworthiness. I think you have to let the experts do their work…”

The U.S. and Japanese governments have agreed that flight operations will not begin until that reconfirmation has taken place. Let’s just say that it would be unlikely for the answer to be “no” at the end of this process. US DoD.

July 19/12: Japan. Fourteen governors whose prefectures host U.S. bases issued a statement criticizing the delivery of MV-22 Ospreys at MCAS Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture. They plan to ask the central government to take responsibility for explaining to prefectural authorities the impact on residents of the Osprey training flights that are to be conducted through many parts of the country, and to respect local opinions. There has also been talk of extending the inquiry to include Class-B (partial disability or $500,000+ damage) and Class-C ($50-500 thousand, recovered injury) V-22 accidents, but:

“The U.S. military regards Class-A mishaps as the major accidents,” a Defense Ministry official said. “There would be no end to the procedure if you began taking up Class-B and Class-C incidents.”

See: Asashi Shimbun | Japan Times.

V22 onto CVN 77
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July 19/12: CVN landing. A V-22 Osprey from Marine Tiltrotor Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron (VMX) 22 lands for the first time on USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) to contribute to that carrier’s flight deck certification. V-22s had already landed on aircraft carriers CVN 77 and 72 earlier during the year, says NAVAIR.

Concepts of employment for the Navy’s V-22s published as early as 2004 [PDF] included landing on carriers for search & rescue missions and for logistics done so far with C-2As. Whether the Navy will procure its own V-22s as carrier on-board delivery planes (COD) has been discussed for years (see also Aug 11/10 entry).

July 12/12: Infrastructure. Pave-Tech Inc. in Carlsbad, CA receives $8.3 million for firm-fixed-price task order to design and build the MV-22 Aviation Pavement Project at Marine Corps Air Station, Camp Pendleton, CA. All contract funds are obligated immediately, and the firm will install or rehabilitate Pendleton’s aircraft pavement to accommodate MV-22 squadrons.

Work will be performed in Oceanside, CA, and is expected to be complete by January 2014. Four proposals were received for this task order, under a multiple-award contract managed by US Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA (N62473-09-D-1605, #0012).

June 16/12: Japan. USMC MV-22s were supposed to deploy to MCAS Futenma in Okinawa, but recent crashes (vid. April 11/12, June 13/12 entries) led Japan’s government to halt those plans. Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura says that Tokyo has asked the United States to investigate the details of the crash as quickly as possible, adding that the “Japanese government will take no further action [on the Osprey deployment] unless details [of the crash] are shared…”

The Osprey deployment has also turned into a lightning rod among local politicians, who cite safety fears. On the one hand, this is a pretext, as many of these politicians are simply hostile to the base in general. On the other hand, Okinawa is densely populated enough that crashes are a legitimate civilian concern, and a crash that killed civilians there could set off a serious political crisis. Even mainland locals in MCAS Iwakuni, where USMC MV-22s were temporarily deployed in July 2012, are restive. Daily Yomiuri.

June 15/12: Support. A firm-fixed-price, sole-source $6.5 million contract for MV-22 rudder assemblies. Work will be performed in Texas and Pennsylvania, using FY 2012-2015 Navy Working Capital Funds until Sept 30/15. The Defense Logistics Agency Aviation in Philadelphia, PA manages this contract (SPRPA1-09-G-004Y-5948).

June 4/12: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN received a $10.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 18 CV-22 “low power repairs” to their AE1107C turboshaft engines.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in February 2013. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-10-C-0020)

March 30/12: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs” for 2012. The V-22 program is included only in passing, as GAO notes the fleet’s current expected total purchase cost of $57.211 billion. That’s a hefty jump from even the “first full estimate” baseline, but the last 5 years have seen a change of just 5.2%.

On the other hand, most of a platform’s costs lie in Operations & Maintenance budgets, and here the V-22 remains a question mark – vid. Nov 29/11 reports that the fleet’s cost would break $100 billion.

March 30/12: Guns. A $31.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to a delivery order will design and develop improvements to BAE’s Interim Defensive Weapon System (IDWS) turret, retrofit the IDWS to incorporate these improvements, provide IDWS logistical support, and perform aero model and software updates.

Work will be performed in Johnson City, NY (95%), and Philadelphia, PA (5%), and is expected to be complete in December 2015 (N00019-07-G-0008).

March 30/12: Testing. A $28,846,120 fixed-price-incentive, cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to provide a new V-22 instrumented aircraft (NVIA) for testing. The NVIA will support V-22 structural tests, and replace an existing test aircraft which is “increasingly difficult and expensive to support and not representative of current production configuration.” They also expect the new NVIA bird to support the V-22 development roadmap with better flight test data, and better reliability than the existing test aircraft.

Work will be performed in Amarillo, TX (35%); Arlington, TX (35%); Fort Worth, TX (21%); Philadelphia, PA (8%); and Seattle, WA (1%), and is expected to be complete in December 2014 (N00019-12-G-0006).

March 6/12: V-22 flight costs. Loren B. Thompson of the Lexington Institute think tank fires a piece strongly in favor of the MV-22, arguing that detractors are not applying the right metrics to properly assess its value, saying they:

“…complain it costs about $10,000 per flight hour to operate the MV-22 compared with about $3,000 per flight hour for the MH-60, the Marine helicopter most closely resembling what the Air Force uses for combat search-and-rescue. However, this ignores the superior speed, range and carrying capacity of the MV-22. When the metric is changed to cost per mile flown, the MV-22 only looks about 60 percent more expensive, and when the metric is passenger seat miles, the MV-22 looks twice as efficient ($1.53 versus $3.21).”

Of course, passenger seat miles assume full capacity. Airlines know that isn’t always true, and the variety inherent in military missions makes it a poor choice of statistic. Thompson does add one point that’s more reasonable, when he says that:

“It is also worth noting that the MV-22′s computerized reporting system depresses apparent readiness rates compared with the older, manual system used for the legacy CH-46s it will replace.”

Feb 26/12: Media are picking up on previous reports of interest from Canada, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, and have added India as a potential export prospect. Most of this involves trade show visits, which don’t mean much, though some cases have involved formal requests for technical information (Israel) and even limited demonstrations (Canada).

This comes as the US military operates more than 160 CV/MV-22s, and has flown more than 130,000 hours with the aircraft. Reuters | Flightglobal. See also Aug 2/11 and Dec 1/11 entries.

Feb 17/12: Hostile in HASC. Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-CA-12, south San Francisco) joins the House Armed Services Committee. Her position statement on defense makes it clear that she’s no fan of the V-22, or of missile defense.

Feb 14/12: MV-22 Block C The first MV-22 Block C is delivered, with enhanced displays in the cockpit and in the cabin. See also Nov 24/09 entry. Boeing.

Feb 13/12: MYP-II? FY13 Budget Request. The Navy proposes a follow-on multiyear procurement (MYP) to buy 98 V-22 aircraft (91 MV-22, 7 CV-22) under a single fixed-price contract, between FY 2013 – FY 2017. The MV-22s will be bought by the Navy for the Marines, while the CV-22s aircraft are a joint buy involving the USAF and SOCOM. Their hope is to save $852.4 million, or 11.6% of the total.

Feb 7/12: Support. Textron subsidiary AAI Test & Training announces a $7.7 million Advanced Boresight Equipment (ABE) award from the US Defense Logistics Agency, to provide 16 Model 310A ABE core test systems for AFSOC’s CV-22 Osprey fleet. Both the USAF and US Special Operations Command were already customers. The company has already delivered more than 40 ABE systems to the USAF, supporting more than 10 different aircraft platforms, while US SOCOM has used AAI Test & Training’s ABEs to align its fixed-wing aircraft fleet for more than 5 years.

ABE is a gyro-stabilized, electro-optical angular measurement system designed to align aircraft subsystems. Poor alignment may be bad for your tires, but it’s a lot worse in a flying aircraft. Because the ABE system supports concurrent maintenance, and does not require aircraft to be jacked and leveled during testing, both depot-level and operational-level users can maintain maintenance schedules, while spending less. These features also support increased manufacturing throughput for original equipment manufacturers.

Feb 2/12: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $55.4 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising a maintenance services option for the V-22 fleets’ AE1107C turboshaft engines.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2012. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Jan 18/12: Unique ID. A $7.3 million fixed-price-incentive-fee contract modification to the MYP will prepare the V-22 production line to incorporate unique identification marked parts, beginning with Lot 16. The US military has been moving toward automated part identification since it adopted the EAN.CC standard in 2005.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (73%); Fort Worth, TX (17%); and Amarillo, TX (10%), and is expected to be complete in October 2014 (N00019-07-C-0001).

Jan 17/12: DOT&E testing. The Pentagon releases the FY 2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). For the V-22, a follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) dubbed OT-IIIG that took place between August and November 2011 showed that the latest V4.01 software works as intended, as well as demonstrated Netted Weather and Blue Force Tracker capabilities.

DOTE was more reserved regarding the Interim Defense Weapon System, noting that its 360 firing radius can only work in limited firing arcs during landing approach. Coordinating targeting with the gunner also adds an extra burden on the co-pilot, and mounting this turret reduces the useful cargo and troop payload. On the other hand, the weapon has been effective when used. The competing ramp-mounted .50 caliber machine gun (RMWS) doesn’t have these issues, because it’s limited to facing the rear of the aircraft, though it is in the way on the ramp. Pick your poison.

“[V-22] Reliability, availability, and maintainability data were not available in time for this report.” They do state, however, that reliability and maintainability during OT-IIIG tests had the same issues as the deployed fleet. They mention an average 53% mission capable rate for the period between June 2007 – May 2010, though the V-22 office has been reporting a readiness rate of about 68% over the last year. Both figures are way below the promised target of 82%. DOTE [PDF].

Dec 29/11: Lot 17 lead-in. A $72.9 million advance acquisition contract for Production Lot 17 (FY 2013) long lead time components. Lot 17 includes 21 V-22s: 17 USMC MV-22Bs, and 4 US AFSOC CV-22s.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (50%), Forth Worth, TX (25%), and Amarillo, TX (25%), and is expected to be complete in December 2012. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-12-C-2001).

Dec 29/11: Support. A $34.4 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order modification covers 2012 engineering and technical support for C/MV-22 flight control system and on-aircraft avionics. This includes configuration changes to the V-22 avionics and flight control software; flight test planning and coordination of changed avionics and flight control configurations; upgrade planning of avionics and flight controls, including performance of qualification testing; and integration testing on software products.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (90%); and Fort Worth, TX (10%); and is expected to be completed in December 2012. $6.6 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Dec 29/11: Defensive. A $33.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order for engineering and flight test modifications to the MV-22B’s APR-39DvX Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System and Radar Warning Receiver.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (96%); Fort Walton Beach, FL (3%); and St. Louis, Mo. (1%), and is expected to be completed in February 2016. $6,526,986 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Dec 29/11: Test Sqn. A $28.9 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to support the Navy Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron’s MV-22s. Services will include on-site flight test management, flight test engineering, design engineering, and related efforts.

Work will be performed at NAS Patuxent River, MD (42%); Philadelphia, PA (37%); and Fort Worth, TX (21%), and is expected to be complete in December 2012 (N00019-12-G-0006).

Dec 29/11: Defensive. An $11.5 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for 12 combined CV-22 Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures System modification and retrofit kits. Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (98%), and Fort Worth, TX (2%), and is expected to be complete in May 2014 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Dec 27/11: Avionics. A $30.2 million fixed-price-incentive, cost-plus-fixed-fee order covering engineering and testing efforts to redesign the C/MV-22′s mid-wing avionic units. The mid-wing avionic units include the vibration structural life and engine diagnostics airborne unit, the fuel management unit, and the drive system interface unit.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (99%), and Philadelphia, PA (1%), and is expected to be complete in June 2014. $30.2 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Dec 22/11: Support. $12.4 million for the repair of various V-22 components. Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA, and is expected to be complete by Dec 30/13. The Navy Working Capital Funds being used will not expire before the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12. One company was solicited for this non-competitive requirement, and one offer was received in response to the solicitation by US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-10-D-003N, DO 0016).

Dec 12/11: Support. A $37.6 million for delivery order for the repair of various V-22 components, under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, using Navy Working Capital Funds. Work will be performed in Roanoke, TX, and is expected to be complete by Dec 30/13. This contract was not competitively procured by US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-10-D-003N, #0015).

Commander’s Award
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Dec 7/11: Recognition. The V-22 Propulsion and Power IPT (Integrated Product Team) receives a Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division Commander’s Award for improving engine time-on-wing and reducing costs – 2 areas where the program has been having real problems. If service experience matches results to date, the team projects that the AE1107 MGT increase will provide an 80% increase in average engine time on wing, and avoid about 200 engine removals over the next 5 years.

The AE1107 Measured Gas Temperature (MGT) Increase Team formed in January 2011 to evaluate raising the MGT limit of the AE1107 engine. They went on to develop, qualify, test and field upgraded engines for an initial field service evaluation in about half the expected time from their initial feasibility study. They didn’t cut the schedule from 14 – 6 months, but they did achieve just 7 months thanks to engineering clarity and parallel tasks. V-22 Joint Program (PMA-275) manager Col. Greg Masiello says officials approved the fully qualified MGT limit modification on Aug 2/11, released the interim flight clearance on Aug 5/11, and incorporated the MGT limit increase on 27 operational V-22s by the end of August 2011. US NAVAIR.

Dec 1/11: UAE. Boeing and Bell Helicopter sent the V-22 to Dubai’s 2011 air show, and a Boeing release is a lot more positive than usual. Of course, with a multi-year buy under consideration, and defense cuts on the table, potential exports add extra weight to economic arguments for a deal. Bell Boeing V-22 Program deputy director, Michael Andersen:

“The amount of interest in the V-22 exceeded our highest expectations leading up to the show, with many regional officials requesting briefings and demonstration flights… We are now working on follow-up visits and providing information as requested by several governments.”

Nov 30/11: Support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN received a $15.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for AE1107C turboshaft engine maintenance services.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2012. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Nov 30/11: CAMEO. SAIC in San Diego, CA, is being awarded an $11.5 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to provide Comprehensive Automated Maintenance Environment, Optimized (CAMEO) system and software engineering support services in support of “a range of Department of Defense programs, including the V-22 Osprey.” This 3-year contract also includes a 2-year option, which could bring the period to 5 years, and the potential value to $19 million.

CAMEO is a related derivative of SAIC’s Pathfinder software series, and is used as part of V-22 fleet maintenance. Work will include software integration and test, product validation/verification analyses, product integration and release, and training. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (50%), and at government sites nationwide (50%), and is expected to be complete Nov 29/12 – or Nov 29/14 with all options exercised. This contract was competitively procured via FBO.gov and the SPAWAR e-Commerce Central website, with 1 offer received by US SPAWAR Pacific in San Diego, CA (N66001-12-D-0048).

Nov 30/11: Sub-contractors. Sierracin-Sylmar Corp. in Sylmar, CA receives $10 million for a delivery order to manufacture V-22 Osprey windshields. Work will be performed in Sylmar, CA, and is expected to be complete in December 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by US NAVSUP Weapons System Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-11-G-011F, #5002).

Nov 29/11: Sub-contractors. Moog, Inc. in East Aurora, NY receives a $12 million firm-fixed-price order to repair the V-22′s swashplate actuator, using Navy Working Capital Funds. The swashplate turns pilot input into rotor blade motion via pitch and tilt changes.

Work will be performed in East Aurora, NY, and is expected to be complete by Dec 30/12. One company was solicited for this non-competitive requirement, and 1 offer was received by US NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-09-G-002D, #7038).

Nov 17/11: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $13.7 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for V-22 AE1107C turboshaft engine maintenance services.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2012, but all contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Nov 14/11: De-icing. A $10.4 million delivery order modification for 40 central de-ice distributors, and 44 nacelle ice protection controller unit retrofit kits. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX and is expected to be complete in December 2013 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Nov 9/11: CV-22 upgrades. A $7 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for the CV-22′s Block 20/C upgrade. Work includes co-site communications; multi-mission advanced tactical terminal replacement; standby flight instrument; GPS repeater system; parking brake light; and environmental control system upgrades.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (86%); Fort Walton Beach, FL (13.6%); and Fort Worth, TX (0.4%); and is expected to be complete in December 2015 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Oct 13/11: V-22 safety data questioned. Over at WIRED’s Danger Room, a long article by reporter David Axe questions the way the USMC has recorded “Class A” accidents for the MV-22. David has earned a reputation as a solid reporter on the defense beat, and the data matters because the USMC is using V-22 safety ratios as part of its case for another multi-year contract, whose termination fees would place the V-22 out of reach for budget cutters. Excerpt from “Osprey Down” :

“A review of press reports, analysts’ studies and military records turns up 10 or more potentially serious mishaps in the last decade of V-22 testing and operations. At least three — and quite possibly more — could be considered Class A flight mishaps, if not for pending investigations, the “intent for flight” loophole and possible under-reporting of repair costs… What follows is the history of the V-22 that the Pentagon and its boosters don’t want you to read — a history of botched design, reckless testing, possible cover-ups and media spin. But mostly, it’s the history of an aircraft capable of some amazing feats, but whose capabilities still come at the cost of burned aircraft and dead men.”

The USMC’s response cites deployment statistics to date, and says:

“…the Marine Corps’ aviation safety records and standards are publicly available at the Naval Safety Center website. The mishap rate… follows Naval Safety Center standards that are applied universally across all type/model/series [of aircraft we fly]… Just because it falls under Flight Related or Ground doesn’t mean it isn’t investigated or counted… the Marine Corps does not include CV-22 mishap rates when talking about the V-22 Osprey because we are the Marine Corps, not the Air Force… since the Osprey was redesigned, the Marine Corps has not had a crash similar to the ones it experienced over a decade ago in which we lost pilots and crew…The MV-22 Osprey has proven to be effective and reliable.”

In a follow-up, Axe did not back down:

“The Marines found reasons not to count a chain of [incidents]… only by omitting officially “non-flight” incidents can the Marines claim a rate of so-called “Class A mishaps” of just 1.28 per 100,000 flight hours, compared to a rate of 2.6 for the overall Marine air fleet… [and] for all non-fatal accidents, the Marines themselves provide the data… it’s not independently derived. And the Marines have a record of manipulating V-22 data.”

See: WIRED Danger Room | USMC response | US Navy safety records | WIRED follow-up | Fort Worth Star-Telegram Sky Talk

Oct 13/11: Sub-contractors. Robertson Fuel Systems, LLC in Tempe, AZ receives a $16.8 million firm-fixed price indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification, buying 24 mission auxiliary fuel tank systems and related hardware for the V-22. See also March 31/11 and Dec 27/10 entries; this makes $47.6 million in publicly announced orders so far.

Work will be performed in Tempe, AZ, and is expected to be complete in December 2012. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/12 (N00019-08-D-0009).

Oct 11/11: Personnel. Bell Helicopter announces the appointment of Michael “Willy” D. Andersen as VP and Program Director for the V-22 Osprey, and deputy director of the Bell-Boeing Program Office. He’ll represent Bell Helicopter in the program office, reporting directly to Bell EVP of military programs Mitch Snyder, and V-22 Program Executive Director John Rader.

Andersen is a retired Air Force Colonel with 27 years of service, who directed and managed product portfolios for aircraft, weapons, avionics and cyber, and international sales.

Oct 1/11: Canada. Reports surface that Bell Helicopter and Boeing have demonstrated their V-22 to the Canadian Forces, as a possible solution to that country’s long-running on-again, off-again domestic search and rescue aircraft competition.

The competition is currently off-again, so there’s no live RFP, and no commitment yet by Boeing to bid. The notional advantage over current contenders, which include the C-27J Spartan, C-295M, and Viking’s revamped DH-5 Buffalo, is the V-22′s ability to go beyond identification and supply drops. A v-22 could simply land and pick people up. The flip side is its status as the most expensive option in the mix, but the counter-argument would be its ability to pick up rescuees if it can find a landing spot, removing the need to send additional helicopters or ground forces. AIN Online | Ottawa Citizen Defence Watch.

MV-22, ropedown
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Sept 20/11: Infrastructure. The Hensel Phelps/ Granite Hangar joint venture in Irvine, CA receives a $97.2 million firm-fixed-price contract for work at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA. They’ll design and build an MV-22 aircraft parking apron/taxiway expansion; an addition to Aircraft Maintenance Hangar 4; and Aircraft Maintenance Hangar 7. The contract also contains 2 planned modifications, which could raise the total to $103.6 million.

This work is designed to enable the operation of both the MV-22 and the CH-53 heavy-lift helicopter, with a focus on accommodating and maintaining the MV-22 squadrons so they can conduct readiness, training, and special exercise operations. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by September 2014. This contract was competitively procured via Navy Electronic Commerce Online, with 10 proposals received by the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA (N62473-11-C-0401).

Sept 19/11: V-22 upgrades. US NAVAIR is working on a number of software changes to improve the V-22′s flight and maintenance performance. A test team from the V-22 Joint Program Office recently spent about 6 weeks in Logan, UT, about 4,400 feet above sea level, in order to test the effects of one software change. This one tilts the rotors about 4 degrees outward in hover mode, reducing air flow over the wings. The result lets the pilot either carry more weight, or carry the same weight to higher altitude.

The software change has already been implemented into some MV-22s, and the plan is to upgrade all V-22s by the end of 2011. US NAVAIR.

Sept 15/11: CV-22 upgrades. An $8.7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification for one-time efforts associated with the CV-22 Block 20 Increment 3 upgrade program. Efforts will include concept definition, non-recurring engineering, drawings, and installation/integration to design, develop, and test the enhanced helmet mounted display upgrade.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA, and is expected to be complete in December 2015. $21,544 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-08-C-0025).

Sept 6/11: Sub-contractors. Elbit Systems of America in Fort Worth, TX announces a contract to supply Boeing with a Color Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) for AFSOC’s CV-22s. The displays are based on Elbit’s widely-used ANVIS/HUD, with full helmet tracking capability and color display.

Aug 15/11: VIP Kits. USMC squadron HMX-1 in Quantico, VA is soliciting 4 installable “VIP kits” for MV-22s. This means a set of green interior wall and ceiling inserts, black seat covers, black carpeting that includes the squadron logo, and carrying/stowage cases.

Ospreys are tentatively set to begin arriving at HMX-1 in 2013. That squadron supports the USA Presidential Helicopter fleet, carrying cargo and associated people as necessary. Gannett’s Marine Corps Times | US NAVAIR.

Aug 8/11: Training. A $34.2 million delivery order to upgrade SOCOM’s CV-22 training devices to faithfully simulate the Block 20/C Upgrade. That means upgrading the Cabin Operational Flight Trainer (COFT), Cabin Part Task Trainer, and the Wing Part Task Trainer.

Work will be performed in Mesa, AZ (57%); Fort Worth, TX (34%); and Ridley Park, PA (9%), and is expected to be complete in June 2014 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Aug 4/11: MYP-II proposal. Bloomberg reports that the Bell-Boeing partnership has submitted an initial proposal for the 2nd and final multi-year V-22 contract, which would buy another 122 CV-22 and MV-22 tilt-rotors to finish the USMC and AFSOCOM’s planned buys at 410. If export deals are made for the Osprey, they would also be produced under the US multi-year volume buy’s terms and conditions, as is done with helicopters like the H-60 Black Hawk/ Seahawk series.

In order to meet the legal requirements for a multi-year deal, however, the Navy must have reliable data to certify that the proposed 5-year block buy can save at least 10% over 5 separate yearly buys. USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation Lt. Gen. Terry Robling told Bloomberg that they believe they can meet or even exceed that threshold. The reported goal is to have that certification ready by April-May 2012, so the 2nd block buy contract can be signed by the end of 2012, or early 2013.

The other thing a multi-year buy does, of course, is make termination costs so steep that a program cannot be cancelled. As the USA enters the jaws of existing fiscal crunch, a number of recommendations have already targeted the V-22 program for cancellation, and replacement with less expensive standard helicopters. Bloomberg | POGO.

Aug 2/11: Israel. Flight International reports that Israel’s air force has returned with a very positive evaluation of the USMC’s MV-22B Ospreys, and wants to include a “limited” initial order in the IDF’s multi-year spending plan. If that doesn’t happen, the IAF may have to use its reserve budgets if it wants the Ospreys that badly.

July 20/11: Flight International:

“Saying export discussions have intensified within the past six months, Textron chief executive Scott Donnelly now estimates as many as 12 countries could buy the Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey tiltrotor after 2015.”

July 18/11: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $9.5 million firm-fixed-price contract modification for 17 CV-22 low power repairs. Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in February 2012. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

July 13/11: V-22 sustainability. In response to questions from DID, US NAVAIR explains “low power repairs,” and also discusses some benchmarks for the V-22 fleet. V-22 Joint Program Manager Col. Greg Masiello says that actual cost per flight hour (CPFH) is currently lower than the projected CPFH and is continuing to trend lower, with an 18% drop over the past year. MV-22s on the front lines are seeing a direct maintenance man-hour : flight-hour ratio of about 19.6:1, and current readiness rates in Afghanistan are around 69% for May 2011. Readiness rates show some monthly fluctuation but, he says, an overall upward trend. With Sikorsky reporting an 85% mission readiness rate for its H-60 Black Hawk helicopter fleet in Iraq and Afghanistan, that will be necessary, in order to avoid invidious comparisons.

With respect to the efforts described in part in the June 7/11 entry, to improve engine time between maintenance, that conversation is still ongoing, and will be published in future.

June 13/11: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $34.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, for maintenance services in support of the MV-22 AE1107C turboshaft engine. There do seem to be a lot of these.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in September 2012. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

June 8/11: Israel. Defense Update reports that Israel may be re-evaluating the V-22 for use by its Special Forces, and for long-range CSAR (combat search and rescue) duties.

The V-22 had been removed from the IAF’s quadrennial procurement plan in 2009, but Israel’s needs represent something of a unique case. The IAF has intermittent but consistent needs to conduct long-range missions, over entirely hostile territory. CH-53 helicopters can be refueled in mid-air, and offer greater versatility by allowing the carriage of vehicles, but the sheer volume and hostility of enemy territory gives speed a special premium for the Israelis. Until competing platforms like Sikorsky’s quieter but developmental S-97 Raider are fielded, those combined needs make a platform like the CV-22 attractive to the Israelis.

June 6/11: Reliability. An article in The Hill magazine notes that the USMC continues to praise the MV-22B’s performance, but doesn’t give any specifics. It does note that “the Osprey’s closely monitored reliability rate in Afghanistan is around 73 percent, according to program officials.”

That’s above the 68.1% reported in 2008, but still below the program goal of 80%. Nor does it address how many maintenance hours are required per flight hour, or the cost of spares required, to achieve present totals.

April 12/11: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN received a $9.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for 3 low power AE 1107C-Liberty engine repairs and 11,247 engine flight hours.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2011. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

April 8/11: Avionics. A $7 million cost-plus-fixed-fee order to install, integrate, and test Block 10.3.01 flight/mission hardware, vehicle management system math model software, computational system software, and instructor/operator station software into 6 AFSOC CV-22 flight training devices.

Work will be performed at Kirtland Air Force Base, NM (66%); Hurlburt Field, FL (17%); and Cannon Air Force Base, NM (17%). Work is expected to be complete in January 2013 (N00019-07-G-0008).

March 31/11: Sub-contractors. Robertson Fuel Systems, LLC in Tempe, AZ receives a $14 million firm-fixed price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract modification, exercising an option for the procurement of V-22 mission auxiliary fuel tanks, refueling kits, and accessories.

Work will be performed in Tempe, AZ, and is expected to be completed in December 2012 (N00019-08-D-0009).

March 25/11: Training. A $30.3 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract to procure 2 AFSOC CV-22 flight training simulators, with associated provisioned items and spares.

Work will be performed in Broken Arrow, OK (53%); Fort Worth, TX (35%); Philadelphia, PA (7%); Clifton, NJ (3%); and Orlando, FL (2%). Work is expected to be complete in September 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1. The Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division in Orlando, FL manages this contract (N61340-11-C0004).

Feb 25/11: CV-22 upgrades. A $13.1 million cost-plus-fixed-fee order for one-time engineering services to upgrade the CV-22′s electrical system and dual digital map system. Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (92%), and Fort Worth, TX (8%), and is expected to be complete in December 2015 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Feb 25/11: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $12.6 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for 14 low power AE1107C engine repairs within the MV/CV-22 fleet, and 6,565 engine flight hours.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be completed in November 2011. All funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Feb 16/11: De-icing. A $9.8 million delivery order modification for 38 central de-ice distributor and nacelle ice protection controller unit retrofit kits, for the V-22 ice protection system. Icing has been an issue with the V-22, especially in early models, and the presence of a full de-icing kit is part of the type’s operational configuration.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete in December 2012 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Feb 15/11: Budgets. Rep. Luis Gutierez [D-IL-4] submits an amendment to the 112th Congress’ H.R. 1 spending bill for FY 2011, which would address the fact that the 11th Congress did not pass a FY 2011 budget. H.Amdt. 13 would have removed $415 million funding from the V-22 program, about 14.8% of the system’s $2.8 billion FY 2011 request. The U.S. House of Representatives defeats the amendment, 326 – 105, (17-223 Republicans, 88-103-2 Democrats). GovTrack for H.Amdt. 13 | Reuters.

Feb 14/11: Budgets. The Pentagon releases its official FY 2012 budget request. The V-22 request is for a total of $2.97 billion, to buy 30 MV-22s and 6 CV-22s, which includes 1 supplemental CV-22 to replace the one that crashed in Afghanistan. Under the multi-year buy, the USA has been ordering V-22s at this same steady pace of 35-36 per year.

The proposed FY 2012 US Navy budget for Ospreys is $2.393 billion, split $85 million RDT&E and $2.309 billion procurement for the 30 MV-22s. The USAF budget is $438.1 million, split $20.7 million RDT&E and $487.6 million procurement for the 6 CV-22s, incl. $57.5 million budgeted for the supplemental combat replacement. There’s also $127.5 million budgeted to the program for spares, which is a lot.

Feb 7/11: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives an $8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for AE1107C engine maintenance services, including 14 low power repairs. There do seem to be a lot of these contracts.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%) and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2011. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Feb 2/11: CAMEO. A $6.6 million modification to a cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to provide engineering and technical services for the Comprehensive Automated Maintenance Environment-Optimized (CAMEO) and technical data systems in support of the MV-22 and CV-22 aircraft, and procure a CAMEO equipment suite and a CAMEO technology upgrade suite in support of V-22 aircraft.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (90%), and Fort Worth, TX (10%), and is expected to be complete in December 2011 (N00019-07-G-0008). See Sept 24/08 entry for more on CAMEO.

Jan 27/11: Engine support. Rolls Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $22.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option to buy 17,800 engine flight hours of support services, and 17 low power repairs. Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%) and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2011. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Jan 3/10: Avionics. A $24.3 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order for engineering and technical support of MV-22 and CV-22 flight control systems and on-aircraft avionics software. This work will support configuration changes to the software of V-22 aircraft for avionics and flight controls, flight test planning, coordination of changed avionics and flight control configurations, upgrade planning of avionics and flight controls, and software qualification/ integration testing.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (90%), and Fort Worth, TX (10%), and is expected to be complete in December 2011. $5.2 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Dec 28/10: Support. A $12.6 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee order to provide 15 sets of organizational and intermediate level support equipment sets that are unique to the MV/CV-22 Osprey, including supportability data.

Work will be performed in Amarillo, TX, and is expected to be complete in January 2014. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the Navy (MV-22/ $9.2M/ 73%) and Air Force (CV-22/ $3.35M; 27%). The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ manages this contract (N68335-10-G-0010).

Dec 27/10: Sub-contractors. Robertson Aviation, LLC in Tempe, AZ receives a $16.8 million firm-fixed price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract modification, exercising an option for V-22 mission auxiliary fuel tanks, refueling kits, and accessories. Work will be performed in Tempe, AZ, and is expected to be complete in December 2011 (N00019-08-D-0009).

Dec 27/10: Support. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. in Hurst, TX receives a maximum $10 million firm-fixed-price, sole-source contract for MV-22 prop rotor gearboxes. The date of performance completion is Oct 31/13. There was originally one proposal solicited with one response to the Defense Logistics Agency Aviation in Philadelphia, PA (SPRPA1-09-G-004Y-5638).

Dec 27/10: Support. A $9.1 million fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for 14 “support equipment workarounds” for MV-22 and CV-22 organizational- and intermediate-level maintenance. Work will be performed in Amarillo, TX, and is expected to be complete in December 2014. $599,607 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ (N68335-11-D-0002).

Dec 23/10: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives an $8.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option for MV-22 engine maintenance services. Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2011. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Dec 17/10: Testing. A $31.6 million firm-fixed-price delivery order, exercising an option for on-site flight test management, flight test engineering, design engineering, and related efforts to support the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron. That squadron conducts MV-22 flight and ground testing.

Work will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (43%); Philadelphia, PA (36%); and Fort Worth, TX (21%), and will run to December 2011 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Nov 29/10: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $26.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification, exercising an option to buy another 12 AE1107C spare engines for the CV-22 fleet. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in December 2011 (N00019-07-C-0060).

The Aug 16/10 entry featured a $23.2 million contract for the same thing.

Nov 22/10: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $20.3 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-10-C-0020), exercising an option for AE1107C engine maintenance services in support, including low power repairs and program management and site support.

Work will be performed in Oakland, CA (70%) and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete in November 2013. $20.3 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11. This contract combines purchases for the USAF (CV-22, $9.4M, 46.3%); US Navy (MV-22, $9.1M; 45%); and Special Operations Command (CV-22, $1.8M; 8.7%).

Nov 19/10: CV-22 upgrades. A $10.1 million firm-fixed-price delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-07-G-0008) for one-time efforts required to complete an engineering change proposal (ECP) for the Air Force CV-22. The fuel jettison mission management restriction removal will remove the fuel jettison restriction, allowing the aircrew to rapidly reduce the CV-22′s mission gross weight.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (70%); Dallas, TX (20%); Fort Worth, TX (7%); Fort Walton Beach, FL (2%); and St. Louis, MO (1%). Work is expected to be complete in August 2013. but all contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11.

MV-22 Osprey
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Sept 27/10: Support. A $7.3 million firm-fixed-price delivery order to buy operational test program sets (OTPSs), for the Air Force (CV-22s; $1.5M; 21%) and Marine Corps (MV-22s; $5.8M; 79%), and on-site verification (OSV) for the Marine Corps. See Sept 20/10 entry for an explanation of OSTPs.

Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO, and is expected to be completed in November 2012. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ manages the contract (N68335-08-G-0002).

Sept 24/10: Training. A $5.6 million firm-fixed-price order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement for simulator software and hardware in support of 7 MV-22 simulators. Work will be performed in New River, NC (85%), and Miramar, CA (15%), and is expected to be complete in February 2012.

Sept 24/10: Support. A maximum $6.4 million firm-fixed-price, sole-source, basic ordering agreement contract for hub assembly items in support of the MV-22. There was originally one proposal solicited with one response, and the contract will run to Dec 31/12. The Defense Logistics Agency Aviation in Philadelphia, PA manages this contract (SPRPA1-09-G-004Y-5260).

Sept 20/10: Support. A $22.4 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to develop and deliver Production Lot IV Operational Test Program Sets (OTPSs), including production copies of the OTPSs for MV-22 and CV-22, on-site verification (OSV), and a buy of General Electric Interface Unit Weapons Replaceable Assemblies (WRAs) and standby flight instrument/enhanced standby flight instrument WRAs. This order combines USAF CV-22 OTPS ($1 million; 4%; 16 production units and OSV of 2 units) and the Marine Corps MV-22 ($22.3 million; 96%; one-time design engineering, 12 pilot production units, 72 production units, and OSV of 12 units).

Asked about the Operational Test Program Set (OTPS) sets, NAVAIR responded that they’re a tool used to test aircraft avionics systems and subsystems, and to diagnose the source of any problems found. The OTPS involves both connective hardware and software programming, and connects a specific aircraft type to the Consolidated Automated Test Station (CASS Station). The software is referred to as the Operational Test Program Medium (OTPM). It includes the Operational Test Program (OTP), the Operational Test Program Instruction (OTPI) that provides additional instructions, Test Diagrams that show the connections for each test, and troubleshooting software.

Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (89.6%), and Ridley Park, PA (10.4%). Work is expected to be complete in August 2015. Contract funds in the amount of $13.5 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ manages this contract (N68335-08-G-0002).

Sept 17/10: Near-hit. A V-22 Osprey nearly collides with a civilian de Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter parachute jump aircraft at 12,000ft altitude in controlled airspace. Flight International adds that:

“Along with inherent limitations in on board see-and-avoid tactics, the NTSB (National Transport Safety Board) also faulted an air traffic controller who had been on a non-pertinent phone call during a time period where the aircraft’s pilot was expecting to receive air traffic reports.”

Oops.

Aug 16/10: Training. The Bell Boeing V-22 program delivers the 6th and final MV-22 Osprey Containerized Flight Training Device (CFTD) to the US Marines. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, NC received the trainer 6 weeks early, and now has has 6 of them, plus 3 full-flight, motion-based simulators and 1 non-motion-based flight training device. MCAS Miramar, CA now has 4 CFTDs., and an upgrade delivered to Miramar in August 2010 brought all CFTDs to full concurrency with the Osprey aircraft. The first CFTD was delivered to MCAS New River in 2007.

The CFTD trains aircrew on basic aircraft familiarization and handling qualities. Additional training capabilities include systems/subsystems operation, communication, malfunctions, day and night flying, use of night-vision goggles, formation flying, aerial refueling and landing on ships. The device is intended to train crews for any task that might be performed in the aircraft, while limiting the monetary and environmental costs and safety risks of in-flight training. All CFTDs can be locally networked, and the CFTDs at MCAS New River also are able to network with AV-8 Harriers at MCAS Cherry Point, NC. Shepard Group.

Aug 16/10: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $23.2 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to supply another 12 AE1107C spare engines for the CV-22 fleet. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in December 2011 (N00019-07-C-0060).

Aug 16/10: Navy plans. DoD Buzz looks at the shifting plans to replace the USMC’s 30 CH-53D Sea Stallions. The original plan was to replace them with MV-22s. At some point in 2007/08, the Marine Corps formally decided replace their aging CH-53Ds with CH-53Ks. But now USMC Lt. General Trautman is saying that he wants an east coast and a west coast MV-22 squadron to replace the CH-53Ds in Afghanistan, and “When I can do that, that’ll be the start of getting CH-53 Delta out of the way.”

Exactly what “out of the way” means is ambiguous. If it means out of service, DoD Buzz correctly notes that this raises questions about the USMC’s support for the CH-53K, and would seem to be better news for the MV-22. If it means “shifted back to Hawaii while MV-22s serve in Afghanistan,” that would be something else. The exact meaning isn’t 100% clear in the article.

Aug 11/10: Navy plans. Flight International reports that the US Navy has commissioned a 6-month study from Northrop Grumman to look at remanufacturing C-2A Greyhound bodies using tooling and components already developed for the new E-2D Hawkeye, in order to give its 36 carrier-capable cargo planes longer service life.

The C-2As were originally designed to last for 36,000 carrier landings and 15,000 flight hours, and some have already had their center wing boxes replaced. The E-2 Hawkeye is a close derivative, and with Northrop Grumman ramping up E-2D production, refurbishing or building C-2s could become a cheaper option than buying up to 48 V-22s for Navy roles that would be anchored by the same Carrier On-board Delivery function.

July 26/10: Support. A $13.8 million firm-fixed-price modification, exercising an option to a previously-awarded delivery order for 107 swashplate actuators and 137 flaperon actuators for MV-22 and CV-22 aircraft. Work will be performed in New York, NY, and is expected to be complete in January 2012 (N00019-07-G-0008).

July 20/10: Presentation. At Farnborough 2010, USMC V-22 Program Manager Col. Greg Masiello on July 20 briefs media about the current status of the program. It reiterates the basic rationale that has justified the V-22 since inception, and adds that a joint industry-government team will be trying to address the platform’s readiness issues by having more spares on hand, analyzing root causes, and making more modifications to the platform. Presentation [PDF, 9.8 MB]

July 14/10: Support. A $12.1 million firm-fixed-price contract modification will buy various obsolete parts for MV-22 and CV-22 aircraft, including both life-of-type and bridge buys. As Defense Acquisition University explains:

“A lifetime [aka. Life Of Type] buy involves the purchase and storage of a part in a sufficient quantity to meet current and (expected) future demands. Lifetime buys are usually offered by manufacturers prior to part discontinuance and may delay discontinuances if purchases are large… The trick with lifetime buys is to determine the optimum number of parts to purchase.”

Parts that end their manufacturing while their military system continues to serve are common problem among military electronics, and the list of parts reflects that: Display Electronics Unit II; Dual Digital Map System; Air Data Unit; Slim Multi Functional Display; and Thermoelectric Cooler Modular Unit.

Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX (95%); Vergennes, VT (3%); and Albuquerque, NM (2%). Work is expected to be complete in October 2014. $10.1 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00019-07-C-0007).

June 28/10: Sub-contractors. Raytheon Technical Services Co. in Indianapolis, IN received a $250.5 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract to develop and support FY 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017 V-22 Block Fleet release avionics systems software, including V-22 aircraft avionics acquisition support. The contract also provides for V-22 situational awareness/Blue Force tracking software and prototype hardware.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in September 2014. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Patuxent River, MD (N00421-10-D-0012).

June 21/10: Engine support. A $12.4 million firm-fixed-price delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-07-G-0008). It will buy 698 upgraded engine air particle separator blowers (558 MV-22; 68 CV-22; and 72 spares). “Air particle separators” help engines avoid being clogged and/or internally sandblasted by flying dust. The V-22 generates a lot of that, and as contracts covered here attest, it has been a recurring problem for the aircraft on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Work will be performed in Ft. Worth, TX (63%), and Jackson, MS (37%), and is expected to be complete in March 2014. $6.8 million of this contract will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10 (N00019-07-G-0008).

April-May 2010: Crash follow-up. Early reports indicate that the CV-22 crash in Afghanistan was caused in part by brownout” conditions, created when a helicopter’s rotors create so much dust that visibility drops to near-zero, and the engine may ingest sand and dust. In May, however Military.com’s Jamie McIntyre offers a different account:

“An investigation of the crash of an Air Force special operations CV-22 Osprey in Afghanistan last month has concluded the pilot of the tilt-rotor aircraft flew too close to the ground, striking an earthen berm, a source who has been briefed on the finding tells Line Of Departure. The conclusions of the accident investigators – which haven’t been released because they are not yet final – rule out mechanical malfunction and hostile fire… evidence suggests the V-22 was flying at high speed, at very low altitude, in airplane mode, with its massive rotors perpendicular to the ground when it struck the berm. A source says the force of the impact sheared off both engines (nacelles) and both wings before the plane flipped over… The accident report neither validates the V-22′s proponents, nor vindicates its detractors. It may just postpone that debate until the next incident… longtime aviation reporter Richard Whittle, author of the authoritative new book, “The Dream Machine: the Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey”… cautions against blaming the pilot for the crash, before the full investigation is released…”

See: Flight International | Popular Mechanics | Military.com Line of Departure.

April 15/10: Avionics. A $42.1 million fixed-price-incentive-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-07-G-0008) to swap out the MV/CV-22′s flight computer hardware for newer and better gear. Official releases refer to an effort to develop, qualify, and test and new “integrated avionics processor into the avionics system architecture,” in order to “resolve obsolescence issues, add new network capabilities, increase data throughput for legacy 1553 network, and re-host mission computer capabilities that will significantly increase avionics system and operations readiness.” Sounds like the old IAP was a problem, which may not be surprising if one contrasts the length of time V-22s have taken to develop, with the expected lifespan of computer processors.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (70%) and Ft. Worth, TX (30%), and is expected to be complete in October 2014.

April 1/10: CV-22 upgrades. A $55.2 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-08-C-0025) for non-recurring efforts associated with the CV-22 aircraft Block 20 upgrade program, Increment III. Efforts to be provided include concept definition, non-recurring engineering, drawings, and installation/integration of brake performance enhancements and the helmet mounted display upgrade.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (91%); Fort Worth, TX (5%); and Fort Walton Beach, FL (4%), and is expected to be completed in December 2015. Contract funds in the amount of $6.5 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

March 30/10: GAO Report. The US GAO audit office delivers its 8th annual “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs report. With respect to the V-22, the GAO said:

“Although the program office considers V-22 critical technologies to be mature and its design stable, the program continues to correct deficiencies and make improvements to the aircraft. For example, the engine air particle separator (EAPS), which keeps debris out of the engines, and has been tied to a number of engine fires caused by leaking hydraulic fluids contacting hot engine parts. Previous design changes did not fully correct this problem or other EAPS problems… Due to the aircraft’s design, many components of the aircraft are inaccessible until the aircraft is towed from its parking spot. Shipboard operations were adjusted to provide 24 hour aircraft movement capability. Temporary work-arounds were also identified to mitigate competition for hangar deck space, as well as to address deck heating issues on smaller ships caused by the V-22′s exhaust… According to the program office, during the first sea deployment in 2009, the MV-22 achieved a mission capable rate of 66.7 percent [emphasis DID's]. This still falls short of the minimum acceptable (threshold) rate of 82 percent. The mission capable rate achieved during three Iraq deployments was 62 percent average.”

With respect to self protection:

“According to program officials the program has purchased eight belly mounted all quadrant (360 degrees) interim defensive weapon system mission kits [DID: see RGS article]. Five kits are currently on deployed V-22 aircraft… the speed, altitude, and range advantages of the MV-22 will require the Marine Corps to reevaluate escort and close air support tactics and procedures.”

The GAO adds that the V-22 program is planning for and budgeting for a second multiyear procurement contract, to begin in FY 2013.

March 26/10: CV-22 support. The US government announces, via FedBizOpps solicitation #FA8509-10-R-21916, a sole source contract to Boeing to have 2 experts co-located within 580th Aircraft Sustainment Group (ACSG) at Robins AFB, to provide on-site technical and engineering support for AFSOC’s CV-22s. The contract will run for 1 year, with an additional 4 annual options that could carry it to 5 years.

March 9/10: Support. The US government modifies a pre-solicitation notice; NAVAIR will award Bell-Boeing a delivery order for integration and test of the V-22 Dual-Digital Map, Electrical System Improvements, Troop Commander Panel, and Holdup Power Circuit (N00019-07-G-0008/ 0092).

Feb 5/10: Support. A $70 million cost-plus-fixed-fee repair contract for repairs in support of the V-22 aircraft. Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (50%), and Fort Worth, TX (50%), and is expected to be complete by June 2012. This contract was not competitively awarded by the Naval Inventory Control Point in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-10-D-003N).

Feb 4/10: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $52.5 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-10-C-0020). The change provides additional funding for maintenance services in support of the MV-22 and CV-22 AE1107C engines.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in February 2011. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the Navy (MV-22, $48.2 million; 92%) and the Air Force (CV-22, $4.25 million; 8%).

Jan 15/10: Support. US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) announces that it will issue an order under Basic Ordering Agreement N00019-07-G-0008, and modifiy contracts N00019-07-C-0001, N00019-08-C-0025 and N00019-07-C-0040 with the Bell Boeing Joint Program Offices.

“The order/modifications will cover Engineering Change Proposals for the Retrofit and Forward Fit of the CV-22 Osprey aircraft that incorporates Block 20/C Upgrades consisting of: Co-Site Communications, Parking Brake, GPS Repeater, Environmental Cooling System, Standby Flight Instrument and Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal. Additionally the order will cover the debit/credit of Technical Manuals.”

Dec 30/09: Support. The Bell-Boeing Joint Project Office in Amarillo, TX received a $13.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification to design and build 12 types of CV-/MV-22 specific support equipment for the intermediate and operational maintenance levels.

Work will be performed in Amarillo, TX, and is expected to be complete in March 2013. Contract funds in the amount of $10.6 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/09 (N68335-06-G-0007).

Dec 29/09: Defensive. The Bell-Boeing Joint Project Office in Amarillo, TX received $11.9 million to provide recurring engineering for the Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Counter Measure (SIRFC) system on the V-22 aircraft. This firm-fixed-price delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement will include replacement of LRU-2 (Line Replaceable Unit, aka. “black box”) with the upgraded LRU-2B, SIRFC cable changes, and antenna radome redesign. Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (98%), and Fort Worth, TX (2%), and is expected to be complete in August 2013 (N00019-07-G-0008).

ITT’s AN/ALQ-211 SIFRC system [PDF] provides detection, analysis and protection against radar-guided threats, including triangulation and GPS geolocation of threats, advance warning that may enable a pilot to route around the threat, and cueing of countermeasures like chaff dispensers via integration with the CV-22′s entire self-protection suite. It’s a modular system with multiple sensors and electronic components installed all around a rotary-winged or fixed winged aircraft. Variants of the ALQ-211 SIFRC equip US AFSOCOM’s CV-22s (ALQ-211v2), as well helicopters like SOCOM MH-47s and MH-60s (ALQ-211v6/v7), some NH90s (ALQ-211v5), and AH-64D attack helicopters (ALQ-211v1). Foreign F-16 jet fighters also deploy the ALQ-211, most recently as the ALQ-211v4 AIDEWS integrated defensive system.

Dec 28/09: Testing. The Bell-Boeing Joint Program Office in Amarillo, TX received a $29.4 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to support the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron by providing on-site flight test management, flight test engineering, design engineering and related efforts to support the conduct of flight and ground testing for the MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft.

Work will be performed in Patuxent River, MD (70%); Philadelphia, PA (19%); and Fort Worth, TX (11%), and is expected to be complete in December 2010 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Dec 28/09: Avionics. A $25.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification, exercising an option to a previously awarded delivery order provides engineering and technical services for the Navy and Air Force in support of the V-22 flight control system and on-aircraft avionics software. It includes supporting configuration changes to the software of the V-22 aircraft for avionics and flight controls; flight test planning; coordination of changed avionics and flight control configurations; upgrade planning for avionics and flight controls; and software qualification and integration testing.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (90%), and Fort Worth, TX (10%). Work is expected to be complete in December 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $6.1 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/09 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Dec 23/09: Avionics. Raytheon Technical Services Co. LLC in Indianapolis, IN receives an $18.7 million delivery order modification. It provides additional funding to extend the firm’s work on V-22 aircraft software until June 30/10.

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN and is expected to be complete in June 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $711,200 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/09 (N00019-05-G-0008).

Dec 18/09: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN receives a $160.6 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract, exercising an option to buy 78 AE1107C engines to equip Navy/USMC MV-22s (62 engines, $128.1 million, 80%) and US AFSOCOM CV-22s (16 engines, $32.5 million, 20%).

Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in December 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $16 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/09 (N00019-07-C-0060).

Dec 5/09: Support. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. in Hurst, TX receives a $5.9 million ceiling-priced order contract for the repair of left hand and right hand blades for the V-22 aircraft. Work will be performed in Ft. Worth, TX, and is expected to be complete by December 2010. This contract was not competitively awarded by the Naval Inventory Control Point (N00383-05-G-048N, #0031).

Nov 30/09: Engine support. Rolls-Royce Corp., in Indianapolis, IN received a $22.6 million firm-fixed-price contract to provide maintenance services for the AE1107C engines installed on Marines’ MV-22s ($12.4 million, 54.7%) and AFSOCOM’s CV-22s ($10.2 million, 45.3%). Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN. T contract extends to December 2010, but $21.3 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10. This contract was not competitively procured, pursuant to FAR 6.302-1 (N00019-10-C-0020).

Nov 19/09: Training. The Marines take delivery of the 2nd MV-22 Osprey flight trainer at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA. The containerized flight training devices (CFTD) are used for over 50% of crew training, and require only a concrete pad and dedicated power hookup. NAVAIR quotes Lt. Col. David Owen of PMA-205, who says that reliability is about 98% (12-15 hours maintenance downtime per year), and costs have gone down from $12 million for the initial units to the current $8.6 million.

The third and fourth trainers are scheduled to be delivered to MCAS Miramar in early to mid-2010. A fifth V-22 flight trainer is scheduled for delivery to MCAS New River, N.C. in the fall of 2010. NAVAIR Dec 16/09 release.

Nov 5/09: Support. A $7.5 million cost-plus fixed-fee order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N68335-06-G-0014) to manufacture 28 peculiar support equipment items for V-22 organizational and intermediate level maintenance.

Work will be performed in Amarillo, TX is expected to be completed in April 2012; $5.3 million in contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ.

Oct 30/09: Training. Boeing announces a contract for the Bell-Boeing team to upgrade the CV-22 Cabin Part Task Trainer (CPTT), including an Aircrew Flight Simulation (AFS) that deploys a fused reality system that fuses video images with virtual reality. The AFS enables the student to view both the interior cabin environment and the simulated outside world in a composite picture sent to the student’s helmet-mounted display, allowing training for things like wing fires, hydraulic leaks and engine smoke. This modification also opens the door to future upgrades that could enable simulated mission operations with separate cockpit flight simulators, where the CPTT could ‘fly’ with the cockpit simulator on a common mission.

The upgrade will be delivered to Air Force Special Operations Command, 58th Training Squadron at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, NM.

Oct 28/09: FY 2010 budget. President Obama signs the FY 2010 defense budget into law. That budget provides almost $2.3 billion in funding for 30 V-22s, and Congress did not modify the Pentagon’s request in any way. White House.

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Sept 22/09: Guns. A $10.6 million cost-plus fixed-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement to design and develop improvements to the interim defensive weapon system on the V-22 tiltrotor aircraft. This delivery order includes the design, qualification testing, airworthiness substantiation; aircraft fit check and ground testing and procurement of all necessary materials and parts.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (50%) and Johnson City, NY (50%), and is expected to be complete in March 2012. All contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00019-07-G-0008).

Sept 21/09: Sub-contractors. L3 Vertex Aerospace of Madison, MS received an $8.2 million contract for UH-1N and HH-60G helicopter maintenance services, and functional check flight services for the CV-22 aircraft located at Kirtland Air Force Base, NM. At this time, all fnds have been committed by the AETC CONS/LGCK at Randolph AFB, TX (FA3002-10-C-0001).

Sept 15/09: Sub-contractors. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division in Crane, IN awards a set of firm-fixed price, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity multiple award contracts with a maximum value of $14 million, to 6 firms. The firms will compete for delivery orders for various types of MH-60S/R and V-22 gun mount components, along with bore sight kits. Work is expected to be completed by September 2014. This contract was competitively procured via the Navy Electronic Commerce Online and Federal Business Opportunities websites, with 14 proposals being received. Contractors include:

• Guardian Technology Group in Crawfordsville, IN (N00164-09-D-JN14)
  
• Northside Machine Company in Dugger, IN (N00164-09-D-JN60)
  
• MCD Machine Inc. in Bloomington, IN (N00164-09-D-JN61)
  
• C&S Machine in Plainville, IN (N00164-09-D-JN62)
  
• Precision Laser Services, Inc. in Fort Wayne, IN (N00164-09-D-JN63)
  
• Colbert Mfg, Co., Inc in Lavergn, TN (N00164-09-D-JN64)

Aug 25/09: CAMEO. A $7.3 million cost plus incentive fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement for the continued development of technical data products necessary for the integration of the Comprehensive Automated Maintenance Environment Optimized (CAMEO) System into the V-22 Osprey (q.v. Sept 24/08 entry).

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (50%); and Fort Worth, TX (40%); and New River, NC (10%), and is expected to be complete in May 2010 (N00019-07-G-0008).

July 15/09: Support. A $24.5 million ceiling-priced indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity time and material contract for the development and delivery of safety corrective actions, reliability and maintainability improvements, and quick reaction capability improvements in support of V-22 Osprey missions for the Air Force, Special Operations Command, and the U.S. Marine Corps.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (50%); Amarillo, TX (25%); and Fort Worth, TX (25%), and is expected to be complete in December 2010 (N00019-09-D-0004).

July 15/09: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems’ Defensive Systems Division in Rolling Meadows, IL receives a $6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-08-G-0012) to perform configuration upgrades to the V-22 large aircraft infrared countermeasures, including qualification testing and acceptance test reports.

NGC produces the LAIRCM system, which uses sensors and pulsed lasers to identify and decoy incoming shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. t is typically fitted to large aircraft like the C-17 and C-130. Work will be performed in Rolling Meadows, IL and is expected to be complete in June 2012.

June 29/09: CV-22 support. A maximum $44.9 million firm-fixed-price, sole source contract for depot level reparables in support of the USAF’s CV-22 aircraft. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year on Sept 30/09, but the contract runs until Oct 31/12. The contracting activity is the DLR Procurement Operations (DSCR-ZC) at Defense Logistics Agency Philadelphia, in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-03-G-001B-THM4).

June 11/09: Support. A $10.9 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery requirements contract to provide joint performance based logistics Phase 1.5 support, which aims to improve component reliability of the US Marine Corps (MV-22: $9.9 million; 91%) and Air Force Special Operations Command’s (CV-22: $1 million; 9%) Osprey tilt rotors.

Work will be performed in Ft. Worth, TX (72%) and Philadelphia, PA (28%) and is expected to be complete in May 2011 (N00019-09-D-0008).

May 20/09: Sub-contractors. Small business qualifier Organizational Strategies, Inc. in Arlington, VA wins a $10 million Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase III firm-fixed-price contract for an “Advanced Training Technology Delivery System.” Phase III is the final stage of the SBIR process, and is expected to lead to a commercial product at the end.

Organizational Strategies will provide services and materials required to deliver the Training Continuum Integration (TCI) portion of the H-53 and V-22 Integrated Training Systems, including collaborative product acquisition, deployment, and concurrency data. Successful completion hopes to reduce program and operational risk, while improving safety, crew performance and operational efficiency for both the H-53 and V-22 programs.

Work will be performed in New River, NC (60%); Patuxent River, MD (20%); and Atlanta, GA (20%), and is expected to be complete in May 2011. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was competitively procured using SBIR Program Solicitation Topic N98-057, with 15 offers received by the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division in Lakehurst, NJ (N68335-09-C-0120).

May 20/09: CV-22 upgrades. A $7.3 million firm-fixed-price delivery order for one-time engineering services to retrofit 7 CV-22 aircraft per single configuration retrofit ECP V-22-0802. The order will bring the 7 aircraft to a Block B/10 configuration. The firm will also provide the associated retrofit kits for 3 more CV-22 aircraft.

Bell-Boeing plans to perform the work in Ridley Park, PA (60%), and Fort Worth, TX (40%) and expects to complete the work in November 2012 (N00019-07-G-0008).

March 31/09: De-icing. A $61.6 million not-to-exceed order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement will provide Ice Protection System upgrades for 49 Marine Corps MV-22s and 8 Air Force CV-22s under the production and deployment phases of the V-22 Program. See the March 30/09 entry for more on the V-22′s de-icing system.

Work will be performed in FT Worth, TX (99%) and New River, NC (1%), and is expected to be completed in December 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $19 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00019-07-G-0008).

March 30/09: GAO Report. The US government’s GAO audit office issues GAO-09-326SP: “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.” It compares the V-22 program’s costs from 1986 to the present, in constant FY 2009 dollars. Over its history, the program’s R&D costs have risen 209%, from $4.1 billion to $12.7 billion, and procurement costs rose 24% from $34.4 billion to $42.6 billion, despite a 50% cut in planed purchases from 913 to 458. With respect to current issues:

“…the full-rate production configuration deployed to Iraq, have experienced reliability problems… with parts such as gearboxes and generators… well short of its full- mission capability goal… complex and unreliable de-icing system… less than 400 hour engine service life fell short of the 500-600 hours estimated by program management… Also, pending modifications to the program’s engine support contract with Rolls Royce could result in increased support costs in the future. Planned upgrades to the aircraft could affect the aircraft’s ability to meet its requirements… [adding a 360 degree belly turret will drop troop carrying capacity below 24... an all-weather radar into the V-22. This radar and an effective de-icing system are essential for selfdeploying the V-22 without a radar-capable escort and deploying the V-22 to areas such as Afghanistan, where icing conditions are more likely to be encountered. However, expected weight increases from these and other upgrades, as well as general weight increases for heavier individual body armor and equipment may affect the V-22's ability to maintain key performance parameters, such as speed, range, and troop carrying capacity. While the program office reports a stable design, changes can be expected in order to to integrate planned upgrades... The program is adding forward firing countermeasures to enhance the aircraft's survivability; modifying the engine air particle separator to prevent engine fires and enhance system reliability; and improving the environmental control system."

March 13/09: Avionics. A $30 million order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement to support configuration changes to the V-22's avionics and flight control software, flight test planning, coordination of changed avionics and flight control configurations, upgrade planning, performance of qualification testing, and integration testing on software products.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (90%) and Ft. Worth, TX (10%), and is expected to be complete in December 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $5.4 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00019-07-G-0008).

March 12/09: To Afghanistan. Military.com quotes Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway, who says that "By the end of the year, you're going to see Ospreys in Afghanistan."

"One Osprey squadron is still in Iraq, but will be returning in a couple of months. The next Osprey squadron to deploy will be going aboard ships with a Marine Expeditionary Unit, Conway said, to test the aircraft's ability to handle salt and sea and give crews shipboard operating experience... The squadron that follows in the deployment line up will then go to Afghanistan."

The MV-22s in Iraq were criticized as glorified taxis, with the aircraft reportedly kept out of dangerous situations. It may be much more difficult to exercise that luxury in Afghanistan.

March 12/09: CV-22 upgrades. An $11.1 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-08-C-0025), for Increment II of the CV-22 aircraft Block 20 upgrade program. Efforts will include concept definition, non-recurring engineering, drawings, prototype manufacturing, installation, and associated logistic support to integrate and test the V-22 Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal Replacement Receiver, and improved crew interface of broadcast data. Additionally, this procurement provides for the supposedly one-time support to augment the contractor engineering technical support team.

Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (81%); Fort Worth, TX (10%); and Fort Walton Beach, FL (9%), and is expected to be completed in September 2012.

March 2/09: Downwash hazard. Gannett's Marine Corps Times reveals that the Osprey's downwash is creating new hazards on board America's amphibious assault ships:

"For example, Kouskouris said flight deck operators [on the USS Bataan] are reluctant to land an Osprey next to smaller helicopters such as the AH-1 Super Cobra or the UH-1 Huey because the tilt rotors’ massive downdraft could blow the smaller aircraft off a deck spot. He has formally asked for this restriction to be included in the Osprey’s future training programs.”

March 2/09: Sub-contractors. GE Aviation Systems, LLC in Grand Rapids, MI received a $12.1 million ceiling-priced indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for aircraft recorders. The order includes 27 Crash Survivable Memory Units (CSMU) for the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotors; 120 Crash Survivable Flight Information Recorder (CSFIR) Voice and Data Recorders (VADRs) for the E-2D Hawkeye AWACS plane; and 2 CSFIR Integrated Data Acquisition and Recorder Systems for T-6A trainer aircraft. In addition, this contract provides for CSFIR supply system spares; engineering and product support; CSFIR and CSMU hardware; software upgrades, repairs, and modifications for CSFIR/Structural Flight Recording Set (SFRS) common ground station software.

Work will be performed in Grand Rapids, MI, and is expected to be complete in March 2010. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD (N00019-09-D-0017).

Feb 27/09: Testing. A $24.5 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-07-G-0008) to support the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron’s MV-22 efforts. The contract includes on-site and off-site flight test management, flight test engineering, design engineering, and related efforts to support flight and ground testing.

Work will be performed at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD (70%); Philadelphia, PA (19%); and Fort Worth, Texas (11%) and is expected to be complete in December 2009.

Feb 17/09: CV-22 plans. Defense News reports that US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is looking to accelerate its purchase of CV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft to an average of 8 planes per year starting in FY 2010.

According to the report, AFSOC deputy director of plans, programs, requirements, and assessments Col. J.D. Clem says that that right now, AFSOC has 7 operational CV-22s at Hurlburt Field, FL and 4 training aircraft at Kirtland AFB, NM. They are reportedly looking to declare Initial Operational Capability before the end of March 2009. If AFSOC’s desired funding in its next 6-year spending plan comes through, it would have a fleet of 50 CV-22s by 2015, but many would not arrive until the end of FY 2011.

Jan 22/09: Support. A $581.4 million cost-plus-incentive fee, indefinite-delivery 5-year requirements contract to provide Joint Performance Based Logistics (JPBL) support for the Marine Corps (MV-22), Air Force, and Special Forces Operations Command (CV-22) aircraft during the production and deployment phase of the V-22 Program.

Work will be performed in Ft. Worth, TX (46.6%); Philadelphia, PA (41.4%); Ft. Walton Beach, FL (6.1%); Oklahoma City, OK (4.3%); and St. Louis, MO (1.6%), and is expected to be complete in November 2013. Contract funds in the amount of $84.8 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured (N00019-09-D-0008).

Dec 8/08: MV-22 upgrades. A $55.6 million modification to a previously awarded fixed price incentive fee contract (N00019-07-C-0066) to incorporate Engineering Change Proposal #708R2, which will convert Lot 5 MV-22 aircraft from the initial MV-22A configuration to the operational MV-22 Block B configuration. Block B aircraft are more reliable and introduce a ramp gun, hoist, refueling probe, and an improved EAPS (engine air particle separator).

Work will be performed in Cherry Point, NC (65%); Amarillo, TX (20%); Philadelphia, PA (10%); Oklahoma City, OK (3%); and Mesa, AZ (2%) and is expected to be complete in May 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $47.9 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Oct 8/08: Support. An $18.1 million modification to a previously awarded cost plus incentive fee contract, exercising an option in support of the MV-22 Total Life Cycle logistics support effort. Services to be provided include planning and management; supportability analysis; training; support equipment; facilities management; computer resources; supportability test and evaluation; packaging, handling, storage and transportation of supplies; post-DD250 engineering and technical support; site/unit activation; on-site representative support; logistics life cycle cost; age exploration; configuration management; technical publications; and Naval Air Training and Operational Procedures Standardization support.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (45%); Fort Worth, TX (40%); New River, NC (10%); and OCONUS Deployment (5%), and is expected to be complete in January 2009 (N00019-03-C-3017).

CV-22 SEAL extraction
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Sept 24/08: Support. A $6.5 million ceiling priced order contract for MV-22 spare parts. Work will be performed at Hurst, TX and is expected to be complete by July 2011. This contract not was competitively procured by the Naval Inventory Control Point.

Sept 24/08: CAMEO. A $6.4 million cost plus incentive fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement for the continued development for a Comprehensive Automated Maintenance Environment for Osprey (CAMEO) electronic maintenance support package for the V-22 family.

CAMEO is a related derivative of SAIC’s Pathfinder software series, and is used as part of V-22 fleet maintenance. CAMEO integrates with the V-22 Tiltrotor Vibration, Structural Life, and Engine Diagnostics (VSLED) unit, and the Aircraft Maintenance Event Ground Station (AMEGS). It allows continuous integration of new technical data, and helps to automate diagnosis and maintenance. It is hoped that the system will lead to better in service rates and availability.

Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (50%); Fort Worth, TX (45%); and San Diego, CA (5%), and is expected to be complete in June 2009 (N00019-07-G-0008).

Sept 18/08: CV-22 support. A $9.8 million not-to-exceed modification to a previously awarded cost plus incentive fee contract (N00019-03-C-0067), exercising an option for interim contractor support for the CV-22 operational flight at Hurlburt Field, Ft. Walton Beach, FL and potential deployed locations. This modification also provides for operational training support at Kirtland Air Force Base, NM.

Work will be performed at Hurlburt Air Force Base, Fort Walton Beach, FL (60%) and Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, NM (40%), and is expected to be complete in January 2009.

Sept 17/08: MV-22 upgrades. A $23 million fixed-price-incentive-fee delivery order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement (N00019-07-G-0008) for “non-recurring engineering effort for ECP-762 Pre-Block A to Block B Retrofit in support of the MV-22 Osprey aircraft.” What this means is that the funds will help upgrade some of the first MV-22As produced to the MV-22B configuration required for serving, operational aircraft. Block B incorporates systems that were left out of initial test aircraft, as well as systems added later to fix testing or operational problems.

Work will be performed in Amarillo, TX (60%) and Philadelphia, PA (40%), and is expected to be complete in September 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $15 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Aug 1/08: CV-22 upgrades. A $91.8 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-08-C-0025) for Phase II of the CV-22 aircraft Block 20 Upgrade. Additions will include integration and testing of Terrain Following (below 50 knots), Terrain Following Logic Improvements, Communication Co-Site Interference, Advanced Mission Computer (AMC) Thru-put, flight test engineering support, and logistics and supply support.

Work will be performed in Hurlburt Field, FL (70%); Ridley Park, PA (15%); and Amarillo, TX (15%), and is expected to be complete in Sept. 2012.

July 14/08: Sub-contractors. GE-Aviation announces a $190 million, 10-year contract with Bell Boeing to supply integrated systems and equipment for 167 MV-22 and CV-22 aircraft – which is to say, all of the V-22s scheduled under the new multi-year deal. Deliveries will begin in 2009.

The systems provided have an estimated value of approximately $410 million over the entire life of the program, which extends beyond this 10-year contract. They will be designed and developed at a range of GE facilities in Maryland, Michigan, Florida, California, Ohio, Illinois and New York, as well as at Cheltenham and Wolverhampton in the United Kingdom. Items will include:

• Aircraft structures – supplied by GE’s Middle River Aircraft Systems, who was named supplier of the year for Bell on the V-22.
  
• Rudder servoactuators
  
• Main landing gear actuation
  
• Forward cabin control station
  
• Ramp door control panel
  
• Optical blade trackers
  
• Hydraulic fluid monitor
  
• Standby attitude indicator
  
• Digital data set
  
• Fight information recorder
  
• Coaxial cables
  
• Environmental control system valves
  
• Primary & secondary lighting control
  
• Nacelle Blowers

July 3/08: CV-22 support. A $14.3 million ceiling priced delivery order under a previously awarded contract for repairable spare components of the CV-22 aircraft such as blade assemblies and pendulum assemblies.

Work will be performed in Hurst, TX, and is expected to be complete in December 2011. One company was solicited for this non-competitive requirement, and one offer was received by the Naval Inventory Control Point in Philadelphia, PA (N00383-03-G-001B, #0275).

June 25/08: CV-22 support. a $28.5 million ceiling priced delivery order under a previously awarded contract for spare components of the CV-22 aircraft. Work will be performed in Hurst, TX and is expected to be complete by December 2011. This contract was not awarded competitively by the Naval Inventory Control Point (N00383-03-G-001B, #0274).

June 19/08: Support. An $18.2 million modification to a previously awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, exercising an option for engineering and logistics services under the MV-22 Total Life Cycle Logistics Support program. Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA (45%); Fort Worth, TX (40%); New River, NC (10%); and Deployment outside the continental USA (5%), and is expected to be complete in October 2008.

Services to be provided include planning and management; supportability analysis; training; support equipment; facilities management; computer resources; supportability test and evaluation; packaging, handling, storage and transportation of supplies; post-DD250 engineering and technical support; site/unit activation; on-site representative support; logistics life cycle cost; age exploration; configuration management; technical publications; and Naval Air Training and Operational Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) support (N00019-03-C-3017).

June 9/08: Avionics. A $17.7 million ceiling-priced cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for hardware and software development and risk reduction efforts associated with a common MV/CV-22 mission and avionics systems upgrade (MSU). The MSU will consist of hardware and software components of the advanced mission computer and displays, tactical aircraft moving map capability, automatic terrain avoidance for very low level and/or night flights, and weapons system control. Work will be performed in Philadelphia, PA (50.8%); Bloomington, MN (36.9%); and St. Louis, MO (12.3%), and is expected to be complete in June 2009. This contract was not competitively procured (N00091-08-C-0024).

May 30/08: Training. A $78.5 million ceiling-priced indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract for the analysis, design, development, manufacture, test, installation, upgrade and logistics support of the MV-22 Aircraft Maintenance Trainer (AMT) and CV Flight Training Device/Full Flight Simulator (CV FTD/FFS) Products. Work will be performed in Amarillo, Texas (70%); and Philadelphia, PA (30%), and is expected to be complete in May 2012. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division in Orlando, FL (N61339-08-D-0007).

May 14/08: Engines. Rolls-Royce Corp. in Indianapolis, IN received a $9.9 million modification to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract for 6 of its AE1107C MV-22 engines. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, IN, and is expected to be complete in December 2010 (N00019-07-C-0060).

May 1/08: A turret at last. Production begins. BAE Systems Inc. in Johnson City, NY receives a FFP pre-priced contract modification for $8 million for a CV-22 interim defense weapon system productions option in support of U.S. Special Operations Command and NAVAIR. Work will be performed in Johnson City, NY from April 30/08 through Jan 31/09, using FY 2006 SOCOM procurement funds and FY 2008 Navy aircraft procurement funds. This is a within scope modification to a competitive contract where 2 offers were received (H92222-08-C-0006-P00003). See also “BAE’s Turret to Trial in CV-22s.”

April 28/08: CV-22 support. A $19 million ceiling-priced delivery order for CV-22 spare components. Work will be performed in Hurst, TX, and is expected to be complete by May 2011. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Inventory Control Point (N00383-03-G-001B, #0270).

April 23/08: Support. A $14.4 million for ceiling priced delivery order under a previously awarded contract (N00383-03-G-001B, #0264) for V-22 spare parts. Work will be performed in Ridley Park, PA and is expected to be complete by July 2011. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Inventory Control Point.

April 16/08: Related modifications to USS Wasp. BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair in Norfolk, VA received a $33.8 million modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-05-C-4403) to exercise an option for the USS Wasp (LHD-1) FY 2008 drydocking phased maintenance availability. There are 80 plus work items that are repair/replace/preserve/install/clean in nature, plus the following ship alternations: LHD1-6 SCD 3263 – fuel oil compensation stability improvement modifications (requires drydock), LHD1-0248K – install additional A/C plant, LHD1-0270K – install nitrogen generator, LHD1-0274K – accomplish MV-22 service and shop modifications, LHD1-0283K – accomplish MV-22 topside modifications, and S/A 71265K – low light flight deck surveillance system.

Work will be performed in Portsmouth, VA, and is expected to be complete by November 2008. All funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center in Norfolk, VA issued the contract.

April 10/08: Infrastructure. The Whiting-Turner Contracting Company in Raleigh, NC received a $35.6 million firm-fixed-price contract for design and construction of an aircraft maintenance hangar, phases I and II, at Marine Corps Air Station New River, Camp Lejeune. The work to be performed provides for construction of a multi-story aircraft maintenance hangar to provide hangar bay, shop space, flight line operations, and maintenance functions in support of the V-22 aircraft squadrons. Work also includes mechanical, electrical support systems and telephone system. Built-in equipment includes a freight elevator and five ton bridge crane. Site improvements include parking and landscaping and incidental related work.

Work will be performed in Jacksonville, NC, and is expected to be complete by May 2010. This contract was competitively procured via the Naval Facilities Engineering Command e-solicitation website with 4 proposals received. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Mid-Atlantic in Norfolk, VA issued the contract (N40085-08-C-1419).

April 4/08: CV-22 support. $15.5 million for ceiling priced order #0260 against previously awarded contract for repairable and consumable spare components for the CV-22 aircraft. Examples of parts to be purchased are valve module-brake, air data unit, hand wing unit (manual), ramp door actuator, and torque link subassembly.

Work will be performed in Hurst, Texas, and is expected to be completed July 2011. This contract was not awarded competitively by the Naval Inventory Control Point (N00383-03-G-001B).

April 4/08: CV-22 support. $12.2 million for a ceiling priced order against previously awarded contract for repairable and consumable spare components for the CV-22 aircraft. Examples of types of parts to be bought include rod end assembly, slip ring assembly, fairing assembly, blade assembly, and link assembly.

Work will be performed in Hurst, TX and is to be completed July 2011. This contract was not awarded competitively by the Naval Inventory Control Point (N00383-03-G-001B, #0259).

March 18/08: New engine? Aviation Week reports that issues that have arisen with V-22 engine maintenance in Iraq may drive the U.S. Marine Corps to look for entirely new engines. Despite a recent redesign to try and solve issues with dust, Marine Corps V-22 program manager Col. Matt Mulhern is quoted as saying that “…as we actually operate the aircraft, the engines aren’t lasting as long as we [or the government] would like.”

This is forcing a move from the proposed “Power By the Hour” framework of payment per available flight-hour, an arrangement that is also used for civil airliner fleets. Rolls Royce reportedly can’t support this model any longer for the V-22, and wishes to change its contract to a standard time and materials maintenance arrangement.

Key problems encountered include erosion in the compressor blades, and lack of power margin to handle expected weight growth. Mulhern has said that “We need to move on, with or without Rolls-Royce,” but General Electric’s GE38-1B is the only alternative engine in the same power class. It will be used in the Marines’ new CH-53K heavy lift helicopter.

Additional Readings

• How Stuff Works – V-22 Osprey

• NAVAIR – V-22 Program Office

• USAF Fact Sheets – SOCOM’s CV-22

• Rolls Royce – AE 1107C-Liberty engine.

• BAE Systems – RGS V-22 turret briefing from AUSA 2007. Press release: “a” [PDF] | RGS Data Sheet [PDF] | Slides [PDF] | Briefing video [Windows Media] | Live fire testing video [Windows Media WVX]. “BAE Systems, which has been working with the user community to develop and demonstrate this capability since mid-2005, is planning to make the system available for installation beginning in the third quarter of 2008.”

Reports

• DID Spotlight – V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame? Includes links to all of the other reports below, and more.

• US GAO (March 30/10, #GAO-10-388SP) – Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. Includes a rundown of the V-22′s ongoing issues, in the V-22 section.

• CSBA Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (June 23/09) – The Future of the MV-22 Osprey [PDF].

• US GAO (June 23/09, #GAO-09-692T) – V-22 OSPREY AIRCRAFT: Assessments Needed to Address Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments

• US GAO (March 30/09, #GAO-09-326SP) – Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. Includes a rundown of the V-22′s ongoing issues, in the V-22 section.

• US Congressional Research Service (updated March 13/07) – V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft [Full http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31384.pdf]. Very fair. Catalogs all of the program’s travails in detail, and presents the arguments both for and against the V-22 Osprey well.

• Center for Defense Information (2006) – V-22: Wonder Weapon or Widow Maker? [PDF]. Contains the most detailed and specific set of allegations to date concerning the V-22.

• The Pentagon, Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Director (September 2005) – V-22 Osprey Program: Report on Operational and Live Fire Test and Evaluation (OT-IIG) [PDF]

News & Developments

• WIRED Danger Room (Oct 4/12) – General: ‘My Career Was Done’ When I Criticized Flawed Warplane. That would be Brig. Gen. Don Harvel (ret.), who led the investigation into the April 9/10 CV-22 crash in Afghanistan.

• WIRED Danger Room (Oct 13/11) – Osprey Down: Marines Shift Story on Controversial Warplane’s Safety Record. The US Marines made an official response, citing the platform’s publicly-available safety records, and success in Afghanistan. David Axe responds that he isn’t satisfied.

• Seapower (March 2011) – Osprey Readiness

• Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Dec 18/10) – Findings on Osprey crash in Afghanistan overturned. “But the general who led the [CV-22] crash investigation said Thursday that there was strong evidence to indicate that the $87 million-plus aircraft, which has a history of technical problems, experienced engine trouble in the final seconds leading to the crash…”

• Aviation Week, via Military.com (March 18/08) – Marines May Seek New V-22 Engines. As a result of issues that have arisen with V-22 engine maintenance in Iraq. Seems to confirm observations re: the Jan 23/08 USMC article. Despite a recent redesign, Marine Corps V-22 program manager Col. Matt Mulhern is quoted as saying that “…as we actually operate the aircraft, the engines aren’t lasting as long as we [or the government] would like.” This is forcing a move from the proposed “Power By the Hour” framework of payment per flight-hour, which Rolls Royce can no longer support.

• US Marine Corps (Jan 23/08) – MV-22 ‘Osprey’ brings new capabilities to the sandbox. The April 14/07 NY Times reported that the V-22s would be kept out of combat situations. These days, that isn’t very hard to do in Anbar province; they key to evaluating this report is clarifying what the Marines are defining as a “combat sortie.” The sentence at the end of the excerpt also hints that answers to questions re: rates of spare parts use would be informative: “The squadron has completed more than 2,000 ASRs in the first 3 months of the deployment, keeping approximately 8,000 personnel off dangerous roadways and accruing approximately 2,000 flight hours… VMM-263 has flown 5 Aeroscout missions, 1 raid, more than 1400 combat sorties and maintained an average mission capable readiness rate of 68.1%… The range and depth of aviation supply parts is the latent limitation for high availability rates.”

• DID (Jan 17/08) – BAE’s Turret to Trial in CV-22s. Refers to the MGS.

• CBS Evening News (Oct 4/07) – Troubled Osprey Set To Take Flight In Iraq. Claims that one of the 10 Ospreys deploying to Iraq had to abort the mission due to mechanical issues, and had to return to USS Wasp [LHD 1] for repairs before resuming the flight.

• NAVAIR, V-22 Program Office (Sept 19/07) – 1st squadron of V-22s quietly deployed to Iraq

• NY Times (April 14/07) – Combat, With Limits, Looms for Hybrid Aircraft. “They will plan their missions in Iraq to avoid it getting into areas where there are serious threats,” said Thomas Christie, the Pentagon’s director of operations, test and evaluation from 2001 to 2005, who is now retired.” Also contains testimonials (both good and worrisome) from people who have flown in them.

• DID (March 12/07) – Lots Riding on V-22 Osprey. The USMC is designing several ancillary programs around the MV-22, setting key requirements for vehicles, howitzers, and more based on the Osprey’s dimensions and capabilities. Is this why they’re buying a $120,000 jeep?

• DID (July 14/05) – Osprey Tilt-Rotor Declared “Suitable and Effective”.

• U.S. Naval Institute (1999) – How Will We Escort the MV-22? (registration required). If attack helicopters aren’t fast enough, and fighter jets are too fast, and Ospreys aren’t really armed…

India’s fleet of Soviet-era maritime patrol aircraft has been upgraded, but it needs to be replaced. Indian naval responsibilities are growing, and the 2008 terrorist atrocities in Mumbai made it crystal-clear that control of their coasts was a necessity. Fortunately, they already had a competition underway. In December 2005, after an attempted buy of Lockheed Martin P-3s fell through, India’s navy had floated an RFP for at least 8 new sea control aircraft. Bids from a variety of contenders, including Lockheed Martin, were submitted in April 2007. Subsequent statements by India’s Admiral Prakash suggested that they could be looking for as many as 30 aircraft by 2020.

The plan had been for price negotiations to be completed in 2007, with first deliveries to commence within 48 months. India’s Ministry of Defence has extreme problems with announced schedules, but their existing fleet was wearing out, international requests for India’s maritime patrol help are rising, and Mumbai’s events provided an extra shove. By January 2009, India had picked its aircraft: the 737-derivative P-8i Neptune, a variant of the P-8A that’s readying for service as the P-3′s successor within the US Navy. DID discusses the geopolitical drivers, the current fleet, the known competitors, Boeing’s P-8i, and key contracts and events.

With Growing Naval Power Comes Growing Naval Responsibility

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The competition and refurbishment efforts are being given greater impetus by international developments. In February 2006, IPT reported that warning bells have been sounded at an international summit over the mounting terrorist threats to sea lanes around Indonesia and the Straits of Malacca, which serves as a choke-point for a significant percentage of global shipping. At a subsequent high-level meeting in the United States that included Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and others, Stratfor reported that India was asked to play a major policing role against sea-piracy in the region.

Successful procurement of modern maritime patrol aircraft would certainly expand India’s capabilities, as its naval responsibilities undergo rapid growth. To the west, India is also undertaking anti-piracy efforts on the East African coast, with a base in Madagascar and a recent military co-operation agreement with Mozambique that includes coastal patrol responsibilities.

Heron UAV, India
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The Indian Navy currently relies on its fleet of around 15 Dornier 228-101 aircraft and 12 Israeli Searcher Mark II and Heron unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor India’s 7,516 km long coastline, 1,197 islands and a 2.01 square km exclusive economic zone.

Additional patrols and interdiction within and beyond that area are undertaken by its 8 ultra-long-range TU-142 Bear aircraft and its remaining IL-38 May maritime surveillance aircraft, which have been upgraded to IL-38SD status. The IL-38SDs was expected to rise to 5 operational planes the by end of 2008, but the planes have been a flashpoint for controversy due to a May 14/07 report from India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) which said that the first 2 are missing essential avionics and weapon systems that are “seriously limiting their operational capabilities.”

New resources are needed. At the low end, India is buying Dornier 228NGs. A mid-tier option is under consideration, but at the high end, India decided that the Boeing’s P-8i’s fast long-range cruise, and advanced ground and ocean monitoring systems, made it their best option for patrolling the Indian Ocean’s vast expanses.

India’s P-8is will be based from Naval Air Station Rajali, at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu. It’s also the base for India’s current fleet of 8 Tu-142 ‘Bear’ aircraft, offering a long runway, and a southern location which increases the planes’ patrol coverage over the Indian Ocean.

P-8i: Program Timeline & Industrial Participants

P-8i concept, armed
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In November 2005, India’s $133 million deal for 2 P-3C Orion maritime-optimized patrol and surveillance planes fell through on grounds of expense, support costs, and timing. Apparently, it would have taken 18-24 months for the US Navy to retrofit the aircraft to the Indian Navy’s specifications, once the lease had been finalized.

In response, December 2005 featured an RFP that sought 8 aircraft, and threw the competition open. Bids were received from various candidates in April 2006, and initial schedules involved a signed contract by the end of 2007, and deliveries by the end of 2009. Of course, that didn’t happen. A July 2007 Defense News report said that an Indian procurement team would be sending preliminary evaluations to the Defence Ministry by September 2007, which would lead to a short list. A preliminary decision and price negotiations were scheduled to begin “within two years,” i.e. by mid-2009.

Experience has demonstrated that price negotiations with India’s MoD can take years themselves – or even sink deals entirely, vid. the various collapsed deals for second-hand Mirage 2000 fighter jets. In this case, however, the $2.1 billion deal for 8 jets was done by January 2009. By October 2010, India’s Navy was pushing to extend the buy, and enlarge its fleet of Boeing P-8 Poseidon aircraft to 12. Now, senior naval officials are openly talking about buying 24 jets.

First deliveries aren’t expected until 2013 at the earliest, and the jets are expected to enter service “before 2015.”

Confirmed weapons at this time include the Mk-54 lightweight torpedo, which can be enhanced with the HAAWC kit for high-altitude, GPS-guided drops. India has submitted a formal DSCA request for these torpedoes. For longer-range surface attacks, AGM-84 Harpoon Block II missiles are carried on external pylons. These sub-sonic cruise missiles can hit ships or land targets, thanks to a combination of GPS guidance, and improved radar resolution that can cut through near-shore clutter. Boeing reportedly has a license to export the longer-range AGM-84K SLAM-ER, which adds longer range and better land attack features, but India’s hasn’t formally requested them. Some pictures, like the one in this section, even show P-8Is carrying smart bombs. The P-8 is designed to be even more capable than its P-3 predecessor on overland surveillance missions, and adding weapons like GPS-guided bombs would give India a new capability for long-range, long-endurance surveillance and strike.

The P-8A has its own industrial team, and most of them will also be involved in the P-8i project. A number of electronic and sensor systems will differ, however, due to a combination of Indian insistence on indigenous content, and American security concerns that forced the use of alternatives. Industrial partners in India, or specific to India’s version, reportedly include:

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Contracts and Key Events

Deliveries begin
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May 15/13: #1 arrives. India inducts the 1st Boeing P-8i Neptune aircraft into their navy at the INS Rajali air station. Boeing says that it will deliver another 2 planes to India in 2013.

INS Rajali is the longest military runway in Asia, located just inland from Madras on India’s SE coast. It currently hosts India’s TU-142F fleet of long-range maritime patrol aircraft, and will be the P-8i’s future home. It also hosts the Indian Navy Helicopter Training School. Boeing | Times of India | Wall St. Journal India.

P-8i arrives in India

Jan 17/13: US DOT&E report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The P-8 is included, and the plane still has a lot of gaps and teething issues before it’s ready for service. The aircraft is working toward reliability goals, but its biggest problems lie with its sensors’ ability to work as advertised, and to work together. Fortunately, India’s P-8is have alternatives in some cases, like different SATCOM and the APS-143(v)3 OceanEye radar. That may help them ensure the technology works as advertised, but working together is a question of the P-8i’s current level of integration, which is unknown.

There are a couple of particular concerns for India. One is that the main fuel tank overheats in hot weather during grounding and low-level flight. This limits anti-submarine flight patterns, and has to be a “must fix” given India’s environment. The other concern involves faulty ESM systems for pinpointing radars and communications sources around the plane.

The P-8′s main radar is flagged for multiple problems by DOT&E, and India has to hope they will be fixed by the time its P-8is enter service. Wide-area submarine searches using the twin-sonobuoy multi-static active acoustic capability (MAC) approach will be a step up from the USA’s current IEER advanced sonobuoys, but their program delay still leaves adequate capability on board. India is likely to find that initial capabilities surpass their TU-142F and IL-38D fleets.

July 7/12: Testing. India’s first P-8i aircraft begin flight-testing in Seattle, and all test objectives are met in its initial flight. Boeing test pilots will continue the process at a US Navy test range west of Neah Bay, WA, and at a joint U.S./Canadian test range in the Strait of Georgia.

Boeing says that assembly is complete on the 2nd P-8I aircraft, and it will make its first flight in the coming weeks. They believe that they are on track to deliver the 1st P-8i to the Indian Navy in 2013. Boeing.

P-8i test flight
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Dec 5/11: 24? Indian Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma has told India Strategic magazine that the first 8 P-8is have been making satisfactory progress, that approval for the follow-on buy of 4 more is expected by the end of their fiscal year in March 2012, and that ultimately, India will want another 12 planes to bring their P-8i fleet to 24.

Dec 5/11: Bear’s back. Indian Tu-142ME maritime patrol aircraft, tail number 312, leaves Beriev Aircraft Company for its home base, following an overhaul and service life extension, and required flight testing. It’s 1 of 8 “Bear ASW” aircraft manufactured at Taganrog at the end of the 1980s for India, and Beriev still provides support and maintenance services through Rosoboronexport.

Beriev expects to continue the overhaul program until 2020, which implies that India’s TU-142s will serve for a while yet. JSC Beriev.

Sept 28/11: 1st flight. Initial flight for the P-8i, which takes off from Renton Field, WA and lands 2:31 later at Boeing Field in Seattle, WA. During the flight, Boeing test pilots performed airborne systems checks including engine accelerations and decelerations and autopilot flight modes, and took the P-8i to a maximum altitude of 41,000 feet. Boeing.

April 13/11: Industrial. IANS reports that Boeing has submitted a $300-million plan for investment in the Indian defense industry, covering 30% of the $1 billion (Rs.4,500 crore) that another 4 P-8i aircraft would cost. Boeing Military Aircraft president Christopher M. Chadwick, mentioned the draft offsets proposal, and told IANS that:

“The P8I order, which we won a few years ago, is on track and we are delivering the first of the eight P8Is in January 2013. The customer has informally talked about the potential for four more P8Is. That will take it (the order) to 12 (aircraft). That programme is on track, on cost and on schedule…”

Feb 11/11: SLAM? A Defense News report quotes Boeing’s P-8i program manager Leland Wright, who confirmed that Boeing has a license to export the AGM-84K Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) to India, but said that P-8is will initially carry 4 of the less capable Harpoon anti-ship missiles instead. On the other hand, the Harpoon is the standard anti-ship missile of the US Navy, and India’s Block II missiles will be more advanced than USN versions.

Feb 3/11: 12? Indian Navy PR officer Commander PVS Satish tells India’s Economic Times that the Navy has decided to exercise its option for 4 more P-8is, “in a bid to boost its maritime patrol capabilities as well as counter piracy threats and the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean.” The deal is expected to range between $1 billion to $1.5 billion, but government approvals to negotiate don’t mean a contract just yet.

No confirming announcement yet at Aero India 2011. Boeing India VP Dr. Vivek Lall confirmed that the Indian government is “considering” the option, and said Boeing has submitted its draft industrial offset program to the Indian MoD. domain-B | India’s Economic Times | StrategyPage.

Jan 20/11: MAD. CAE in Montreal, QB, Canada announces a subcontract from Boeing to provide its AN/ASQ-508A Advanced Integrated Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) System for India’s 8 P-8is. The value is cloaked by its presence within a scattershot set of announcements worth a total of “more than $140 million.”

MAD systems work by identifying magnetic variations or anomalies caused by large metal objects, such as a submarine, in the Earth’s magnetic field. CAE’s MAD system is already in use by a number of countries and platforms: P-3 Orion derivatives flown by Brazil, Canada, and South Korea; Turkey’s CN-235MP and ATR-72 MPAs; Chile’s C-295 MPAs; and Japan’s locally-developed XP-1 maritime patrol aircraft.

Dec 23/10: IFF. Defence PSU Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has delivered an Indian-designed Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interrogator to Boeing, for installation into India’s P-8i. Other Indian electronics eing provided for final integration include BEL’s Data Link II communications system, Avantel’s mobile satellite system, and the Electronic Corporation of India Ltd’s (ECIL) speech secrecy system. IANS via Thaindian | The Hindu.

Harpoon in flight
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Dec 21/10: Weapons. The US DSCA announces [PDF] India’s formal request for up to 21 AGM-84L Harpoon Block II Missiles, 5 ATM-84L Block II Training Missiles, Captive Air Training Missiles, containers, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and related U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost is up to $200 million, and this request is very explicit about their use:

“India intends to use the missiles on its Indian Navy P-8I Neptune maritime patrol aircraft which will provide enhanced capabilities in effective defense of critical sea lines of communication. India has already purchased HARPOON Block II missiles for integration on the Indian Air Force Jaguar aircraft and will have no difficulty absorbing these weapons into its armed forces.”

Note that the P-8i is known as the Poseidon in the USA – “Neptune” was the Roman name for the same Greek deity. The prime contractors will be The Boeing Company in St. Louis, MO, and Delex Systems Incorporated in Vienna, VA. Implementation of this proposed sale will require annual trips to India involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews, support, and oversight on for approximately 5 years. Details of a potential industrial offset agreement in connection with the proposed sale were not known when the DSCA made the announcement. See also Tehelka.

Harpoon missile request

Oct 4/10: Fleet plans, gaps. India’s navy wants to grow its P-8i fleet to 12 planes, by exercising a $1 billion option for 4 more. Indian sources are telling the media that the prices and offset agreements would be the same as the original $2.1 billion contract for 8 aircraft. The decision follows a recent visit by Indian defense minister Antony and Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma. The proposal will now be sent to India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for approval, and other steps also remain on the to do list. The Times of India:

“P-8Is are being customised to Indian naval requirements, with communication, electronic warfare and other systems being sourced from India. For instance, defence PSU Bharat Electronics is delivering Data Link-II, a communication system to enable rapid exchange of information among Indian warships, submarines aircraft and shore establishments, for the P-8Is to Boeing. There is, however, the question of India having not yet inked the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) being pushed by the US as ”a sensitive technology-enabler” for P-8I and other arms procurements.”

See: India Defence | Times of India | Zee News | China’s Xinhua.

July 20/10: Industrial. A new F/A-18E is delivered as the 1st US Navy Super Hornet featuring a gun bay door manufactured by India-based Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The gun bay door contract is the first military contract between Boeing and HAL, and stems from Boeing’s industrial participation commitment to India for the P-8i contract. Boeing.

Sept 17/10: Industrial. Dow Jones reports that Mahindra & Mahindra subsidiary Mahindra Aerospace Pvt. Ltd. has signed a deal to buy aircraft parts-making machinery from Boeing’s plant in Melbourne, Australia, for expected delivery by the end of 2010. The company hopes it will improve the quality of aircraft parts it produces, and boost orders placed under offset clauses. In addition to the P-8i deal, for instance, there have also been offset clauses in government airline orders, creating a lucrative (if rentier) market.

The Mahindra Group has become active in the aerospace sector, and reportedly plans to invest about $55 illion (INR 2.5 billion) in its aerospace business over the next few years. In 2009, they bought 75.1% stakes Australia’s Gippsland Aeronautics and Aerostaff Australia for almost $38 million. Mahindra Systech President Hemant Luthra waqs coy about this deal’s value, saying only that it’s “…a slightly complex deal and I wouldn’t want to get into a specific value.”

Sept 8/10: Industrial. India’s Economic Times reports that Maini Global Aerospace (MGA) has bagged an outsourcing contract worth up to $10 million to make structural components for the extended range fuel cells of the Boeing P-8A Poseidon multi-mission maritime (MMR) aircraft. These components would be common to the P-8A and P-8i.

July 18/10: Radars. Raytheon announces a contract from Boeing to develop an international version of the AN/APY-10 surveillance radar for India’s P-8i. It’s a private arrangement, and Raytheon’s director of strategy and business development, Neil K Peterson, tells DNA India that details of the contract are still being worked out. He adds that “The radar we will be giving to the Indian Navy’s planes will have more features than those with The US Navy.”

This is the first sale of the APY-10 beyond the USA. The challenge is to provide excellent performance, without including some of the American radar’s protected features. Raytheon describes the APY-10 as a “long-range, multimission, maritime and overland surveillance radar.” So far, Raytheon is under contract with Boeing to provide 6 AN/APY-10 systems and spares for the US Navy’s P-8A program, and has delivered 4. The firm says that it remains on or ahead of the production schedule. Raytheon | DNA India.

March 2/10: Avionics. BAE Systems announces that it will provide India’s P-8i with mission computer systems, and says it will begin deliveries to Boeing in 2011. BAE provides the same computers for the P-8A.

Feb 3/10: Radars. Flight International reports that Boeing plans to put an additional Raytheon radar on the aft section of India’s P-8is, and is exploring an air-to-air mode for the APY-10. India wanted air-to-air capability and a 360 degree radar, and the AN/APY-10 provides only 240 degree coverage from the P-8′s nose section.

P-8i concept
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Oct 2/09: Industrial. domain-b reports that Boeing has signed P-8i related agreements with several Indian public sector defense firms, as part of the P-8i’s offset commitments. See also Feb 2/09 entry. Boeing India chief Vivek Lall:

“We have signed agreements with Indian companies such as Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Electronic Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL) and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL)… They will be supplying indigenous equipment and spares such as transponders and other electronic equipment for the aircraft.”

Aug 8/09: TAA cleared. The Times of India reports that:

“The last hurdle for the execution of the biggest-ever defence deal with US, the $2.1 billion contract for eight Boeing P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft, has now been cleared.”

That hurdle is the technical assistance agreement (TAA) for the P-8i contract, which follows on the heels of a contentious July 2009 agreement with the USA defining End-Use Monitoring Agreements. With these agreements in place, all aspects of the P-8i contract are now set. See also: Express Buzz | Sindh Today | UPI Asia.

March 12/09: P-8 DCS OKed. In a notice to the US Congress, the State Department has said that it will license the direct commercial sale of P-8i aircraft to India, having factored in “political, military, economic, human rights and arms control considerations.” India’s domain-b.

While a direct commercial sale faces far fewer hurdles than a Foreign Military Sale, there are still some legal hurdles and agreements that must be present before the aircraft are delivered to the customer.

Feb 11/09: EUA. Reports surface that standard American provisions around “End Use Monitoring”, and information sharing restrictions that accompany American defense exports, are beginning to become a problem for the P-8i sale.

Feb 2/09: Industrial. The Wall Street Journal’s LiveMint reports that Boeing will buy aerospace structures and aviation electronics products worth at least INR 29.41 billion (about $600 million) from Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Dynamatic Technologies Ltd, HCL Technologies Ltd, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), Larsen and Toubro Ltd (L&T), Wipro Ltd, and simulator-maker CAE’s subsidiary Macmet Technologies Ltd.

Wipro, HCL, L&T and HAL declined to comment, but a Dynamatics executive confirmed that their firm had been chosen. A BEL executive said the firm had entered into an agreement with Boeing for communication equipment, radars, electronic warfare systems and contract manufacturing, but a contract was yet to be signed. Swati Rangachari, a spokeswoman for Boeing in India:

“Our team is working on the offset strategy and will be in touch with industry partners in a while… We will concentrate in the areas of avionics (aviation electronics) and aerostructures.”

Meanwhile, Flight International takes a deeper look at India’s nascent private aerospace industry, and its challenges, in “Can India’s aerospace manufacturers step up?”

Jan 5/09: Winner! The Indian government announces that it has signed a $2.1 billion deal with Boeing for 8 maritime patrol aircraft in “P-8i” configuration. The $2.1 billion figure is the commonly reported total at the moment; DID cautions readers that exact dollar figures for Indian contracts often take some time to clarify. The contract reportedly includes lifetime maintenance support, and an option for another 8 aircraft. Indian Navy spokesman Commander Nirad Sinha:

“Though we have signed a deal, final clearance is still required from a U.S. authority… The first plane delivery is four years from the final contract signing, so I think it should come in 2013.”

Boeing’s release commits to delivering the 8th aircraft by 2015. See: Boeing | India Defence | CNN Money.

Contract: 8 P-8i

Dec 29/08: P-8i? The P-8I deal for India appears to be moving closer. India Defence reports that “virtually all the steps” required for the contract to be signed, including tabling of it in the Cabinet Committee on Security for approval, are complete. Reports place the deal at Rs 8,500 crore (about $1.7 billion) for 8 jets, with first delivery coming within 4 years and all deliveries by 2015. India currently flies 8 Tu-142s. India Defence | StrategyPage.

Aug 10/08: P-8i? Sindh Today reports that India’s contract negotiating committee has completed its report on price negotiations with Boeing, after the P-8I won the technical bid and the trials of the product. Negotiations were reportedly stuck due to the end-user agreement, under which Boeing can conduct physical inspections of the aircraft as and when it wants to check if the product is being used for the purpose it has been acquired. This is linked to requirements under American ITAR laws, which regulate sales of military equipment whether they are conducted as FMS or direct commercial sales. India’s defence ministry reportedly separated that set of negotiations from the deal itself, knowing that a signed deal will be significantly harder to cancel, on either side.

The contract will reportedly be a direct commercial agreement between the Boeing company and the Indian Navy, rather than an announced Foreign Military Sale. The cost is reportedly around $2.2 billion, and that deal will now go to the defence acquisition committee (DAC) and then to the cabinet committee on security (CCS) for approval.

Aug 9/08: Future Force. During a lecture in New Delhi, Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta reportedly vowed that:

“By 2022, we plan to have 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants including submarines and close to 400 aircraft of different types. This will be a formidable three dimensional force with satellite surveillance and networking to provide force multiplication”

AP Pakistan | domain-B

April 20/08: USA? India’s NDTV reports that:

“India is set to sign a $2.2 billion deal, its biggest with the US, for eight long-range maritime reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft, even as the Indian Navy chief opposed ”intrusiveness” in the use of military hardware the country purchases.

Negotiations for the purchase of the Boeing-P8I LRMR aircraft are in the final stages and are likely to be wrapped up during Indian Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta’s visit to the US that began Sunday [DID: That did not happen]. The agreement for the purchase under the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route will be signed between the two governments in New Delhi later this year, official sources said.”

A319, Indian Air
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Sept 7/07: India’s IANS wire service reports that the Indian Navy has completed evaluations of maritime patrol aircraft (MRA) on schedule, including a 4-member navy team led by a one-star officer who observed MRA derivative trials and simulations in July 2007 for the Airbus A319 in Spain and Boeing’s P-8A Poseidon MMA in the US. WebIndia story.

They also offer a list of bids submitted: Boeing, EADS Airbus, IAI/Elta, Lockheed Martin, and Rosoboronexport; plus this interesting tidbit:

“But official sources said since the navy was more interested in the longer range MRAs still under development, it was “seriously considering” acquiring two or three of the existing shorter range aircraft as an interim measure to plug a vital operational void in patrolling India’s vast coastline.

July 3/07: Defense News reports that Indian officials will be studying Boeing and Airbus aircraft in France, Germany, Spain and the United States as they prepare for a decision re: their maritime patrol aircraft competition. Defense News.

Don’t get too excited about outcomes, though; India’s procurement system has already solicited bids, and will be sending preliminary evaluations go to the Defence Ministry by September 2007, which will lead to a short list of bidders. A preliminary decision and price negotiations will begin “within two years.” Past experience has demonstrated that such price negotiations can take years themselves – or even sink deals entirely.

May 14/07: Ill 38s? India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) warned in a report that the first 2 of 5 upgraded IL-38SDs remain without essential avionics and weapon systems that are “seriously limiting their [the Il-38SD's] operational capabilities.” The problem? As usual… “unrealistic assumption” about the capability of timely indigenous development of certain avionics systems, and lead-time for import of necessary weapon systems. India Defence | Times of India

April 20/06: Lockheed’s deal reportedly includes a combination offer: 8 upgraded US Navy P-3C aircraft for $550-700 million; and 16 multi-mission MH-60R helicopters from Sikorsky costing $350-400 million.

April 13/06: Team Boeing announces its proposal to develop and deliver 8 P-8I Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft variants, touting its commonality and supportability benefits. The Boeing team includes CFM, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and Smiths Aerospace, and their proposal includes the development of a unique Indian navy P-8 configuration, significant participation for Indian industry, test and certification activities, and 8 aircraft delivered over a 4-year period. See release – and note that Boeing just pledged to invest $1.5 billion in India’s aerospace industry, as part of a $6 billion deal with Air India.

Feb 14/06: Flight International reported that India’s navy has set a March 2007 deadline to receive bids for 16-24 more anti-submarine warfare helicopters; but the manufacturers that were handed the tender (AgustaWestland, Eurocopter, Kamov and Sikorsky) asked for an extension.

That program ended up taking far longer than the maritime patrol aircraft competition, but some MPA bidders looked to bundle the 2 together in a single solution. India eventually bought the P-8is as a “clean” acquisition.

Appendix A: The Competitors

According to Indian media reports, India’s 8-10 TU-142 Bear aircraft are being retired, after negotiations with Russia and Israel to retrofit them were called off. Invited bidders (and their relevant offerings) reportedly included:

• BAE (Nimrod)
  
• Boeing (P-8A MMA)
  
• IAI/Elta (Dassault Falcon 900 MPA)
  
• Lockheed Martin (P-3C Orion)
  
• Northrop-Grumman (Global Hawk, presumably)
  
• EADS (CN-235MP, AT3 Atlantique, ATR-72MP, modified A319)
  
• Rosoboronexport (IL-38 “May” and TU-142 “Bear”, both currently in service)

P-8A MMA
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India has shown interest in the Boeing 737-derived P-8A MMA. This P-3 Orion’s successor will feature long range, very advanced radars that will also be useful for ground surveillance and may have air-to-air uses; advanced electro-optics for day/night viewing, and an array of weapons and sensors that will include Harpoon anti-ship and land-attack missiles, torpedoes, sonobuoys, etc. All in a package that’s broadly compatible with existing global 737 commercial fleets.

The P-8A is not expected to be available before 2013-2014. Nevertheless, The Times of India’s sources in the Indian Navy believed that the P-8A would match the combined operational profile presently being executed by its existing fleet of Ilyushin Il-38 Mays and TU-142 Bears. Given the limited remaining lifetime of even the refurbished IL-38SDs, a long-term, long-range solution was attractive.

From the beginning, India has treated its potential involvement in the Boeing P-8 MMA program as a test of Washington’s long-term military and strategic commitment. Significant distrust remains in the wake of the USA’s 1988 embargo of military exports to India and Pakistan following underground nuclear tests – an embargo that was only lifted fully in September of 2004. While its timeline may pose problems, just having the P-8A offered and cleared for export has been the one of the biggest benefits India received from this RFP.T the Pentagon has also pledged to make additional technical military capabilities available to New Delhi as they enter US service.

In the end, Team Boeing submitted its proposal to develop and deliver 8 P-8I Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft variants, touting its commonality and supportability benefits (q.v. April 13/07 timeline entry). The proposal included the development of a unique Indian navy P-8 configuration, significant participation for Indian industry, test and certification activities, and 8 aircraft delivered over a 4-year period. Thanks to its combination of compatibility, range, technology, and the stability and future development guaranteed by US Navy orders, Boeing’s P-8i won.

TU-142M “Bear”

The TU-142 Bear is the current incumbent. It was originally built as the TU-95 heavy bomber in the pre-jet era, before going on to a very long and successful career as the Eastern Bloc’s most important and longest ranging maritime surveillance and attack aircraft. A TU-142 can fly from Mumbai (Bombay) to Johannesburg, South Africa and back – without refueling. Bharat-Rakshak reports that 8-10 Bears remain in service with the Indian Naval Air Arm. Supplied to India in 1987-1988, all of them have been refurbished at least once.

Bharat-Rakshak notes that proposals had been floated to Russian and Israeli firms to significantly upgrade the TU-142 with the Leninets Sea Dragon common patrol suite, as well as other electronic enhancements useful for surveillance and even electronic warfare. Proposed Sea Dragon upgrades were rejected on cost and performance grounds, which led to discussions concerning an Israeli IAI Elta surveillance and communications package based around the AN/M-2202A radar used in Spain’s P-3C upgrades. These upgrades may even have been installed on at least one aircraft.

IL-38 May
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Russia’s smaller IL-38 had 2 big advantages. One was its recent refurbishment, and use by the navy. The other was the likely timeline for long-range replacement aircraft from Boeing or Airbus. Russia’s IL-38 May is about the same vintage as the P-3C Orion. Only 3 aircraft remain in Indian service from the original set of 5, after 2 of the aircraft were lost in an airshow collision. Unlike the TU-142s, however, the status of their upgrades is clear. India Defence reports that the first of 3 improved Il-38SD maritime anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft has been delivered to the Indian Navy following Russian upgrades that cost about $35 million per plane. Another 4 similarly upgraded IL-38SDs were scheduled for delivery to the Indian Navy by early in 2007, bringing the fleet to 7 – but the upgrades themselves have had problems due to poor delivery from DRDO.

The IL-38 upgrade includes the Leninets Morskoy Zmei (Sea Dragon) digital common patrol suite, which is designed to detect and intercept surface vessels and submarines as well as detect mines and carry out surveillance. Like the Israeli M-2202A, the suite can also detect airborne targets, and it can be linked to the Russian Glonass GPS satellite navigation system. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation has supplied the new IL-38SD’s electronic intelligence system, electronic countermeasures station system, digital firing decoys and radio communication system. India also plans to mount the medium-range PJ-10 BrahMos supersonic cruise missile on this aircraft in the near future.

The age of refurbished airframes had to be a concern for a long-term buy like India’s LRMR competition, but IL-38SD may have become an “interim buy” option, if India’s preferred choice was delayed or unavailable for other reasons. Russia reportedly submitted proposals based on its TU-142 and IL-38, but they were not compelling enough. India’s existing fleets will retire, without new additions or refits.

Australian AP-3C
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Even though India’s MPA competition began with the cancellation of a P-3C Orion order, Lockheed Martin could not be counted out. Their bid reportedly included a combination offer: 8 upgraded US Navy P-3C aircraft for $550-700 million; and 16 multi-mission MH-60R helicopters from Sikorsky costing $350-400 million.

The P-3 platform is in service with 15 nations, and Lockheed-Martin still hoped to reach 16 by adding India. A February 2006 Press Trust of India report quoted Lockheed VP Richard Kirkland as saying their bid will offer “P-3C Orions which have completely been refurbished with new wing-spans and tails to serve almost a life time of 20 years… We are offering the Navy the choice of sensors and equipment to be placed onboard and the configuration it wants either for long-range maritime reconnaissance or anti-submarine mode.”

The previous P-3C contract had been canceled due to long delivery times, but Lockheed has been taking steps to shorten that process. It opened a plant to manufacture new wings for old P-3C aircraft, as a way of keeping fleets flying in their 15 customer nations. The refurbished aircraft are already being delivered to the US Navy and to international customers, along with new composite-wing spans and tails.

Kirkland believed that shorter delivery time would be an advantage for Lockheed this time around, and September 2007 reports added that the lead time for a long-range P-8A or Airbus 319 solution had led to a second look at the P-3C as an interim option. In the end, that option faded, and the P-3C/MH-60R offer did not win the competition.

Atlantique MPA
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EADS’ maritime patrol offerings include EADS-CASA’s CN-235MP Persuader in service with a number of countries, and the twin-turboprop AT3 Atlantique offered as part of the SECBAT consortium (EADS, Dassault Aviation of France, Alenia of Italy, and SABCA-SONACA of Belgium). While these are capable aircraft, their range and payload limitations may make them a dubious contender to replace the TU-142. Further up the range scale, maritime variants of their ATR 42 and ATR 72 short-haul passenger turboprops are produced for some customers, and EADS also refurbishes and maintains Spanish P-3C Orion aircraft.

In the end, however, EADS’ primary offering was “none of the above.” A July 2007 Defense News report suggested that rather than using any of these proven designs, EADS wa leveraging equipment from those efforts to propose a maritime patrol variant of the Airbus A319 passenger jet for this competition. The design was not expected to become operational before 2014, however, which means that EADS’ shorter-range options could have become relevant again if India’s Navy sought an interim buy as part of a package deal, or wanted to complement its forces with medium range aircraft from the same source.

Airbus and Boeing both made substantial investments in India, and both looked into partnering with Indian companies to jointly develop communications, data-link and identification friend-or-foe (IFF) equipment as part of their bids. An Indian order would launch the A319 MPA as a serious international contender, and help underwrite the cost of developing the aircraft at a time when projects like the A350 and A400M are squeezing Airbus’ cash and financing capacity. Unfortunately for Airbus, what it saw as opportunity, India saw as risk. The A319 was considered very seriously, but it did not win.

Falcon 900DX
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There were reports in April 2005 that India might be interested in a modified MPA based on Dassault’s high-end Falcon 900 business jet. Though the platform was absent from most subsequent coverage, the reports turned out to be true.

In September 2007, IANS reported that Israel Aerospace Industries and its subsidiary Elta Systems had submitted a proposal based on this jet, leveraging Elta systems extensive experience with naval radars and other surveillance systems, and IAI’s experience converting business jets into surveillance platforms. The tri-engine Falcon 900 may be a business jet, but it’s known as a VIP class offering with a lot of space and a long 4,100-4,500 nautical mile (7,600-8,330 km) unrefueled range.

The Falcon 900 is many things, but ‘cheap’ is not one of them. Bid prices could easily approach those of larger aircraft like the refurbished P-3Cs, which complicated IAI’s odds of being selected as an interim solution. On the other hand, Israel has deep relationships of its own in India, and IAI’s Heron and Searcher II UAVs could allow IAI to offer an integrated manned/ unmanned surveillance system that costs far less than higher-end options like the P-8A/BAMS, and offers proven aircraft/UAV integration that can be added to larger aircraft like the A319 or P-8A later on.

The biggest advantage of a solution based on a business jet would be operating costs. The biggest disadvantage is lack of space, which means fewer sensor and weapon options. In this case, the fact that India would be the team’s first customer also added substantial risk to the choice. India did not need an interim option, and saw Boeing’s P-8i as a more attractive option.

Listed, But Not Submitted

Some manufacturers were included in the tender, but did not submit a bid.

Nimrod MR2 via NATO
(click for MRA4 upgrades)

BAE Systems’ modernized Nimrod MRA4 program received consideration from the USA as a replacement option for its P-3C Orions, but pressures for standardization with the global civil air fleet and a desire for a “made in America” solution pushed them to adopt the 737-based P-8A instead. A British program was begun in 1996 to rebuild their existing Nimrod Mk2 fleet to the MRA4 standard with new wings, engines, internal systems, and mission systems. Unfortunately, that program faced a series of budget cuts, stalls, and conditions before getting a go-ahead for 12 aircraft in July 2006.

The entire program was questioned in Britain’s 2010 strategic review, and the program was ultimately scrapped with 1 aircraft fully ready and 4 of the remaining 8 being 90% ready. But knowing that would require clairvoyance, and refurbishing very old airframes, all of which are essentially custom built, was always a dubious option for India. In the end, the Nimrod was not even bid.

RQ-4: AWOL?
(click to view full)

Northrop-Grumman, which has held discussions with India around its E-2D Hawkeye 2000 carrier-capable AWACS aircraft, is also listed as one of the solicited companies by the India Defence report. The only asset they have which would fit the maritime surveillance category, however, is the RQ-4 Global Hawk High-Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE) UAV. The Global Hawk is slated for a Maritime Surveillance role with the USA and Australia; indeed, a “Pacific pool” approach similar to the NATO E-3 AWACS model, and involving The USA, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand, has been proposed.

It certainly has the range. A demonstration flight using a smaller RQ-4A Global Hawk took off from Adelaide, Australia and spent loiter time over Japan and Singapore before returning to Adelaide. While the Global Hawk lacks the payload capacity for sonobuoys, missiles, etc. possessed by all other contenders, the prospect of joining other friendly countries and sharing in the resulting intelligence data from all over the Pacific might still be very interesting. If pursued in combination with the P-8is, it would give India a combination similar to the US Navy’s P-8A/ RQ-4N BAMS. If pursued alone, it would sharply blunt India’s long-range offensive capabilities once the TU-142s were retired; but if this was seen as a bridge until the P-8A’s arrival, the intelligence benefits could make the proposal very attractive. Nevertheless, media reports did not list Northrop Grumman among the RFP respondents.

Additional Readings

• DID – India’s Mid-Tier Maritime Patrol Aircraft Competitions. Will complement the P-8is with shorter range planes, which will also carry fewer or no weapons.

• DID – P-8 Poseidon MMA: Long-Range Maritime Patrol, and More

• DID – An EUM Bellwether? India/US Arms Deals Faced Crunch Over Conditions. Agreement was reached on some matters in July 2009, but not on others.

• DID – Ships Ahoy! The Harpoon Missile Family

• Telephonics – Radar Systems. Including the AN/APS-143Cv3 used as the P-8i’s aft radar.

• DID – Kicking it Up a Notch: Poseidon’s Unmanned BAMS Companion. The RQ-4N Global Hawk variant.

• Asia Times (Sept 29/10) – Leaks in India’s submarine strategy. Mentions the P-8i, casts doubt on key technology transfers.

• DID (Sept 16/08) – India Floats Tender for New Maritime Helicopters

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts.

LCS: Concept & Needs

LCS-I missions
(click to view full)

Ultimately, the US Navy is trying to replace 30 FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, 14 MCM Avenger Class mine countermeasures vessels, and 12 MHC-51 Osprey Class coastal mine hunters (TL = 56), with about 55 Littoral Combat Ships.

The LCS requirement has been identified as part of a broader surface combatant force transformation strategy, which recognizes that many future threats are spawning in regions with shallow seas, where the ability to operate near-shore and even in rivers will be vital for mission success.

That requires the ability to counter growing “asymmetric” threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. It also requires intelligence gathering and scouting, some ground combat support capabilities, and the ability to act as a local command node, sharing tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units.

At the same time, however, the US Navy needs ships that can act as low-end gap-fillers in other traditional fleet roles, and operate in the presence of missile-armed enemy vessels and/or aerial threats.

Given the diversity of possible missions in the shallow-water and near-shore littoral zones, and the potential threats from forces on land, any ship designed for these tasks must be both versatile and stealthy. History also suggests that they need to be able to take a punch. Meanwhile, the reality of ships that are expected to remain in service for over 30 years gives rise to a need for electronic longevity. As the saga of the USA’s cost-effective but short-lived FFG-7 frigates proved, “future-proofing” and upgradeability for key systems, electronics, and weapons will be critical if these small surface combatants are to remain useful throughout their mechanical lives.

While a ship’s hull and design makes a number of its performance parameters difficult to change, the Americans believed they may have a solution that lets them upgrade sensors and key systems. Denmark’s Standard Flex 300 corvettes pioneered a revolutionary approach of swappable mission modules, based on ISO containers. In contrast to the traditional approach, which is to cram a wide-ranging set of bolted-in compromise equipment into fixed installations, “flex ships” can radically changes the ships’ capabilities, by swapping in a full breadth of equipment focused on a particular need.

Swappable modules also give the Navy new options over time. One option is technology-based, via spiral development that focuses on rapid insertions of new equipment. This creates a long series of slight improvements in the mission modules, and hence the ship’s capabilities. Over time, the cumulative effect can be very significant. The 2nd benefit is cost-related, since upgrades require far less work and cost to install when mission technologies evolve. The 3rd benefit is risk-related. The ability to do low-cost, spiral upgrades encourages frequent “refreshes” that remain within the existing state of the art, rather than periodic upgrade programs that must stretch what’s possible, in order to handle expected developments over the next 25 years.

LCS: Designs & Teams

There are currently 2 different LCS designs being produced and procured as part of the competition.

USS Independence
(click to view full)

The first team is offering a futuristic but practical high-speed trimaran, based on Austal designs and experience with vessels like the US Marines’ Westpac Express high-speed transport and the Army and Navy’s TSV/HSV ships. It offers an especially large flight deck (7,300 square feet) and internal mission volume (15,200 square feet mission bay) for its size, with a 3,500 square foot helicopter hangar. The hull is aluminum, but the trimaran design offers additional stability options, and may help with hits to the ship’s sides.

The Independence Class will carry a General Dynamics designed combat system, and standard LCS weapon fittings. The RAM defensive missile launcher sacrifices some size, but the 11-round SeaRAM is a self-contained unit with its own radar. If the LCS should require a full suite of naval weapons in future, export designs based on the this class tout “tactical-length” vertical launch cells that are limited to shorter weapons like RIM-162 ESSM and SM-2 air defense missiles, and VL-ASROC anti-submarine missiles.

Not anymore…

The initial teaming arrangement was led by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipbuilder as prime integrator, with Austal of Mobile, AL (a subsidiary of Austal Ships of Australia) as the main design partner and ship-building site. That alliance was broken by the requirements of the 2010 RFP, which demanded a 2nd builder for the designs that was unaffiliated with the first.

Austal is now the sole prime contractor for the LCS-2 Independence Class design. GD subsidiaries remain heavily involved, including General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products Division in Burlington, VT; General Dynamics Electric Boat Division in Groton, CT; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems in Fairfax, VA; and General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Ontario. Other key participants include:

• Boeing in Seattle, WA
  
• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD
  
• L3 Communications Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA
  
• Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD
  
• Maritime Applied Physics Corporation in Baltimore, MD
  
• GE (LM 2500 gas turbines)
  
• MTU (8000 Series diesel engines)
  
• Saab (Sea Giraffe AMB radar)
  
• Wartsila (water jets)

The ships will have an open-architecture combat system based on existing market offerings. Bofors (gun) and Ericcson (radar) are among the minor partners whose equipment will be featured on the Austal Team’s proposed design.

Team Lockheed Martin’s LCS-1 Freedom Class offers a proven high-speed semi-planing monohull, based on Fincantieri designs that have set trans-Atlantic speed records. The design will use the firm’s COMBATSS-21 combat system as the fighting electronic heart of the ship, has shock-hardened the engine systems, and uses a combination of a steel hull and aluminum superstructure. USS Freedom has required additional bolt-on buoyancy fittings at its stern, however, and there have been persistent reports of weight and stability issues.

Team Lockheed LCS Concept
(click for cutaway)

The ships have a smaller flight deck than the Independence Class at 5,200 square feet, but a larger 4,680 square foot helicopter hangar. The Freedom Class’ LCS mission bay is the biggest difference – it’s under half the size, at 6,500 square feet. On the other hand, its RAM missile launcher is the 21-round Mk.49, and if the ships need weapon upgrades, export designs stemming from the Freedom Class mount full strike-length Mk.41 vertical launch cells. These can handle any vertically-launched system in the fleet, including SM-3 long-range air defense missiles, and Tomahawk long-range precision attack missiles.

Lockheed’s core team includes various Lockheed divisions, plus naval architects Gibbs & Cox of Arlington, VA; shipbuilder Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA; and shipbuilder Marinette Marine of Marinette, WI. Niche providers and related partnerships include:

• Angle Incorporated
  
• Argon ST (threat detection systems)
  
• Blohm + Voss
  
• Data Links Solutions
  
• DRS Technologies
  
• EADS (TRS-3D radar)
  
• Fairbanks Morse (Colt-Pielstick PA6B-STC diesel engines)
  
• Fincantieri (diesel generators)
  
• Izar (now Navantia)
  
• L-3 Communications
  
• MAAG Gear AG
  
• MacTaggart Scott
  
• Raytheon
  
• Rolls Royce (MT30 gas turbines, shaftlines, bearings, software, Kamewa waterjets)
  
• Sensytech
  
• Sperry
  
• Terma
  
• Unidynamics
  
• United Defense, now BAE Systems

LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Packages…

LCS Flight 0 Basics
(click to view full)

At 115 – 127 meters in length and 2,800 – 3,100 tons of displacement, the USA’s competing LCS ship designs are almost the size of a Britain’s Type 23 frigates. They might well be classified as frigates, were it not for their shallow water design and employment. For whatever reason, high speed has also been identified as an important ship characteristic. As such, both the GD/Austal trimaran and Lockheed’s racing-derived monohull offer potential top speeds of 40-50 knots over short distances.

No matter which mission modules are loaded, the ship will carry a BAE Systems Mk.110 57mm naval gun with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute, and Mk.295 ammunition that works against aerial, surface or ground threats. The ship will also carry .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine guns, plus defensive systems including automated chaff/flare dispensers and a launcher for Raytheon’s RIM-116 RAM Rolling Airframe Missile. RAM is designed to handle anti-ship missiles, aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, and even small boats, but its range of just 9 km/ 5 nm will only protect its own ship. Unlike larger missiles such as the RIM-162 ESSM, RAM systems cannot perform fleet defense.

LCS ships will also rely on their onboard MH-60 helicopters and/or MQ-8B Fire Scout helicopter UAVs, plus other robotic vehicles including a variety of Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV). The terms have changed over time, but the US Navy has downgraded the term “mission modules” to mean individual components plus their support equipment. Integrated packages of weapons, sensors, robotic vehicles, and manned platforms that can be switched in and out depending on the ship’s mission are now called “mission packages.” They include all task-related mission modules, onboard aircraft, and their corresponding crew detachments.

The ships’ first and most important mission package is not officially listed. It consists of a small but very cross-trained crew. LCSs were intended to operate with a core crew of 40 sailors, plus a mission module detachment of 15 and an aviation detachment of 25. Each ship has a pair of 40-person crews (Blue and Gold), which will shift to 3 crews over time that can deploy in 4-month rotations.

There are concerns that this is a design weakness, leaving the LCS crew at the edge of its capabilities to just run the ship, with insufficient on-board maintenance capabilities, and too little left over for contingencies such as boarding and search, damage control, illnesses, etc. USS Freedom’s addition of 20 more bunks before her 1st Asian deployment indicates that the Us Navy may be about to concede this point – but to do that, the LCS manning plan must also change.

Beyond the human element, the LCS program will initially draw upon packages for Mine Warfare (MIW: 24 planned), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW: 16 planned) and Surface Warfare (SUW: 24 planned). The LCS Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) packages a variety of technologies to these ends, many of which are produced by other program offices and delivered as elements of a particular mission module. Costs per module have gone down over time, but that hasn’t been from any genius in planning and fielding. Rather, it results from a high program failure rate of individual components, and their replacement in the program by less expensive items.

LCS: Controversies & Cautions

Into battle
(click to view full)

The cost and size of LCS ships are now comparable to other countries’ high-end naval frigates. As the US Navy’s primary low-end vessels in the future fleet, they will be expected to perform many of the same roles. The cargo hold’s size has created some challenges in fitting all of the required equipment into the mission modules, without compromising high-end performance at the modules’ particular tasks. Even so, LCS ships can be expected to perform the mine countermeasures role very well, and the frigates’ traditional anti-submarine role reasonably well, thanks to their helicopters, array of robots, and rapidly upgradeable systems.

Other traditional roles for frigate-sized vessels are more controversial. The biggest controversy surrounds the ships’ one area of severe inflexibility: their weapons fit.

Present LCS designs don’t even carry torpedo tubes, or vertical-launch systems (VLS) that could accommodate present and future attack and/or defensive missiles. Even with the Surface Warfare module installed, LCS ships will carry a very light armament set for a major naval vessel: a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system; RIM-116 SeaRAM short range defensive missiles; 30mm cannons that would replace very short range Griffin launchers if installed; 12.7mm machine guns; plus any missiles or 70mm rockets carried by its accompanying helicopters (up to 2 H-60 slots or up to 4 MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV slots).

That armament is closer to a support vessel than a naval surface combatant, and larger high-speed support designs like the JHSV would offer far more mission module space for reconfigurable specialty support ships. Naval analyst Raymond Pritchett has pithily described the current compromise as:

“…3000 ton speedboat chasers with the endurance of a Swedish corvette, the weapon payload of a German logistics ship, and the cargo hold of a small North Korean arms smuggler.”

LCS-I components
(click to view full)

The LCS weapons array also compares unfavorably with comparable-sized frigates that can perform the full array of anti-submarine, fleet air defense, and naval combat roles. The new Franco-Italian FREMM Class, or even Britain’s much older Type 23/Duke Class, outclass it considerably. So do smaller corvettes like Israel’s US-built, $260 million Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class, and Sweden’s ultra-stealthy Visby Class. Even the tiny Danish Flyvefisken Class, whose swappable “flex ship” modules helped pave the way for the LCS idea, has a Mk 48 vertical launch system that can handle longer-range air defense missiles, and mounts launchers for Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

LCS’ lack of weaponry may not matter against small boats like the “Boghammers,” fielded by the Iranians during their late-1980s guerrilla warfare at sea against the US Navy in the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, many nations field larger Fast Attack Craft equipped with anti-ship missiles. Despite being 1/3 the LCS’ length and far less than 1/3 of its displacement, their employment would create a threat that could attack an LCS from beyond its range of reasonable retaliation, with weapons that the LCS’ may not be able to stop or survive.

It’s telling that brochures for the International LCS versions offered by each team feature a major radar capability boost via the small SPY-1F AEGIS system or other radar upgrade, and are armed with torpedo tubes, anti-ship missiles and vertical-launch system (VLS) cells.

USS Stark, 1987
(click to view full)

Meanwhile, survivability has become an issue on 3 fronts. One is the slim margins created by a very small crew, leaving little margin for tasks like damage control if automated systems are damaged or fail. The other issues involve questions of shock/survivability testing, and of aluminum structures. The original concept for LCS was a ship whose damage resistance could save the crew, but not the ship, in the event if a significant strike. That was upgraded slightly to potentially saving the crew and the ship, but not continuing to fight while doing so. As the Exocet missile strikes on the HMS Sheffield (sank) and USS Stark (survived, barely) proved, even steel warships designed to keep fighting after a strike may find it challenging to meet their design specifications. Navy revelations that the LCS ships would not meet even Level I standards, let alone the OPNAVINST 9070.1 Level II standard of the frigates they’ll replace, has caused some consternation.

So, too, has the use of aluminum in ships exposed to hostile fire. The LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure, while the LCS-2 Independence Class is primarily an aluminum design. While both ships have had to certify to the same fire-proofing standards asked of other ships, aluminum conducts heat very well, and melts or deforms easily. If the ancillary fire-fighting systems, resistant coatings, etc. fail, or cannot handle a given situation at sea, structural integrity problems and secondary fires could become fatal concerns very quickly.

The emerging scenario in the USA is a cost for the base ships that continues to hover around $400-500 million each, plus weapons, electronics, and mission modules that bring the price per equipped ship to $500-650 million, even under the proposed new fixed-price contract. That’s no longer a cheap $220 million corvette class price tag. Instead, it’s a price tag that places the USA’s LCS at the mid-to-upper end of the international market for full multi-role frigate designs. Even as future procurement trends will make LCS ships the most common form of US naval power.

In that environment, unfavorable comparisons are inevitable. A versatile surveillance and special forces insertion ship whose flexibility doesn’t extend to the light armament that is its weakest point, and isn’t able to deal with anything beyond token naval or air opposition, won’t meet expectations. Worse, it could cause the collapse of the Navy’s envisaged “high-low” force structure if the DDG-1000 destroyers and CG (X) cruisers are priced out of the water, and built in small numbers. That domino has already fallen, as DDG-1000/ DD (X), production has been capped at just 3 ships, and CG (X) was canceled entirely in the FY 2011 budget. As Vice-Admiral Mustin (ret.) and Vice-Admiral Katz (ret.) put it in a 2003 USNI Proceedings article:

“Because the Navy has invested heavily in land-attack capabilities such as the Advanced Gun System and land-attack missiles in DD (X), there is no requirement for [the Littoral Combat Ship] to have this capability. Similarly, LCS does not require an antiair capability beyond self-defense because DD (X) and CG (X) will provide area air defense. Thus, if either DD (X) or CG (X) does not occur in the numbers required and on time, the Navy will face two options: leave LCS as is, and accept the risk inherent in employment of this ship in a threat environment beyond what it can handle (which is what it did with the FFG-7); or “grow” LCS to give it the necessary capabilities that originally were intended to reside off board in DD (X) and CG (X). Neither option is acceptable.”

Especially if the low end has grown to a cost level that makes it equivalent to other countries’ major surface combatants, while falling short on key capabilities that will be required in the absence of higher-end ships.

The LCS Program

In 2009, the CBO estimated LCS shipbuilding costs at around $30.2 billion, with a fleet average of 1.2 mission modules per ship bought separately at about $100 million per module. This contrasts with the original hope of $22 billion total shipbuilding costs, at $400 million per ship ($220M construction + (3 x $60M) mission modules).

Despite these rising costs, the US Navy’s shipbuilding plan still envisions building 55 littoral combat ships until about 2040, accounting for about 18% of the Navy’s planned 313-ship force. The current plan also expects to buy 64 mission modules for the 55-ship program, or about 1.2 modules per ship, down from the originally-envisaged 3-4 modules per ship.

Technically, only 45 LCS ships would count toward Navy fleet totals. Because these ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the 10 ships bought from 2036 – 2040 would be replacements for the original ships of class. Even so, that number of LCS ships would almost certainly be more than 18% of the actual force. The US Navy has already sagged to under 300 ships, and unless major changes in course lie ahead for its budget or its chosen designs, it will not rise above that number again.

In July 2011, the Navy created PEO LCS to oversee the program, headed by Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch. Ship construction supervision was removed from PEO Ships, while mission module supervision was removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which was dissolved. It wasn’t the first big change in the program – and may not be the last.

It’s normal for programs to change elements like numbers ordered, but not to change the entire buy strategy. The Littoral Combat Ship program has shifted its entire buy strategy several times during its short lifetime – a sorry sequence of orders, budgets not spent, contract cancellations, etc. documented in Appendix A.

The last buy strategy has lasted long enough for a multi-ship contract. After buying 4 ships and taking bids under their 2009 revised strategy, the US Navy went to Congress and asked for permission to accept both 10-ship bids, buying 20 more ships for an advertised price that was about the same as the estimates for the 15 they had wanted. The GAO and CBO both have doubts about those estimates, in part because the Navy is still changing the designs; but the contracts were issued at the end of December 2010. Each contractor would get 1 initial ship order, then 9 more options, with the ship purchases spread across FY 2010-2011 (1 per year for each contractor); FY 2012-2015 inclusive (2 per year for each contractor). Cost overruns will be shared 50/50 between the government and contractor, up to a set cost cap.

By the end of FY 2013, the program is expected to be at about a quarter of total procurement, in units orders and dollars spent.

LCS: Ship Roster

Team Lockheed, Freedom Class

• LCS 1, USS Freedom. Commissioned Nov 8/08.
  
• LCS 3, USS Fort Worth. Commissioned Sept 22/12.
  
• LCS 5, Milwaukee
  
• LCS 7, Detroit
  
• LCS 9, Little Rock
  
• LCS 11, Sioux City
  
• LCS 13, Wichita

Team Austal, Independence Class

• LCS 2, USS Independence. Commissioned Jan 16/10.
  
• LCS 4, Coronado. Going to be a bit late.
  
• LCS 6, Jackson
  
• LCS 8, Montgomery
  
• LCS 10, Gabrielle Giffords
  
• LCS 12, Omaha
  
• LCS 14, Machester

LCS: Export Potential

MMCS
(click to view full)

Once one steps beyond small patrol craft, growing capabilities have made frigate-sized vessels the most common naval export around the globe. With many nations confronting challenges in the world’s littorals, which include the globe’s most important shipping choke points, one would expect some interest in the Littoral Combat Ship beyond the USA. A Dec 11/06 Austal release claimed 26 potential buyers worldwide for the ship and its companion equipment, “with two near-term contenders and four others that have expressed active interest.”

There are 2 interesting aspects to LCS export bids. One is their equipment, which is radically different from the US Navy’s set.

Lockheed Martin’s international Multi-Mission Combat Ship (MMCS) version, which attracted some interest from Israel before cost issues intervened, has a variety of configurations from OPV/corvette to large frigate size. In addition to their upgraded radars, torpedo tubes, and 8 Harpoon missiles, these ships offer between 4-48 VLS cells, some of which are full strike-length size.

General Dynamics’ trimaran adds torpedo tubes, plus 16 tactical-length vertical launch (VLS) cells for VL-ASROC anti-submarine launchers or up to 64 quad-packed RIM-162 ESSM anti-air missiles.

Turkish MEKO 200
(click to view full)

The other aspect worth noting is the failure to close any export sales over almost 7 years.

Israel did step up in July 2008, and confirmed its request for an LCS-I based on Team Lockheed’s design. Israel’s variant was very different from LCS 1 Freedom, however; it featured a fixed set of weaponry rather than full mission module spaces, and its weapons and proposed SPY-1 AEGIS or MF-STAR radar made it far more capable in critical roles like air defense and ship to ship warfare. As noted above, these changes have been a common theme among international LCS offerings, but an estimated ship cost of over $700 million eventually pushed Israel to rethink its plans. That country is now pursuing cheaper options based on Blohm + Voss’ MEKO family of corvettes and frigates, or South Korean designs.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has reportedly expressed interest in a fixed armament version of the General Dynamics/Austal design. That interest was reiterated in 2010, but they’re also evaluating Lockheed Martin’s design for the Arabian/Persian Gulf fleet. In 2011, it emerged that the Saudis might skip an LCS buy altogether, in exchange for a much more heavily-armed, versatile, and expensive option: the USA’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class multi-role destroyers, with ballistic missile defense capability.

At present, both LCS designs have reportedly received preliminary export inquiries, but Israel and Thailand are the only cases where it has gone farther than that, and the Freedom Class lost the Thai competition. Meanwhile, designs like the German MEKO family, the multi-role Franco-Italian FREMM, the modular-construction Dutch Sigma class, and refurbished 1980s-era NATO frigates continue to find buyers around the world.

LCS: Ship Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

To Singapore
click for video

May 7/13: USN Report. Bloomberg gets its hands on a March 9/12 confidential draft report prepared for CNO Adm. Greenert by Rear Adm. Samuel Perez. This document is separate from USN Commander of Surface Forces Vice-Adm. Copeman’s “Vision for a 2025 Surface Fleet”, which recommended a full set of weapon for LCS (q.v. March 18/13 entry). Perez’ report is broader, but his conclusions are similar: serious gaps between ship capabilities and the missions the Navy will need LCS to execute. Key areas of concern include:

Manning: “The minimal-manning level and subsequent fatigue result in significant operational and safety impacts, with notable degradation of crew readiness, performance levels and quality of life.” USS Freedom has since added 20 more berthings for its initial deployment, bringing total crew to 100 (40 core + 25 aviation + 15 mission package + 20).

Armament: Perez shares Copeman’s reservations about the LCS’ armament, and points out that Iran alone has 67 Fast Attack Craft that carry anti-ship missiles with a range of over 5 miles. Any one of them can strike LCS ships without direct retaliation, and deliver disabling hits.

CONOPS: He also cites the lack of a clear LCS concept of operations, and notes that getting all of the right people and equipment on station to swap a mission module can take several weeks, instead of the advertised 96 hours. As a result, the concept “no longer has the tactical utility envisioned by the original designers.”

Navigation: Finally, Perez points out that the Independence Class trimaran’s width “may be a navigational challenge in narrow waterways and tight harbors,” though Bloomberg’s account doesn’t quantify that in any way.

The disturbing thing about these reports isn’t their conclusions. It’s the fact that these conclusions have been obvious for years, and have been pointed out for years, while US Navy leadership pretended that everything was fine. That’s still the Navy’s M.O., and CNO Greenert dismissed questions by saying that “study is over a year old – we’ve done a lot since then”. Which doesn’t address what they’ve done to change the conclusions of the study. In a number of critical areas, the answer is “nothing” or “not much.” Bloomberg.

Perez Report

April 25/13: Support. CACI Technologies Inc. in Chantilly, VA receives a $20.1 million contract modification for professional support services in support of PEO LCS (Program Executive Office Littoral Combat Ships). They’ll help with program management and acquisition support, technical and engineering support, business and financial management support, and logistics support.

Work will be performed in Washington DC (89.9%); Norfolk, VA (4.2%); San Diego, CA (2.2%); Panama City, FL (1.8%); Newport, RI (1.3%); and Monterey, CA (0.6%), and is expected to be complete by October 2013. Just $362,308 are being committed immediately, and $181,334 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-13-C-6322).

April 15/13: General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.6 million contract modification, exercising Independence Class Design Services for LCS 6 and following ships. Work includes baseline design services, class documentation services, class engineering studies, cost estimating support, LCS ship transition, and a liaison role for ship construction and post delivery.

Work will be performed in Bath, Maine (52%); Pittsfield, MA (47%); and Mobile, AL (1%), and is expected to be complete by June 2014. It’s completely funded by the FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion budget (N00024-09-C-2302).

April 12/13: Naming. 2 LCS ships are among the 7 named by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, who actually stuck to class naming conventions this time instead of veering into political partisanship.

The Freedom Class LCS 13 Wichita is named in honor of Kansas’ largest city, while the Independence Class LCS 14 Manchester is named for one of New Hampshire’s industrial centers. Pentagon.

April 8/13: Arming LCS. Austal VP Craig Hooper says it’s quite possible to arm the LCS-2 Independence Class with effective anti-ship weapons and vertical launch cells, which isn’t exactly a surprise since that has been in Austal brochures:

“You want Harpoon? I can give you eight to 16. You want VLS, 75mm gun? OK we can do it…. but is that the right path? If we hand over all the available margin on LCS to legacy weapons… do we risk losing the opportunity to exploit the changes that are coming in the war at sea?”

As with all things, there is a balance point. It isn’t at all obvious why a quad Harpoon launcher topside, or a 76mm gun with the ability to launch long-range shells, or an 8-cell VLS, precludes mission module space in a class with a lot of it. USN Director of Surface Warfare Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden doesn’t see an armament problem at all, saying “I’m the keeper of the keys for requirements. And I am here to tell you that LCS meets the requirements.”

A more thoughtful response comes from Bryan McGrath at ID, who notes that the last US Navy surface ship built to fire anti-ship missiles was USS Porter [DDG 78], the last Arleigh Burke Flight I destroyer. Every Flight II/IIA destroyer all the way up to DDG 116 has omitted those launchers, and every FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigate in USN service has removed theirs. Meanwhile, fleets like China’s have invested heavily in anti-ship missiles that work at longer and longer ranges, and routinely carry them even on corvettes. As DDG-51 Flight I destroyers have to retire due to age, the problem will just get worse, and LCS is a contributor to the “out-sticked” problem rather than a solution. Military.com | Information Dissemination.

April 5/13: Review? Military.com reports that US Navy leaders plan to discuss the LCS and its fit in the future fleet at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space Symposium on April 8th. Word is that they’re considering a program review.

April 1/13: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin Mission System and Training in Baltimore, MD receives a $17 million cost-plus-award-fee order for USS Fort Worth’s post-shakedown work, including renewed post-repair trials. The ship was commissioned on Sept 22/12. This is in addition to the $12.7 million contract for post-shakedown planning (q.v. Oct 25/12).

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. The full amount is committed immediately, using FY 2006, 2012, and 2013 Shipbuilding and Conversion funding. The USN Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME manages the contract (N00024-12-G-2317).

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. GAO designates 16/19 critical LCS technologies as mature, and the 3 omissions are either minor differences (Freedom Class retrieval system) or unsatisfiable any time soon. If a 30-year ABS certification doesn’t satisfy the 20 year operational hull life requirement for “maturity,” the only solution seems to be “wait 20 years.” Ask us again in 2032.

For the Freedom Class, GAO says that the cracking problem “occurred either in high stress areas or were due to poor workmanship.” They’ve been repaired. The ship has also had corrosion problems in the mission zone due to a poor stern door seal, and class design changes were made in response to both issues. They do seem to be finding quite a few issues in this design (q.v. entries), but LCS 5 & 7 accomplished production readiness and integrated baseline reviews. LCS 5 is listed as 53% complete, and LCS 7 is listed as 37% complete.

For the Independence Class, “will now [add] a corrosion protection system similar to [the Freedom Class] to mitigate the corrosion and will backfit it on existing hulls.” That’s an unusual item to casually omit from 1 LCS class, but OK. LCS 4 has experienced construction delays to summer 2013, but the program office says that these issues are resolved now. LCS 6 & 8 accomplished production readiness and integrated baseline reviews: LCS 6 is listed as 49% complete, and LCS 8 is listed as 24% complete.

In October 2012, the Navy rescinded their requirement to conduct a Milestone C/ Low Rate Production LCS review. That means there will be 24 ships under contract before there’s a systematic review to support a production decision, in FY 2019.

March 29/13: YGBKM. There’s a lot poor reporting out there on defense issues, and we don’t always call it out, but sometimes the standards are so poor that it’s necessary. Former ballet dancer Allison Barrie’s FOX News “reporting” on LCS’ Pacific arrival is in that category. Where to begin? MH-60 helicopters can’t carry heavyweight torpedoes, or key mine clearance equipment. The mine warfare module touted in the article isn’t ready, and the surface warfare mission module is only effective against motorboats. And what does “Should a battle erupt, Freedom can act as a hub to tie together sea, air and land assets” even mean?

The article paints a picture of a ship that can perform a number of specialized missions at a high level, right now – and almost none of it is true. A dash of skepticism and about 15 minutes of Google searching would have revealed the many and serious holes in this piece, especially given recent coverage in several major media outlets. Unfortunately, no-one at FOX seems to have put in the time or oversight. Falling below even the New York Times’ standards on defense issues should be a source of shame. FOX News | “Someone Help Allison Please“.

March 19/13: 30mm Mk46s. General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. in Woodbridge, VA receives a $25.7 million contract option for eight 30mm MK46 MOD 2 gun turrets, including associated spares and shore based parts. It covers 2 gun weapon systems for the LPD 17 class, and 6 more to equip LCS 5, 6, and 7. The guns are part of the “surface warfare” mission package.

Work will be performed in Woodbridge, VA (43%); Tallahassee, FL (20%); Lima, OH (14%); Westminster, MD (11%); Sterling Heights, MI (10%); Scranton, PA (2%), and is expected to be completed by November 2014. All funding is committed immediately (N00024-10-C-5438).

March 15/13: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD received a $32.8 million contract modification for Freedom Class service efforts and special studies, analyses and reviews. “Lockheed Martin will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

All funds will come from US Navy FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion, and are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (32%); Marinette, WI (27%); Moorestown, N.J. (22%), and Washington, DC (19%), and is expected to be complete by March 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-2300).

March 15/13: Support. Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL received a $20 million contract modification for Independence Class Class service efforts and special studies, analyses and reviews. “Austal USA… will assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

All funds will come from US Navy FY 2012 Shipbuilding and Conversion, and are committed immediately. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (72%) and Pittsfield, MA (28%), and is expected to complete by March 2014. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-11-C-2301).

March 4/13: LCS 4. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.3 million contract modification, exercising an option for post-delivery support of LCS 4, the Independence Class ship USS Coronado. Bath Iron Works will perform the planning and implementation of deferred design changes identified during the construction period, which are necessary to support Coronado’s sail-away and follow-on post-delivery test and trials.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (76%); Bath, ME (18%); and Pittsfield, MA (6%), and is expected to be complete by February 2014. The full amounts are committed immediately, using FY 2009 Shipbuilding and Conversion funds (N00024-09-C-2302).

Feb 21/12: New waterjets. Rolls-Royce delivers its new Axial Mk1 waterjet for use on the Freedom Class, offering 22MW of power per jet. Each Freedom Class ship has 4. This marks the successful completion of the Office of Naval Research’s (ONR) Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) program for “Compact, High Power Density Waterjets,” and the Axial Mk1s will be standard equipment on the Freedom Class going forward.

They’ll be made in the United States, with primary manufacturing activity at Rolls-Royce facilities in Walpole, MA and Pascagoula, MS. Rolls Royce.

Feb 8/13: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $6.9 million cost-plus award fee contract modification. They’ll provide engineering, management, advance planning and design work to support post shakedown work on LCS 2, the first-of-class USS Independence. Efforts will include program management, advance planning, engineering, design, material kitting, liaison and scheduling (see also May 21/12′s $7 million entry).

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (90%) and Pittsfield, MA (10%), and is expected to be complete by April 2013. All funds are committed, using FY 2013 RDT&E funding. The US Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME manages this contract (N00024-09-G-2301).

Jan 30/13: Thai competition. IHS Jane’s reports that Thailand is talking about buying 3 Chinese Type 054 Jiangkai-II frigates from Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, plus technology transfer to enable maintenance, repair, and overhaul and to locally produce unspecified components under licence. Thailand already operates some Chinese-built ships, and its 2 Nareusan Class frigates boast the very unusual feature of having American & European systems and weapons on board.

They see the Chinese ships as an option that could fit their total $1 billion budget, but Lockheed Martin has comnfirmed that they’re competing, too, with a variant of the Freedom Class LCS. Further competition can be expected from European manufacturers like TKMS (MEKO), Damen Schelde (SIGMA), and possibly DCNS (Gowind); and South Korea (FFX Incheon Class) adds a new international option in this category.

Jan 22/13: Industrial. Austal announces a strategic partnership with Sembcorp Marine subsidiary Sembawang Shipyard Pte. Ltd., in Singapore. “Austal and Sembawang Shipyard will together provide rapid, high quality support specifically tailored to the US Navy’s fleet of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV), both of which are expected to operate in the region.”

True, though the first example will be a Lockheed Martin ship.

Jan 10/13: Program update. Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden offers an update covering the LCS program and its mission modules.

USS Freedom is preparing for her Asian deployment, and LCS 3 USS Fort Worth is preparing to undergo a Post Delivery Test and Trials period. USS Independence is testing the Mine Counter-Measure module, and LCS 4 Coronado is under construction and slated for summer 2013 delivery.

On the mission module front, they’re now referred to as “mission packages.” The vestigal Surface Warfare MP is scheduled for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in FY 2014. USS Independence [LCS 2] has demonstrated successful launch and recovery of offboard vehicles for the Mine Counter Measures MP, which is also slated for IOC in 2014. The ASW MP is working on “[i]ntegration of the launch and recovery system into the hull, and won’t reach IOC until FY 2016. USN’s Navy Live blog.

Jan 10/13: PEO support. CACI Technologies Inc. in Chantilly, VA receives a $20.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to support PEO Littoral Combat Ships. All funds are committed immediately, but $4.4 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13.

Work will be performed in Washington ,DC (89.9%); Norfolk, VA (4.2%); San Diego, CA (2.2%); Panama City, FL (1.8%); Newport, RI (1.3%); and Monterey, CA (0.6%), and is expected to be complete by April 2013. This contract was not competitively procured, per the sole-source allowances in 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented in FAR 6.302-1 (N00024-13-C-6322).

Dec 26/12: LCS 1 fixes. Aviation Week reports that the US Navy has made a number of fixes to problems identified in their May report (q.v. April 23/12 entry), after vehemently denying that accounts of those problems were true.

Fixes include augmentation of the ship’s anti-corrosion system, complete repainting of the main machinery room and piping that had not been previously painted, non-destructive testing of piping that was then reviewed by the the American Bureau of Shipping, and changes to weld procedures and Non-Destructive Testing procedures on LCS-3 and subsequent Freedom Class ships. Fixes to the RIX air compressors don’t appear to have been effective, based on “ship sources.” They may be replaced with Sauer products. Program officials also supposedly redesigned the Isotta Fraschini ship’s service diesel engines (SSDGs) that have been causing power problems – but subsequent events indicate that it hasn’t fixed the problems. Maybe Finmeccanica shouldn’t have been given such carte blanche by Lockheed Martin to specify its own products.

Dec 26/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives $13.5 million for planning yard services to support LCS-2 and LCS-4, the first Independence Class ships. Services will include: vendor training and crew familiarization; in-service engineering support; trainer support; availability maintenance advanced planning; long lead time material planning and procurement; material warehousing; logistics product updates; and the class sustainment management.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME, and is expected to be complete by September 2013. $9.4 million is committed immediately, and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year on Sept 30/13 (N00024-12-G-4330).

Dec 20/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD receives a $12.1 million contract modification, exercising an option for Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship core class services. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (36%), Hampton, VA (30%), Washington, DC (23%), and Marinette, WI (11%), and is expected to be complete by December 2013 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Dec 20/12: Support. Austal USA LLC in Mobile, AL receives an $8.1 million contract modification, exercising an option for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) core class services. They’ll assess engineering and production challenges, and evaluate the cost and schedule risks of affordability changes to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs. All contract funds are committed immediately.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (51%) and Pittsfield, MA (49%), and is expected to be complete by December 2013 (N00024-11-C-2301).

Oct 25/12: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Baltimore, MD receives a $12.7 million cost-plus-award-fee order to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design to support of LCS-3 Forth Worth’s post-shakedown availability.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. The USN supervisor of shipbuilding, conversion, and repair in Bath, ME manages the contract (N00024-12-G-2317).

Oct 5/12: Controversy. USMC Lt. Col. John Sayen pens an LCS article for TIME’s Battleland that minces few words, while comparing LCS to specific foreign ship classes:

“The Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is not only staggeringly overpriced and chronically unreliable but – even if it were to work perfectly – cannot match the combat power of similar sized foreign warships costing only a fraction as much…. About the only threat the LCS might handle is the “swarms” of Iranian machinegun and RPG-carrying speedboats in the Persian Gulf…. When asked why the LCS has sacrificed so much for speed, Navy spokesmen tend to become vague.”

The US Navy fires back in short order, saying that:

“…the LCS was never designed to protect other ships or to support troops ashore. That’s not its job. Its job is to protect the sea base and high value naval units from swarming boats, hunt down and sink diesel submarines, and clear mines in littoral waters.”

Some of their other shots miss, but they’re right about a few things. In terms of major points, shipbuilding is to naval vessel standards, not commercial standards as Sayen claimed, a change that cost the Navy a good chunk of money on initial ships. That argument ducks the issue of lower survivability standards, however, which are a legitimate point of debate. The Navy’s contention re: superiority to 1980s-era FFG-7 frigates that have had all major weapons removed in a bit disingenuous, and it would be useful to understand the basis for their claims of superiority over much smaller and cheaper 1990s-era Osprey Class minesweepers. TIME Battleland | USN’s Navy Live blog | Military.com.

Sept 28/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Washington, DC receives an $8.5 million contract modification, finalizing the contract for Freedom Class FY 2013 engineering support services. Work includes technical library services, logistics and technical data and documentation, quality management services in preparing of test and inspection requirements, quality assurance inspection, collecting and analyzing test data, and otherwise working to standardize the class’ follow-on availability periods.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by September 2013. All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329).

LCS 4 launch
(click to view full)

Sept 28/12: Support. Lockheed Martin MS2 in Washington, DC wins a $7.5 million modification, as part of finalizing the contract for Freedom Class FY 2013 engineering support services.

All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to complete by September 2013. The USN’s sSouthwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4329).

Sept 28/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $7 million modification, finalizing the contract for LCS Independence Class FY 2013 engineering support services. Work includes technical library services, logistics and technical data and documentation, quality management services in preparing of test and inspection requirements, quality assurance inspection, collecting and analyzing test data, and otherwise working to standardize the class’ follow-on availability periods.

All funds expire on Sept 30/12, at the end of FY 2012. Work will be performed in San Diego, CA. The USN’s Southwest Regional Maintenance Center in San Diego, CA manages the contract (N00024-12-G-4330).

Aug 22/12: LCS Council. The US Navy convenes an “LCS Council” of high-ranking officers, in order to ensure that the LCS is ready to deploy to Singapore in 2013, per its commitments, and that the USN is ready to support it properly. “Addressing the challenges identified by [preparatory USN] studies necessitates” this high-level group, in order to drive fixes in multiple places across the Navy.

It’s filled with brass: Vice Adm. Rick Hunt, director of the Navy Staff, as its chairman, and the following senior officers also on board: Vice Adm. Mark Skinner, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Vice Adm. Tom Copeman, commander, Naval Surface Forces; and Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy, commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. The Plan of Action and Milestones are due no later than Jan 31/13. USN Memo [PDF] | POGO.

Aug 16/12: “Directional instability”. POGO and Aviation Week find documents that detail problems keeping LCS 1 on a straight course. While ships do need some directional instability to maneuver well, but “a source close to the LCS program told POGO that the directional instability affected the crew’s ability to operate the Lockheed ship.”

Worse, the problem occurred just before the Navy went to Congress, asking for permission to buy both ship types. The documents show the Navy instructing people to either not talk about this problem, or minimize it. POGO.

May 31/12: Support. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $12.5 million cost-plus-fixed fee contract modification for LCS Independence Class design services. They’ll provide class baseline design services, class documentation services, class engineering studies, cost estimating support, LCS ship transition work, interim support services, and liaison for ship construction and post delivery with the class design agent for even-numbered ships from LCS 6 Jackson onward. This modification includes an option, which could bring its cumulative value of this modification to $25.1 million.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (54%), Pittsfield, MA (45%), and Mobile, AL (1%). Work is expected to be complete by June 2014 (N00024-09-C-2302).

May 31/12: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Bath, ME receives a $7 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design in support of LCS-2 USS Independence’s post-shakedown availability. Efforts will include program management, advance planning, engineering, design, material kitting, liaison, and scheduling.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME, and is expected to be complete by February 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by the USN’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, ME (N00024-09-G-2301).

POGO Presentation
click for video

May 11/12: Push for GAO. House Armed Services Committee member Rep. Jackie Speier [D-CA] is leading a push to have the Congressional GAO audit office to review the LCS program. Rep. Duncan Hunter [R-CA] is also active in submitting LCS-related amendments that are critical of the Navy and its lack of disclosure. Speier says that:

“…serious flaws…. threaten the operational capabilities of the ship…. it’s disturbing that the Navy would accept a ship that fails to meet the basic requirements for a tugboat. The future of the fleet is corroding before our eyes.”

See: Maritime Executive | AOL Defense | The Hill.

July 2/12: 20 more berths. Defense News reports that the Navy is acknowledging the obvious, and adding 20 more berths to USS Freedom. They’re not adding any more space, of course, but they will add 2 officer berths, 2 petty officer berths, and 16 enlisted berths. No decision has been made yet about USS Independence.

LCSs were intended to operate with a core crew of 40 sailors, plus a mission module detachment of 15 and an aviation detachment of 25. Each ship has a pair of 40-person crews (Blue and Gold), which will shift to 3 crews over time that can deploy in 4-month rotations. In order to use the additional berths, the manning plan also has to change.

Other LCS 1 Freedom Class upgrades will reportedly involve an Aqueous Film-Forming Foam system, improvements to stern ramp fender stanchions, removal of its retractable bitts; and more fire suppression sprinklers, tank level indicators, and pipe hangers. Those sorts of changes aren’t unusual for a ship at this stage.

May 22-24/12: Despite the PREINSURV report of May 7/12, The Special Trial takes place anyway with an overall good assessment. Because the Freedom was on the pier for repairs, its crew had spent too little time on it prior to the inspection, which explains some of the hiccups.

These repairs have addressed some problems like hull cracks (see April 11/11 entry) but other vexing issues remain unsolved since they have been spotted in 2008, such as water intrusion up the hawse pipe and through the aft stern doors. Navy Times.

May 7/12: A PRESINSURV report recommends not to proceed with a scheduled Special Trial, as they have found the crew unprepared with the inspection and unfamiliar with their ship. At least they had a positive attitude. It should be noted that a pre-inspection is supposed to find issues, in order to get all ducks in a row before the real deal. Gannett’s Navy Times | Information Dissemination has the verbatim memo.

April 8/12: Program unstoppable? The New York Times writes an article about the Littoral Combat Ship: “The Next War: Smaller Navy Ship Has a Rocky Past and Key Support.” The money paragraph:

“Analysts say an important factor driving the Navy and Congress is that the vessels the ships are meant to replace – frigates and minesweepers – are aging, and that there is little else in the pipeline. The combat ship is seen as too far along in production to be killed now. [Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-CA says] It’s one of those things that once the snowball goes down the hill, it just keeps rolling…. There’s no way I’m going to stop it.”

See: New York Times | DoD Buzz.

March 14/12: US NAVSEA issues a pair of contracts for a year of “special studies, analyses, review and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services… [to] assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.” Work will last until March 2013.

The award disparity between the Freedom (Lockheed) and Independence (Austal) classes is interesting, and calls to mind the AvWeek report that suggested the need for a fundamental redesign (Jan 30/12). Maritime Memos’ Tim Colton wonders what the heck the government is thinking with the whole award. “…[T]hese are fixed-price contracts: the contractors should be doing everything they can to reduce costs and schedule at their own expense.” Which is true, but lifecycle costs are a bigger fraction, and are entirely the Navy’s problem unless there’s a contract to address them. Of course, not picking 40+ knot speeds as a key requirement would have done a lot to reduce operating costs and boost range – but it’s too late for the Navy to do that now.

Lockheed Martin Corp in Baltimore, MD receives a $33.6 million option (N00024-11-C-2300), with work to be performed in Hampton, VA (32%); Marinette, WI (27%); Moorestown, NJ (22%); and Washington, DC (19%).

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $19.7 million option (N00024-11-C-2301), with work to be performed in Mobile, AL (72%) and Pittsfield, MA (28%).

Feb 15/12: LCS 11 & 12 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus names the next 2 Littoral Combat Ships. He keeps politics out of this naming set, naming the Freedom Class ship LCS 11 Sioux City, and the Independence Class ship LCS 12 Omaha. US Navy | Washington Times.

Feb 10/12: LCS 10 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus can’t seem to keep politics out of his ship names. He names LCS 10 after shot Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords [D-AZ], even though the naming convention for LCS ships has been cities. He did the same for Rep. John Murtha [D-PA] in the San Antonio Class LPDs.

Mabus’ politicized ship naming choices have drawn fire, to the point of sponsored bills and amendments that would add congressional oversight to SecNav’s traditional prerogative. Traditionally, there has been some level of politics in the process, but it has generally involved choices that had acceptance on both sides of the aisle. The Giffords naming would qualify, but coming after Mabus’ other choices, it’s raising the heat rather than dissipating it. US DoD | Austal.

Jan 30/12: Freedom Class a lemon? Aviation Week reports that after being given copies of Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN) briefings the findings of Navy and industry reports, the set of defense analysts it probed believe that the Freedom Class may need to be fundamentally redesigned.

“The analysts also call for an investigation into how the ship was accepted in such – in their view – questionable shape…”

Jan 14/12: LCS 4 launch. LCS 4 is christened Coronado, after the California city near San Diego. Note that she is not yet USS Coronado. US Navy.

Dec 19/11: Support. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives an $11.9 million contract modification, exercising an option for core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services until December 2012. They’ll assess engineering, and provide baseline and configuration management services during construction, post-delivery, test and trials for the Freedom Class.

Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (20%); Virginia Beach, VA (20%); Washington, DC (15%); Marinette, WI (13%); Moorestown, NJ (12%); Baltimore, MD (10%); Manassas, VA (7%); and Arlington, VA (3%). Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, DC, is the contracting activity (N00024-11-C-2300).

Dec 19/11: Support. Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives an $11.9 million contract modification, exercising an option for core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class services until December 2012. They’ll assess engineering, and provide baseline and configuration management services during construction, post-delivery, test and trials for the Independence Class.

Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (30%); Pittsfield, MA (30%); Malvern, PA (20%); Newport News, VA (13%); and various locations of less than 2% each, totaling 7% (N00024-11-C-2301).

Dec 19/11: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin in Baltimore, MD receives a $15.2 million contract modification, exercising an option for LCS 3 (future USS Fort Worth) post-delivery support. Lockheed Martin will perform the planning and implementation of deferred design changes that have been identified during the construction period, and are deemed necessary to support Fort Worth’s sailaway and follow-on post delivery test and trials.

Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (39%); Marinette, Wis. (34%); Hampton, VA (18%); and Washington, DC (9%). Work is expected to be completed by December 2012. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, DC, is the contracting activity (N00024-09-C-2303).

Dec 16/11: Philippines deployment? Discussions continue re: deployment of LCS ships to Singapore (vid. Dec 4/10), and reports suggest that the Philippines is also involved in discussions with the USA. The moves are said to be part of a broader US strategy to “pivot” its military focus toward the Pacific, and away from Europe. Reuters.

Oct 24/11: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin announces that LCS 3 Fort Worth has passed builder’s trials, and returned to Marinette Marine on Lake Michigan to prepare for Navy acceptance trials.

Oct 20/11: Cost is #1. LCS PEO Rear Adm. James Murdoch tells reporters that cost is now the overriding priority for the program, which means avoiding any changes unless there’s no choice. The flip side is that all of the 2 classes’ current weaknesses end up more or less frozen as is.

The mission modules will continue to evolve. He says that the Navy is still trying to reduce the Independence Class’ [LCS-2] preparation time to employ some of its mine-clearing mission package, so it can meet the Navy requirement to clear a (classified) area in a (classified) amount of time of a (classified) number of mines. They’re also taking steps to replace the anti-submarine USVs with simpler towed sonar arrays, which can be run at speed. Aviation Week.

Named.
(click for cutaway)

Sept 20/11: Sub-contractors. Saab and its American subsidiary Saab Sensis Corp. announce the official Sea Giraffe contract from General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, who is the Independence Class’ platform system engineering agent. Saab’s Sea Giraffe has always been the planned radar for the LCS-2 Independence Class, and has been ordered for the first 2 ships; this just makes it official for all ships under the new contract.

The 3-D Sea Giraffe AMB is used for aerial scans, water surface scans, and weapon guidance. Land-based counterparts can even back-track incoming rockets and ballistic projectiles to their firing point, and Saab confirms reports that the naval radar can do so as well. Saab Sensis manages the US technical baseline for Sea Giraffe AMB. They will provide US based program management hardware and software adaptations, system integration, testing, and total life-cycle support to in support of the radars on Austal’s LCS design.

Sept 8/11: LCS 2. USS Independence [LCS-2] arrives in St. Petersburg, FL. The question is now how the Navy will use it. GAO reports contend that USS Freedom’s previous deployment may have set the whole program back, by removing the ship’s use as a test bed for LCS mission modules. DoD Buzz discusses what they think we know:

“We can presume the ship’s corrosion issues are resolved since it was given the green light to leave Naval Station Mayport, Fla., and that it’s seaworthy because it made the trip around the state, and that it’s handling flight operations now – the ship stood into Tampa Bay with an MH-60 helicopter on its flight deck…”

Aug 29/11: Exports? Aviation Week quotes Lockheed MS2 VP of littoral ship systems, Joe North, who says that over 21 countries have expressed interest in their LCS design. He’s the first to admit that interest does not always equate to a budget, and the article notes that Chinese frigate designs are becoming thinkable alternatives to buying a ship like the Freedom Class.

Aug 22/11: LCS 5 begins. Lockheed Martin announces the start of construction on LCS 5 Milwaukee, at Marinette Marine. The ship is due for delivery to the U.S. Navy in 2014, and is the 1st of 10 Freedom Class ships awarded to Lockheed Martin under the December 2010 Navy contract.

Meanwhile, LCS 3 Fort Worth remains on track for delivery in 2012.

Aug 5/11: Freedom Class changes. Aviation Week’s “U.S. Navy Studies And Improves LCS-1” describes the post-shakedown process, which includes design and procedure changes that are incorporated into the class. Previous hull cracking issues aren’t on USS Freedom’s PSA list, but magazine modifications and a mooring configuration change are.

Aug 1/11: LCS 6 begins. The Navy authorizes the first cutting of aluminum for the Independence Class ship LCS 6 Jackson at Austal’s Modular Manufacturing facility in Mobile, AL. US Navy.

July 27/11: Rep. Duncan D. Hunter [R-CA-52] and Rob Wittman [R-VA-1] ask the GAO to update its 2010 audit of the LCS program. Full Letter [PDF].

July 22/11: LCS 2. General Dynamics – Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $10 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to provide engineering and management services for advance planning and design in support of the post shakedown availability for USS Independence [LCS 2]. While Austal is the builder and contract owner, GD-BIW began the LCS competition as their bid partner, and would likely have served as the “2nd shipyard” for the trimaran design, if the Navy had pursued that requirement.

Work will be performed in Bath, ME (72%); Pittsfield, MA (20%); and Mobile, AL (8%). Work is expected to be completed by February 2013. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair in Bath, Maine manages this contract (N00024-09-G-2301).

July 15/11: LCS 9 named. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next Freedom Class ship, LCS 9, will be named USS Little Rock, in honor of Arkansas’ capital city.

The previous USS Little Rock began life as a Cleveland Class light cruiser after World War II [CL-92], and was one of 6 to be converted to a Galveston Class guided missile cruiser later on [CLG/CG-4]. She was decommissioned in 1976, and now sits in Buffalo, NY as a museum ship. US Navy.

July 13/11: Corrosion. A bipartisan group of 7 U.S. Senators sends a formal letter to the Pentagon’s Ashton Carter, asking for explanations about LCS certifications that had been waived by the Navy. Waived items included survivability-related certifications, an area that’s a known weakness for the type. Senators Webb [D-VA, former Secretary of the Navy], Begich [D-AK], McCaskill [D-MO], McCain [R-AZ], Brown [R-MA], Coburn [R-OK], and Portman [R-OH] question:

• An April 7/11 Office of the Secretary of Defense certification to move the LCS to Milestone B, while waiving several requirements, with no explanation of why.
  
• The use of Navy acquisition cost estimates, instead of those from the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) group.
  
• A waiver of the need to certify program tradeoffs, granted late in the program
  
• How the LCS program “will ensure reliability and minimize major cost growth in operations and sustainment costs” in light of LCS-2′s corrosion issue; they also want detailed information about the problem, and a response to the Austal CEO’s public statement.

See: Full text of letter | Gannett’s Navy Times.

July 11/11: PEO LCS Created. The US Navy formally establishes Program Executive Office, Littoral Combat Ships (PEO LCS), during a ceremony at Washington Navy Yard, in order to oversee the program. Ship construction supervision is removed fro PEO Ships, while mission module supervision is removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which is dissolved.

Per predictions made in May, Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch is placed in charge of the office, which is designed to bring all elements of the troubled program together under one roof. US Navy | Information Dissemination (May 2011) was not enthusiastic.

July 5/11: US Navy:

“The littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1) is undergoing $1.8 million in maintenance while in dry dock at BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair. Freedom is scheduled to undock September 19, 2011.”

The accompanying picture clearly shows the single helicopter hangar, as well as the 2 boxy stern bustles, aka. “water wings,” which added at a late stage to address the type’s reserve buoyancy issues.

June 20-22/11: Corrosion. June 20-22/11: After USS Independence corrosion reports hit Austal’s share price, a company release addresses the issue. It notes the complete lack of such problems on all of Austal’s commercial and military ships to date, and suggests that the US Navy may have failed to follow basic procedures. Note that Westpac Express is a leased vessel, maintained by Austal:

“…having built over 220 aluminum vessels for defence forces and commercial clients around the world… galvanic corrosion has not been a factor on any Austal built and fully maintained vessel, and our technical experts are eager to support any request to identify root causes… The Westpac Express… has shuttled U.S. Marines throughout the Pacific Basin continuously for ten years, with a 99.7% availability over that period.

Austal has a well-developed methodology for the management of galvanic corrosion, which it has deployed globally… If selected to provide post-delivery support for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Class Services program, it is a straight forward process for Austal engineers… deploy temporary sacrificial anodes every time the vessel is moored, and ensure that high-voltage maintenance equipment is properly grounded before use aboard ship.”

Reports that the US Navy’s temporary fix involves installing a cathodic protection system aboard USS Independence do tend to suggest several major lapses: in specifications and acceptance (US Navy), by the Design Agent (Austal), and by the contract prime (GD Bath Iron works). Information Dissemination has a different take, and thinks there are grounds for believing that Austal’s JHSV ships, which may not have a cathodic protection system either, could also be at risk:

“In the case of LCS-2, the problem was apparently accelerated by stray currents in the hull from the electrical distribution system problems the ship has been having since it was turned over to the Navy. LCS-4 doesn’t have [a cathodic protection system] either, but apparently CPS is part of the lessons learned process and was included in the fixed-price contracts for Austal versions of the LCS beginning with LCS-6. LCS-2 will have the CPS installed at the next drydock period, while Austal has said a CPS will be added to LCS-4 before the ship is turned over to the Navy. The question everyone seems to be asking is whether the JHSV could suffer the same issue… I’d be curious to know if Westpac Express has a CPS installed, or some other form of prevention is used at all.”

See: Austal release | Alabama Press-Register | Information Dissemination | WIRED Danger Room.

June 17/11: Corrosion. The US Navy has told Congressional appropriations committees that “aggressive” corrosion was found in the propulsion areas of USS Independence, which rely on Wartsila waterjets. The ship has been given temporary repairs, but permanent repairs will require dry-docking and removal of the water-jet propulsion system. The strong Australian dollar has hurt Austal’s commercial exports, so this blow to its defense business has added impetus. Bloomberg | Alabama Press-Register | Sydney Morning Herald.

Corrosion in new ships isn’t unheard of, though it’s never a good sign. Norway’s Fridtjof Nansen Class AEGIS frigates had this problem, for instance. The Independence Class runs some risks that are specific to its all-aluminum construction, however, as key subsystems with different metals create risks of galvanic corrosion. Interestingly, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) NGO notes that:

“The Senate Armed Services Committee’s markup of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, released today, gives the Pentagon $32.1 million to address “the DoD Corrosion Prevention and Control shortfall in funding requirements.” The Pentagon estimates that funding in this area yields an estimated 57:1 return on investment by reducing the costs for repairs and replacements of corroded systems and parts.”

June 16/11: WLD-1 launch testing. The US Navy Program Executive Office for Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW) announces the successful first time launch and recovery of the WLD-1 Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) semi-submerged USV from USS Independence [LCS 2], while underway near Panama, FL. The vehicle went through 5 successful cycles of deployment, towed operations and recovery, while also testing things like vehicle stability in the wake zone and remote operation.

In active use, the RMMV will tow the AN/AQS-20A sonar, and the entire Remote Minehunting System is scheduled for further testing in summer 2011 as part of the LCS MIW mine warfare module’s core AMCM system. This test matters to the LCS program for other reasons as well. The effectiveness of LCS rear launch and recovery systems has been a concern for both designs. US NAVSEA.

June 15/11: Saudi Arabia. Defense News reports that Saudi Arabia may be shifting their focus away from a fully armed variant of the Littoral Combat Ship, carrying the smaller AN/SPY-1F radar and AEGIS combat system. In its place, they received May 2011 briefings concerning DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers displacing about 3 times the tonnage, with ballistic missile defense capability upgrades. The cost trade-off would be about 4-6 modified LCS ships, in exchange for about 2 DDG-51 Flight IIA BMD ships.

The unspoken threat here is, of course, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The unspoken concern is the security of a top-level defense technology, which is critical to defending the USA and its allies, in Saudi hands.

To date, the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class has never been exported per se, though their AEGIS combat system and accompanying AN/SPY-1D radars have. Another possible option for Saudi Arabia would be used US Navy DDG-51 Flight I ships, upgraded with AEGIS BMD. That would allow the Saudis to field more ships for the same money, if an agreement was reached. The costs would lie in questions about hull life and length of service, and the Flight Is’ lack of a helicopter hangar. Helicopters have been shown to be essential defenses against speedboat threats, of the kind that Iran fields in the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Defense News | Information Dissemination.

June 4/11: LCS to Singapore. In a speech made at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates disclosed US plans to deploy new littoral combat ships (LCS) to Singapore. US Navy ships routinely stop in Singapore, but these would be the first US Navy ships permanently deployed there. SecDef Gates speech transcript | East Asia Forum.

June 2/11: Sub-contractors. Taber Extrusions LLC announces contracts to supply extruded aluminum products for JHSV 3 Fortitude, and LCS 6 Jackson, from its facilities in Russellville, AR and Gulfport, MS. Some structural extrusions for both ships will also be manufactured by Taber and supplied to Austal through a contract with O’Neal Steel Corp.

Taber has an 8,600 ton extrusion press with a rectangular container and billet configuration. The firm says that compared with smaller presses and round containers, their tool gives superior metal flow patterns with much tighter tolerances for flatness, straightness and twist; and better assurance of critical thickness dimensions. The resulting wide multi-void extrusions are friction stir welded into panels, and tight tolerances improve productivity while reducing downstream scrap. When finished, they make up some of the ship’s decking, superstructure and bulkheads.

April 11/11: Cracking. DoD Buzz relays US Navy LCS program manager Capt. Jeff Riedel’s words, from a briefing at the US Navy League’s annual Sea, Air Space conference. He says it isn’t a design issue – or is it?:

“Both Lockheed and the Navy are going through their final review that should be available in the next couple of weeks… The design is adequate, how I build it is a different story… If I was able to weld it as it was designed to be welded, it wouldn’t have been an issue. The real issue was, getting access to that area to be able to do the weld… We modeled the superstructure and we found that we had areas that were high stress areas, so we would expect, potentially, a crack to occur in that high-stress area… So we instrumented the superstructure and we used that instrumentation to validate the model and in fact, we’re now using that to better the design… for LCS-3 and following we’ve gone back and changed the design so we can reduce those stress areas.”

Beginning with LCS-3, Riedel says that the spot on the ship where the crack occurred was made easier for welders to reach, allowing them to lay an extra thick weld.

March 25/11: LCS 6 & 8 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the Freedom Class LCS 6 will be named the USS Jackson, after Mississippi’s state capitol, and LCS 8 will be named the USS Montgomery, after Alabama’s state capitol. US DoD

March 18/11: LCS 5 & 7 named. US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announces that the next 2 Freedom Class ships built by Lockheed Martin will be named the USS Milwaukee [LCS 5] and the USS Detroit [LCS 7]. LCS 3 Fort Worth is said to be about 85% complete at the moment, and on schedule for 2012 delivery. LCS 5 Milwaukee will begin construction in the summer of 2011, while LCS 7 Detroit isn’t expected to begin construction until May 2012.

The last ship named USS Detroit was a Sacramento Class fast support ship, T-AOE-4. It was decommissioned in 2005. The last ship named USS Milwaukee was T-AOR-2, a Wichita Class oiler that was decommissioned in 1994. US Navy | Alabama Press Register | Detroit Free Press | Australia’s Herald Sun (Victoria/ Melbourne) | Green Bay Press-Gazette | West Australia Business News.

March 15/11: Support. Contracts to the 2 shipbuilders for Littoral Combat Ship class services, funding efforts to “assess engineering and production challenges and evaluate the cost and schedule risks from affordability efforts to reduce LCS acquisition and lifecycle costs.”

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives $34.1 million contract modification. Work will be performed in Hampton, VA (31%); Marinette, WI (25%); Washington, DC (24%); and Moorestown, NJ (20%); and is expected to be complete by March 2012 (N00024-11-C-2300).

Austal USA in Mobile, AL receives a $19.7 million contract modification. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (83%), and Pittsfield, MA (17%); and is expected to be complete by March 2012 (N00024-11-C-2301).

March 8/11: Controversy. The Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearings regarding the Navy’s FY 2012 Navy budget and longer-term plan. SecNav Ray Mabus outlines the Navy’s view of the approved multi-year buy strategy.

“With an average cost of $440 million per ship, and with the cost reductions we have seen demonstrated on LCS 3 and 4, the Navy will save taxpayers approximately $1.9 billion in FY12-FY16. More importantly, the fact that prices were so dramatically reduced from the initial bids in 2009 will allow us to save an additional $1 billion – for a total of $2.9 billion – through the dual award of a ten-ship contract to each bidder.”

On the other hand, ranking member Sen. McCain continues to express concerns re: the LCS acquisition plan, though the multi-ship buy has been approved:

“As you probably know, I continue to think the Navy made a big mistake in going forward with a dual-source strategy on the LCS program. I believe that the true lifecycle costs of buying and sustaining both ships will be considerably more than what the Navy told us. I do not believe it is wise for Congress to authorize what amounts to a ‘bulk buy’ on a program without proving that its key aspects will work as intended and that its sustainability costs are reasonable. In the case of LCS, the Navy could not tell Congress what its plans are for the two different combat systems for the two designs; and, the combined capability of the mission packages with the sea-frames, which gives the ships combat power, remains unproven. I am concerned that the costs of operating and sustaining both variants will eventually require moving to a single combat system or going to a common propulsion and mechanical system. If that is where affordability concerns drive the Navy, why are we buying two versions of this ship?”

See: SASC Hearings record | Sen. Levin (chair) floor statement | Sen. McCain floor statement.

March 7/11: Industrial. Fincantieri subsidiary Marinette Marine Corporation breaks ground for a new panel-line fabrication building to support construction of the U.S. Navy’s Freedom-class LCS. It will use more automation, improve raw material storage, and cut the distance ship modules have to travel during construction. It’s part of a 5-year, $100 million modernization plan by the shipyard’s new parent company, and builds on 2009 improvements that included higher-capacity overhead cranes, plasma-cutting tables and pipe-bending machines.

In addition to this groundbreaking, Marinette Marine also marked the opening of its professional center and the completion of a project to expand its main indoor ship construction building. This expansion project nearly doubles the building’s size, creating enough space to house 2 complete LCS hulls and parts for 2 additional ships. The firm’s counterpart, Austal, has also been investing in major facility improvements at its Gulf Coast shipyard. Marinette Marine [PDF] | Lockheed Martin.

Feb 1/11: Sub-contractors. EADS North America announces a contract from Lockheed Martin to supply its TRS-3D radar for up to 10 Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ships through 2015. Under the terms of its contract, EADS North America will deliver the 1st radar unit to Lockheed Martin for installation in 2012.

Within the US armed forces, the TRS-3D also serves aboard the Coast Guard’s new frigate-sized National Security Cutters. Austal’s Independence Class trimarans use Saab’s Sea Giraffe AMB radar instead.

Jan 17/10: Sub-contractors. Fairbanks Morse announces a contract from Lockheed Martin for 2 of its 17,000 bhp Colt-Pielstick 16-cylinder PA6B STC diesel engines, to power the Freedom Class LCS 5 ordered in December 2010. The engines will be manufactured and tested at the company’s facility in Beloit, WI, in accordance with American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Naval Vessel Rules.

Price is not disclosed. If the entire set of 10 ships is ordered, the firm would provide 20 diesel engines.

It may be presumed that Austal is busy working on contracts with its engine suppliers as well: GE (LM2500 turbines) and MTU (800 series diesel).

Jan 17/10: Sub-contractors. Rolls Royce Marine announces an immediate contract from Lockheed Martin for 2 more of its 36MW MT30 gas turbines, as part of a larger contract to equip up to 10 Freedom Class ships.

The MT30 is derived from the firm’s Trent engines that outfit large passenger jets. In the US Navy, the MT30 also serves on the forthcoming fleet of 3 DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyers. Each LCS-1 Freedom Class ship takes 2 turbines, so the total order would be 20 if all 10 Freedom Class ships are ordered. Price is not disclosed, and the release adds that:

“In addition to gas turbines and waterjets, a significant range of Rolls-Royce equipment is specified in the Lockheed Martin design, including shaftlines, bearings and propulsion system software.”

They have not been trouble-free, however: see esp. Sept 29/10 entry.

Build ‘em both!
(click to view full)

Dec 30/10: Dual Buy. Now that the provisional spending authority is approved along with the Navy’s revised dual-buy plan, the Navy issues 2010-2015 block buy contracts to Austal and to Lockheed Martin. The contract includes options for up to 9 additional vessels in the following 5 years, plus post delivery support, additional crew and shore support, special studies, class services, class standard equipment support, economic order quantity equipment. These contracts were competitively procured via the Federal Business Opportunities website, with 2 offers received.

Freedom class monohulls: Lockheed Martin Corp. in Baltimore, MD receives a fixed-price-incentive contract (vid. Dec 8/10 entry) for $491.6 million: $436.9 million for a Freedom class ship, and $54.7 million for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except FY 2010 RDT&E funds.

Fincantieri’s Marinette Marine Corporation will build the ships, and naval architect Gibbs & Cox will provide engineering and design support. Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Walpole, MA (14%); Washington, DC (12%); Oldsmar, FL (4%); Beloit, WI (3%); Moorestown, NJ (2%); Minneapolis, MI (2%); and various locations of less than 1 percent (7%). Work is expected to be complete by August 2015.

If all 10 Freedom class ships are bought, the given cumulative value is $4.07 billion. If the Navy exercises options according to the previous procurement approach instead, and looks in 2012 for a 2nd source to build 5 more ships, the contract could rise to $4.571 billion, including selected ship systems equipment for a 2nd source builder and selected ship system integration and test for a 2nd source (N00024-11-C-2300).

Independence class trimarans: Austal USA, LLC in Mobile, AL receives a fixed-price-incentive contract (vid. Dec 8/10 entry) for $465.5 million: $432.1 million to build an Independence class LCS, plus $33.4 million for technical data package, core class services, provisioned items orders, ordering, a not-to-exceed line item for non-recurring engineering, and data items. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year, except FY 2010 RDT&E funds.

This brings Austal’s total order book to A$ 1.3 billion; the same shipyard is also building the US Navy’s JHSV fast-transport catamarans. Austal is beginning LCS-related preparation work beyond its investments to date, including a $140 million facility expansion and workforce development program over the next 12 months, which will more than double Austal’s workforce to 3,800 employees. Construction of the first LCS vessel will begin in early 2012, and it’s currently scheduled for delivery by June 2015. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50%); Pittsfield, MA (17%); Cincinnati, OH (3%); Baltimore, MD (2%); Burlington, VT (2%); New Orleans, LA (2%); and various locations of less than 2 percent each (24%).

If all 10 Independence class ships are bought, the given cumulative value is $3.786 billion. If the Navy exercises options according to the previous procurement approach instead, and looks in 2012 for a 2nd source to build 5 more ships, including selected ship systems equipment for a 2nd source and selected ship system integration and test for a 2nd source, the contract could rise to $4.386 billion (N00024-11-C-2301).

Note that these prices do not reflect the additional cost of Government Furnished Equipment, including all weapons, mission modules, etc. Those additional costs can be expected to be comfortably over $100 million per ship. See also US Navy | Austal | Lockheed Martin | Defense Tech.

Dual buy contract for up to 20 ships

Dec 22/10: Budgets. The US Senate passes H.R. 6523, the House’s Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. Having passed in identical form in both the House and Senate, it was introduced to the President to be signed on Dec 29/10. US Senate [PDF]. See also Aviation Week debate coverage | Sen. McCain’s [R-AZ] floor statement, against inclusion of the LCS.

Dec 21/10: Budgets. The US house of Representatives’ “lame duck” session of outgoing Congresspeople passes a new continuing resolution proposed by Senate Democrats to keep the government running through early 2011. The only arms-program-specific language in the legislation says that: “Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of the Navy may award a contract or contracts for up to 20 Littoral Combat Ships”.

On the other hand, the funding will not extend through the end of the fiscal year on Sept 30/11, as the incoming House and Senate will have full opportunity to pass their own budget. Gannett’s Navy Times.

Dec 14/10: GAO Report. The US Senate Armed Services Committee holds hearings regarding the proposed LCS program change. Reuters | See esp. the US GAO testimony: “Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of Risks,” which generally echoes their Dec 8/10 report.

Dec 13/10: Competition. Lockheed Martin and Austal extend their bid price offers to Dec 30/11, to allow extra time to finalize contracts at current prices. That’s necessary for 2 reasons. One is the funding uncertainty and turmoil created by continuing resolutions, as the 112th Congress tries to clean up the budgetless mess left by the last Congress. The other, related issue is that the latest LCS acquisition plan hasn’t been approved by Congress yet. Ranking Senate Armed Services Committee member Sen. John McCain [R-AZ] continues to oppose approval of that new acquisition plan, pending clarity on combat effectiveness and long-term costs. Green Bay Press Gazette.

Dec 10/10: CBO Report. The US Congressional Budget Office releases its report on the proposed program change: “Cost Implications of the Navy’s Plans for Acquiring Littoral Combat Ships” [PDF]. The CBO often has different cost estimates than the US Navy – and CBO’s higher estimates have a history of being right. In this case, however, they acknowledge that they’re handicapped by not seeing the shipyard bids.

They see the central issues as twofold. One is future operating and maintenance costs, which the GAO has also flagged as a serious issue. Maintaining 2 types is both a plus and a minus. That could really help the fleet if one design performs better, and right bow, data is limited. n the other hand, it also means additional spares, maintenance and training infrastructure, which may have to be duplicated on both coasts depending on deployment plans.

The other issue is the hardwired central combat systems, which are said to cost about $70 million per ship. They’re a topic of special attention in the report, as they’re different for the 2 ship designs. On the other hand, aligning them to allow common upgrades and maintenance would result in high retrofit costs down the road. Some estimates place the cost between $910 million – $1.8 billion. See also subsequent coverage of the combat system issue by Aviation Week | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Dec 8/10: GAO report on buy strategy. The US GAO releases its report – “Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program.” They still see the program as risky, and the risks are inherent in the design, concept, and execution, not the procurement strategy. The Navy doesn’t really understand operating and maintenance costs for the designs yet, which creates a big budget risk, though building both ships may hedge against the risks that one design turns out to be poor in this or other areas. Most significantly, the GAO points to a chronic and serious problem that has destroyed cost estimates for previous ship classes:

“In an effort to address technical issues on the first two ships, the Navy has implemented design changes for… LCS 3 and LCS 4… [that are] not yet complete. These changes are significant and have affected the configuration of several major ship systems including propulsion, communications, electrical, and navigation. In addition, launch, handling, and recovery systems for both designs are still being refined… contract modifications will need to be negotiated and priced. According to the Navy, it estimates funding requirements for these change orders to total 5 percent for all future follow-on ships produced… In addition, Navy officials stated that the seaframe solicitation includes a provision that agreed to design changes are “not to exceed” $12 million – a feature that Navy officials state will bound government cost risk due to design changes. Pending full identification and resolution of deficiencies affecting the lead ships, the Navy’s ability to stay within its budgeted limits remains to be seen.”

While the US Navy says that designs for LCS 3 & 4 are stable as built, the GAO points out that this is because key changes have been deferred until post-delivery. As testing reveals other issues, the amount of deferred work for follow-on ships “can reasonably be expected to grow.” See also Bloomberg.

Dec 6/10: LCS-2. USS Independence (LCS 2) arrives at BAE Systems Ship Repair in Norfolk, VA to begin its first industrial post-delivery availability. During the availability, the ship will complete the installation of needed components not installed during construction. US Navy.

Dec 4/10: LCS 3 launched. The 2nd Freedom-class LCS, USS Fort Worth (LCS 3), is launched at the Marinette Marine shipyard, on the Menominee River. Lockheed Martin | Argon ST [PDF].

Oct 26/10: Saudi Arabia. Lockheed Martin MS2 President Orlando Carvalho confirms that his company has supplied price and availability information on its version of the littoral combat ship (LCS) to Saudi Arabia, which is looking to buy 8 modern frigate-sized warships. Lockheed is proposing a very different LCS, configured as a frigate equipped with AN/SPY-1F radars, an AEGIS combat system, and set equipment instead of mission modules.

It remains understood the Saudi authorities are waiting to see which LCS version the U.S. Navy chooses, but the ship’s capabilities might be well suited to the Arabian/Persian Gulf’s shallow waters. At Euronaval 2010, a French official reportedly said that France is hoping to sell between 4-6 FREMM frigates for the Saudis’ western (Red Sea and Indian Ocean) fleet, while the LCS was seen as likely for the eastern (Gulf) fleet. Defense News | Shephard Group | Tactical Report.

Oct 14/10: CRS Report. The Congressional Research Service issues its updated report: “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress” [PDF]. It offers details concerning the program’s history and current plans. Key issues examined include:

• Whether Congress had adequate time to review the latest procurement strategy in 2010
  
• Whether the Navy’s new plan gives it enough time to really evaluate how the initial ships of class perform
  
• Whether the price-focused RFP properly balances sticker price against life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs and ship capability
  
• What happens if the Navy picks a winner, and the winner can’t deliver to cost?
  
• How does the Navy plan to evolve the winning ship’s combat system to a configuration that has greater commonality with one or more existing Navy surface ship combat systems?
  
• What are the Navy’s longer-term plans regarding the 2 “orphan” ships from the LCS class that isn’t picked?
  
• What potential alternatives are there to the Navy’s new acquisition strategy? CRS cites block buys of both types, Profit Related to Offer bidding, and having the Navy buy the combat system separately.
  
• In light of the cost growth, is the LCS program still cost-effective? What is the LCS sea frame unit procurement cost above which the Navy would no longer consider the LCS program cost-effective?

Other concerns include survivability, and CRS quotes the December 2009 report from the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation:

“LCS was designated by the Navy as a Level I survivability combatant ship, but neither design is expected to achieve the degree of shock hardening as required by the CDD [Capabilities Development Document]… Only a few selected subsystems will be shock hardened… Accordingly, the full, traditional rigor of Navy-mandated ship shock trials is not achievable, due to the damage that would be sustained by the ship… The LCS LFT&E [Live Fire Test and Evaluation] program has been hampered by the Navy’s lack of credible modeling and simulation tools for assessing the vulnerabilities of ships constructed to primarily commercial standards (American Bureau of Shipping Naval Vessel Rules and High Speed Naval Craft Code), particularly aluminum and non-traditional hull forms. Legacy LFT&E models were not developed for these non-traditional factors, nor have they been accredited for such use. These knowledge gaps undermine the credibility of the modeling and simulation, and increase the amount of surrogate testing required for an adequate LFT&E program. The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment as evidenced by the limited shock hardened design and results of full scale testing of representative hull structures completed in December 2006.”

See the US Naval Institute blog’s take on the report as well, with a particular focus on survivability and the lessons of littoral naval combat. One excerpt from the full report discusses an important procedural point:

“The Navy had earlier planned to make the down select decision and award the contract to build the 10 LCSs sometime this past summer, but the decision was delayed and reportedly will now occur within 90 days of September 15 – the date by which the two industry teams were told by the Navy to submit new proposal revisions. On this basis, it would appear that the decision could be announced as late as December 14. On October 12, 2010, it was reported that a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review meeting on the LCS program that was scheduled for October 29 has been postponed to a later date that has not been set. The Navy states that it cannot announce its down select decision and award a contract to the winner until after the DAB meeting occurs.”

MT30 turbine
(click to view full)

Sept 29/10: MT30 improvements. Rolls-Royce Naval Marine, Inc. in Walpole, MA received a $9.8 million cost-plus fixed-fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract for “engineering and technical services on the Rolls-Royce gas turbine engine product improvement program. This contract is being awarded to research potential improvements to Rolls Royce gas turbine engines. Delivery Order 0001 will be issued on the same day of contract award with initial contract funding in the amount of $800,000.”

Work will be performed in Walpole, MA (70%), and Indianapolis, IN (30%), and is expected to be complete by September 2015. $800,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, which is Sept 30/10. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Ship Systems Engineering Station in Philadelphia, PA (N65540-09-D-0016).

DID has not tied this contract directly to the LCS program yet, but a search through US Navy ship types didn’t reveal any ships using Rolls Royce gas turbines, except LCS 1.

Sept 15/10: Bids in. Final bids for the latest incarnation of the Littoral Combat Ship contract are in from Lockheed Martin and Austal USA. Lockheed Martin | Defense News.

Sept 14/10: Politics. The Senate defense appropriations subcommittee votes to fund just 1 Littoral Combat Ship in FY 2011, instead of 2. That’s a long way from being the final word on the matter, but chairman Sen. Daniel Inouye [D-HI] reportedly says that:

“…two ships funded in 2010 have not yet been contracted. Under the new plan, the Navy would seek to award four ships to a single contractor in the coming year. There is virtually no way that the winning contractor would be able to begin construction of four ships in 2011.” Funding for one ship in 2011 “is more than adequate,” he said. And it saves $615 million.”

See: Gannett’s Navy Times | Information Dissemination.

Sept 14/10: Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia may be interested in the LCS as part of its rumored $60 billion weapons package. Despite previous focus on Austal’s trimaran design, a Washington Post report says that:

“The official said the Saudis continue to have internal discussions about those purchases and are watching to see the outcome of a competition to build a new Littoral Combat Ship.”

Sept 9/10: LCS a Lemon? In a piece called “Red Flags Everywhere,” influential naval blog Information Dissemination, which has generally been mildly supportive of the program, says:

“There isn’t just one thing wrong with the Littoral Combat Ship program – every thing is wrong with this program. There are so many red flags waiving frantically in the face of Congress, the Navy, and any casual observer in regards to the Littoral Combat Ship I feel like I am standing roadside in Beijing during a Party propaganda parade… The Littoral Combat Ship has traded survivability, armor, endurance, weapon payloads, cost efficiency, and reduced operational capabilities across the board for the advantage of speed. What is this advantage of speed that makes the trade off worth it? What is 40 knots giving the Navy’s new small combatant that 28 knots can’t?”

The piece comes in response to a generally supportive Lexington Institute piece:

“More recently, the Navy seemed to have the LCS program under control… Understanding the importance of the LCS, the Navy responded to initial problems with the basic ships or sea frames with the necessary attention, expertise and resources. The same effort must now be devoted to the development of working mission packages. This also includes developing the desired unmanned systems, particularly for subsurface operations.”

Aug 31/10: GAO Report. US GAO report #GAO-10-523 on the LCS program sees problems. “Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities.” Key excerpts:

“The Navy plans to invest over $25 billion through fiscal year 2035 to acquire LCS. However, recurring cost growth and schedule delays have jeopardized the Navy’s ability to deliver promised LCS capabilities… technical issues with the first two seaframes have yet to be fully resolved… Challenges developing mission packages have delayed the timely fielding of promised capabilities, limiting the ships’ utility to the fleet during initial deployments… Key mine countermeasures and surface warfare systems encountered problems in operational and other testing that delayed their fielding…”

With respect to the ships themselves:

“The Navy has required LCS seaframes to meet Level 1 survivability standards. Ships built to Level 1 are expected to operate in the least severe environment, away from the area where a carrier group is operating or the general war-at-sea region… Current ships in the fleet built to the Level 1 standard include material support ships, mine-warfare vessels, and patrol combatants.”

“…In our work on shipbuilding best practices, we found that achieving design stability before start of fabrication is a key step… Addressing [LCS 1 and 2] technical issues has required the Navy to implement design changes at the same time LCS 3 and LCS 4 are being built… Our analysis of the procurement section of the LCS total ownership cost baseline found the estimate lacks several characteristics essential to a high-quality cost estimate.”

See also the LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events section for additional excerpts related to those areas, and “MH-60S Airborne Mine Counter-Measures Continues Development” for in-depth reports on the mine warfare mission module components. See also: Aviation Week | Information Dissemination on the larger cultural issues this report speaks to.

Aug 29/10: LCS 3s. DoD Buzz reports that “Lockheed Martin, with just a five-week head start, has completed 60 percent of LCS 3, compared to Austal, whose LCS 4 is only 26 percent complete.” Why is that? It’s partly because Lockheed Martin reused work done on the original LCS 3 contract, which was canceled mid-stride. Lockheed Martin MS2 business development director Paul Lemmo:

“Lemmo also pointed out that Lockheed Martin has kept parts and materials left over from the previously terminated LCS-3. The Navy originally terminated Lockheed Martin’s second LCS in April 2007… [but] the company decided to continue manufacturing about 50 to 55 systems all the way to their completion… “Those systems have been in storage either at the manufacturer or at some of our facilities and they will be brought to bear on the ship,” [Lemmo] said. “The value of that material is about at least half of the total value of the material on the ship. Half the material needed for Fort Worth was already purchased. Generically a lot of it is long-lead propulsion machinery–the engine, the gas turbines, diesels, gears, water jets, shafting, those kinds of things…what was on order.”

See: DoD Buzz | Defense Daily.

Aug 23/10: Selection delayed. The US Navy delays its final selection for the new Littoral Combat Ship contract. The decision appears to have been pushed back to Dec 30/10, but the exact date in unclear. Defense News.

April 12/10: Competition. Lockheed Martin announces that its industry team has submitted its proposal for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fiscal year 2010-2014 contract to the U.S. Navy today. The Navy will award the winning team a fixed-price incentive fee contract to provide up to 10 ships with combat systems, as well as combat systems for 5 additional ships, to be built at a second shipyard.

March 31/10: LCS 2. Aviation Week Ares describes the current state of USS Independence [LCS 2]. At this point, its captain says that she’s still in the pre-tactical risk mitigation stage. The crew is becoming familiar with the ship, and performing basic tasks like air defense testing, fast acceleration and deceleration, putting fast boats in the water while at sea, etc.

March 30/10: GAO Report. The US GAO issues report #GAO-10-388SP, its 2010 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.

With respect to the Littoral Combat Ship, the report places the program far below the desired level of technology and manufacturing knowledge for a program at this stage. Compared to its 2004 baseline, which was itself about 150% of original cost-per unit estimates, LCS R&D costs have increased by 169.2% of baseline. Procurement cost for the initial capability ships is up by a stunning 505.3%, total program cost for initial fielding has risen 285.9%, and acquisition cycle time rose 139% over the original baseline. The report also flags LCS weight increases that have led to LCS 1 stability issues due to a higher center of gravity, and mission modules that are only partially capable.

Mission Module findings are detailed in the Ancillaries section, but the key takeaway is that they’re not ready for effective service yet – and the ship’s chosen missile armament could become a serious problem.

March 22/10: Support. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD receives a $14.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-09-C-2303) to provide engineering, program, and technical support for LCS class ships. This includes class baseline design services, class configuration management services, class documentation services, ship interim support, ship systems development, and other technical and engineering analyses.

Work will be performed in Norfolk, VA (41%), Moorestown, NJ (16%), Baltimore, MD (15%), Marinette, WI (14%), Washington, DC (8%), Arlington, VA (6%), and is expected to be complete by December 2010.

March 20/10: Costs. Inside the Navy:

“The Navy does not ask competing Littoral Combat Ship builders Austal USA and Lockheed Martin to arrive at an exact dollar figure for how much each bidder’s ship will cost over its lifespan in the current request for proposals for what will be the winning LCS design, sources told Inside the Navy last week. Yet, the sea service wants the competitors to “qualitatively: explain how they will manage “total ownership costs” in the future…”

March 16/10: Cracking. Reuters reports on a recent US Navy SBIR research solicitation, aimed at more quickly and cheaply diagnosing cracking in aluminum ship structures. From US Navy SBIR N10A-T041: “Fracture Evaluation and Design Tool for Welded Aluminum Ship Structures Subjected to Impulsive Dynamic Loading” :

“A new analysis tool combined with an experimental validation protocol is needed to accurately characterize the dynamic response and fracture behavior of welded aluminum ship structures subjected to extreme loading events. The goal of this effort is to develop an explicit dynamic failure prediction toolkit for fracture assessment of welded thin-walled aluminum structures. To efficiently characterize a large size ship structure, innovative modeling techniques using fractured shell elements are needed along with a mesh independent crack insertion and propagation capability. In addition to innovative crack simulation in a shell structure, advanced constitutive models have to be implemented in the toolkit to capture the rate dependence and anisotropy in strength, plastic flow and ductility. Developing and demonstrating novel damage simulation and fracture prediction methods has significant potential impact on design and operation of current and future Navy welded aluminum, ship structural systems.”

US Navy Commander Victor Chen reiterated the Navy’s confidence in the JHSV and LCS ships; the JHSV catamaran is aluminum construction, as is the LCS-2 Independence Class, and the LCS-1 Freedom Class uses an aluminum superstructure on a steel hull. He adds that:

“We already have a level of confidence in how to work with aluminum. The Office of Naval Research is trying to expand the knowledge base and build on what we already know.”

March 16/10: Drug busts. On her initial deployment to the Caribbean, the US Navy highlights USS Freedom’s [LCS 1] conduct of drug busts. The fast boats were intercepted with help from Freedom’s embarked MH-60S helicopter – a capability that is not unique to the LCS, by any means. Aviation Week Ares.

March 13/10: Industrial. New Fincantieri subsidiary Marinette Marine Corporation in Marinette, WI breaks ground on an expansion that will nearly double the size of its main indoor ship construction building. The expansion will provide enough indoor space to simultaneously house 2 complete LCS hulls and parts for 2 additional ships. It will also allow greater use of more efficient modular construction processes. The expansion is part of parent company Fincantieri’s 5-year, $100 million plan to modernize its U.S. shipbuilding operations and support the LCS program. Green Bay Gazette | MarineLog.

LCS 1 & LHD 6
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March 3/10: CSBA Report. The USA’s non-partisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment puts out a paper: “Littoral Combat Ship: An Examination of its Possible Concepts of Operation” [PDF]. While the report is generally positive about the LCS, and even offers several operational scenarios that use the ship’s capabilities, it does raise a few issues. Crew size is one, but the other relate to the standard trio of speed, armament, and sustainability:

“The disadvantage is that speed requires great power. By choosing speed the Navy has consciously chosen to accept lower carrying capacity and endurance.49 The impact on endurance is illustrated by the fact LCS’s cruising range of around 4,000 nautical miles (nm) at 20kts reduces to 1,500 nm at 45kts. This compares to an endurance of around 12,000 nm at 9kts for the US Coast Guard’s Legend- class National Security Cutter. Consequently, any mission that requires extensive use of speed will significantly limit the ship’s unrefueled time on station. Restrictions on payload and fuel capacity (including aviation fuel) mean that the LCS will require considerable logistical support for the provisioning of fuel, ammunition, perishable foods and other consumables. The Navy will almost certainly need to give greater thought to how the LCS can be supported when operating at distance from base areas.

…While taking due account of the fact that none of these nations operate carriers or long-range strike forces, the ability of the LCS to defend itself when compared to similar ships designed to undertake similar tasks appears to be limited, especially against air attack, regardless of which mission package is carried… The ship currently lacks a torpedo detection capability. The Navy is now taking urgent steps to rectify this worrisome omission… consideration needs to be given to providing a “mother ship” or tender in support able to resupply not only fuel but also other consumables, such as ammunition, perishables and spare parts, and provide medical treatment and workshop facilities. The LCS is designed to be self-sustaining for between fourteen and twenty-one days but in circumstances when it is operating at high speed this could conceivably drop to as little as four days. Workshop access may be particularly important because, as part of the drive to restrict crew size, much of the maintenance generally conducted by a ship’s crew has, in the case of the LCS, been transferred ashore.”

…NWDC laid equal stress on “frequently conducted” or “continuous” missions including SOF support, maritime interception operations/ SLOC(Sea Lines of Communication) patrol, and logistics. It pointed out that in the 29-year period prior to 1999, 60 percent of all naval missions were of this type… The implication of these statements is that the primary use of the LCS is increasingly considered to be as a naval constabulary vessel (which all naval vessels are to a degree) that is also able to undertake most naval diplomacy tasks and selected missions at the middle and lower ends of naval war fighting.”

Note that many of the scenarios to illustrate the ships’ usefulness depend on sustained high-speed operations, against the backdrop of a US Navy that is already short on oilers. Another involves escorts through the Persian Gulf, against fast attack craft armed with anti-ship missiles whose range the LCS cannot match, and whose strikes the LCS is ill-equipped to survive.

March 3/10: Fuel & Range. Inside the Navy publishes data about the relative fuel efficiency of the 2 LCS contenders (Source). There’s a significant difference, with implications for both operating costs and range, but the Navy proposes to treat them as equivalent, vid. Feb 25/10 entry:

“The General Dynamics variant of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) uses less fuel per hour during higher rates of speed than the Lockheed Martin vessel, according to a Navy document. The one-page LCS Consumption Curves shows that both ships use about the same amount of fuel, or barrels, per hour between zero and 16 knots. At five knots, the General Dynamics aluminum trimaran uses 3.2 barrels per hour versus 3.9 for Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull [DID: +21%]. At 14 knots, the General Dynamics ship uses 11.3 barrels per hour while the Lockheed Martin ship uses 12.7 [DID: +12.4%]. At 16 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship uses 18.4 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 15.5 [DID: +18.7%], according to the document. At 30 knots, the General Dynamics trimaran burns through 62.7 barrels per hour, while the Lockheed Martin monohull uses 102.9 barrels per hour [DID: +64.1%] … At 40 knots, the Lockheed Martin ship burns through 138 barrels per hour while the General Dynamics ship uses 105.7 barrels per hour [DID: + 30.5%].”

The LCS-1 Freedom Class’ weight issues could change these figures, especially when fully loaded. The LCS-2 Independence Class also has greater fuel capacity.

Feb 25/10: Competition. US Sen. Sessions [R-AL] questions criteria for Littoral Combat Ship RFP, pointing out the RFP’s cost as sole determinant approach, despite capability differences. The Navy responds that they consider both ships to be equivalent, and says that the ships will spend a low percentage of their time at high speeds. AL.com | YouTube video | Gannett’s Navy Times article.

Feb 19/10: LCS 3. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Kim Martinez says that the Fort Worth [LCS 3] “is being assessed to preclude the same tank design,” and may be modified to avoid the need for USS Freedom’s bolt-on rear “water wings.” Gannett’s Navy Times blog Scoop Deck adds:

“Neither LockMart nor the Navy will say the original LCS 1 design included too little reserve buoyancy, but Martinez stressed that Freedom “meets all the Navy’s requirements, including for reserve buoyancy.” So does that mean the Navy discovered problems with its own requirements after accepting delivery of the Freedom? “That’s a question best answered by the Navy,” Martinez said.”

Feb 16/10: Freedom Class change. Gannett’s Navy Times’ blog “Scoop Deck” notes an interesting change to USS Freedom [LCS 1]:

“There is one big change, however: In a yard period late last year, Freedom acquired two large oblong metal boxes on its transom, on either side of the stern gate its crew uses to launch and recover boats. The sailors call these “buoyancy tanks,” although they look almost like a baby’s water wings for the pool… Do water wings added after the fact mean the Freedom – and Lockheed Martin’s design for the LCS 1-class – suffered from too little reserve buoyancy? “I can’t really talk much more about that,” [Gold Crew skipper, Commander Randy] Garner said.”

Feb 2/10: GAO Report. The US Congress’ GAO submits official report GAO-10-257: “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.” Key excerpts:

“GAO’s analysis of the Navy’s 2009 estimates showed that the [LCS] operating and support costs for seaframes and mission packages could total $84 billion (in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) through about 2050 [divided $64.1B seaframes, $20.8B packages]. However, the Navy did not follow some best practices for developing an estimate… The costs to operate and support a weapon system can total 70 percent of a system’s costs… With a decision pending in 2010 on which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program, decision makers could lack critical information to assess the full costs of the alternatives. The Navy has made progress in developing operational concepts for LCS, but faces risks in implementing its new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that are necessitated by the small crew size… an average of 484 days of training is required before reporting to a [LCS] crew, significantly more than for comparable positions on other surface ships. Moreover, the Navy’s maintenance concept relies heavily on distance support, with little maintenance performed on ship. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new concepts… If the Navy cannot implement its concepts as envisioned, it may face operational limitations, have to reengineer its operational concepts, or have to alter the ship design. Many of the concepts will remain unproven until 2013 or later, when the Navy will have committed to building almost half the class… Navy officials from two divisions within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – the Surface Warfare Division and the Assessments Division – said they were unaware of any analysis supporting the total planned quantities for either the surface warfare package or its maritime security module. Also, Navy officials said that the Navy has not performed a force structure analysis on the antisubmarine package because the contents are under development.”

GAO’s core recommendation, among several:

“To improve decision making, we are recommending that the Navy conduct a risk assessment and consider the results before committing to buy LCS ships in order to link procurement with evidence that the Navy is progressing in its ability to implement its new operational concepts.”

Jan 20/10: No LVL 1 Survivability. Reuters offers conclusions from the Pentagon’s director of Operational Test and Evaluation. They include the failure of either design to meet Level I survivability criteria except among some sub-sections, and that neither ship could be expected to “be survivable in a hostile combat environment.”

Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class monohulls had problems in early air target tracking tests, which revealed deficiencies in the TRS-3D radar’s power supply and reliability, and serious problems with the combat system. The report added that the ship could face stability problems when fully loaded. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Jen Allen claims that stability is no longer a problem for this class, and Reuters reports that the Navy plans to install external tanks to effectively lengthen the ship’s stern, and increase its buoyancy.

General Dynamics/ Austal’s Independence Class trimaran had its builders trials delayed due to reported leaks at the gas turbine shaft seals, and more testing identified deficiencies in the main propulsion diesel engines. Reuters

Jan 11/10: Partnership break-up? Defense News reports that General Dynamics and Austal are set to break up their LCS partnership, which has GD Bath Iron Works as the prime contractor but most of the structural shipbuilding work done by Austal in Mobile, AL. Under the new procurement rules, the US Navy will require a second-supplier shipyard for the winning design, that can’t be associated with the primary builder. Before they take any final actions, however, the GD/Austal team is waiting to see the Navy’s latest RFP, which is a bit behind schedule but is still expected in January 2010.

General Dynamics had reportedly seen Bath Iron Works as the logical shipbuilding facility to take on shipbuilding work if their team’s trimaran design won, but there is some speculation that this may shift to T-AKE shipbuilder GD NASSCO in California, instead.

LCS 2 christening
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Dec 18/09: LCS 2 delivered. The General Dynamics Littoral Combat Ship Team delivers Independence [LCS 2] to the US Navy. USN Commanding Officer Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair Captain Dean Krestos officially accepted custody of Independence in Mobile, AL, where the ship will remain before its commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/10. That date will mark the first time a US Navy ship has been commissioned in Mobile since 1945. The ship will then prepare for its next set of trials, in the summer of 2010. US Navy | GD release.

Dec 17/09: LCS 4 keel. A brief keel laying ceremony is held in Mobile at Austal USA’s Assembly Bay 4 to record completion of the first major construction milestone for Coronado [LCS 4]. As one might expect, the centerpiece of the ceremony was the ship’s keel module, a large outfitted section of the aluminum center hull. GD release.

Dec 12/09: Coast Guard on USS Freedom. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that USS Freedom [LCS 1] will have US Coast Guard VBSS teams on board when it ventures into the Caribbean:

“The littoral combat ship Freedom is to take aboard a Coast Guard law enforcement detachment for part of its trial deployment early next year, Navy officials said, with the Coasties substituting for part of the Navy boarding team added to the LCS crew. Freedom is taking 20 sailors in two visit, board, search and seizure teams…”

Nov 13-21/09: LCS 1. USS Freedom [LCS 1] also conducts independent ship deployment training and certification at sea, operating with ships from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower [CVN 69] Carrier Strike Group during their Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX). That was part of the Maritime Security Surge certification for the ship’s Gold Crew, which will deploy aboard Freedom in early 2010 to U.S. Southern Command.

Nov 19/09: Testing. The US Navy announces that LCS 2 Independence has successfully completed acceptance trials, after completing a series of graded in-port and underway demonstrations for the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV).

Acceptance trials are the last significant milestone before delivery of the ship to the Navy. Ship delivery is expected to occur with the ship’s commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/09 in Mobile, AL.

Oct 18/09: Testing. LCS 2 Independence successfully completes builder’s trials in the Gulf of Mexico. The trials included more than 50 demonstration events in preparation for final inspection by the Navy, including stable flight deck performance and ship control in Beaufort Sea State 5 conditions, sustained speeds of 44 knots, tests of the ship’s open architecture OPEN CI electronic backbone, and detection and engagement of a simulated cruise missile fire by an small jet aircraft. Austal release | GD release | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Oct 14/09: USS Freedom to deploy. The Navy announces the decision to deploy the USS Freedom [LCS 1] in early 2010 to the Southern Command and Pacific Command areas ahead of her originally scheduled 2012 maiden deployment (see also June 9/09 entry). Military.com says that:

“In evaluating options for deploying the Freedom earlier than originally scheduled, the Navy took into consideration several key factors including combat systems testing, shakedown of the ship systems and overseas sustainment with a new concept of operations and crew training. To facilitate the early deployment, the Navy adjusted the Freedom testing schedule, prioritized testing events needed for deployment and deferred others not required for the missions envisioned during this deployment.”

LCS 2, builder’s trials
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Sept 16/09: LCS Plan #4. The Pentagon reiterates its commitment to 55 LCS ships, but changes the LCS program’s acquisition structure, again. There will be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

This timeline would not give the Navy enough time to fully evaluate the ships relative merits before it makes its selection, essentially removing the entire rationale for building 2 types of Flight 0 ships. It would also leave the ships’ overall operational utility an open question.

Colton Company’s Maritime Memos adds that the envisioned structure may face challenges, depending on which design wins. It sees Team Lockheed’s steel hull as biddable to Northrop Grumman Pascagoula, GD Bath Iron Works, and GD NASSCO, plus VT Halter Marine; and possibly Todd, Bollinger in a break-away bid, or anyone who buys Bender in liquidation. The GD Bath Iron Works/Austal aluminum-hull design requires a more specialized set of skills, however, and those ships are too wide to be built on the Great Lakes and shipped out through the seaway. Colton believes a shipbuilder would have to invest in a new yard, or partner with an established aluminum boatbuilder, such as Swiftships or megayacht builder, such as Trinity Yachts. Colton adds:

“In essence, there might not be any credible competition for a second-source contract. Since almost everyone now agrees that the Austal design is clearly superior to the Marinette design, this could give the Navy a new problem.”

It could certainly give the Austal/GD team a new problem. US DoD | The Hill magazine | Alabama Press-Register | Associated Press | Reuters | Information Dissemination op-ed: “The LCS is Still a Mess.”

Acquisition plan #4

July 30/09: Politics. At the House Armed Services Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee’s “Hearing on Efforts to Improve Shipbuilding Effectiveness,” Chair Gene Taylor [D-MS] states in his opening remarks that:

“The LCS program is still a disaster, there is no way to sugar coat it, the program is still a disaster. Those first vessels were constructed in the most inefficient manner possible, just like my house construction analogy, and now we are being told by both the contractors that the cost of these ships really is in excess of a half a billion dollars. I am not sure the Congress is willing to go forward with that program unless significant progress is made on cost control, and I do mean significant.

With the challenges being faced by all the Services in trying to reset from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Navy cannot count on additional funding for ship construction. We all need to figure how to rebuild our Fleet with the procurement dollars available. To do that all costs must come under control. Hard decisions need to be made. Soon.”

June 15/09: Inside the Navy, Vol. 22, No. 23:

“The House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee has proposed to restructure the congressionally mandated $460 million cost cap for the Littoral Combat Ship to solely include the price of each vessel [DID: and not its weapons, radars, and "mission equipment"], but if shipbuilders cannot meet the cost cap, lawmakers would require the Navy to rebid the ship.”

June 10/09: Testing. Austal announces “light off” of LCS 2 Independence’s 4 propulsion engines: 2 GE LM2500 22,000kW gas turbines, and 2 MTU 20V 8000 M71 9,100kW diesels. The light off followed fuel loading and testing of all 4 generators.

Activation and testing of the combat and other systems onboard Independence is continuing at Austal’s US facility in Mobile, AL. The beginning of sea trials is expected within a few weeks.

June 9/09: The Military Officers’ Association of America’s “Inside the Headquarters” blog says that the US Navy is thinking of deploying the LCS early:

“According to a source at Lockheed Martin, the Navy wants the USS Freedom (LCS 1) to deploy soon and well ahead of schedule. Apparently the chief of naval operations himself, Adm. Gary Roughead, has called for the move. Currently, the Freedom is not scheduled to deploy until 2012.”

The Somali coast would be the most likely destination. Efforts to move endangered weapons programs to the front lines, in order to secure a program’s future, have a long history in the US military.

June 9/09: Support. Alion Science and Technology Corp. in Washington, DC received an $8.6 million modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-09-F-B008) for support to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program office. This will include program planning and management, business and financial management planning and execution, systems engineering, test and evaluation engineering, life cycle engineering and support, logistics and operation support, configuration and data management engineering, and combat systems development.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC, and is expected to be complete by September 2009.

June 1/09: Costs. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that based on FY 2010 budget justification documents, the price to build, outfit and deliver Team Lockheed’s USS Freedom [LCS 1] now is $637 million, up from last year’s estimate of $631 million. The price tag for the GD/Austal ship Independence [LCS 2], however, rose from $636 million to $704 million. Most of the cost growth on the LCS 2 is listed under Basic Construction Cost.

LCS 1, builder’s trials
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May 22/09: Testing. The USS Freedom wasn’t able to perform a number of key Navy acceptance tests on Lake Michigan, where she was built. A 2nd round of INSURV testing was required, and the US Navy PEO Ships release states that:

“There were no major safety issues or operational restrictions determined during the trial, although the ship must complete a number of scheduled system certifications before it can conduct unrestricted operations.”

INSURV inspectors noted that since the August 2008 lake trials, the ship has made improvements to its propulsion plant, machinery control system, communication systems, and information systems. The new salt water tests allowed inspectors to check the ship’s cathodic protection, degaussing, and reverse osmosis system. Ocean conditions let them test surveillance and identification systems at a sufficient distance from land without border issues. And stepping out of a lake used for drinking water let them demonstrate the ship’s fire suppression and waste discharge systems. Other major systems and features demonstrated for INSURV this time included aviation support, small boat launch handling and recovery, fin stabilizers, in addition to the full-power run.

May 15/09: LCS for NFS? Aviation Week reports that US Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway is working with his Navy counterpart, Adm. Gary Roughead, to expand the concept of using the LCS as a naval fire support option for Marine landings.

Conway is quoted as discussing “a box of rockets” as the Marnes’ preferred option, which would seem to indicate the LCS surface warfare module’s planned NLOS-LS/NETFIRES “missile in a box” system. On the other hand, the report adds that:

“The services are still examining storage and elevator capacity aboard LCS, and Conway said “we don’t have [the] box we need.”

April 6/09: Budgets. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announces his FY 2010 budget recommendations, which include 3 LCS ships. Despite issues with the program, and concern about the ship’s combat capabilities, Gates reiterates the goal of eventually buying 55 of these $500+ million specialty support ships. The announcement bolstered confidence at Austal, which had been watching the budget deliberations closely.

March 12/09: LCS 4 named. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter announces that LCS 4 will be named USS Coronado. A 4th LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been allocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships. The Navy’s release has a picture of the GD/Austal trimaran design next to the announcement, but the announcement does not confirm that type as LCS 4.

Coronado, near San Diego, CA is home to Naval Air Base North Island (NASNI) and Naval Amphibious Base (NAB), Coronado, and has been home to the Navy since 1917. Coronado hosts 2 aircraft carriers, the west coast’s major SEAL special forces facility, and over 120 tenant commands between the 2 bases. US Navy.

March 11/09: Politics. Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week reports that one logical corollary of a “build to [blue]print” approach is that foreign shipyards might become eligible to compete for LCS construction:

“[Taylor] also noted to the conference that he’s visited other shipyards – Hyundai in Korea, Maersk in Finland – and concluded that “our yards have to get up to their [DID: highly automated] standards.” So if LCS goes to open bidding, would those shipyards be eligible to bid? “Traditionally the House has preferred to build our weapons domestically,” Taylor said, “but we’ve had a hard time getting it past Senator McCain. If I had my way I’d limit it to American shipbuilders. But I often don’t get my way.”

That statement can fairly be described as cryptic. Sweetman’s conjecture re: foreign construction is unlikely, for a variety of political reasons. Government funding for shipyard improvements, meanwhile, did not appear in the “stimulus” bill, and would be most likely to be funneled to the larger military shipyards if it was granted.

March 10/09: Politics. MarineLog reports that the Littoral Combat Ship program receives another bi-partisan rough ride at the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces. Chairman Gene Taylor [D-MS]:

“When I look at the plan from just two years ago, we should by now have at least 4 ships delivered, 3 more nearing completion from a fiscal year 2008 authorization, 6 under contract from a fiscal year 2009 authorization, and today we should be discussing the authorization of 6 more ships for fiscal year 2010. That would be a total of 19 ships. So instead of having 13 delivered or under contract with another 6 in this year’s budget, we have one ship delivered that will likely tip the scales well above two and a half times the original estimate and one ship that might finish this summer, with similar if not higher cost growth… Everyone should understand that the current situation of these vessels costing in excess of a half billion dollars cannot continue… There are too many other needs and too little resources to pour money into the program that was designed to be affordable.”

With respect to Taylor’s desire for a “build to print” approach, the answer appears to be that the government owns the rights to the ship’s physical design, but integration of all the sub-systems like the radar, Mk110 naval gun etc. is another matter. Rep. Todd Akin [R-MO] was critical of the Navy’s acquisition strategy, from the repeated changes over the last 2 years to the current strategy’s sustainability:

“We cannot reasonably expect the industry teams to make the investments in facilities and designs for affordability we demand, if we cannot articulate what we want to buy. Further, we cannot reasonably expect the taxpayers to continue to fund ships that we cannot definitively say we want… We need to be very cautious about increasing capacity for which the Navy lacks the volume to support… We must ensure that we are not creating two additional shipyards who rely on a sole customer for support. The strategy for building LCS at mid-tier yards was explicitly to avoid this phenomenon, since these yards had commercial work. Now, we hear that these yards may have turned away commercial work and are considering capital investments with the intent of constructing LCS only.”

See: MarineLog | Information Dissemination.

March 6/09: New LCS 3 named. US Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announces 6 that the LCS 3 will be named USS Fort Worth. A 3rd LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been allocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships.

The Navy says that the announcement continues the practice of naming the agile LCS vessels after American midsized cities, small towns and communities. Fort Worth, TX, near Dallas, is an especially important hub of aerospace manufacturing, but a number of other defense-related activities go on there. US Navy.

March 2/09: Industrial. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-03-C-2311) for “LCS program continuation efforts necessary to preserve production capability at its industry team shipyard facility.” Work is expected to be complete by April 2009, and will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Moorestown, NJ (13%); Clearwater, FL (11%); Brunswick, GA (10%); Washington, DC (8%) and Baltimore, MD (2%) under contract (N00024-03-C-2311).

Lockheed Martin has already delivered USS Freedom [LCS 1] to the Navy, and the Navy’s prior cancellation of LCS 3 has left that shipyard with a work gap. General Dynamics and Austal, meanwhile, continue to build LCS 2 Independence at their Gulf Coast shipyard. This award must be at least $5 million, or the Navy would not have announced it at all, but no figure was given. With respect to this award, the US Navy cites this justification for its lack of transparency:

“As this award represents efforts integrally related to Phase I of a competitive two-phased acquisition approach to procure FY09/FY10 LCS, with Phase II including potential award of up to three additional LCS Flight 0+ Class ships, the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time.”

That translates as “we’re still negotiating with Lockheed Martin and with General Dynamics for fixed-price awards, and are appropriating these funds to buy advance materials and avoid layoffs at Marinette.”

Feb 24/09: Politics. Senators McCain and Levin, who have authored legislation to reform the US military’s procurement system, single out the LCS program in their comments. CNN:

“Levin said the ships are “way beyond” their projected construction time of two years, and the program has grown from a cost per ship of about $220 million to more than $500 million, according to a November report from the Congressional Research Service. “We can’t have a ship that’s a small ship that’s supposed to be built in two years run completely out of control to double or triple or quadruple its original cost estimates,” McCain said.”

Jan 28/09: LCS 2. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received a $37.75 million basic ordering agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) of the USS Independence [LCS-2]. Work will include the ship’s PSA efforts, testing, and materials, from program management to advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List, and required fixes.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%); Norfolk, VA (24%); and Mobile, AL (23%), and is expected to be complete by December 2012. This contract was not competitively procured (N00024-09-G-2301).

Dec 29/08: NVR cert. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) in Houston, TX is a congressionally recognized agent of the government, and certification to set standards is one of their services. They receive a $55 million cost no fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinitely-quantity contract to provide for ship classification and classification-related services using Naval Vessel Rules (NVR), which form the core of the certification process for surface ships bought by US NAVSEA.

New construction contracts require the ships to be designed and constructed in accordance with ABS Rules for Building and Classing Naval Vessels, and other referenced ABS Rules and Guides as necessary to comply with the designated class notations. Readers of this brief will recall that the switch to NVR rules during LCS construction was one of the key factors that inflated the costs of the first ships, and raised costs across the board for the class. On the other hand, ships built to NVR standards can be expected to survive damage better than comparable non-NVR ships.

Approximately 46% of ABS’ services will be performed in support of new DDG ships in Bath, ME (GD-BIW); Pascagoula, MS; and Gulf Port, MS (NG-SS) and approximately 46% in support of future LCS new construction ships in locations to be determined. The remaining 8% of services will be performed in Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; and various worldwide points as specified in task orders to be issued. Work is expected to be completed by December 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Washington, DC (N00024-09-D-4208)

Dec 17/08: Weight. Information Dissemination relays an Inside the Navy report hat covers ongoing platform issues in “LCS Weight Issue Revisited“. From Inside the Navy:

“In October, Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss confirmed that initial tests by the Navy were showing the vessel to be six percent overweight, but maintained that it was not cause for concern… “There’s stuff on board that I don’t think we need,” Gabrielson said. “There’s some pretty big things on board that I think we could live without.”

Oct 31/08: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a $37.5 million Basic Ordering Agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) on the Littoral Combat Ship, USS Freedom [LCS-1]. The orders to be issued will encompass services include, but are not limited to program management, advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, and preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List. The orders will also encompass material and labor to perform the PSA for LCS 1, all testing, including post repair trials required to verify the accuracy and completion of all shipyard industrial work, non-standard equipment when approved, and technical manuals for non-standard equipment.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%) and Norfolk, VA (47%), and is expected to be completed by January 2011. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, D.C. (N00024-09-G-2300).

Oct 24/08: The Freedom [LCS 1] sails away from the Marinette Marine Corp. shipyard in Marinette, WI, en route to Duluth, MN for a four-day port visit beginning Oct. 27. This will be the first leg in the ship’s voyage of commissioning and transit to Norfolk, VA, where she will undergo fleet testing and evaluation away from the Great Lakes’ ice buildups. Maritime Reporter and Engineering News.

Oct 4/08: LCS 2 christened. The Austal/General Dynamics ship LCS 2 Independence is christened in a ceremony at Austal’s Mobile, AL shipyard. US Navy PEO Ships release | Austal release.

Team GD LCS Concept
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September 2008: The US Navy has the appropriated funds to build an additional LCS ship, but decides not to issue that contract. Source.

No FY 2008 ship

Sept 30/08: Infrastructure. R. A. Burch Construction Co., Inc. in Ramona, CA received $6.5 million for a firm-fixed-price task order under a previously award multiple award construction contract. They will be responsible for upgrading Building 57 for the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) squadron administrative headquarters at Naval Base San Diego. The task order also contains one option, which if exercised would increase cumulative task order value to $8.7 million.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by April 2010. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, and 3 proposals were received for this task order by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA (N62473-08-D-8607, #0005).

Sept 18/08: LCS 1 delivered. The Lockheed Martin-led LCS team delivers LCS 1 Freedom to the U.S. Navy. The delivery milestone marks the Navy’s preliminary acceptance of LCS 1.

Sept 4/08: CSBA Cool to LCS Concept. WIRED Danger Room’s post “Navy Already Shifting Away from Shallow Waters?” forwards an analysis by Bob Work, naval analyst at the respected, nonpartisan CSBA think tank in Washington. He sees the same pressures that turned the Navy against the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer program impinging on the future of the Littoral Combat Ship:

“The maritime area over which a strong coastal power can now influence with multidimensional, combined-arms naval reconnaissance-strike complexes is expanding. The combination of space-based sensors, over-the-horizon radars, maritime [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], patrol and strike aircraft, nuclear and [Air-Independent Propulsion] submarines armed with wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles, and now anti-ship ballistic missiles, poses severe threats to any surface ship. Under these circumstances, the Navy has to improve its ability to fight from range, in the open ocean.”

July 31/08: CRS report. In testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee, Dr. Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office discusses the LCS program to date [PDF]:

“The Navy’s 2009 shipbuilding plan envisions building 55 littoral combat ships between 2005 and 2019. Because those ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the Navy would need to begin procuring their replacements in 2032… The Navy expects to buy 64 mission modules for the 55-ship program.

…Originally, each sea frame was expected to cost about $260 million (in 2009 dollars, or $220 million in 2005 dollars). The Navy’s 2009 budget would allow the purchase of 18 LCSs during the 2009-2013 period, at an average cost of about $450 million per sea frame. That is 11 fewer than the 2008 plan envisioned… In the 2009 budget, the Navy estimates the cost of LCS-1 at $631 million and LCS-2 at $636 million… using the lead ship of the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate as an analogy… The first FFG-7 cost about $670 million to build (in 2009 dollars), or about $250 million per thousand tons, including combat systems. Applying that metric to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $600 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module… CBO estimates that the first two LCSs could cost about $700 million each, including outfitting and postdelivery costs… As of April 27, 2008, LCS-1 was 87% complete and LCS-2 was 72% complete. So, additional cost growth is possible…”

July 30/08: What happened to LCS? Naval Technology’s article “Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground” offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state. In brief, it states that:

“Distilling the story yields the following guide to botching development projects in five steps [...];

1. Make the goal as difficult as possible
2. Impose a management style ideally suited for commoditised products
3. When sourcing, be penny-wise and pound-foolish
4. Design and build simultaneously
5. When you’re in a hole, keep digging

[...] Perhaps the moral of the LCS story is this: the US can produce better ships, or produce ships better – but it can’t do both at the same time.”

July 28/08: Testing. LCS 1 Freedom begins builder’s trials on Lake Michigan. US Navy release | Reuters Aug 12/08 follow-up.

April 28/08: LCS 2 launched. Austal USA’s Mobile, AL shipyard launches LCS 2 Independence. The ship will be moored alongside the Austal USA facility for activation and testing of combat and other onboard systems is completed. Sea trials are expected to commence in late 2008. Austal release.

March 14/08: Controversy. The odds don’t look good for the US Navy’s FY 2009 request of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. The house Armed Services Committee’s Seapower & Expeditionary Forces subcommittee took testimony regarding that request, and the LCS request came under fire from both sides of the aisle. See “US Navy’s 313-Ship Plan Under Fire in Congress” for full links etc. Chairman Rep. Gene Taylor [D-MS], a strong proponent of more naval shipbuilding:

“So, instead of being asked to fund programs that are building ships on time and at projected cost, we are asked to fund programs which are not… [the LCS] will go into the textbooks to train future acquisition officials how not to run a program. The LCS will be at least twice as expensive as advertised, it has taken twice as long to build the lead ships, neither vessel has been underway on its own power, and the Navy cancelled two contract options last year, which were already funded, because of cost overruns.

Yet this year we are asked to authorize two more ships – why? What has changed between then and now that indicates that this program is in any way ready to build more ships? We have been told the answer to this question is that there is an ‘emergent need’ for these ships in the fleet. If that is true why did the Navy cancel two of the ships? At some point we must stop throwing money at this program until the Navy can prove that at least one of the ships can get to sea and do its mission.”

Ranking minority member Roscoe Bartlett [R-MD] was equally skeptical:

“And how much risk are we buying down if we procure two more Littoral Combat Ships, the year after we cancelled two, and the year in which the Navy plans to conduct an operational evaluation and possible downselect of LCS-1 and 2? Even if there is no downselect, the Navy has stated that there will be design changes made to the Flight One ships. So the two we buy now will be different than the remaining 50. Is that worth it, if those funds could keep a stable program like LPD-17 alive?”

Feb 4/08: Costs. FY 2009 budget documents released by the Navy give the expected final cost for its LCS-1 and LCS-2 ships: $631 million and $636 million, respectively. First-of-class ships usually cost more – but recall that prescient July 24/07 estimate of $630 million from the Congressional Budget Office.

Oct 11/07: Israel. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that the Israeli Navy “has launched a second study regarding the potential acquisition of the United States Navy’s (USN’s) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) focused on Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull design known as LCS-I (Israel). “That design appears to be the most suitable for our needs,” a senior IN source told Jane’s…”

See “An LCS For Israel?” for full coverage.

GD: Helicopter space
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Sept 27/07: Sub-contractors. Small business qualifier ALCOA Inc. in Alcoa Center, PA received an $8.3 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee completion contract to provide engineering services in support of the re-design of existing aluminum structures to improve performance and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) via weight reduction of selected assemblies or components. Work will be performed in Alcoa Center, PA (84%); Johnstown, PA (11%); Columbus, OH (3%); and various shipyards (2%), and is expected to be complete in September 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $3.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, West Bethesda, Md., is the contracting activity (N00167-07-D-0010).

This contract will fund the Alcoa Collaborative Design Approach (ACDA), a phased program approach in which the following tasks will be applied to the LCS: selection of candidate assemblies and components; development of conceptual designs and down selection of design concepts; evaluation of design concepts and final selection; development and evaluation of prototypes; and ship integration. The components for improvement may include hull sections, doors/hatches, load floors, foundations, large apertures or similar structures.

Alcoa has considerable expertise in this area, having worked closely with Lockheed Martin on a very similar effort re: the F-35B Lightning II STOVL fighter.

Still, one wonders why, exactly, this has become a priority for the LCS program? The Dec 17/08 entry suggests that weight reduction was the goal.

Sept 24/07: LCS 2 issues. Newhouse News Service reports that “Navy inspectors have documented numerous problems with construction of a next-generation vessel known as the littoral combat ship, or LCS, according to government records obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act.” They are referring specifically to the General Dynamics/ Austal ships, and proceed to detail these issues in “Navy Inspectors Find Numerous Problems With Ship Project.”

Some of these items are “normal” issues that inspectors exist to catch, others are less so. Note, especially the time frames of the issues raised, as many date from 2006 and predate subsequent reports.

Sept 21/07: LCS 4? Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the US Navy and General Dynamics are expected to meet next week to discuss the LCS program:

“GD spokesman Kendall Pease confirmed the Navy had asked for the meeting but provided no further details, other than to say a specific date had not been set. Other sources, however, said the meeting was to discuss slowing construction on LCS 4, the second ship GD is building at its Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, Ala.”

The Navy was forced to reimburse Team Lockheed for a number of expenses after canceling LCS-3, and they are reportedly trying to restructure the deal with the GD/Austal team to avoid paying those costs in the event that LCS-4 is canceled. If the parties cannot agree, the Navy could always choose to cancel LCS-4 on those grounds, and pay the minor reimbursement fees that would be involved at this early stage. The downside is that a second cancellation decision would leave the entire LCS program in tatters, either turning it into a 1-ship each “sail off” competition, or throwing the entire program back to the drawing board.

Aug 8/07: Cost growth. US Navy acquisition chief Dolores Etter said in an interview with Reuters that General Dynamics is about 54% done with its first ship [LCS-2], which is due to be delivered in mid-2008. She also stated that “We … continue to see challenges with the program and with each platform, specifically with the propulsion system on LCS-1 and systems integration on LCS-2.”

With respect to the GD/Austal team’s effort to rein in costs, she said that “We do have points at which our concern will go up. You can’t predict what will happen, but things are moving forward in a good direction” in terms of the firm’s efforts to rein in costs.

Meanwhile, Reuters adds that US Navy officials have asked lawmakers to approve a 55% increase in a cost cap for the 5th and 6th LCS ships, to $460 million. They also said costs for the first Lockheed ship and GD’s LCS-2 could be up to 75% higher than expected. Reuters article: “US Navy sees progress on General Dynamics LCS ship.”

July 24/07: CBO Report. In a statement before the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Congressional Budget Office representatives testify that [PDF format]:

“Experience had suggested that cost growth was likely to occur in the LCS program. In particular, historical cost-weight relationships – using the lead ship of the Oliver Hazard Perry class of frigates (FFG-7) as an analogy – indicated that the Navy’s original cost target for the LCS was optimistic. The first FFG-7, including its combat systems, cost a total of about $650 million (in 2008 dollars) to build, or about $235 million per thousand tons. Applying that per-ton estimate to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $575 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module (to make them comparable to the FFG-7). In this case, looking at cost-weight relationships produced an estimate less than the apparent cost of the first two LCSs but substantially greater than the Navy’s original estimate.

As of this writing, the Navy has not publicly released an estimate for the LCS program that incorporates the most recent cost growth, other than its request to raise the cost caps for the fifth and sixth ships. CBO estimates that with that growth included, the first two LCSs would cost about $630 million each, excluding mission modules but including outfitting, postdelivery, and various nonrecurring costs associated with the first ships of the class. As the program advances, with a settled design and higher annual rates of production, the average cost per ship is likely to decline. Excluding mission modules, the 55 LCSs in the Navy’s plan would cost an average of $450 million each, CBO estimates.”

DID background: The FFG-7 frigates are still widely touted as a successful example of cost containment. The Oliver Hazard Perry Class met their budget and performance targets and served successfully. The USS Stark even survived a hit from an Iraqi Exocet missile while patrolling the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. The ships paid a price in lower capability and lack of space for capability growth, however, and many were sold to other countries or retired early because upgrading them was too difficult. That experience was one of the inspirations for the LCS’ open-architecture, mission modules approach.

Feb 28/07: Costs. Reports surface that the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS design is also expected to face cost overruns, although the scope of the increases is not yet clear. Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter had said the first General Dynamics LCS ship would cost $350 million or more, but Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, Etter’s spokesman, said in an e-mail that:

“Etter mistakenly characterized the cost of LCS 2 to be $350 million or more. The estimated cost range of LCS 1 is $350 million-$375 million, as previously testified. That estimate is based on the best information to date. There is insufficient information to know precisely the final cost range of LCS 2… Although we anticipate some cost growth, it is premature to discuss specific numbers as they are unavailable at this time.”

Etter described Team Lockheed’s LCS-1 Freedom as 75-80% complete, and the GD/Austal team’s LCS-2 Independence as about 33% complete. Reuters report | Defense News report (March 20/07).

Jan 12/07: Stop Work on LCS 3. “The Navy issued a stop work order Jan. 12 to Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors unit, Moorestown, N.J., for the construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This stop work order will take effect immediately, and is for a period of 90 days. The stop work order was issued because of significant cost increases currently being experienced with the construction of LCS-1 and LCS-3, under construction by Lockheed Martin…”

The US Navy says they are “working closely with the contractor to identify the root cause of the costs growth… [and] reviewing the overall acquisition strategy for the LCS program…” At this point, the GD/Austal team’s trimaran design and build-out of LCS 2&4 are unaffected. See full DID coverage with all updates, not to mention the Lexington institute’s predictive December 2006 report “Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy.”

Oct 17/06: The FY 2007 defense budget is signed. LCS funding is not cut, but remains at $520.67 million

LCS 1 Freedom christening
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Sept 23/06: LCS 1 launch. The US Navy christens and launches LCS 1 Freedom, the nation’s first littoral combat ship, at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin. The ship will continue to undergo outfitting and testing at Marinette Marine; it will be commissioned in 2007 and eventually homeported in San Diego, CA. The ship’s sponsor is Birgit Smith, wife of the late Medal of Honor recipient U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul Ray Smith.

July 26/06: CRS report. The US Congressional Research Service releases its report “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress.” Meanwhile, as negotiations in Congress go forward, The House-reported version of the FY2007 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5631) recommends approval of this request. The Senate reported version recommends a 2-ship cut by funding just one LCS in FY 2007, and rescinding funding for 1 of the 3 LCSs procured in FY 2006.

April 13/06: Israel. Israel is considering Lockheed’s Littoral Combat Ship design. Specifically, they’re considering Lockheed’s monohull design as a potential replacement for their Saar Class corvettes and missile boats. A funded initial study is underway to assess feasibility, and integration with Israeli systems and weapons is critical.

Jan 19/06: LCS 2 keel. GD/Austal Lays Keel for LCS 2. Austal USA hosts a traditional US Navy keel-laying ceremony to signify the start of construction on the first Flight 0 General Dynamics/Austal LCS trimaran. The keel laying follows on the heels of the official November 17, 2005 opening of Austal USA’s ship construction facility in Mobile, AL. See also General Dynamics team lead press release.

Dec 2/05: The U.S. Navy announced that USS Freedom [LCS 1] will be homeported at Naval Station San Diego, CA when it enters service. The ship is expected to be delivered to the Navy in December 2006, and arrive in San Diego in early 2007. See US Navy release.

Skjold Class
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June 2/05: LCS 1 keel. Lockheed Lays Keel for LCS 1, USS Freedom. This is the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design, and the ceremony was attended by numerous dignitaries. This event is related the Dec 15, 2004 shipbuilding contract, of course.

April 11/05: Bath Iron Works prepares for construction. Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $16 million cost-plus-fixed-fee option to previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310 for the advance procurement of required Long Lead Material for the first “Flight Zero” models of General Dynamics’ trimaran Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design. The contract award for Long Lead Material includes a description of the items to be procured, the supplier, the required ordering date, supplier lead-time, in-yard need date and a breakout by month of the dollar amounts required. Work is expected to be complete in September 2005.

June 6/04: LCS 1 design. Lockheed unveils latest version of its LCS design.

Visby Corvette
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July 17/03: Preliminary Designs. The following 3 companies out of 6 offers won firm-fixed-price contracts for Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship Preliminary Design:

General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME (N00024-03-C-2310 – $8.9 million)

Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems, Surface Systems in Washington, DC (N00024-03-C-2311 – $10 million)

Raytheon Company Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI (N00024-03-C-2312 – $10 million).

Each contractor will perform a preliminary design effort to refine its proposed Littoral Combat Ship concept. Work is expected to be complete in February 2004. The 3 losing teams include Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Gibbs and Cox (who would join the Lockheed team), John J McMullen Associates, and Textron Systems Marine & Land Operations.

The biggest surprise is the absence of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, who was working from an already-proven littoral corvette design by Sweden’s Kockums AB, and its German parent Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG. Kockums designed and is building Sweden’s Visby Class littoral warfare corvettes, and Northrop Grumman planned to use the stealthy carbon fiber mono-hull as the baseline for its LCS program.

Preliminary design contracts

May 21/03: Lockheed Martin holds an Industry Day to solicit potential members for its LCS team. Its base design concept is then known as “Sea Blade.”

March 4/03: Lockheed lays foundation for LCS team. Lockheed Martin, naval architects Gibbs & Cox, Bollinger Shipyards and shipbuilders Marinette Marine formally partner on the LCS program. The Lockheed release contains details of their respective areas of responsibility and past work.

September 2002: Skjold. US Navy finishes studying Norway’s Skjold (“Shield”) Class air cushion catamaran littoral fast patrol boats. The ship completed a 13-month deployment in the USA, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea. The ship participated in a series of naval exercises and a number of tests with US Navy research establishments NAVSEA and the Office of Naval Research.

March 25/02: Sea SLICE. Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel participates in naval exercise. The vessel participated as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons, as does this GlobalSecurity.org Sea SLICE profile.

LCS Ancillaries: Equipment, Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events

Griffin launch
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Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

Some items are covered separately. The helicopter-based portions of the MCM module will be covered in full at “MH-60S Airborne Mine Counter-Measures Continues Development“, but notes and link entries may also appear here for some events, in order to provide an integrated timeline perspective or reference specific ships. The same is true for Raytheon’s RAM air defense and surface attack missile, and its Griffin missile.

Note that the structure of weapon contracts like the RAM, Mk-46, Mk-110, etc. may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship. Inclusions here should be considered illustrative, therefore, rather than comprehensive.

March 28/13: GAO Report. The US GAO tables its “Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs“. Which is actually a review for 2012, plus time to compile and publish. The Navy owns 3 MCM (mine, 1st delivery Sept. 2007) and 4 SUW (“surface warfare”, 1st delivery July 2008) mission modules, and has completely re-started the ASW anti-submarine module. Several of the sub-systems in these modules are still experiencing performance problems, many components are still in development, and the Navy has yet to fully integrate these technologies and test them on board an LCS in a realistic environment. In October 2012, DOD delegated future decision authority to the Navy and requested an acquisition program baseline within 60 days – which was not delivered on schedule.

MCM: The Navy plans to accept 1 more in 2013, but it doesn’t meet requirements. The MH-60S helicopter can’t tow the AQS-20A sonar as planned, the WLD-1 USV has performance issues, the ALMDS laser system gets too many false positives from surface reflections, and the RAMICS gun and OASIS decoy are out. Nonetheless, the Navy describes recent MCM tests as “very successful”. The Navy plans to conduct developmental testing in FY 2014 and establish initial operational capability with 7 MCM modules in September 2014. Full operational capability isn’t expected until 2018, when the Navy is expected to have 21 LCS ships, of 30 ordered.

SUW: Does not meet requirements. At the moment it’s just the 57mm gun up front, a pair 30mm guns, a helicopter, and an 11m RHIB small boat for boarding teams. This is about what a coast guard cutter carries, and it still won’t reach initial operational capability before September 2014. Even the Griffin missile with its miniscule 3 nm range isn’t expected before 2015, and a competition for a missile with a more serious tactical range isn’t expected before 2019.

ASW: Canceled and has been restarted. The Navy plans for initial delivery in 2016, and full operational capability in 2018. The design is stripped down, involving a ship-based variable-depth sonar, towed array, and towed torpedo decoy for defense.

March 18/13: IOC delays. Jane’s quotes director of navy staff Vice-Admiral Richard Hunt says that the Continuing Resolutions have “delayed us probably a year for IOC [initial operational capability] for a couple of those different modules…”

March 15/13: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $28.6 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission packages. To date, those efforts haven’t gone very well, with many technologies failed out and no truly ready sets over 7 years after development began.

Work will be performed in Portsmouth, VA (32%); Huntsville, AL (25%); Bethpage, NY (21%); Manchester, NH (11%); Silver Creek, NY (10%); Hollywood, MD (1%), and is expected to be completed by September 2014. All monies are committed immediately, using FY 2012 Navy Operations & Maintenance funding (N00024-06-C-6311).

Jan 17/13: DOT&E Testing Report. The Pentagon releases the FY 2012 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The LCS mission modules still have a lot of issues. There isn’t anything left to test any more in the ASW anti-submarine module, for instance, so DOT&E didn’t report on it while the Navy considers a re-start.

Mine Warfare: Begin with the MH-60S helicopter, which isn’t powerful enough to safely tow the AQS-20A sonar or OASIS decoy under all of the required conditions. Both are being removed from AMCM, and OASIS is removed from the MIW module. This would seem to be the epitome of a forseeable/ easily testable problem, but it’s being “discovered” 7 years after development began. Why?

The AQS-20A will now depend on the WLD-1 RMMV snorkeling USV, which is trying to correct its reliability and performance issues by 2015. RMMV v4.1 is showing some improvements in limited testing, but the ships themselves need to make changes to launch and recover it while underway. The AQS-20A sonar has its own problems with contact depth calculations in all modes, and with false contacts in 2 of 3 search modes. The Navy hopes to find AQS-20 engineering fixes. Meanwhile, in order to reduce those errors, the Navy will have to slow its scan methods and reduce the area covered.

The AES-1 ALMDS laser mine-detection system doesn’t meet Navy requirements for False Classification Density or reliability, and the DOT&E expects to issue a formal test report in Q2 FY2013. The Navy hopes to find engineering fixes. Meanwhile, in order to reduce those errors, the Navy will have to slow its scan methods and reduce the area covered. Some reports suggest that ALMDS will be cut entirely, but the raft of other MCM system casualties may force the Navy to keep it.

Surface Warfare: Still useless against anything ut a lightly-armed motorboat, but that’s beyond GAO’s purview. What they do say is that the Navy hasn’t not finalized any tactical idea of how the ships will be used with the SUW mission module. Even within this limited set, the MK46 “30 mm guns and associated combat system exhibit reliability problems,” and the Freedom Class has performance deficiencies with its COMBATSS-21 combat system and TRS-3D radar that affect tracking and engagement of contacts.

Dec 28/12: RMS. Lockheed Martin in Riviera Beach, FL receives a $12.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order to perform Remote Minehunting System/WLD-1 USV maintenance, testing and integration with the with Littoral Combat Ship. The WLD-1 is currently working on improving its reliability and performance, after falling short in these areas.

Work will be performed in Palm Beach, FL (87%), and Syracuse, NY (13%), and is expected to be complete by May 2013. $5.3 million is committed immediately, and $295,000 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract (N00024-10-G-6306).

Dec 20/12: AMNS. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI receives a $7.9 million contract modification, covering AMNS’ Critical Design Review.

Work will be performed in Portsmouth, RI, and is expected to be complete by July 2013. All contract funds are committed immediately, and $4.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/13. US NAVSEA in Washington DC in is the contracting activity (N00024-10-C-6307).

Feb 15/12: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives an $18.7 million contract modification to provide LCS Mission Module engineering and production planning services. “Mission package capabilities are currently focused on primary mission areas of mine warfare emphasizing mine countermeasures, littoral anti-submarine warfare, and littoral surface warfare operations, including prosecution of small boats.”

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (45%); Washington, DC (20%); Panama City, FL (20%); Ventura County, CA (10%); and Dahlgren, VA (5%), and is expected to be completed by December 2012. US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC manages the contract.

Feb 10/12: Armed USVs. US Navy expeditionary warfare division branch chief Capt. Evin Thompson says that they are looking to arm their MUSCL (Modular Unmanned Surface Craft Littoral) USV unmanned boats with RAFAEL’s Spike anti-tank missile. Navy officials initially tested the weapon’s performance during the Trident Warrior exercise, aboard a USV originally designed as part of the LCS anti-submarine warfare package.

RAFAEL’s Spike packs roughly equivalent range and punch to the LCS’ Griffin missiles, with some variants having longer reach. MUSCL does look a bit light for it, but could certainly carry DRS/NAWCAD’s Spike missile. At this point, despite the involvement of the LCS PEO, there are no plans to deploy a USV/missile combination on LCS. AOL Defense.

Dec 19/11: MIW – WLD-1. Lockheed Martin announces the end of the 1st of 3 planned development and testing cycles, involving 500 hours of reliability testing on the U.S. Navy’s WLD-1 RMMV. These efforts are aimed at improving the Remote Minehunting System’s reliability and operational availability, which have been a serious problem for the sonar-towing snorkeling USV. A recent $52.7 million contract will continue the program to improve its reliability until 2013. Read “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development” for more.

Nov 7/11: Griffin replacement? Inside the Navy reports [subscription] that the Griffin missile will be part of LCS’ initial surface warfare module, but a competition will begin in 2012, and:

“The program executive office for the Littoral Combat Ship has already identified capabilities that could replace the Griffin missile…”

IAI’s Jumper (vid. May 16/11 entry) comes to mind, and there appear to be others.

Sept 30/11: SMCM UUV. General Dynamics AIS in McLeansville, NC wins a $48.6 million contract with cost-plus-incentive-fee, cost-plus-fixed-fee, and firm-fixed-price line items for the engineering, manufacturing and development of the Surface Mine Countermeasure Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (SMCM UUV, aka. “Knifefish”).

This will be a new part of the Littoral Combat Ship’s Mine Counter-Measures package, and includes 2 of Bluefin Robotics’ large Bluefin-21 UUVs, launch and recovery equipment, a support container, spare parts and support equipment, and an advanced sonar payload developed by GD-AIS. Read “LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development” for more.

Aug 25/11: A not-to-exceed $161 million contract modification to previously awarded contract for MK15 Mod 31 SeaRAM missile systems to equip the Independence Class ships LCS 6 Jackson and LCS 8 Montgomery, and Japan’s “DDH 2405 helicopter destroyer”; as well as Phalanx CIWS Block 1B class “A” overhauls, and land-based Phalanx Weapon System class “A” overhauls. See the linked article for further details.

Aug 1/11: RAM. A $7.4 million contract modification for 3 refurbished and upgraded RAM MK 49 Mod 3 Guided Missile Launch Systems with associated hardware, for use on LHA 7 (unnamed, America Class escort carrier, 2 systems) and LCS 5 Milwaukee (Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship, 1 system).

Work will be performed in Tucson, AZ, and is expected to be complete by March 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year (N00024-11-C-5448). Note that the structure of RAM contracts may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship.

July 21/11: MIW – UISS. The US Navy announces the successful completion of shore-based and at-sea integrated system tests on the prototype Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) USV and payload in Panama City, FL. UISS is designed for the LCS as part of the mine countermeasures mission package, supplementing the helicopter-based AMCM system. The system consists of an unmanned surface craft that carries and tows the combined acoustic and magnetic minesweeping payload.

The Phase 1 Sweep Operational Checkout was very basic, testing that UISS can be deployed and retrieved from Textron’s Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), and that it tows the acoustic and magnetic Sweep Power Subsystem properly. The first phase of testing was completed on July 1/11; Phase II is currently ongoing, and the summer test program will include a full signature test and full mission profile that demonstrate minesweeping capability. US Navy | Textron Systems.

May 16/11: SUW. An Israeli answer for LCS missiles? Israel Aerospace Industries’ MLM Division announces that they’ll present a new maritime application for their Jumper missiles-in-a-box system at IMDEX Asia 2011, the Singapore International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference. Like Raytheon’s cancelled NLOS-LS, the Jumper missiles are launched from an 8-round Vertical Launcher Hive (VLH) mounted on a ship’s deck, a truck, or on the ground. The missiles then use GPS/INS and optional Laser guidance to hit targets at ranges of up to 50 km/ 30 miles, using fragmentation or penetration warheads.

Jumper had been showcased beginning in 2009, but as a land weapon. Its naval capability and good range is likely to draw interest from several quarters, but to play on the LCS, IAI would have to offer a lower-cost solution than Raytheon’s NLOS-LS PAM. IAI release | UPI | IAI’s Jumper page.

May 12/11: SUW – Griffin. Inside the Navy reports:

“The Navy may not have settled on the Griffin missile to replace the canceled Non-Line-Of-Sight missile on the Littoral Combat Ship, despite the service’s announcement in January that it planned to use the missile for both a short-term and long-term solution to the capability gap, officials told Inside the Navy last week…”

May 2/11: Alion Science and Technology announces a 3-year, $4.6 million contract from the US Naval Air Warfare Center Training System Division, to develop a PC-based training system for LCS-2 Independence Class Readiness Control Officers.

Alion will be developing the system based on its LCS-1 Freedom Class LCS RCO solution, but a number of changes are necessary because it’s a different ship design. It is intended that the LCS-2 RCO will ultimately integrate with the LCS Shore Based Training Facility in San Diego, CA.

April 13/11: Mk-110. BAE Systems announces a contract from Austal to supply various communications systems and its 57mm Mk 110 gun system, for use in the Independence Class as orders come in.

General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems has had BAE Systems as a major partner for LCS communications systems since 2004. The Mk110 gun is used in both LCS classes, along with its accompanying Mk 295 pre-fragmented, 6-mode programmable, and proximity-fused (3P) ammunition that makes it useful against aerial or surface targets. A corresponding January 2011 contract covered gun systems for Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class.

Feb 14/11: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman will assemble LCS mission packages at Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA. The mission module supplier team will comprise:

• Earl Industries in Portsmouth, VA (ISO TEU 20′ containers; Electrical systems)
  
• Excelco in Silver Creek, NY (WLD-1 RMMV capture spine)
  
• Granite State in Manchester, NH (RMMV cradles)
  
• Smith Brothers in Shelby Township, MI (Maintenance stand assemblies mission module hardware)
  
• Teledyne Brown, Huntsville, AL (gun mission modules).

The end items from each of those companies will be shipped to Port Hueneme, where a Northrop Grumman-Navy team will complete the assembly of each package.

Jan 24/11: MIW – RAMICS. Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the RAMICS supercavitating 30mm cannon for killing shallow mines may be next on the chopping block, after performing poorly in testing. It would be replaced by the AMNS system, which would do double duty against both shallow and deep water mines using Archerfish towed kill vehicles, packing 4 shaped charges each.

The tradeoff would be one of greater performance certainty, cost certainty, timely delivery, and commonalty with AMNS; vs. the ability to engage more shallow water mines in far less time by using a RAMICS system that worked.

Jan 11/11: SUW – Griffin. Media report that the U.S. Navy is moving towards selecting Raytheon’s Griffin missile as the replacement for the cancelled NLOS-LS, instead of taking over that program’s development now that the Army has pulled out. USN surface warfare division director Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe told a Surface Navy Association convention audience in Arlington, VA that a 6-month review had settled on this Raytheon product, as something that can hit targets at “acceptable” ranges and cost.

That recommendation must be endorsed by the Navy before anything comes of this; if they do, the service would field the existing very short range Griffin by 2015, and try to develop a longer range version later. See “Raytheon’s Griffin Mini-Missiles” for in-depth coverage.

Jan 7/11: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a an $18.3 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission modules.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (20%); Ventura, CA (6%); and Dahlgren, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. $1,51 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/11 (N00024-06-C-6311).

Jan 6/11: NLOS-LS canceled. As part of a plan detailing $150 billion in service cuts and cost savings over the next 5 years, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announces the proposed cancellation of NLOS-LS, among many other programs. The Army had pulled out by the point, and the Navy considered picking up the program, but apparently decided against it. Full Gates speech and Gates/Mullen Q&A transcript | Pentagon release.

MK46 naval

Sept 28/10: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY receives a $28.8 million contract modification to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission modules. Work will be performed in Huntsville, AL (56%), and Bethpage, NY (44%), and is expected to be complete by September 2012 (N00024-06-C-6311).

Aug 31/10: GAO Report. US GAO report #GAO-10-523 on the LCS program sees problems. “Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities.” Key excerpts:

“Navy analysis of anti-submarine warfare systems has shown the planned systems do not contribute significantly to the anti-submarine warfare mission… Mission package delays have also disrupted program test schedules – a situation exacerbated by early deployments of initial ships… Further, the Navy has determined that an additional capability will be incorporated into future anti-submarine warfare mission packages. The existing anti-submarine warfare mission package procurement is temporarily suspended, and performance will be assessed during at-sea testing in 2010… To date, most LCS mission systems have not demonstrated the ability to provide required capabilities.”

With respect to USS Freedom’s [LCS 1] Surface Warfare module tests:

“The surface warfare mission package onboard LCS 1 has yet to be fully integrated with the seaframe and lacks key capabilities necessary to defeat surface threats. For example, the 30-millimeter guns have undergone testing with the LCS 1 seaframe, but have yet to be fully integrated with the ship’s combat suite. Also, while the guns provide a close range self-defense capability, Navy officials report LCS 1 is currently unable to automatically transfer tracking data from the ship’s radar to the 30-millimeter guns.”

Current plans involve just 8 partially-capable mission modules delivered by the end of FY 2012, instead of the 2007 plan of 11 partial and 5 fully-capable mission modules. As of August 2010, 5 partially-capable packages have been delivered: 2 Mine Warfare (MIW), 2 Surface Warfare (SuW), and one anti-submarine (ASW). The planned changes by end FY 2012 break down as follows:

MIW: From 3 partial and 1 full capability by FY 2012 to 3 partial.
SuW: From 6 partial and 3 full capability by FY 2012 to 4 partial.
ASW: From 2 planned and 1 full capability by FY 2012 to 1 partial.

One of the rationales behind the LCS mission module approach was precisely this decoupling of onboard payload development with ship fielding and development, so delays in one don’t create delays in the other. At the same time, the Navy now plans to purchase 17 ships and 13 mission packages between FY 2011 – 2015, which would leave the Navy with whose payloads and effectiveness are unproven.

Aug 5/10: SUW – Mk.46. The first MK-46 30mm gun module is installed aboard USS Independence [LCS 2]. US Navy PEO-LMW.

July 2/10: ASW – towed sonar. DRS Sonar Systems, LLC in Gaithersburg, MD received a $9.7 million firm-fixed-price contract to develop a high search rate variable depth sonar (VDS) for installation on the littoral combat ship. This contract includes options which would bring its cumulative value to $12.7 million.

The VDS will include a rugged specialized handling system with an articulating arm and capture mechanism, that can handle a towed body the size and weight of a small car. The towed active subsystem consists of a hydro-dynamically stable tow body, a tow cable, handling and stowage equipment, and acoustic transmit assemblies. The sonar must be able to survive high sea states, work in deep water while being towed at flank speed, and possess enough power to detect submerged submarines.

Work will be performed in Gaithersburg, MD (10%); Panama City, FL (20%); and Stockport, UK (70%), and is expected to be complete by September 2011. This contract was competitively procured, with 3 offers received by the US Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division in Newport, RI (N66604-10-C-0675).

June 2/10: Mk-46. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. in Woodbridge, VA receives a $22.3 million firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed fee contract for the MK46 MOD 2 gun weapon systems (GWS) and associated hardware, spares and services.

There are several Mk46s in the US Navy, but this one is a 30mm enclosed turret packing a Mk44 Bushmaster chain gun and advanced sights. It equips the US Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (Mk46, MOD 0), LPD-17 San Antionio Class amphibious ships, and the Littoral Combat Ship surface warfare package. This contract covers both naval platforms, where the turret is operated from a console inside the ship.

Work will be performed in Woodbridge, VA (69%); Tallahassee, FL (12%); Lima, OH (12%); Westminster, MD (4%); Scranton, PA (2%); and Sterling Heights, MI (1%). Work is expected to be complete by May 2013. $812,412 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, on Sept 30/10. This contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Sea Systems Command, in Washington, DC (N00024-10-C-5438).

April 2/10: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Bethpage, NY received a $17.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to provide engineering and production planning services for LCS mission packages and “improve mission capability in identified mission areas.”

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (12%); Hollywood, MD (12%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by March 2011. Contract funds in the amount of $1.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

April 1/10: ASW – WLD-1 out. The Pentagon releases its April 2010 Selected Acquisitions Report, covering major program changes up to December 2009. One of the changes is to the Remote Minehunting System (WLD-1) in the Mine Warfare suite:

“The PAUC (Program Acquisition Unit Cost) increased 79.5% and the APUC(Average Procurement Unit Cost, no R&D) increased 54.6% to the current and original [baselines] as a result of a reduction in production quantities, the use of an incorrect average unit cost as a basis of estimate in the 2006 program baseline calculation, and an increase in development costs needed to address reliability issues. The Navy re-evaluated the capabilities of the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and decided to eliminate the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) from the ASW Mission Package. This decision reduced the total number of RMMV production units from the program baseline quantity of 108 to the current quantity of 54. The increase in development costs was needed to address reliability problems, which arose during an operational assessment in 2008.”

This level of overage is a critical breach, a.k.a. Nunn-McCurdy breach for the legislation that forces the Pentagon to certify the program’s fitness to continue, and provides for potential Congressional involvement.

March 30/10: GAO update. The US GAO issues report #GAO-10-388SP, its 2010 Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. Regarding the LCS’ mission packages, the mine countermeasures package is either yet to be tested in a realistic environment (Surface USV, OASIS towed emitter, RAMICS cannon), or cannot meet system requirements (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System USV). With respect to other modules:

“The Navy has accepted delivery of partially capable Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Surface Warfare (SUW), and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) mission packages. Overall, operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW packages requires a total of 22 critical technologies, including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 5 weapons.

…The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable SUW(SUrface Warfare) mission package in July 2008. This package included two engineering development models for the 30 mm gun, but did not include the Non-Line-of- Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) launcher or missiles. Integration of the gun with LCS 1 was completed in January 2009… The program expects delivery of the second SUW mission package in March 2010. It will include the 30 mm gun module and the NLOS-LS launcher, but no missiles.

The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable ASW mission package in September 2008, but plans to reconfigure the content of future packages… recent warfighting analyses showed that the baseline ASW package did not provide sufficient capability to meet the range of threats… The first package underwent end-to-end testing in April 2009 and will undergo developmental testing in fiscal year 2010. During the 2009 end-to-end test, the Navy found that the USV and its associated sensors will require reliability and interface improvements to support sustained undersea warfare.”

See also DefenseTech re: NLOS-LS issue.

Feb 26/10: SUW glitch. The NLOS-LS PAM missile Limited User Test (LUT) run from Jan 26/10 – Feb 5/10 at White Sands Missile Range, NM has 2 direct hits, 2 misses with causes known and corrected, and 2 misses still under investigation. That reportedly makes 23 PAM missiles fired with 14 direct hits so far, though not all firings were designed to hit a target. A Pentagon Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting in March 2010 is expected to discuss this issue, and determine a way forward.

If the missiles cannot be made to work as advertised, the Littoral Combat Ship’s existing problems with poor armament would become far more severe. Since it lacks a built-in Vertical Launch System, such as the Mk.41 VLS with ExLS adapters for NETFIRES missiles, substituting other missiles for the NETFIRES launcher package would require ship redesign and modifications. Aviaiton Week Ares | Defense News | Defense Tech.

Jan 25/10: ASW – VDS. FBO solicitation #N6660410R0675 for a variable-depth towed sonar to equip the LCS:

“The Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport has a requirement to develop and field a high search rate tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability in the form of a Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) for installation on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). A major component of the VDS System is the Towed Active Subsystem (TAS) consisting of a hydro-dynamically stable tow body, tow cable, handling and stowage equipment and acoustic transmit assemblies. The TAS shall be an existing product that is modified to meet the LCS integration and installation constraints identified in the performance specifications. The objective of this procurement is to fabricate, install, test and support the TAS and its integration with the VDS system.”

Feb 9/09: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY received a $16.6 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311). They will continue to provide integration services for the ships’ mission module packages.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%), Washington, DC (26%), Panama City, FL (12%), Hollywood, MD (12%), San Diego, CA (2%), and Dahlgren, VA (1%) and is expected to be complete by September 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $3.3 million will expire on Sept 30/09.

NETFIRES Concept

Sept 19/08: ASW rollout. The Navy rolls out its new Anti-Submarine Warfare mission module package in a ceremony at Naval Base Point Loma Naval Mine & ASW Command Complex in San Diego, CA. US Navy release

Aug 13/08: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., in Bethpage, NY receives a $16.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311). This continues funding for mission module integration services, using a spiral development approach of rapid, incremental improvements.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (32%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (15%); Hollywood, MD (15%); San Diego, CA (5%); Dahlgren, VA (5 percent); and Newport, RI (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2009.

Aug 10/08: Northrop Grumman Corporation announces that the NGC/US Navy team has completed the successful installation of the Mission Package computing environment into LCS-1 Freedom in June 2008. Northrop Grumman employees installed and tested the computing environment itself, which comprises 4 racks of processing hardware and the classified and operational software that runs the package. A system check indicated that the computing environment was operating properly, and that communication with the ship’s infrastructure was complete.

Each mission package needs only 15 personnel, plus 23 aviation detachment personnel for the helicopters.

July 21/08: Launch & Recovery. General Dynamics Robotic Systems announces a contract from the USA’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) to develop the LCS’ Common Launch and Recovery System (CLRS) for unmanned boats and other watercraft. The firm is already designing and building the 11m USV that is slated for use as part of the ships’ anti-submarine mission module.

Oct 22/07: Defense News reports that Lockheed Martin is testing the LCS-1 Independence’s ability to load containerized mission modules and other equipment into the mission bay area. On Oct 10/07, their Moorestown, NJ facility ran a successful test of their COMBATSS-21 combat system’s ability to load the mine warfare mission package software. NAVSEA is continuing work on software for the other 2 initial mission packages: anti-submarine, and anti-surface warfare.

The article also covers Israel’s ongoing interest in the Lockheed Martin LCS design. See “An LCS For Israel?” for more details regarding that spin-off program.

Oct 12/07: MIW – issues. The US GAO audit office has some news re: the mine warfare module, the LCS’ first mission module. It seems some changes will be required:

“…For example, operation of mine countermeasures systems is currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the [Littoral Combat] ship, which could affect the ship’s ability to execute this mission. In addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only limited capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However, because the Navy recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems from two to one per ship, operational availability for these systems may decrease below current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures mission package currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require the Navy to accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and the concepts of operation it can likely execute.”

Sept 26/07: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, N.Y. receives a $15.4 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This modification supports the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Module Program Office (PMS 420), Program Executive Office, Littoral and Mine Warfare.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2008. Contract funds in the amount of $113,338, will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Sept 25/07: SUW Go-ahead. The Navy announces that it is moving forward with development of the LCS Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package, which it describes as “designed to combat small, fast boat terrorist threats to the fleet.” The announcement lists the components as:

“…electro-optical/infrared sensors mounted on a vertical take off unmanned air vehicle to provide over-the-horizon detection; 30mm guns to kill close-in targets; four [4] non-line-of-sight launching system (NLOS-LS/ “NetFires”/ “missile in a box”) container launch units, with each system containing 15 offensive missiles; and the MH-60R armed helicopter for surveillance and attack missions. The SUW mission package has software that interfaces with the LCS command and control system to maintain and share situational awareness and tactical control in a coordinated SUW environment… The first two SUW mission packages assembled for developmental and operational testing use the Mark 46 30mm gun made by General Dynamics Amphibious Systems.”

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren division is the technical direction agent for the SUW mission package, with NSWC Port Hueneme division providing integrated logistics and testing support. NAVSEA release.

April 2/07: MK-110. BAE Systems in Minneapolis, MN announces its second contract from General Dynamics to supply a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system as the main gun fitted to the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship [LCS 4]. The contract is worth $7.2 million, and includes options such as spare parts and training. The gun is scheduled to be delivered in 2008.

The gun’s Mk 295 ammunition allows the system to perform against aerial, surface or ground threats, with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute. The Mk 110 is designed to have minimal deck penetration, and can be operated directly or by remote control. BAE Systems has now received 3 contracts from the LCS program contenders, for a total of 4 gun systems. Note that the structure of MK.110 contracts may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship.

Jan 5/07: GD’s Open Data Model. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems has delivered the Littoral Combat Ship Open Data Model to the U.S. Navy for inclusion in the Software Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository, with unrestricted rights for re-use by any other Navy program.

The Open Data Model is a critical open architecture component of the General Dynamics LCS computing environment. By using the Open Data Model, any company’s products can be integrated into the General Dynamics LCS quickly and efficiently, creating ease of integration and upgrade, as well as a continuous competitive environment that improves capabilities, lowers costs, and avoid’s platform lock-ins.

With this delivery, the SHARE repository now provides a vehicle for any company interested in bringing their technology to the General Dynamics LCS to gain access to the Open Data Model. In addition, the Open Data Model is now available as the basis of a published open architecture solution for any other Navy programs looking to reap the benefits afforded by open architecture, advancing the Navy’s growing focus on open architecture ship systems. EE Times report.

Oct 20/06: MIW – WLD-1. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors (MS2) Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY received a $13.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-05-C-6327) for in the development, demonstration and integration of the Remote Mine-hunting Vehicle (RMV) with the anti-submarine warfare systems mission module, and for production of 4 installation and checkout kits with supporting equipment for 4 RMV units. This module will is part of the Littoral Combat Ship ASW mission package, and the RMVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91-96 and LCS Class ships.

The RMV is also known as the WLD-1, a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines; with slight adjustments, the system can perform active anti-submarine scans as well. Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY (80%) and Riviera Beach, FL (20%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington in Washington, DC issued the contract.

Oct 19/06: ASW – USVs. a $12.7 million contract for 4 Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), for the Littoral Combat Ship’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Module. General Dynamics Robotic Systems will develop them. This contract follows a similar May 1/05 contract for up to 4 USVs; see below for further details, or just flip to DID’s dedicated coverage – and some of GDRS’ competitors in the USV field.

Oct 13/06: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Bethpage, NY receives a $15.5 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The US Navy’s plan is to use spiral development to improve mission capability on an ongoing basis, which is much easier since LCS mission packages can be developed and acquired separately from the ship itself. Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. See also DID’s Jan 5/06 entry.

(click to view full)

Aug 25/06: SUW – NETFIRES. Netfires LLC of Grand Prairie, TX received a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for $54.8 million as part of an estimated $1.15 billion contract to procure the NLOS-LS Naval Littoral Combat Ship Integration, System Development and Demonstration. Work will be conducted in Tucson, AZ and Baltimore, MD, and will be complete by Aug. 31, 2010. The U.S. Army Aviation & Missile Command issued the contract (W31P4Q-04-C-0059). See also Raytheon’s Aug 29 release.

Aug 22/06: Engines. Rolls Royce announces that its Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines will power LCS 3, the second Lockheed Martin-designed Littoral Combat Ship. The order also includes 4 of its Kamewa waterjet systems. These systems were also installed in Team Lockheed’s LCS 1 Freedom, so the only surprise would have been a change.

July 31/06: MIW – WLD-1. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY receives $23.4 million as part of the remote minehunting system (RMS) program (N00024-05-C-6237) to service 3 WLD-1 remote minehunting vehicle (RMV) UUVs. As noted above, the WLD-1 is a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines. The RMV/UUVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91 through DDG 96 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, as well as the LCS.

April 10/06: Israel. Lockheed Martin announces a $5.2 million NAVSEA study studied Team Lockheed’s LCS hull, mechanical, and engineering systems’ ability to accommodate the systems and weapons the Israelis want, while avoiding the need for major redesign of the USA’s basic configuration.

The final answer was that it could, with some obvious modifications to accommodate better radars and vertical launch systems for missiles. See “A Littoral Combat Frigate For Israel?” for more.

April 4/06: SeaRAM for Independence. Raytheon Company announces that it will install the SeaRAM anti-ship missile defense weapon system on General Dynamics’ trimaran design for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). SeaRAM combines upgraded Phalanx Block 1B close in weapon system radar & infrared sensors and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1A Helicopter, Aircraft, and Surface (HAS) guided missiles. Raytheon will work with General Dynamics to integrate SeaRAM with the LCS combat management system.

Note that the structure of RAM contracts may not announce all systems, or connect all systems to a specific ship.

April 2006: ASW – Sea Talon. The Navy’s Sea Talon Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) system successfully completes a series of testing milestones offshore from Lockheed Martin’s Riviera Beach, Fla., facility.

Sea Talon is part of the LCS the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission module. Using 2 Remote Minehunting Vehicle (RMV) semi-submersibles developed under the AN/WLD-1 Program, Sea Talon creates an unmanned, distributed, underwater sensor network that uses unmanned vehicles for sensor deployment and sensor data communications. For Sea Talon, the RMVs are being fitted with the Remote Towed Active Source (RTAS) and the Remote Towed Array (RTA). Once fitted with these sensors, Sea Talon rapidly detects, tracks, classifies and localizes quiet diesel submarines in littoral waters, while conducting above-water persistent situational awareness and transmitting real-time data to U.S. Navy ships.

Sea Talon involves no new major technology development, but leverages already developed technologies from the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System, the AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 surface sonar program, towed array sonar development, and common software baselines. The April tests demonstrated that the RTA and RTAS could be towed at multiple depths, and that the RMV’s stability was not affected during the towing of the active source and passive source receiver at various speeds and depths. July 15/06 PEO-LLMW release.

Jan 5/06: Mission modules integrator: NGC. Northrop-Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY is awarded a 10-year, cost-plus award-fee/ award-term contract serve as mission package integrator for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Modules program. The contract has a potential dollar figure of $159 million, and the FY 2006 portion of the contract award is $4.5 million. DID covers N-G’s mission modules integration contract in more depth.

July 6/05: COMBATSS-21, Flight 0. Lockheed Martin announces that they’ve completed their COMBATSS-21 combat management system’s software. COMBATSS-21 supports the FORCEnet initiative within the USA’s Seapower 21 doctrine, and uses an open architecture system that reuses proven components from Lockheed Martin, the US Navy, domestic industry and international industry. By leveraging off-the-shelf components, Lockheed Martin claims to have achieved greater than 95% software reuse, completing the Flight 0 COMBATSS-21 software well ahead of ship installation and below budget.

Lockheed Martin says they will continually evaluate new components for COMBATSS-21, which they’ll use for the Navy’s LCS, DD (X) Destroyer program, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program, and other US and international ships.

May 1/05: ASW USVs. GD gets an order for up to 4 ASW USVs. An $8.5 million contract covers the first 2 vehicles, with options for raising that contract to 4 USVs and $11.3 million. The USVs will be used as part of the LCS Anti-Submarine Warfare module, employing towed arrays, dipping sonar sensors and acoustic sources as payloads.

General Dynamics Robotic Systems is a subsidiary of General Dynamics Land Systems. The company plans to adapt its land robotics command and control system for the new USVs; indeed, Scott Myers President Scott Myers cited this expertise as a key reason the Navy chose them.

June 29/04: GD announces core missions systems & software team. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems announces the open-architecture core mission systems team for the General Dynamics design of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Core mission systems infrastructure is a flexible information technology backbone for operating the ship as a whole that allows “plug and play” integration of custom-designed software modules for specific functions. GD AIS’ focus is on making it easy to integrate new modules by using non-proprietary standards and commercial middleware software as the key interface:

• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD is responsible for the ship’s internal and external communications systems, as well as topside antenna modeling and mission module interface coordination.

• CAE USA Inc. Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA, is responsible for the ship automation and control system. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD is responsible for the Integrated Combat Management System (ICMS).

• General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products in Charlotte, NC is responsible for “all of the weapons and effectors.”

• General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Canada is responsible for the above- and below-water sensors.

Appendix A: LCS’ Yo-Yoing Budgets & Program Structures

LCS 1, final construction
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In July 2011, the Navy created PEO LCS to oversee the program, headed by Rear Adm. James A. Murdoch. Ship construction supervision was removed fro PEO Ships, while mission module supervision was removed from PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO LMW), which was dissolved. It wasn’t the first big change in the program – and may not be the last. Indeed, in August 2012 the Chief of Naval Operations added a council tasked to come up with a plan.

It is normal for programs to change elements like numbers ordered, but not to change the entire buy strategy. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what the LCS program has done. Several times.

Early plans for much cheaper ships would have built them from 2005 – 2019, but the extent of the program’s timeline and budgetary issues can be inferred from the current production timeline: 2011-2040.

How the US Navy arrived at that plan is a very tangled, but very instructive, story of goals not met, budgets changed or not spent, and an acquisition plan that has now been changed several times.

The LCS program’s budget mess has reflected their yo-yoing underlying program structure. LCS budgets are not even suitable for inclusion as a table, because the program’s structure has changed repeatedly. For several of those years, program turmoil was so great that it prevented budgeted funds from being spent. As such, each year’s budget can only be understood in light of the program’s shifting plans.

Plan #1: 13 ships. Under the original vision, Team Lockheed and the General Dynamics/Austal consortium would each produce a number of fully operational, competing Flight 0 ships. The idea was that experience with these ships is the best teacher and evaluator, ensuring that the Navy selects the right winning team for the overall program. It would also begin an immediate expansion of the US Navy’s falling numbers, since all of the Flight 0 ships would be available after the testing phase was complete. The design approach for the winning team’s second generation Flight 1 LCS ships would be flexible, and was envisioned as changing somewhat in light of the experience gained with the Flight 0 designs. Initially, 4 Flight 0 ships and 9 Flight 1 ships were contemplated, along with a purchase of various mission modules.

In FY 2005, Congress approved the Navy’s plan to fund the construction of the first 2 competing LCS sea frames, funded LCS-1, required LCS-2 to be built to a different design when funded in FY 2006, and added other basic stipulations.

The FY 2006 budget was $1.054 billion ($470.3M procurement, $584.1M RDT&E). The Navy had initially asked for LCS-2, but shipbuilding supporters in Congress funded LCS 2-4. As the program progressed, however, new Navy shipbuilding standards, and other shifts in specifications, caused LCS ship prices to rise sharply. As ship costs doubled, and then continued to rise, political scrutiny grew. In response, legislators inserted an adjusted $220 million cost cap on LCS 5-6, and made that buy and any others contingent on Navy certification of a stable LCS design.

Plan #1a: The FY 2007 budget was $926.6 million ($597.2M for ships & mission modules, $329.4M RDT&E). Congress funded LCS-5 and LCS-6. Austal’s Dec 11/06 press release even implied that more early-build ships might enter US Navy plans:

“Recent Navy reports have speculated on an expanded acquisition strategy, from 4 to a possible 17, for the Flight 0 fleet of LCSs that also includes an alternate monohull ship design. Commenting in September, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Dr Delores Etter, told Reuters, ‘The U.S. Navy hopes to finalize its acquisition strategy for a new class of shore-hugging combat ships by mid-December [2006].’ “

Plan #2: Bailing out. In March 2007, however, the US Navy canceled Team Lockheed’s LCS-3 due to cost growth. In November 2007 (technically, FY 2008), the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS-4 joined it. A Navy policy of requesting fixed-price contracts, coupled with specifications and designs they could keep changing at will, created a gap too large for negotiations to bridge. Contracts for LCS 5 & 6 were never issued.

Under the Navy’s revised approach, planned FY 2007-2008 procurements would be channeled into getting LCS 1 & 2 built, rather than buying additional ships. Instead of buying 3 more LCS ships in 2008, and then ramping up to 6 ships per year in 2009 – 2012, amended procurement plans proposed to buy 1 ship in 2008 and 2 ships in 2009. Under that Plan B, the 2 consortia would compete for orders, with 2 ships contracted to the winning builder and 1 for the loser. A down-select to 1 design would take place in 2010.

The FY 2008 request was set at $1.208 billion ($990.8M for 3 ships + 2 mission modules, $217.5M RDT&E); but the Navy’s cancelations and revised procurement strategy led to $337.1 million in funding for a single LCS – a contract the Navy never issued. Meanwhile, Congress had raised the per-ship cost cap to $460 million, and required fixed-price-type contracts for LCS ships bought from here on.

Where to now?
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Plan #3: Fog of war. The FY 2009 request was $920 million, for 2 LCS ships. The final 2009 defense bill increased that funding to $1 billion. Once again, however, the Navy’s LCS procurement plan changed. Now, it planned to buy 2 LCS ships in 2009, with an option for Phase II that could involve up to 3 more LCS Flight 0+ Class ships on the same terms in 2010. Those Phase II ships would likely be split between the contractors, but could be issued for just 1 design.

Congress added some relief by delaying the implementation of the LCS cost cap to FY2010, but contract negotiations must have been interesting. Neither manufacturing team had demonstrated the ability to deliver an LCS ship for $500 million, and the Navy was insisting on fixed-price contracts that transfer all risk to the shipbuilders. Both contracts (LCS-3 and LCS-4) were eventually signed in 2009, but the Navy decided that their terms needed to be kept secret.

That seems likely leave just 2 Flight 0 LCS ships in the water before the revised LCS program was supposed to pick one final design. Or not. Under terms that remained unclear.

Additional reports added even more uncertainty. First came reports that that final selection might even feature a design competition that would be separate from the build competition, which means the ship’s design team may not be the final builders. That kind of competition is called “build to print,” in which the government buys the blueprints and then contracts for construction separately. Of course, handing a new ship design to a firm that hasn’t built it before carries cost-inflation risks of its own. The question is whether the potential threat of switching suppliers creates enough added incentives to keep costs down, in order to justify the increased time, overhead, and added program risk inherent in running 2 serial competitions instead of 1.

The FY 2010 budget requested $1.877 billion ($1.38 billion for 3 more ships, $136.7M for mission modules, plus $360.5M RDT&E which includes $75.5 million to cover cost growth on LCS 1-2). The program ended up with $1.579 billion: $1,157 million for all procurement of 2 ships and mission modules, and $422.0 million for RDT&E.

Plan #4: 10 + 5. In September 2009, while the House and Senate were working on reconciling their FY 2010 defense bills, another major change to the program’s structure was announced. There would be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

Assuming that this program would remain intact, the FY 2011 request was for $1.819 billion with RDT&E would be $226.3 million, while $1.592 billion for procurement would fund 2 ships ($1.2 billion), advance orders for FY 2012-14 major hull and propulsion components ($280 million), and mission modules (remainder, about $112 million).

Plan #5: Dual-build 20. Naturally, the proposed procurement approach changed again. Upon examining the bids, the US Navy went to Congress and asked for permission to accept both 10-ship bids, buying 20 ships for an advertised price that was about the same as the estimates for the 15 they had wanted. The GAO and CBO both have doubts about those estimates, in part because the Navy is still changing the designs; but the contracts are underway. For better or for worse, the Navy finally has an approach that is actually buying ships.

The Navy’s FY 2011-15 plan called for 17 ships total in a 2, 3, 4, 4, and 4 sequence, though that may rise to 20 ships. The Navy’s longer-range shipbuilding plans would buy 3 LCS hulls per year from FY 2016-19, dropping to 2 per year from FY 2020-24, then dropping again to a 1-2-1-2 pattern for FY 2025-33. The program would finish up at 2 per year from FY 2034-40.

Because these ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the 10 ships bought from 2036 – 2040 would be replacements for the original ships of class.

Unless, of course, the entire acquisition plan changes again. The graph below shows how estimates of the total program cost have fluctuated as the Navy changed its procurement structure, again and again:

FY12 Forecast: US Navy Comptroller
No such data released in May 2009 document

The projected costs and cost/unit, include outfitting and post delivery costs, which explains why they’re above the widely-used Total Obligational Authority (TOA) numbers. At more than $1.3 billion over the life of the program, these extra costs are hardly pocket change

Additional Readings & Sources

The Littoral Combat Ships: Basic Program & Ship Background

• U.S. Navy LCS site

• FedBizOpps.GOV (Jan 27/10, #N0002410R2301) – 19–Fiscal Year 2010 through 2014 Littoral Combat Ship Construction. The current RFP.

• General Dynamics/ Austal – LCS mini-site.

• Austal – Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS-2 Independence Class. There’s also a team site, but parts of that aren’t current.

• Austal – Advanced Seaframes for Littoral Security [PDF] http://www.austal.com/Libraries/Newsletters-Presentations-Presentations-and-Publications/Advanced-Seaframes-for-Littoral-Security.pdf

• Lockheed Martin – LCS Team. LCS mini-site.

• Lockheed Martin – Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS-1 Freedom Class.

• Naval-Technology.com – Littoral Combat Ship LCS High-Speed Surface Ship

• GlobalSecurity.org – Littoral Combat Ship.

• USN – Littoral Combat Ships – Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package

• USN – Littoral Combat Ships – Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package

• USN – Littoral Combat Ships – Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package

• Information Dissemination (July 10/07) – The US Navy’s PF-109 “Patrol Frigate” Program. Which led to the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, as the low end of US surface combatant force structure during the 1970s and 1980s. Says the LCS program isn’t imitating the FFG-7′s successes. Then again, compare this contention with the CBO’s July 24/07 testimony, which compared the first-of-class ships of each type in FY 2008 dollars, and found that LCS was cheaper.

• NDIA’s National Defense Magazine (March 2010) – Builders of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Pull Out All the Stops. Offers a good side-by-side comparison of the 2 ship types.

• DID (March 19/07) – Cost Growth Puts the Brakes on the USA’s Littoral Combat Ship Program. And causes both cancellation of Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, and a revised LCS program plan. Not to mention a continued threat to the overall program, if costs remain near $400 million while weapon capabilities remain so limited and inflexible.

• International Hydrofoil Society (Sept 23/04) – NAVSEA Presentation re: Littoral Combat Ship Program [PDF format]. Includes visuals ad information related to mission modules, program structure & timelines, and the two competing teams.

• DefenseLINK (May 28/04) – Special Department of Defense Briefing re: Littoral Combat Ship Program. Good discussion of the program as a whole and procurement approach, as well as how the modules were envisioned to work.

• US Naval Institute, Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS. But note esp. Vice-Adm. Mustin & Katz’ warnings about the possibility of a failed “high-low” force mix. By 2013, that warning had come true.

LCS Exports

• General Dynamics – international variant brochure, dating from when they were teamed up with Austal [PDF].

• Lockheed Martin – Multi-Mission Combat Ship. LCS for export, but with real weapons and an improved radar. Comes in varying sizes: 85m (corvette), 118m (light frigate, like LCS), and 150m (full frigate). See also their older LCS-Israel brochure [PDF, 4.27 MB], offering a design that removes the Mk110 gun while adding a 30mm gun system like the Typhoon, Harpoon missiles, Barak anti-air missiles, and strike-length Mk41 vertical launch cells.

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/multi-mission-combat-ship.html

• DID Spotlight – A Littoral Combat Frigate for Israel? The Israelis wanted a very different approach. No mission modules. Full fleet defense capabilities, including vertical launch cells and a SPY-1F AEGIS radar. Anti-ship missiles, and torpedo tubes. Problem was, the ship was too expensive for them.

• Aviation Week Ares (Oct 18/08) – Lockheed Martin Pushes Export LCS. With a long list of offered and potential changes to armament, layout, and even propulsion. Market demand in the rest of the world appears to be delivering some design verdicts.

Official Reports

• USN Undersecretary Robert Work (January 2013: DRAFT) – The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why. Scribd copy of the early draft.

• US Congressional Research Service (Aug 10/12 update, #RL33741) – Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress.

• DOTE – FY2011 Report: LCS [PDF]

• US Congressional Budget Office (Dec 10/10) – Cost Implications of the Navy’s Plans for Acquiring Littoral Combat Ships [PDF]

• US GAO (#GAO-11-277T, Dec 14/10) – Defense Acquisitions: Realizing Savings under Different Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategies Depends on Successful Management of Risks

• US GAO (#GAO-11-249R, Dec 8/10) – Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship Program

• US GAO (#GAO-10-523, Aug 31/10) – Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities

• Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (March 3/10) – Littoral Combat Ship: An Examination of its Possible Concepts of Operation” [PDF]. CSBA is one of Washington’s most respected think tanks, and lives up to its non-partisan billing.

• US GAO (#GAO-10-257, Feb 2/10): “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.”

• Information Disemination (Jan 11/10) – Streetfighter 2010: The New Navy Fighting Machine. See also full study GoogleDoc. NNFM is an ONA funded study in which 9 members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty attempted to develop a force structure that reflected the vision in the USA’s “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” by building an illustrative fleet on paper.

• US Naval Postgraduate School, John P. Baggett Thesis (March 8/08) – Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) operating independently in the Pacific.

• US GAO (#GAO-08-13, Oct 12/07) – Report to the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities” [PDF]

• US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces (July 24/07) – Congressional Budget Office, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security and Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst: The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs [PDF format]

• US GAO (#GAO-07-943T, July 24/07) – Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs.

• US GAO (#GAO-07-406SP, March 30/07) – Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. LCS is one, and this study is an annual release. Here is the March 30/06 version.

• US GAO (#GAO-06-587T March 30/06) – Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range Shipbuilding Plans

LCS Program: Analysis and Stories

• Naval Technology – Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground.” Offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state. Written in July 2008.

• Harold Lee Wise – Inside the Danger Zone: the US Military in the Persian Glf, 1987-1988. An excellent book that outlines the kind of situation LCS was supposedly built for. Unfortunately, gaps in the required mine warfare capabilities, low damage tolerance, and station/support capacities leave doubts concerning the LCS’ ability to handle the same situation as well as the less expensive cobbled-together solutions used at the time; esp. the very successful converted barge Hercules.

• G2mil – Diesel Electric Corvettes. Highly critical of the LCS program. Core of the criticism: “The LCS is the size of modern frigate and bigger than destroyers of World War II, yet has the armament of a patrol boat in order to accommodate the mysterious ultra high-speed requirement… The US Navy should scrap the current LCS plan in favor of slower, smaller, and more capable DE [diesel-electric] corvettes based on the Visby class corvette design and supported by tenders [vid. Yellowstone Class AD-41]“

• Information Dissemination – Evolving towards a 21st Century Surface Action Group. He suggests a set (LPD/LSD Mothership + DDG-51 + T-AKE + 2 frigates/ 4 corvettes + 2 LCS as support for the flotilla) derived in part from some of the principles laid down by Sir Julian Corbett. “Ultimately, I do not see the LCS as is capable of meeting the requirements the Navy is demanding from it. The LCS is too expensive to buy the number of littoral ships needed to dominate that battlespace. The LCS is too big to be risked in the littorals during wartime, not to mention having survivability problems if thought of or treated as a warship. The LCS is too small to deploy the number of unmanned vehicles necessary to be effective, and cannot repair those systems when they break. That does not make the LCS a poor addition to the flotilla, rather it would be a smart addition, if utilized in a way that supported a credible approach to littoral warfare.”

• WIRED Danger Room (Jan 4/11) – Navy’s New Warship: Bargain, Death Trap or Both?

• Aviation Week (Jan 3/11) – Common LCS Combat Systems Debated

• US Naval Institute blog (Jan 2/11) – The LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat environment… Also discusses the lessons of past naval littoral combats.

• Gannett’s Navy Times (Dec 19/10) – Analysis: Navy mum on multiple LCS system issue. Refers to the combat systems.

• James Hasik (Dec 10/10) – Is buying two types of littoral combat ship good for the US Navy?

• Defense Tech (Sept 27/10) – Is LCS Dying a Slow Death?

• Information Dissemination (Sept 9/10) – Red Flags Everywhere”

• Information Dissemination (Sept 3/10) – What the GAO LCS Report Reveals. In his opinion, systemic and serious cultural problems in the Navy.

• Lexington Institute (Sept 7/10) – Littoral Combat Ship: It’s The Mission Packages, Stupid:

• Reuters (Jan 20/10) – EXCLUSIVE: Early tests show Lockheed LCS problems-report. The Pentagon’s testing reports say that neither LCS design will meet requirements for survivability in a combat environment. The report also details other class issues.

• Defense News (Jan 17/10) – Failing the Littoral Challenge: LCS Capabilities, Cost Miss the Boat. By Charles W. Robinson. “To counter these limitations, we urge testing of a littoral mission unit (LMU) by activating a military transport, the Cape Mendocino, which, with minor modifications, could transport four or more Street Fighters to areas of threat. This vessel would also serve as their mother ship.”

• Defense News (Jan 8/10) – Aluminum Glitters Inside 2nd Littoral Combat Ship Variant. Chris Cavas takes a tour.

• US Naval Institute’s Proceedings Magazine (September 2009) – No Need for High Speed. Contends that over-emphasis on speed has gravely damaged the LCS’ ability to carry out several necessary missions.

• Information Dissemination (Sept 29/09) – The Day the LCS Was Promoted to Warship With AEGIS ships sliding toward missile defense roles, but naval action groups needing protection, the current LCS leaves the US Navy with no in-between options that ca pick up the slack.

• Information Dissemination (July 17/09) – May 10th, 2019: Missing Nelsons Cruisers. Scenario illustrates the hole in US Navy force planning.

• Mobile, AL Press-Register (April 15/09) – LCS could be a pirate’s nightmare. But the article adds appropriate caveats.

• WIRED Danger Room (Nov 9/08) – Rosy Future for Navy’s Troubled Shoreline Fighters? Based on conversations with CSBA’s Bob Work.

• Armed Forces journal – Think Small. “A force of the new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), when they enter service in the next decade, will not significantly increase the Navy’s capabilities in conducting littoral warfare. This bad situation can be changed by building or acquiring a force composed of multipurpose corvettes and missile combat craft.”

• Information Dissemination (Sept 13/07) – Littoral Combat Ship: 2 + 2 +3 – 4 = 2 plus 1

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral combat ship could slip behind schedule as price tag nears $500 million. “As Congress battles over the Defense Department’s budget, lawmakers have signaled their displeasure at LCS cost overruns and delays. The number of littoral combat ships that policymakers allow the sea service to buy in 2008 could portend whether the program uprights itself in the next few years, say analysts.”

• Lexington Institute (Nov 28/06) – Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy [PDF format]. Washington think-tank offers an in-depth look at the LCS as the Navy’s most transformational program, and the key program challenges that must be overcome in order for the LCS program to be successful.

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral Combat Ship Troubles: Opportunity for Small Boat Companies? “The Navy’s really trying to think, ‘do we need a vessel in between the LCS and the riverine,’ and I think in the end, they’re going to say, yes they do,” says Robert Work, senior naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” The Stiletto experimental ships are cited as one likely gap-filler.

• DID (April 12/06) – The Lion in Winter: Government, Industry, and US Naval Shipbuilding Challenges. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter discusses US shipbulding plans and challenges. The LCS is referenced as an important trend and exemplar.

• The Fourth Rail (April 27/05) – Of Pirates and Terrorists

• Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (June – Sept 1992) – The Value of Warship Attributes in Missile Combat

LCS Ancillaries & Auxilliaries

• Anthony G Williams – Naval Armament: The MCG Problem. MCG = medium-caliber gun. There has been a global divergence of views re: what 55mm-155mm naval guns should be for, and therefore which characteristics should be stressed. BAE’s 57mm gun, which will equip the LCS, falls firmly on one side of this debate.

LCS & MH-60S Mine Counter-Measures Continue Development. Covers AMCM and the MIW package. DII Spotlight article.

• Lockheed Martin – COMBATSS-21 Combat Management System. Used in the Freedom Class, based in part on Lockheed’s Aegis. The Independence Class has a different system.

• DID – Raytheon’s Griffin Mini-Missiles. The NLOS-LS replacement, with just a 3 nautical mile range. Has already been mounted on some Cyclone Class patrol boats.

• DID – Cheap, Fast, Deadly: The NETFIRES “Missiles in a Box” Program (updated). DII FOCUS on NLOS-LS. Canaceled.

• DID – RAM Missiles: Contracts & Events. Will provide the LCS’ primary defense against aircraft and missiles.

• Military.com (Nov 1/07) – LCS to Carry Marines?

• Lockheed Martin (July 10/06) – Lockheed Martin Sea Talon Program Achieves Key Milestones Toward Deployment As Littoral Combat Ship ASW Mission Module. Since abandoned.

• DID (May 4/06) – $8.5M for 2 Littoral Combat Ship Anti-Submarine USVs. Since abandoned.

• DID (Jan 9/06) – N-G Gets $159M Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Integration Contract. Covers the mission module program’s structure, and the MIW, ASW, and SUW modules as envisioned back then. Much has changed since.

• Seapower Magazine (December 2005) – Navy Custom Tailors Crew Training for Littoral Combat Ship.

• DID (Dec 2/05) – Sub-Finding Sensor Nets Get A Step Closer. Covers the ADS, or Advanced Deployable System. Abandoned due to technical issues, and realizations that static nets were not the way to go.

• DID (Oct 20/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. Updated to include a number of related anti-submarine warfare technologies, most of of which will find their way onto the LCS fleet or will interface with it.

• DID (Oct 17/05) – The Fire Scout UTUAV Program: By Land and By Sea (updated)

• DID (Sept 23/05) – Navy Launches Final Development of Bluefin 21 UUV. It would appear in the LCS years later, as the mine warfare module’s “Knifefish”.

• DID (Sept 20/05) – Raytheon Receives $55M to Put New Mine Detection Sonar Into Production. The WLD-1 UUV and AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar are still the expected combination, but WLD-1 RMMVs aren’t expected to be ready until 2015 – and as of 2013, the AQS-20 still has some serious kinks of its own.

• DID (Sept 15/05) – $124.5M for 3 Airborne Laser Mine Detection Systems (Updated). These will be carried on the LCS, which will become an operational center for up to 5 MH-60S helicopters equipped with the AN/AES-1 ALMDS system. As of 2013, ALMDS is still having serious problems with false positives.

• DID (May 18/05) – Spartan USVs for Singapore’s Navy. These sorts of developments helped shape the USN’s thinking.

• C4ISR Journal (July 2004) – Design Work Proceeds on LCS Mission Modules: Suites will allow quick switches for pressing threat

Related American and International Programs

• Danish Navy – Flyvefisken Class (1989-), aka. Standard Flex 300

• Naval Technology – Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) Multi-Role Vessels, Denmark

• Danish Navy – Absalom Class (2004-). These multi-role ships can act as frigates, minelayers, command ships, hospital ships, or even as small roll-on/ roll-off landing ships thanks to their “Flex-Deck” and other features.

• Naval Technology – Skjold (“Shield”) Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats, Norway. One of these air cushion catamaran ships completed a 13-month deployment in the USA before the LCS program got underway, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea.

• Naval Technology – Visby Class Corvettes, Sweden

• DID FOCUS – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward

• US Navy PEO Ships – FAQ: JHSV vs. LCS

• DID – Dead Aim, Or Dead End? The USA’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Program. FOCUS Article.

• DID – Russia & China Building Littoral Warships. The Chinese Type 022 wave-piercing catamaran fast attack craft is a potential littoral opponent. The Russian Project 2038 Steregushchiy (“Guarding”) Class, on the other hand, may well represent a true export competitor.

• Boston Globe (April 19/09) – The (smaller, faster, cheaper) future of sea power. Which may be significantly smaller and cheaper than the LCS.

• Defense News (Oct 25/05) – Ship Shows Off Danish Navy’s ‘Transformation’ Re: Absalom Class ships.

• DID (March 4/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines is forcing doctrinal changes, as well as new technology programs. Quite a few of these new programs will find their way onto the LCS, or interface with it.

• Sea Classics, via FindArticles (November 2004) – Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Contracts Awarded – What Does It Mean To The US Navy?

• Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey (Dec 2003) – “Sea Swat”: A Littoral Combat Ship for Sea Base Defense

• Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS

• Melana Zyla Vickers at FOXNews (Oct 14/03) – High Seas Robbery. Covers the need for the LCS program.

• Melana Zyla Vickers at TechcentralStation (May 6/02) – Naval Overkill. She thinks the DD (X) is, but the LCS and Streetfighter programs aren’t.

• Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine (November 2003) – Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII – Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet. Gives good background re: the releationship of the links that follow to the LCS program, and how that kind of effort fits in with the US Navy’s new naval doctrine.

• GlobalSecurity.org – HSV Program for high speed troop carrier vessels (incl. WestPac Express and TSV ships TSV-1X Spearhead and HSV-2 Swift). Given that “HSV-2″ is also a designation for a variety of Herpes Simplex STD, it is possible that this designation will change to a TSV variant once the ship class is firmly established.

• DID (Nov 24/05) – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward

• DID (Sept 27/05) – UAVs, Blimps, and HSV-2, Oh My! It would not surprise us at all if the semi-autonomous, long-endurance ScanEagle surveillance UAV were to find itself added to the LCS’ onboard options in future. These UAVs are valued very highly by the US Marines as combat surveillance UAVs, and testing them on the HSV-2 seems explicitly designed to pave the way for LCS integration.

• DID (July 22/05) – U.S. Marines Extend Westpac Express TSV Ship Charter. The success of Austal’s HSV 4676 has also helped to shape US military thinking about potential LCS designs. The article also discusses Austal’s new Mobile, AL facility, which will be a key participant in LCS construction for the General Dynamics team.

• Naval Sea Systems Command (April 2004) – HSV-2 proving to be Prototype for Littoral Combat Ship Program

• US Navy Fact File – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel

• HowStuffWorks.com – How the FSF-1 Sea Fighter Works

• Navy Marine Corps News (June 4/05) – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel: Initial Deployment News Video

• Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel. The vessel participated in a US naval exercise as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons.

Tag: LCSFOCUS

• After long negotiations between its ministry of finance and defense officials, Israel’s defense budget looks set to be reduced by 3 billion sheqels (about $830M) in 2014, with 1 NIS billion in reserves used to dampen cuts that were initially expected to be deeper: Globes | AFP | Jerusalem Post.

• Russia’s recently re-established Mediterranean task force is about to reach that sea and may see the addition of nuclear submarines, according to RIA Novosti. The number of patrols by Russian SSBNs has reportedly cratered (if the underlying intel is reliable) in the past two decades.

• Lessons from the recent stand-off in Ladakh between China and India: China is ready to take calculated risks to control the agenda, dictate the tempo, and back up an increasingly assertive posture with all its neighbors.

• Defense-Aerospace offers a worthy review of France’s CAESAR 155/52 caliber truck-mounted artillery program. The French army found such relatively heavy but mobile materiel useful against what turned out to be [in French] a determined enemy in Mali.

• The US Air Force will host an event [PDF] dedicated to fuze technology on 25-26 June 2013 at the University of Florida.

• The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) think tank’s latest report [PDF] ponders the future of US Special Operations Forces, following a decade where USSOCOM saw its budget more than quadruple and its personnel grow by 25,000 people (+68%).

• The Lowly Institute is starting a series of videos on Australia’s defense policy. The first one (embedded below) discusses whether enough is spent, relative to the country’s low threat outlook and the goals it sets for itself:

India has marked over $4 billion worth of artillery projects to purchase several hundred new 155mm howitzers. They are intended to supplement India’s dwindling artillery stocks, while out-ranging and out-shooting Pakistan’s self-propelled M109 155mm guns. It seemed simple enough, and in the main towed artillery competition, BAE Systems Bofors had been competing against systems from Israel’s Soltam and Denel of South Africa.

Unfortunately, India’s 2 towed howitzer competitions, and its 2 self-propelled artillery procurements, have mostly served as cautionary tales. If the stakes weren’t so high, they’d qualify as farce. The simple process of buying off-the-shelf artillery guns has become a decades-long affair filled with legal drama, accusations of corruption, and multiple re-starts – but not one new gun. Competitions are declared, and canceled, again and again. One is on its 5th iteration. Another is on its 3rd. Meanwhile, India’s stock of operational 155mm FH77 howitzers has dwindled to around 200, and their last successful artillery buy was over 2 decades ago. Is there an end in sight to any of these competitions? Or a potential winner?

Towed Artillery Competition Saga

Soltam Rascal
(click to view full)

US-India Defense and Strategic Affairs reported on the competition in 2004, and noted that this was expected to be one of the first large defense procurement decisions made by India’s new United Progressive Alliance government. The question became whether a decision could be made within that government’s term(s) of office. The answer: no.

The saga is illustrative of the problems India’s defense bureaucracy is creating across all of its artillery competitions, as it attempts to field working products before its existing artillery systems expire.

After multiple firing trials and several years, India’s towed artillery competition managed to end up without any competitors left standing. All 3 competitors (Bofors FH-77 B05, Soltam TIG 2002, Denel G5/2000) failed to meet India’s accuracy specifications in 2003 trials. Which might lead one to question the specifications, but all 3 improved their guns to compete again in 2004. There are reports that Soltam fell out of the race entirely, after a barrel burst during field trials. Then South Africa’s Denel was sidelined in 2004 and eliminated in 2005, after the Indian government accused the manufacturer of corruption in another defense deal.

That created problems on 2 fronts. One front involved a key competitor. Denel’s financial situation was deteriorating, and The Times of India reported that the contract may have been critical to the firm’s financial survival. In hindsight, that concern was valid, but Denel managed to survive the loss. A win certainly would have made a significant difference, and might have allowed Denel to delay its major corporate restructuring and associated strategic rethinking for several years.

Bofors’ FH-77B05:
Winner by default?
(click to view full)

The other problem involved India’s Ministry of Defence. India’s defense procurement establishment has shown an extreme risk-averse behavior and Defense India observes that when a competition devolves to a single-vendor solution, the practice is often to re-tender. Soltam and Denel’s exit left just BAE Bofors, until they, too were eliminated by allegations that Bofors had paid INR 640 million (about $16 million) in bribes, trying to secure the order.

The net effect of corporate blacklists, plus single-vendor prohibitions, is a process that can’t field equipment to India’s military when it’s needed – and sometimes ever. Unfortunately for India’s front-line soldiers, their need for working artillery hasn’t changed.

Indian history suggests that this is a long-standing problem. Bofors Defence AB had been blacklisted by India before, after allegations of kickbacks in a 1987 deal during Rajiv Gandhi’s regime. That scandal had derailed a planned 1,500 gun buy, reducing it to 410 FH-77 B02 howitzers. Fortunately for India, those guns arrived in time to become an iconic feature of the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan. On the civil front, meanwhile, those accused in the Bofors case eventually had their day in court, and won. Leaving behind a number of questions that India’s political class would rather leave unasked.

In April 2007, India re-opened its towed howitzer competition again, and the passage of time had created a number of changes in its requirements and options. By November 2009, however, it was the same old dynamic. The mere allegation of bribery had frozen the competition again, by leaving just 1 eligible contender. Would the January 2011 re-start fare any better?

Meanwhile, the support contract with Bofors for India’s in-service howitzers expired in 2001. As of January 2009, India’s stock was believed to sit at just 200 operational 155/39 caliber guns. They are accompanied by existing stocks of Soviet-era 130mm artillery, and 105mm light guns. A contract with Soltam (now Elbit) of Israel has converted some of those 130mm howitzers to 155mm/45 caliber weapons, raising the guns’ range from 26 km to 39 km/ 24 miles.

India’s Howitzer Competitions

Zuzana SPH
(click to view larger)

The competition for Indian artillery is actually several competitions.

Towed Howitzers

The competition covered in the previous section involves about $1.8 billion for 400 towed 155/52 artillery guns, to be followed by production of up to 1,180 in India.

Current Status: 5th RFP is now out. Winter and summer trials planned in 2010, now in limbo. BAE Bofors’ FH77 was competing against ST Engineering’s FH-2000, but BAE pulled out, and ST Kinetics is barred by a 10-year blacklist. On the sidelines, India’s DRDO has used the blockage to start a design project of its own.

It also turned out that India’s incompetent Ordnance Factory Board has been sitting on the plans it was given for the 155/39 caliber Bofors FH77B02, as the tech transfer piece of the 1990s buy that allowed licensed production in India. An October 2011 decision directed the OFB to begin manufacturing 155/39 and 155/45 caliber versions of these guns for trials, for delivery beginning in December 2012.

Ultra-Light Howitzers

A 2nd competition involves about $700 million for the ultra-light 155/39 howitzer competition, covering about 145 pieces. These would be portable, towed guns.

Current status: India’s government may be doing a government-to-government deal, as an emergency end-run to buy BAE’s M777, and bolster its dwindling artillery.

Singapore’s Pegasus was picked in 2009, but ST Kinetics’ 10-year blacklisting has derailed them, pending a legal fight. The reasons for the M777′s holdup are a combination of the Indian bureaucracy’s inability to conduct the required trials in over 2 years since the DSCA request, and reports that legal advisors were worried about a decision in the ST Kinetics’ legal case entangling any M777 buy. In May 2012, India’s MoD was reportedly cleared to negotiation an M777 contract worth around $550 million. As of May 2013, they haven’t managed to get anything done.

Self-Propelled Tracked Howitzers

A 3rd competition would spend about $800 million for about 100 155mm self-propelled tracked guns. The BHIM (Denel G-6 gun on Arjun tank chassis) winner was terminated in 2006, when Denel was barred following a corruption case. Partner Bharat Earth Movers was the big loser. Another RFP in 2007 failed, as all of the firms with products to offer were barred.

Current status: In limbo, though India recently gave indications that some kind of process was underway in 2013, with 3 Indian firms participating. Meanwhile, Pakistan began its own process in 2005, and bought 115 tracked M109A5 155mm self-propelled howitzers from the USA, at a very cheap price. The last one was delivered to Pakistan in 2010.

Self-Propelled Wheeled Howitzers

A 4th competition involves about $900 million – $1 billion for 180 self-propelled wheeled guns.

Current status: Canceled November 2011. RFP responses were reported to pit Slovakia’s 155/45 Zuzana system against Germany’s Rheinmetall and their RWG-52 155/52 system, which uses the PzH-2000 turret. Samsung Technwin’s entry, which is no longer listed in their product line, was eliminated in 2009.

Contracts and Key Events

M777: Chinook pick-up
(click to view full)

May 6/13: SPH. A Parliamentary reply indicates that India is pursuing another avenue for new self-propelled guns, in the wake of the 2007 RFP’s failure:

“A case for procurement of Qty.100 x 155mm/52 Calibre Tracked (self-propelled) Guns is in progress wherein three Indian vendors, including two private sector companies, have been selected for trials of their equipment. The recent amendments to the DPP-2011 which have been accepted by the Defence Acquisition Council aim to give higher preference to indigenous capacity in the Defence Sector.”

It will be interesting to see which companies are involved, and what they’re offering. Bharat Forge’s partnership with Elbit (q.v. Feb 7/13 entry) would allow them to offer the Rascal system, for instance.

April 29/13: 114 from OFB. Minister of state for Defence Shri Jitendra Singh confirms the contract details with India’s Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), who discovered that they had been sitting on blueprints to license-produce the 155/39 FH77 howitzer for over 20 years (vid. Oct 15/11), even as OFB personnel destroyed previous competitions by soliciting bribes.

OFB have carried out several firings of their derivative 155mm x 45 calibre gun, but it hasn’t been submitted for user testing yet, and hasn’t received production clearance. Once they get that clearance, there’s a contract for 114 towed guns. The first 6 will be delivered within 8 months of clearance, and another 6 over the next 4 months. Year 2 will produce 36 guns, and the last 60 will be manufactured in year 3. Indian government.

OFB contract for 114 license-built FH77/45s

April 29/13: What, me worry? Defense Minister AK Antony offers the usual non-response to a Parliamentary question that asks about the delays in getting India’s Army new artillery. We’ll save you the verbiage. Summary: “Nothing’s happening, and we’re not doing much about it, either.”

Feb 7/13: Elbit/Bharat JV. Israel’s Elbit Systems is forming a joint venture with the Kalyani Group’s Bharat Forge, to market advanced artillery and mortar systems in India.

Elbit products in this field include their Athos towed and Atmos wheeled self-propelled artillery, and their 120mm vehicle-mounted Cardom mortar. They also upgrade Soviet caliber artillery systems. Defense Update | Economic Times.

Feb 6/13: M777, FH-77. India Strategic quotes Chief of the Army Staff Gen Bikram Singh as saying that “whatever the reasons earlier [for delaying the M777 purchase], there would be no delay now.” India has held its firing trials, asked for some changes, and verified that BAE has made them. The Maintainability Evaluation is done, and negotiations are now focused on the price of 145 of the 155mm/ 39 caliber guns, plus a support package.

India’s 2004 buy of counter-fire artillery radars in 2004 reportedly omitted support considerations, and they don’t want to have to go through that problem again.

On another front, trials of the state-run OFB’s license-built Bofors FH-77Bs are now slated for the summer of 2013. The original guns and plans are 155 mm/ 39 caliber, but OFB’s version will be 155/45 caliber instead. Many standard towed 155mm guns these days are 155/52 caliber or more, and if India’s towed guns solicitation ever goes ahead, it will probably be to that specification. India Strategic writes:

“Senior officers of the Army are confident that the acquisition of M-777 will not go beyond 2013, and if there is a delay, it would not be beyond the coming fiscal year April 2013-March 2014. That is, a delay of not more than three months beyond 2013.”

US M777A2
fires Excalibur
(click to view full)

May 16/12: License-build. A written reply by Minister of State for Defence Dr MM Pallam Rajuin sets out India’s initial plans to license-build FH-77B02 155mm guns for initial trials, and confirms that India has a standing license agreement with M/s AB Bofors to produce the FH-77B02 155/39 caliber gun and its ammunition. If trials go well, full-scale production may begin.

Meanwhile, India’s state-owned Ordnance Factory Board will produce 2 FH77 155mm /39 caliber prototypes by December 2012. This is the same gun India is currently using. By June 2013, the OFB will also produce 2 upgraded FH77 155/45 caliber guns, with electronic and mechanical upgrades, and apply the same upgrades to 1 existing 155/39 gun. India’s MoD says that the Technology Transfer Agreement allows those changes. India MoD.

May 11/12: M777 approved. CNN-IBN reports that India’s MoD has cleared a Rs 3000 crore deal to buy 145 of BAE’s M777 ultra-light 155mm howitzers, as a government-to-government deal through US Foreign Military Sale channels.

They’re careful to note that this isn’t a contract yet, which may explain the absence of any announcement from BAE. At current conversion rates, the deal would be worth around $557 million, but exchange rates may change when and if negotiations produce an actual contract. CNN-IBN | India Defence.

January 2012: India Strategic sums things up, by quoting Chief of Army Staff Gen VK Singh:

“The procurement game is a version of snakes and ladders where there is no ladder but only snakes, and if the snakes bite you somewhere, the whole thing comes back to zero,” he said adding that he was hopeful of some guns to be cleared for acquisition shortly. It was 25 years ago that the Indian Army had acquired Bofors guns from Sweden… The gun had come with designs for production in India, with the much-needed Transfer of Technology, but its production was never undertaken by the designated public sector body, the Ordnance Factory Board… Bofors has since been sold several times to US and British companies. There has also been a proposal to acquire 145 ultra light howitzers M777 from the BAE Systems’s US arm. But it is also stuck somewhere.”

As the Hindustan Times notes, at least 3 of the few foreign vendors that make artillery systems are on the MoD’s blacklist, over allegations that don’t seem to get resolved in any timely way. This is true, but Israel’s IMI makes rocket artillery. Only Singapore’s ST Kinetics and Germany’s Rheinmetall would matter for these competitions, though it’s worth noting that their absence has already derailed 2 artillery programs. The newspaper also cites Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal (ret.) of The Centre for Land Warfare Studies think tank, as one voice beginning to make the argument that blacklisting is a failure, and arguing that other approaches are needed.

Dec 12/11: Why so late? A Parliamentary question about India’s howitzer plans gets an answer from the defence minister, which is informative but not encouraging. Basically, India’s bureaucracy has had almost 2 years to get its act together on trials, and has not:

“Ultra Light Howitzer is amongst the equipment that is included in the Artillery Profile 2027 prepared by the Artillery Directorate of Army, The procurement on Single Vendor basis from M/s ST Kinetics, Singapore is sub-judice [DID: a legal case]. The option of procuring the equipment through US Government (FMS route) is also being pursued.

The field evaluation of Ultra Light Howitzer comprises three parts viz. user trials, DGQA trials and Maintainability trials. Out of these, only user trials of the gun proposed to be procured through US Government have been completed. The performance of the gun can be ascertained only after evaluation of all three trial reports.

The field evaluation trial report of the guns was a confidential document. Four pages of draft field trial report were received in an anonymous envelope by the Army Hqrs. An enquiry in the matter is underway. Detailed instructions exist about security of classified documents. Aberrations, if any, are dealt with as per the relevant rules.”

One wonders what the over/under odds would be in Vegas, on the subject of India actually having some new artillery pieces by 2027.

June 29/11: DRDO DIY. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has started developing an indigenous 155mm 52 caliber howitzer for the armed forces, with its Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) in Pune as the lead agency. DNA India.

May 18/11: M777. In “India’s consolation prize to US,” The Times of India reports that India is close to an M777 buy, pursued as government-to-government Foreign Military Sale. The Times of India reports that:

“…the Army has dispatched a team to the US to carry out quality assurance assessments of maintenance and other technical specifications of M777… Once the team returns, “it wouldn’t take much time to conclude the deal”, sources said, adding that a June-end deadline was being looked at. He also hinted that this order too could go up, now that the government is expected to approve Army’s recommendation to raise a dedicated mountain strike corps for China border.”

April 29/11: BAE out. BAE Systems opts out of India’s Jan 23/11 tender for 1,580 towed artillery guns. They seem to have tired of the headaches, and will settle for the limited M777 ultralight howitzer procurement conducted outside of India’s normal processes. Guy Douglas:

“While we are certain that the FH-77B05 is the most capable 52 calibre towed gun available, and it was specifically designed for and demonstrated to meet the Indian Army… the company will not submit a proposal… We found that the new RFP includes technical and performance relaxations that allow less capable weapon systems to enter the competition. This significantly reduces the competitive advantage FH-77B05 derives from its greater capability… the decision not to bid is a commercial one based on the high investment costs required to participate in a complex artillery competition of this nature, where the win probability has been reduced…”

The question is whether this will leave India facing a single-vendor situation again, which will force them to cancel a 5th time. The RFP was not sent to Singapore’s ST Kinetics, but it did go to firms in France, the US, Israel and the Czech Republic. The question is who will respond. See StratPost.

Bofors Archer System
(click to view full)

Sept 10/10: SPH. The Indian defense ministry is expected to issue its 3rd wheeled howitzer RFP, for 140 wheeled guns, by the end of September. BAE’s Archer apparently doesn’t fit the RFP criteria, which implies requirements that aren’t in line with global norms for the class. France’s Caesar is also unmentioned in this competition, leaving just Rheinmetall’s RWG-52 and Slovakia’s Zuzana as known contenders. Aviation Week.

July 7/10: Blacklists, again. India’s CBI has asked the Defence Ministry to blacklist 6 firms for their alleged involvement in the Ordnance Factory Board graft scandal: Cooperation Defence in Russia, Singapore Technologies Kinetics (ST Kinetics), Israel Military Industries Ltd (IMI), Rheinmetall Air Defence (RAD) in Zurich, T S Kisan and companies Pvt Ltd in New Delhi, and R K Machines Tools Ltd in Ludhiana. If the Defence Ministry agrees, it would likely derail the self-propelled howitzer competition, where a different division of Rheinmetall is one of 2 finalists.

The move follows a 2,700-page chargesheet in a special CBI court against former Director General of Ordnance factory Board, Sudipta Ghosh and 11 others. The CBI alleges that Ghosh had entered into criminal conspiracy with other accused personnel, with the object of demanding and obtaining huge bribes in return for supply orders placed by the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). Indian Express.

March 15/10: Still stalled. Indian Defence Minister Shri AK Antony responds to Shri Asaduddin Owaisi and others in Parliament:

“In March, 2008, the Government had issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for procurement of towed guns. The name of one of the firms participating in the said procurement case figured among the names of seven firms in the FIR filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in May, 2009 in respect of various supply orders placed by Ordnance Factory Board. The procurement / acquisition cases in pipeline with any of the firms figuring in the said FIR were put on hold until further orders. Later, it was decided that multi-vendor procurement cases, presently held up at various stages of technical evaluation / trials, may be progressed further as per Defence Procurement Procedure – 2008. However, no tender will be awarded to the companies mentioned in the FIR unless CBI investigation clears them totally.

No towed guns / howitzers have been procured during the last three years. The proposals presently being processed include production of towed guns by Ordnance Factory Board under transfer of technology from the selected vendor. The procurement proceeds as per the provisions of the Defence Procurement Procedure 2008. The induction of the equipment, as and when it takes place, will enhance the firepower of the Indian Artillery.”

Feb 15/10: Towed. The Wall Street Journal reports that BAE Systems Ltd. expects to start trials in India for its FH77 B05 towed howitzer by early March. That’s a month or so behind the original February 2010 expectation for winter trials. The FH77 B05 would be manufactured and marketed in India by BAE’s joint venture with Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.

BAE also reportedly expects to start trials for the M777 ultra-light howitzer in India by the end of 2010. Speaking at DefExpo 2010 in New Delhi, BAE Systems India (Services) Pvt. Ltd. VP and General Manager Mark Simpkins reportedly said that the initial M77 order “is likely to be for 145 units, which could increase to 1,000 units in the future.”

Feb 15/10: SPH. As part of its DefExpo 2010 push, Rheinmetall Defence discusses its RWG-52 and RTG-52 candidates for India’s self-propelled programs.

Jan 28/10: M777. Indian sources tell DID that that the M777 request could also become an attempt to sidestep India’s paralyzing procurement bureaucracy. Single-vendor competitions are problematic when following India’s Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP), but can reportedly be used for government-to-government foreign military sales deals, per Section 71 of the DPP 2008:

“There may be occasions when procurements would have to be done from friendly foreign countries which may be necessitated due to geo-strategic advantages that are likely to accrue to our country. Such procurements would not classically follow the Standard Procurement Procedure and the Standard Contract Document but would be based on mutually agreed provisions by the Governments of both the countries.”

While ST Engineering’s Pegasus is still an ultra-light howitzer contender, the question is whether the legal steps required to make that deal would take too long – even though nothing has been proven concerning the firm’s conduct in India.

Jan 22/10: ST Kinetics. Singapore’s ST Kinetics announces that it is keen to set up a manufacturing base in India, if it wins some of the 5 contracts it has bid for. The tenders comprise 2 artillery gun projects (ultra-light and towed howitzers), a light strike vehicle for the army, and 2 carbine rifle projects for internal security forces.

Jan 15/10: ST Kinetics speaks. Singapore’s ST Kinetics issues a release touting “the longest in-service 155 mm 52 Calibre towed Howitzer, the FH 2000,” which is expected to enter field trials in February 2010. It also says that:

“The company is hopeful that the stalled [Indian] trial of the 155 mm calibre 39 Pegasus Lightweight Howitzer (LWH) will also recommence very shortly… ST Kinetics plans to address India’s strategic needs and is fielding tailored solutions to meet the requirements of the modernisation programmes of the armed forces. These include the iFH2000 155mm 52 Calibre Howitzer for the Towed Gun requirement and the Pegasus 155mm 39 Calibre Lightweight Howitzer for the Ultra Lightweight Howitzer program. ST Kinetics has also offered the SAR 21 Carbine with its proven reliability and performance.

Speaking at the Press Conference, Brig Gen Patrick Choy, Chief Marketing Officer, said “…The company is respected for its integrity, transparency and high standards of corporate governance. [The Pegasus 155mm / 39 howitzer]… is already in India in Gwalior and is awaiting a call to trials.”

SLWH Pegasus

Nov 23/09: Blacklistings. India’s MoD publicly confirms the blacklisting and terms for all 7 firms mentioned in the Nov 12/09 Defense News report:

“In regard to the tender cases of procurement/execution, where the tender process has already been started and where the companies mentioned in the FIR are figuring, each case should be dealt as per the tender conditions, keeping in view of the FIR in question. No tender should be awarded to the companies mentioned in the FIR unless the CBI investigation clears them totally.”

Nov 12/09: Frozen again. Defense News reports that India’s artillery competition is frozen yet again. Singapore Technologies has been disqualified, and under India’s rules, competitions can’t proceed with just one qualified vendor.

In June 2009, corruption charges filed against the former director-general of India’s Ordnance Factory Board placed 7 firms on the “tainted” list, blacklisting them from defense contracts: Singapore Technologies, Israel’s IMI, Poland’s BVT, Singapore’s Media Architects, and India’s HYT Engg, T.S. Kishan and R.K. Machine Tools. The latest Indian MoD advisory will not allow them to participate in defense procurements, pending a full Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) report.

Towed competition frozen, 7 firms blacklisted

Oct 7/09: Bofors. Indian Express reports that:

“The government may have decided to let Ottavio Quattrocchi off the hook, but the Bofors ghost continues to haunt the armed forces, with several key artillery modernisation programmes put in the limbo due to wrongdoing charges levelled against three major international manufacturers.”

Jan 14/09: An anonymous Army official tells Indian reporters that:

“The procurement process for the towed and light howitzer is proceeding as planned. Bids have been received from all the vendors and trials of the guns are planned in February or March [of 2009]… The trials for self-propelled howitzers are planned in May-June [2009].”

According to the IANS report, the initial contract involves 180 guns, but the eventual contract is to include up to 400 guns, thanks to transfer of technology to build the howitzers in India. Of these, 140 will be light howitzers that will be spread over 7 regiments. They will still be 155/52 caliber, just lighter thanks to advances in metallurgy and design. The remaining 260 guns will be towed and self-propelled variants. IANS via India Defence | Hindustan Times.

G6 Base, Bleeding?

April 4/07: SPH Re-tender. The Calcutta Telegraph reports that India has reopened its artillery competitions entirely, refloating 2 global RFPs to 12 makers of 155mm/52 calibre self-propelled guns. The Indian Army reportedly proposes to buy 400 systems at the outset: 180 tracked and 220 wheeled.

The first new tender was for wheeled guns, with an RFP floated in early March 2007. The second tender for tracked guns was floated at the end of the month. Expected competitors include BAE Land Systems USA (M109A6 Paladin possible for tracked), BAE Bofors (FH77B towed, Archer wheeled), France’s Nexter (Caesar wheeled), Rheinmetall (Zuzana wheeled from Kerametal in Slovakia, possibly PzH-2000 for tracked), Korea’s Samsung Techwin (K9 for tracked), and Israel’s Soltam (Atmos 2000 for wheeled, Rascal for tracked).

In making its decision to re-float the RFP, the cabinet committee on security reportedly concluded that:

• A single-vendor situation must be avoided;
  
• South Africa’s Denel had emerged as the single vendor for the tracked version, but they were blacklisted in 2005 on another deal;
  
• The process delays of 5 years since the first tender have been so great that the field as a whole has advanced since then;
  
• The standards for the selection of the guns need to be revised; and
  
• India’s defence procurement policy has been revised in the interim, and the RFP should reflect that.

Self-propelled howitzers RFP v2.0

Jan 16/06: A new scandal is swirling around re-opened allegations of kick-backs involving Bofors, and complicity by the current government in covering them up.

Jan 13/06: New trials. The Press Trust of India (PTI) reports that Army Chief General J J Singh has ordered a 4th round of extensive trials for the guns, in which only the Bofors and Soltam guns will be taking part. He said the two contending 155mm/52 caliber guns would be evaluated through summer and winter trials, with the winner inducted by 2007.

DID thought that was a bit optimistic…

Jan 12/06: BMCS RFP. The Times of India reports that India’s UPA government has floated new global tenders for collaboration in the Nalanda ordnance factory project to manufacture 155mm Bi-Modular Charge Systems (BMCS) for India’s artillery. See this link from BAE’s SWS Defence for a more in-depth look at a particular BMCS solution.

South Africa’s Denel had been picked, but the blacklisting stemming from the anti-material rifles’ deal is having further ripple effects. The winner of this competition will be well positioned for any follow-on orders involving India’s new howitzers.

June 15/04: Madison Government Affairs, summarizing Defense News:

“The Indian Army will choose among three foreign contenders for a $2 billion purchase of about 400 155mm self-propelled howitzers after field trials in the Rajasthan desert later this month, an Indian Defence Ministry official said. The candidates are the Swedish SWS Defense AB FH77B05 L52, the Israeli Soltam TIG 2002 and the South African Denel G5/2000 gun. All three failed to meet India’s accuracy specifications in last year’s trials; all three improved their guns to compete again this year, said an Indian Army official from the artillery directorate”

Additional Readings

• India MoD – Defence Procurement Procedures

• Bharat Rakshak – 155mm BOFORS FH-77B

• BAE’s SWS Defence – 155 mm FH 77B05 L52

• DID – Sweden, Norway to Cooperate on Archer Artillery Project. Uses the FH-77.

• DID – M777: He Ain’t Heavy, He’s my Howitzer. An alternative from BAE Systems for the towed segment.

• Denel Land Systems – G6-52 SP Gun Howitzer and T5-52 Truck-Mounted gun Howitzer.

• DID (Oct 30/05) – Singapore Unveils New Air-Portable, Semi-Mobile 155mm Pegasus Howitzer

• Army Technology – Caesar 155mm Self-Propelled Artillery System, France (Nexter)

• GlobalSecurity – K9 155mm self-propelled howitzer (Samsung Techwin)

• Soltam Systems – Athos. Towed 155mm howitzer.

• Army Technology – Soltam’s Atmos towed/truck-mounted howitzer, and tracked Rascal systems.

• Global Security – 155mm ShKH Zuzana (ZTS)

• Rheinmetall Defence – RWG-52 and RTG-52 for India’s artillery modernization programme

• Force – Indian Artillery marred by the S factor, stagnation and scandal

• Operations and maintenance were the first to be hit by sequestration. Pentagon Comptroller Bob Dale told Defense News that the impact of sequestration on acquisition programs will be known soon, with some noticeable but not huge cuts in units ordered, and delays especially on the research & development side. There is a significant reprogramming request coming to wrap up FY13, while the outlook for furloughs is still shifting and fuzzy.

• Israel launched airstrikes between Friday and Sunday against a Syrian military facility near Damascus. The situation in Syria doesn’t get any clearer, as UN investigators say sarin gas may well have been used by rebels rather than the government.

• China and India seem to be defusing tension at the Line of Actual Control in the Ladakh region. At least until next time. Hindustan Times | PTI.

• China commissioned Yueyang, the latest ship in its Type 054A frigate class.

• The US Air Force announced it recently successfully completed its final test flight with the X-51A vehicle, at a peak speed of Mach 5.1.

• An M51 ballistic missile launched by France from a submarine during a test self-destructed during its first propulsion phase. The 5 earlier tests had been successful. France 24 | Liberation [in French].

• At $1.2B, ITT Exelis Q1 2013 sales were 14% lower that a year ago.

• The US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute published a book on cyber infrastructure protection [PDF] covering the gamut of economic, social, and legal aspects.

In November 2005, reports surfaced that that Germany would sell Israel 2 AIP-equipped Dolphin submarines, to join its existing fleet of 3 conventional diesel-electric Dolphin Class boats. In 2006, the deal for 2 Dolphin AIP boats was finalized at a total of $1.27 billion, with the German government picking up 1/3 of the cost. The new boats are built at the Howaldtswerke-Deutche Werft AG (HDW) shipyard, in the Baltic Sea coastal city of Kiel, with deliveries originally scheduled to begin in 2010. Those have been delayed, and have not begun as of yet.

Reports that an additional sale may be in the offing have now been confirmed, but just absorbing these 3 new boats will be no small challenge for Israel’s “3rd service”…

The Dolphin Class, and Its Improvements

Dolphin Class Cutaway
(click to view larger)

The Dolphins are quiet diesel-electric attack submarines that evolved from Germany’s famous and ubiquitous U209 Class. They can fire torpedoes and missiles from their 533mm torpedo tubes, perform underwater surveillance, and even launch combat swimmers via a wet and dry compartment.

Germany had already donated two Dolphin submarines to the Israeli navy after the Gulf War in the early 1990s. The first-of-class INS (Israeli Naval Ship) Dolphin was commissioned in 1999, while INS Leviathan was commissioned in 2000. The Israelis later bought a 3rd submarine for $350 million total, using a 50/50 shared cost arrangement with the German government. INS Tekuma (“revival, renewal”) also entered service in 2000.

INS Leviathan
(click to view larger)

The Dolphin subs are reportedly designed for a crew of 35 and can support 10 passengers. They have a maximum speed of 20 knots (though as diesel subs, their endurance at speed is limited), and a maximum range of 4,500 km/ 2,700 miles. The submarines incorporate Atlas Elektronik’s ISUS 90-1 TCS for provides automatic sensor management, fire and weapon control, navigation and operation.

Dolphin submarines are versatile and heavily-armed, with a wet and dry compartment for deploying underwater swimmers, and no less than 10 bow torpedo tubes. Four of the tubes have a 650mm diameter, which can launch larger cruise missiles, but are also useful for launching commandos in swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs). The other 6 x 533mm tubes can launch STN Atlas Elektronik’s DM2A3 torpedoes or anti-ship missiles (likely Boeing’s UGM-86 Harpoons). Underwater mines offer another option.

It is also rumored that Israel has tested a nuclear-capable version of its medium-range “Popeye Turbo” cruise missile design for deployability from the 650mm torpedo tubes in its Dolphin Class submarines. The 2002 Popeye Turbo launch test location off Sri Lanka suggested that the tests may have been performed in cooperation with India.

HDW’s AIP System

The rumors concerning Israel’s nuclear-capable cruise missiles had stalled additional Dolphin class sales in 2003, as had Israeli issues with the price tag. Israel’s Navy is widely considered to be last among the country’s services on the spending priority list, and so finds itself with less latitude than the Army and Air Force. The final $846 million/ $424 million Israeli-German deal for 2 more submarines addressed Israeli price concerns to some extent, provided a job creation benefit for the German government, and completed the 2nd major long-delayed arms sale that the Schroeder government solidified during its final month in office. [1]

The AIP system chosen for the 3 newest Dolphin boats (#4-6) has not specified. While HDW owns Kockums AB and its successful Stirling AIP system, it also has its own technology using Siemens PEM hydrogen fuel cells. This HDW system is used in the U212/214 Class, which the Dolphins resemble and which are also derived from the U209 1300/1400 subs.

Contracts and Key Events

April 29/13: INS Rahav. HDW hands over Israel’s 5th submarine, INS Rahav, in a ceremony at the Kiel dockyards. INS Rahav is expected to reach Israel within several months and dock at Haifa. A 6th submarine is expected to arrive in 2017.

Anglicizations can be tricky, and we apologize for not looking at the original Hebrew. Bantam-Megiddo 1986 defines “Rahav” as “boasting,” but Israeli correspondents say its live usage is closer to fearlessness, and can be used for arrogance. The name Rachav/ Rahav/ Rahab has an interesting history from the Book of Joshua. She was an inkeeper/ prostitute in Jericho who was good-hearted enough to hide Joshua’s spies from agents of the king, as the Israelites were preparing to enter the Promised Land. Jericho’s walls would later go down in a series of loud blasts, after which Rachav and her family became part of the Jewish people.

In anglicized form, the word and the name can be rendered the same way. In Hebrew, that subtle difference you see is a different letter entirely, and they aren’t the same word. yNet News.

INS Tanin ceremony

May 3/12: INS Tanin. HDW hands Israel’s 4th submarine over to the Israeli Navy, at a ceremony in Kiel, Germany. The new boat is due to enter service in 2013, following at-sea testing and evaluation.

The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz places Tanin’s cost at $500 million, as part of a EUR 1.4/ $ 2.04 billion overall cost for boats #4-6. In return, they report that the German government will cover 33% of the total cost, and buy another EUR 400 million worth of equipment from Israeli suppliers. The Israeli equipment used in these submarines counts, and Germany is already buying Israeli equipment for its own use, so that total shouldn’t be a problem.

The name INS Tanin (Heb.: “crocodile”) is interesting. “Gator ship” is traditionally used to refer to ships that do a lot of work close in-shore. A submarine that spends a lot of time of special forces landings and pickups would certainly fit that description. Then again, there are rumors that these submarines are nuclear capable. Nile Crocodiles are well-known for hiding in the water and unleashing sudden, devastating attacks. Arutz Sheva | Ha’aretz | Russia’s RIA Novosti.

Feb 5/12: 6th sub contract. The Jerusalem Post reports that the deal for a 6th Dolphin submarine is now a signed contract:

“Christian Schmidt, [Germany's] secretary of state for defense, told the Post that the contract was signed a few weeks ago and that Germany had agreed to subsidize its cost… The submarines under construction will be fitted with a new [AIP] propulsion system… Schmidt said that Germany was looking to increase its defense cooperation with Israel and was specifically interested in learning from the IDF about training and military doctrine. He said that Germany was also considering buying the Heron TP long-range unmanned aerial vehicle later this decade to replace the Heron 1 it is operating in Afghanistan.”

STN-ATLAS CCS

Dec 18/11: The Jerusalem Post reports that INS Dolphin has returned to service, following a 2-year, NIS 100 million (about $26.4 million) major refit at the Israeli Navy’s Haifa shipyard. Renovations reportedly included dismantling, inspecting, and restoring all of the submarine’s valves, pipes and sonar systems; doing the same to the engine; and making sure the submarine body is cleaned and all cracks re-welded. INS Dolphin isn’t named specifically, but only 1 submarine entered service in 1999.

The fact of this refit was not previously disclosed, so that Israel’s enemies wouldn’t know that 1/3 of the existing submarine force was out of service. The report adds that new construction of hardened berths in underway for the next 2 Dolphin subs, and the question for Israel’s enemies is whether a similar overhaul for INS Leviathan or INS Tekuma will wait until they arrive.

That may matter, because Israel is has just put together a “Depth Corps” for long-range operations, which will initially include special forces and supporting air, land, and sea assets. The Navy’s Flotilla 13/ Shayetet, which just won the IDF’s annual “Chief of Staff Award” for operations in 2011, will be part of that group. The Navy’s submarines can also be expected to play a major role.

Nov 30-Dec 3/11: The 6th submarine sale is back on. German Chancellor Angela Merkel tells German lawmakers that she has dropped her opposition to the subsidized sale, after Israel agreed last week to unfreeze the transfer of $100 million a month in customs duties and other funds to the Palestinian Authority. Iran may also have helped, as “protesters” recently stormed the British Embassy in Tehran, triggering a backlash by allied countries. The new Israeli submarine is expected to arrive by 2016.

Israel’s funding clampdown had been triggered by the PA’s violation of the Oslo Accords’ peace talk framework, via an attempt at unilateral declaration of statehood at the UN, including a recently-granted seat on the socio-cultural body UNESCO. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu qualified Israel’s actions, adding that Israel would consider renewing the ban if the Palestinian Authority “resumes taking unilateral steps.” Arutz Sheva | Israel’s Globes | Ha’artez | Jerusalem Post | Washington Times.

Oct 31/11: Der Speigel cites “Government sources” who have reportedly confirmed that Germany is threatening to stop the delivery of the 6th Dolphin Class submarine to Israel, after approving EUR 135 million in subsidies for the sale (vid. July 17/11). The move reportedly comes in response to the Israeli government’s decision to approve the construction of 1,100 new homes in Gilo, an Arab part of Jerusalem captured from Jordan in the 1967 Six Day War. The Israeli government’s official position is that Gilo is part of its capital, Jerusalem, hence part of Israel.

In an additional twist, Der Spiegel has also reported that the submarine subsidies may be a way of settling a 1953 German-Israeli reparations agreement for $500 million that had been attributed to East Germany, but never paid. This would help to explain the unusual spectacle of difficult negotiations over how much the selling country will subsidize the buyer. Der Spiegel | Ha’aretz | UPI.

Sept 10/11: ynet news speaks to Israel’s Colonel Oded, who recently completed his tenure as the commander of that country’s submarine fleet.

July 17/11: Der Spiegel reports that German Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere has given the formal go-ahead for the 6th Dolphin submarine deal. An initial EUR 135 million (about $191 million) transfer will provide the financing for initial construction activities, and serve as Germany’s subsidy for the project. Subsequent reports place its value at about 33% of the cost. Jerusalem Post | Ha’aretz | ynet News.

May 5/11: Reuters reports that a deal is done for a 6th submarine, after previous efforts ran aground on the $500-700 million price tag:

“It’s finalized – we will be getting another submarine from Germany, with payments spread over several years,” an Israeli official briefed on the negotiations said. The official did not immediately say how much the Dolphin would cost Israel or whether Germany would arrange a discount.”

Subsequent reports in Arutz Sheva and ynet News place the price tag at $1 billion for this 6th sub, though how that figure was arrived at is not specified. Those reports also note the opposition of the Israeli Defense Forces to the buy, given the cost and other IDF priorities. The drive to expand the submarine fleet was made as a political decision.

April 6/11: That 6th sub again. The Jerusalem Post reports:

“Talks on the Dolphin submarine deal stalled last year after the Germans declined to underwrite it, as they had done with previous purchases. Israel sought up to a third off the $500 million to $700 million price for the new Dolphin… “We’re still hoping for a discount, and the prime minister will raise this matter” in a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel scheduled for Thursday, the Israeli official said without elaborating.”

In the current climate of austerity, one doesn’t have high hopes for his chances.

Jan 9/11: Recruitment. Expanding a submarine force from 3 to 5 vessels is not a trivial matter. Those submarines need crews, which has to be done without crippling the quality of existing crews. In response, the IDF journal Bamachaneh reports that the number of soldiers selected for submarine warfare has grown by 30% in the latest IDF recruitment batches. That’s significant in a country that has traditionally emphasized the Army and Air Force as destinations for its top quality recruits. In parallel, more officers are being trained for submarine posts, and the number of cadets who will be trained for submarine command positions is rising by 35%. Arutz Sheva.

July 25/10: The Israeli MoD takes the unusual step of denying that talks are in progress to acquire a 6th Dolphin Class submarine. From The Jerusalem Post:

“The statement clarified that since Israel was not in talks with Germany regarding the procurement of a sixth submarine, there were, as a result, no talks regarding an Israeli request to receive German government financial assistance for the deal. The Defense Ministry statement came amid reports that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government had decided to turn down an Israeli request for financial assistance in purchasing the Dolphin-class submarine and new [MEKO frigates]. In another rare statement, the German government, which rarely talks about defense sales, also denied it was holding talks with Israel on subsidizing new naval vessels. “There are no negotiations between Israel and Germany about submarines,” government spokesman Ulrich Wilhelm was quoted as saying by Reuters.”

Jan 23/10: Philadelphia’s The Bulletin relays a Der Tagesspiegel report that a delegation of 7 Israeli government cabinet ministers, headed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, held a joint cabinet meeting with their counterparts in Berlin, Germany. The sub deal was reportedly on the agenda, as was “Israel’s intention to station new German-made submarines in the Persian Gulf on a permanent basis.”

If true, this would seem to be about deploying Israel’s nuclear deterrent so that a retaliatory strike from the country’s short-to-medium range submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles would be able to reach deep into Iran.

Jan 18/10: Defense News reports that Germany and Israel are in talks concerning a $1.45 billion naval deal that would add 1 Dolphin Class submarine, and 2 MEKO-derived frigates as the beginning of Israel’s next-generation frigate program. Current reports do not see a January 2010 agreement as likely, and Defense News claims that Israel is asking Germany to pay for 33% of the cost as a German industrial stimulus program, just as it did with Israel’s previous 2-sub order.

The MEKO ships would be Israel’s alternative to a very modified version of Lockheed Martin’s Littoral Combat Ship design, which Israel rejected due to its expected $700+ million cost. Even so, American components in the total naval package could reach up to $200 million. This is important because Israel can use US military aid dollars to buy them, instead of hard currency.

Jan 5/10: Israel’s Hebrew-language Ma’ariv newspaper quotes a “senior” Israeli source as saying that submarine-related negotiations with Germany are at an advanced stage, with a possible announcement during Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Israel later in January. Papers in the UAE and Brunei characterize it as revolving around an additional submarine, as opposed to payment or acceptance negotiations concerning the 2 submarines that were slated for delivery beginning in 2010.

If the deal is an additional sale, it would bring the total number of Dolphin Class submarine orders to 6. Brunei FM | UAE’s Press TV.

Dec 3/09: Acorn Energy subsidiary DSIT Solutions Ltd. announces the successful completion and delivery of Stage I of the Dolphin Submarine Tactical Trainer project for the Israeli Navy.

Work on the final Stage 2 is well underway, and expected to reach completion in 10 months. It will bring the submarine tactical trainer to a state of full representation of the entire spectrum of Dolphin submarine weapon systems, sensors, and command and control systems.

Sept 29/09: Reports surface that Israel has taken delivery, thanks to quotes from an anonymous Israeli military spokesman that “We have received two Dolphin-class submarines built in Germany.” Delivery was initially expected in 2010, and confirmation is iffy.

Subsequent reports cshow the report to be false. Always helps to keep your enemies guessing, though. Agence France Presse | Ennahar in Algeria | The News International in Pakistan.

June 21/07: Acorn Energy subsidiary DSIT Solutions in Givat Shmuel, Israel announces the $8 million Dolphin Submarine Tactical Trainer project, following an international tender. The trainer to be supplied by DSIT will simulate all sonar and weapons systems on board the Dolphin Class submarines, allowing the Dolphin tactical team of officers and operators to practice in an environment that duplicates that of an actual submarine at sea.

DSIT has worked with the Israeli Navy for the past 15 years on a range of advanced sonar and acoustic related projects, including sonar simulators, as well as shipboard consoles.

Aug 22/06: The Jerusalem Post reports a formal contract signing for 2 SSK Dolphin Class diesel-electric submarines. EADS is also a player in the deal following its acquisition of Atlas Elektronik. Unlike their 3 predecessors, these submarines would incorporate an AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) system in order to allow them to spend far more time submerged; most likely HDW’s system used on the U-212 Class.

The Jerusalem Post reports that the contract was signed after a long dispute over the price and financing, though the final cost in dollars ($1.27 billion) is slightly higher than the 2005 reports of EUR 1 billion/ $1.17 billion. A third of the deal (about $425 million) will still be financed by the German government, however, effectively offering a foreign aid subsidy to jobs and production at HDW.

The same article also noted that the Israeli Navy is also considering a Fixed Underwater Sonar System off its coast, in order to improve detection of foreign submarines.

Nov 2005: Defense-Aerospace relays reports from Der Spiegel and Focus that Germany will sell Israel 2 AIP-equipped SSK Dolphin Class submarines for Eur 1 billion, then about $1.17 billion.

Footnotes

fn1. Before the Israeli submarine contract was issued, the outgoing German government broke another logjam, and agreed to sell 298 surplus Leopard 2 battle tanks to Turkey.

Additional Readings

• Naval Technology – SSK Dolphin Class attack submarines, Israel

• Israeli Weapons – SSK Dolphin Class attack submarine

• Kockums AB (an HDW subsidiary) – Stirling AIP system

• Dolphin Israel Submariners Association – The Dolphin Project. A more detailed assessment and set of information than the Naval-Technology page linked above.

• ynet News (Sept 10/11) – Doomsday weapon: Israel’s submarines. Includes quotes from Colonel Oded, who recently completed his tenure as the fleet’s commander.

The THAAD Ground-Based Radar (GBR), now known as the AN/TPY-2, is an X-Band, phased array, solid-state, long-range air defense radar. It was developed and built by Raytheon at its Andover, MA Integrated Air Defense Facility, as the main radar for the US Army’s THAAD late midcourse ballistic missile defense system.

For THAAD, targeting information from the TPY-2 is uploaded to the missile immediately before launch, and continuously updated in flight via datalinks. The TPY-2 is always deployed with THAAD, but it can also be used independently as part of any ABM (anti ballistic missile) infrastructure. That flexibility, and ease of deployment, is carving out an expanding role for the TPY-2/ “FBX” that reaches beyond THAAD. If a recent NRC report is adopted, that role will expand again to include national-scale ballistic missile defense. Hence this separate article to cover its ongoing development.

The TPY-2/ FBX System

AN/TPY-2 system
(click to view full)

The radar uses a trailer-mounted, single-faced 9.2 square meter wideband phased-array antenna. In the antenna there are 72 transceiver modules in semiconductor technology, which supply a total of 25,344 antenna elements. In “forward-based” or volume search mode, the TPY-2′s high power output and beam/waveform agility lets it perform air surveillance to very high altitudes at ranges of up to 1,000 km (600 miles). In “terminal” (targeting) mode, it performs aerial target identification and tracking.

Those targets can include incoming ballistic missiles. While they’re adapted for end to end use against short range ballistic missiles, TPY-2 radars can be used against longer-range missiles as well. Their X-band frequency and narrow beam widths add the additional advantage of being able to tell the difference between smaller objects, such as a warhead vs. space debris (“range resolution”). The penalty is that they’re not as good as the huge SSPARS/UEWR radars at searching wide volumes of space, and of course they have a much shorter range. At present, their best use against long-range attacks is to observe the early stage of missile launches from a forward base, and relay that information to the national command to cue larger radars.

The entire AN/TPY-2 radar system includes:

• The phased-array Antenna Equipment Unit (AEU)
  
• A Cooling Equipment Unit (CEU) for use with the antenna array
  
• The Electronic Equipment Unit (EEU)
  
• A 1.3 MW Prime Power Unit (PPU)
  
• An Operator Control Unit (OCU) which lets soldiers see the radar’s results, monitor the system, and communicate. It has its own built-in power unit.

The FBX (Forward Based X-band) is a stand-alone AN/TPY-2 radar, with some additional communications for independent meshing with other missile defense elements. Normally, the THAAD system would handle that, but FBX deploys on its own, without the THAAD missile system.

Future proposals for FBX could field a much more powerful version.

The USA’s National Research Council submitted a 2012 report that recommended an improved FBX, as part of an enhanced GMD-E mid-cource defense system for the continental USA. On the ground, 5 “GBX” twin-stacked and integrated, rotatable TPY-2 derivative radars would be added, with X-band uplink and downlink modes. Four would be co-located with current SPSS ballistic missile early warning sites at Clear AFS, AK; Cape Cod, MA; Thule, Greenland; and Fylingdales, United Kingdom. The 5th would be placed at Grand Forks, ND, which currently houses the 10th Space Warning Squadron.

Each GBX would have a 20 degree x 90 degree field of view, rotatable through an azimuth sector of 270 degrees, while providing electronic scan coverage from the horizon to the zenith over a traverse angle sector of 45 degrees from broadside. Output from the stacked TPY-2 radars would be combined coherently through a time-delay device that permits full instantaneous signal bandwidth to be used for range Doppler imaging, creating an elevation beam width half that of the AN/TPY-2 radar, with 2x the gain (4x times the 2-way gain) and 2x the peak and average power. Duplicate power supply and cooling units would be required, and an upload/download link would need to be added. See also “Ballistic Missile Defense: Why the Current GMD System’s Radars Can’t Discriminate” for an in-depth technical explanation of why even the huge UEWR radars aren’t suitable for discriminating between warheads and the decoys used by more advanced missiles, and why TPY-2′s X-band wavelength is a much better fit.

Contracts & Key Events

Note that some TPY-2 contracts will not appear here, because they were simply bundled within THAAD missile system development and purchases, and were not independently visible.

AN/TPY-2 changes
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April 26/13: The GAO looks at the Missile Defense Agency’s full array of programs in report #GAO-13-342, “Missile Defense: Opportunity To Refocus On Strengthening Acquisition Management.” With respect to the AN/TPY-2 system, there have been a few slips, but those mostly come from shifts by the MDA and the THAAD program. One delay that was intrinsic involved the Production Readiness Risk Assessment, which was delayed for 2 years because of an obsolete radar processor that was hard to replace.

THAAD reductions from 9 batteries to 6 also hit the TPY-2 program, as the MDA cut its planned TPY-2 buy from 18 to 11. That’s a greater than proportional reduction, for an asset that’s also in wide demand without THAAD. The reduction means that the last American TPY-2 was ordered in December 2012, and the line will shut down in FY 2015 without export orders. Which do appear to be forthcoming. The reported average cost in the 2012 BAR to buy one more AN/TPY-2 is FY11$ 187 million, though foreign buyers will also have to pay for the support infrastructure, training, etc.

March 19/13: #8 delivered. Raytheon announces that they’ve delivered their 8th AN/TPY-2 radar to the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

March 15/13: Japan. Following North Korea’s 3rd nuclear test attempt, the new US Secretary of Defense announces that the USA will add 14 more ground-based interceptor missiles at Fort Greely, AK and Vandenberg AFB, CA. They’re paying for this by “restructuring” the SM-3 Block 2B Next Generation Aegis Missile program. In reality, they’re cancelling SM-3-2B.

Japan will continue to collaborate with the USA on the SM-3 Block 2A program, and will get a 2nd AN/TPY-2 radar on its territory in addition to the one at Shariki Air Base, per the Sept 27/12 announcement. Pentagon AFPS | Full Speech Transcript.

AN/TPY-2, guarded
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Sept 17/12: 2nd TPY-2 to Japan. The US military and Japan agree to strengthen anti-missile defenses by placing a 2nd TPY-2 radar in Japan. Japan’s BMD system relies on ship-based SM-3 missiles for area defense, with PATRIOT PAC-3 missiles for land-based point defense. TPY-2s have been tested with AEGIS ships before against enemy missiles. US DoD:

“A defense official traveling with Panetta told reporters on background the radar, a second Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance system, or AN-TPY-2, will augment one previously set up in Shariki on the northern part of Honshu island. A team from the United States arrived in Japan this week to work with Japanese officials in determining a site for the new radar, the official added.”

2nd deployment to Japan

Clear AFS, AK:
EWR upper right
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September 2012: NRC recommends stacked “GBX”. The US National Research Council publishes “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives.” The report staff have deeply impressive backgrounds related to missile defense, and their main conclusion is that very fundamental reasons of geography and physics make boost-phase defense systems a waste of time. On the other hand, they propose an important upgrade to the USA’s midcourse defense sensors, by substituting sets of stacked AN/TPY-2 radars (GBX) for the proposed PTSS satellite constellation. First, the core problem:

“…the midcourse discrimination problem must be addressed far more seriously if reasonable confidence is to be achieved… While the current GMD may be effective against the near-term threat… the committee disagrees with the statement… that this capability can be maintained “for the foreseeable future.”1… The signal bandwidth of the [EWR/ SPSS] UHF radars is limited to a few megahertz… range resolution is measured in tens of meters. While all these radars can be used to commit midcourse interceptors that have sufficient onboard sensing, autonomy, and divert capability to acquire and parse the threat complex during fly-out, they offer little help in discrimination of decoys or other countermeasures.”

The affordable sensor fix involves 5 TPY-2 FBX derivatives. Four would be co-located with current SPSS ballistic missile early warning sites at Clear AFS, AK; Cape Cod, MA; Thule, Greenland; and Fylingdales, United Kingdom. The 5th would be placed at Grand Forks, ND, which currently houses the 10th Space Warning Squadron:

“To avoid the need for developing a new radar capable of detecting and tracking threat objects in excess of 3,000 km, it is recommended that… (2) a new variant we call “GBX” be created by stacking two TPY-2 radar arrays one on top of the other and integrating their coherent-beam-forming electronics and software to provide twice the power and twice the aperture X-band radar with a 120 degree by 90 degree field of view… [GBX] radars would be mounted on azimuth turntables… that could be mechanically reoriented (not scanned) through an azimuth sector of 270 degrees… [while providing] electronic scan coverage from the horizon to the zenith over a traverse angle sector of 45 degrees from broadside… The output of this… GBX system would be combined coherently through a time-delay device that permits the full instantaneous signal bandwidth to be used for range Doppler imaging. The coherent combination produces an elevation beam width half that of the AN/TPY-2 radar, with twice the gain (four times the twoway gain) and twice the peak and average power. Duplicate power supply and cooling units would be required, but a single electronic equipment unit should suffice, with minimal added electronics… An uplink/downlink function should be included as a new radar mode.”

See also NY Times | “Ballistic Missile Defense: Why the Current GMD System’s Radars Can’t Discriminate” for an in-depth technical explanation of why even the huge UEWR radars aren’t suitable for discriminating between warheads and the decoys used by more advanced missiles.

Feb 18/12: Turkey(s). During meetings with NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu states the TPY-2 radar based at Diyarbakir (vid. Sept 3/11) must not have any of its data sets shared beyond NATO, with a specific reference to Israel. The radar is positioned in a way that makes it easy to see into Iran, for early detection of ballistic missile launches. Voice of America | UPI.

Nov 1/11: Software & analysis. The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) awards Raytheon IDS of Woburn, MA a maximum $307.6 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. Under this new contract, Raytheon will maintain software required to operate “the X-band family of radars,” and perform and Ballistic Missile Defense System test planning, execution and analysis. Discussions with Raytheon personnel confirmed that the funding applies to the XBR radar on the SBX naval platform, as well as their AN/TPY-2 radars (THAAD, European missile defense, deployed in Israel & Japan), and a “Ground Based Radar Prototype” that they’re working on as a technology demonstrator.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from Nov 1/11 through Oct 31/13, and the MDA’s FY 2012 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to fund initial orders. The MDA at Redstone Arsenal, AL manages the contract (HQ0147-12-D-0005).

April 7/11: Software. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA receives a $14 million sole-source cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to maintain and improve the AN/TPY-2 radar’s software. Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from April 2011 through June 2011, and $4 million in FY 2011 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to incrementally fund this effort.

This award beings total contract awards so far under (HQ0006-03-C-0047) to $1.936 billion.

Nov 10/10: Refurb. A sole-source $25.2 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract modification to Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA, to refurbish AN/TPY-2 radar #4.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA through August 2011, funded by FY 2010 – 2011 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation funds (HQ0006-03-C-0047).

Sept 1/10: Support. A $22.6 million sole-source cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA will continue support services for the AN/TPY-2 radar’s flight and ground testing.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA from September 2010 through June 2011. $1,443,793 in FY 2010 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used to incrementally fund this effort (HQ0006-03-C-0047).

Aug 24/10: Software. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems in Woburn, MA received a sole-source contract modification for $43 million continue software maintenance in support of the AN/TYP-2 radar. The modification includes both fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee line items, and work will be performed in Woburn, MA. The performance period is through March 2011. FY 2010 & 2011 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds will be used, and the US Missile Defense Agency manages the contract (HQ0006-03-C-0047). See also Raytheon release.

July 29/10: Test. A THAAD system successfully intercepts its target during a low-endo-atmospheric MDA test at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. Soldiers of the 6th Air Defense Artillery Brigade of Fort Bliss, Texas, conducted launcher, fire control and radar operations, and were not informed of the exact launch time for the unitary missile target.

The AN/TPY-2 radar was a particular focus, and it achieved all test objectives: acquiring the target, discriminating the lethal object, providing track and discrimination data to the fire control, and communicating with the in-flight THAAD interceptor. The fire control software, jointly developed by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, also performed successfully. This was the 7th successful intercept in 7 attempts for the operationally-configured THAAD system.

Several missile defense assets and emerging technologies observed the launch and gathered data for future analysis. Participants included the Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) system, and elements of the U.S. Army’s PATRIOT system which conducted engagement coordination with THAAD, and conducted upper tier debris mitigation exercises during the intercept engagement. US MDA: release | MDA photos and video | Raytheon.

March 16/10: Support. Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems of Woburn, MA receives a $17.4 million sole-source contract modification that includes both fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee line items. Under this contract modification, Raytheon will continue Phase II of concurrent test, training, and operations support unit integration for AN/TYP-2 X-Band radar.

Work will be performed in Woburn, MA through November 2010. Fiscal year 2010 research, development, test and evaluation funds will be used for this effort (HQ0006-03-C-0047).

July 9/09: Power unit. Raytheon announces successful integration and acceptance testing the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar’s Prime Power Unit (PPU), a trailer-mounted 1.3 megawatt Generator Set. Following this success at White Sands Missile Range, NM, the PPU will undergo extensive user evaluations as the next stage in its fielding process.

June 13/08: AEGIS Test. A non-firing test involves THAAD TPY-2 X-band radars in conjunction with the SPY-1 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system aboard the USS Lake Erie [CG 70], as 2 medium-range target missiles are launched near-simultaneously from the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Barking Sands, Hawaii. Lake Erie’s crew used their own radars, and also received data from 2 APY-2 THAAD radars at PMRF via secure links. All equipment performed as designed, and the cruiser was able to get launch solutions on both targets. MDA release [PDF].

Oct 8/07: Japan. Community relations take on an interesting dimension in Shariki, Japan, where a TPY-2 radar is based. Locals were worried about the radar’s potential to disrupt cell phones, and were worried that living near it might be a health hazard. Building a housing complex near the radar for the Raytheon technicians who operate the radar, and Blackwater security contractors who protect the site, helped ease those concerns. Stars & Stripes.

June 22/07: AEGIS Test. Missile defense Flight Test Maritime-12 took place, launching an SM-3 Block 1A missile from the destroyer USS Decatur [DDG 73]. The Spanish Navy’s Alvaro de Bazan Class AEGIS frigate Mendez Nunez [F-104] also participated in the test “as a training event to assess the future capabilities of the F-100 Class.” So, too, did the US Navy’s Ticonderoga Class AEGIS cruiser USS Port Royal [CG 73], which successfully used its SPY-1B radar augmented by a prototype AEGIS BMD Signal Processor (BSP) to detect and track the separating warhead in real time, and to tell the difference between the simulated warhead and the rest of the missile. The final variant of that processor is expected to be deployed in 2010.

USS Port Royal also exchanged tracking data with a ground-based Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system ashore, in order to verify compatibility. Video from the test | US MDA release [PDF] | Raytheon release | Boeing release | Lockheed Martin release.

Feb 9/07: Order. Raytheon Company in Woburn, MA received a $20 million cost-plus-fixed-fee modification contract that could soar to $212.2 million to manufacture, deliver, and integrate the AN/TPY-2 radar component of the THAAD ABM system. Fiscal Year 2007 R&D funds worth $20 million will be used. Work will be performed at Woburn, MA and is expected to be complete by May 2010. The Missile Defense Agency in Washington, DC issued the contract (HQ0006-03-C-0047). See also Raytheon release.

May 11/06: Test. Successful launch was achieved of a THAAD interceptor missile marks the 1st fully integrated flight test. This is not an not intercept test, which would take place in 2007. Instead, it tests all THAAD components, including the mobile launcher, radar, fire control and communications element, and the interceptor missile.

A Raytheon release touts the performance of its THAAD Ground-Based Radar in the test. The THAAD radar, developed by Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems (IDS), accomplished all test objectives, including communicating with the in-flight THAAD missile. Track and discrimination reports were successfully transmitted between the THAAD radar and fire control. Performance of the fire control software, jointly developed by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, was also successful. See also Lockheed Martin MFC release.

Additional Readings

• Raytheon – Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2)

• RadarTutorial.EU – AN/TPY-2

• DID DII – THAAD: Reach Out and Touch Ballistic Missiles. TPY-2 serves as its GBR component.

• Wikipedia – IAI EL/M-2080 Green Pine. Israel’s “Green Pine” radar works with its Arrow missile system in the same role as the TPY-2, and competes with it on the international market. Green Pine has a shorter range, though: just 500 km. It has been exported to India as the Swordfish, and a Green Pine radar is also believed to be in Azerbaijan. A follow-on “Super Green Pine/ Great Pine” radar with ranges to 800-900 km will be exported to South Korea.

• US NRC (September 2012) – Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives

• Mostly Missile Defense (July 28/12) – Ballistic Missile Defense: Why the Current GMD System’s Radars Can’t Discriminate. But big X-band radars could.

• Raytheon (Sept 9/11) – Raytheon’s TPY-2 Radar Performs in Two Modes – Forward-Based and Terminal

The USA needs a plane that can provide effective precision close air support and JTAC training, and costs about $1,000 per flight hour to operate – instead of the $15,000+ they’re paying now to use advanced jet fighters at 10% of their capabilities. Countries on the front lines of the war’s battles needed a plane that small or new air forces can field within a reasonable time, and use effectively. If these 2 needs are filled by the same aircraft, everything becomes easier for US allies and commanders. One would think that this would have been obvious around October 2001, but it took until 2008 for this understanding to even gain momentum within the Pentagon. A series of intra-service, political, and legal fights have ensured that these capabilities won’t arrive before 2015 at the earliest, and won’t arrive for the USAF at all.

The USA has now issued 2 contracts related to this need. The first was killed by a lawsuit that the USAF didn’t think they could defend successfully. Now, in February 2013, they have a contract that they hope will stick. The 3 big questions are simple. Will the past be prologue for the new award? Will there be an Afghan government to begin taking delivery of their 20 planes much beyond 2014? And will another allied government soon need to use this umbrella contract for its own war?

LAR/ LAAS Contenders

Gracie Under Fire: EMB-314/ A-29 Super Tucano

A-29: LAS concept
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The winning Super Tucano/ ALX aircraft is known as the A-29 to Brazil’s FAB, but abroad, it’s the EMB-314 multi-role successor to Embraer’s widely-used EMB-312 Tucano trainer. A-29 is better for marketing a light atack plane, though, and Embraer is trying to shift the designation for the up-engined version using the 1,600hp PT6A-68-3 with FADEC. The Super Tucano offers better flight performance than the EMB 312 Tucano, plus armoring and wing-mounted machine guns, weapons integration with advanced surveillance and targeting pods, precision-guided bombs, and even air-to-air missiles. This makes it an excellent territorial defense and close support plane for low-budget air forces, as well as a surveillance asset with armed attack capability. Brazil uses it this way, for instance, alongside very advanced EMB-145 airborne radar and maritime patrol jets.

The Super Tucano is a large and heavy training platform, as a tradeoff for being built from the ground up as an effective short-field light attack/ patrol/ counter-insurgency aircraft that can operate with little ground support. On the other hand, veteran pilots have praised the quality of its ride, the power of its large control surfaces at load and in crosswinds, and its level of visibility from both seats.

Unlike its fellow contenders, the aircraft carries 2 of FN’s M3P .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings, leaving its hardpoints free for other weapons or fuel. Its AN/AAQ-22 Star SAFIRE II surveillance and targeting turret was designed-in from the outset and is mounted under the nose, offering a better field of view and fewer blind spots. Avionics are generally from Elbit Systems, and the plane supports a variety of weapons including gun pods; rocket pods; bombs including Brazilian cluster and incendiary weapons, and various laser-guided bombs; the ability to mount surveillance and targeting pods like RAFAEL and Northrop-Grumman’s popular LITENING; and even an array of short-range air-to-air missile options that reportedly include the AIM-9L Sidewinder, Brazil’s MAA-1, and Israel’s Python 4/5.

It hasn’t fired laser-guided rockets yet, but it has all of the required capabilities. LAS variants will probably add the AGM-114 Hellfire light strike missile, but the Super Tucano is already integrated with the heavier AGM-65 Maverick. Elbit’s DASH helmet-mounted display is reportedly an option, and a partnership with Boeing looks set to add GPS-guided JDAM family and GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs.

Beyond Brazil (99 planes), the Super Tucano already had customers in Colombia (25), Chile (12), the Dominican Republic (8), and Ecuador (18) by the time the LAS RFP was issued in August 2010. Since then, the platform has added the African countries of Angola (6), Burkina Fasso (3), and Mauritania (1-4?); and Indonesia (16). Guatemala (6) is a pending customer.

AT-6: The Kansas Contender

AT-6B, armed
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Beechcraft’s AT-6 is a derivative of its widely-produce T-6 trainer, which equips the US military and serves with a number of other air forces around the world. It’s up-engined with Pratt and Whitney’s 1,600hp PTA?68D engine, and adds Kevlar amoring inserts, CMC Esterline’s mission modified Cockpit 4000, a mission system based on Lockheed Martin’s A-10C upgrades, and L-3 WESCAM’s MX-15Di sensor suite in a mid-plane belly mounting. Thales Visionix’s Scorpion Helmet Mounted Display is reportedly an option as well.

One advantage of the AT-6B is that it can add new capabilities by leveraging outside investments in T-6B Texan and A-10C Thunderbolt operational flight program software updates. It’s also optimized for inexpensive operation, and leverages commonality with American pilot training infrastructure. On the flip side, aspects of its trainer design (narrow landing gear, low runway clearance, rear seat visibility less important, low armoring) are disadvantages in austere counterinsurgency situations. Another disadvantage is the need to mount its surveillance turret farther back in the belly, which creates line of sight blockages from its belly-mounted antenna blade (see photo) and from the AT-6B’s wings when tilted.

The AT-6B light attack/COIN version was actually at Farnborough 2006, back when they were still Raytheon Aircraft. It has been developed in an iterative fashion since then, and has been helped by participating in special forces exercises and working with the US Air National Guard on concept studies and demonstrations. By the end of 2012, weapons integrated and tested on the AT-6 included .50-cal/ 12.7mm gun pods; unguided bombs up to 500 pounds, Paveway-II laser-guided bombs up to 500 pounds; APKWS (BAE/GD), TALON (Raytheon/EAI), and GATR (ATK/Elbit) laser-guided 70mm rockets; and AGM-114P+ Hellfire short-range strike missiles. There has also been talk of adding AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air weapons. Even so, a corporate representative told us that:

“Understand that the airplane is not intended for heavy combat. Its primary role would be counter insurgency and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance) as a node within a network. It could provide data and intelligence calling in whatever assets were appropriate to deal with the situation it was encountering.”

Iraq is the only country to submit an official request to buy the AT-6, but several years later, there’s no AT-6 contract follow-on to its 15-plane T-6B trainer fleet.

AT-802U: A Missed Opportunity?

AT-802U
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Outside the 2 finalists, contenders for various phases of the LAAR/LAS competition have reportedly included Alenia Aermacchi’s M-346 advanced jet trainer (not integrated with weapons), Boeing’s proposed OV-10X revival of the Vietnam-era Bronco FAC/light attack plane (developmental), and even the Pilatus PC-6 Porter/ AU-23A armed short-take-off transport, which was also used in Vietnam.

The most interesting option was the Air Tractor AT-802U. It didn’t make the LAS finals, but it has an awful lot to recommend it to customers like Afghanistan. This single-engine turboprop is powered by the PT6A-67F engine, and adapted from the firm’s popular AT-802A crop duster. That sounds like an odd derivation, but it isn’t. Agricultural planes need good visibility, ruggedness, sure handling, the ability to work from unimproved runways or fields, long operating time, and low maintenance requirements. Every one of those traits translates directly into counter-insurgency requirements. In places like Afghanistan, where the narcotics trade has a large footprint and agriculture is a big part of the economy, crop dusting defended fields and agricultural surveying can are valuable counter-insurgency requirements all by themselves.

The AT-802 is big enough to handle the added payload and cockpit and engine armoring. The AT-802U variant combines an 8,000 pound/ 3,629 kg payload with an impressive 10-hour ISR mission time. Tested armament includes dual .50 cal. GAU-19/A 3-barrel Gatling guns, dual M260 7-tube rocket launchers, and 500 pound unguided Mk-82 bombs on 9 combined wing and fuselage hard points (expandable to 15). Its L3 Wescam MX-15Di sensor turret system is housed in a retractable mount under the nose, and it has mounting provisions for an optional AAR-47/ALE-47 threat warning and decoy-dispensing system. The cockpit is night-vision compatible, and its optional Compact Multi-Channel Data Link (CMDL) system is compatible with ROVER video feeds.

The AT-802U is also configurable for more advanced systems, but that would require more investment by customers like the US Department of State, the United Arab Emirates, or others. It’s combat-proven in Department of State Latin American counter-drug operations, where it has taken over 200 bullet strikes with no loss of life, and racked up a miniscule average of 1.7 maintenance man-hours per flight hour.

Unfortunately, this plane was excluded by several clauses in the original LAS RFP. Its landing gear doesn’t retract, for instance, so clause 3.1.2.4 of the SRD disqualified it. The LAS also had to be “configured to be readily available for use as either a two-seat advanced trainer or a two-seat attack platform with no field level conversion.” That isn’t what the AT-802U does.

What Now for LAS?

AAF C-27A: fail
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The Light Air Support contract is the much-diminished version of programs that have gone by names like OA-X and Light Attack/ Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR). Its devoluton is instructive, because all the interests, rivalries, and prejudices that have brought things to this point are still operating. The past could be prologue.

Political/ legal obstruction. The Congressional resistance that stalled past Super Tucano requests from people like Afghan front commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal is still in place, and the legal and political reactions to the USAF’s 2nd award are still pending. What’s certain is that Beechcraft is in serious straits as it emerges from bankruptcy, and Boeing recently closed their Wichita, KS plant. Congressional delegations from smaller states with less diversified economies traditionally fight harder for these kinds of contracts, and this one has overtones of life and death for local industry, despite its small size. Expect a serious fight again.

Military disinterest. The USAF is still focused on big ticket fighters. Its pet plane is now the F-35 fighter instead of the F-22A, and the KC-46A tanker program has joined the F-35 in sucking all of the oxygen from the room. A country that seems disinclined to pursue counterinsurgency wars strengthens those big-ticket interest groups in the USAF, many of whom have been hostile to OA-X and its ilk from the beginning. Despite the operating savings, LAS’ very contract structure and order pattern demonstrates little appetite for domestic use as JTAC training and surveillance aircraft with front-line capability. Even US SOCOM, who has wanted Super Tucanos for a couple of years, is going to have its hands full funding desperately-needed replacement of its C-130 and helicopter fleets.

Nor is there much call for counterinsurgency strikes to kill American civilians – with the admitted exception AECOM’s Col. Benson (ret.), who used to head up the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies officer training facility at Fort Leavenworth, KS.

With budget crunches abounding, future funding is not guaranteed. Even present funding could now be jeopardized, by the same Congressional politics that has derailed related efforts before.

Afghan instabilities. Along the way, Afghanistan has devolved, and its air force just retired 20 C-27A transports that the USA spent about $600 million buying and delivering. All parties are keeping omerta on the subject beyond Alenia’s “inability to perform to the contract,” but there are rumors that Afghan corruption was a big factor in the inability to maintain them. The regime’s ability to avoid the C-27A’s fate for its Super Tucanos has to be viewed as questionable, and its mere survival to take full delivery is not a complete certainty.

The key to LAS may turn out to be its ability to recruit other customers. Mexico needs planes like this, and gets a lot of US aid, but it already picked an armed T-6C+. Beechcraft factories in Mexico ensure that they won’t switch. Iraq has a standing AT-6 request they could now switch to the Super Tucano under LAS, but it’s hard to see US funding for that at this point. LAS would still be useful as a pass-through vehicle for an Iraqi purchase, and that might turn out to be important for the program.

Beyond Iraq, Embraer has proven to be perfectly capable of selling the plane itself in Latin America, Africa, and even Asia. US aid to East Africa, Thailand, or the Philippines would seem to be the best near-term bet for LAS beyond Iraq – but no-one can predict the future, and world events could create a demand elsewhere before 2019.

Contracts & Key Events

Super Tucano
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April 25/13: Beechcraft’s case. Beechcraft CEO Bill Boisture lays out the core of their protest and case. He starts by saying that the RFP was about compliance with requirements, contends that their AT-6 met all threshold and 5/7 objective requirements, and says their bid was $125 million cheaper. None of that is really new.

On a technical level. Boisture says that the AT-6′s design choices give it better takeoff, climb and cruise performance. The Super Tucano may be larger, but it carries 100 pounds less fuel, and unlike the AT-6 it can’t land at its Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight. Boisture adds that using the EO/IR turret forces the Super Tucano to give up its centerline weapons station.

It’s useful to know what the expected arguments are, but really, this is up to the GAO now. Aviation Week.

April 19/13: No Stop Work Order. The US Court of Federal Claims sides with the USAF decision to ignore a Stop Work Order until the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews their award. Beechcraft continues its protest with the GAO. Kansas.com.

March 21/13: Lawsuit. Beechcraft Corporation announces that they filed suit again in the Court of Federal Claims, contesting the USAF’s decision to lift the stay of performance on the Light Air Support (LAS) contract while the GAO reviews the protest.

Note that their suit does not contest the award entire, which was the key to overturning the contract last time. Right now, they’re looking for an injunction to halt the existing contract while the GAO reviews their protest. If they’re successful, they’d keep their biggest political argument: the $125 million difference between the bid costs.

March 15/13: As you were. The USAF can’t stop Beeccraft’s protest, but they can use provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act to mandate that the best interests of the United States require continuation of the contract, while the protest takes its course.

They’ve just done that for LAS, and Beechcraft and the Kansas congressional delegation aren’t happy. A letter from state representatives cites waste of taxpayer dollars, which is true if the contract is overturned. What they don’t say is that it also impedes political efforts to stop the contract, by raising cancellation costs so that there’s a lot less difference between Beechcraft + cancellation fees, vs. SNC/Embraer. Beechcraft | Bloomberg | Wichita Eagle.

March 8/13: Protest. Beechcraft announces that they’re protesting the LAS award to the GAO. The award will be on hold until a decision is reached, which must come within 90 days. Their rationale? Beechcraft CEO Bill Boisture:

“Following our debrief with the Air Force earlier this week, we are very perplexed by this decision. Our belief that we have the best aircraft was confirmed by the Air Force rating our aircraft ‘exceptional’…. We simply don’t understand how the Air Force can justify spending over 40 percent more – over $125 million more – for what we consider to be less capable aircraft…”

A couple of notes. It’s possible for multiple contenders to rate as “exceptional”, but still differ with respect to objective (desired vs. mandatory) requirements. In this case, the best value competition had 3 categories, where capability was most important, past performance the 2nd, and cost in 3rd place. It’s hard to argue the AT-6B as superior on capability, and past performance is a tough row given that the A-29 is operational and the AT-6B isn’t. Within the challenge, however, these questions aren’t going to be relevant. GAO’s focus will be whether the USAF violated its own RFP guidelines, or treated one contender unfairly. Congress is where price will be relevant. A better and more proven capability for a foreign air force, flying aircraft bought with American money, may not be as important to politicians as it is to the US military. Beechcraft | SNC/Embraer.

AT-6B vs. EMB-314
(click to view full)

Full comparison graphic, originals from SNC (JPG, 345.4k).

Sept 17/12: AT-6. Hawker Beechcraft announces [PDF] that they’ve completed Phase III weapons assessment at Eglin AFB, FL. Phases I and II of the weapons assessment included computer-aided deliveries of general purpose and laser-guided bombs, as well as air-to-ground and air-to-air gunnery using the aircraft’s two 50-caliber guns.

By the end of Phase III, weapons integrated and tested on the AT-6 included .50-cal/ 12.7mm gun pods; unguided bombs up to 500 pounds, Paveway-II laser-guided bombs up to 500 pounds; APKWS (BAE/GD), TALON (Raytheon/EAI), and GATR (ATK/Elbit) laser-guided 70mm rockets; and AGM-114P+ Hellfire short-range strike missiles.

That’s a very good array, which will suit the needs of most American allies. As a matter of comparison, the Super Tucano hasn’t tested laser-guided 70mm rockets or AGM-114 Hellfire missiles yet, but it offers a wider array of gun pods; a wider array of laser-guided weapons; Brazilian incendiary and cluster bombs; an array of air-to-air missiles including the AIM-9L Sidewinder, Brazil’s MAA-1 Piranha, and Israel’s Python 4/5s; and the heavier Raytheon AGM-65 Maverick strike missile.

July 24/12: Late. Air Force Brig. Gen. Timothy Ray, who heads the NATO air training command in Afghanistan, sums things up by saying that “Afghanistan is unlikely to gain an independent, fully functioning air force until around 2016 or 2017, two to three years after the U.S. pullout”.

The rest of the article provides a snapshot of the Afghan Air Force’s current state, and notes that the USA has spent nearly $300 million to upgrade the AAF’s Shindad AB facilities. Wall Street Journal.

July 10/12: Boeing and Embraer announce cooperation on the Super Tucano program, which will involve integrating Boeing weapons on the aircraft. Their GPS-guided JDAM family of bomb kits would be front and center in any such effort, and Boeing’s official statement is that:

“The new weapons integration capacity enhances the solution presented to the U.S. Air Force Light Air Support (LAS) program by not only meeting program requirements, but exceeding them in ways that are important to the customer.”

July 9/12: HBC Chinese ownership? Hawker Beechcraft, Inc. signs an exclusivity agreement that may lead to a buyout by China’s Superior Aviation Beijing Co. for $1.79 billion. This deal explicitly excludes Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company (HBDC), which would remain a separate entity. That would keep the T-6 and AT-6 out of China’s Hands, but the USA is mostly done with its JPATS trainer buys, so HBDC’s stand-alone survival would be questionable.

June 19/12: Bids in. Sierra Nevada Corporation announces that they’re participating in the new LAS source selection process, but they’re still pursuing court action to reinstate the December 2011 contract. Their release also contains a jab at the removal of any requirement for a flight demonstration.

SNC commits that about 86% of each aircraft’s dollar value will come from components supplied by U.S. companies “or countries that qualify under the Buy American Act,” and that Embraer will invest about $3 million in bringing the Jacksonville, FL.

June 12/13: SNC lawsuit. SNC has gone from a motion to see documents, to a lawsuit in the United States Court of Federal Claims that contests the termination of its December 2011 contract, and attacks the terms of the new RFP.

“According to SNC the cancellation of the contract was an extreme response to what appears to be paperwork errors on the part of the USAF. Moreover, the revised Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by the USAF is tilted in favor of the competition.”

To bolster that last point, SNC cites the elimination of flight demonstration/evaluation, the delay of First Article Testing until the point of delivery (!) in July 2014, and the fact that Amendment 8 now allows improvements that were made to the aircraft since the original source selection to be admitted into consideration. Their point of contention is that the USAF gave Hawker Beechcraft millions of Title X dollars for development, exercises etc. with US ANG pilots [DID: vid. Oct 14/10 entry], and that the products of that work should be tipping the scales. We understand the fairness argument there, but the EMB-314/ A-29 has a number of military customers doing the same things in real-life operational missions, so it’s not like there’s a major disadvantage. SNC.

May 8/12: HBC gripe. After an initial review of the revised LAS RFP, HawkerBeechcraft has this to say [PDF]:

“We are profoundly disappointed to see in the amended RFP that the USAF continues to permit antiquated pilot accommodation standards for ejection seat equipped aircraft which can place both USAF and partner nation pilots at unnecessary and higher risk. Those standards were developed by the USAF to protect their own male and female pilot population, and every aircraft acquired by the USAF should meet those modern safety standards.”

The Super Tucano reportedly uses Martin-Baker’s Mk 10 LCX ejection seat. Martin-Baker is the standard provider for pretty much every Western aircraft, including every US fighter type.

April 17/12: SNC sues. Sierra Nevada files a court motion in the botched Light Air Support award. They would like to see the content of the Air Force’s Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) of the LAS program, to assess whether a recompete is really warranted. SNC | Reuters.

Feb 2/12: Lobbying. “Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), the winner of the U.S. Air Force Light Air Support (LAS) competition, today issued a point-by-point rebuttal of misinformation being spread by the disqualified contender for the contract.”

APKWS loading, AT-6C
(click to view full)

January 2012: AT-6. BAE’s APKWS and Raytheon’s TALON laser-guided rockets fired from a HawkerBeechcraft AT-6C turboprop light attack plane at Eglin AFB.

The shots will help both BAE and HawkerBeechcraft, whose setback in the 20-plane American LAS competition was mitigated by an initial sale of 6 “weapons capable” T-6C+ to Mexico. Mexico has used existing Pilatus trainers against domestic insurgencies before. The T-6C family’s proven ability to fire laser-guided rockets makes the new planes more valuable to Mexico, and to other potential customers. BAE | HawkerBeechcraft | Aviation Week.

Jan 25/12: Second Line of Defense:

“We are publishing a USAF background paper currently circulating on the Hill. It validates everything we have written on Second Line of Defense for more than a year about the LAS competition…. This paper provides information on the LAS acquisition. Due to the ongoing litigation brought by Hawker Beechcraft Defense Corporation (HBDC), the United States Air Force (USAF) cannot release information regarding the LAS competition.”

Jan 19/12: A Defence Talk article sums up the current situation:

“Since September, many unexpected changes have been made to the original USAF requirements. At the start of the competition, the Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LAAR) program, planned to supply up to 100 aircraft to the USAF, was paired with Light Air Support (LAS) to supply 20 aircraft to Afghan Air Force.

Nevertheless, in September the USAF backtrack on LAAR, reducing the number to 15 aircraft…. The change in priorities left Hawker and the SNC/Embraer team to duck it out for LAAR’s 15 and LAS’s 20 aircraft requirement…. Meantime the U.S. Navy has run into difficulties of its own, by clearly preferring the Super Tucano after it took part in an evaluation phase known as Imminent Fury programme in 2009 to develop a CAS/COIN platform for special operations. Since then, congress rejected additional funds of $22 million for further development in 2010 and $17 million last October for phase II known as Combat Dragon II programme for deployment and combat confirmation of the Super Tucano’s capabilities in Afghanistan.”

Jan 4/12: Stop work. In light of the pending legal review, the USAF issues a stop work order for the LAS contract that was awarded to SNC. Source.

Dec 27/11: HBC Sues. Hawker Beechcraft announces a lawsuit with the Court of Federal Claims.

“The company still has no concrete reasons for the AT-6′s exclusion, having been denied explanation by the U.S. Air Force on two occasions. The LAS contract is valued at nearly $1 billion of U.S. taxpayer money and exclusion of the AT-6 could result in a de facto award to a non-U.S. company. “We are disappointed in the GAO’s decision as we were relying on their investigation to provide transparency into what has been a bidding process of inconsistent, irregular and constantly changing requirements…” said Bill Boisture, Hawker Beechcraft chairman and CEO.”

Dec 22/11: GAO OK. The GAO dismisses Hawker Beechcraft’s protest of the LAS award. All it will say of the USAF’s actions is that:

“After reviewing HBDC’s responses to issues raised during discussions, the Air Force concluded that HBDC had not adequately corrected deficiencies in its proposal. In this regard, the agency concluded that “multiple deficiencies and significant weaknesses found in HBDC’s proposal make it technically unacceptable and results in unacceptable mission capability risk.”

Their ruling didn’t address that. It’s a narrow dismissal, on a narrow point of timing:

“Accordingly, HBDC was required to request a debriefing within three days of its receipt of the Air Force notice on November 4, or, absent a debriefing, was required to file its protest no later than 10 days after that date.[4] Where HBDC did not timely request a debriefing, and failed to file its protest until 17 days after it was notified that its proposal had been excluded from the competitive range, the protest is untimely and must be dismissed.”

Nov 20/11: Lobbying knife fight. We submit “Obama Admin Bans US Aircraft Maker, Favors Non-US Firm with Ties to Iran on Light Aircraft Project” as a snapshot of the type of public lobbying underway. It cites the fact that the order would keep the T-6 line open past 2015, securing “1,400 employees in 20 states – including 800 at Hawker Beechcraft in Wichita” who work on the AT-6 and T-6 programs.

We’re not sure how long 20 planes can keep them busy, but OK, sure. The article also focuses on Embraer’s sale of 40 EMB-312 Tucano trainers to Iran 22 years ago, in 1989. Tucanos are globally popular training aircraft in service with 17 air forces. They lack the EMB-314 Super Tucano’s purpose-built close air support construction and mounted machine guns, but they can be armed. Iran has armed them for close support roles within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Air Force (as distinct from Iran’s regular air force), and Brazil’s Lula administration has remained friendly to Iran without being aggressive toward the USA.

AT-6B exercise
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Jan 18/11: LAS. System Demonstration completed. Source.

Dec 28/10: LAS. Vendor proposals received. Source.

Sept 14/10: In the wake of the LAS RFP, most of the “Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance” discussion at the Air Force Association’s Air & Space Conference has shifted toward building the capabilities of partner air forces, and less around American use. Derek Hess, director of AT-6 development programs for Hawker Beechcraft, describes it as:

“…a structurally enhanced Beechcraft T-6A/B airframe with a more powerful Pratt & Whitney PT6A-68D engine, and a Lockheed Martin A-10C Mission System that is integrated with the T-6B primary flight avionics system. It also has the same sensor suite as the MC-12W with a laser designator/range finder. “When our airplane wakes up in the morning, it believes it’s an A-10…”

May 10/10: LAAR. IHS Jane’s:

“There have been several proposals for LAAR – from the Aermacchi M-346 jet, through a reborn OV-10 Bronco, to the Air Tractor AT-802U militarised agricultural aircraft – but the front-runners appear to be two evolutions of turboprop trainers: Embraer’s Super Tucano and the Hawker Beechcraft AT-6.”

April 8/10: AT-6. Hawker Beechcraft begins flying its modified AT-6 prototype, which it expects to submit for LAAR. Defense Tech.

Feb 5/10: OV-10X. Speaking at the Singapore Air Show at Changi Airport, Boeing’s vice-president of business development for Global Strike Systems, Jeff Johnson says that interest has been strong enough to ensure continued development of the modernized OV-10X Bronco, even if it loses the LAAR competition for up to 100 aircraft.

“Several countries have got very excited about the type of capability that an OV-10 could bring to their air forces,” he said. He added that the company could have a flying prototype ready within nine months, but that the real challenge would be costing the low-rate production run of the LAAR programme (the USAF has a requirement for 100 aircraft).”

Despite this statement, after the LAAR peters out and vanishes, Boeing drops the project, and ends up helping Embraer with its Super Tucano. IHS Jane’s.

Feb 2/10: LAAR funding delay. DefenseTech reports that:

“Air Force budget officials said the so-called “light attack aircraft” would not have any significant funding until the 2012 submission, where the service will allot $172 million for the so-called COIN plane.

The Air Force did, however, take a step toward a COIN wing by ordering up 15 Light Mobility Aircraft to the tune of nearly $66 million. According to a submission to FedBizOpps, the LiMA must be able to carry a minimum of six pax and crew, operate from “austere landing surfaces” and carry a minimum of 1800 pounds with crew. The plane needs a loading door that can take litters and a 36 inch warehouse skid and have two pilot stations but be able to be flown by one pilot.”

LiMA turned out to be the Pilatus PC-12, which is currently in use by US special forces.

Jan 20/10: LAAR. Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley specifically mentions LAAR as part of the USAF’s “balanced force” concept, during his remarks to the Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power in the 21st Century Conference. Full transcript.

Dec 4/09: LAAR. The US military is expected to ask for $90 million in FY 2010, to begin the LAAR program. Long term costing iestimates are $2 billion for 100 aircraft, to be placed under Air Combat Command rather than AFSOC. The goal is to have the first 24 reach IOC by 2013.

Possible contenders include the AirTractor AT-802U (a modified crop duster), Alenia Aermacchi M-346, Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano, Hawker Beechcraft AT-6, and Boeing’s OV-10X Bronco. Some sources also mention the Pilatus PC-6 Porter short-take-off transport, which was armed into the AU-23A, used in Vietnam, and later sold to the Thai Air Force. Defence IQ | Defense Media Network | Airforce Technology (some elements inaccurate).

Sept 16/09: AT-6. Hawker Beechcraft and Lockheed Martin have teamed to compete for the LAAR competition, with Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY acting as the AT-6′s mission systems integrator. Space War.

USAF OV-10
(click to view full)

Sept 11/09: OV-10X. Boeing confirms that it will bid a modernized version of the Vietnam-era OV-10 Bronco for the USAF’s LAAR requirement. The OV-10 served very capably as a forward air control and light strike plane in Vietnam, but like the “Misty” F-100F Commando Sabres fast FACs, it was an uncommonly dangerous way for a pilot to make a living.

Boeing inherits the OV-10 Bronco’s design rights from its 1980s acquisition of North American Rockwell. The DEW Line.

April 2008: OA-X. Col. Gary L. Crowder, then commander of Air Forces Central’s Combined Air and Space Operations Center, makes a serious pitch for using light attack aircraft for missions over Iraq and Afghanistan, and details an international partnership building program.

Crowder has spent much of his Air Force career studying irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, but service leadership is busy arguing for more F-22As, and is very unreceptive until Gen. Norton A. Schwartz becomes Air Force Chief of Staff in mid-2008. Discussion of an “OA-X” aircraft begins. Airforce Magazine.

Additional Readings

• FBO.gov (Aug 12/10 – May 30/12, #FA8637-10-R-6000) – Light Air Support (LAS) Aircraft

• Embraer – Super Tucano

• SNC – Built for the Mission. Site promoting the EMB-314/ A-29 Super Tucano for LAS.

• Beechcraft – Light Attack

• Beechcraft – Mission-Ready AT-6. Site promoting the AT-6 for LAS, and beyond.

• Air Tractor – AT-802U

• Defence Review Asia (Oct 22/12) – Super Tucano leads the flock

• Defence Talk (Sept 10/11) – Bringing Back Counter-Insurgency: AT-6B vs. A-29B

• Three Capes (March 20/10) – Light Attack Armed Reconaissance: It’s Time to Change The Way We Fight The Long War. By Col James Jinnette.

• Airforce Magazine (January 2010) – The Light Attack Aircraft

In an exclusive June 2006 interview, Israeli Air Force (IAF) chief procurement officer Brigadier-General Ze’ev Snir told Israeli media that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was a key part of their IAF recapitalization plans, and that Israel intended to buy over 100 of the fighters to replace their fleet of over 300 F-16s.

Since then, however, the expected cost of that purchase has more than doubled. Israel’s F-35 contract had to deal with that sticker shock, with issues like the incorporation of Israeli technologies and industrial work, and with major schedule slips in the core F-35 program. Israel was even contemplating delaying its purchase, which would have removed an important early adopter for the Lightning II. In the end, however, Israel decided to forego other fighter options, and became the first foreign buyer of operational F-35s. So, how is the “F-35i” shaping up?

F-35 for Israel: Key Issues

F-16B & X-35
(click to view full)

The IAF currently flies 27 F-15I “Raam” Strike Eagles and 102 F-16I “Soufa” fighters as its high-end strike force. Another 72 F-15 A-D Eagle and 224 F-16 A-D Falcon models form the backbone of its force, making Israel the world’s 2nd largest F-16 operator behind the United States.

The plan was that Israel would phase out its F-16A “Netz” models in particular. A smaller number of new F-35s would first replace the Netz fighters, and then replace more advanced F-16 A-D models. That plan is underway, but it has run into severe turbulence. The F-35 will need to address those barriers as it competes with other options for future IAF dollars.

Cost

Israel’s original estimates made their F-16 replacement plan seem feasible. They pegged a 100-plane F-35A deal at around $5 billion, and Gen. Snir added that:

“The IAF would be happy to equip itself with 24 F-22s but the problem at this time is the US refusal to sell the plane, and its $200 million price tag.”

Unfortunately, Israel’s September 2008 request for its first 75 F-35s revealed an estimated $15 billion price tag – or about $200 million per plane. All in return for a fighter with poorer air-to-air performance than the F-22, and less stealth. Defense News quoted an official in the IDF General Staff as saying that:

“It’s unbelievable, first it was $40 million to $50 million, and then they [the IAF] told us $70 million to $80 million. Now, we’re looking at nearly three times that amount, and who’s to say it won’t continue to climb?”

Unless its price drops sharply, the F-35 can expect to experience continued competing against other options for each successive IAF offer. A pending gusher of oil and gas revenues from offshore fields may make the Israelis less price sensitive, but Israel’s jets aren’t just for show. If the F-35s are seen as too expensive to support the fleet size Israel needs, the IAF will look at more affordable options to supplement their F-35is.

Capability

F-22A Raptor
(click to view full)

Israel originally wanted a different fighter, and pressed the USA for F-22EX aircraft, in order to maintain the IAF’s traditional requirement of regional air superiority. The F-33 offers far fewer weapon choices than the F-35, but it would have been available immediately, while offering better air-to-air performance and higher stealth capabilities against the most advanced air defense systems and fighter radars. Ultimately, America’s shut-down of its F-22 program removed that option.

For Israel, F-35 capability is linked to progress in its testing and integration schedule, which has slipped very badly over the last 5 years. The F-35A Block 3, which will be fielded in 2018, will arrive with a weapon set that hardly distinguishes it from an F-22, and is far inferior to the array its existing fighters already carry.

Longer term, F-35 capability is also linked to another variable: Israel’s ability to customize it, as the IAF has done to its F-15 and F-16 fleets.

Customization

Spice bomb
click for video

Access to the F-35′s software source code remains a live issue for the Israelis, as it has been with the Australians [PDF], British, and others. That access is necessary when air forces want to upgrade the aircraft’s computers, and/or integrate new weapons, communications, or electronic warfare systems. Israeli planes generally undergo heavy modifications to incorporate Israeli electronics and weapons systems, and the USA has allowed the Israelis access to the F-15 and F-16′s software. Israel has since exported a number of those enhancements for F-16 and F-15 customers in Asia and Latin America.

The USA doesn’t seem willing to bend on the software code issue for anyone, and insists on routing upgrade and change requests through Lockheed Martin, with attendant costs and possible delays.

Israel has gone ahead with an initial buy anyway, while negotiating to add key items. Israeli “F-35i” fighters will include compatible communications systems and datalinks, and provisions to insert some locally-built ECM and defensive electronics.

Israel will also want to broaden the plane’s weapons array to include Israeli weapons, as a subject of future agreements. Items mentioned in reports to date include Python short-range air-to-air missiles, and dual-mode guidance Spice GPS/IIR smart bombs. Those items are still being negotiated, and Israel’s top-of-the-line strike fighter will need even more weapons than these in order to be fulfill its role.

Israel’s Leverage

Israel didn’t get everything it wanted in its initial buy, and ended up paying considerably more than it had expected. On the other hand, it did get the USA to move on the subject of ECM defensive systems as of 2010, and may succeed in getting more changes made.

On the seller’s side of the table, Israel’s buy is a respected vote of confidence that the F-35 needs. Lockheed Martin is trying to ramp up orders for the F-35 quickly, even though the aircraft are now expected to remain in testing until 2018. A large order book would allow the firm to offer early buyers much lower prices for each plane, using dollar averaging over a substantial initial batch, instead of charging $130 – $170 million for early production aircraft, and $100 million or so for the same plane 3 years later.

That wide difference in purchase costs is standard for military aircraft of all types, but the F-35 is about 5-7 years late versus its ideal market window. Worse, American budgets are already slowing orders, with over 150 planned fighters removed from the latest 5-year plan. Potential customers with air fleets that are reaching their expiry dates are reluctant to pay those high early production costs. If enough of them defect, the F-35 program as a whole could find itself in trouble. By adding an Israeli endorsement, and adding orders during a critical period for the program, Israel’s 20-plane order assumes an importance out of proportion to its size.

The final leverage point for Israel is its solid commitment to its fighter force, and known need for future upgrades. Over time, 326 F-16s have to be replaced with some something, and an early order puts the F-35 in a strong competitive position for further orders. If volume purchases from other countries can help drive costs down closer to $80 million, and new approaches can beat current estimates of high F-35 operating and maintenance costs, the F-35 could become very hard to compete against.

Beyond the F-16s, The IAF’s F-15 Eagles will also require replacement in the coming years, which will be a competition all its own. If the F-35 falters, sharply closer defense relations with Italy could turn the Eurofighter into an option, and Boeing is spending private funds to develop a stealth-enhanced F-15SE “Silent Eagle.” The F-15SE would offer longer range, twin engines for reliability, a much wider set of integrated weapons, and IAF fleet commonalities, in exchange for less stealth than the F-35. If costs are even close to equivalent, the F-35 will have a serious competitor.

Contracts and Key Events

Pilot training in the USA has been pushed back from steadily as the F-35 program faltered, and is now expected to start in 2016. The 1st F-35is would arrive in Israel around 2017.

LMCO Touts the F-35
click for video

April 22/13: Industrial. Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) signs a 10-15 year contract with Lockheed Martin to produce F-35 wings, with deliveries to begin in 2015. Their production will reach beyond Israel, and the contract could be worth up to $2.5 billion over its lifetime.

IAI’s Lahav production line already produces F-16 and T-38 wings, but the F-35′s manufacturing methods and challenges are a few steps ahead. IAI is investing in the required advanced systems and technologies, and working with Lockheed martin to get the new line set up. IAI.

Major sub-contract: wings

F-15I, Red Flag 04
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Dec 26/11: Other options. The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel is looking for ways to bolster its fleet before the the F-35s arrive. Phased elections in Egypt, which are beginning to hand significant power to Taliban-style Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, are creating a new strategic situation. Meanwhile, the possibility of slowdowns to the F-35 program or further cost increases leaves their affordability and timeliness in question.

Beyond upgrades to existing platforms, the Israelis are reportedly considering scenarios in which American budget cuts lead to retirement of serving F-15s and F-16s, and hence the availability of used planes at a bargain price.

Dec 12/11: The Jerusalem Post reports that delays to the F-35 program appear to be pushing Israel toward further F-16C/D upgrades, and may even trigger new aircraft buys if the multi-national program’s delivery dates slip beyond 2017.

Nov 22/11: Basing. The IDF has decided to base its F-35s at Nevatim AB, in the Negev, between Be’er Sheva and Arad. Arutz Sheva | Jerusalem Post.

June 30/11: F-35i. The IAF has sent 2 servicemen to the United States to serve as the lead technical team in the development of the F-35i, and integrate Israeli technology. It’s now believed that deliveries won’t begin until 2016-2017, and the IAF is reportedly looking at 2016 as the date for pilots to go through training in the USA. Jerusalem Post.

F135 Engine Test
(click to view full)

Oct 14/10: Engines. To no-one’s surprise, Israel’s F-35As will fly with Pratt & Whitney engines. Israel’s early delivery schedule meant that the F135 was the only practical engine option.

There’s also a relationship angle to this buy. Unlike the USAF, Israel has remained a steadfast Pratt & Whitney (F100 engine) client for all of its F-16s, as well as its F-15 fleets. Pratt & Whitney.

Aug 30/10: Industrial. Reuters reports that Israel’s F-35 industrial work package may well include wing assemblies, which would be done by Israel Aerospace Industries. A final deal is expected by late September 2010. Reuters adds:

“An Israeli official said reciprocal purchase deals worth $4 billion had been secured for Israeli companies for their participation in the plane’s manufacture and might be increased to $5 billion although it would be conditional on Israel exercising its option to buy the additional 55 planes.”

Aug 27/10: F-35i. Aviation Week reports that Israeli F-35s will be designated F-35i. Initial cockpit interfaces will allow installation of IAF command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems, via a plug-and-play feature in the main computer. They will also be able to carry a 600-gallon external drop tank to boost range. The biggest weakness will be electronic warfare systems. The U.S. will not grant Israel the source code to alter threat and jamming libraries, and so Israel must rely on an arrangement by which the U.S. will “make the required software changes to meet any new threat that might emerge in the region.” If they’re willing. When they get around to it.

Other priorities whose exact future is less certain include installing Python 5 and subsequent air-air missile in the F-35′s internal bays; initial F-35As will be restricted to American AIM-9Xs externally. Israel is reportedly interested in adding a version of the Stunner radar/infrared dual-mode anti-air missile from the David’s Sling anti-missile system, and will have to make changes to Rafael’s Spice GPS/IIR guided bombs, in order to fit within the F-35′s weapon bays.

The air force reportedly plans to receive the first JSF for test flights in the U.S. in 2015, with 3 more fighters delivered by the end of the year, another 3 in 2016, and the other 13 in 2017.

Aug 24/10: The F-35A will have to make a wider case in Israel. Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz believes that a decision with such great defense and economic implications, should not be left solely to the defense minister and the Israel Defense Forces. Instead, the F-35 will be considered by a forum of senior ministers. Ha’aretz.

July 27/10: Customization. A Ha’aretz op-ed article claims that:

“And now Israel goes hat in hand pleading for a chance to be allowed to acquire the F-35 aircraft, at a price tag of $150 million each. But it’s not only the astronomical price. Israel is told that the F-35 must be taken as is – no changes or modifications to suit Israel’s specific needs, and absolutely no Israeli systems included. Take it or leave it.

Just imagine Israel’s position today had the Lavi project not been canceled…”

That claim contradicts other reports.

July 19/10: Negotiations. Reuters reports that Israel may be just “days away” from a $3 billion contract to deliver 19 F-35s. Outgoing DSCA head Vice Admiral Jeffrey Wieringa is quoted saying that: “The ball is in their court… I am waiting for them to make a decision any day.”

Lockheed Martin VP for F-35 business development, Steve O’Bryan, added that the firm is close to reaching a FY 2010 LRIP-4 production agreement with the U.S. government for another 32 planes, adding that classified briefings have been given to other countries, including Greece and Belgium, and that Finland and Spain have expressed interest.

July 8/10: F-15SE. Boeing flies its stealth-enhanced F-15SE “Silent Eagle,” for the first time, demonstrating the weapon bay operation in flight. The next stage will involve firing an AIM-120 air to air missile from the recessed weapon bay, which is part of the plane’s conformal fuel tank.

Boeing executives are also quoted as saying that they expect export approval for the F-15SE, and have received interest for Korea. A Jerusalem Post report adds Israel to this list, citing several conversations between Israeli defense officials and Boeing about F-15SE capabilities, and possible interest in a cheaper Silent Eagle bridge buy that allows full Israeli customization, while the F-35A achieves greater cost certainty and lower production costs. The F-15SE could also fit South Korea’s interest in a KFX-3 development program, which would involve both Korean research and equipment, but use a foreign fighter as the base. Both South Korea (F-15K) and Israel (F-15I) already fly Strike Eagle variants, and the 2 countries have begun to cooperate in a number of advanced defense programs. This raises interesting speculation about the possibility of tripartite cooperation on the F-15SE. Boeing | Defense News | Jerusalem Post.

April 25/10: Customization. Jane’s Defense Weekly reports that earlier expectations of an F-35 contract by the end of 2010 appear to have faded. Instead, the IAF is looking at buying 18-24 F-15 or F-16 variants as a stopgap, and may even postpone its fighter replacement program and retain F-16As in its inventory instead. Leading candidates for the additional squadron, and possible follow-on buys, would be more F-16I or F-15Is, or collaboration with Boeing to develop and field the stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle.

With respect to 3rd party equipment issues, Jane’s adds that the Americans have approved the installation of Israeli electronic warfare systems, but no decision has been made concerning RAFAEL’s Python 5 short range air-air missile, or the dual GPS/IIR guidance Spice guided bomb. UPI.

March 8/10: Negotiations. With the American F-35 program facing a delay of a year or more before its variants enter operational service, and testing going very slowly, Israel is reportedly delaying its own contract signing. A contract was originally expected in March 2010, but media reports indicate that spring 2011 is more likely.

The reports also characterize issues of Israeli technology insertion as largely resolved, but adds that delivery delays and the $130 million minimum expected cost may give a leg up to Boeing’s F-15SE “Silent Eagle,” which could be offered for $100-100 million and be available in 2011 instead of 2014-2015. Jerusalem Post | Brahmand | Jane’s | UPI.

Feb 12/10: Negotiations. UPI reports that discussions between Israel and the USA concerning the F-35 are also covering the potentially contentious area of exports to Arab countries.

Traditionally, American weapons exported to Arab countries have been less sophisticated than the same weapons sold to Israel. Saudi Arabia’s F-15S Strike Eagles are an example of achieving that through downgrade, while Israel’s F-16I “Soufa” is an example of achieving that by letting the Israelis fully customize their aircraft with Israeli equipment. Option #2 is currently a sticking point of its own in negotiations, and non-NATO downgrades or Israeli upgrades in the stealth arena would each create their own issues.

F-15SE unveiled
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Nov 25/09: Customization. Jon Schreiber, who heads the Pentagon’s F-35 international program, told Reuters that an Israeli version of the F-35 could include command and control systems developed in Israel, as well as the ability to carry Israeli Python 5 air-air missiles and Spice dual-mode GPS/IIR guided bombs in early model jets. Israel would also get “a relatively inexpensive path for hardware and software upgrades to add future weapons,” by which he may mean the planned reprogramming facility for the global fleet. Ha’aretz says that the boost of an Israeli endorsement has become more important to the program:

“The Americans’ willingness to soften their stance is the result of a series of meetings held by Lockheed officials and Israeli defense establishment officials three weeks ago, and also difficulties with the project, particularly concerns that orders by countries participating in the development project will be low.”

The JSF program office is still reportedly opposed to the introduction of an Israeli electronic warfare suite, but the need for fast reprogramming and tight national security regarding Israel’s knowledge of enemy signals makes that a key Israeli condition. Schreiber is quoted as saying that policy or circumstances would have to change, in order for that restriction to change. At present, the plan is for a centralized F-35 fleet signals database and electronic warfare update facility at the United States Reprogramming Laboratory in Fort Worth, TX.

Schreiber says that the United States plans to formally submit its offer and prices in January 2010. Israel must approve this no later than March 2010, and reach a deal with Lockheed on integrating the Israeli weapons and other systems by June or July 2010, in order to buy in FY 2012 and take delivery delivery in 2015. Reuters | Ha’aretz | Jerusalem Post.

Nov 24/09: Customization. Reuters reports that:

“The United States will keep to itself sensitive software code that controls Lockheed Martin Corp’s new radar-evading F-35 fighter jet… Jon Schreiber, who heads the program’s international affairs, told Reuters in an interview Monday [that] “That includes everybody,”…acknowledging this was not overly popular among the eight that have co-financed F-35 development – Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.”

Instead, the USA plans to set up a “reprogramming facility” to develop F-35-related software and distribute upgrades. The terms on which allies might use this facility, and Lockheed Martin’s ability to stall or block upgrades that might boost competing products, are not detailed. Reuters | UK’s Daily Mail | New Zealand TV | UK’s Spectator Op-Ed.

Nov 23/09: Cost. Reuters reports that order delays and reductions by several F-35 partner countries are likely to push up prices for early buyers. With respect to Britain’s F-35B orders (vid. Oct 25/09 entry), however, F-35 international program manager Jon Schreiber says:

“The only thing that they’ve told me is that they’re currently on plan – and don’t believe what you read in newspapers…”

Nov 10/09: Negotiations. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reports on F-35 negotiations and the associated issues, and lays out the timetable:

“The United States is scheduled to respond next week to Israel’s express request for 25 of the jets. Jerusalem is to reach a final decision by early 2010, and there’s a good chance a deal will be signed by the middle of the year. Assuming Lockheed maintains its original production timetable the first fighters will be delivered in 2014. Two years later, Israel will have its first operational squadron of F-35s.”

Nov 4/09: Customization. Jane’s reports that Israel has decided not to integrate any Israeli equipment into its first F-35As, in order to curtail an expected price tag of over $130 million per plane. A follow-on Nov 11/09 article in Ha’aretz reports that Israeli defense firms are not at all pleased by this development:

“This time, the defense establishment skipped over this [consultation] stage and is willing to accept the American dictate that this aircraft is a closed package [technologically] and it is very difficult to make changes to it that are specific to each client,” the [industry] official said. “The air force urgently wants this aircraft and it looks like they are going to give in, which is going to result in the Israeli industry almost not participating in the largest procurement program in IDF history.”

The country is also debating the wisdom of the purchase as a whole, with the Ministry of Defence arguing for a 2-year delay in procurement. Israel’s air force has always believed in qualitative superiority over regional competitors, but the F-35A’s 2014 delivery/ 2016 in service dates would make it irrelevant to Iran’s expected hostilities. On the other hand, the funds required could buy a lot of Namer heavy IFVs and other equipment, which would be extremely valuable during the next war in Lebanon.

Lockheed Martin is trying to keep the pressure on, saying that by 2016, F-35 production slots will already be filled by other orders and may be unavailable. The question is whether this will spur Israel to begin F-35 payments on schedule in 2010, or spur them to find another aircraft.

Oct 5/09: Cost. Aviation Week reports that the proposed international consortium buy to get allies their F-35s in time, but avoid the vastly higher price tags of early-production aircraft, may have collapsed. If so, the cost repercussions are likely to affect Israel’s calculations as well:

“A plan for a five-year, eight-nation, 368-aircraft order for Joint Strike Fighters is dead, according to a senior Australian government official. According to Australian Financial Review (subscription site) Defence Management Organization chief executive Stephen Gumley has told Australia’s parliament that a lack of interest among partners, plus US procurement rules, has killed the plan. (To “cruel” something, in Australia, means approximately the same as “kibosh” – its implication is terminal.)

Gumley also told AFR that, as a result, Australia may defer its main JSF orders by two years, to 2015 (with delivery in 2017) to avoid buying high-priced low-rate initial production aircraft.”

Other reports, such as a recent Dutch KRO-Reporter TV show, quote Lockheed Martin representatives as saying that they hope to be able to offer a firm averaged price to international partners in Q1 2010.

Sept 8/09: Negotiations. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli F-35 contract signing is likely to be delayed past the target of early 2010, and continues to face problems. That may delay the F-35A’s introduction past 2014:

“A continued Pentagon refusal to integrate Israeli systems into the stealth Joint Strike Fighter will likely cause delays in the arrival of the advanced fighter jet to Israel, senior defense officials and IDF officers told The Jerusalem Post… The negotiations are still ongoing and we do not even know yet what the price of the aircraft will be,” said a top officer involved in the negotiations… Israeli demands have focused on three issues – the integration of Israeli-made electronic warfare systems into the plane, the integration of Israeli communication systems and the ability to independently maintain the plane in the event of a technical or structural problem. The British have made similar requests and according to a recent report in the Daily Telegraph is also seeking independent maintenance capabilities as well as access to some of the more classified technologies.”

July 9/09: Letter of Request. The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israeli Air Force has submitted an official Letter of Request (LOR) to the Pentagon to purchase its first squadron of 25 F-35s:

“Defense officials said that… negotiations regarding the final price of the plane – estimated at around $100 million – as well as the integration of Israeli systems would continue. The LOR will be followed by the signing of a contract in the beginning of 2010. The first aircraft are scheduled to arrive in Israel in 2014…According to senior IDF officers, the Defense Ministry and the Pentagon have reached understandings on most of the major issues…”

See also: Arutz Sheva | defpro | Turkish Daily News | Al Jazeera | Pravda | China’s Xinhua.

April 19/09: F-15SE. The Jerusalem Post reports that Israel’s Air Force is reviewing Boeing’s new F-15 Silent Eagle (F-15SE, see March 17/09), as a potential alternative to Lockheed Martin’s F-35A, if export permission for a downgraded F-22 model is still refused. While the F-35′s high cost remains an issue for the Israelis, expected delivery delays to 2014 and the inability to install Israeli-made systems appear to be bigger stumbling blocks.

In contrast, the F-15SE would be available by 2011; like an F-22EX model, some additional development will be required to finalize the design. The F-15SE offers considerably more range and payload than the F-35, for less than the F-22 would cost; possibly for less than early-model F-35s would cost. Electronics and equipment flexibility would be similar to the other F-15s Israel flies, and the potential option of upgrading Israel’s 25 F-15I Strike Eagles to a similar standard offers an additional consideration.

On the flip side, the resulting aircraft would offer significantly less stealth than the F-22, and less than the F-35A as well. This would make precision strike attacks against advanced air defense systems more difficult. It would also lack the suite of integrated, embedded multi-spectral sensors, which reach their modern apotheosis on the F-35A.

April 17/09: Negotiations. Ha’aretz reports that Israel’s F-35 negotiations are still bogged down, with cost – and more so, technology transfer and control – as the key issues.

March 19/09: Negotiations. The Jerusalem Post relays word from Israel’s Ministry of Defense, who said that Israeli systems “have already been installed in the F-35… We are holding further discussions to install further systems.”

US-built models of the jet would incorporate Israeli-made data links, radios and other command and control equipment, but would reportedly exclude an Israeli-made electronic warfare suite due to the high cost of integrating the system into the plane.

March 17/09: F-15SE unveiled. Boeing unveils the F-15SE “Silent Eagle” variant. The aircraft has slightly canted vertical tails to improve aerodynamics and reduce weight, some minor radar shaping work, the addition of coatings to improve radar signature further, and a pair of conformal fuel tanks with cut-in chambers for 2 air-to-air missiles each, or air-to-ground weapons like the 500 pound JDAM and 250 pound GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb. The tanks would be swappable for traditional conformal tanks if desired, and weapons could also be carried externally. BAE’s DEWS electronic self-protection system would be fitted, along with Raytheon’s AN/APG-63v3 radar that will equip all Singaporean F-15s and be retrofitted to the American fleet.

The intent appears to be to offer a “budget Raptor” in the $120 million range, with a basic radar signature that’s competitive with newer fighters like the similarly-priced Eurofighter Typhoon. Advantages would include better radar signature when internal carriage is used for long combat air patrols or limited precision strikes, a superior and proven AESA radar, longer range, and more total carriage capacity if necessary. On the flip side, it would not provide the same maneuverability options as canard equipped contenders like EADS’ Eurofighter or Dassault’s Rafale. The total package would come closer to parity with the SU-30MKI/M and subsequent versions of Sukhoi’s offerings, but may or may not measure up against longer-term opponents like Sukhoi’s PAK-FA or China’s J-XX. From Boeing’s release:

“Boeing has completed a conceptual prototype of the CFT internal-carriage concept, and plans to flight-test a prototype by the first quarter of 2010, including a live missile launch. The design, development, and test of this internal carriage system are available as a collaborative project with an international aerospace partner.”

March 17/09: Negotiations. Reuters quotes Pentagon official Jon Schreiber, who heads the Joint Strike Fighter’s international program, concerning potential buys by Israel and Singapore:

“I think our system will meet [Israel's] requirements with some tweaking, and I think they’re starting to come around to that realization themselves. They have pretty tight budget constraints and we’re attempting to fit their requirements into their budget… We expect to get a revised letter of request from (Israel) within the next month or so…”

March 14-15/09: Dave Majumdar of Examiner.com proposes sending Israel the USA’s recently-decommissioned F-117A stealth attack aircraft, in order to meet Israel’s needs immediately and give them breathing room to buy the F-35 at a less expensive stage. That might be an interesting policy move for the USA, but it’s not in Lockheed Martin’s interest to do so. Part 1: The Problem | Part 2: The Solution.

Feb 25/09: Negotiations. Aviation Week quotes an Israeli Air Force general who says the F-35′s price is the biggest issue, industrial participation industries is 2nd, and the tiff about replacing U.S. electronic warfare systems with local products is 3rd.

The report adds that Elta is expected to provide its own AESA radar to replace the APG-81, without U.S. complaint, but the price tag of “more than $100 million” remains the biggest problem.

Feb 10/09: Customization. Aviation Week’s Ares publishes “JSF Secrets to Stay Secret“:

“After a long period of obtuse answers about whether foreign customers would be able to put their own systems in F-35 or customize the software themselves, the issue has been clarified.

“No,” says Maj. Gen. Charles Davis, program executive officers of the Joint Strike Fighter program… They are going to buy aircraft that have basically the same capability as all the others,” Davis says. “They are trying to do a requirements analyses for future missions. Those mission [refinements] would be submitted through Lockheed Martin [and other contractors]. That [customization] is doable through software. It is not doable by Israelis sticking boxes in the airplane. [Elbit and Elta being involved] is not an option…”

The Jerusalem Post notes that this is a significant departure; Israeli F-15s and F-16s have all been modified to carry Israeli electronic warfare, radars, munitions, and command and control systems. Israel believes that electronic warfare in particular must be local and flexible, in order to counter local, evolving threats in a timely way, rather than suffering on someone else’s schedule. Its weapons are another significant area of departure, and have become successful exports while offering their own form of insurance against both countermeasures and foreign diktat. In this case, however:

“…the US refused to conduct the negotiations [on these issues] with the [Israeli] MOD until an announcement that it would procure the plane had been made. The announcement was made in October in an official request to the Pentagon.

A defense industry source familiar with the negotiations between Israel and the US said that the talks were “tough” but predicted that a deal would be reached in the coming months and that Israel would finally place an official order.”

Feb 7/09: Cost. In a talk at the Brooking Institution, JSF program head USAF Maj.-Gen. Charles R. Davis has admitted that that the average cost of F-35 fighters will range from $80 – 90 million in current dollars, but IDF sources tell the Jerusalem Post that they believe the cost per aircraft will exceed $100 million, “making it very difficult for Israel to follow through with its initial intention to purchase 75 aircraft.” Jerusalem Post.

F-35B features
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Nov 9/08: Cost. Israel remains relatively unaffected by the global financial crunch, has $3 billion per year in military aid dollars to spend within the United States, and faces growing regional threats to its existence. Lockheed Martin is seeking to finalize early orders for the F-35, in order to assure production. It seems like a natural fit. Israel is only an F-35 “security cooperation partner,” however, and its HMDS helmet-mounted display technology is its only contribution to date.

Israel traditionally incorporates an array of its technologies and weapons into American-bought fighters. A Reuters report adds that:

“A Lockheed source said seven Israeli companies had already been contracted to contribute to the [Israeli F-35] project.

On the other hand, uncertainty over the breadth of and timing that integration, questions about F-35 delivery schedules, and pricing issues are all working against contract negotiations. There are even reports that Israel is considering a renewed request for the $180 million F-22A, which could be delivered by 2011, or for additional purchases of upgraded F-16s instead.

Reuters reports that CEO Robert Stevens visited Israel in early November to lobby for an early 2009 contract, and advanced the argument that an earlier buy would translate into greater participation. The argument is also being used that Israeli investment in technology inserts would become potential export options for other F-35 customers, as was the case with the F-16. On the other hand, Defense News quoted an official in the IDF General Staff as saying that

“It’s unbelievable, first it was $40 million to $50 million, and then they [the IAF] told us $70 million to $80 million. Now, we’re looking at nearly three times that amount, and who’s to say it won’t continue to climb?”

See also: Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper | Jerusalem Post | Israel’s Globes business paper | Reuters | StrategyPage.

Nov 10/08: F-22. Flight International reports that sticker shock over the proposed $200 million per plane price of F-35As, and a need for rapid delivery, may push Israel to renew its F-22EX request with the new Obama administration. An excerpt:

“This aircraft can be delivered in two years if the deal is approved [DID: 2011, vs. 2012-14 for F-35s], and that is very important for the security of Israel,” comments one Israeli source.”

Oct 16/08: Cost. The Jerusalem Post reports that:

“According to the officials, the IDF will likely hold off signing an official contract with the US Air Force to buy the jet, also known as the F-35, until the economic situation becomes clearer… One official said it was possible that if orders dropped, the cost of the plane would increase and that as a result Israel would need to reconsider the number of planes it will buy.”

F-35A head-on
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Oct 25/07: Early delivery? Israel may begin taking deliveries of the F-35 in 2012, a couple years earlier than expected and only slightly after the USA begins receiving production aircraft of its own. The timing and technology agreements reportedly came in the wake of a Washington meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and may represent an attempt to deflect Israeli calls for an export version of the F-22A Raptor, which has more stealth and capability, and whose production line is currently scheduled to close in 2010.

Read “F-35s to Israel Early?” for full coverage.

June 21/06: Plans for 100. Israel’s globe’s Online interviews Brigadier-General Ze’ev Snir, who confirms that the IAF is looking to replace its F-16s with the F-35, at a cost estimated at at least $5 billion for 100 aircraft, or about $50 million per. That figure was always very questionable, given the F-35 program’s price increases and the additional costs associated with placing a new aircraft type in service.

The F-35 also fits into a broader modernization effort. Israel is also reportedly considering several near-term IAF procurements, including a possible buy of 6 C-130J Hercules transports plus associated support & equipment at a cost of about $500 million [requested July 2008, up to $1.9 billion], as well as a $100 million upgrade of Sikorsky CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters to extend their operational lifespan by 20 years. See full Globes Online article.

Additional Readings

• DID FOCUS – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: 2009-2010 | F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: JSF Events & Contracts 2007-08.

• DID – Israel Requesting F-22EX Fighters

• The F-35′s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy. Can the aircraft hold its own against existing fighter competitors like the Russian SU-30 family, French Rafale, the Eurofighters flown by Saudi Arabia, etc.?

• DID – Israel Kicks Off Program to Improve Its F-16s and F-15s

• Ha’aretz (July 27/10) – F-35 – take it or leave it

• Aviation Week (June 11/09) – Boeing Studies Stealth Eagle Options. Interesting point made re: retrofits and stealth sales: “It’s not how low can you go, it’s how low are you allowed to go, and the U.S. government controls that,” says Brad Jones, Boeing program manager for F-15 future fighters. “We can get to different levels depending on the country.”

• DID (Aug 22/05) – Follow-Up: Tech Transfers to Israel Resume, Conditionally

• DID (Apr 19/05) – Reports: Israel Frozen out of F-35 Development