The US Department of Defense’s Information Analysis Centers (IACs) are research and analysis organizations operated by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Chartered by the DoD to help researchers, engineers, scientists and program managers, IACS offer specialized research staff to DoD agencies and military services.

The mission of the IACs is 2 two-fold: (1) IACs provide access to worldwide scientific and technical information to improve the productivity of personnel in the defense science and technology communities. The IACs accomplish this mission by collecting, analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating relevant information in clearly-defined and structured subject areas; (2) IACs serve their respective fields by providing technical services and solutions.

There are 10 DTIC IACs that specialize in various scientific areas relevant to the US military. In the latest development, Booz Allen Hamilton received a $108.8 million contract to operate 1 of the IACs, the Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center, for a 3-year period…

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Galileo concept
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The European Union is cooperating with a number of outside investors to replace the USA’s free Global Positioning System service with an alternative under their own control. In addition to civilian GPS (the Open Service), services to be offered include a paid Commercial Service (with accuracy greater than 1 meter), and a Public Regulated Service (PRS)/ Safety of Life Service (SoL) for use by security authorities (police, military, etc.) and safety-critical transport applications (air-traffic control, automated aircraft landing, etc.). PRS/SoL aims to offer Open Service quality, with added robustness against jamming and the reliable detection of problems within 10 seconds.

Organizational issues and shortfalls in expected progress pushed the “Galileo” project back from its originally intended operational date of 2007 to 2013-14 – and doubts persist in several quarters about its economic model, even as security issues arise regarding China’s COMPASS project. After a public-private partnership model failed to agree among themselves or with the EU’s desired terms, the organization gained initial-stage approval for its plan to finance the program with tax dollars instead of the expected private investments. Political issues were overcome, albeit with some protest, by raiding other EU accounts for over EUR 3 billion (about $5.35 billion) in funds, rather than asking for more money from member states.

The latest set of updates cover developments in Galileo, and in related programs like GIOVE and EGNOS. While the project’s base funding is now more secure, its ability to remain within budget faces issues, as does the expected launch timetable. Recent events may even lead to a smaller Galileo constellation…

• Galileo: Goals, Structure & Costs
• “Eppur, Si Bloccare”: Trials & Tribulations [updated]
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: The EU Proposal – Going Forward (2007)
• Appendix B: Additional Readings [updated]
• Appendix C: Additional Readings – The Security Dimension
  
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NH90: TTH & NFH
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The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AugustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow. The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points.

While battlefield damage to composite airframes can be more difficult to repair in the field, the combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Orders currently stand at 507 machines, on behalf of 14 nations.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article, offering an in-depth look at the multi-national NH90 program, its customers, and its chronology from 1995 to the present day. The most recent additions cover developments, timelines, and controversies in Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Germany since January 2009…

• The NH90 Platform(s)
• The NH90 Production Program
• Contracts & Key Events, 1995-present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Guest article by Ian Cookson & Grant Thornton Corporate Finance LLC

Aerospace component M&A activity remained strong in 2008, and was one of the best performing sectors, with the same number of transactions as the record set in 2007. Activity was again weighted toward the first half of the year (in a 60/40 split), with a similar number of transactions in the second half of 2008 as 2007. Although 40% of transactions were led by private equity groups, this masks a shift in the second half where strategic buyers proved more successful in winning bids (by a factor of 3:1). Private equity buyers found it harder to raise the levels of debt that supported prices of previous acquisitions.

The strong level of aerospace component activity is in stark contrast to U.S. M&A activity as a whole, which declined by a third in volume terms from the prior year (and substantially more by value). However, the number of smaller deals across all industries (under $50 million) remained remarkably constant. It is this category of smaller deals that is more reflective of aerospace component transactions.

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by P.W. Singer, The Brookings Institution

Something big is going on in the history of war, and maybe even humanity itself. The US military went into Iraq with just a handful of drones in the air and zero unmanned systems on the ground, none of them armed. Today, there are over 5,300 drones in the US inventory and another roughly 12,000 on the ground. And these are just the first generation, the Model T Fords compared to what is already in the prototype stage. This is what is happening now. Peering forward, one Air Force lieutenant general forecast that “given the growth trends, it is not unreasonable to postulate future conflicts involving tens of thousands.”

For my book Wired for War, I spent the last several years trying to capture this historic moment, as robots begin to move into the fighting of our human wars. The book features stories and anecdotes of everyone from robotic scientists and the science fiction writers who inspire them to 19 year old drone pilots and the Iraqi insurgents they are fighting. The hope wasn’t just to take the reader on a journey to meet this new generation of warriors—both human and machine, but also to explore the fascinating, and sometimes frightening, political, economic, legal and ethical questions that our society had better start facing in how our wars will be fought and who will fight them. In other words, “What happens when science fiction becomes battlefield reality?”

Despite all the enthusiasm in military circles for the next generation of unmanned vehicles, ships, and planes, there is one question, however, that people are generally reluctant to talk about. It is the equivalent of Lord Voldemort in Harry Potter, the issue That-Must-Not-Be-Discussed. What happens to the human role in war as we arm ever more intelligent, more capable, and increasingly more autonomous robots?

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RPG-27

Back in December 2005, “Russia to Dominate $5.33B Portable Anti-Armor Market Through 2014” covered analyst firm Forecast International’s global predictions for man-portable, unguided, anti-tank and bunker-buster weapons. In January 2009, the firm’s rolling forecast sees the market’s value holding steady at “over $5 billion” over the next 10 years, still sees Russia as the dominant player, and still sees European players grabbing a dollar share that outweighs their market share. Compared with 2005, however, there is a rising contender.

Forecast International sees Russian weapons accounting for 59.3% of global production in this segment, and 46.5% of the market’s dollar value through 2018. (2005: 68% of production and over 51% of market value through 2014)...

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IBM’s Center for the Business of Government:

“One of the biggest challenges facing the new administration, as well as future administrations, is the effective acquisition of complex products…. This report examines contracting for complex products by reviewing the U.S. Coast Guard’s experience with its Deepwater Program…. a major “system of systems” acquisition to upgrade and integrate the Coast Guard’.... Important elements are missing from the Deepwater story, notably the impact of contract management and the behavior of each party within the IDIQ contract design…. Although Deepwater has garnered headlines for some of its stumbles, a more complete review of the early phases suggests a more mixed and balanced record.”

DID has covered numerous aspects of the US Coast Guard’s $25 billion Deepwater program-of-programs; “US Coast Guard’s Deepwater Effort Hits More Rough Sailing” offers a good summary of developments to date, and links to most of the key articles. Readers can download the full IBM CBG report [PDF], which recommends more investment in building up the acquisition workforce (a workforce that is often cut short-sightedly when budgets get smaller), which leads to a better understanding of risk drivers. They CBG also recommends a commitment to learning by trying different kinds of contracts for complex systems, ensuring that the contracts can be modified mid-stream in light of experience, and collecting lessons learned.

This report was also discussed in USCG Rear Admiral Blore’s Dec 31/08 blog post, where he states his general agreement with the report, and contends that most of its recommendations have already been implemented.

Giuseppe Ceracchi:
“Minerva as the Patroness
of American Liberty”
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In this day and age, more people associate “Minerva” with a strict teacher at a fictional wizard’s school than with Rome’s incarnation of Pallas Athena, the Greek goddess of wisdom, knowledge, and war. As “WIRED: A Different Kind of Net-Centric Warfare in Iraq” revealed, however, Minerva’s ancient incarnation remains very relevant today. “The surge” in Iraq is best known for its increase in the number of American troops, but that was actually its least significant feature. Its most significant feature was a major shift in the way the Americans fought the war, using a counterinsurgency doctrine that acted on the lessons from successes like Malaysia – and on newer insights from social scientists embedded with the American military. See also General Petraeus’ December 2008 remarks in Washington [Transcript | Slideshow].

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has previously served as the president of Texas A&M University. Under his watch, the US DoD has unveiled The Minerva Initiative to foster longer-term research that’s relevant to the national security community. Now the first awards have been made under that program…

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SU-30K: Export star
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The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a twin collapse for Russia’s vast arms industries. On the one hand, revelation of the state’s bankruptcy collapsed domestic arms spending. As a follow-up punch, it also collapsed aid-financed exports to dependent Soviet client states. Russia’s arms industry has been clawing its way back ever since. During the 1990s, China effectively replaced Russia as the industry’s core domestic market, underwriting the R&D base and creating a springboard for further exports.

“Russian Arms Exports Rose to $5.78B in 2004” began to chronicle that comeback. In late 2005, “Russian Defense Industry Exports Stabilizing at $6B/Year, But Structure May Change” looked at some of the adjustments being made to Russia’s export sales arrangements, even as its industry was consolidated. In September 2008, “Russia’s Military Spending Jumping – But Can Its Industry?” looked at the challenges facing a sector that has lost most of its engineers, and now faces strong civilian competition for talent.

India and China remain Russia’s largest defense customers, though India is moving to diversify its defense imports by adding Western manufacturers to its mix. Even so, a major deal with Algeria may offer long-term promise if it holds, Indonesia has stepped up as a buyer, Libya may be next, and Venezuela is positioning itself as Russia’s next big customer. Konstantin Biryulin of the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation (FSMTC) recently told RIA Novosti that arms export sales volume to Q3 2008 was 23% higher than the same period in 2007, which finished at $7.4 billion. Pravda.

In 2006, DID noted a raft of Saudi arms purchase announcements, from mobile howitzers, to helicopters, to advanced fighter aircraft. More requests have followed, including a controversial request for JDAM GPS-guided bombs. Many of these official requests have yet to turn into firm contracts, but the volume of fulfilled requests has attracted attention nonetheless. So, too, has the diversification of Saudi suppliers, as Russia enters the arena for the first time. Will Saudi spending continue? How significant is it? Forecast International… forecasts:

“Faced with both internal and external threats to its security, Saudi Arabia will continue to boost defense spending significantly over the coming years…. Record-high oil prices, substantial influxes of energy revenues and an unyielding global demand for Saudi petroleum, meanwhile, will continue to serve as enablers…. Saudi defense and security spending – estimated by Forecast at around $36 billion for 2008 – will reach almost $44.5 billion by 2012…. the fledgling Saudi defense industrial base is limited primarily to maintenance work thus leaving Riyadh heavily dependent upon international suppliers for its equipment. As a result the Saudi market is not only the largest for defense equipment in the Middle East, but one of the largest worldwide.

....Meanwhile, the Saudi government is attempting to rectify its defense industrial shortcomings, partly by increasingly insisting on offsets and technology transfers as conditions for arms purchases. The defense ministry is also initiating a program to domestically-produce spare parts for its weapons platforms, and a ‘Saudization’ process whereby a shortage of technically-qualified workers is filled through increased ranks of trained, qualified Saudi workers. Despite these initiatives progress in developing the Saudi defense sector is slow and its projects and workforce remain foreign-dominated….”