1991: HMCS Protecteur &
USS Wisconsin [BB-64]
(click to view larger)

The Canadian supply ships and oilers HMCS Protecteur, and HMCS Preserver have contributed to humanitarian aid missions in Florida and the Bahamas, peace-making off Somalia and East Timor, and have been poised for the evacuation of non-combatants from Haiti, to name but a few of their recent endeavors.

As part of its spate of military modernization announcements issued just before Canada Day (July 1) 2006, the Canadian government issued an RFP that began the process of defining and building 3 “Joint Support Ships.” The aim was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current Protecteur Class oiler and resupply ships. In addition to being able to provide at-sea support (re-fueling and re-supply) to deployed naval task groups, the new JSS ships were envisioned as ships that would also be capable of sealift operations, as well as amphibious support to forces deployed ashore.

JSS v1.0
(click to view larger)

This was expected to be a C$ 2.9 billion (USD $2.58 billion) project. This article describes the process, the 4 pre-qualified industry teams participating, and some of the issues swirling around Canada’s very ambitious specifications. Specifications that ultimately sank the whole project, in a manner that was predictable from the outset. Leaving Canada’s navy with a serious problem. Will a second go-round in 2012-13 help any?

• Take 2: Lessons, Process, and Contenders [updated]
• JSS: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
• Appendix A: The JSS v1.0 Procurement Process
• Appendix B: DID Op-ed/Analysis – June 30, 2006
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USNS Sacagawea

Warships get a lot of attention, but without resupply, an impressive-looking fleet becomes a hollow force. The US Navy’s supply and support fleet has been aging, and needed new vessels. T-AKE is part of that effort, and the ships have also found themselves performing “naval diplomacy” roles.

The entire T-AKE dry cargo/ ammunition ship program could have a total value of as much as $6.2 billion, and a size of 14 ships, as the US looks to modernize its supply fleet. How do T-AKE ships fit into US naval operations? What ships do they replace? What’s the tie-in to US civilian industrial capacity? How were environmental standards built into their design? And what contracts have been issued for T-AKE ships to date? This FOCUS article covers the T-AKE program, and offers answers:

• T-AKE Ships: Mission & Capabilities
• T-AKE Ships: Program
  • T-AKE Ships: The Civilian Industry Angle
  • T-AKE Ships & the Environment
• T-AKE Ships: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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Norwegian C-130H by
Torbjorn Kjosvold

Back in February 2007, the Norwegian Forsvarsnett said:

“The Armed Forces have six C-130H Hercules transport aircrafts today [DID: 335 skv, out of Oslo-Gardermoen]. These were bought in 1969 and are outdated. Recent updates have made them able to be operational until 2012-15, but it is now known that the planes need further work done to them still. Therefore the Norwegian government has started investigating the possibility of either renting or buying up to four new planes of the type Hercules C-130J.”

Faced with the prospect of further C-130H refurbishment work on one hand, and entreaties by the A400M consortium on the other, Norway needed to decide what to do. They did, and the decision promptly came under political attack – but a deal was done for 4 stretched C-130J-30s, and the final aircraft flew off to Norway in July 2010:

• The Platform: C-130J-30
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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Austal Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts:

• LCS: Concept & Needs
  • LCS: Designs & Teams
  • LCS Solution = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules [updated]
• LCS: Controversies & Cautions
• The LCS Program
  • LCS Ship Roster
  • LCS: Export Potential?
• LCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
• Appendix A: LCS’ Yo-Yoing Budgets and Program Structure [updated]
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WANTED: stuff like this…

On July 25/06 Al-Anbar commander and U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer submitted an MNF-W priority 1 request. It pointed to the hazards inherent in American supply lines, and noted that many of the supply convoys on Iraq’s roads (up to 70%, by some reports) were carrying fuel. Much of that fuel wasn’t even for vehicles, but for diesel generators used to generate power at US bases. That is still true, and Afghanistan has even more daunting logistics. By some estimates, shipping each gallon of fuel to Afghanistan requires 7 gallons of fuel for transport.

A number of Pentagon projects use alternative energy at various installations, but Zilmer’s request is believed to have been the first formal request from a front-line commander. Not to mention the first formal request that acknowledges the security dimension of alternative energy sources, in response to the growth of “systempunkt” terrorism and the non-linear battlefield. It has not been the last.

• The Need on the Ground
• Options and Considerations
• Contracts and Key Developments [updated]
• Additional Readings
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FNS Tonnerre [BPC 2],
during sea trials

In December 2008, reports surfaced that France intended to accelerate production of its 3rd Mistral Class LHD amphibious assault and command ship, as part of a EUR 2.3 billion defense component of France’s economic stimulus package. That deal was finalized on Apr 10/09, and production of the 3rd ship of class is now complete. It is expected to enter service as FS Dixmude in 2012.

Cost figures were not released initially, but the use of commercial cruise ship standards and civilian yards reportedly allowed France to field the first two 21,300t Mistral Class LHDs for about EUR 660 million. By 2010, it emerged that Dixmude would be delivered for about 10% less, or EUR 300 million. That would make each Mistral Class LHD just 25% of the price for a single American 22,700t LPD-17 San Antonio Class amphibious assault and command ship:

• BPC 3: A Different Construction Approach
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
• Appendix A: The Mistral Class LHDs [updated]
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Westpac, Expressin’

The Westpac Express fast ferry ship has been instrumental in changing the way the US Navy approaches sealift in the Western Pacific. It’s fast enough to substitute for airlift in many cases, and large enough to move a Marine battalion with its gear. Early trials went very well, and the innovative designs and performance of Australian shipbuilders Austal and Incat laid a foundation of manufacturing experience and customer comfort that led to the innovative GD/Austal trimaran design for the new Independence Class “Flight 0” Littoral Combat Ship, while spawning a major acquisition program in the Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV).

HSV Westpac Express isn’t a Navy-owned ship; technically, it’s a chartered vessel. In July 2005, we noted an 18-month extension to its charter. In 2006, that service period was extended still further via a new charter, lasting up to 5 years. During that charter’s period, a bankruptcy in Hawaii created an opportunity to buy the Austal-built catamaran Superferry MV Huakai, which will replace Westpac Express in the Pacific. Until then, the USMC needs one more contract extension…

From these…

In the aftermath of the START-II arms control treaty, some of the USA’s nuclear-powered Ohio Class SSBN nuclear missile submarines were converted to become long range conventional strike and special operations SSGN “Tactical Tridents.” Four ultra-stealthy Ohio-class SSBNs had their 24 Trident II D-5 nuclear ballistic missiles removed. They were replaced with up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles, plus space in the sub for 66-102 special forces troops, special attachments for new Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) or older Seal Delivery Vehicle (SDV) “mini-subs,” and a mission control center. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, and even UAVs for aerial operations, are expected to become equally important options over the SSGN fleet’s career.

...to these

These modifications provide the USA with an impressive and impressively flexible set of conventional firepower, in a survivable and virtually undetectable platform, which can remain on station for very long periods of time. As surveillance-strike complexes make the near-shore more and more hazardous for conventional ships, and the potential dangers posed by small groups continue to rise, America’s converted SSGN submarines will become more and more valuable. This updated, free-to-view article covers their origins and timeline, the key technologies involved, contracts from the program’s inception to the present day, with all 4 submarines back in service:

• The US Navy’s New SSGN Platform
• SSGN Conversions: Timelines & Program Contractors [updated]
• SSGN Tactical Trident: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• SSGN Tactical Trident: Ancillary Programs
• Additional Readings
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C-17 over Hawaii

This in-depth, public-access DII Spotlight Article offers key statistics for the C-17A, explains the Globemaster III Sustainment Partnership’s (GSP) components, and details its contracts. While the C-17 may have limited production time in its future, the C-17 GSP is likely to continue for many years. The rising cost of maintenance has made it a greater concern to the world’s militaries, and new contract vehicles are reflecting that. Under the C-17 GSP, Boeing has total system support responsibility for the big transport aircraft, including materiel management and depot maintenance, for fleets around the world. The goal is total aircraft sustainment support under a single contract, in order to achieve improvements in mission readiness, while reducing operating and support costs.

The initial C-17 GSP contract has grown and broadened, even as Boeing’s customer base grew in the USAF (now 223), Australia (6), Britain (8), Canada (4), India (10-16), Qatar (2-4), NATO (3), the UAE (6) – and possibly Kuwait (1):

• The C-17 Globemaster III
• The C-17 Globemaster III Sustainment Partnership
• The C-17 PE/PI Program
• Contracts and Key Events, FY 2004-Present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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AN-70

Antonov UAC JV; Other developments since 2009. (Oct 5/11)

Antonov’s AN-70 has had a long and difficult development history from its first studies and concepts in 1979, including the dissolution of its sponsoring state in 1991, the crash of the initial prototype aircraft in a 1995 collision with its chase plane, and the selection of the EADS A400M development project as the basis of Europe’s Future Large Aircraft (FLA). Antonov’s project has been kept alive on a shoestring budget by the participating companies, who believe that they have a winner on their hands if they can just bring it into production. The A400M’s struggles and cost escalation, and the C-130J’s 20-ton limitations, have validated that assessment – but assessments don’t meet payroll, or pay for equipment.

The FLA loss was indeed a bitter blow to a Ukrainian program that had already seen many setbacks. For many years, it even looked like the defeat might turn out to be fatal, consigning the AN-70 to “what if” status on par with Canada’s fabled CF-105 Avro Arrow fighter. Recent developments, 30 years after the project first began, look set to change that status…

• Team Antonov’s AN-70 [updated]
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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