YRH-70 test, 2005

The US Army’s Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program aimed to replace around 375 Bell Textron OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters, after the $14.6 billion RAH-66 Comanche program, was canceled in 2004. Instead, the Army would buy a larger number of less expensive platforms, with reduced capabilities. Bell Helicopter Textron initially won the ARH competition with a militarized version of its highly successful 407 single-engine commercial helicopter, but despite significant private investment after Army funding stopped in March 2007, spiraling costs killed the ARH-70 in October 2008.

What hasn’t changed is the battlefield need for on-call, front-line aerial surveillance and fire support. With its existing OH-58D stock wither wearing down, or shot down, the Army needs to do something. But what? This will serve as DID’s FOCUS Article for the ARH program, and its potential successor the Armed Aerial Scout. It includes updated background, coverage of contracts and key events, and additional research materials.

• The ARH Program: What Happened? [updated]
• AAS: Now What? [updated]
• ARH-AAS: Contracts & Events [updated]
• Appendix A: Weary Warriors – The Army’s OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Fleet [updated]
• Appendix B: Initial Winner – Bell’s ARH-70
• Additional Readings & Sources [updated]
  Continue Reading… »

Bridge to the future?

In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in anti-shipping surveillance-strike complexes, and the need to defend large sea lanes, and dropped something of a surprise. They proposed increasing Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be successors to Australia’s a current fleet of advanced Collins class submarines.

The Collins class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has encountered a number of issues, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines put a huge crimp in the fleet’s usefulness. High-level attention led to 29 recommendations aimed at improving conditions and staffing on Australia’s submarines, and those are now being implemented. Their long term effect remains to be seen. So, too, does the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost:

• Program Structure & Timeline [NEW]
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
  Continue Reading… »

LAV-III: stuck
(click to view larger)

In late November 2008, Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) announced its intention to combine 3 programs into one general set of upgrades to its armored vehicle fleets. The C$ 5 billion (about $4.3 billion) meta-program would include (1) a “close combat vehicle,” in order to perform as a tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle or Armored Personnel Carrier alongside Canada’s new Leopard 2A6 tanks; (2) a new “Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle”; and (3) upgrades the existing LAV-III wheeled APC fleet. In July 2009, A 4th “FME” project was added to field dedicated Armored Engineering Vehicles based on the Leopard 2, along with engineering-related attachments for Canada’s new Leopard 2 tanks.

The “Close Combat Vehicle” appears to be the most urgent purchase, but the stated procurement approach isn’t structured to deliver urgency. As things stand, all contracts are scheduled to take effect after Canada is slated to end its Afghan mission. The LAV-IIIs showed limitations in key terrain within Afghanistan, and keeping them in the field requires a lot of maintenance. Canada’s M113 tracked APCs have been used successfully as a supplement, but the Canadians appear to be leaning toward a heavier vehicle for their future CCV:

• The Close Combat Vehicle [updated]
  • Tracked Options
  • Wheeled Options
• The Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle (TAPV)
• LAV-IIIs, and the RESET/RECAP Imperative
• Force Mobility Enhancement: Heavy Engineering
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  Continue Reading… »

Tejas LCA

India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the largest component of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft will face similar problems in the near future.

In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s fading hope is that India can maintain their fighter numbers until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA sale delivers replacements. Which still leaves India without an affordable overall solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21bis program adds years of life to those airframes, but that extended lifespan is still quite finite. By 2020, they’re likely to be gone.

That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the Indian Air Force’s future prospects, and why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, however, the program’s delays are a growing problem for India. Beyond India, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market means that choices made in the LCA’s design will also affect its export potential. Which, in turn, feeds back into the overall program’s lifetime costs and viability…

• LCA Tejas: India’s Lightweight Fighter [updated]
  • Radar Love: Weapons & Fire Control
  • Engines & Alternatives
  • In the Navy… Naval LCA
• LCA Tejas: Program, Prospects, and Future [updated]
  • Industrial Team
  • Future Prospects
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (2006)
• Appendix B: The Kaveri Engine: Keystone, or Killer?
• Appendix C: Additional Readings & Sources
  Continue Reading… »

An M4 – or is it?

The 5.56mm M-16 has been the USA’s primary battle rifle since the Vietnam war, undergoing changes into progressive versions like the M16A4 widely fielded by the US Marine Corps, “Commando” carbine versions, etc. The M4 Carbine is the latest member of the M16 family, offering a shorter weapon more suited to close-quarters battle, or use by units who would find a full-length rifle too bulky.

In 2006 an Army solicitation for competitive procurement of 5.56mm carbine designs was withdrawn, once sole-source incumbent Colt dropped its prices. The DoD’s Inspector General weighed in with a critical report, but the Army dissented, defending its practices as a sound negotiating approach that saved the taxpayers money. As it turns out, there’s a sequel. A major sequel that has only grown bigger with time.

The M4/M16 family is both praised and criticized for its current performance in the field. In recent years, the M4 finished dead last in a sandstorm reliability test, against 3 competitors that include a convertible M4 variant. Worse, the 4th place M4 had over 3.5x more jams than the 3rd place finisher. Was that a blip in M4 buys, or a breaking point? DID explains the effort, the issues, and the options, as the Army moves forward with an “Individual Carbine” competition. But will it actually replace the M4?

• The M4 Carbine
  • Nobody Loves Me but My Mother – and She Could Be Jivin’ Too…
  • The Cry for Competition: How Much Is That HK In the Window?
  • Any Last Words?
• The Tests, Reactions, and Subsequent Developments
• M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources – News & Developments
• Additional Readings & Sources: Weapons & Background
• Appendix A: Testing, Testing – Fairly?
  Continue Reading… »

Gripen & S-1000/S340

It’s a small, agile fighter that can take off and land on highways, while carrying the latest technologies and weapons. It does very well against NATO’s best aircraft in exercises, comes with a reasonable price tag, and is built for low lifetime operating costs. Unfortunately, in a world where people often buy your weapons because they want you to be their friend, the cachet of having Sweden in your corner isn’t quite what it used to be when their sailors wore those cool horned helmets. As a result, the JAS-39 Gripen is an excellent, reasonably-priced fighter yet it has been struggling for traction in the global marketplace.

A recent sale to Thailand has expanded Saab’s horizons somewhat, as the Gripen beat out the SU-30s favored by the previous Thai government. Lockheed Martin’s F-16 had been considered the leading contender to replace the RTAF’s 15-25 aging F-5B/Es, given Thailand’s extensive history with that aircraft. Other candidates included Russia’s MiG-29, and France’s Rafale. Saab had a very competitive offering on cost and performance, but in order to win, they had to throw in a very significant “something extra”: their Saab 340-AEW AWACS aircraft.

• The Thai AF and the Program
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Apendix A – Wild Card: Thailand’s Political Situation (October 2007)
• Appendix B – Additional Readings
  Continue Reading… »

Oshkosh M-ATV

“The Government plans to acquire an MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). The M-ATV is a lighter, off-road, and more maneuverable vehicle that incorporates current MRAP level [bullet and mine blast] protection. The M-ATV will require effectiveness in an off-road mission profile. The vehicle will include EFP (Explosively Formed Projectile land mine) and RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade panzerfaust) protection (integral or removable kit). The M-ATV will maximize both protection levels and off-road mobility & maneuverability attributes, and must balance the effects of size and weight while attempting to achieve the stated requirements.”
  —US government FedBizOpps, November 2008

Oshkosh Defense’s M-ATV candidate secured a long-denied MRAP win, and the firm continues to remain ahead of production targets. The initial plan expected to spend up to $3.3 billion to order 5,244 M-ATVs for the US Army (2,598), Marine Corps (1,565), Special Operations Command (643), US Air Force (280) and the Navy (65), plus 93 test vehicles. FY 2010 budgets and subsequent purchases have pushed this total even higher, and orders now stand at over 8,800:

• MRAP ATV: Requirements and Contenders
• M-ATV Variants
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  Continue Reading… »

Buoy oh buoy…

The January 2010 failure of a generator aboard HMAS Farncomb was just the latest in a long history of problems faced by its fleet of 6 Collins Class diesel-electric submarines – which have sometimes been reduced to just 1 operational vessel. That readiness issue presents an immediate financial headache for Australia’s government, and adds a longer-term challenge to the centerpiece of Australia’s future naval force.

With just 6 submarines in its fleet, Australia’s current deployment set-up leaves little room for error. Even a normal setup of 2 in maintenance, 2 for training but available if needed, and 2 on operations makes for a thin line, given Australia’s long coastline and sea lanes. Almost 15 years after the first Collins Class boat was delivered, they are still short of this goal. When crewing problems are added to the mechanical issues, the failings of its current fleet are creating sharp questions about the Australia’s 2009 White Paper plan to build 12 new diesel-electric fast attack submarines, as the future centerpiece of the 2030 Australian Navy.

• A Cursed Class?
• Updates and Developments [updated]
• Additional Readings
  Continue Reading… »

• Q1 results are in for L-3 Communications, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. They are all showing more topline resilience than Northrop Grumman. Quick summary table of their sales and backlog at the bottom of this entry.

• Lockheed Martin’s CEO Bob Stevens will retire and be replaced by current President and COO Christopher Kubasik effective January 1, 2013. Kubasik is an alumnus from the Defense Acquisition University.

• US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta leaned on Brazil in support of Boeing’s F/A-18s for the ongoing F-X2 competition. Panetta discussed technology transfers with his counterpart Celso Amorim. Dassault is working the local cooperation angle too [in French].
  Continue Reading… »

In March 2008, the Bell Boeing Joint Project Office in Amarillo, TX received a $10.4 billion modification that converted the previous advance acquisition contract (N00019-07-C-0001) to a fixed-price-incentive-fee, multi-year contract. The new contract now sits at $10.92 billion, and will be used to buy 143 MV-22 (for USMC) and 31 CV-22 (Air Force Special Operations) Osprey aircraft, plus associated manufacturing tooling to move the aircraft into full production.

The V-22 tilt-rotor program has been beset by controversy throughout its 20-year development period. Despite these issues, and the emergence of competitive but more conventional compound helicopter technologies like Piasecki’s X-49 Speedhawk and Sikorsky’s X2, the V-22 program continues to move forward. This DID Spotlight article looks at the V-22’s multi-year purchase contract for 2008-12, associated contracts for key V-22 systems, program developments that arise after the contract conversion, and a preview of what may come next.

• V-22 MYP-II? [NEW]
• Contracts & Key Events (June 2008 – Present) [updated]
• Additional Readings
  Continue Reading… »