Iran-Syria vs. Israel, Round 1: Assessments & Lessons Learned

Hezbollah/Iran’s rockets

In the aftermath of the 2006 war between Iran/Syria proxies Hezbollah and Israel, after action reviews and assessments began to trickle in. While war is inseparable in practice from political strategy, and the Olmert government’s interference in military planning & operations was significant and negative, DID has searched for analyses that offer more of a techno-tactical assessment. A picture has begun to emerge, as independent evaluations were made of the 2 forces’ effectiveness.

Hezbollah can safely be characterized as a state within a state and was aided by Iranian forces. Accordingly, this conflict featured most of the accoutrements of full state conflicts: Armed UAVs (apparently used by both sides), air and missile strikes with corresponding air defense activity, anti-ship cruise missiles, tanks vs. advanced anti-armor missiles (incl. AT-13s and Milans), etc. As such the performance of the two forces and their equipment is of serious interest to defense observers around the world. The fact that public assessments are still being published in 2012 is solid evidence of that interest.

US Military Bringing a Switchblade to A Gun Fight

Switchblade out
(c) Aerovironment

In late June 2011, the US Army gave Aerovironment a contract to begin fielding Switchblade UAV. Aerovironment’s new tube-launched, man-portable UAV will work for surveillance, and transmits live color video. It also functions as a kamikaze missile, however, which can be armed and locked on target by operator control. This makes it extremely useful against dug-in or fortified infantry positions, enemy missile teams, mortars, etc. After a set of 2011 trials, the US Marines added a contract of their own, even as the US Army moved to deploy the system to Afghanistan by summer 2012.

The US military’s interest is understandable. One of the key lessons of Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon involved infantry use of guided anti-tank weapons as immediately-available precision artillery fire. Iran’s Hezbollah legionnaires frequently used Russia’s 1960s era 9K11/AT-3 missile designs for this purpose, while Israeli forces used the higher-tech Spike. Similar trends have been observed among American and British forces in Afghanistan, who use expensive $75,000 – 100,000 per shot Javelin missiles. With Switchblade, the US military has taken a step toward fielding a lower cost platoon level surveillance/strike weapon. The economics involved, and the clear global trend at work, mean that the US Army won’t be alone.

Britain’s Future Frigates: Type 26 & 27 Global Combat Ships

Type 26 concept

Britain’s “Future Surface Combatant” program is slated to replace the existing fleet of Type 22 Broadsword Class and Type 23 Duke Class frigates with 2 new ship classes. Outside attention often focuses on big-ticket ships like aircraft carriers, submarines, and advanced destroyers – but the frigate is the real backbone of most modern navies.

Lord Nelson loved his HMS Victory and her fellow first-rate ships of the line, but he asked the admiralty for more cruisers because he knew their versatile value as the “eyes of the fleet.” Modern multi-role frigates that can engage threats on the water, under water, and in the air fill that same role today, protecting other navy ships or undertaking independent action away from their task group. The Type 26 multi-role frigate will have to fill that niche – but first, its requirements and design must be defined.

Tanks for the Lesson: Leopards, too, for Canada

Leopard 2A6M CAN
& LAV-III, Afghanistan

Canadian Forces took some of the lessons re-learned during Operation Medusa in Afghanistan, directly to heart. Canada’s DND:

“The heavily protected direct fire capability of a main battle tank is an invaluable tool in the arsenal of any military. The intensity of recent conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East has shown western militaries that tanks provide protection that cannot be matched by more lightly armored wheeled vehicles… [Canada's existing Leopard C2/1A5] tanks have also provided the Canadian Forces (CF) with the capability to travel to locations that would otherwise be inaccessible to wheeled light armoured vehicles, including Taliban defensive positions.”

In October 2003, Canada was set to buy the Styker/LAV-III 105mm Mobile Gun System to replace its Leopard C2 tanks. By 2007, however, the lessons of war took Canada down a very different path – one that led them to renew the very tank fleet they were once intent on scrapping, while backing away from the wheeled vehicles that were once the cornerstone of the Canadian Army’s transformation plan. This updated article includes a full chronology for Canada’s new Leopard 2 tanks, adds information concerning DND’s exact plans and breakdowns for their new fleet, and discusses front-line experiences in Afghanistan.

Arming RQ-7 UAVs: The Shadow Knows…

RQ-7 Shadow

By 2007, US Army RQ-7 Shadow battalion-level UAVs had seen their flight hours increase to up 8,000 per month in Iraq, a total that compared well to the famous MQ-1 Predator. Those trends have gained strength, as workarounds for the airspace management issues that hindered early deployments become more routine. Some RQ-7s are even being used to extend high-bandwidth communications on the front lines.

The difference between the Army’s RQ-7 Shadow UAVs and their brethren like the USAF’s MQ-1A Predator, or the Army’s new MQ-1C Sky Warriors, is that the Shadow has been too small and light to be armed. With ultra-small missiles still in development, and missions in Afghanistan occurring beyond artillery support range, arming the Army’s Shadow UAVs has become an even more important objective. It would take some new technology, but that seems to be on the way for the US Marine Corps RQ-7B Shadow UAV fleet.

Rise of the “Blimps”: The US Army’s LEMV

LEMV concept

The rise of modern terrorism, sharply increasing costs to recruit and equip professional soldiers, and issues of energy security, are forcing 2 imperatives on modern armies. Modern militaries need to be able to watch wide areas for very long periods of time. Not just minutes, or even hours any more, but days if necessary. The second imperative, beyond the need for that persistent, unblinking stare up high in the air, is the need to field aerial platforms whose operating costs won’t bankrupt the budget.

These pressures are forcing an eventual convergence toward very long endurance, low operating cost platforms. Many are lighter-than-air vehicles or hybrid airships, whose technologies have advanced to make them safe and militarily useful again. On the ground near military bases, Raytheon’s RAID program fielded aerostats, and then surveillance towers. Lockheed Martin has also fielded tethered aerostats: TARS along the USA’s southern border, and PTDS aerostats on the front lines. The same trend can be observed in places like Thailand and in Israel; and Israeli experience has led to export orders in Mexico and India. At a higher technical level, Raytheon’s large JLENS aerostats are set to play a major role in American aerial awareness and cruise missile defense, and a huge ground and air scanning ISIS radar is under development under a DARPA project, to pair with Lockheed Martin’s fully mobile High Altitude Airship.

The Army’s Long-Endurance Multi-intelligence Vehicle (LEMV) project fits in between RAID and HAA/ISIS, in order to give that service mobile, affordable, very long term surveillance in uncontested airspace. Its technologies may also wind up playing a role in other projects.

US Military Orders More King Air 350ER Aircraft

MC-12 arrives

Despite all of the high-tech fighter hours flown in theater, Hawker Beechcraft’s twin-propeller King Air 350 continues to gain traction as an affordable, long-endurance option for light cargo delivery in remote areas – and effective manned battlefield surveillance and attack. Iraq’s Air Force was the first to order them, and an initial 6-plane UC-12W order from the US Marines/Navy followed in July 2008.

Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pushed hard to improve ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) capabilities on the front lines, and one of those planned purchases involved about 30 King Air 350/ C-12 aircraft for the Army. These “MC-12s” have proven to be very useful as a component of the Army’s Task Force ODIN, which has combined the respective advantages of UAVs and manned aircraft to improve aerial surveillance and response over Iraq. ODIN is credited with a number of successes on the ground, and the concept is being exported to Afghanistan. Part of that process involves buying new, updated aircraft, and the US military continues to buy KA350 turboprops for use in different configurations.

Rapid Fire May 21, 2012: NATO Summit No Peak

• NATO and Pakistan have not found an agreement on reopening transport routes out of Afghanistan. The fact Pakistan tried to increase the price per truck by a factor of 20 might have something to do with it. If allied combat troops are to withdraw by mid-2013 and don’t want to leave most of their equipment behind or ship it back at an outrageous cost, this will need to be resolved.

• Five years after Estonia’s cyber attacks: any lessons learned for NATO? [PDF]

• The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) gathered a lot of force composition data [PDF] in the Gulf.

Persuader Patrol Planes for Mexico’s Maritime

Mexican CN-235 MPA

Mexico’s military needs have escalated, as the country faces what counter-terrorist analyst John Robb has called a growing “open source insurgency” composed primarily of narco-traffickers, with some leftist groups and political forces jockeying for position in the uncoordinated mix. By 2010, the violence associated with “The Cartel War” had reportedly claimed around 28,000 lives since 2006 – a figure that continues to rise steadily.

In response, the Mexican government has been signing contracts on a number of fronts, from full city-wide surveillance and monitoring systems, to UAVs and aerostats, to medium helicopters. More equipment is on the way, via Mexico’s own purchases and the USA’s Merida Initiative.

One of its most important acquisition programs is EADS-CASA’s popular CN-235 MPA maritime patrol aircraft, which currently serves with Spain, Colombia, Ireland, Turkey, and the US Coast Guard. Indonesia’s Digiranta has built them for Indonesia, Brunei and the UAE, and recently added South Korea’s Coast Guard as a customer. A May 1/08 Economist article may help to explain the importance of these aircraft to Mexico’s current Cartel War:

The USA’s C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft

C-27J Spartan

When the WALRUS super-heavy cargo airship was canceled, combat commanders complained that front-line airfields were often too short for the C-130 Hercules that make up the USAF’s tactical transport fleet. Delays in buying a small cargo aircraft to fill that role were making that problem worse. Starved of useful help due to USAF-sponsored delays, and the lack of appropriate aircraft in the USAF, the Army carried on with its aging C-23 Sherpas, and repurposed aircraft like the unprotected C-12 Hurons, in order to ferry troops, supplies, and/or very small vehicles within its theaters of operations. From the start the US Army and US Air Force expressed different levels of urgency and priority that led to Congressional SNAFUs and an initial contract award.

JCA could have been worth up to $6 billion before all was said and done, and the finalists were a familiar duo. After EADS-CASA’s CN-235 and a shortened version of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J were disqualified for failing to meet requirements, JCA became yet another international competition between EADS-CASA’s C-295M & Alenia’s C-27J. The C-27J team eventually won the delayed decision in June 2007, and prevailed in the subsequent contract protests from their rivals. What remained unclear was exactly what they had won. The joint-service decision and contract announcement didn’t end the inter-service and Congressional politicking, either, and the contractor side was equally fractious. This FOCUS article covers the JCA competition, and subsequent developments – including the Pentagon’s 2012 push to end the program, and sell its planes: