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RN CVF Concept
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In 1998, Britain’s Strategic Defence review (SDR) announced plans to replace the current set of 3 Invincible Class 22,000t escort carriers with 2 larger, more capable Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) ships that could operate a more powerful force. These new carriers would be joint-service platforms, operating aircraft and UAVs from all 3 services (Navy, RAF, Army) in roles that could include ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance), force projection and logistics support, close air support, anti-submarine/ anti-surface naval warfare, and land attack.

Once the new ships of the Queen Elizabeth Class are complete, Britain will possess a full-size carrier force for the first time in several decades. The 65,000t CVF carriers will be equipped with Harrier GR9 and F-35B Lightning II STOVL fighters, along with AEW aircraft and helicopters; but the ships will be upgradeable to handle conventional fixed-wing aircraft and/or unmanned UCAVs during their expected 40-50 year life span.

CVF, De Gaulle, and
Invincible Class
(click to add Nimitz)

The scale of the CVF effort relative to Britain’s past experiences means that the program structure is rather complex. It has passed through several stages already, and is being run and conducted within an industrial alliance framework. There is also a parallel international framework, involving cooperation with France on its PA2 carrier as a larger derivative of the CVF design.

This DID FOCUS article covers that structure and framework, ongoing developments, and the ships themselves as they round toward final design, construction, and fielding. Recent updates include a new volume search radar project for use on the CVF carriers, and over 50 million pounds sterling in other sub-systems contracts…

• The CVF Queen Elizabeth Class (“continue reading…”) [updated]
• Program Team: The Aircraft Carrier Alliance
• CVF Program Management
• The CVF Program: Contracts and Key Events
• CVF-Related Contracts and Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources: The Program
• Additional Readings & Sources: The Ships
  
  Continue Reading… »

The entire fleet
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The prime missions of the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer are to provide naval gunfire support and next-generation air defense in near-shore areas where other large ships hesitate to tread, possibly even as the anchor for an action group of stealthy Littoral Combat Ships and submarines. The estimated 14,500t (cruiser sized) Zumwalt Class will be fully multi-role, however, with undersea warfare, long-range surface attack, and ballistic missile defense roles. As such, the DDG-1000 is also envisioned as a “hidden ace card” that can use its overall stealth to create uncertainty for enemy forces.

At over $3 billion per ship for construction alone, and just 2-8 ships to be built in the class, the program faces significant obstacles as it tries to avoid either “technology demonstrator” status, or the fulfillment of Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter’s fears for the fleet. A follow-on CG (X) cruiser is currently contemplated, and the success of the DDG-1000 Program will have a significant influence on whether and how it comes to fruition.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article for the DDG-1000 program; it covers the new ships’ capabilities, key controversies, related contracts, and related background resources. From the outset, DID has noted that the Zumwalt Class might face the same fate as the ultra-sophisticated, ultra-expensive SSN-21 Seawolf Class submarines. That appears to have come true, with news of the program’s cancellation at 2 ships.

A recent Congressional Hearing provides in-depth background information re: the DDG-1000 and DDG-51 programs, the decisions that were made, and shipbuilding options between now and the CG (X) cruiser’s debut in 2015 or so. That’s relevant, because the Navy has now reversed course and plans to ask for a 3rd Zumwalt class ship. The question is, will they get it? A recent interview with CNO Adm. Gary Roughead suggests that they may not push very hard if there’s opposition – and also cites anti-submarine warfare deficiencies…

• Zumwalt Class: Program and Participants (i.e. “Continue reading…”)
• DDG-1000 Key Technologies and Features
• DDG-1000 Issues and Controversies
• Zumwalt Class: Contracts and Key Events
  • FY 2008 [updated]
  • FY 2007
  • FY 2006
  • FY 2005
  • FY 1998 through 2004 [new]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
  Continue Reading… »

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Canberra concept
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In May of 2006, “Australia Issues Official Tender for A$ 2.0B Large Amphibious Ships Program” covered Australia’s decision to expand its naval expeditionary capabilities. HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla would be replaced with substantially larger and more capable modern designs, featuring strong air support. Navantia and Tenix offered a 27,000t LHD design that resembled the Strategic Projection Ship (Buque de Proyeccion Estrategica) under construction for the Spanish Navy. The DCNS-Thales Australia team, meanwhile, proposed a variation of the 21,300t Mistral Class that is serving successfully with the French Navy.

Navantia’s larger design eventually won, giving the Spanish firm an A$11 billion clean sweep of Australia’s “Air Warfare Destroyer” and LHD programs. These 5 ships will be the core of Australia’s future surface navy. The LHDs will be able to serve as amphibious landing ships, helicopter carriers, floating HQs and medical facilities for humanitarian assistance, and launching pads for UAVs or even short/vertical takeoff fighters.

The latest inclusions involve navigation systems for the ships…

• Winner: The Navantia-Tenix LHD
• Construction and Program
• Contracts and Key Events
• Additional Readings
  
  Continue Reading… »

The US Navy’s lack of a credible plan for its future naval forces has become a growing problem for the service. In Congress, the leadership of the HASC Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee has weighed in from both sides of the partisan aisle, with Navy plans squarely in their sights. Beyond, independent think-tanks and analysts (vid. Information Dissemination’s maritime strategy archive | FY 2009 budget analysis), and even official reports like the CBO’s Dr. Eric Labs (2005 testimony [PDF]), the late Vice-Adm. Cebrowski’s Alternative Fleet Architecture Design study [PDF] (q.v. also derivative 2005 CRS analysis: HTML | PDF), et. al. have been expressing grave doubts for several years now concerning the Navy’s ability to finance or implement its existing “313-ship navy” plan. Which is itself a major step down from the Reagan era’s 600 ship Navy.

The latest broadside comes from the respected center-right think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and was prepared with the assistance of US Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal winner Anthony Cordesman. The synopsis and title of “ABANDON SHIPS: The Costly Illusion of Unaffordable Transformation” [PDF] mince few words:

“The Navy’s procurement policy is in serious disarray. Unrealistic force plans, overoptimistic cost estimates, unrealistic projections of technical feasibility, and inadequate program management have created an unaffordable ship building program, led the Navy to phase out capable ships for new ships it cannot fund, and threaten the US Navy’s ability to implement an effective maritime strategy…. The problem starts at a conceptual disconnect between strategy and reality. The Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower[i] is a set of concepts that was not linked to any clearly defined force plan, modernization plan, program, or budget. Navy shipbuilding plans are now shaped more as the result of budgetary constraints than as a response to strategic requirements. They seem to be an expression of wishful thinking rather than a realistic strategic guideline for naval procurement…. This reality-strategy disconnect in the entire shipbuilding program is a case study in failed leadership on the part of the most senior officers and civilians in the Navy. No reforms in procurement, changes in program management, cost analysis, and test and evaluation can begin to compensate for taking hard and realistic decisions at the top, and holding senior flag officers, senior civilians, and the Secretary of the Navy accountable.”

General Dynamics Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is the U.S. Navy’s newest surface combatant class. Optimized for shallow seas and operations within 100 miles of shore, but deployable across the ocean, LCS ships are a centerpiece of the USA’s new focus on littoral warfare. They will help to counter growing “asymmetric” threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. They will also perform intelligence gathering and scouting using helicopters and UAVs, offer some ground combat support capabilities, and share tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units. Swappable “mission modules,” UAV robot aircraft, and robotic UUV and USV vehicles will give these small ships the specialized capabilities they require for each of these roles – and the quick-replace adaptability they need to keep up.

At present, 2 teams are competing for the final LCS design. The General Dynamics team is offering a futuristic but practical high-speed trimaran based on Austal designs and experience. The Lockheed Martin team offers a high-speed semi-planing monohull based on Fincantieri designs that have set trans-Atlantic speed records. Team Lockheed’s efforts have run into serious trouble, including cancellation of the contract for their second ship. The General Dynamics/Austal team hit the same rocks soon afterward, in part because of the US Navy’s unusual proposal for future business arrangements.

DID places recent developments in context by explaining a bit more about the US Navy’s new surface combatant; detailing the teams, key time line events, and contract awards under the program to date; and providing additional resources and links to complete our in-depth coverage. New material appears in green type. The latest updates involve mission module integration, a report on program status and costs from the Congresional Budget Office, and an article by Naval Technology that looks at the LCS program’s issues to date…

• LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules
• LCS: Budgets and Program Structure [updated]
• LCS: Designs & Teams
• LCS Controversies
• LCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
  Continue Reading… »

SSN-23 in MSF at Kitsap
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Aug 11/08: The Watts-Healy Tibbitts joint venture in Honolulu, HI receives an initial $42.4 million increment to build a drive-in magnetic silencing facility at Beckoning Point, Naval Station Pearl Harbor. The 2nd increment will be funded in FY 2009 at $35.9 million, and the 3rd increment will be funded in 2010 at $6.6 million to finish the $84.8 million contract. The contract also contains an unexercised option, which would increase the cumulative contract value to $86.1 million.

The reason behind these expensive facilities is simple. Any mass of iron stressed in the earth’s magnetic field becomes a magnet. Riveting and other construction activities magnetize a ship, as do some operational activities. That magnetization then changes gradually when the ship is underway, depending on its heading and location. A magnetized object can be detected, of course, and magnetic field changes can also be used as a trigger for weapons like mines and homing torpedos. Magnetic Silencing Facilities provide deperming/ degaussing, which reduces the ship’s electromagnetic signature to a point that’s much closer to the earth’s natural level. Cryptome has a partial list of American MSFs, including some photos and links.

Work will be performed in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and is expected to be complete by October 2010. This contract was competitively procured, with 41 offers solicited and 4 proposals received by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific in Pearl Harbor, HI (N62742-08-C-1311).

F100 visits Sydney
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The Royal Australian Navy took a pair of giant steps toward its future force in June 2007, when it selected winning designs for 2 new Canberra Class LHD amphibious operations vessels, and 3 new Hobart Class air warfare destroyers.

Australia’s ANZAC Class (Meko 200 derivative) and Adelaide Class (FFG-7 Adelaide Class) frigates have limited air defense capabilities. They would be hard-pressed to survive against modern anti-ship missiles, and even planned ANZAC upgrades would not make them suitable for protecting a task force. Under the SEA 4000 program, Australia plans to replace its retired air defense destroyers with a modern system that can provide significantly better protection from air attack, integrate with the US Navy and other Coalition partners, offer long-range air warfare defense for Royal Australian Navy task groups, and help provide a coordinated air picture for fighter and surveillance aircraft. Despite their name and focus, the ships are multi-role designs with a “sea control” mission that also includes advanced anti-submarine and surface warfare capabilities.

After a long campaign that supported the creation and detailed evaluation of 2 fleshed out designs, the A$ 8 billion program has a winner. To the surprise of some observers, Australia’s 3 new “air warfare destroyers” will be… ‘Australianized’ F100 AEGIS frigates. Spain’s Navantia made an A$ 11 billion clean sweep, winning both the Canberra Class LHD and the Hobart Class Air Warfare “Destroyer” contracts. The new AWD ships were scheduled to begin entering service with the Royal Australian Navy in 2013, but that date has now slipped to 2014-2015.

This DID FOCUS Article explains the details of the SEA 4000 program, offers some details re: the winning design plus the losing “Evolved DDG-51” option, and covers the contracts and key events to date. Recent events include an update on AEGIS prouction, and a winner for the ships’ sonar system…

• SEA 4000: The Design Competition
• SEA 4000: The Program
• SEA 4000: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: SEA 4000 Program Phase Organization
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
  Continue Reading… »

“Cost Pressures Force European Aerospace to Look Outside Europe” has discussed the effects of exchange rates on the European aerospace industry, while “EU Procurement Challenges & Defense Weakness Debated (updated)” offered some expert analysis of Europe’s shrunken defense budgets and the effect on industry. When set beside an American defense industry that continues to receive investment as a national priority, and a Dollar to Euro ratio that makes operations in a “dollar zone” attractive, European firms are looking across the Atlantic for complementary acquisitions. In recent months, EADS bought PlantCML, and moved to make Mobile, Alabama its assembly line for Airbus A330F freighters; meanwhile, Italy’s Finmeccanica bought DRS.

Now Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri – Cantieri Navali Italiani S.p.A. has signed a definitive acquisition agreement to acquire the Manitowoc Marine Group (MMG), from its parent, The Manitowoc Company, Inc., for about $120 Million in cash. Lockheed Martin Corporation has agreed to be a minority investor with Fincantieri in the proposed acquisition.

Fincantieri is Italy’s leading shipbuilder, building a range of ships from aircraft carriers and frigates to offshore patrol vessels. MMG is a leading mid-tier American shipbuilder, who has worked on commercial, Coast Guard, and naval programs….

Continue Reading… »

Croatia
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by Igor Tabak

Croatia’s famous Adriatic coastline is warmer than Finland’s, but its geography of long coastlines and near-shore islands in a narrow body of water lends itself to similar naval solutions and requirements. On July 17/08 Croatia purchased two Fast Attack Craft (FACs) vessels from Finland, which are well suited to near shore and coastal patrol. Croatian Minister of Defense Branko Vukelicand “Patria Aviation Oy” representatives Ilkka Jaakkola and Risto Marjomaa signed the actual contract on the purchase of 300t Helsinki Class FACs Oulu (62) and Kotka (63) in Zagreb.

This naval acquisition was not foreseen in the list of goals stated within its “Armed forces long term development plan 2006-2015”. As such, it can be seen as a opportunity seized. That is also the view brought forth by the Croatian authorities. Croatian Defense Minister Vukelic stated that Patria’s representatives recently informed the Croatian authorities of the possibility, and due consideration found the 2 vessels to be highly compatible with the FACs already in Croatian naval service.

• The Vessels
• Technology Similarities
• New Technologies for Croatia
• The Deal
• Conclusion
  
  Continue Reading… »

M-Ship Stiletto
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DID has covered the late Vice-Admiral Cebrowski’s legacy at the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation. With the formal roll-out of the 88-foot Stiletto stealth ship and its cutting-edge “M-Hull” wave-damping design, that legacy takes another step forward. The Stiletto is part of Project WolfPac, which aims to test new concepts of shallow-water and riverine warfare organized around swarms of smaller, affordable ships linked by communications. The Stiletto can slip into shallow waters, launching inflatable boats and even UAVs while serving as a communications hub via its “electronic keel.” Best of all, the M-Hull significantly reduces the pounding its occupants take from waves – poundings that often result in back injuries that cut careers short, or leave sailors with lingering disabilities in later life.

After a long, drawn-out testing period, the ship is finally being given a chance to silence doubts about its ability to stand up to open sea conditions. It has been deployed – with a crew of Army mariners to operate it…

• The Stiletto Program
• Contracts and Key Events
• Appendix A: M-Hull Technology – From Venice to Victory
• Appendix B: Additional Readings
  
  Continue Reading… »