In November 2005, “Taiwan Orders F-16 Training in USA, But Larger Defense Buys Remain in Limbo” described the gridlock that had hampered key weapons sales of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot PAC-3 missiles, and diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan – in some cases, since 1997. The opposition KMT party’s flip-flops and determined stalling tactics eventually created a crisis in US-Taiwan relations, which finally soured to the point that the USA refused a Taiwanese request for F-16C/D aircraft.

That seems to have brought things to a head. Most of the budget and political issues were eventually sorted out, and after a long delay, some major elements of Taiwan’s requested modernization program appear to be moving forward: P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot missile upgrades; and requests for AH-64D attack helicopters, E-2 AWACS planes, and missiles for defense against aircraft, ships, and tanks. These are must-have capabilities when facing a Chinese government that has vowed to take the country by force, and is building an extensive submarine fleet, a large array of ballistic missiles, an upgraded fighter fleet, and a number of amphibious-capable divisions.

Chinese pressure continues to stall some of Taiwan’s important upgrades, including diesel-electric submarines and American fighter jets. One contract that has gone through involves air-air missiles for Taiwan’s helicopters, as they work on restructuring their forces. And could there be light at the end of the F-16 tunnel, after all?...

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F100 visits Sydney
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DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. The Royal Australian Navy took a pair of giant steps in June 2007, when it selected winning designs for its keystone naval programs: Canberra Class LHD amphibious operations vessels, and Hobart Class “air warfare destroyers.” This DID’s FOCUS article offers in-depth research and coverage of the Hobart Class competition and program organization, along with the new “air warfare destroyer’s” capabilities, and associated contracts, and related developments.

Under the SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer program, Australia plans to replace its retired air defense destroyers with a modern system that can provide significantly better protection from air attack, integrate with the US Navy and other Coalition partners, offer long-range air warfare defense for Royal Australian Navy task groups, and help provide a coordinated air picture for fighter and surveillance aircraft. Despite their name and focus, the ships are multi-role designs with a “sea control” mission that also includes advanced anti-submarine and surface warfare capabilities.

Spain’s Navantia made an A$ 11 billion clean sweep, winning both the A$ 3 billion Canberra Class LHD and the A$ 8 billion Hobart Class Air Warfare “Destroyer” contracts. The new AWD ships were scheduled to begin entering service with the Royal Australian Navy in 2013, but that date has now slipped to 2014-2015. Recent events include Australia’s Defence White Paper, decisions about the ship’s missiles, turbine orders, and system tests and support for the F100 derivative’s AEGIS radar and combat systems…

• SEA 4000: The Design Competition
• SEA 4000: The Program
• SEA 4000: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: SEA 4000 Program Phase Organization
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
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LPD-17 cutaway
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LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are a new class of ship which is just entering service with the US Navy. Much like their predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. What changes are the capabilities and technologies incorporated to perform that mission. This new ship class includes significant internal technology and design upgrades, and is designed to operate accompanying platforms like the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle amphibious armored personnel carrier.

Between 10-11 scheduled ships of this class are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships, including the USA’s older LSD-36 USS Anchorage class dock landing ships (all decommissioned as of 2004, LSD-36 and LSD-38 transferred to Taiwan) and its LPD-4 USS Austin Class ships (12 built and serving, LPD 14 Trenton now India’s INS Jalashva). The San Antonio class ships may also replace 2 classes of ships currently mothballed and held in reserve status under the Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP): the LST-1179 Newport class tank landing ships, and LKA-113 Charleston class amphibious cargo ships.

Welcome to Norfolk…
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Replacing that many existing ships is already a very tall order. While its design incorporates notable advances, the San Antonio Class has also had its share of teething problems. So, too, has the New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract has been assigned. The number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The initial ships have been criticized for sub-standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered and accepted before any ship of class was sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain due to oil leaks. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts at over $1.7 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPD classes, and more than 10 times as much as Singapore’s 6,600 ton Endeavour Class LPD.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This is DID’s FOCUS Article for the San Antonio Class, detailing the ships’ unique features and capabilities, its program innovations and issues, ship timelines, and related contracts throughout the program’s history. As has become DID custom, the most recent additions are highlighted in green type. The latest developments include updated budgetary figures and dates, and a $200+ million contract that begins work on LPD 26 in earnest…

• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Capabilities and Features
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Process & Issues
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Program, Budgets & Timelines [updated]
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Contracts and Events (1996-Present) [updated]
• Appendix A: Additional Readings & Sources – LPD-17 Ship Class
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources – News and Views
  
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IOTV: key features
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When reading about modern body armor one often hears about small arms protective inserts (SAPI) or Enhanced SAPI (ESAPI) ceramic plate inserts. While these inserts are more fragile than past generations of inserts, they offer a significant improvement over its 1990s predecessors in terms of both weight and protection. After episodic issues with production ramp-up and quality control, this gear is widely fielded with the US Army and several allied militaries. The US Marines replaced it with the MTV. The Army itself has introduced the Improved OTV. Privately developed body armors like Blackwater Gear is also in theater. Yet all of these designs rely on a “vest and plates” approach that uses a similar set of inserts to give the vests most of their bullet-stopping power.

This DID spotlight article covers the USA’s purchases in this area. The latest news involves another contract to Armorworks, in the wake of testing controversies surrounding some of its plates…

• ESAPI, Explained
• Contracts & Key Events, 2004 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Adm. Stavridis
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The Florida Times-Union offers an interview with Adm. James G. Stavridis, currently Commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM, covers Latin America) and soon to take charge of United States European Command as (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

The full transcript discusses the role of the U.S. Navy now and in the future, Afghanistan and Colombia, what lies ahead for NATO, and the current state of US Navy thinking. Those comments are worthwhile reading in and of themselves, but the article adds even more value by including links to the works Stavridis cites as examples of good and thought-provoking work. That includes an April 2009 Proceedings article by serving US Navy Cmdr. Jerry Hendrix called “Buy Ford, Not Ferrari”, which argued for a restructured US Navy that places far less emphasis on nuclear carrier strike groups, and redeploys the ones it retains.

The Hendrix article is part of a larger debate about the future Navy’s force structure, and DID has carried a range of voices, from CSIS criticism to current shipbuilding plans, to the late Adm. Cebrowski’s 2005 Alternative Fleet Architecure study [PDF] to the Heritage Foundation’s recent exposition of their QDR recommendations in “USA: A 21st Century Maritime Posture for an Uncertain Future.”

RSAF Eurofighter
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Back in 2005, DID reported that talks were underway for a Saudi purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 2 advanced air superiority and strike aircraft from Britain’s BAE Systems – with an important (albeit denied) set of conditions on the Saudi side.

December 2005 saw confirmation that Saudi Arabia had ordered Eurofighter Typhoons, but the 72-plane deal started sinking into the tar sands shortly thereafter. Investigations from Britain’s Serious Fraud Office swirled around a GBP 43 billion oil-for-planes deal from the 1980s called Al-Yamamah (see Appendix A); in return, the Saudis played some hardball of their own. The investigation was eventually called off at the highest levels of government, and later confirmed by the House of Lords. After a period of uncertainty, a contract was finally signed on Sept 11/07. Ironies aside, the price was a bit lower than many expected; even so, it comes with support arrangements that are likely to push the final value quite a bit higher.

This DID Spotlight article covers the Saudi Eurofighter deal, its associated controversies, and related developments. The latest development is delivery of the first 2 aircraft…

• Typhoons Incoming: Updates and Contracts (i.e. “Continue reading…”) [updated]
• The Long Road to the Deal
• Analysis: Effects on the Eurofighter’s Export Prospects
• Appendix A: From Al-Yamamah to Project Salaam
• Appendix B: Saudi Arabia: Dependence & Deployment Options (December 2006)
  
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RAAF C-130J-30, flares
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The C-130 Hercules remains one of the longest-running aerospace manufacturing programs of all time. Since 1956, over 40 models and variants have served as the tactical airlift backbone for over 50 nations. The C-130J looks similar, but the number of changes almost make it a new aircraft. Those changes also created issues; the program has been the focus of a great deal of controversy in America – and even of a full program restructuring in 2006. Some early concerns from critics were put to rest when the C-130J demonstrated in-theater performance on the front lines that represented a major improvement over its C-130E/H predecessors. A valid follow-on question might be: does it break the bottleneck limitations that have hobbled a number of multi-billion dollar US Army vehicle development programs?

C-130J customers now include Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, India, Iraq, Italy, Norway, Oman, Qatar, and the United States. American C-130J purchases are taking place under both annual budgets and supplemental wartime funding, in order to replace tactical transport and special forces fleets that are flying old aircraft and in dire need of major repairs.

This DID FOCUS Article describes the C-130J, examines the bottleneck issue, covers global developments for the C-130J program, and looks at present and emerging competitors. The latest updates include a minor training system purchase, and inquiries from Britain and… France?!?

• The (Private) Labors of Hercules: the C-130J
• The C-130J and the 20-ton Bottleneck
• Turbulent Flight: The C-130J Program
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources, incl. emerging competitors & Special Operations requirements
  
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In March 2008, the Bell Boeing Joint Project Office in Amarillo, TX received a $10.4 billion modification that converted the previous advance acquisition contract (N00019-07-C-0001) to a fixed-price-incentive-fee, multi-year contract. The new contract now sits at $10.8 billion, and will be used to buy 141 MV-22 (for USMC) and 31 CV-22 (Air Force Special Operations) Osprey aircraft, plus associated manufacturing tooling to move the aircraft into full production.

The V-22 tilt-rotor program has been beset by controversy throughout its 20-year development period. DID’s “V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame?” offers a focused look at a number of specific allegations associated with the program, with material from Pentagon test reports, critical reviews, ongoing news reports, and the US military’s responses. Despite these issues, and the emergence of competitive but more conventional compound helicopter technologies like Piasecki’s X-49 Speedhawk and Sikorsky’s X2, the V-22 program continues to move forward. This DID Spotlight article looks at the V-22’s new multi-year purchase contract, associated contracts for key V-22 systems, and program developments that arise after the contract conversion.

The latest developments involve upgrades for existing CV-22s, a high-tech training system, and efforts to improve component reliability…

• Contracts & Key Events (June 2008 – Present) [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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Raytheon: C4ISR Future?
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As video communications is integrated into robots, soldiers, and UAVs, and network-centric warfare becomes the organizing principle of American warfighting, front-line demands for bandwidth are rising faster than the US military can add it. The Transformation Communications Satellite (TSAT) System is part of a larger effort by the US military to address that need, and close the gap.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record – and TSAT is certainly significant. The final price tag on the entire program has been quoted at anywhere from $14-25 billion through 2016, including the satellites, the ground operations system, the satellite operations center and the cost of operations and maintenance. Lockheed Martin and Boeing each won over $600 million in risk reduction contracts to develop key TSAT SS satellite system technologies, and TSAT’s $2 billion TMOS ground-based network operations contract was already underway.

The TSAT constellation’s central role in next-generation US military infrastructure makes it worthy of in-depth treatment – but its survival was never assured. There was always a risk that outside events and incremental competitors could spell its end, just as they spelled the end of Motorola’s infamous Iridium project. This FOCUS article examines that possibility, even as it offers an overview of the US military’s vision for its communications infrastructure, how TSAT fits, the program’s challenges, and complete coverage of contracts and significant events. New additions are highlighted in green for your convenience.

The latest developments revolve around the end of the program. Despite a positive recent report from the GAO, key components of TMOS/TSAT are being canceled outright as part of the program’s planned termination…

• Key Background – Why TSAT Is Thought to be Necessary (i.e. continue reading…)
• Key Background – The Big Picture: TSAT and the Transformational Communications Architecture
• Briefing – What Is TSAT?
• Briefing – TMOS: TSAT’s Ground Component
• Briefing – TSAT: Issues & Decisions
• Briefing – The AEHF Alternative, and Lessons Learned for TSAT
• Briefing – TSAT: Program
• Analysis – TSAT’s Competitors – and Its Fate
• News – TSAT: Timeline and Ongoing Developments [updated]
• Appendix A – Additional Readings & Sources
  
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B-52H: to 2030?
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The current US Air Force fleet, whose planes are more than 23 years old on average, is the oldest in USAF history. It won’t keep that title for very long. Many transport aircraft and aerial refueling tankers are more than 40 years old – and under current plans, some may be as many as 70-80 years old before they retire. Since the price for next-generation planes has risen faster than inflation, average aircraft age will climb even if the US military gets every plane it asks for in its future plans. Nor is the USA the only country facing this problem.

As this dynamic plays out and average age continues to rise, addressing the issues related to aging aircraft becomes more and more important in order to maintain acceptable force numbers, readiness levels, and aircraft maintainability; avoid squeezing out recapitalization budgets; handle personnel turnover that becomes more and more damaging; and keep maintenance costs in line, despite new technical problems that will present unforeseen difficulties. Like F-15 fighters that are under flight restrictions due to structural fatigue concerns – or grounded entirely.

The biggest contracts aren’t always the ones deserving of the most attention. Enter the USA’s Joint Council on Aging Aircraft (JCAA), and initiatives like the Navy’s ASLS. Enter, too, DID’s Spotlight article. It seeks to place the situation and its effects in perspective, via background, contracts, and a research trove of articles that tap the expertise and observations of outside parties and senior sources within the US military…

• The JCAA
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Aging Aircraft: Some Additional Readings [updated]
  
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