Tejas LCA

India’s Light Combat Aircraft program is meant to boost its aviation industry, but it must also solve a pressing military problem. The IAF’s fighter strength has been declining as the MiG-21s that form the largest component of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. India’s other Cold War vintage aircraft will face similar problems in the near future.

In response, some MiG-21s have been modernized to MiG-21 ‘Bison’ configuration, and other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs of their own. The IAF’s fading hope is that India can maintain their fighter numbers until the multi-billion dollar 126+ plane MMRCA sale delivers replacements. Which still leaves India without an affordable overall solution. MMRCA can replace some of India’s mid-range fighters, but what about the MiG-21s? The MiG-21bis program adds years of life to those airframes, but that extended lifespan is still quite finite. By 2020, they’re likely to be gone.

That’s why India’s own Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project is so important to the Indian Air Force’s future prospects, and why India’s rigid domestic-only policies are gradually being relaxed, in order to field an operational and competitive aircraft. Even with that help, however, the program’s delays are a growing problem for India. Beyond India, the west’s near-abandonment of the global lightweight fighter market means that choices made in the LCA’s design will also affect its export potential. Which, in turn, feeds back into the overall program’s lifetime costs and viability…

• LCA Tejas: India’s Lightweight Fighter [updated]
  • Radar Love: Weapons & Fire Control
  • Engines & Alternatives
  • In the Navy… Naval LCA
• LCA Tejas: Program, Prospects, and Future [updated]
  • Industrial Team
  • Future Prospects
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (2006)
• Appendix B: The Kaveri Engine: Keystone, or Killer?
• Appendix C: Additional Readings & Sources
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A-RCI is a sonar system upgrade installed on the USA’s entire submarine fleet, including SSN-688 Los Angeles & SSN-688I Improved Los Angeles Class, SSN-21 Seawolf Class, SSN-744 Virginia Class, SSBN-726 Ohio Class nuclear missile boats, and the new SSGN Tactical Trident special ops and strike subs.

This DID Spotlight on ARCI adds a bit more explanation of exactly what the program entails and where its benefits were focused, as well as covers contracts placed under the A-RCI program from FY 2005 onward. The program’s concept is simple: you can upgrade the system without changing the sensors. By sharply upgrading ship sensor processing, it integrates and improves the boat’s towed array, hull array and sphere array sonars, running more advanced algorithms and providing a fuller “picture” of the surrounding environment. Sometimes, it really is all about what you can do with it. A-RCI’s open architecture concept also make it easier to integrate additional sensors, providing a dual-track improvement option for American submarines.

• A-RCI: Specifics & Benefits [updated]
  • The Open Architecture Advantage
• A-RCI: FY 2005-2012 Contracts [updated]
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Swiss F-5Es

The F-5E/F Tiger II was a follow-on upgrade to the wildly successful F-5 Freedom Fighter, a low-budget aircraft designed to capture the lower tier of the non-Soviet global fighter market in the 1960s and 1970s. A number of countries still operate F-5s, but the airframes are very old. While F-5 owners like Brazil, Chile, Thailand, et. al. have opted for comprehensive refurbishment and upgrades, Switzerland is looking to replace 3 of its 5 Tiger II squadrons with new aircraft under its Tiger-Teilersatz TTE program. The new fighters will partner with the 3 squadrons of upgraded F/A-18C/D Hornets that make up the rest of its fighter fleet.

An initial evaluation RFP was issued to 4 contenders, but Boeing’s withdrawal narrowed the selection to Sweden’s Gripen, France’s Rafale, or EADS’ Eurofighter Typhoon. A 2010 suspension of the competition was followed by a measured revival, thanks to the latest budgets – and now, by a provisional winner. No matter who won, though, left-wing opponents of Switzerland’s military would be working hard to derail the purchase. It’s likely to face a national referendum, just like the 1993 F/A-18 Hornet sale. After the current controversy over fighter evaluations runs its course…

• The Swiss Competition: Rationale and Process
• The Competitors
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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Afghan drop

Low-velocity parachutes are so named because they’re used for cargo airdrops made below about 1,200 feet, with the cargo aircraft flying at low speed as parachute-rigged containers roll out the rear ramp. US Army Soldier Systems Natick developed them in 2006, aiming to offer a lower-cost low altitude system that did not require specialized parachute manufacturers. US Army PM FSS engineer Bruce Bonaceto’s designs hit those targets, and low velocity parachutes have been doing the same on the front lines. They’re generally used to deliver basic supplies such as gas, ammunition and food to troops in rough terrain and isolated locations, without having to use a more expensive high-altitude GPS-guided parachute system like JPADS, or a more expensive standard parachute like the G-12.

As one might imagine, demand is high in Afghanistan, and some of the small business contract recipients are an interesting set of stories in and of themselves…

Hydras & Hellfires

The versatile Hydra 70mm rocket family is primed for a new lease on life, thanks to widespread programs aimed at converting these ubiquitous rockets into cheap laser-guided precision weapons. Conversion benefits include cost, use on both helicopters and fighters, more precision weapons per platform, low collateral damage, and the activation of large weapon stockpiles that couldn’t be used under strict rules of engagement.

Firms all over the world have grasped this opportunity, which explains why strong competition has emerged from all points of the compass. America’s “Advanced Precision-Kill Weapon System (APKWS)” is one of those efforts, but the road from obvious premise to working weapon has been slow. After numerous delays and false starts since its inception in 1996, an “APKWS-II” program finally entered System Design and Development (SDD) in 2006. In 2010, it entered low-rate production, and it was fielded to the front lines in 2012. That date will still put APKWS on the cutting edge of battlefield technology, as a leading player in a larger trend…

• The USA’s APKWS Programs
  • APKWS: Concept and Weapon
  • Why APKWS? Combat Advantages
• Contracts and Key Developments [updated]
• Additional Readings
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F-35: takeoff…?

Back in 2006 Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Lightning II team were facing difficulties and controversies in Norway. Since then, there have been some successes. The next milestone MoU was signed on Jan 31/06, amidst industrial and missile deals designed to bring Norway on board – but even that signing came with express statements that the country was keeping its options open. Norway had threatened to back out of its Tier 3 partnership in the JSF program, but a Kongsberg JSM/NSM missile deal, and a subsequent conditional composite structures deal laid the ground work, and the JSF production MoU was signed on December 31/07. On June 17/11, Parliamentary opposition caved and endorsed an initial buy of 4 F-35As.

The potential for controversy isn’t over, and will not be over until fighter orders are signed. Nevertheless, Norway has made a decision. One whose aftermath continues to reverberate within the country, the region, and beyond.

• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources: Background
  • Norwegian Defense Experts Weigh In
  • Other News & Developments
• Appendix A: The Play of Politics
• Appendix B: The Defense Debate: Strike-Fighter or Interceptor?
• Appendix C: 2006 Analysis – Could JSF Really Lose in Norway?
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NH90: TTH & NFH

The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AgustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow.

The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points. Its combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Certification and acceptance have also been slow, with very few NH90s in service over a decade after the first contracts were signed. Orders currently stand at 524 machines, on behalf of 14 nations…

• The NH90 Platform(s)
• The NH90 Production Program [updated]
• Contracts & Key Events, 1995-present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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SBIRS-High

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High satellite program is a key component of the USA’s future missile alert system, designed to give maximum warning and monitoring of ballistic missile launches anywhere in the world. The new satellites will replace the existing Defense Support Program (DSP) fleet. Their infrared sensors have 3x the sensitivity of DSP and 2x the revisit rate, while providing better persistent coverage.

Unfortunately, the program has been beset by massive cost overruns on the order of 400%, technical challenges that continue to present problems, and uncertainties about performance. Despite these problems, the U.S. Air Force is proceeding with the program, and has terminated potential alternatives and supplements.

• SBIRS – High: Current State [updated]
• Contracts and Key Events, 2009 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
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1991: HMCS Protecteur &
USS Wisconsin [BB-64]
(click to view larger)

The Canadian supply ships and oilers HMCS Protecteur, and HMCS Preserver have contributed to humanitarian aid missions in Florida and the Bahamas, peace-making off Somalia and East Timor, and have been poised for the evacuation of non-combatants from Haiti, to name but a few of their recent endeavors.

As part of its spate of military modernization announcements issued just before Canada Day (July 1) 2006, the Canadian government issued an RFP that began the process of defining and building 3 “Joint Support Ships.” The aim was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current Protecteur Class oiler and resupply ships. In addition to being able to provide at-sea support (re-fueling and re-supply) to deployed naval task groups, the new JSS ships were envisioned as ships that would also be capable of sealift operations, as well as amphibious support to forces deployed ashore.

JSS v1.0
(click to view larger)

This was expected to be a C$ 2.9 billion (USD $2.58 billion) project. This article describes the process, the 4 pre-qualified industry teams participating, and some of the issues swirling around Canada’s very ambitious specifications. Specifications that ultimately sank the whole project, in a manner that was predictable from the outset. Leaving Canada’s navy with a serious problem. Will a second go-round in 2012-13 help any?

• Take 2: Lessons, Process, and Contenders [updated]
• JSS: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
• Appendix A: The JSS v1.0 Procurement Process
• Appendix B: DID Op-ed/Analysis – June 30, 2006
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Austal Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts:

• LCS: Concept & Needs
  • LCS: Designs & Teams
  • LCS Solution = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules [updated]
• LCS: Controversies & Cautions
• The LCS Program
  • LCS Ship Roster
  • LCS: Export Potential?
• LCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
• Appendix A: LCS’ Yo-Yoing Budgets and Program Structure [updated]
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