CGC Sanibel

In September 2005 the U.S. Coast Guard and the Lockheed Martin/ Northrop Grumman joint venture Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) completed the preliminary design review for a program to buy 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRC). “The FRC is being designed to provide the Coast Guard with a state-of-the-art patrol craft that is capable of conducting simultaneous missions,” said ICGS Deepwater’s FRC program manager Mike Duthu.

That success was surrounded, and eventually overwhelmed, by delays and failures on multiple fronts. More than 2 years after the Coast Guard asked ICGS to accelerate the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program timeline by more than 10 years, in order to hasten replacement of their deteriorating Island Class patrol vessels, the Coast Guard was still waiting for replacements of any type to arrive. Hull cracking in the first 8 refurbished Island Class ships had made that stopgap unfit for service. Even as delays and technical problems tossed the FRC program about.

When the Island Class refurbishment program was terminated in June 2005, 41 Island Class vessels still plied US and international waters. Their time is running out, but their initial replacement program fared little better. In February 2006, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater system-of-systems Program ‘temporarily’ suspended design work on the FRC-A program due to technical risk. FRC-A was eventually canceled in favor of an off-the-shelf buy, and on March 14/07, ICGS lost responsibility for the Deepwater Fast Response Cutter-B off-the-shelf acquisition as well. What happened next? DID discusses the programs, their outcomes and controversies, the fate of the Island Class and FRC programs, and the work underway to replace them:

• Behind the Programs: The Modernization Imperative
• FRC Plan B: The Sentinel Class
• Program Updates & Contracts 2[updated]
• Appendix A: Down on the Islands – The Suspended Modernization
• Appendix B: FRC-A’s Not-So Fast Response: The Catch With Composite Cutters
  • March 2007: What Next?
• Appendix C: Additional Readings – Background
• Appendix D: Additional Readings – News, Official Reports & Statements
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ASDS

Northrop Grumman’s ASDS “Advanced SEAL Delivery System” aimed to build mini-subs as successors to the current SDV (SEAL/Swimmer Delivery Vehicle). It began with great promise. The SDVs, carried on US modified Benjamin Franklin Class [SSBN-640] special warfare submarines, as well as new Ohio Class SSGNs, were old – and cold. ASDS would offer a modern, dry alternative, with advanced sensors besides.

In the end, however, technical and reliability issues proved insuperable. The program spiraled out of control, with cost overruns of 400+%. In its place, a less ambitious SWCS replacement program is beginning to take shape, even as the private sector begins to step in with options of its own. This DID FOCUS article chronicles the ASDS program’s history, its designated successors, and emerging privately-funded alternatives:

• What’s Next? The SWCS/JMMS
• To Davy Jones’ Locker & Back: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: DID Op/Ed, December 2005
• Appendix B: The ASDS Program & Mission
• Appendix C: ASDS Taking on Water
• Appendix D: Additional Readings and Sources
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E-737 Wedgetail
over New South Wales

The island continent of Australia faces a number of unique security challenges that stem from its geography. The continent may be separated from its neighbors by large expanses of ocean, but it also resides within a potential arc of instability, and has a number of important offshore resource sites to protect. Full awareness of what is going on around them, and the ability to push that awareness well offshore, are critical security requirements.

“Project Wedgetail” had 3 finalists, and the winner was a new variant of Boeing’s 737-700, fitted with an MESA (multirole electronically scanned array) radar from Northrop Grumman. That radar exchanges the traditional AWACS rotating dome for the E-737’s stationary antenna and its “top hat” look. That design, and the project as a whole, have run into severe turbulence, creating problems for Boeing earnings, the ADF, and other export orders for the type. DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This one covers contracts, events, and key milestones within Australia’s E-737 program, from inception to the current day.

• Project Wedgetail: Program and Participants
• Contracts & Key Events, 1997 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
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PA2 Concept, June 2006

In the absence of an order, design changes continue. (Nov 1/10)

Throughout most of the Cold War period, France maintained two aircraft carriers. That changed when the FNS Foch, the last Clemenceau Class carrier, was retired in November 2000 (it will now serve the Brazilian Navy as the Sao Paolo). As Strategis notes, France has lacked the capacity to ensure long-distance air coverage during the FNS Charles de Gaulle’s maintenance cycles or during other periods when the carrier is not available for active duty (approximately 35% of the time). In 2015, the ship will be taken out of service for an extensive maintenance overhaul. Despite a slippage in initial construction dates from 2005 to 2007-2008, the French still hope to take delivery by 2014 so the new ship can be operational by the time their sole operational aircraft carrier goes off line for repairs.

That was the original idea, anyway. Recent developments once again cast doubt on the PA2’s future. A future likely to be decided by French President Sarkozy himself – but not until 2011…

• PA2: The Design & Acquisition Program
• PA2: Developments and Updates [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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All they’re ready for?

On Sept 12/06, The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Australia’s A$ 400 million ALR2002 project, aimed at putting radar and infrared missile warning systems (RWRs) in Australia’s helicopters, transports and F/A-18s, had ended in at least partial failure with the scrapping of F/A-18 integration under the HUG 2.3 upgrade program. Sticking with the offering from
BAE Systems Australia’s electronic warfare division, they said, would deliver the project at least 2 years late and A$ 200 million over budget.

In response, a decision was formally announced on Nov 13/06. RAAF F/A-18A/B fighters would not use “Project Echidna’s” system, but its helicopters and C-130s would. More than 4 years after the original Phase 2A award, the scope of fielding for “Project Echidna” is about to be reduced again…

Back in February 2006, “The Pentagon’s Broken Book-keeping” discussed the depth of the problems inherent in trying to audit that organization. It’s not that the US Department of Defense fails audits. The problem is more fundamental: it is not currently possible to audit it, and any comprehensive audit would be a first-ever event in modern times.

This topic can seem trivial, but the Pentagon’s accounting problems are not limited to issues of day to day functioning. They also go right to the heart of the American political system’s ability to properly evaluate and learn from procurement decisions over the long term.

On June 18/09, U.S. Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Dr. Tom Coburn (R-OK), and Chuck Grassley (R-IA) introduced bill S.1287, the Department of Defense Financial Accountability Act of 2009, which sets a progressive deadlines for the Department of Defense to undergo a complete audit of its financial statements. DID offers more information about the bill, and excerpts from a special supplement to the Pentagon’s FY 2010 budget documents…

T-90, backside ollie

India’s main battle tanks had one been relatively advanced by world standards, but long delays in fielding the indigenous “Arjun” MBT, combined with a successful Pakistani/Ukrainian program for its T-80UD “Al-Khalid” tanks, eroded India’s local advantage. The poor performance of T-72s in combat against modern main battle tanks could not have been comforting, either. In early October 2006, India Defence and Indian papers reported that the Indian Army intended to produce nearly 1,000 T90S ‘Bhishma’ main battle tanks in India by 2020. These would be bought in addition to the 310 T90 MBTs already under contract from Russia. Later that month, news reports noted a follow-on contract for another 330 T-90S tank kits from Russia that would assembled in India. Taken together those 2 firm production agreements reportedly exceed $1 billion.

The modernized T-72 now known as the T-90 has reportedly encountered serious problems in Indian service, from issues with its Thales thermal imaging systems, to difficulties in hot weather, to low readiness rates. Meanwhile, negotiations with Russia over technology transfer issues had shelved the 1,000 tank indigenous production goal, leaving only the 2 firm production agreements. The Arjun project has continued to fade, however, with the Indian Army announcing in July 2008 that production would be capped at just 124 tanks. As the final act in the battle for the core of India’s future tank force, recent reports indicate that the Russians have removed their technology transfer roadblocks, clearing the way for fully indigenous T-90S production in India…

• The T-90 in India: Directions and Delays
• Updates and Key Events
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SH-2G: rocky shoals

In 1997, Australia signed an $A 667 million contract with Kaman to purchase 11 upgraded SH-2G (A) “Super Seasprites,” with modernized avionics. This compact helicopter design was thought to be well suited to operation from the RAN’s ANZAC Class frigates, and even from patrol boats with helicopter decks. The first helicopter was unveiled in 2003, but by 2005 up to 40 deficiencies had been identified including inability to operate in bad weather and low-light conditions, and inability to meet Australian airworthiness certification standards. Placing modern avionics into a 1960s airframe proved challenging indeed; the helicopters were restricted to “passenger and supply transport in good weather” in 2005, then grounded in May 2006.

The project is now 6 years behind schedule, costs have risen over 50% to $A 1.1 billion (currently about $900 million) for 11 helicopters, and the program is being used as a case study in the Australian Defence College’s leadership and ethics course. It’s estimated that at least $A 45 million more and 29 months of work would be required to make them serviceable, with full operational status unlikely until at least 2010. Other SH-2 operators include New Zealand (from its ANZAC frigates), Egypt, and Poland.

In 2007, Australia’s Liberal Party government elected to continue the Super Seasprite program – but their successor Labor government has reversed that decision, and come to an interesting agreement with Kaman…

• The May 2007 Continuation
• Super Seasprite: Issues and Dilemmas
• Program Updates [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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Bushmaster, ADF

It has been one of the most puzzling features of the MRAP competition to date. Thales Australia’s Bushmaster vehicle was one of the first mine-resistant vehicles on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it has served successfully with Australian and Dutch forces. Yet it reaped none of the “low risk deployment” orders issued at the competition’s inception, and has received none since. Now Thales Australia makes it official: with over 80% of allotted vehicles ordered, the Bushmaster Category II JERRV vehicle is out of the race for MRAP-I competition orders.

The announcement means that both of Oshkosh’s partnered entries have washed out, coming as it does on the heels of reports that their PVI, Inc. partnership’s Alpha Category I MRUV vehicle had failed MRAP testing. The Aug 8/07 Thales Australia release [PDF format] says:

In “Voted Off the Island: The USCG’s Deepwater FRC Program,” DID wrote:

“The Coast Guard’s March 14, 2007 statement RE: FRC-B’s removal from Integrated Coast Guard Systems’ purview was careful to note that ”...this decision pertains only to the acquisition of patrol boats and does not impact ongoing negotiations with ICGS for other work to be done in the second performance period of the Deepwater contract, beginning June 2007.” Nevertheless, the Blueprint for Acquisition Reform that Adm. Allen discussed with Congress on February 8, 2007 definitely lays the groundwork for further shifts if performance does not improve….The one essential truth behind all of these maneuvers is the US Coast Guard’s serious and growing need to replace worn equipment. All else is ultimately variable; the Coast Guard must and will do whatever it takes to secure the confidence and funding it needs, in order to address that underlying truth.”

That assessment appears to be borne out by the April 17, 2007 announcement that the US Coast Guard is taking over the lead integrator role for the entire Deepwater suite of acquisitions. Admiral Thad Allen: