FSTA Concept

Back in 2005, Great Britain was considering a public-private partnership to buy, equip, and operate the RAF’s future aerial tanker fleet. The RAF would fly the 14 Airbus A330-MRTT aircraft on operational missions, and receive absolute preferential access to the planes. A private contractor would handle maintenance, receive payment from the RAF on a per-use basis – and operate them as passenger charter or transport aircraft when the RAF didn’t need them.

The deal became politically controversial, and negotiations on the 27-year, multi-billion pound deal charted new territory for both the government, and for private industry. Which may help to explain why a contract to move ahead on a “Private Financing Initiative” basis had yet to be issued, and procurement had yet to begin, over 7 years after the program began. In March 2008, however, Britain issued the world’s largest-ever Defence Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract. This FOCUS Article describes the current British fleet, the aircraft they chose to replace them, how the new fleet will compare, the innovative deal structure they’ve chosen, and ongoing FSTA developments:

• RAF Tankers: The Current Fleet
• A330-200 MRTT: The RAF’s Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft
• UK FSTA: Program & Industrial Team [updated]
  • PFI: The Art of the Deal
• UK FSTA: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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RSAF Eurofighter

In 2005 talks were underway for a Saudi purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 2 advanced air superiority and strike aircraft from Britain’s BAE Systems – with an important (albeit denied) set of conditions on the Saudi side.

December 2005 saw confirmation that Saudi Arabia had ordered Eurofighter Typhoons, but the 72-plane deal started sinking into the tar sands shortly thereafter. Investigations from Britain’s Serious Fraud Office swirled around a GBP 43 billion oil-for-planes deal from the 1980s called Al-Yamamah (see Appendix A); in return, the Saudis played some hardball of their own. The investigation was eventually called off at the highest levels of government, and later confirmed by the House of Lords. After a period of uncertainty, a contract was finally signed on Sept 11/07. Ironies aside, the price was a bit lower than many expected; even so, it comes with support arrangements that are likely to push the final value quite a bit higher.

This DID Spotlight article covers the Saudi Eurofighter deal, its associated controversies, and related developments.

• Typhoons Incoming: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
  • The Long Road to the Deal
  • Analysis: Effects on the Eurofighter’s Export Prospects
• Appendix A: From Al-Yamamah to Project Salaam
• Appendix B: Saudi Arabia: Dependence & Deployment Options (December 2006)
• Additional Readings [NEW]
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NH90: TTH & NFH

The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AgustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow.

The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points. Its combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Certification and acceptance have also been slow, with very few NH90s in service over a decade after the first contracts were signed. Orders currently stand at 524 machines, on behalf of 14 nations…

• The NH90 Platform(s)
• The NH90 Production Program [updated]
• Contracts & Key Events, 1995-present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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Norwegian C-130H by
Torbjorn Kjosvold

Back in February 2007, the Norwegian Forsvarsnett said:

“The Armed Forces have six C-130H Hercules transport aircrafts today [DID: 335 skv, out of Oslo-Gardermoen]. These were bought in 1969 and are outdated. Recent updates have made them able to be operational until 2012-15, but it is now known that the planes need further work done to them still. Therefore the Norwegian government has started investigating the possibility of either renting or buying up to four new planes of the type Hercules C-130J.”

Faced with the prospect of further C-130H refurbishment work on one hand, and entreaties by the A400M consortium on the other, Norway needed to decide what to do. They did, and the decision promptly came under political attack – but a deal was done for 4 stretched C-130J-30s, and the final aircraft flew off to Norway in July 2010:

• The Platform: C-130J-30
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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Austal Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts:

• LCS: Concept & Needs
  • LCS: Designs & Teams
  • LCS Solution = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules [updated]
• LCS: Controversies & Cautions
• The LCS Program
  • LCS Ship Roster
  • LCS: Export Potential?
• LCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
• Appendix A: LCS’ Yo-Yoing Budgets and Program Structure [updated]
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Bradley puts on wear

The US Army’s Heavy Brigade Combat Teams have relied on BAE’s 30+ ton Bradley family of M2/3/6/7 vehicles for a variety of combat functions, from armed infantry carrier and cavalry scout roles, to specialized tasks like calling artillery fire and even short-range air defense. The Bradley first entered US Army service in 1981, however, and the fleet has served through several wars. Even ongoing RESET, modernizations, and remanufacturing cannot keep them going indefinitely.

The Army’s problem is that replacing them has been a ton of trouble. Future Combat Systems’ MGV-IFV was terminated, along with the other MGV variants, by the 2010 budget. A proposal to replace it with a “Ground Combat Vehicle” (GCV) program raised concerns that the Army’s wish list would create an even less affordable solution. Now a revised GCV program is underway. Can it deliver a vehicle that will be effective on the battlefield? Just as important, can it deliver a vehicle that the US Army can afford to buy and maintain, in the midst of major national budgetary problems and swelling entitlement programs?

• GCV: Concept & Requirements
• GCV: Issues & Controversies
• GCV: Program
• GCV: Competing Teams
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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Israeli C-130

In July 2008, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced Israel’s request to buy up to 9 stretched C-130J-30 aircraft, which will replace some of the aging C-130 aircraft that Israel made famous in its 1976 commando raid at Entebbe, Uganda.

It took some time, but Israel finally became the 13th C-130J customer nation in April 2010. Appropriately, Israel’s new Super Hercules planes will contain a number of features associated with the new special forces variants bought by India and the USA. The program of up to 9 planes looks like it will take a while to finish, though…

• Truth, Lies, Afghanistan – and what this has to do with the Army’s Future Combat Systems.

• Pakistan received its 18th and final new F-16C/D Block 52 fighter, and its 1st 2 upgraded F-16 fighters, under a multi-billion set of deals with the USA and Turkey.

• India’s potential AH-64D Block III attack helicopter buy may have an additional bonus: the use of FIM-92H Stinger ATAS anti-aircraft missiles on other Indian helicopters as well.
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Do you feel lucky…?

The T-45 Training System includes T-45 Goshawk aircraft, advanced flight simulators, computer-assisted instructional programs, a computerized training integration system, and a contractor logistics support package. The integration of all 5 elements is designed to produce a superior pilot in less time and at lower cost than previous training systems.

The US Navy uses the Hawk-based T-45TS system to train its pilots for the transition from T-6A Texan II/ JPATS aircraft to modern jet fighters – and carrier landings. This is not a risk-free assignment, by any means. Nevertheless, it is a critical link in the naval aviation chain. This DID FOCUS article covers the T-45TS, and associated contracts to buy and maintain these systems:

• T-45: History & Background
• T45TS Contracts and Key Events, 2006-Present [updated]
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Gentlemen, start your….

War’s over: GE/RR discontinue development. (Dec 5/11)

Back in January 2006 the Pentagon attempted to remove FY 2007 funding from the F-35 Lightning II’s second engine option, the GE/ Rolls Royce F136. As predicted, protests from fellow Tier 1 partner Britain followed at the highest levels of government. Many in the US Congress, meanwhile, were openly skeptical of handing Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engine the keys to the entire F-35 fleet. In the end, the Pentagon’s argument that low program risk made R&D spending on F136 development a waste, failed. Congress re-inserted funding, and F136 development has continued on schedule.

Fast forward to the FY 2008 budget. For the second year in a row, the USAF removed funding for the GE/RR F136, arguing that killing the F136 would free up $1.8 billion. Politicians disagreed, and the USA’s GAO auditors backed them up. Funding was reinstated. Again. That process was repeated every year until December 2011, when Pratt & Whitney was finally handed its engine monopoly over all 3 services’ core fighter jet of the future:

• The F136 Program
• The F136: Detractors and Defenders
• Updates and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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