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Australia’s Next-Generation Submarines

HMAS Waller
Bridge to the future?

Kokoda report published – objectivity, conclusions, seriousness all questioned. (Jan 19/12)

In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in anti-shipping surveillance-strike complexes, and the need to defend large sea lanes, and dropped something of a surprise. They proposed increasing Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be successors to Australia’s a current fleet of advanced Collins class submarines.

The Collins class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has encountered a number of issues, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines put a huge crimp in the fleet’s usefulness. High-level attention led to 29 recommendations aimed at improving conditions and staffing on Australia’s submarines, and those are now being implemented. Their long term effect remains to be seen. So, too, does the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost…

Rapid Fire: 2011-01-26

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  • Former Northrop Grumman engineer Noshir Gowadia gets 32 years in prison for assisting China in developing a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system and providing classified information on the B-2 Spirit bomber.
  • RAND report [PDF] says there is no “direct benefit” to the US military’s use of alternative fuels for tactical operations. It recommends that the military stick to proven tech, and focus on efficiency rather than cutting edge commercialization.
  • ABI Research: Military spending and Gallium Nitride adoption is fueling demand for RF power semiconductors used in radar and military communication and electronics equipment.

Rapid Fire: 2010-04-14

  • Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin to replace Gen. Ray Odierno as senior US general in Iraq, the Associated Press says quoting anonymous officials.

The F-35’s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy

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F-35A
F-35A test flight

The $300 billion, multi-national F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is the largest single military program in history. It’s also reaching a critical nexus. In order to keep costs under control and justify the industrial ramp up underway, participating countries need to sign order agreements within the next year or so. The problem is that the F-35 is not a proven fighter design, with a demonstrated baseline of performance in service. It is a developmental aircraft in the early days of its test program, which is scheduled to continue until 2013 or even 2014.

As one might expect, this status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. The USA is looking at its budgets, and has concluded that it can afford about half of the annual aircraft buys it had originally planned during the program’s early years. Its fellow Tier 1 partner Britain is reportedly re-evaluating its planned F-35B order in light of rising costs and problematic defense budgets. Sharp controversy has erupted in Tier 2 partner the Netherlands over long-term costs and industrial arrangements, leading to political pressure for a competitive bid. Tier 3 partners Norway and Denmark have both traveled down that same road, and are holding open competitions that pit the F-35 against Saab’s modernized JAS-39NG Gripen.

Australia hasn’t yet reached that point, but September 2008 has featured a very public set of controversies around the F-35’s performance. In the current environment, the altercation in Australia has become a controversy with implications, and responses, that have reached well beyond that continent’s shores.

Recent additions to this article take a much closer look at the RAND study that triggered the controversy. A study that did not specifically address the F-35, but which does have implications for the F-35’s projected performance – and for the heart of the USAF’s current fighter force concept…

  • F-35: September 2008’s Australian Altercation
  • Australian Altercation: The RAND Study
  • F-35: Air to Air Analyses
  • F-35: The Air-Air Controversy and Program Success
  • Additional Readings
    Continue Reading… »

The Australian Debate: Abandon F-35, Buy F-22s?

F/A-22 Raptor
F-22s for Australia?

In their October 2006 article, “Rapped in the Raptor: why Australia must have the best,” Australian newspaper The Age reported that:

”[Recently] Retired RAAF air vice-marshal Peter Criss has put aside usual conventions to openly question the wisdom of Canberra spending about $16 billion for the F-35 Lightning, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter. The Government committed an initial $300 million to become an early partner in the JSF program, with a final decision to be made by 2008. But Mr Criss says the RAAF should, in fact, consider buying the F-22 Raptor…”

Criss’ disquiet was the first significant breaking of ranks by top military brass over this issue, but Australia’s opposition Labor Party soon stepped into the fray with a formal statement, discussing the fighter gap that will exist between the F-111’s planned retirement early in 2010 and the proposed F-35A LRIP purchase in 2013 or later.

A subsequent purchase announcement and follow-on contracts for 24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornets have only intensified the discussion. While that F/A-18F purchase is very close to a fait accompli, Australia’s F-35 purchase has moved from an assumed conclusion to a very serious debate. DID’s Spotlight article chronicles those positions, while offering links and background materials from both sides of the Australian debate. In the end, however, the F-22’s production line shutdown by the USA made the issue moot.

RAND on Counter-Insurgency Airlift

PUB RAND 2007 Airlift Capabilities COIN

RAND Corporation’s Project Air Force undertakes a number of studies as part of its mandate. A recent example looks at US airlift capabilities and their fit with the needs of counter-insurgency operations. The answers could matter a great deal to programs like the Joint Cargo Aircraft, the GPS-guided JPADS paradrop system, et. al., and to tactical options like the British Lt. Col. Labouchere’s successful “Bedouin approach” in southern Iraq. Select quotes from RAND’s “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations” [RAND release | Report] include:

”....The positive influence of airlift on counterinsurgent morale and confidence is also well documented and strategically important…. Very quickly, a conventional theater airlift fleet can run out of “tails” to support such dispersed operations ….a counterinsurgent airlift effort likely will include a greater proportion of small-scale, quick-response military missions overshadowed by the possibility of encountering serious air defense threats…. The U.S. armed forces’ experience with the C-7 Caribou… provides an instructive precedent…. the C-7 possessed a unique combination of moderate speed, economy of operation, and the ability to take off and land on rough fields that ….proved to be enormously valuable in Vietnam…. there may be a need to refill the C-7’s operational niche. However, this need should be understood as a shortfall in capability…. two general program goals that DoD should emphasize….

RAND Report re: Alternative US Aircraft Carrier Missions

SH-60 with Carrier

RAND’s National Defense Research Institute does a lot of work for the US military and defense intelligence communities under joint contract DASW01-01-C-0004. One recent piece addresses the future of America’s carrier fleet, whose size and capabilities make it unique in the world. The report’s introduction notes:

“Because they offer unparalleled mobility, provide sustained military presence, can send signals of U.S. concern and possible actions, and free the United States from having to conduct flight operations from foreign bases or obtain permission from foreign powers to fly over territory, aircraft carriers likely will continue to be an asset of choice for years to come. Indeed, it is entirely possible that, as the United States seeks ways to stretch its defense dollars, pursue the Global War on Terrorism, and meet other national-security challenges, policymakers will increase their reliance on aircraft carriers, using them more often and in more situations than they have in the past, especially if the vessels have the additional capabilities to respond appropriately.

The current and expected use of aircraft carriers led the U.S. Navy in fall 2004 to commission the RAND Corporation to explore new and nontraditional ways that the United States might be able to employ aircraft carriers in pursuit of traditional and emerging military and homeland defense missions….”

Read “Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities: Exploring New Combat and Noncombat Roles and Missions for the US Carrier Fleet ” in full [PDF].

Why Are US Shipbuilding Costs Rising?

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Earlier DID articles have covered the issue of increasing US shipbuilding costs from various points of view – see esp. “Costing the CVN-21: A DID Primer” and “RAND: UK Offers Shipbuilding Industry Lessons for USA.” Now RAND turns its attention more fully to the US Navy and shipbuilding industry. Its summary page notes that:

“Over the past several decades, the increases in acquisition costs for U.S. Navy amphibious ships, surface combatants, attack submarines, and nuclear aircraft carriers have outpaced the rate of inflation. To understand why, the authors of this book examined two principal source categories of ship cost escalation: economy-driven factors (which are outside the control of the Navy) and customer-driven factors (features for which the Navy has the most control). The authors also interviewed various shipbuilders to find out their views on other issues contributing to increasing costs. Based on their analysis, the authors propose some ways the Navy might reduce ship costs in the future, including limiting growth in features and requirements and reconsidering the mission orientation of ships. It is recognized, however, that such reductions come at a cost, since the nation and the Navy understandably desire technology and capability that is continuously ahead of their competitors.”

The full, 124-page report can be found here in PDF format.

Additional Readings

RAND: Chinese Arms Industry Improving

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DID has covered RAND’s Project Air Force before, and their lessons learned from the F-22 and F/A-18 Super Hornet programs attracted a lot of reader interest here. Now they shift their focus to China’s defense production capabilities, which are beginning to address previous weaknesses and turn out a range of increasingly advanced weapons (for instance, the YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile). This study examines the current and future capabilities of China’s defense industry, as part of a larger RAND Project Air Force look at Chinese military modernization.

The study’s goals and foci include recent trends in China’s long effort to reform its defense industry, the individual strengths and weaknesses its missile, aircraft, shipbuilding, and information technology sectors, a look at variations in performance and structure among different Chinese defense-industry sectors, and the overall prospects for China’s defense industry and its ability to contribute to military modernization. China’s growing electronics industry and its contribution to defense modernization is also covered. Readers can skip into the HTML page covering this research to see the overview and buy the book, read only the summary [PDF], or download the whole report [PDF].

RAND also recommends the related short brief, “China’s Defense Industry Is Emerging from Its Troubled Past.” DID, in turn, recommends the following pair of briefs as accompaniment:

RAND’s “Project Air Force” Gets 5-Year, $210.6M Extension

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RAND Corp. in Santa Monica, CA received a $210.6 million cost-reimbursement plus fee-for-need contract to provide for RAND Project Air Force, Research of Air and Space Power. Originally known as Project RAND (an acronym for research and development), PAF was established in 1946 by General H. H. “Hap” Arnold as a way of retaining for the United States Air Force (USAF) the considerable benefits of civilian scientific thinking that had been demonstrated during World War II. Since its founding, PAF has focused entirely on studies and analyses rather than systems engineering or scientific laboratories. Publications include the F/A-18 E/F and F/A-22 program lessons learned report that DID covered earlier today.

This is a five-year option period, which extends the contract to a ten-year period. Solicitations began August 2005 and one proposal was received; work will now be complete in September 2015. The Air Force District Washington in Rosslyn, VA issued the contract (FA7014-06-C-0001). For more information, contact the 11th WG/PA at 202-767-7561.