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F-35A AA-1
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The F-35 Lightning II is a major multinational program which is intended to produce an “affordably stealthy” multi-role strike fighter that will have three variants: the F-35A conventional version for the US Air Force et. al.; the F-35B Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing for the US Marines, British Royal Navy, et. al.; and the F-35C conventional carrier-launched version for the US Navy. The aircraft is named after Lockheed’s famous WW2 P-38 Lightning, and the Mach 2, stacked-engine English Electric (now BAE) Lightning jet. System development partners included The USA & Britain (Tier 1), Italy and the Netherlands (Tier 2), and Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Turkey (Tier 3). Now the challenge is agreeing on production phase buys, with initial purchase commitments expected around 2008-2009. Export interest is also beginning to stir in a number of quarters, even though full testing will not be complete until 2014.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This updated article has expanded to feature more detail regarding the $300 billion F-35 program, including details regarding the different F-35 variants, associated contracts for the aircraft, and notable events on the bumpy road toward stable production. New material is in green type. Recent additions include a sharp response from Saab re: the Norwegian competition, noise issues spreading to the Netherlands, and an engine contract between Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce…

• The F-35 Family of Aircraft (i.e. “Continue reading…”)
• F-35 Program: Production Timelines & Structure
• F-35 Program: Events & Developments, 2007-08 [updated]
• F-35 Program: System Development & Production Contracts, 2007-08 [updated]
• F-35 Program: Ancillary and Sub-contracts, 2007-08
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
  Continue Reading… »

LAV-III, FOB Robinson
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The Government of Canada recently awarded “EODC Engineering, Developing and Licencing Inc.” of Ottawa, Canada C$ 81.5 million (about $65.5 million ) worth of contracts to provide for add-on-armour kits, modules and spares for its LAV III wheeled armored personnel carriers. LAV-III vehicles are known as Piranha-III in Europe, and are the base platform for the USA’s Stryker family of vehicles. Canadian LAV-IIIs have seen extensive use on the front lines of Afghanistan, where they have both achieved important successes and demonstrated key limitations.

The first, C$ 68 million contract, includes kits, modules, and spares for LAV III supplemental armor, as well as the repair and overhaul of their current modules and kits. An additional contract estimated at C$ 13.5 million was also awarded to EODC to provide “an Improvised Explosive Device Protection Kit.” The government release adds that EODC is the sole-source supplier because it owns the intellectual property rights. As the CASR think tank points out, Engineering Office Deisenroth Canada (EODC) is a subsidiary of Germany’s IBD Deisenroth; and IBD Deisenroth’s site makes it clear that Canadian LAVs have already started to use AMAP-IED armor.

AMAP-IED armor
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Deisenroth makes the MEXAS armoring that has outfitted Canadian LAVs and Leopard 1A5 tanks. Its more advanced AMAP line offers greater protection against medium-caliber small arms fire, fragmentation, and rockets. There’s also a dedicated AMAP-IED product, whose combination of materials and spacings provides good side protection against a range of threats that include land mine blasts and even EFP side-attacks. Under-belly armor is also part of the kit and offers additional land mine protection, though the LAV-III’s base design is not optimized against this threat in the same way as the v-hulled MRAPs. Government of Canada release | CASR.

Note that even perfect armor may not solve the problem completely. AMAP-IED may be an important step forward in general protection, and offers insurance against a casualty spike if EFP mines become more prevalent in theater. Past casualty reports, however, indicate that many of the LAV-III’s mine-related casualties were blast pressure injuries to soldiers who are riding with part of body outside a vehicle hatch. This is the result of a tradeoff between the need for all-around awareness, and the benefits of having locals see your faces and presence; versus the need for protection.

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CC-130 over BC
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DID has covered the growing realization in the US military that its aging aircraft fleet will begin posing serious challenges in the coming years. In a related vein, consider the problems that Canada is currently experiencing. In 2005, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier said that “Our [CC-130 E/H] Hercules fleet right now is rapidly going downhill. We know that three years and a little bit more than that, the fleet starts to become almost completely inoperational and we will have to stop supporting operations – or else, not be able to start them.”

The CC-130s are used in a wide variety of roles, from tactical transport to aerial refueling and even search and rescue. The Canadian Forces do not own any other aircraft in a similar class, which makes replacement essential. EADS tried to remain in the running with its Airbus A400M, and other alternatives were proposed, but the specific requirements set by Canada’s Department of National Defense (DND) tended to exclude alternatives. In December 2008, a program worth almost C$ 5 billion got underway to buy 17 of Lockheed’s privately-developed C-130J “Super Hercules” planes.

In this revised Spotlight article, DID can offer additional details regarding the Canadian procurement program, and the thinking behind it; some background that points up the parallels between the issues faced by the Canadians, and the experiences of other air services; and some insight into why the buy took so long, after the C-130J was declared Canada’s preferred choice in an “expedited” process. Despite these delays, and the supposed urgency of the situation, Canada’s DND appeared to be ignoring a USAF offer of early delivery… but that may have changed.

• The Transports and the Damage Done: Issues With the Fleet
• Live Rust: What To Do Until the New Planes Arrive?
• Bite the Bullet: Canada’s Procurement Approach and Process
• Comes a Time: Key Developments and Contracts [updated]
• Someday: Facing the Future, At Last?
• Appendix A: Are You Ready for the Country – Possible Competitors C-130J, C-130M, A400M… IL-76?
• Appendix B: Walk On – Additional Readings & Sources
  
  Continue Reading… »

Despite its staid sounding name, The Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC has been anything but staid and diplomatic in its recent series of reports on America’s defense procurement plans. “ABANDON SHIPS: The Costly Illusion of Unaffordable Transformation” was indeed a shot across the bow. Lest anyone think that assessment was an aberration, CSIS has now followed it up with its look at the US Air Force: “America’s Self-Destroying Air Power – Becoming Your Own Peer Threat” [Summary | Full report, PDF format]:

”[The] new Burke Chair report… examines the impact of a crisis in aircraft procurement on tactical, strategic, and enabling capabilities of US air power. It draws on recent government and other reports to describe the problems in US aircraft procurement and their impact on US air power and the challenges the next administration will face in force planning and budgeting.

....The problems described in this report must be kept in context. Every service has, to some extent, mortgaged its future by failing to contain equipment costs, and by trading existing equipment and force elements for developing new systems that it may never be able to procure in the numbers planned…. US aircraft procurements are no exception. The problems are so severe that the US risks becoming its own peer threat to US airpower…. These problems are compounded by the fact that there now are fewer program alternatives if any key aircraft program runs into trouble. They are also compounded by the systematic underestimation of technology risk, growth in performance requirements, the use of failed methods of cost analysis, and the pressure to “sell” programs by understating cost and risk. All have combined to push air modernization to the crisis point.”

Incoming fire…
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The right-wing Heritage Foundation recently published an in-depth paper that addresses the destroyer shipbuilding debate in Congress. The USA’s reconciled FY 2009 defense budget approves $2.5 billion to “fully” fund DDG-1002, but that will not end the debate. Official reports place the ship’s likely cost at up to twice that amount, and the FY 2009 bill includes a clause that could divert the $2.5 billion to fund additional DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers instead.

“Changing Course on Navy Shipbuilding: Questions Congress Should Ask Before Funding” contains a great many links to existing research. It can reasonably be characterized as leaning toward building more DDG-1000 ships, but the offers key questions to ask rather than recommendations. This is more than just a rhetorical device. The answers to those questions could tip the debate either way, and the report does point to discrepancies between recent and past Navy statements that need clarification. The think tank also offers research evidence that disputes some recent Navy statements, with an especial focus on the ships’ air defense and anti-submarine capabilities:

“The recent testimony by Admiral McCullough and Deputy Assistant Secretary Stiller has raised new questions and left other concerns unanswered. The Navy’s leadership has an obligation to provide Congress with full answers to these questions in a timely manner. Before deciding which plan to fund in 2010, Congress should demand the appropriate information to conduct its due diligence….”

Continue Reading… »

The US Navy’s lack of a credible plan for its future naval forces has become a growing problem for the service. In Congress, the leadership of the HASC Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee has weighed in from both sides of the partisan aisle, with Navy plans squarely in their sights. Beyond, independent think-tanks and analysts (vid. Information Dissemination’s maritime strategy archive | FY 2009 budget analysis), and even official reports like the CBO’s Dr. Eric Labs (2005 testimony [PDF]), the late Vice-Adm. Cebrowski’s Alternative Fleet Architecture Design study [PDF] (q.v. also derivative 2005 CRS analysis: HTML | PDF), et. al. have been expressing grave doubts for several years now concerning the Navy’s ability to finance or implement its existing “313-ship navy” plan. Which is itself a major step down from the Reagan era’s 600 ship Navy.

The latest broadside comes from the respected center-right think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and was prepared with the assistance of US Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal winner Anthony Cordesman. The synopsis and title of “ABANDON SHIPS: The Costly Illusion of Unaffordable Transformation” [PDF] mince few words:

“The Navy’s procurement policy is in serious disarray. Unrealistic force plans, overoptimistic cost estimates, unrealistic projections of technical feasibility, and inadequate program management have created an unaffordable ship building program, led the Navy to phase out capable ships for new ships it cannot fund, and threaten the US Navy’s ability to implement an effective maritime strategy…. The problem starts at a conceptual disconnect between strategy and reality. The Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower[i] is a set of concepts that was not linked to any clearly defined force plan, modernization plan, program, or budget. Navy shipbuilding plans are now shaped more as the result of budgetary constraints than as a response to strategic requirements. They seem to be an expression of wishful thinking rather than a realistic strategic guideline for naval procurement…. This reality-strategy disconnect in the entire shipbuilding program is a case study in failed leadership on the part of the most senior officers and civilians in the Navy. No reforms in procurement, changes in program management, cost analysis, and test and evaluation can begin to compensate for taking hard and realistic decisions at the top, and holding senior flag officers, senior civilians, and the Secretary of the Navy accountable.”

With American elections approaching, questions are being asked in the industry about the potential implications for American defense policy. In January 2007, “The Impact of Recent Political Changes on the Defense Sector” transcribed Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute think tank, during the Raymond James Washington Technology & Services Summit. It offered some interesting thoughts on the contractor/ military political gap, and added:

“The bottom line on the Democratic defense agenda is that it doesn’t reflect much support for new technology outlays, but it also doesn’t herald an era of rapidly declining defense budgets. What’s likely to change is the composition of defense spending rather than the scale.”

Fast forward to February 2008, where Thompson is speaking to US Army Leaders at the RAND Arroyo Center. “The Role Of Party Politics In Shaping Defense Priorities” offers an impartial presentation of how the two major parties evolved, how they think about national security, their inclinations and allocation preferences with respect to the defense budget, and what a victory by either side probably means. Unusually, it is a fair presentation that puts forward each party’s broad view reasonably faithfully. Which matters, because:

”...we need to understand how party politics shapes defense policy—not because we like it, but because it is a fundamental reality of life in a democracy. Did you know that a recent study of weapons outlays found 91% of all the variation in spending over the last four decades was traceable directly or indirectly to which party controlled the Senate and the White House? Like me, you probably thought that threats were the main driver of weapons spending, but the data show otherwise.

Read both speeches, consider your own experiences, and decide what you think. Thompson also changes his tune slightly, however, when he says that:

”... if the Democratic Party wins control of the White House and Congress in November, it will take a huge demand stimulus from the likes of Osama bin Laden to prevent a leveling off and then decline in defense spending in subsequent years.”

MV-22 Osprey
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Every once in a while, a defense-related controversy becomes large enough to hit mainstream news outlets. Making the cover of TIME Magazine is often a good sign for world leaders, but it’s almost always a very bad sign for military programs. Especially a program that is just making its combat debut. TIME’s Oct 8/07 cover story “V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame” pulls few punches:

“The saga of the V-22 – the battles over its future on Capitol Hill, a performance record that is spotty at best, a long, determined quest by the Marines to get what they wanted – demonstrates how Washington works (or, rather, doesn’t). It exposes the compromises that are made when narrow interests collide with common sense. It is a tale that shows how the system fails at its most significant task, by placing in jeopardy those we count on to protect us. For even at a stratospheric price, the V-22 is going into combat shorthanded. As a result of decisions the Marine Corps made over the past decade, the aircraft lacks a heavy-duty, forward-mounted machine gun to lay down suppressing fire against forces that will surely try to shoot it down. And if the plane’s two engines are disabled by enemy fire or mechanical trouble while it’s hovering, the V-22 lacks a helicopter’s ability to coast roughly to the ground – something that often saved lives in Vietnam. In 2002 the Marines abandoned the requirement that the planes be capable of autorotating (as the maneuver is called), with unpowered but spinning helicopter blades slowly letting the aircraft land safely. That decision, a top Pentagon aviation consultant wrote in a confidential 2003 report obtained by TIME, is “unconscionable” for a wartime aircraft. “When everything goes wrong, as it often does in a combat environment,” he said, “autorotation is all a helicopter pilot has to save his and his passengers’ lives.”

Recent developments are about to address one of these concerns, but TIME has hardly been the Osprey’s only critic, or the most thorough. That distinction probably belongs to a report published by the left-wing Center for Defense Information, which makes a number of very specific allegations re: the V-22’s technical and testing failings…

• The V-22: Controversy, Turrets & the CDI Report [updated]
• Key Allegations & Excerpts from the CDI Report [updated]. Includes sections covering Flight control, Performance, Reliability & maintainability, and Survivability.
• Additional Readings
  
  Continue Reading… »

KC-X contenders
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As the $35 billion KC-45 tanker purchase flies into the teeth of Washington’s political battles, the Lexington Institute think-tank discusses the relative ratings of each contestant in the USAF’s aerial tanker competition. This is a bit unusual, as even Boeing has yet to hear the official debrief – a fact that has them somewhat upset. DID would not normally consider a report of this nature credible, but the think-tank has a wide range of contacts in Washington, and has been focusing on this deal for some time. Their broad assessment also mirrors commenets made by Sen Richard Shelby [R-AL], so it is possible – but not certain – that their report is correct.

Lexington defense analyst Loren Thompson contends that the Airbus/Northrop Grumman proposal would be able to deliver 49 operational tankers by 2013, whereas Boeing would have been able to deliver just 19 aircraft within that timeframe. That’s an interesting calculation whose basis DID would be interested in viewing, but public access may be an issue as it was attributed to USAF reviewers. Beyond that, Thompson concludes that Boeing lost out on 4 of 5 key measures, and tied on the 5th. Of course, sharp-eyed DID readers will recall that they were 9 Key Performance Parameters listed in the RFP…

Continue Reading… »

JS Kongo fires SM-3
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Aviation Week’s “Obering Wants To Shift MDA to Realistic Testing” is an interesting article in light of today’s headline re: the ballistic missile intercept by a Japanese destroyer. US Missile Defense Agency chief Lt. Gen. Henry (Trey) Obering is quoted as saying that it’s time to incorporate more realism into the MDA’s testing process, now that basic intercepts have racked up a string of successes:

“What we have to do now is to turn our attention to make sure we can fully wring out the system in a variety of operational and realistic scenarios. And that is what we will be doing over the next couple of years.”

There are both technical and political dimensions to that course of action…

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