The F-35′s Air-to-Air Capability Controversy

F-35A test flight

The $300+ billion, multi-national F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is the largest single military program in history. It’s also reaching a critical nexus. In order to keep costs under control and justify the industrial ramp up underway, participating countries need to sign order agreements soon. The problem is that the F-35 is not a proven fighter design, with a demonstrated baseline of performance in service. It’s a developmental aircraft in the early middle of its test program, which is now scheduled to continue until 2018 or even 2019.

As one might expect, this status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. Costs aren’t certain, numbers ordered are slipping in many countries, and timelines aren’t certain after numerous schedule delays. With combat testing still a year or 2 away, even operational performance isn’t certain. That’s especially consequential for air forces that expect to field the F-35 as their only fighter.

September 2008 featured a very public set of controversies around the F-35′s air combat performance. Many partner countries were beginning to make decisions about their long-term needs, so the altercation in Australia became a controversy with implications, and responses, that reached well beyond that continent’s shores. The RAND study that triggered it didn’t specifically address the F-35, but it does have implications for the F-35′s projected performance – and for the heart of the USAF’s current fighter force concept.

This article takes a much closer look at the RAND Pacific Vision study, while bringing in other opinions, analyses, and subsequent developments. Understanding the F-35′s real air superiority potential and weaknesses, and their implications for partner nation participation, has only grown in importance since 2008. Let us begin…

India’s Mid-Tier Maritime Patrol Aircraft Competitions

Lower tier:
Indian Do-228 MPA

India’s growing power is creating growing naval responsibility around the Indian Ocean, from the strategic chokepoint and shipping channel represented by Indonesia’s Straits of Malacca in the east, to anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and basing agreements with Madagascar in the west. Hence the January 2009 deal for 8-16 of Boeing’s 737-derived P-8i Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, which will replace Russian-built TU-142s as India’s long-range patrol aircraft.

Closer to home, however, India has its own long coastline to patrol, and nations like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan that represent existing or potential trouble spots along its borders. The P-8i will work in those problem areas, but less-expensive and shorter-range aircraft will be needed to supplement their coverage – and to replace India’s aging Britten-Norman Islanders. Inshore, and at strategic locations like Nicobar Isand, new Dornier Do-228NG aircraft, and UAVs like India’s Israeli-built Searcher and Heron UAVs, provide solid local coverage. In between, medium sized manned aircraft must fill their own niches in India’s Navy and its Coast Guard. In January 2009, the wheels began turning on pair of follow-on buys covering short and medium range manned aircraft for India’s Navy and Coast Guard. That effort stalled out, but has now restarted.