CD-Adapco
DID » Geographical Focus » Asia - Central » The Major’s Email: British Harrier Support in Afghanistan, Revisited

The Major’s Email: British Harrier Support in Afghanistan, Revisited

26-Sep-2006 09:36 EDT

Related Stories: Americas - USA, Asia - Central, Britain/U.K., Field Reports, Fighters & Attack, Issues - Political, Policy - Doctrine, Policy - Procurement

AIR_Harrier_GR7s_With_Eurofighter.jpg
GR7s & Eurofighter
(click to view full)

DID has written in the past about the British GR7 Harrier II’s performance in Afghanistan, so the recent controversy over their performance in the wake of a soldier’s email deserves attention. Newspaper reports described a leaked email from a British Major serving in Afghanistan, which reportedly said that:

“Twice I have had Harriers in support when c/s on the ground have been in heavy contact, on one occasion trying to break clean. A female harrier pilot ‘couldn’t identify the target’, fired 2 phosphorous rockets that just missed our own compound so that we thought they were incoming RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades), and then strafed our perimeter missing the enemy by 200 metres.”

Nor is that all. He reportedly added that “the US air force had been fantastic”, and “I would take an A-10 over Eurofighter any day.” The UK MoD responds, and DID discusses the issues….

AIR_Harrier_GR7_Kandahar.jpg
GR7A at Kandahar
with Paveway bombs
(click for alternative picture)

The British Ministry of Defence responds:

“Like many others published in recent weeks, this is a moving and at times humbling account of fighting in a part of Helmand province, Afghanistan. It reflects both how intense the fighting can occasionally be, and the enormous courage, dedication and skill of the British troops operating there. As the Secretary of State said only this week, British soldiers in Helmand are, in some cases, working to the limits of endurance, but their morale is high and they are winning the fight.”

“The comments this Major makes about the RAF are, however, unfortunate. They do not reflect the view of the vast majority of soldiers about the Harrier Force in Afghanistan, which has consistently performed brilliantly in defending coalition forces, so much so that it is in regular demand not just from British commanders on the ground, but from our allies too. It must be remembered that this is the opinion of only one man.

The general view is very different….”

The release then adds some assessments from infantry officers as well as the local military spokesman in Helmland Province, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, and the Chief of the General Staff. You can read the full response here.

DID Thoughts/ Op-Ed:

AIR_Harrier_GR7_RAF.jpg
GR7 Harrier II
(click to view full)

British Harrier pilots have had difficulty identifying ground targets before; this was an issue in the 1982 Falklands War, for instance, and at least one pilot (Sqn. Leader Bob Iveson) got shot down trying. American Harrier pilots now rely on their LITENING surveillance and targeting pods to make their Harriers effective amidst the urban warfare challenges of Iraq; British Harriers use a Thales-Vinten Joint Reconnaissance Pod instead, which lacks the targeting functions and may not have been carried as integral equipment on the flights in question.

In this case, as in so many others, the aircraft’s ancillary systems can be as important as the platform itself when it comes to determining battlefield performance.

ORD_A-10_w_LITENING.jpg
A-10s with LITENING
(click to view full)

British Eurofighters will be equipped with the LITENING pod, which can also be carried on the USA’s A-10s. The O/A-10 “Warthog” also has the advantage of armored protection, along with a purpose-built design that allows slower speed forward flight and longer loiter time over the battlefield. This is what allowed it to do a substantially better job in Desert Storm than fast-moving fighters like the quickly-abandoned “A-16” F-16 experiment, and it’s currently keeping them very busy in Afghanistan.

It kept them busy in Iraq, too. A July 2003 report in Air Force News quoted Lt. Col. Dave Kennedy:

“Kennedy said during a Pentagon interview that in the first week of the war, close-air support requests went to the Combined Air Operations Center “open-ended”—meaning no specific aircraft type was requested. After the first week, he said, 80 to 90 percent of the requests for close-air support were A-10-specific.”

As one can see, the British Major is hardly alone in his preferences. Why is this?

As this National Defense magazine article notes, fast jets simply aren’t an ideal choice for close air support, and the British aren’t alone in having this issue. US Army Sgt. First Class Frank Antenori discuss his recent experiences in Iraq:

“The aircraft that we have are awesome, but they are too awesome, they are too fast, too high speed. The older technology, the A-10, is far better than the new technology, Antenori said. “The A-10s never missed, and with the F/A-18s we had to do two or three bomb runs to get them on the target,” he said, recalling his recent experiences in combat.”

Dispatches from Afghanistan add an additional edge, and reinforce the point:

The A-10 combines some of the best of today’s high-technology Air Force with a solid, low-tech foundation. The addition of a targeting and laser-designation pod was a huge boost to the plane’s capabilities, but still no substitute for the pilot’s eyeballs.

“Most other aircraft rely heavily on (electronic) sensors to find and target the enemy,” said Capt. Rick Mitchell, deployed here from the Air Force Reserve Command’s 442nd Fighter Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo. “In the A-10, it’s not unusual for a pilot to use binoculars.”

Despite advances in technology like the LITENING pod, Brimstone missiles, et. al., if we were doing what the Major was doing in Afghanistan and needed close air support, we’d share his preference for an A-10 over a Harrier or a Eurofighter. It’s purpose built for the close air support job, far better armed, and more survivable; this combination means it will be flown differently, giving it a far better likelihood of seeing ground targets and accurately attacking them. Though it isn’t ideal,[1] we’d be crazy to choose any other current or planned Western fighter in its place.

Britain has invested a great deal in the Eurofighter as its multi-role fighter of the future, which may make the Major’s criticism a sensitive point for some. Still, no serious observer could expect anything else.

If there is a larger question triggered by the Major’s email, it needs to address force mix amidst the demands of modern conflicts rather than “this aircraft vs. that aircraft.”

An A-10, for instance, certainly can’t perform air superiority missions or strike missions as well as the Eurofighter, which is arguably the world’s second-best air-air fighter behind the F-22A Raptor. On the other hand, if the kinds of failed state/ peacemaking conflict represented by Afghanistan are indeed a future norm, the same Western militaries that are rethinking their wheeled patrol vehicles may also wish to rethink the balance and composition of their air assets. In order to provide the support required by their troops on the ground, and handle forward observation and light precision attack roles properly, “new” options may be required. Options like “Bronco” type forward air control aircraft (currently under US consideration) at the low end, purpose-built aircraft like the A-10 at the high end, lighter options like options like the Brazilian Super Tucano et. al., or even light gunship aircraft may be necessary.

Additional Readings & Sources

  • Defense of the Realm (Sept 23/07) – Jackpot! Covers a series of letters to The Sunday Telegraph, including one from from Group Captain Hastings (Ret.), who commanded the Sultan of Oman’s tactical air force in Dhofar Province in the latter stages of a war which, he writes, “had similarities with the current Afghan operations…. Air strikes were flown against a ruthless and determined enemy equipped with surface-to-air-missiles, heavy machine guns and AK47s.” Their weapon of choice? A slow-flying BAE Strikemaster counter-insurgency aircraft, derived from an RAF trainer. The same fast/jet/slower plane effectiveness dynamic applied back then.
  • UK MoD (Jan 30/07) – New Harrier takes up the fight in Afghanistan. Confirmation that the upgraded GR9 has arrived, and that the Kandahar detachment will become an all GR9 fleet by the end of 2007, significantly improving their precision attack capabilities.
  • UK MoD (Oct 11/06) – GR9 Harrier Delivered On-Time, On-Budget. Early heads-up that Britain’s new upgraded GR9 Harriers, which have been significantly improved to carry precision weapons, would be headed to Afghanistan.
  • Harrier.org.uk – Harrier GR.9/9A & T. Mk.12. Upgraded UK variant just entering service in 2007. This pages describes the specific upgrades in detail.
  • Wikipedia – A-10 Thunderbolt II. Not a bad entry, with some good program and feature details as of this writing.
  • Eurofighter Typhoon – This private UK site doesn’t keep up with happenings as well as the official site, but provides much better and clearer background information cvoncerning the Typhoon, its various component systems, and even its weapons.