The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is the U.S. Navy’s newest surface combatant class. Optimized for shallow seas and operations within 100 miles of shore, but deployable across the ocean, LCS ships are a centerpiece of the USA’s new focus on littoral warfare. They will help to counter growing “asymmetric” threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. They will also perform intelligence gathering and scouting using helicopters and UAVs, offer some ground combat support capabilities, and share tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units. Swappable “mission modules,” UAV robot aircraft, and robotic UUV and USV vehicles will give these small ships the specialized capabilities they require for each of these roles – and the quick-replace adaptability they need to keep up.

At present, 2 teams are competing for the final LCS design. The General Dynamics team is offering a futuristic but practical high-speed trimaran based on Austal designs and experience. The Lockheed Martin team offers a high-speed semi-planing monohull based on Fincantieri designs that have set trans-Atlantic speed records. Team Lockheed’s efforts have run into serious trouble, including cancellation of the contract for their second ship. The General Dynamics/Austal team hit the same rocks soon afterward, in part because of the US Navy’s unusual proposal for future business arrangements.

DID places recent developments in context by explaining a bit more about the US Navy’s new surface combatant; detailing the teams, key time line events, and contract awards under the program to date; and providing additional resources and links to complete our in-depth coverage. New material appears in green type. The latest updates include the launch of Austal/GD’s LCS 2 Independence…

• LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules
• LCS: Budgets and Program Structure
• LCS: Designs & Teams
• LCS Controversies
• LCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events
• Additional Readings & Sources

LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules…

The US Navy is trying to replace 30 FF-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class “frigates,” 14 MCM Avenger Class mine countermeasures vessels, and 12 MHC-51 Osprey Class coastal mine hunters (TL = 56), with about 55 Littoral Combat Ships. The LCS requirement has been identified as part of a broader surface combatant force transformation strategy, which recognizes that many future threats are likely to require near-shore and even river access. Given the diversity of possible missions in these zones, any ship given these tasks must be extremely versatile, and also stealthy. Given the reality that ships are expected to remain in service for 30+ years, “future-proofing” and upgradeability are critical in order for these small ships to remain useful.

While a ship’s hull and design makes a number of performance parameters difficult to change, the Americans believe they may have a solution to the problem of affordable upgrades to sensors, weapons, et. al. The revolutionary approach of swappable mission modules pioneered by designs like the Danish Standard Flex 300 corvettes radically changes the LCS’ breadth of top-level capabilities, and also allows for spiral development and much simpler future upgrades as technologies evolve.

Given their size (at 127-134 meters length, almost the size of a British Type 23 frigate) and 2,500 – 3,000 tonne displacement, the Littoral Combat Ship might well be classified as a frigate were it not for its shallow water design. For whatever reason, high speed has also been identified as an important ship characteristic. Both the GD/Austal trimaran and Lockheed’s racing-derived monohull fulfill this requirement, with potential top speeds of 40-50 knots. Internal capacity will allow Special Forces to be embarked for missions, along with their equipment.

No matter which mission modules are loaded, the ship will carry a BAE Systems Mk110 57mm naval gun with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute, and Mk 295 ammunition that allows the system to perform against aerial, surface or ground threats. The ship will also carry .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine guns, plus defensive systems including automated chaff/flare dispensers and a Raytheon RIM-116 RAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) launcher integrated into an upgraded version of the MK 15 Phalanx gun system’s radar & IR sensors. The ships will also rely on their onboard MH-60 helicopters and/or RQ-8B Fire Scout helicopter UAVs, plus other robotic vehicles including a variety of Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV). UUVs currently being tested for use with the LCS include the Bluefin 21 advance surveyor, WLD-1 which tows AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar, and others.

As discussed above, these systems will actually be part of mission modules, integrated packages of weapons, sensors, robotic vehicles, and manned platforms that can be switched in and out depending on the ship’s mission. The program will initially draw upon modules for Mine Warfare (MIW), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) and Surface Warfare (SUW).

The LCS Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) packages a variety of technologies, many of which are produced by other program offices and delivered as elements of a particular mission module.

The MIW module, for example, brings together several systems developed by the Mine Warfare program office (PMS 495): the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting UUV System; the AN/AQS-20A towed mine-detecting sonar and sensors; the Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS); the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (AES-1 ALMDS); the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS); The Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) 30mm cannon with its “supercavitating” ammunition; and others. DID has described them asll or linked to in-depth profiles in our in-depth coverage of the MH-60S Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) program.

The Advanced Deployable System (ADS) had been at the heart of the ASW anti-submarine module, and was intended to be a fast-deploying underwater sensor net developed by Lockheed Martin under the Maritime Surveillance Systems program office (PMS 485). Unfortunately, as our coverage’s update section notes, ADS was terminated. The ASW module also includes Lockheed’s WLD-1 UUV, a new General Dynamics USV, and acoustic sensors such as Lockheed’s Sea Talon multifunction towed array and remote towed active source. Other detection systems and weapons are designed for use aboard the MH-60 helicopter and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) like the Spartan. New technologies like the revolutionary “Sea Sparker” that DID covered in August 2005 may also find their way into this mix.

The SUW attack module makes use of 4 weapon stations. In addition to the 57mm naval gun, firepower could include same 30mm cannon used in the Mine Warfare program’s RAMCIS mine-disposal system, and in the Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Another option is a version of the US Army’s Non Line-of-Sight – Launch System. NLOS-LS, aka. NETFIRES. Each of the on-board weapon stations are sized to carry 4 Netfire modules, each of which packs 15 cells (60 missiles total per station). These cheap “missile-in-a-box” precision attack missiles (PAM) roughly duplicate the effects of a 155mm shell, and have a range of up to 40 km/ 24 miles. They can be fired in direct mode; and a forthcoming LAM missile would be able to loiter in an area and look for targets, or wait for another platform to laser-designate one.

Other missions that havereportedly been studied for the LCS, including a configuration with medical/humanitarian modules, SEAL support, Troop transport for Marines, and Naval Fire Support employing a variant of the Army-Marine Corps Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The Danish Absalom Class multi-mission ships have shown that recofigurable bays can be adapted to carry troops and vehicles, in a manner reminiscent of the 1930s era APDs adapted from World War 1 destroyers. With respect to mounting MLRS modules on ships, the option poses fewer engineering problems than programs like the MONARC 155mm howitzer, due to the absence of recoil. The new German F125 Sachsen Class frigates were also supposed to carry MLRS modules, but navalization challenges caused them to drop that option.

LCS: Budgets & Program Structure

According to official Pentagon documents, the Navy’s FY 2006 budget for the LCS program was $1.054 billion ($470.3M procurement, $584.1M RDT&E), which dropped to $926.6 million in FY 2007 budget ($597.2M procurement of ships & mission modules, $329.4M RDT&E). The FY 2008 request was set at $1.208 billion ($990.8M for 3 ships + 2 mission modules, $217.5M RDT&E); but the Navy’s revised procurement strategy led to $337.1 million in funding for a single LCS, a contract that Rear Adm. Stan Bozin says is not likely until “the end of [fiscal] 2008 or the beginning of [fiscal] 2009,” and is much less than the projected cost of 1 LCS ship. The 2009 request is $920 million, for 2 LCS ships.

The program was originally structured with Team Lockheed and the General Dynamics/Austal consortium each producing a number of fully operational, competing Flight 0 ships; construction of the first 2 ships from each team is now underway. The idea was that experience with these ships is the best teacher and evaluator, ensuring that the Navy selects the right winning team for the overall program. Meanwhile, it would still be able to use all of the Flight 0 ships during the testing phase and beyond. The design approach for the winning team’s second generation Flight 1 LCS ships would be flexible, and was envisioned as changing somewhat in light of the experience gained with the Flight 0 designs.

Initially, 4 Flight 0 ships and 9 Flight 1 ships were contemplated, along with 7 mission modules that would include 3 mine warfare modules and 2 anti-submarine modules (ASW). Austal’s December 11, 2006 press release even implied that more early-build ships might enter US Navy plans:

“Recent Navy reports have speculated on an expanded acquisition strategy, from 4 to a possible 17, for the Flight 0 fleet of LCSs that also includes an alternate monohull ship design. Commenting in September, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Dr Delores Etter, told Reuters, ‘The U.S. Navy hopes to finalize its acquisition strategy for a new class of shore-hugging combat ships by mid-December [2006].’ “

As the program progressed, however, per-ship cost growth due to new Navy standards compliance requirements and other shifts has forced significant changes in the Navy’s acquisition strategy. Under the new approach, planned FY 2007 procurements would be channeled into getting LCS 1-4 built, rather than buying additional ships as some in Congress proposed. Instead of buying 3 more LCS ships in 2008, and then ramp up to building 6 ships per year beginning in 2009 through 2012, amended procurement plans canceled ships 3-4, proposed to possibly buy 1 LCS ship in 2008, and 2 in 2009. Congressional votes, which are becoming less supportive of the LCS program as its costs rise, could trim that number even further.

Now the revised LCS program will select one final design by 2010 – with a design competition that would be separate from the build competition, meaning that the ship’s design team may not be the final builders. Of course, handing a ship design to a firm that hasn’t built it before carries cost-inflation risks of its own. The question is whether the potential threat of doing so creates enough added incentives to keep costs down to justify the increased time and overhead of 2 serial competitions.

While the total number of LCS ships is not finalized, there has been speculation of 50-60 LCS ships within a total US naval fleet of 315 ships. This would put the overall program value at around $24 billion, based on the original price tag of about $400 million total for each ship ($220 million + 3 mission modules @ $60 million each). At present estimates ($450 million + $100 million per mission module), the total would rise to $30.25 billion, even if the mission module buy was cut in half to only 1.5 mission modules per ship.

LCS: Designs & Teams

As noted earlier, there are currently two different LCS designs being produced and procured as part of the competition. The General Dynamics team is offering a futuristic but practical high-speed trimaran, based on Austal designs and experience with vessels like the US Marines’ Westpac Express high-speed transport and the Army and Navy’s TSV/HSV ships. It offers an especially large landing area and internal volume for its size, and has the potential for improved survivability against hits to its sides thanks to the trimaran design.

The General Dynamics LCS team is led by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipbuilder as prime integrator, with Austal of Mobile, AL (a subsidiary of Austal Ships of Australia) as the main design partner and ship-building site. GD subsidiaries General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products Division in Burlington, VT; General Dynamics Electric Boat Division in Groton, CT; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems in Fairfax, VA; and General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Ontario are also involved under the General Dynamics banner. Other key participants include:

• Boeing Company in Seattle, WA
• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD
• L3 Communications Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA
• Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD
• Maritime Applied Physics Corporation in Baltimore, MD.

Bofors (gun) and Ericcson (radar) are among the minor partners whose equipment will be featured on the GD Team’s proposed design.

Team Lockheed Martin, meanwhile, offers a proven high-speed semi-planing monohull based on Fincantieri designs that have set trans-Atlantic speed records. Lockheed’s core team includes various Lockheed divisions, plus naval architects Gibbs & Cox of Arlington, VA; shipbuilders Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA; and shipbuilders Marinette Marine of Marinette, WI.

It also includes a host of niche providers and related partnerships including: Angle Incorporated, Blohm + Voss, Data Links Solutions, DRS Technologies, EADS, Fairbanks Morse Engine, Fincantieri, Izar (now Navantia), L-3 Communications, MAAG Gear AG, MacTaggart Scott, NAWCAD, Raytheon, Rolls Royce, Sensytech, Sperry, Terma, Unidynamics, and United Defense (now BAE Systems).

There is also some interest in the Littoral Combat Ship beyond the USA. A Dec 11/06 Austal release adds that foreign interest is rising, and cites a figure of ”...reported 26 potential buyers exist worldwide for the ship and its companion equipment with two near-term contenders and four others that have expressed active interest.” DID notes releases and information below that pinpoint Israel (Lockheed version) and Saudi Arabia (GD/Austal version) as two of those possible foreign sales.

LCS Controversies

LCS ships can be expected to perform the mine countermeasures role very well, and the anti-submarine role reasonably well, thanks to their array of drones, helicopters, and rapidly upgradeable systems. Other traditional roles for frigate-sized vessels are more controversial. Even with the Surface Warfare module installed, LCS ships will carry a very light armament set for a major naval vessel: one 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system; RIM-116 SeaRAM short range defensive missiles; up to 4×15-missile launchers for light short-range NETFIRES missiles, each with striking power equal to a 155mm shell; 30mm cannons that would replace NetFires launchers 1-for-1 if installed; 12.7mm machine guns; plus any missiles or 70mm rockets carried by its accompanying helicopters (up to 2 H-60 slots or up to 4 MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV slots). Present LCS designs don’t even carry torpedo tubes, or vertical-launch systems (VLS) that could accommodate present and future attack and/or defensive missiles.

Even the corvette-sized Danish Flyvefisken Class, whose swappable modules helped pave the way for the LCS idea, has a Mk 48 vertical launch system and can carry Harpoon anti-ship missiles and/or longer-range air defense missiles. The LCS weapon array also compares unfavorably with corvettes like Israel’s US-built, $260 million Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class, and Sweden’s ultra-stealthy Visby Class; or even some small Fast Attack Craft classes. Not to mention comparable-sized multi-role frigates like the new Franco-Italian FREMM Class or Britain’s much older Type 23/Duke Class.

In contrast, brochures for the International LCS versions offered by each team feature the small SPY-1F AEGIS radar and 16 VLS cells (GD version has 16 tactical length cells for up to 64 RIM-162 ESSM anti-air missiles, LM version has strike length cells that could accommodate anti-ship missiles et. al.), as well as Harpoon missiles. The GD/Austal international brochure even adds torpedo tubes.

The Littoral Combat Ships were originally touted as $220 million vessels, with 3 mission modules available for each ship to maximize flexibility, for a total price tage of $400 million or so. It’s estimated that the Navy’s decision to switch to Naval Vessel Rules rather than civilian standards has added about $50 million per ship. On top of that, leaving out the MH-60S/R helicopters at $25-30 million per, the Navy claims that the mission modules will be about $80 million apiece. If so, the best case may be a recurring cost of around $427 million ($297M per + $50M + $80M) to provide a ship and only 1 mission module – a development that would severely undercut the ships’ much-touted flexibility, unless additional funds were added in future, pushing the overall ship costs higher. Congressional Budget Office estimates in July 2007 went a step further, and placed the ships’ likely average cost at $450 million each, exclusive of mission modules.

If the LCS’ cost for the base ships continues to hover around even $400-450 million each, future procurement trends begin to make LCS ships the most common form of US naval power, and their armament continues to lack flexibility, unfavorable comparisons are inevitable. A versatile surveillance and special forces insertion ship whose flexibility doesn’t extend to the light armament that is its weakest point, and isn’t flexible enough to accommodate anything beyond token naval or air opposition, won’t meet those expectations.

Worse, it could cause the collapse of the Navy’s envisaged “high-low” force structure if the DDG-1000 destroyers and CG (X) cruisers are priced out of the water and built in small numbers. As Vice-Admiral Mustin (ret.) and Vice-Admiral Katz (ret.) put it in a 2003 USNI Proceedings article:

“Because the Navy has invested heavily in land-attack capabilities such as the Advanced Gun System and land-attack missiles in DD (X), there is no requirement for [the Littoral Combat Ship] to have this capability. Similarly, LCS does not require an antiair capability beyond self-defense because DD (X) and CG (X) will provide area air defense. Thus, if either DD (X) or CG (X) does not occur in the numbers required and on time, the Navy will face two options: leave LCS as is, and accept the risk inherent in employment of this ship in a threat environment beyond what it can handle (which is what it did with the FFG-7); or “grow” LCS to give it the necessary capabilities that originally were intended to reside off board in DD (X) and CG (X). Neither option is acceptable.”

Especially if the low end has grown to a cost level that makes it equivalent to other countries’ major surface combatants, while falling short on key capabilities that will be required in the absence of higher-end ships.

LCS: Ship Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

April 28/08: Austal USA’s Mobile, AL shipysrd launches LCS 2 Indeoendence. The ship will be moored alongside the Austal USA facility for activation and testing of combat and other onboard systems is completed. Sea trials are expected to commence in late 2008. Austal release.

March 14/08: The odds don’t look good for the US Navy’s FY 2009 request of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. The house Armed Services Committee’s Seapower & Expeditionary Forces subcommittee took testimony regarding that request, and the LCS request came under fire from both sides of the aisle. See “US Navy’s 313-Ship Plan Under Fire in Congress” for full links etc. Chairman Rep. Gene Taylor [D-MS], a strong proponent of more naval shipbuilding:

“So, instead of being asked to fund programs that are building ships on time and at projected cost, we are asked to fund programs which are not…. [the LCS] will go into the textbooks to train future acquisition officials how not to run a program. The LCS will be at least twice as expensive as advertised, it has taken twice as long to build the lead ships, neither vessel has been underway on its own power, and the Navy cancelled two contract options last year, which were already funded, because of cost overruns.

Yet this year we are asked to authorize two more ships – why? What has changed between then and now that indicates that this program is in any way ready to build more ships? We have been told the answer to this question is that there is an ‘emergent need’ for these ships in the fleet. If that is true why did the Navy cancel two of the ships? At some point we must stop throwing money at this program until the Navy can prove that at least one of the ships can get to sea and do its mission.”

Ranking minority member Roscoe Bartlett [R-MD] was equally skeptical:

“And how much risk are we buying down if we procure two more Littoral Combat Ships, the year after we cancelled two, and the year in which the Navy plans to conduct an operational evaluation and possible downselect of LCS-1 and 2? Even if there is no downselect, the Navy has stated that there will be design changes made to the Flight One ships. So the two we buy now will be different than the remaining 50. Is that worth it, if those funds could keep a stable program like LPD-17 alive?”

Feb 4/08: FY 2009 budget documents released by the Navy give the expected final cost for its LCS-1 and LCS-2 ships: $631 million and $636 million, respectively. First-of-class ships usually cost more – but recall that prescient July 24/07 estimate of $630 million from the Congressional Budget Office. See “Littoral Combat Ship Costs, Issue Rising Again” for the exact calculations.

Nov 1/07: The US Navy cancels construction of LCS-4 by the General Dynamics/Austal team, leaving its LCS acquisition strategy adrift amidst deep proposed funding cuts from Congress in the FY 2008 budget. There was also the minor problem of a second contractor who refused to accept a “deal” that let the Navy make any number of design changes, while the contractor was solely responsible for costs, and would pay for overruns above the proposed fixed-price contract. Read “Navy Sinks LCS-4 Construction” for more.

Oct 22/07: Defense News reports that Lockheed Martin is testing the LCS-1 Independence’s ability to load containerized mission modules and other equipment into the mission bay area. On Oct 10/07, their Moorestown, NJ facility ran a successful test of their Combatss-21 combat system’s ability to load the mine warfare mission package software. NAVSEA is continuing work on software for the other 2 initial mission packages: anti-submarine, and anti-surface warfare.

The article also covers Israel’s ongoing interest in the Lockheed Martin LCS design, which has now led to a second NAVSEA study and could lead to detail design by 2009 and construction by 2010. See “An LCS For Israel?” for more details.

Oct 12/07: The US GAO audit office has some news re: the mine warfare module, the LCS’ first mission module. It seems some changes will be required:

”...For example, operation of mine countermeasures systems is currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the [Littoral Combat] ship, which could affect the ship’s ability to execute this mission. In addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only limited capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However, because the Navy recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems from two to one per ship, operational availability for these systems may decrease below current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures mission package currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require the Navy to accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and the concepts of operation it can likely execute.”

Oct 11/07: Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that the Israeli Navy “has launched a second study regarding the potential acquisition of the United States Navy’s (USN’s) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) focused on Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull design known as LCS-I (Israel). “That design appears to be the most suitable for our needs,” a senior IN source told Jane’s…”

Sept 27/07: Small business qualifier ALCOA Inc. in Alcoa Center, PA received an $8.3 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee completion contract to provide engineering services in support of the re-design of existing aluminum structures to improve performance and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) via weight reduction of selected assemblies or components. Work will be performed in Alcoa Center, PA (84%); Johnstown, PA (11%); Columbus, OH (3%); and various shipyards (2%), and is expected to be complete in September 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $3.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, West Bethesda, Md., is the contracting activity (N00167-07-D-0010).

This contract will fund the Alcoa Collaborative Design Approach (ACDA), a phased program approach in which the following tasks will be applied to the LCS: selection of candidate assemblies and components; development of conceptual designs and down selection of design concepts; evaluation of design concepts and final selection; development and evaluation of prototypes; and ship integration. The components for improvement may include hull sections, doors/hatches, load floors, foundations, large apertures or similar structures.

Alcoa has considerable expertise in this area, having worked closely with Lockheed Martin on a very similar effort re: the F-35B Lightning II STOVL fighter. Still, one wonders why, exactly, this has become a priority for the LCS program?

Sept 26/07: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, N.Y. receives a $15.4 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This modification supports the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Module Program Office (PMS 420), Program Executive Office, Littoral and Mine Warfare.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2008. Contract funds in the amount of $113,338, will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Sept 24/07: Newhouse News Service reports that “Navy inspectors have documented numerous problems with construction of a next-generation vessel known as the littoral combat ship, or LCS, according to government records obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act.” They are referring specifically to the General Dynamics/ Austal ships, and proceed to detail these issues in “Navy Inspectors Find Numerous Problems With Ship Project.”

Some of these items are “normal” issues that inspectors exist to catch, others are less so. Note, especially the time frames of the issues raised, as many date from 2006 and predate subsequent reports.

Sept 21/07: Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the US Navy and General Dynamics are expected to meet next week to discuss the LCS program:

“GD spokesman Kendall Pease confirmed the Navy had asked for the meeting but provided no further details, other than to say a specific date had not been set. Other sources, however, said the meeting was to discuss slowing construction on LCS 4, the second ship GD is building at its Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, Ala.”

The Navy was forced to reimburse Team Lockheed for a number of expenses after canceling LCS-3, and they are reportedly trying to restructure the deal with the GD/Austal team to avoid paying those costs in the event that LCS-4 is canceled. If the parties cannot agree, the Navy could always choose to cancel LCS-4 on those grounds, and pay the minor reimbursement fees that would be involved at this early stage. The downside is that a second cancellation decision would leave the entire LCS program in tatters, either turning it into a 1-ship each “sail off” competition, or throwing the entire program back to the drawing board.

Aug 8/07: US Navy acquisition chief Dolores Etter said in an interview with Reuters that General Dynamics is about 54% done with its first ship [LCS-2], which is due to be delivered in mid-2008. She also stated that “We … continue to see challenges with the program and with each platform, specifically with the propulsion system on LCS-1 and systems integration on LCS-2.”

With respect to the GD/Austal team’s effort to rein in costs, she said that “We do have points at which our concern will go up. You can’t predict what will happen, but things are moving forward in a good direction” in terms of the firm’s efforts to rein in costs.

Meanwhile, Reuters adds that US Navy officials have asked lawmakers to approve a 55% increase in a cost cap for the 5th and 6th LCS ships, to $460 million. They also said costs for the first Lockheed ship and GD’s LCS-2 could be up to 75% higher than expected. Reuters article: “US Navy sees progress on General Dynamics LCS ship.”

July 24/07: In a statement before the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Congressional Budget Office representatives testify that [PDF format]:

“Experience had suggested that cost growth was likely to occur in the LCS program. In particular, historical cost-weight relationships – using the lead ship of the Oliver Hazard Perry class of frigates (FFG-7) as an analogy – indicated that the Navy’s original cost target for the LCS was optimistic. The first FFG-7, including its combat systems, cost a total of about $650 million (in 2008 dollars) to build, or about $235 million per thousand tons. Applying that per-ton estimate to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $575 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module (to make them comparable to the FFG-7). In this case, looking at cost-weight relationships produced an estimate less than the apparent cost of the first two LCSs but substantially greater than the Navy’s original estimate.

As of this writing, the Navy has not publicly released an estimate for the LCS program that incorporates the most recent cost growth, other than its request to raise the cost caps for the fifth and sixth ships. CBO estimates that with that growth included, the first two LCSs would cost about $630 million each, excluding mission modules but including outfitting, postdelivery, and various nonrecurring costs associated with the first ships of the class. As the program advances, with a settled design and higher annual rates of production, the average cost per ship is likely to decline. Excluding mission modules, the 55 LCSs in the Navy’s plan would cost an average of $450 million each, CBO estimates.”

DID background: The FFG-7 frigates are still widely touted as a successful example of cost containment. The Oliver Hazard Perry Class met their budget and performance targets and served successfully. The USS Stark even survived a hit from an Iraqi Exocet missile while patrolling the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. The ships paid a price in lower capability and lack of space for capability growth, however, and many were sold to other countries or retired early because upgrading them was too difficult. That experience was one of the inspirations for the LCS’ open-architecture, mission modules approach.

Mach 14/07: Navy Cancels Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, warns General Dynamics. The Navy explains that they couldn’t reach agreement on a new contract. Lockheed Martin expressed “disappointment,” and says: “We believe that our proposal was fully consistent with the Secretary’s stated desire to bring the benefits of increased competition to shipbuilding while holding the Navy’s industrial partners accountable for cost performance within their control”. Note especially those last 3 words, given the role played by Navy specification shifts in that cost growth.

See “Cost Growth Leads to Stop-Work on Team Lockheed LCS-3 Construction (updated)” for DID’s full coverage.

Mach 14/07: Navy revises LCS program plan. Based on a comprehensive two-month review of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition program, Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announced that he is prepared to lift a previously issued stop work order for construction of Lockheed Martin’s LCS 3 – under a renegotiated contract.

The new decision will also affect the General Dynamics/ Austal team. Under the restructured Littoral Combat Ship program plan, the Navy will recommend deferral of FY 2007 LCS procurement, and use those funds to complete the construction of LCS 1-4 by the Lockheed and General Dynamics teams.

This is part of a wider package of efforts aimed at controlling program costs… before those costs raise comparisons, questions, and dilemmas that begin to control the program. For full coverage, see “Cost Growth Leads to Stop-Work on Team Lockheed LCS-3 Construction (updated)”.

Feb 28/07: Reports surface that the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS design is also expected to face cost overruns, although the scope of the increases is not yet clear. Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter had said the first General Dynamics LCS ship would cost $350 million or more, but Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, Etter’s spokesman, said in an e-mail that:

“Etter mistakenly characterized the cost of LCS 2 to be $350 million or more. The estimated cost range of LCS 1 is $350 million-$375 million, as previously testified. That estimate is based on the best information to date. There is insufficient information to know precisely the final cost range of LCS 2…. Although we anticipate some cost growth, it is premature to discuss specific numbers as they are unavailable at this time.”

Etter described Team Lockheed’s LCS-1 Freedom as 75-80% complete, and the GD/Austal team’s LCS-2 Independence as about 33% complete. Reuters report | Defense News report (March 20/07).

Jan 29/07: Firings will continue until costs improve. Capt. Donald Babcock, the Navy’s LCS program manager, is relieved of his duties by Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton – who is also being reassigned.

Jan 12/07: Stop Work issued to Team Lockheed. “The Navy issued a stop work order Jan. 12 to Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors unit, Moorestown, N.J., for the construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This stop work order will take effect immediately, and is for a period of 90 days. The stop work order was issued because of significant cost increases currently being experienced with the construction of LCS-1 and LCS-3, under construction by Lockheed Martin…”

The US Navy says they are “working closely with the contractor to identify the root cause of the costs growth… [and] reviewing the overall acquisition strategy for the LCS program…” At this point, the GD/Austal team’s trimaran design and build-out of LCS 2&4 are unaffected. See full DID coverage with all updates, not to mention the Lexington institute’s predictive December 2006 report “Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy.”

Dec 8/06: 2nd GD-Austal Flight 0 Ship. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $208.1 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/ award-fee modification under previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310, exercising an option for construction of the 4th Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the second by the GD-Austal team. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (55%); Pittsfield, MA (24%); and Bath, ME (21%), and is expected to be complete by August 2009.

The associated General Dynamics release trumpets its trimaran design as having “one of the largest usable payload volumes per ton of ship displacement of any U.S. Navy surface combatant afloat,” and notes its ability to carry even the CH-53 medium-heavy transport helicopter if the mission requires it.

Austal’s associated release discusses potential US Navy plans that could include an extended buy of the Flight 0 version ships, and adds that its workforce in Mobile is slated to grow to 1,200 by the end of 2007.

Oct 17/06: The FY 2007 defense budget is signed. LCS funding is not cut, but remains at $520.67 million

Sept 23/06: The US Navy christens and launches LCS 1 Freedom, the nation’s first littoral combat ship, at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin. The ship will continue to undergo outfitting and testing at Marinette Marine; it will be commissioned in 2007 and eventually homeported in San Diego, CA. The ship’s sponsor is Birgit Smith, wife of the late Medal of Honor recipient U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul Ray Smith.

July 26/06: The US Congressional Research Service releases its report “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress.” Meanwhile, as negotiations in Congress go forward, The House-reported version of the FY2007 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5631) recommends approval of this request. The Senate reported version recommends a 2-ship cut by funding just one LCS in FY 2007, and rescinding funding for one of the three LCSs procured in FY 2006.

June 26/06: 2nd Lockheed Flight 0 Ship. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $197.6 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/ award-fee modification under a previously awarded contract, exercising an option for construction of one Flight 0 monohull Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Work will be performed in Lockport, LA (63%); Moorestown, NJ (36%); and Arlington, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by January 2009. See corporate release.

April 13/06: Israel Considering Lockheed’s Littoral Combat Ship Design. Specifically, they’re considering Lockheed’s monohull design as a potential replacement for their Saar Class corvettes and missile boats. A funded initial study is underway to assess feasibility, and integration with Israeli systems and weapons is critical.

April 4/06: Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter has named LCS 2, the first Flight 0 ship of the General Dynamics/Austal trimaran design. She will be the USS Independence. This Navy release notes the backgrounds of other ships who have borne that name. It’s all part of a speech on the future of Navy shipbuuilding that DID covered extensively.

Jan 19/06: GD/Austal Lays Keel for LCS 2. Austal USA hosts a traditional US Navy keel-laying ceremony to signify the start of construction on the first Flight 0 General Dynamics/Austal LCS trimaran. The keel laying follows on the heels of the official November 17, 2005 opening of Austal USA’s ship construction facility in Mobile, AL. See also See US Navy release.

Oct 7/05: LCS 2, the 1st GD-Austal Flight 0 Ship, is ordered. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received a $223.3 million cost-plus-award-fee/ incentive-fee modification to exercise an option under contract N00024-03-C-2310 for detail design and construction of one Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50) – note that this represents Austal’s component, and is the company’s largest-ever individual contract. Work will also be performed in Pittsfield, MA (33%); Bath, ME (15%); and Baltimore, MD (2%), and is expected to be complete by October 2007. This award is one of the potential options described in the May 27, 2004 contract award.

June 2/05: Lockheed Lays Keel for LCS 1, USS Freedom. Thhis is the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design, and the ceremony was attended by numerous dignitaries. This event is related the Dec 15, 2004 shipbuilding contract, of course.

May 9/05: Secretary of the Navy Gordon England has named LCS 1, the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design. She will be the USS Freedom. See DefenseLINK release.

April 11/05: Bath Iron Works prepares for construction. Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $16 million cost-plus-fixed-fee option to previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310 for the advance procurement of required Long Lead Material for the first “Flight Zero” models of General Dynamics’ trimaran Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design. The contract award for Long Lead Material includes a description of the items to be procured, the supplier, the required ordering date, supplier lead-time, in-yard need date and a breakout by month of the dollar amounts required. Work is expected to be complete in September 2005.

Dec 15/04: Lockheed awarded first Flight 0 shipbuilding contract for LCS 1. Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ received a $188.2 million cost-plus award-fee/ incentive-fee option to contract N00024-03-C-2311 for detail design and construction of the first Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (38%); Marinette, WI (57%); and Arlington, VA (5%), and is expected to be complete by December 2006. This is one of the potential options described in the May 27, 2004 contract award.

June 6, 2004: Lockheed unveils latest version of its LCS design.

May 27/04: Downselect and Initial Contracts. Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ, and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received cost-plus-award-fee contract modifications to previously awarded contracts for final system design, with options for detail design and construction of up to two Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS):

• Lockheed Martin received $46.5 million contract modification for a 7-month final system design, which could go as high as $423.4 million if options for detail design and construction of up to two LCS Flight 0 ships are excercised. Work on the final system design is expected to be complete by December 2004. See corporate release for further details re: Team Lockheed’s design & objectives.

• General Dynamics received a $78.8 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to N00024-03-C-2310 for a 16-month final system design. The award could go as high as $536 million if options for detail design and construction of up to two LCS Flight 0 ships are exercised ($536,020,688 including all options). Work on the final system design is expected to be complete by September 2005. Corporate release for further information re: the GD team’s design goals.

July 17/03: Preliminary Design. The following three companies out of six offers won firm-fixed-price contracts for Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship Preliminary Design: General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME (N00024-03-C-2310 – $8.9 million); Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems, Surface Systems in Washington, DC (N00024-03-C-2311 – $10 million); Raytheon Company Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI (N00024-03-C-2312 – $10 million). Each contractor will perform a preliminary design effort to refine its proposed Littoral Combat Ship concept. Work is expected to be complete in February 2004.

The three losing teams include Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Gibbs and Cox (who would join the Lockheed team), John J McMullen Associates, and Textron Systems Marine & Land Operations.

Interestingly, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems was working from an already-proven littoral ship design from Swedish company, Kockums AB and its German parent company, Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG. Kockums AB designed and is building Sweden’s VISBY Class littoral warfare corvettes, and Northrop Grumman planned to use the stealthy carbon fiber mono-hull as the baseline for its LCS program.

May 21/03: Lockheed Martin holds an Industry Day to solicit potential members for its LCS team. Its base design concept is then known as “Sea Blade.”

March 4/03: Lockheed lays foundation for LCS team. Lockheed Martin, naval architects Gibbs & Cox, Bollinger Shipyards and shipbuilders Marinette Marine formally partner on the LCS program. The Lockheed release contains details of their respective areas of reponsibility and past work.

September 2002: US Navy finishes studying Norway’s Skjold (“Shield”) Class air cushion catamaran littoral fast patrol boats. The ship completed a 13-month deployment in the USA, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea. The ship participated in a series of naval exercises and a number of tests with US Navy research establishments NAVSEA and the Office of Naval Research.

March 25/02: Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel participates in naval exercise. The vessel participated as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons, as does this GlobalSecurity.org Sea SLICE profile.

LCS Ancillaries: Equipment, Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

Sept 25/07: The Navy announces that it is moving forward with development of the LCS Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package, which it describes as “designed to combat small, fast boat terrorist threats to the fleet.” The announcement lists the components as:

“electro-optical/infrared sensors mounted on a vertical take off unmanned air vehicle to provide over-the-horizon detection; 30mm guns to kill close-in targets; four [4] non-line-of-sight launching system (NLOS-LS/ “NetFires”/ “missile in a box”) container launch units, with each system containing 15 offensive missiles; and the MH-60R armed helicopter for surveillance and attack missions. The SUW mission package has software that interfaces with the LCS command and control system to maintain and share situational awareness and tactical control in a coordinated SUW environment…. The first two SUW mission packages assembled for developmental and operational testing use the Mark 46 30mm gun made by General Dynamics Amphibious Systems.”

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren division is the technical direction agent for the SUW mission package, with NSWC Port Hueneme division providing integrated logistics and testing support. NAVSEA release.

April 2/07: BAE Systems in Minneapolis, MN announces its second contract from General Dynamics to supply a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system as the main gun fitted to the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship [LCS 4]. The contract is worth $7.2 million, and includes options such as spare parts and training. The gun is scheduled to be delivered in 2008.

The gun’s Mk 295 ammunition allows the system to perform against aerial, surface or ground threats, with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute. The Mk 110 is designed to have minimal deck penetration, and can be operated directly or by remote control. BAE Systems has now received 3 contracts from the LCS program contenders, for a total of 4 gun systems. See full DID coverage.

Jan 5/07: General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems has delivered the Littoral Combat Ship Open Data Model to the U.S. Navy for inclusion in the Software Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository, with unrestricted rights for re-use by any other Navy program.

The Open Data Model is a critical open architecture component of the General Dynamics LCS computing environment. By using the Open Data Model, any company’s products can be integrated into the General Dynamics LCS quickly and efficiently, creating ease of integration and upgrade, as well as a continuous competitive environment that improves capabilities, lowers costs, and avoid’s platform lock-ins.

With this delivery, the SHARE repository now provides a vehicle for any company interested in bringing their technology to the General Dynamics LCS to gain access to the Open Data Model. In addition, the Open Data Model is now available as the basis of a published open architecture solution for any other Navy programs looking to reap the benefits afforded by open architecture, advancing the Navy’s growing focus on open architecture ship systems. EE Times report.

Oct 20/06: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors (MS2) Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY received a $13.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-05-C-6327) for in the development, demonstration and integratiion of the Remote Mine-hunting Vehicle (RMV) with the anti-submarine warfare systems mission module, and for production of 4 installation and checkout kits with supporting equipment for 4 RMV units. This module will is part of the Littoral Combat Ship ASW mission package, and the RMVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91-96 and LCS Class ships.

The RMV is also known as the the WLD-1, a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines; with slight adjustments, the system can perform active anti-submarine scans as well. Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY (80%) and Riviera Beach, FL (20%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington in Washington, DC issued the contract.

Oct 19/06: a $12.7 million contract for 4 Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), for the Littoral Combat Ship’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Module. General Dynamics Robotic Systems will develop them. This contract follows a similar May 1, 2005 contract for up to 4 USVs; see below for further details, or just flip to DID’s dedicated coverage of this contract – and some of GDRS’ competitors in the USV field.

Oct 13/06: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Bethpage, NY receives a $15.5 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The US Navy’s plan is to use spiral development to improve mission capability on an ongoing basis, which is much easier since LCS mission packages can be developed and acquired separately from the ship itself. Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. See also DID’s Jan 5/06 entry.

Aug 25/06: Netfires LLC of Grand Prairie, TX received a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for $54.8 million as part of an estimated $1.15 billion contract to procure the NLOS-LS Naval Littoral Combat Ship Integration, System Development and Demonstration. Work will be conducted in Tucson, AZ and Baltimore, MD, and will be complete by Aug. 31, 2010. The U.S. Army Aviation & Missile Command issued the contract (W31P4Q-04-C-0059). See also Raytheon’s Aug 29 release.

Aug 22/06: Rolls Royce announces that its Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines will power LCS 3, the second Lockheed Martin-designed Littoral Combat Ship. The order also includes 4 of its Kamewa waterjet systems. These systems were also installed in Team Lockheed’s LCS 1 Freedom.

July 31/06: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY receives $23.4 million as part of the remote minehunting system (RMS) program (N00024-05-C-6237) to service 3 WLD-1 remote minehunting vehicle (RMV) UUVs. As noted above, the WLD-1 is a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines. The RMV/UUVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91 through DDG 96 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, as well as the LCS. See full DID coverage.

April 10/06: Lockheed Martin announces a $5.2 million NAVSEA study studied Team Lockheed’s LCS hull, mechanical, and engineering systems’ ability to accommodate the systems and weapons the Israelis want, while avoiding the need for major redesign of the USA’s basic configuration.

The final answer was that it could, with some obvious modifications to accommodate better radars and vertical launch systems for missiles. See “A Littoral Combat Frigate For Israel?” for more.

April 4/06: Raytheon Company announces that it will Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1A Helicopter, Aircraft, and Surface (HAS) guided missiles. Raytheon will work with General Dynamics to integrate SeaRAM with the LCS combat management system.

April 2006: The Navy’s Sea Talon Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) system successfully completes a series of testing milestones offshore from Lockheed Martin’s Riviera Beach, Fla., facility.

Sea Talon is part of the LCS the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission module. Using 2 Remote Minehunting Vehicle (RMV) semi-submersibles developed under the AN/WLD-1 Program, Sea Talon creates an unmanned, distributed, underwater sensor network that uses unmanned vehicles for sensor deployment and sensor data communications. For Sea Talon, the RMVs are being fitted with the Remote Towed Active Source (RTAS) and the Remote Towed Array (RTA). Once fitted with these sensors, Sea Talon rapidly detects, tracks, classifies and localizes quiet diesel submarines in littoral waters, while conducting above-water persistent situational awareness and transmitting real-time data to U.S. Navy ships.

Sea Talon involves no new major technology development, but leverages already developed technologies from the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System, the AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 surface sonar program, towed array sonar development, and common software baselines. The April tests demonstrated that the RTA and RTAS could be towed at multiple depths, and that the RMV’s stability was not affected during the towing of the active source and passive source receiver at various speeds and depths. July 15/06 PEO-LLMW release.

Jan 5/06: Mission modules integrator chosen. Northrop-Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY is awarded a 10-year, cost-plus award-fee/ award-term contract serve as mission package integrator for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Modules program. The contract has a potential dollar figure of $159 million, and the FY 2006 portion of the contract award is $4.5 million. DID covers N-G’s mission modules integration contract in more depth.

July 6/05: Lockheed Martin completes COMBATSS-21 combat management software system. COMBATSS-21 supports the FORCEnet initiative within the USA’s Seapower 21 doctrine, and uses an open architecture system that reuses proven components from Lockheed Martin, the US Navy, domestic industry and international industry. By leveraging off-the-shelf components, Lockheed Martin claims to have achieved greater than 95% software reuse, completing the Flight 0 COMBATSS-21 software well ahead of ship installation and below budget. Through the use of an open business model, Lockheed Martin will continually evaluate new components for COMBATSS-21, which Lockheed will use for the Navy’s LCS, Deepwater program, and other US and international ships as well.

May 1/05: similar award for up to 4 USVs. An $8.5 million contract covers the first 2 vehicles, with options raising that contract to 4 vehicles and $11.3 million. The USVs will be used as part of the LCS Anti-Submarine Warfare module, employing towed arrays, dipping sonar sensors and acoustic sources as payloads.

General Dynamics Robotic Systems is a subsidiary of General Dynamics Land Systems. The company plans to adapt its land robotics command and control system for the new USVs; indeed, Scott Myers President Scott Myers cited this expertise as a key reason the Navy chose them.

June 29/04: GD announces core missions systems & software team. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems announces the open-architecture core mission systems team for the General Dynamics design of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Core mission systems infrastructure is a flexible information technology backbone for operating the ship as a whole that allows “plug and play” integration of custom-designed software modules for specific functions. GD AIS’ focus is on making it easy to integrate new modules by using non-proprietary standards and commercial middleware software as the key interface:

• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD is responsible for the ship’s internal and external communications systems, as well as topside antenna modeling and mission module interface coordination.

• CAE USA Inc. Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA, is responsible for the ship automation and control system. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD is responsible for the Integrated Combat Management System (ICMS).

• General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products in Charlotte, NC is responsible for “all of the weapons and effectors.”

• General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Canada is responsible for the above- and below-water sensors.

Additional Readings & Sources:

The Littoral Combat Ships: Program & Ship Background

• U.S. Navy LCS site

• Naval-Technology.com – Littoral Combat Ship LCS High-Speed Surface Ship

• GlobalSecurity.org – Littoral Combat Ship. See also Globalsecurity.org’s page covering Littoral Combat Ship mission modules, which offers more detail regarding the goals & objectives for each module.

• General Dynamics – LCS Summary Page and Site. See also their international variant brochure [PDF format, 303k].

• Lockheed Martin Team LCS Site. See esp. their video covering the LCS concept and various aspects of the design: “A Day in the Life of an LCS.” See also their LCS-Israel brochure [PDF format, 4.27 MB], offering a design that removes the Mk110 gun while adding a 30mm gun system like the Typhoon, Harpoon missiles, Barak anti-air missiles, and strike-length Mk41 vertical launch cells.

• Information Dissemination (Sept 13/07) – Littoral Combat Ship: 2 + 2 +3 – 4 = 2 plus 1

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral combat ship could slip behind schedule as price tag nears $500 million. “As Congress battles over the Defense Department’s budget, lawmakers have signaled their displeasure at LCS cost overruns and delays. The number of littoral combat ships that policymakers allow the sea service to buy in 2008 could portend whether the program uprights itself in the next few years, say analysts.”

• DID (March 19/07) – Cost Growth Puts the Brakes on the USA’s Littoral Combat Ship Program. And causes both cancellation of Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, and a revised LCS program plan. Not to mention a continued threat to the overall program, if costs remain near $400 million while weapon capabilities remain so limited and inflexible.

• Lexington Institute (Nov 28/06) – Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy [PDF format]. Washington think-tank offers an in-depth look at the LCS as the Navy’s most transformational program, and the key program challenges that must be overcome in order for the LCS program to be successful.

• International Hydrofoil Society (Sept 23/04) – NAVSEA Presentation re: Littoral Combat Ship Program [PDF format]. Includes visuals ad information related to mission modules, program structure & timelines, and the two competing teams.

• DefenseLINK (May 28/04) – Special Department of Defense Briefing re: Littoral Combat Ship Program. Good discussion of the program as a whole and procurement approach, as well as how the modules are envisioned to work.

• US Naval Institute, Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS. But note esp. Vice-Adm. Mustin & Katz’ warnings about the possibility of a failed “high-low” force mix.

Official Reports

• US GAO (#GAO-08-13, Oct 12/07) – Report to the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities” [PDF]

• US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces (July 24/07) – Congressional Budget Office, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security and Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst: The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs [PDF format]

• US GAO (#GAO-07-943T, July 24/07) – Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs.

• US GAO (#GAO-07-406SP, March 30/07) – Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. LCS is one, and this study is an annual release. Here is the March 30/06 version.

• US GAO (#GAO-06-587T March 30/06) – Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range Shipbuilding Plans

LCS Ancillaries & Auxillaries

• Anthony G Williams – Naval Armament: The MCG Problem. MCG = medium-caliber gun. There has been a global divergence of views re: what 55mm-155mm naval guns should be for, and therefore which characteristics should be stressed. BAE’s 57mm gun, which will equip the LCS, falls firmly on one side of this debate.

• DID – Cheap, Fast, Deadly: The NETFIRES “Missiles in a Box” Program (updated). FOCUS Article.

• DID – RAM Missiles: FY 2006 Contracts & Events (updated). Covers SeaRAM, the new system that will provide the LCS’ primary defense against aircraft and missiles.

• Lockheed Martin – COMBATSS-21 Combat Management System

• Military.com (Nov 1/07) – LCS to Carry Marines?

• Lockheed Martin (July 10/06) – Lockheed Martin Sea Talon Program Achieves Key Milestones Toward Deployment As Littoral Combat Ship ASW Mission Module

• DID (May 4/06) – $8.5M for 2 Littoral Combat Ship Anti-Submarine USVs.

• DID (Jan 9/06) – N-G Gets $159M Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Integration Contract. Covers the mission module program’s structure, and the MIW, ASW, and SUW modules.

• Seapower Magazine (December 2005) – Navy Custom Tailors Crew Training for Littoral Combat Ship.

• DID (Dec 2/05) – Sub-Finding Sensor Nets Get A Step Closer. Covers the ADS, or Advanced Deployable System.

• DID (Oct 20/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. Updated to include a number of related anti-submarine warfare technologies, most of of which will find their way onto the LCS fleet or will interface with it.

• DID (Oct 17/05) – The Fire Scout UTUAV Program: By Land and By Sea (updated)

• DID (Sept 23/05) – Navy Launches Final Development of Bluefin 21 UUV

• DID (Sept 20/05) – WLD-1 UUV and AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar

• DID (Sept 15/05) – $124.5M for 3 Airborne Laser Mine Detection Systems (Updated). These will be carried on the LCS, which will become an operational center for up to five MH-60S helicopters equipped with the AN/AES-1 ALMDS system.

• DID (May 18/05) – Spartan USVs for Singapore’s Navy

• C4ISR Journal (July 2004) – Design Work Proceeds on LCS Mission Modules: Suites will allow quick switches for pressing threat

LCS and Related Programs

• Danish Navy – Flyvefisken Class (1989-), aka. Standard Flex 300

• Naval Technology – Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) Multi-Role Vessels, Denmark

• Danish Navy – Absalom Class (2004-). These multi-role ships can act as frigates, minelayers, command ships, hospital ships, or even as small roll-on/ roll-off landing ships thanks to their “Flex-Deck” and other features.

• Naval Technology – Skjold (“Shield”) Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats, Norway. One of these air cushion catamaran ships completed a 13-month deployment in the USA before the LCS program got underway, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea.

• Naval Technology – Visby Class Corvettes, Sweden

• DID – Dead Aim, Or Dead End? The USA’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Program. FOCUS Article.

• DID – Russia & China Building Littoral Warships. The Chinese Type 022 wave-piercing catamaran fast attack craft is a potential littoral opponent. The Russian Project 2038 Steregushchiy (“Guarding”) Class, on the other hand, may well represent a true export competitor.

• G2mil – Diesel Electric Corvettes. Highly critical of the LCS program. Core of the criticism: “The LCS is the size of modern frigate and bigger than destroyers of World War II, yet has the armament of a patrol boat in order to accommodate the mysterious ultra high-speed requirement…. The US Navy should scrap the current LCS plan in favor of slower, smaller, and more capable DE [diesel-electric] corvettes based on the Visby class corvette design and supported by tenders [vid. Yellowstone Class AD-41]”

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral Combat Ship Troubles: Opportunity for Small Boat Companies? “The Navy’s really trying to think, ‘do we need a vessel in between the LCS and the riverine,’ and I think in the end, they’re going to say, yes they do,” says Robert Work, senior naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” The Stiletto experimental ships are cited as one likely gap-filler.

• Information Dissemination (July 10/07) – The US Navy’s PF-109 “Patrol Frigate” Program. Which led to the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, as the low end of US surface combatant force structure during the 1970s and 1980s. Says the LCS program isn’t imitating the FFG-7’s successes. Then again, compare this contention with the CBO’s July 24/07 testimonmy, which compared the first-of-class ships of each type in FY 2008 dollars.

• DID (April 12/06) – The Lion in Winter: Government, Industry, and US Naval Shipbuilding Challenges. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter discusses US shipbulding plans and challenges. The LCS is referenced as an important trend and exemplar.

• Defense News (Oct 25/05) – Ship Shows Off Danish Navy’s ‘Transformation’ Re: Absalom Class ships.

• The Fourth Rail (April 27/05) – Of Pirates and Terrorists

• DID (March 4/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines is forcing doctrinal changes, as well as new technology programs. Quite a few of these new programs will find their way onto the LCS, or interface with it.

• Sea Classics, via FindArticles (November 2004) – Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Contracts Awarded – What Does It Mean To The US Navy?

• Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey (Dec 2003) – “Sea Swat”: A Littoral Combat Ship for Sea Base Defense

• Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS

• Melana Zyla Vickers at FOXNews (Oct 14/03) – High Seas Robbery. Covers the need for the LCS program.

• Melana Zyla Vickers at TechcentralStation (May 6/02) – Naval Overkill. She thinks the DD (X) is, but the LCS and Streetfighter programs aren’t.

• DID Topic Archive: Naval Equipment/ Coastal & Littoral

• Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine (November 2003) – Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII – Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet. Gives good background re: the releationship of the links that follow to the LCS program, and how that kind of effort fits in with the US Navy’s new naval doctrine.

• GlobalSecurity.org – HSV Program for high speed troop carrier vessels (incl. WestPac Express and TSV ships TSV-1X Spearhead and HSV-2 Swift). Given that “HSV-2” is also a designation for a variety of Herpes Simplex STD, it is possible that this designation will change to a TSV variant once the ship class is firmly established.

• DID (Nov 24/05) – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward

• DID (Sept 27/05) – UAVs, Blimps, and HSV-2, Oh My! It would not surprise us at all if the semi-autonomous, long-endurance ScanEagle surveillance UAV were to find itself added to the LCS’ onboard options in future. These UAVs are valued very highly by the US Marines as combat surveillance UAVs, and testing them on the HSV-2 seems explicitly designed to pave the way for LCS integration.

• DID (July 22/05) – U.S. Marines Extend Westpac Express TSV Ship Charter. The success of Austal’s HSV 4676 has also helped to shape US military thinking about potential LCS designs. The article also discusses Austal’s new Mobile, AL facility, which will be a key participant in LCS construction for the General Dynamics team.

• Naval Sea Systems Command (April 2004) – HSV-2 proving to be Prototype for Littoral Combat Ship Program

• US Navy Fact File – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel

• HowStuffWorks.com – How the FSF-1 Sea Fighter Works

• Navy Marine Corps News (June 4/05) – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel: Initial Deployment News Video

• Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel. The vessel participated in a US naval exercise as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons.

DID appreciates the assistance provided by our readers to date, and welcomes further information, corrections, and updates concerning the LCS program. Please send emails to Editor-In-Chief Joe Katzman, via joe@ the domain for the site (defenseindustrydaily.com).

Tag: LCSFOCUS