Joint Common Missile Program Fired - But Not Forgotten
Related Stories: Americas - USA, Helicopters & Rotary, Lobbying, Lockheed Martin, New Systems Tech, R&D - Contracted

The Joint Common Missile (JCM) was seen as the next-generation, multi-purpose, air-to-ground precision missile that will replace AGM-114 Hellfire family, AGM-65 Maverick family, and airborne *GM-71 TOW missiles with a single weapon usable by the airplanes, helicopters and UAVs of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was also being considered for use on some ground vehicles.
In May 2004, Lockheed Martin was picked over Raytheon and a Boeing-Northrop Grumman team to conduct JCM’s 4-year system development and demonstration (SDD) phase, which was to be worth as much as $1.6 billion. The long-term U.S. production estimate of 54,000 missiles would have brought the program to $5 billion, and the United Kingdom had expressed interest in the new weapon and participated in the development process. Tests were underway, and going well.
A 2005 program cancellation derailed that effort, but JCM has risen from the procurement grave – as the JAGM (Joint Air-Ground Missile) program, with contracts to 2 vendor teams. While Raytheon has nothing to say at this point concerning its team or its proposed design, Lockheed Martin has just provided more details regarding its own team…
- The JCM/JAGM Program
- Contracts and Key Events
- Appendix A: The Road Less Taken – JCM’s Program History
- Additional Readings & Sources
The JCM/JAGM Program

Under the revised JAGM program, the US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps is thinking of ordering about 35,000 missiles. Beginning in 2016, they would replace the Hellfire family of missiles on the Army’s AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, ARH-70 Arapaho scout helicopters, and MQ-1C Sywarrior UAVs; the Marines’ AH-1Z Viper attack helicopter; and the Navy’s new MH-60R/S Seahawk helicopters. Navy F/A-18 Hornets would also carry them in place of the current AGM-65 Maverick missile.
The program is currently in a 27 month “risk reduction” development phase, leading up to a competitive flyoff. Previous JCM incumbent Lockheed Martin is back with a team, competing against a team of Raytheon and Boeing.
In Lockheed Martin’s design, The JAGM’s body and tri-mode sensors build on the existing body designs and sensors from Lockheed Martin’s Hellfire missile family’s semi-active laser and millimeter wave Longbow missiles, and the sensors used by the Lockheed/Raytheon Javelin imaging infrared missile to add extra fire-and-forget insurance. Seeker improvements beyond the tri-mode features include extended range, “safing” that would allow carrier landings with live JCS ordnance instead of forcing planes to jettison their loads, and greater “fire and forget” capability.
A single insensitive-munition rocket motor provides the required propulsion. Once it reaches the target, a multi-purpose warhead similar to the Hellfire IIs packs a shaped-charge designed to defeat the most advanced armored threats, along with a blast fragmentation capability to defeat ships, buildings, bunkers with a two-phase warhead punch.
Team Lockheed includes LM Missiles and Fire Control (lead integrator, tri-mode seeker), Aerojet in Camden, AK (rocket motor), Aliant Techsystems in Woodland Hills, CA (aircraft integration), EMS technologies in Atlanta, GA (millimeter wave antenna), General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems in Niceville, FL (warhead), Honeywell in Minneapolis, MN (inertial measurement unit), L3 in cincinnati, OH (focal plane array infared detector), Roxel in Summerfield, UK (propellant), Marvin Engineering in Inglewood, CA (JAGM launcher), Moog in Aurora, NY (control fin actuators), and Perkin Elmer in Miamisburg, OH (warhead firing module).
Pentagon planners expect that JCM/JAGM standardization would keep maintenance and supply costs lower. Integration with the F-35 fighter family is possible in future, and so are international contracts if the missile makes it through development to become a program of record. At that point, JAGM biggest international competitor would be MBDA and Boeing’s Brimstone, which is being integrated with Britain’s Royal Air Force Harriers, Tornados, and Eurofghters.
Contracts and Key Events

The JAGM program will be managed by the U.S. Army’s Aviation and Missile Command, with participation by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.
Oct 8/08: Lockheed Martin announces and details its JAGM team.
Oct 2/08: The US military announces the initial contracts under the JAGM program, within each contracting team’s limit per earlier entries. Bids were solicited via the Web, and 2 bids were received by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL.
Raytheon Co. in Tucson, AZ receives an $18.7 million fixed price incentive firm target contract, for 27 months of technology development for the Joint Air Ground Missile Program. Work will be performed in St. Louis, MO (Boeing) and Tucson, AZ (Raytheon) with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/10 (W31P4Q-08-C-A789).
Lockheed Martin Corp. in Orlando, FL received an $18.7 million fixed price incentive firm target contract, for 27 months of technology development for the Joint Air Ground Missile Program. Work will be performed in Orlando, FL; Ocala, FL; and Troy, AL, with an estimated completion date of Dec 31/10 (W31P4Q-08-C-A123).
Sept 22/08: The Raytheon / Boeing team announces a 27-month, $125 million contract for the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile program. The contract funds technology development program to develop and fire 3 prototype missiles with fully integrated tri-mode seekers.
Sept 18/08: Lockheed Martin announces that it has won a 27-month, $122 million competitive risk-reduction phase for the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) system. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control VP Rick Edwards:
“Our extensive risk-reduction tests have significantly mitigated risk on the three critical subsystems [seeker, warhead, rocket motor], our software and simulations are mature and proven, and we have made significant strides in developing low-risk platform integration solutions.”
See also the Orlando Sentinel: “Lockheed’s $122M missile contract could create 200 jobs in Orlando area.”
April 14/08: Raytheon Company and Boeing announce a teaming agreement to pursue the U.S. Army-U.S. Navy Joint Air to Ground Missile program, which has an intended in-service date of 2016. Raytheon will be the prime contractor within the team, and the move is significant in that Boeing will not be teamed up with Northrop Grumman this time around.
Raytheon makes existing TOW and Maverick missiles, and the team-up with Boeing creates commonality on a different level: integration with the manufacturer of many USAF and Navy aircraft, an area that Lockheed Martin covers on its own. Boeing is also part of the MBDA-led team that developed the Brimstone missile, Britain’s answer to the JCM program. Raytheon release.
Sept 26/07: Jane’s Missiles & Rockets reports that
“A new Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) programme is expected to become the successor of the Lockheed Martin AGM-169 Joint Common Missile (JCM) programme. As with the JCM, the JAGM is to be a multiservice weapon able to replace all versions of the Lockheed Martin Hellfire, Raytheon Maverick and Raytheon TOW missiles that currently equip fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles in US service…”
Feb 21/07: The Lexington Institute think-tank wades into the controversy with “Joint Common Missile: Why Argue With Success?” Excerpt:
“Here’s a fantasy. Imagine three military services agreed on the need for a versatile air-to-ground missile that could precisely destroy a wide range of elusive targets—everything from camouflaged armored vehicles to terrorist speedboats. Imagine they found a low-cost design that could do those things day or night, good weather or bad, even when enemies were trying to jam the missile. Imagine the services selected a company that developed the missile on time and on cost, meeting all of its performance objectives. And imagine the missile was fielded expeditiously, replacing four cold-war missiles with an easy-to-maintain round that saved military lives while minimizing unintended damage.
You’d have to be pretty naive to believe the Pentagon’s dysfunctional acquisition system could deliver all that, wouldn’t you? That’s right, you would—because the military actually has a program matching that description, and senior officials have been trying to kill it for two years. Why? Well, nobody really knows why….”
Jan 26/07: Inside Defense, Pentagon OKs Funding For Hellfire Replacement Effort:
“The Pentagon comptroller has directed the Army and Navy to pony up $68.5 million to fund missile research and development in an account that could be used to revive the Joint Common Missile—or something like it—more than two years after the Office of the Secretary of Defense moved to terminate the program….”
Dec 30/05: Inside Defense reports that when US House and Senate conferees reconciled the details of the FY 2006 defense appropriations bill, they restored $30 million to the Army-led JCM program to continue the missile’s development ($26 million in research, development, test and evaluation funding from the Army, and $4 million from the Navy). They’ve also required a report by January 30, 2006 explaining how the Pentagon plans to fill the future gaps created by the missile’s demise, and a cost analysis of continuation vs. termination and buying existing missiles. Depending on what that study says, the JCM program could rise again.
Appendix A: The Road Less Taken – JCM’s Program History
The JCM program had made heavy use of modeling & simulation in its early phases, and was the first missile program ever to reach a Milestone B decision without conducting a live test. Subsequent live tests, including live fire tests against simulated urban targets, were also successful.
The missile reported less success on the budget front, however. In 2005, the Pentagon cut the Joint Common Missile (JCM) program in order to fund operations in Iraq. Canceling the Army-led JCM was estimated to save about $2.4 billion over the next 6 years ($928 million Army, $1.5 billion Navy). This triggered a counter-campaign by Congressional representatives, and created a controversy over the future of the program that never really went away.
The UK ended up developing its own system. In November 1996, the UK gave MBDA the Brimstone contract, in order to create a fire-and-forget anti-armor missile that could be fired by fast jets as well as helicopters. Brimstone uses inertial guidance plus millimeter-wave radar, and has a terrain following mode as well. In October 2003, a successful series of test firings were carried out, and the missile entered service with the RAF in March 2005. The 50 kg/ 110 pound Brimstone is being deployed on Britain’s Harriers, Tornados, and Eurofighters, and experiments are underway with ground vehicle launchers as well.
The need for a capability similar to the JCM remained clear even to the Pentagon, and so the U.S. Department of Defense’s Program Budget Decision (PBD) No. 753 directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to commission a study for a very similar weapon system in time for the 2008 budget review. Meanwhile, the Alabama Congressional delegation and other members of Congress kept lobbying to keep the missile program going. All of that work eventually ended up as a renewed competition under a new name: Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM).
Additional Readings & Sources
- Defence-Update.com: JCM – Joint Common Missile
- GlobalSecurity.org: Joint Common Missile
- Boeing All Systems Go Magazine (Vol. 1 #6, 2003) – The Next Generation Weapon: Joint Common Missile
- Boeing – Brimstone Precision Guided Missile. Britain’s answer to the JCM’s demise; development was led by MBDA.
- Lexington Institute (Feb 21/07) – Joint Common Missile: Why Argue With Success?
- Huntsville Times (Mar 24/05) – Battle stepped up to save Redstone missile project
- Spacewar.com (Mar 17/05) – Lockheed Martin Joint Common Missile Destroys Urban Targets
- Aerospace Daily & Defense Report (Jan 05/05) – Joint Common Missile’s Demise Spurs ‘Capability Needs’ Study
- Battle Command, Simulation & Experimentation Directorate (July 30/03) – SMART Lessons Learned Case Summary



