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On Sept 30/08, “The USA’s National Cybersecurity Initiative” focused on the belated but growing reaction to recent uses of cyber-attacks as an adjunct to warfare, and by the growing rate of attempted intrusions into American systems from countries like China. In June 2008, “Secure Semiconductors: Sensible, or Sisiphyean?” discussed the growing realization within the US military that massive use of commercial electronics, coupled with the complexity of modern chip designs, made it very difficult to be sure that “backdoors” and other security flaws weren’t being inserted into high-end American defense equipment. It’s a difficult conundrum, because commercial chips offer orders of magnitude improvements in cost and performance. Hence DARPA’s “Trust in IC” program, which hopes to crack the problem and offer the best of both worlds.

On Oct 2/08, Business Week’s in-depth article “Dangerous Fakes” claimed that a key component of the silicon security threat might be even simpler:

“The American military faces a growing threat of potentially fatal equipment failure – and even foreign espionage – because of counterfeit computer components used in warplanes, ships, and communication networks. Fake microchips flow from unruly bazaars in rural China to dubious kitchen-table brokers in the U.S. and into complex weapons. Senior Pentagon officials publicly play down the danger, but government documents, as well as interviews with insiders, suggest possible connections between phony parts and breakdowns…. Potentially more alarming than either of the two aircraft episodes are hundreds of counterfeit routers made in China and sold to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines over the past four years. These fakes could facilitate foreign espionage, as well as cause accidents. The U.S. Justice Dept. is prosecuting the operators of an electronics distributor in Texas – and last year obtained guilty pleas from the proprietors of a company in Washington State – for allegedly selling the military dozens of falsely labeled routers…. Referring to the seizure of more than 400 fake routers so far, Melissa E. Hathaway, head of cyber security in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, says: “Counterfeit products have been linked to the crash of mission-critical networks, and may also contain hidden ‘back doors’ enabling network security to be bypassed and sensitive data accessed….”

Recent years have seen cyber-security rise as a defense industry and national security issue. The frequency of cracking attempts against security-related systems from Chinese sources has grown to the point where it is being acknowledged in the Pentagon’s annual “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” publications. Estonia found itself the subject of politically motivated cyberattacks from Russia in May 2007. In 2008, cyber-assaults on Georgia operated in tandem with a buildup of Russian troops within Georgian territory, prior to the recent invasion.

Governments respond slowly, but responses are now beginning to get underway. Federal Computing Weekly, “Unlocking the national cybersecurity initiative”

“The cybersecurity initiative launched by the Bush administration earlier this year remains largely cloaked in secrecy, but it’s already clear that it could have a major and far-reaching effect on government IT operations in the future.

Overseeing all of this will be a central office run by the Homeland Security Department, the first time that the government’s efforts in cybersecurity will run through a single office tasked with coordinating the work of separate federal cybersecurity organizations…”

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AEHF concept
(click to view full)

The USA’s new Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites will support twice as many tactical networks, while providing 10-12 times the capacity and 6 times higher data rate transfer than that of the current Milstar II satellites. They will form the secure backbone of the Pentagon’s intermediate term Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) architecture, until the larger capacity Transformational Communications Satellite System or its equivalent enters service. Its companion Family of Advanced Beyond-line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T) program, meanwhile, will give the US military modern capabilities and more flexibility on the receiving end.

Like a number of current US satellite development programs, the AEHF program has been cited for cost overruns and schedule slips, in part as a result of failures by the US National Security Agency to furnish key cryptography requirements and specifications in the most timely manner.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This article offers a look at the AEHF system’s rationale and capabilities, while offering insight into some of the program’s problems, and an updated timeline covering over $5 billion worth of contracts since the program’s inception.

The latest news involves ongoing assembly work, and some promising tests regarding the new FAB-T terminals…

• The AEHF Program (i.e. “Continue reading…”)[updated]
• FAB-T Terminals and Ground Control
• FAB-T: Contracts and Key Events, full history [updated]
• The AEHF Satellites
• The AEHF Satellites: Contracts & Key Events, full history [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
  Continue Reading… »

Think of RFID (Radio Frequency I.D.) as a bar code that can be read at a distance, instead of having to be scanned directly. RFID is becoming a pervasive feature in the American defense supply chain, and is beginning to make inroads into other markets as well. While supply chain solutions remain its main use, it is also a common feature in security solutions like ‘smart’ access cards. That latter use has led to a number of problems lately, including the posting of armed guards to secure sensitive government facilities in Europe.

NXP Semiconductors is currently filing suit in The Netherlands against Radboud University in Nijmegen, in an attempt to keep its researchers from publishing a paper about reported security flaws in NXP’s widely distributed MiFare Classic RFID chip. The chip’s 48-bit encryption was high end in 1994, but is considered very vulnerable by modern standards. The chip’s security flaws were publicized in a 2007 crack, but the downside of hardware-based security systems is the expense and time involved in changing them. In light of recent events, government agencies employing smart cards will need to factor that unpleasant reality into their purchasing decisions. Ken van Wyk, principal consultant at KRvW Associates is quoted by Computerworld on this issue:

“It turns out it’s a pretty huge deal…. There are a lot of these things floating around out there. Using it for building locks is the biggy, especially when it’s used in sensitive government facilities – and I know for a fact it’s being used in sensitive government facilities.” Van Wyk noted in March that one European country had deployed soldiers to guard some government facilities that used the MiFare Classic chip in their smart door key cards…. “You have an RFID chip deployed by the millions,” said van Wyk. “Switching that around is extremely costly and won’t happen very quickly. It could be it will take them months or a year to do that.”

DID thanks reader Michael Butler for the tip.

Trident Technology Solutions, of Fairfax, VA received a maximum $49.9 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity contract. Trident will design an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) for the Air Force, Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) tha incorporates multi-level security and “encompasses all aspects of information sharing including file sharing text chat, audio and video teleconferencing, blogs, and wikis.” At this time $868,281 has been obligated by the Air Force Research Laboratory/RIKF in Rome, NY (FA8750-08-D-0206).

Ironically, at press time, the Trident Technology Solutions web site and the parent firm site for Trident Systems, Inc. were both unavailable.

IEEE spectrum magazine, in “The Hunt for the Kill Switch”:

“Feeding those dreams is the Pentagon’s realization that it no longer controls who manufactures the components that go into its increasingly complex systems. A single plane like the DOD’s next generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, can contain an “insane number” of chips, says one semiconductor expert familiar with that aircraft’s design. Estimates from other sources put the total at several hundred to more than a thousand. And tracing a part back to its source is not always straightforward. The dwindling of domestic chip and electronics manufacturing in the United States, combined with the phenomenal growth of suppliers in countries like China, has only deepened the U.S. military’s concern.

Recognizing this enormous vulnerability, the DOD recently launched its most ambitious program yet to verify the integrity of the electronics that will underpin future additions to its arsenal. In December, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon’s R&D wing, released details about a three-year initiative it calls the Trust in Integrated Circuits program…. Three years ago, the prestigious Defense Science Board, which advises the DOD on science and technology developments, warned in a report that the continuing shift to overseas chip fabrication would expose the Pentagon’s most mission-critical integrated circuits to sabotage. The board was especially alarmed that no existing tests could detect such compromised chips, which led to the formation of the DARPA Trust in IC program.”

Nimrod MR2 at work
(click to view full)

In the face of the Soviet threat to the West’s vital sea lanes and thus its reinforcements in the event of war, long-range maritime patrol aircraft were a high priority for the western alliance. Like Lockheed’s P-3 Orion, Britain’s Nimrod aircraft are also based on a previous airliner design. Unlike the USA, Britain chose a jet-age Comet airframe. They ended up with an aircraft that boasted an unrefueled endurance of over 10 hours and longer range than the P-3, but less-favourable “low and slow” characteristics. The British claim, however, that “propeller-engined aircraft make a discrete resonance that can be detected by submerged submarines, whereas the jet noise of the Nimrod is virtually undetectable.” Both aircraft types would go on to see long and successful service, and both would also be produced in ELINT / SIGNIT versions: the EP-3, and the Nimrod MR1.

The USA dithered over the successor to its P-3 Orion fleet, before finally choosing the 737-based P-8A in June 2004. Meanwhile, a British program was begun in 1996 to rebuild their existing Nimrod Mk2 fleet to the MRA4 standard with new wings, engines, internal systems, and mission systems. Unfortunately, that program has faced a series of budget cuts, stalls, and conditions that have reduced the program from 21 aircraft to 12, and threatened complete cancellation at times. As of July 2006, however, the British are also moving forward.

This article will serve as DID’s focus for the UK’s Nimrod fleet upgrade programs, which may have spinoff effects into India’s ongoing maritime patrol aircraft competition. The most recent update is unrest in Britain’s Parliamentary Defence Committee, and a coroner’s report that the Nimrod which crashed in Afghanistan in 2006 had “never been airworthy.” He recommends grounding the fleet, but the UK MoD refuses…

• Hunters of Subs & Signals: Britain’s Nimrods
• MRA4 Program: The Next Nimrods
• Contracts and Events [updated]
• Project HELIX: Upgrading the Nimrod R1 ELINT Fleet
• Additional Readings & Sources
• Addendum: Correction Credit
  
  Continue Reading… »

Eagan, McAllister Associates, Inc. in Lexington Park, MD received a $22.1 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity performance-based contract with hybrid pricing arrangements. The firm will work with the The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center in Charleston, SC to provide production engineering, integration product improvement, test and evaluation, and maintenance support as well as the capacity to modernize or introduce transformational technologies into systems and technical support services of various C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cryptology, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) programs. The results will be fielded on platforms such as: Marine Corps Up-Armored HMMWV, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Rapid Responded Vehicle, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, other Department of Defense vehicle platforms, Navy C5ISR tactical vehicles, and Marine Corps C5ISR tactical vehicles, in addition to other tactical vehicles.

This contract includes four 1-year options and 3 award terms. If exercised, they would bring the cumulative value of this contract to $222 million. Work will be performed in Charleston, S.C., and is expected to be complete by May 2009 (May 2016 with all options and award terms exercised). The Request for Proposal was posted on the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center E-Commerce website, with 2 offers received (N65236-08-D-2837).

In May of 1998, technical and consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. of McLean, VA received a $199.6 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to establish and operate the US military’s Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center. This contract had a 3-year base period, plus a 3-year option period and a 4-year option period, for a total performance period of 10 years with completion by April 30, 2008. The Defense Supply Center Columbus solicited 9 bids, and received 2 (SPO700-98-D-4002). A number of awards have been made under this contract, but a set of awards announced on May 16/08 appear to be the final set of contracts under this arrangement…

Continue Reading… »

FRES-U finalists: There
can be only one…
(click to view full)

Many of Britain’s army vehicles are old and worn, and the necessities of hard service on the battlefield are only accelerating that wear. The multi-billion pound “Future Rapid Effects System” (FRES) aims to recapitalize the core of Britain’s armored vehicle fleet over the next decade or more, filling many of the same medium armor roles as the Stryker Family of armored wheeled vehicles and/or the Future Combat Systems’ Manned Ground Vehicle family. Current estimates indicate a potential requirement for over 3,700 FRES vehicles, including utility and reconnaissance variants. Even so, one should be cautioned that actual numbers bought usually fall short of intended figures for early-stage defense programs.

The FRES program was spawned by the UK’s withdrawal from the German-Dutch-UK Boxer MRAV modular wheeled APC program, in order to develop a more deployable vehicle that fit Britain’s exact requirements. Those initial requirements were challenging, however, and experience in Iraq and Afghanistan led to decisions that removed a number of FRES requirements including weight. The UK MoD has taken some criticism for its selection of wheeled APCs as its FRES-U infantry fighting vehicle finalists, and even more criticism for making the Boxer MRAV one of those finalists after spending all that time and sterling on FRES development. The MoD is defending its choices, however, and has now declared a winner…

• FRES: The Program (Continue reading…) [updated]
• FRES: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
• Appendix 1 – The British Army’s Armored Vehicle Fleet, late 2006
• Appendix 2 – A New Procurement Approach: System House Challenges
• Appendix 3 – FRES: Key Challenges for the Contractors
• Appendix 4 – FRES Experiments: Electronic Architecture Contracts
• Appendix 5 – FRES Experiments: Vehicle-Related Contracts
  
  Continue Reading… »