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688I-Class SSN: Drydocking
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General Dynamics Electric Boat Corp. in Groton, CT received a $285.9 million cost plus fixed fee contract for “design agent, planning yard, engineering, and technical support for active nuclear submarines.” This contract includes options which would bring the cumulative value of the contract to an estimated $1.788 billion if they are all exercised and funded.

Under the terms of the contract, GDEB will provide design, engineering, material and logistics support, and research and development activities for active U.S. Navy nuclear submarines and submersibles. Since the USN has an all-nuclear fleet, this means all American submarines. Electric Boat will also provide information services, planning, scheduling and technical support for submarine maintenance and modernization activities, training and facility support, and affordability/cost reduction support.

Work performed under the initial award is expected to be complete by October 2009. It will be performed in Groton, CT (73%); Kings Bay, GA (11%); Bangor, WA (8%); Quonset, RI (6%); and Newport, RI (2%), and is expected to be complete by October 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $34.3 million will expire at the end of the fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington Navy Yard, DC (N00024-09-C-2101). See also: GDEB release.

Virginia Block I-II
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The SSN-774 Virginia Class submarine was introduced in the 1990s as a Clinton-era reform that was intended to take some of the SSN-21 Seawolf Class’ key design and technology advances, and place them in a smaller, less heavily-armed, and less expensive platform. The resulting submarine would have learned some of the Seawolf program’s negative procurement lessons, while performing capably in land attack, naval attack, special forces, and shallow water roles. In the end, the Seawolf Class became a technology demonstrator program that was canceled at 3 ships, and the Virginia Class became the naval successor to America’s famed SSN-688 Los Angeles Class. The Virginia Class program was supposed to reach 2 submarines per year by 2002, removing it from the unusual joint construction approach between General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding – but that goal has been pushed back to 2012 in progressive planning budgets.

In FY 2005 dollars, SSN-21 submarines cost between $3.1-3.5 billion each. According to Congressional Research Service report #RL32418, and the Navy is working toward a goal of shaving FY05$ 400 million from the cost of each Virginia Class boat, and buying 2 boats in FY2012 for combined cost of $4.0 billion in FY 2005 dollars – a goal referred to as “2 for 4 in 12”. In real dollars subject to inflation, that means about $2.6 billion per sub in 2012, and $2.7 billion in 2013. The Navy believes that moving from the current joint construction arrangement will shave FY05$ 200 million from the cost of each submarine, leaving another FY05$ 200 million (about $220 million) to be saved through ship design and related changes. “Virginia Block III: The Revised Bow” chronicles some of the significant cost-saving design changes underway to the Virginia Class Block 3 subs, which begin at SSN-784, the 11th ship of class.

How is the program doing? The good news is, they just won a major procurement award for their efforts…

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SSN Akula Class
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According to GlobalSecurity.org, India’s ATV (advanced technology vessel) program to build a nuclear-powered submarine began in 1974, and became a serious effort in 1985. The Federation of American Scientists’ December 1996 document “The Indian Strategic Nuclear Submarine Project: An Open Literature Analysis” remains one of the best single open sources on India’s program. Unfortunately, it was compiled over a decade ago and has become rather dated.

Meanwhile, even if one omits the problem-plagued Type 091 Han Class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and old, updated-Romeo Type 035 Ming Class SSKs, China’s attack sub force is still projected at about 30 subs by 2010, including 4 Type 093 Shang Class SSN nuclear powered attack subs and 8 Kilo (Project 636) & Advanced Kilo Class (Project 877) diesel-electric SSKs. In contrast, India is likely to have just 10-16 Scorpene, Kilo, and Type 209 Class SSKs of its own by that time, plus any nuclear fast attack submarines in its service.

More and more sources were claiming that the Akula Class boat INS Chakra would be operational as a training vessel by 2009. But a deadly accident during K-152 Nerpa’s sea trials may delay that schedule – and cost India more…

• The ATV Program: Background
• Events and Reports [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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“Il n’y a pas de liberté, il n’y a pas d’égalité, il n’y a pas de fraternité sans securité.”
—French President Nicolas Sarkozy

In June 2007, “France’s Sarkozy Softening on Defense After Electoral Stumble” covered debate around France’s future armed forces, and apparent backtracks in his campaign position regarding future defense spending. In July 2007, President Sarkozy put together a group that was tasked it with creating a White Paper to define France’s future defense policy. The last time an exercise of this type had been conducted was in 1994.

That group eventually returned with its report, and on June 17/08, President Sarkozy made a speech outlining the key elements of that future direction. The decisions made will change the shape of French defense spending, and will launch an attempt to implement an interlocking set of procurement, infrastructure, and political reforms and changes.

This DID article offers some details from that plan, explains the implications for NATO and the EU, and follows ongoing developments, which include recent cabinet approval of a 6-year spending plan…

• France’s 5 Foci
• Military Programs and Decisions
• Other Elements of Interest
• France, NATO, and the EU
• Updates and Key Events [NEW]
• Additional Readings
  
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Basic Nuclear Propulsion
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Several navies around the world currently use nuclear propulsion in at least some ships and submarines: The USA has had an all-nuclear submarine fleet for over 50 years, a policy that dates back to Adm. Hyman Rickover. Britain’s sale of its SSK Upholder Class to Canada (as the problem-plagued Victoria Class) has made them an all-nuclear submarine fleet as well. China, France and Russia all use naval nuclear propulsion within mixed submarine fleets, India is currently working to join this club via its SSN program, and Brazil may be about to launch a program of its own. On the surface, France’s problem-plagued aircraft carrier FNS Charles de Gaulle joins Russia’s Kirov Class cruisers. Across the ocean, America’s aircraft carriers will soon become an all-nuclear fleet with the retirement of the USS Kitty Hawk [CV 63], and FY 2008-09 spending legislation is pushing the US Navy to use nuclear power in its future CG (X) cruisers and new amphibious ship classes.

The saga of the Charles de Gaulle serves as a reminder that adapting nuclear propulsion technology to the small spaces of a submarine, or fitting them to a surface warship, is no trivial feat. Much can go wrong, even in nations that have used nuclear naval propulsion for some time. On the flip side, advances in design can offer significant benefits. The new nuclear plants in America’s Virginia Class and Seawolf Class fast attack subs, Britain’s new Astute Class fast attack submarines, and the USA’s forthcoming CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford Class aircraft carriers, offer designs that will save billions over the life of each ship by eliminating the standard mid-life reactor refueling.

This Spotlight article currently covers related American nuclear propulsion industrial base contracts since the beginning of FY 2006. All contracts noted here are awarded by The US Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC, and that completion date or other additional information are provided for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program contracts as a matter of official policy. Other contracts related to maintenance, however, may show completion dates.

The latest item raises the total over the month of October 2008 to more than $1.4 billion…

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E-6B TACAMO
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The USA’s E-6 Mercury (aka. TACAMO, as in TAke Charge And Move Out) “survivable airborne communication system” airplanes support their Navy’s SSBN ballistic missile submarine force and overall strategic forces. With the advent of the new “Tactical Trident” converted Ohio Class special operations subs, their unique capabilities become even more useful. The E-6B version also has a secondary role as a “Looking Glass” Airborne National Command Post, and in recent years they have seen use as communications relay stations over the front lines of combat.

Delivery of the first production E-6 aircraft took place in August 1989, with delivery of the 16th and final airplane coming in May 1992. This is DID’s FOCUS Article concerning the E-6 system, which includes details concerning the capabilities and associated contracts. They’re mostly maintenance and training-related contracts, these days…

• E-6 Mercury: Messenger from On High
• E-6 Mercury: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
  
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From these…

At various times, DID has covered advance materials procurement and other contracts under the program to modify some of the USA’s nuclear-powered Ohio Class SSBN nuclear missile submarines to become long range conventional strike and special operations SSGN “Tactical Tridents.”

Four ultra-stealthy Ohio-class SSBNs are having their 24 Trident II D-5 nuclear ballistic missiles removed and replaced with up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The USA is also adding accommodation for 66-102 special forces troops, special attachments for new Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) or older Seal Delivery Vehicle (SDV) “mini-subs,” and a mission control center. In future, the SSGNs may also carry UUV underwater robotic vehicles and even UAVs for aerial operations.

...to these
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These modifications provide the USA with an impressive and impressively flexible set of conventional firepower, in a survivable and virtually undetectable platform that can remain on station for very long periods.

DID has updated its previous material and discusses the origins of this conversion program, the key players, the timeline, and the key technologies involved. We also offer comprehensive coverage of the announced contracts under this $1.4 billion refurbishment and conversion program to date, including a number of related ancillary contracts and programs. This will remain the updated DID Focus article for all materials related to the SSGN program. All 4 submarines have now returned to service, and they are beginning to execute key missions…

• The US Navy’s New SSGN Platform
• SSGN Conversions: Timelines & Program Contractors
• SSGN Tactical Trident: Contracts and Key Events
• SSGN Tactical Trident: Ancillary Programs
• Additional Readings
  
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A-RCI is a sonar system upgrade installed on the USA’s entire submarine fleet, including SSN-688 Los Angeles & SSN-688I Improved Los Angeles Class, SSN-21 Seawolf Class, SSN-744 Virginia Class, SSBN-726 Ohio Class nuclear missile boats, and the pending SSGN Tactical Trident special ops and strike subs.

The program’s concept is simple: you can upgrade the system, without changing the sensors. By sharply upgrading ship sensor processing, it integrates and improves the boat’s towed array, hull array and sphere array sonars, running more advanced algorithms and providing a fuller “picture” of the surrounding environment. Sometimes, it really is all about what you can do with it. A-RCI’s open architecture concept also make it easier to integrate additional sensors, providing a dual-track improvement option for American submarines.

DID’s Spotlight on A-RCI adds a bit more explanation of exactly what the program entails and where its benefits were focused; then we’ll go on to cover contracts placed under the A-RCI program from FY 2005 onward. The latest item involves a significant upgrade to Improved Los Angeles Class fast attack submarines, courtesy of easy integration with A-RCI…

• A-RCI: Specifics & Benefits
• A-RCI: FY 2005-2008 Contracts
  
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SSN Swiftsure Class
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In 2003, Thales UK received a 10-year contract to support the Royal Navy’s major sonar systems worth about GBP 100 million over the first 5 years. Over that period, equipment readiness rates have improved, and some overall savings have been achieved in the cost of support. With that kind of initial experience under their belts, the usual process under Britain’s “future contracting for avilability” initiatives has been to extend and broaden the contract, in preparation for a a future contract that features full availability-based contracting for the item in question.

The UK MoD/ Thales UK ‘Integrated Support Team – Sonar’ at Abbey Wood, Bristol have now done exactly that, finalizing a second 5-year term for GBP 134 million, while broadening its scope. The contract now covers the Sonar 2054 systems fitted to the UK’s SSBN Vanguard Class nuclear missile submarines, the Sonar 2074 / 2076 systems fitted to Britain’s SSN Swiftsure Class and Trafalgar Class fast attack submarines, mine-hunting Sonar 2093 / 2193 systems, and the new Sonar 2087 low-frequency active sonar (LFAS) upgrade being fitted to Britain’s Type 23 Duke Class frigates. Note that Britain’s new Type 45 Daring Class air defense destroyers, who will depend on the MFS 7000 sonar array from Ultra Electronics and EDO, remain outside this contract.

The total value of Thales UK’s 10-year sonar support contract is now over GBP 230 million. Thales UK will leverage its 300-perseon facility at Cheadle Heath near Manchester, which designs and builds sonar, as well as the 400-person Templecombe facility in Somerset, which manufactures mine hunting sonar systems and outboard arrays. Thales release.

The US Navy’s lack of a credible plan for its future naval forces has become a growing problem for the service. In Congress, the leadership of the HASC Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee has weighed in from both sides of the partisan aisle, with Navy plans squarely in their sights. Beyond, independent think-tanks and analysts (vid. Information Dissemination’s maritime strategy archive | FY 2009 budget analysis), and even official reports like the CBO’s Dr. Eric Labs (2005 testimony [PDF]), the late Vice-Adm. Cebrowski’s Alternative Fleet Architecture Design study [PDF] (q.v. also derivative 2005 CRS analysis: HTML | PDF), et. al. have been expressing grave doubts for several years now concerning the Navy’s ability to finance or implement its existing “313-ship navy” plan. Which is itself a major step down from the Reagan era’s 600 ship Navy.

The latest broadside comes from the respected center-right think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and was prepared with the assistance of US Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal winner Anthony Cordesman. The synopsis and title of “ABANDON SHIPS: The Costly Illusion of Unaffordable Transformation” [PDF] mince few words:

“The Navy’s procurement policy is in serious disarray. Unrealistic force plans, overoptimistic cost estimates, unrealistic projections of technical feasibility, and inadequate program management have created an unaffordable ship building program, led the Navy to phase out capable ships for new ships it cannot fund, and threaten the US Navy’s ability to implement an effective maritime strategy…. The problem starts at a conceptual disconnect between strategy and reality. The Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower[i] is a set of concepts that was not linked to any clearly defined force plan, modernization plan, program, or budget. Navy shipbuilding plans are now shaped more as the result of budgetary constraints than as a response to strategic requirements. They seem to be an expression of wishful thinking rather than a realistic strategic guideline for naval procurement…. This reality-strategy disconnect in the entire shipbuilding program is a case study in failed leadership on the part of the most senior officers and civilians in the Navy. No reforms in procurement, changes in program management, cost analysis, and test and evaluation can begin to compensate for taking hard and realistic decisions at the top, and holding senior flag officers, senior civilians, and the Secretary of the Navy accountable.”