Scratch one flag…
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In April 2005, South Africa’s Public Enterprises Minister Alec Erwin expected the cost of the SAAF’s 8 planned Airbus A400M medium-heavy military transport aircraft to be EUR 830 million. That converted to R 6.5 billion at those exchange rates, or about $177.75 million per plane in American dollars. South Africa reportedly intended to take delivery of 8 of the A400Ms from 2010-2014, with a further 6 on option. Ordering those additional 6 aircraft would reportedly have pushed the total contract value to EUR $1.5 billion, or about R11.9 billion at those exchange rates. When the deal was signed in December 2006, the price for 8 aircraft and initial fielding had risen to R 17.646 billion, or almost $2.5 billion: about $308 million per plane.

Meanwhile, South Africa bit the bullet and decided to upgrade its 8-9 aged C-130B Hercules planes. The first SAAF C-130Bs were delivered in 1963, and badly needed additional upgrades and refurbishment.

Subsequent delays to the A400M program were set to either extend the C-130Bs’ service, or force reliance on charters, even as the A400M’s likely costs grew. That SAAF aerial uncertainty has only grown, now that South Africa has become the first country to pull out of the A400M program…

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Old as the hills…
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DID’s FOCUS articles cover major weapons acquisition programs – and no program is more important to the USAF than its current bid to replace its aerial tanker fleet. In January 2007, the big question was whether there would be a competition for the USA’s KC-X proposal, which will cover 175 production aircraft and 4 test platforms. The cost for this first phase alone is likely to reach $35+ billion spread over about 20 years, but America’s 40-50 year old aerial tanker fleet demands new planes. Otherwise, unpredictable age or fatigue issues, like the ones its F-15A-D fleet experienced in 2008, could ground its aerial tankers – and with them, a substantial slice of the USA’s total airpower. KC-Y and KC-Z contracts may follow in subsequent decades, in order to replace all 530 KC-135s/ Boeing 707s (195 active; ANG 251; Reserve 84) that were delivered until 1965, as well as the USAF’s 59 larger KC-10 tankers delivered from 1979-1987.

In the end, it was Team Boeing’s KC-767 Advanced (767-200 derivative) vs. the Team Northrop Grumman KC-30B (Airbus A330-200 derivative), both within the Pentagon and in the halls of Congress. Most observers correctly pointed out that all this lobbying was important, since the financial stakes guaranteed a huge political fight no matter which side won. A fight that ended up sinking, and restarting, the entire program.

Recent additions revolve around the KC-X v2.0 draft RFP’s release, as the canceled competition is on again, with a decision expected by mid-2010. As expected, complaints regarding the structure and process have already begun. The latest additions include an important milestone for EADS, amid doubts that the team can win under the new competition…

• KC-X: The Story So Far
• KC-X RFP v2.0: The New Structure [NEW]
• The Contenders and The Cargo Factor: KC-30B, KC-767… KC-777?
• KC-X: Teams & Locations [updated]
• KC-X RFP: Key Developments [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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F-16B & X-35
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In an exclusive June 2006 interview, Israeli Air Force (IAF) chief procurement officer Brigadier-General Ze’ev Snir told Israel’s Globes publication that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was a key part of their IAF recapitalization plans, and that Israel intends to buy over 100 of the fighters to replace their F-16s over time. A 100-plane deal would have cost at least $5 billion under Israel’s original estimates, and would involve the F-35A conventional take-off Air Force version. Snir added that:

“The IAF would be happy to equip itself with 24 F-22s but the problem at this time is the US refusal to sell the plane, and its $200 million price tag.”

Unfortunately, Israel’s September 2008 request for its first 75 F-35s would end up costing them an estimated $15 billion – or about $200 million per plane. All in return for a fighter with poorer air-to-air performance than the F-22, and less stealth. The necessary contract must deal with that sticker shock, and with issues like the incorporation of Israeli technologies, before it can be signed. The latest news is that Israel may forego its own weapons and technologies, in order to curtail a $130 million price tag – and may decide to delay its F-35 purchase by 2 years…

• F-35 for Israel: Key Issues
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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[by John MacNeill]
Goo goo g’joob!

In April 2005, “USN, DARPA See Blimps & HULAs Rising”, looked at a range of projects on the drawing board, including the Walrus heavy-transport blimp (that’s “heavy” as in “1-2 million pounds”) which offered the potential for a faster and more versatile sealift substitute.

In this article DID explains the Walrus concept, details the contractors and contracts involved in this initial award (including a few updates), and lays out the program’s structure… or at least, what used to be its structure. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded phase 1 contracts, but things seemed to end in 2006. Yet the imperatives driving the need for Walrus, or even for a much smaller version of it, remain. Is the Walrus dead? What about Paul? And could it, or a HULA like like it, rise again?

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A400M: The real target?
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From “C-130J Acquisition Program Restructured”:

”[The C-130J Hercules] has since been deployed into theater by the USAF, where its vastly improved performance in “hot and high” environments has come in very handy. Unlike the pending Airbus A400M, however, the C-130J doesn’t solve the sub-survivable 20-ton armored vehicle limit that has stymied multiple US armored vehicle programs from the Stryker IAV to Future Combat Systems. As such, it represents an improvement that fails to address US tactical airlift’s key bottleneck limitation.”

Something called the Advanced Composite Cargo Aircraft (ACCA) may – or may not – represent a first step toward addressing that issue. It may also represent a US aerospace effort to avoid a looming future in which the Airbus A400M would be the only available tactical transport for survivable armored personnel carriers. With the light transport JCA made up of entirely foreign designs, the 20-ton transport market beginning to crowd, and the heavy-lift C-17 production line headed toward shutdown, the US aerospace industry risks a slip from a 1980-1990s position of market dominance in the military transport space to a position of fighting for its competitive life by 2020.

So where does ACAA fit in? How is it connected to the Composite Affordability Initiative, and the notional Advanced Joint Air Combat System (AJACS) program?

• From CAI to ACAA
• The AMC-X/ AJACS Program: Intent and Issues
• Contracts and Key Events
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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VH-71 Concept
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In June 2005, the U.S. Navy selected the US101 for a new fleet of “Marine One” helicopters for the President of the United States. The US101 is an American variant of AgustaWestland’s successful EH101 multimission medium helicopter; it beat out Sikorsky’s S-92 Superhawk, which is already in use as a VIP state transport in countries like South Korea. Lockheed Martin, which leads Team US101 as prime contractor, received a $1.7 billion contract from the Navy for the Marine One program’s systems development and demonstration phase.

Based on the contract schedule, the first US101 that was equipped to transport the President was expected to be available in 2009. The entire fleet of 28 US101s was scheduled for delivered to the Marine One squadron by late 2015.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article for the program. In 2008, the US Navy reached an agreement to proceed with the VH-71, despite a cost per aircraft equal to or greater than the President’s Air Force One 747s. In 2009, the program’s massive requirements changes and accompanying costs overruns led to its proposed cancellation, and a first round of layoffs from Lockheed Martin. Another round is on the way in the wake of a formal stop-work order and program cancellation, even as the Pentagon considers buying 2 different helicopters in the follow-on program. Recent additions include upgrades for the existing Presidential helicopter fleet, and veto recommendation threats from SecDef Gates…

• VH-71: The New Marine One Helicopter Program
• VH-3/ VH-60 Refurbishment: Contracts & Events [NEW]
• VH-71 Marine One: Contracts & Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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C-17, waiting
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A Washington think-tank has gone so far as to call the planned cancellation of C-17 heavy transport aircraft production “The Dumbest Weapons Decision of the Decade.” With heavy usage that is accumulating fatigue hours far faster than originally planned, the US Air Force is loath to pay $1.5 billion to close the C-17 line – then pay another $4+ billion to re-open if their decision proves to be too hasty. Not to mention the larger $8+ billion economic effects and lost jobs. Still, the cost of its equipment means that funds are tight, and last-minute Congressional earmarks have been necessary to keep the C-17 line going. Concern has also been expressed that by shuttering the line, the USA is effectively handing the global strategic airlift market over to France and Russia; the Airbus A400M and Russia’s super-giant AN-124 would be the only games in town from 2010-2025, or longer.

Worse, there is almost no confidence in the Pentagon’s 2005 Mobility Requirements Study, whose assumptions hadn’t budged from a 2000 study – before 9/11 and the resulting global war saw airlift usage and flight hours skyrocket, before the Army’s Future Combat Systems’ failure to fit into C-130 transports as promised… before a lot of things happened. Now, as the battle in Washington heats up again, DID offers this updated article, readings – and accompanying interactive Excel spreadsheet – as a contribution to the discussions.

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MC-12 arrives
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Despite all of the high-tech fighter hours flown in theater, Hawker Beechcraft’s twin-propeller King Air 350 continues to gain traction as an affordable, long-endurance option for light cargo delivery in remote areas – and effective manned battlefield surveillance and attack. Iraq’s Air Force was the first to order them, and an initial 6-plane order from the US Marines/Navy followed in July 2008.

US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has pushed hard to improve ISR capabilities on the front lines, and one of those planned purchases reportedly involves about 30 King Air 350/ C-12 aircraft. The C-12s have proven to be very useful as a component of the Army’s Task Force ODIN, which has combined the respective advantages of UAVs and manned aircraft to improve aerial surveillance and response over Iraq. ODIN is credited with a number of successes on the ground, and the concept is being exported to Afghanistan.

Part of that process involves buying new and updated light aircraft. The USAF is now exercising its option for more, under the original contract…

• Project Liberty, and the MC-12
• Contracts and Key Events
• Additional Readings
  
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RAAF C-130J-30, flares
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The C-130 Hercules remains one of the longest-running aerospace manufacturing programs of all time. Since 1956, over 40 models and variants have served as the tactical airlift backbone for over 50 nations. The C-130J looks similar, but the number of changes almost make it a new aircraft. Those changes also created issues; the program has been the focus of a great deal of controversy in America – and even of a full program restructuring in 2006. Some early concerns from critics were put to rest when the C-130J demonstrated in-theater performance on the front lines that represented a major improvement over its C-130E/H predecessors. A valid follow-on question might be: does it break the bottleneck limitations that have hobbled a number of multi-billion dollar US Army vehicle development programs?

C-130J customers now include Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, India, Iraq, Italy, Norway, Oman, Qatar, and the United States. American C-130J purchases are taking place under both annual budgets and supplemental wartime funding, in order to replace tactical transport and special forces fleets that are flying old aircraft and in dire need of major repairs.

This DID FOCUS Article describes the C-130J, examines the bottleneck issue, covers global developments for the C-130J program, and looks at present and emerging competitors. The latest update includes $827.4 million of advance procurement funding for FY 2010 C-130Js, HC-130Js and MC-130Js…

• The (Private) Labors of Hercules: the C-130J
• The C-130J and the 20-ton Bottleneck
• Turbulent Flight: The C-130J Program
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources, incl. emerging competitors & Special Operations requirements
  
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US Army Paratroopers
Drop into North Korea
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We all have seen photos of a sea of big round parachutes, as US Army paratroopers descended on German troops in France during World War II, on North Korean troops during the Korean War, and into northern Iraq in the most recent Iraq War. The US Army’s parachute design hasn’t changed much over the years. Until now.

The US Army has undertaken a complete redesign of its T-10 parachute, which it has used since the 1950s. The new T-11 parachute has a new square design and a number of advantages over the T-10: a larger canopy, slower descent rate, and greater carrying capacity.

After 3,200 test jumps, the Army is moving ahead with T-11 procurement to get the parachutes into the field…

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