BAE’s Hawk:
over the top
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The UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has spent the last 6 years chasing BAE systems over allegations that bribes were paid to secure foreign deals in a number of countries. Bribes are the least of the allegations involved in some international defense deals, and contract wins without inducements would be far more surprising in countries like Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, and South Africa. Nevertheless, the UK does have laws to prevent British firms from paying them.

An SFO investigation into the giant Saudi Al-Yamamah aircraft deal was killed in December 2006 on national security grounds, after the Saudis threatened to cut off anti-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing. The government’s decision was upheld by the British House of Lords, but the SFO continued to pursue other reports concerning Chile, the Czech Republic, Romania, South Africa, Tanzania, and Qatar. The US Department of Justice, meanwhile, never let go of the Saudi deal.

BAE systems was reportedly been given about a month by the UK SFO to plead guilty concerning its activities in 3 countries, or face formal charges. Several months later, a settlement was reached that included the SFO – and the US DoJ, who got the lion’s share…

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FS Mistral
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France mulls approval of 3 more Mistral LHDs for Russia, amidst political pressure from Russia over Georgia, and concern by French allies. (Feb 8/10)

In August 2009, Russian media reported that their country was planning to take a radical step, and buy a French Mistral class amphibious assault ship (LHD) by the end of 2009. The outlet quoted the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Gen. Nikolai Makarov, who said that: “We are negotiating the purchase of one ship at present, and later planning to acquire 3-4 ships [of the same class] to be jointly built in Russia.” A Russian order would represent a sea change on several fronts – and also the extension of some trends.

France currently operates 2 Mistral class LHDs, and recently ordered a 3rd using economic stimulus funds. Unlike some other LHD designs, the Mistral class cannot operate fixed wing aircraft. Even so, it’s an important tool of power projection. Mistral class ships can carry and deploy up to 16 helicopters, including attack helicopters like France’s Tiger or Russia’s Ka-50/52. Its main punch revolves around its 4 landing barges or 2 medium hovercraft, however, which deliver armored vehicles, tanks, and soldiers to shore. The vessel is equipped with a 69-bed hospital, and could be used as an amphibious command ship.

• Mistral’s Meaning: A Method to their Madness?
• The Mistral Class BPC/LHDs
• Updates and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
  
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Taiwan orders up to 20 medium helicopters, and may be headed for a modernized FFG-7 program. (Feb 3/10)

Despite China’s military buildup across the strait, key weapons sales of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot PAC-3 missiles, and diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan have been sabotaged by Taiwanese politics for years – in some cases, since 1997. The KMT party’s flip-flops and determined stalling tactics eventually created a crisis in US-Taiwan relations, which finally soured to the point that the USA refused a Taiwanese request for F-16C/D aircraft.

That seems to have brought things to a head. Most of the budget and political issues were eventually sorted out, and after a long delay, some major elements of Taiwan’s requested modernization program appear to be moving forward: P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot missile upgrades; and requests for AH-64D attack helicopters, UH-60M Black Hawks helicopters, E-2 AWACS planes, minehunting ships, and missiles for defense against aircraft, ships, and tanks. These are must-have capabilities when facing a Chinese government that has vowed to take the country by force, and which is building an extensive submarine fleet, a large array of ballistic missiles, an upgraded fighter fleet, and a number of amphibious-capable divisions.

Chinese pressure continues to stall some of Taiwan’s important upgrades, including diesel-electric submarines and American fighter jets. Meanwhile, other purchases continue…

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Dassault Rafale
(click for cutaway view)

Performance-based support contract for Thales. (Feb 2/10)

Will Dassault’s fighter become a fashionably late fighter platform that builds on its parent company’s past successes – or just “the late Rafale”? It all began as a 1985 break-away from the multinational consortium that went on to create EADS’ Eurofighter. The French needed a lighter aircraft that was suitable for carrier use, and were reportedly unwilling to cede design authority over the project. As is so often true of French defense procurement policy, the choice came down to one of paying additional costs for full independence and exact needs, or losing key industrial capabilities by partnering or buying abroad. France has generally opted for expensive but independent defense choices, and the Rafale was no exception.

Those costs, and associated delays triggered by the end of the Cold War and reduced funding, proved to be very costly indeed. Unlike previous French fighters, which relied on exports to lower their costs and keep production lines humming, the Rafale has yet to secure a single export contract – in part because versions fielded to date have impaired capabilities in key roles. The Rafale may, at last, be ready to be what its vendors say: a true omnirole aircraft, ready for prime time on the global export stage. The question is whether that will come in time. Rivals like EADS’ Eurofighter, Russia’s Su-27/30 family, and the American “teen series” of F-15/16/18 variants are all well established. Meanwhile, Saab’s versatile and cheaper JAS-39 Gripen remains a stubborn foe in key export competitions, and the multinational F-35 juggernaut is bearing down on it.

• Dassault’s Rafale: Variants
• Dassault’s Rafale: Program
• Contracts and Key Events, 2009-Present [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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F-35A: incoming…
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FY 2011 budget proposals, withheld performance fees, a change in program leadership, Australian reaction. (Feb 2/10)

The $300+ billion F-35 Joint Strike fighter may well be the largest single global defense program in history. This major multinational program is intended to produce an “affordably stealthy” multi-role fighter that will have 3 variants: the F-35A conventional version for the US Air Force et. al.; the F-35B Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing for the US Marines, British Royal Navy, et. al.; and the F-35C conventional carrier-launched version for the US Navy. The aircraft is named after Lockheed’s famous WW2 P-38 Lightning, and the Mach 2, stacked-engine English Electric (now BAE) Lightning jet. Lightning II system development partners included The USA & Britain (Tier 1), Italy and the Netherlands (Tier 2), and Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Turkey (Tier 3), with Singapore and Israel as “Security Cooperation Partners.” Now the challenge is agreeing on production phase membership and arrangements, to be followed by initial purchase commitments in 2009-2010.

This updated article has expanded to feature more detail regarding the F-35 program, including contracts, sub-contracts, and notable events and reports. New material is highlighted by putting it in green type.

• The F-35 Family of Aircraft
• F-35 Program: Production Timelines & Structure
• F-35 Program: Controversies and Competitions
• F-35 Program: Events & Developments, CY 2009-2010 [updated]
• F-35 Program: System Development & Production Contracts, FY 2009-2010 [updated]
• F-35 Program: Ancillary and Sub-contracts, FY 2009 – 2010
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Used to be ours…
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Boeing discusses its plan and process for up to $2 billion in industrial offset arrangements, and Canada makes its basing decision. (Jan 31/10)

Back in 1991, Canada’s Mulroney government sold the country’s CH-47 Chinook medium-lift helicopter fleet to the Dutch. They cost a lot to maintain and operate, and Canada didn’t need them anyway. Or so they thought. Fast forward to 2002, then 2006. Canada has had boots on the ground in Afghanistan for several years now, but doesn’t have any helicopters capable of operating in the hot and/or high-altitude environment of southern Afghanistan. To support its 2,000 or so troops in Afghanistan, Canada has to rely on favors from US, British, Australian, Polish, and – irony of ironies – Dutch pilots flying CH-47 Chinooks.

Even so, Canada’s “emergency” purchases for Operation Archer never included helicopters. It should have come as a relief, therefore, to learn in June 2006 that the Canadian government had announced a CDN$ 4.7 billion program to purchase 16 “medium-heavy” helicopters for military and “disaster response” roles. It should have, but it didn’t. It took 21 months after this helicopter program was announced before a sole-source RFP was even issued. DID explains the Afghan situation on the ground for Canadian forces, the RFP, the options, the problems, the ultimatum issued by Canada’s Parliament, and the contract(s) for new CH-47F/ CH-147 helicopters.

• Cemetary Sideroad: On the Ground in Afghanistan
• Bring It All Back: The New Helicopter Competition
• Looking for a Place to Happen: The Problem
• We’ll Go Too: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Escape Is at Hand for the Travellin’ Man: Additional Readings & Sources

FH-77Bs, Kargil War
via Bharat Rakshak
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The competition is still stalled, but a $647 million DSCA request for the M777 may be an end run around India’s DPP. (Jan 26/10)

India’s $2 billion purchase of about 400 new 155mm self-propelled howitzers is intended to supplement India’s dwindling artillery stocks, while out-ranging and out-shooting Pakistan’s self-propelled M109 155mm guns. It seems simple enough, and BAE Systems Bofors had been competing against systems from Israel’s Soltam and Denel of South Africa.

Unfortunately, the competition has mostly served as a cautionary tale, a years-long affair filled with legal drama, accusations of corruption, and more than one re-start. Meanwhile, India’s stock of operational 155mm howitzers has dwindled to around 200. In 2007, a new RFP was issued, and the competition was expanded. Only to crash again in 2009. Is there an end in sight? Or a potential winner?

• Competition Background
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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Patriot PAC-2
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Nearly $45 million in PAC-3 upgrades for UAE. (Jan 26/10)

A 2007 US National Intelligence Assessment [redacted NIE summary] believes Iran’s nuclear program has stopped, but others, including the United Nations and Israel are more skeptical. Intelligence is always a very uncertain and ambiguous exercise, and occasionally features assessments like the infamous NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) whose 1962 judgment was that there were no Soviet missiles in Cuba [1]. Uncertainty creates perceptions of risk, and perceptions of risk lead to behaviors aimed at reducing that risk. Iraq is no longer a missile/WMD threat, Iran’s regular and Revolutionary Guards air forces remain relatively weak, and Iran’s ballistic missiles based on North Korean designs lack accuracy. Still, even a lucky conventional missile could create havoc in some Gulf states if it hit important oil-related infrastructure, or hit the larger and more nebulous target of business confidence.

Arms spending is an incomplete but very concrete way of tracking a state’s real assessment of threats and priorities. It’s becoming clear that Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have stepped up their defense spending in recent years. Those expenditures cover a range of equipment, but anti-ballistic missile capabilities appear to be rising to the top of the priority list.

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• EMB-314 Super Tucano turboprops for Indonesia? How about Britain?

• Human Terrain System intel program, rebooted.

• UAE doubles down on Italian Commandanti Class variant corvettes. Original $117 million order for 2 placed during IDEX 2009.

• USAF announces shift in C-17’s sustainment plans.

• SBIRS-High missile warning satellite program inches ahead.

• RQ-7 Shadow UAVs for Pakistan

• Another month, another Predator UAV crash.

• Elbit laser designators to Israel, “North American customers”.

• US Army incorporates front-line lessons into a standardized advanced marksmanship course.

• Oshkosh to research light aluminum/ magnesium alloys with the strength of cast steel.

• Tweets from spaaaaace!

• Free IT security careers webinar, specifically directed at members of the military. Hosted by USAF Lt. Col. Paul Capicik (Ret.) of American Sentinel University. Tuesday, January 26th, 1 pm CST. Register.

Adm. Gorshkov: Before.
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This free-to-view DID Spotlight article offers an in-depth look at India’s troubled attempt to convert and field a full-size aircraft carrier, before time and wear force it to retire its existing naval aviation and ships.

Right now, there are 2 major concerns in India. One is slipping timelines. The other concern involves Vikramaditya’s 3-fold cost increase, including worries that Russia will raise it rates yet again once India is deeper into the commitment trap. The carrier purchase has now become the subject of high level diplomacy, involving a shipyard that can’t even execute on commercial contracts. An agreement in principle reportedly exists, but negotiations that began in 2007 have yet to lead to a revised contract. Recent Russian demands have continued to raise the price, even as advance work related to India’s new MiG-29K naval fighters continues.

Now, reports surface once again that India and Russia have reached an agreement on the Vikramaditya’s price. An actual deal remains unfinished, however, which is why recent reports regarding a $1.2 billion contract for MiG-29Ks must be taken with caution until a signed contract is announced…

• Waiting for Gorshkov – A History
• Gorshkov-Vikramaditya: Aerial Complement
• INS Vikramaditya: Updates & Contracts [updated]
• Appendix A: Additional Readings – Equipment Profiles
• Appendix B: Additional Readings – Related Developments
  
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