Scratch one flag…
(click to view full)

In April 2005, South Africa’s Public Enterprises Minister Alec Erwin expected the cost of the SAAF’s 8 planned Airbus A400M medium-heavy military transport aircraft to be EUR 830 million. That converted to R 6.5 billion at those exchange rates, or about $177.75 million per plane in American dollars. South Africa reportedly intended to take delivery of 8 of the A400Ms from 2010-2014, with a further 6 on option. Ordering those additional 6 aircraft would reportedly have pushed the total contract value to EUR $1.5 billion, or about R11.9 billion at those exchange rates. When the deal was signed in December 2006, the price for 8 aircraft and initial fielding had risen to R 17.646 billion, or almost $2.5 billion: about $308 million per plane.

Meanwhile, South Africa bit the bullet and decided to upgrade its 8-9 aged C-130B Hercules planes. The first SAAF C-130Bs were delivered in 1963, and badly needed additional upgrades and refurbishment.

Subsequent delays to the A400M program were set to either extend the C-130Bs’ service, or force reliance on charters, even as the A400M’s likely costs grew. That SAAF aerial uncertainty has only grown, now that South Africa has become the first country to pull out of the A400M program…

Continue Reading… »

As part of Britain’s Defence Industrial Strategy, the Labour Party government and Ministry of Defence actively sought to reduce the number of companies involved in naval surface ship building and maintenance. In fact, they wanted just one company to deal with. Monopolies tend to drive prices up and effectiveness down, but the Ministry of Defense believed that a long-term partnering arrangement with performance guarantees could counteract that natural tendency. They also believed that the expected volume of warship construction and maintenance could no longer support more than one sizeable firm. Rather than force the merger, they dangled a sizeable carrot: they would not issue contracts for the planned CVF aircraft carrier program until they had a single entity to deal with.

Almost a year after the original July 25/07 Heads of Terms signed by BAE systems, VT Group, and the UK MoD, BAE Systems plc finalized a legally binding Framework Agreement with VT Group plc (‘VT’) to establish the BVT Surface Fleet Ltd. joint venture as the UK’s premier provider of surface warships and through-life support. The firm would become the UK Government’s strategic partner for the design, build and support of future warships, and will also pursue export opportunities. The joint venture targets total net savings to the government in excess of GBP 700 million (currently about $1.4 billion) to be shared 70/30 between the MoD and the BVT. These net savings, and the extent to which the parties will actually benefit, remain to be seen in practice.

The joint venture is now a single venture again, as BAE Systems buys out its partner…

Continue Reading… »

French Mirage F1s
(click to view full)

Morocco’s combat air force currently flies 2 squadrons of old F-5s, and 2 squadrons of only slightly newer Mirage F1s; T-37 light jets serve as key transitional trainers. Their neighbor and rival Algeria flies MiG-23s of similar vintage, but the Force Aerienne Algerienne also flies SU-24 Fencer and SU-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft, even more modern and capable MiG-29s, and is set to receive multi-role SU-30MKs as part of a multi-billion dollar weapons deal with Russia.

Morocco can’t beat that array. Instead, they’re looking for replacement aircraft that will prevent complete overmatch, and provide a measure of security. Initially, they looked to France. France’s Rafale is part of a set of European 4+ generation fighters that were developed and fielded during the 1990s-early 21st century, with the aim of surpassing existing offerings among America’s “teen series” fighters, as well as Russia’s Mig-29 Fulcrum and SU-27/30 Flanker family. “Dogfight at the Casbah: Rafale vs. F-16” discussed the French sales slip-ups that cost Dassault its first export order for the 4+ generation fighter. That outcome is now official.

Just to make things worse, the final multi-billion dollar deal involves new-build F-16s, at a price comparable to the rumored figures for the Rafale. Not to mention an accompanying American deal to replace Morocco’s T-37 trainer fleet with T-6Cs, and contracts for air-launched weapons, targeting pods, and C-27J short-haul transports. The latest development includes a DSCA request for CH-47D helicopters…

• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Why The F-16? DID Analysis – Dec. 2007
• Additional Readings
  
  Continue Reading… »

Adm. Gorshkov: Before.
(click to view full)

This free-to-view DID Spotlight article offers an in-depth look at India’s troubled attempt to convert and field a full-size aircraft carrier, before time and wear force it to retire its existing naval aviation and ships.

Right now, there are 2 major concerns in India. One is slipping timelines. INS Viraat was scheduled to retire in 2009. It’s only semi-operational, and nearing the limits of its mechanical life, even as shortages of flyable Sea Harrier fighters are creating issues of their own. Meanwhile, the delivery date for India’s locally-built 37,000t escort carrier project appears to be slipping to 2015 or so. This leaves India’s Navy with a serious scheduling problem, and no significant carrier force.

The other concern involves Vikramaditya’s 3-fold cost increase, including worries that Russia will raise it rates yet again once India is deeper into the commitment trap. The carrier purchase has now become the subject of high level diplomacy, involving a shipyard that can’t even execute on commercial contracts. An agreement in principle reportedly exists, but negotiations that began in 2007 have yet to lead to a revised contract.

Recent Russian demands have continued to raise the price, even as advance work related to India’s new MiG-29K naval fighters continues. The latest news is no news, as an expected agreement during an official Indian visit to Moscow remained elusive…

• Waiting for Gorshkov – A History
• Gorshkov-Vikramaditya: Aerial Complement
• INS Vikramaditya: Updates & Contracts [updated]
• Appendix A: Additional Readings – Equipment Profiles
• Appendix B: Additional Readings – Related Developments
  
  Continue Reading… »

Galileo concept
(click to view full)

The European Union is cooperating with a number of outside investors to replace the USA’s free Global Positioning System service with an alternative under their own control. In addition to civilian GPS (the Open Service), services to be offered include a paid Commercial Service (with accuracy greater than 1 meter), and a Public Regulated Service (PRS)/ Safety of Life Service (SoL) for use by security authorities (police, military, etc.) and safety-critical transport applications (air-traffic control, automated aircraft landing, etc.). PRS/SoL aims to offer Open Service quality, with added robustness against jamming and the reliable detection of problems within 10 seconds.

Organizational issues and shortfalls in expected progress pushed the “Galileo” project back from its originally intended operational date of 2007 to 2013-14 – and doubts persist in several quarters about its economic model, even as security issues arise regarding China’s COMPASS project. After a public-private partnership model failed to agree among themselves or with the EU’s desired terms, the organization gained initial-stage approval for its plan to finance the program with tax dollars instead of the expected private investments. Political issues were overcome, albeit with some protest, by raiding other EU accounts for over EUR 3 billion (about $5.35 billion) in funds, rather than asking for more money from member states.

The latest set of updates cover developments in Galileo, and in related programs like GIOVE and EGNOS. While the project’s base funding is now more secure, its ability to remain within budget faces issues, as does the expected launch timetable. Recent events may even lead to a smaller Galileo constellation…

• Galileo: Goals, Structure & Costs
• “Eppur, Si Bloccare”: Trials & Tribulations [updated]
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: The EU Proposal – Going Forward (2007)
• Appendix B: Additional Readings [updated]
• Appendix C: Additional Readings – The Security Dimension
  
  Continue Reading… »

RN CVF Concept
(click to view full)

In 1998, Britain’s Strategic Defence review (SDR) announced plans to replace the current set of 3 Invincible Class 22,000t escort carriers with 2 larger, more capable Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) ships that could operate a more powerful force. These new carriers would be joint-service platforms, operating aircraft and UAVs from all 3 services (Navy, RAF, Army) in roles that could include ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance), force projection and logistics support, close air support, anti-submarine/ anti-surface naval warfare, and land attack.

The scale of the CVF effort relative to Britain’s past experiences means that the program structure is rather complex. It has passed through several stages already, and is being run and conducted within an industrial alliance framework. There is also a parallel international framework, involving cooperation with France on its PA2 carrier as a larger derivative of the CVF design.

This DID FOCUS article covers that structure and framework, ongoing developments, and the ships themselves as they round toward final design, construction, and fielding. The latest addition involves a report that one of the 2 carriers has been quasi-canceled, and Britain’s F-35 buy will be severely slashed…

• The CVF Queen Elizabeth Class (“continue reading…”)
• Program Team: The Aircraft Carrier Alliance
• CVF Program Management
• The CVF Program: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• CVF-Related Contracts and Events
• Additional Readings & Sources: The Program
• Additional Readings & Sources: The Ships
  
  Continue Reading… »

NH90: TTH & NFH
(click to view full)

The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AugustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow. The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points.

While battlefield damage to composite airframes can be more difficult to repair in the field, the combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Orders currently stand at 507 machines, on behalf of 14 nations.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article, offering an in-depth look at the multi-national NH90 program, its customers, and its chronology from 1995 to the present day. The most recent additions cover developments, timelines, and controversies in Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Germany since January 2009…

• The NH90 Platform(s)
• The NH90 Production Program
• Contracts & Key Events, 1995-present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
  Continue Reading… »

C-17, waiting
(click to view full)

A Washington think-tank has gone so far as to call the planned cancellation of C-17 heavy transport aircraft production “The Dumbest Weapons Decision of the Decade.” With heavy usage that is accumulating fatigue hours far faster than originally planned, the US Air Force is loath to pay $1.5 billion to close the C-17 line – then pay another $4+ billion to re-open if their decision proves to be too hasty. Not to mention the larger $8+ billion economic effects and lost jobs. Still, the cost of its equipment means that funds are tight, and last-minute Congressional earmarks have been necessary to keep the C-17 line going. Concern has also been expressed that by shuttering the line, the USA is effectively handing the global strategic airlift market over to France and Russia; the Airbus A400M and Russia’s super-giant AN-124 would be the only games in town from 2010-2025, or longer.

Worse, there is almost no confidence in the Pentagon’s 2005 Mobility Requirements Study, whose assumptions hadn’t budged from a 2000 study – before 9/11 and the resulting global war saw airlift usage and flight hours skyrocket, before the Army’s Future Combat Systems’ failure to fit into C-130 transports as promised… before a lot of things happened. Now, as the battle in Washington heats up again, DID offers this updated article, readings – and accompanying interactive Excel spreadsheet – as a contribution to the discussions.

Continue Reading… »

F100 visits Sydney
(click to view full)

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. The Royal Australian Navy took a pair of giant steps in June 2007, when it selected winning designs for its keystone naval programs: Canberra Class LHD amphibious operations vessels, and Hobart Class “air warfare destroyers.” This DID’s FOCUS article offers in-depth research and coverage of the Hobart Class competition and program organization, along with the new “air warfare destroyer’s” capabilities, and associated contracts, and related developments.

Under the SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer program, Australia plans to replace its retired air defense destroyers with a modern system that can provide significantly better protection from air attack, integrate with the US Navy and other Coalition partners, offer long-range air warfare defense for Royal Australian Navy task groups, and help provide a coordinated air picture for fighter and surveillance aircraft. Despite their name and focus, the ships are multi-role designs with a “sea control” mission that also includes advanced anti-submarine and surface warfare capabilities.

Spain’s Navantia made an A$ 11 billion clean sweep, winning both the A$ 3 billion Canberra Class LHD and the A$ 8 billion Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer contracts. The new AWD ships were scheduled to begin entering service with the Royal Australian Navy in 2013, but that date has now slipped to 2014-2015. Recent updates involve a number of smaller contracts and progress reports, as well as the resolution of A$ 450 million worth of Australian shipbuilding contracts…

• SEA 4000: The Design Competition
• SEA 4000: The Program
• SEA 4000: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: SEA 4000 Program Phase Organization
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
  Continue Reading… »

Gowind-200
(click to view full)

DCNS’ 103m, 1,950t (338 ft., 2,150 ton) Gowind corvettes are directly derived from the design and technological lead advances of the new Franco-Italian FREMM multi-mission frigates.

Following his October 2006 meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev initially gave the go-ahead for negotiations to buy 4 Gowind corvettes. A French-Bulgarian working group was then set up to finalize the estimated EUR 900 million (then about $1.25 billion) contract before the end of 2007, but Bulgaria subsequently backed out, saying that it could not afford the contract. Instead, in December 2007 the Bulgarian navy spent EUR 54 million on a pair of used frigates and a minesweeping vessel from Belgium.

Still, one should never underestimate the power of diplomacy. A July 2008 trip by President Sarkozy appeared to have snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. On the other hand, one should never underestimate the power of economics…

• The Gowind Class Corvette
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
  Continue Reading… »