Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) received a follow-on task order from the US Army Aviation and Missile Lifecycle Management Command (AMCOM) to provide professional and engineering support services to the Army Aviation & Missile Research, Development & Engineering Center (AMRDEC).

The single award, indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity task order has a 5-year period of performance and a ceiling value of $848 million. The task order was awarded under the AMCOM Expedited Professional & Engineering Support Services (EXPRESS) contract vehicle, which has a total ceiling of $7.7 billion.

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USMC KC-130J
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Special Operations Command’s AC-130H/U gunships can lay down withering hails of accurate fire, up to and including 105mm howitzer shells, in order to support ground troops.

The Marines wanted heavy aircraft that could support their Leathernecks on the ground. The bad news was that the the Corps could field about 45 KC-130J aerial tankers for the price of a 12-plane AC-130J squadron, and lighter options like the AC-27J “Stinger II” would probably tally similar costs once R&D dollars were factored in. Could the Marines change tack, and offer a modular weapon package that would let them arm their existing tankers as needed? Could armed KC-130Js offer limited fire support, while loitering over the battlefield and using their unique speed range to refuel helicopters and fast jets alike? The Harvest Hawk program aims to do just that. It would give the USMC a far less capable convertible gunship option for Afghanistan, at a cost that’s about 2 orders of magnitude below a dedicated gunship fleet.

Unsurprisingly, the next service to show interest in this concept was SOCOM itself. The latest developments to this article (which will soon become DII subscriber content) include added background, and ammunition orders for SOCOM’s similar MC-130Ws…

• Gunships R Us: Equipping The Hercs [updated]
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings and Sources
  
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Javelin, firing
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After a series of disastrous experiences in Vietnam trying to use 66mm M72 LAW rockets against old Soviet tanks, the US military developed a renewed seriousness about giving its soldiers shoulder-fired weapons that packed enough punch to face down enemy armor. A number of options like the Mk 153 SMAW and the AT4/M136 spun out of that effort in the 1980s, but it wasn’t until electronics had miniaturized for several more cycles that it became possible to solve the next big problem: the need for soldiers to remain exposed to enemy fire while guiding anti-tank missiles to their targets.

Javelin solves both of those problems at once, offering a heavy fire-and-forget missile that will reliably destroy any enemy armored vehicle, and many fortifications as well. While armored threats are less pressing these days, the need to destroy fortified outposts and rooms in buildings remains. Indeed, one of the lessons from both sides of the 2006 war in Lebanon has been the infantry’s use of guided missiles as a form of precision artillery fire.

Javelin is not an ideal candidate for that latter role due to its high cost-per-unit; nevertheless, it has often been used this way. Its performance in Iraq has revealed a clear niche on both low and high intensity battlefields, and led to rising popularity with international and American clients. This DID FOCUS Article covers the Javelin anti-armor missile system, and associated contracts and key events. The latest items include a $200+ million contract for more Javelin systems…

• The Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile System
• Javelin ATGM: The Program [updated]
• Javelin ATGM: Reports from the Front
• Javelin: Contracts & Key Events (2004 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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YRH-70 w. Hydras
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In July 2008, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced Iraq’s formal request to buy 24 helicopters. Based on the request, Iraq seems to be interested in Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters that act as scouts, perform light close air support, and escort other helicopters on dangerous missions.

The IqAF currently relies on a small force of Russia’s popular Mi-8/17 and refurbished Bell “Huey II” helicopters. While the Russian helicopters can be armed, their status as Iraq’s only medium utility helicopters makes them a poor fit for an ARH role. Instead, Iraq chose between 2 competitors: Bell’s 407, whose derivative ARH-70A won the competition in America but ran into trouble; and Boeing’s AH-6 “Little Bird” light attack helicopters used by US Special Forces. AH-6s are very effective in urban settings, and provided critical fire support during the 1991 “Blackhawk Down” incident.

The DSCA documents also included requests for airborne weapons – something the nascent post-Saddam IqAf has not really had to this point. Now, it appears that Iraq has picked its ARH winner – and issued production contracts. Even so, much still remains to be decided…

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(click to download)

Defense was an issue in the last Australian election. The center-left Labor Party attacked the center-right Liberal Party by citing mismanaged projects, and accusing the Howard government of making poor choices on key defense platforms like the F/A-18F Super Hornet and F-35A Joint Strike fighters. That sniping continued even after Labor won the election, and has been evident in more than a few Defence Ministry releases.

The new government made some program changes, such as canceling the SH-2G Seasprite contract. Yet it has been more notable for the programs it has not changed: problematic upgrades of Australia’s Oliver Hazard Perry frigates were continued, the late purchase of F/A-18F Super Hornets was ratified rather than canceled, and observers waited for the real shoe to drop: the government’s promised 2009 Defence White Paper, which would lay out Australia’s long-term strategic assessments, and procurement plans.

On May 2/09, Australia’s government released “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030.” DID has reviewed that document, and the reaction to date… including a new ASPI roundup of reactions from around Asia.

• Fast Incoming
• The Highlight Reel
• Additional Readings & Assessments [updated]
  
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Death from above
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The Viper Strike began life as the BAT – a canceled munition option for ground-fired ATACMS missiles. After USAF Predator UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles began to show promise in the Global War on Terror, however, US Army planners began to examine their options. Could they place a similar capability in the hands of Army ground commanders? In July 2002, these examinations led to the award of a 90-day contract to demonstrate the possibility of BAT deployment on a modified U.S. Army RQ-5 Hunter UAV.

Those tests went well, and Viper Strikes are currently carried by RQ-5B Hunter UAVs in Iraq – see this video of a Viper Strike in testing [MPG, 13.2 MB]. The weapon’s small size (3 feet long, 44 pounds) and special advantages in urban fights, mountainous terrain, etc. give it a chance of spreading to other platforms. Special Operations Command has shown interest, but without front-line deployment, progress has been very slow.

Is the Viper Strike a case of “the right weapon at the right time”? Or a case of “caught betwixt and between”? A recent announcement may offer some hope for this innovative weapon…

• Viper Strike: The Weapon
• SOCOM’s Solution: Viper Strikes for AC-130s?
• Contracts & Key Events
• Additional Readings
  
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AH-64D Longbow, armed
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“UAE’s 30-Helicopter Apache Upgrade Program Underway” described the UAE/Dubai’s efforts to upgrade its attack helicopter fleet, while “UAE Ordering Weaponized UH-60M ‘Battlehawk’ Helicopters” looked at their efforts to add firepower punch to their support helicopters. Both sets of helicopters will need weapons, and one of the common weapons will be the AGM-114 Hellfire family of missiles, which have been requested as part of each helicopter package as well as separate DSCA requests.

US Defense Security Cooperation Agency requests can take a notoriously long time to turn into orders, but this article covers a pair of dedicated DSCA requests made over the last 2 years, including the latest $500+ million request with an interesting addendum…

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Base, Bleeding Out?
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Back in July 2005, DID informed its readers that India’s sanctions against Denel and possible disqualification from a $2 billion artillery contract could have a major effect on the South African defense firm as a whole. In August 2005, those sanctions came to pass, barring Denel from a contract it was likely to win and accelerating efforts already underway to radically restructure the firm.

CEO Shaun Liebenberg launched that shift in late 2005 with some frank discussion of the global defense market, and the position of small-medium players like Denel in it. At DSEI 2005 in London, UK, the outline of this new strategy was already apparent. Many of the products Denel is known for will no longer define the firm. But could it find a way to stanch the bleeding and survive in a globalized market?

And how has it done since?

• Denel’s Position
• Denel’s New Strategy
• Updates and Key Events [updated]
  
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NETFIRES concept
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The basic concept of NETFIRES (a Future Combat Systems program) is to develop a family of artillery-like precision attack missiles based upon a vertical launcher design. Yet the idea goes far beyond that simple description. The NETFIRES CLU box launcher is intended to be be fully autonomous, meaning it can be dropped off anywhere and operate on its own without a support vehicle. The launch unit includes power generation and control systems as well as a total of 15 missiles, each with a warhead similar in size and capability to a 155mm artillery shell.

The system is also known as Non Line-Of-Sight, Launch System, or NLOS-LS, and remains one of Future Combat systems’ most promising programs, slated for early fielding to the Army and even for integration with US naval forces.

This will be DID’s focus article for the NETFIRES program, and it will be updated as new events and contracts enter the picture. The latest news involves key tests, as it gears up to be part of FCS Spinout Phase 1.

• The NETFIRES Concept
• NETFIRES Missiles
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: Lockheed’s Successful Design Improvement Workshops
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Yak-130
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In an earlier Feb 1/06 report, DID noted that a $4 billion arms sale was brewing between Algeria and Russia involving fighter aircraft, tanks, and air defense systems, with the possibility of additional equipment. Those options would appear to have come through, as numerous sources are now reporting that a high-level Russian delegation in Algeria has closed $7.5 billion worth of arms contracts. The Algerian package would be post-Soviet Russia’s largest ever single arms deal, and compares to annual Russian weapons exports to all customers of $5-6 billion per year in 2004 and 2005.

T-90 tank
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Reuters South Africa quotes Rosoboronexport chief Sergei Chemezov as saying that “Practically all types of arms which we have are included, anti-missile systems, aviation, sea and land technology.” The actual contents of that deal were murky, though DID offers triangulation among several sources to help sort out the confusion. The subsequent crash of Algeria’s MiG-29 deal, and its ripple effects, are also discussed. The latest addition is a report on some of the deliveries to date…

• Detailing the Deal: The Algerian Package [updated]
• Structuring the Deal: Anatomy of a Euro Squeeze Play
• Updates & Developments [updated]
• Appendix A: Algeria’s Appetite for Advanced Arms
• Appendix B: Russia’s Arms Industry Woes
• Appendix C: Additional Readings [updated]
  
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