1991: HMCS Protecteur &
USS Wisconsin battleship
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The Canadian supply ships and oilers HMCS Protecteur, and HMCS Preserver have contributed to humanitarian aid missions in Florida and the Bahamas, peace-making off Somalia and East Timor, and have been poised for the evacuation of non-combatants from Haiti, to name but a few of their recent endeavors.

As part of its spate of military modernization announcements issued just before Canada Day (July 1) 2006, the Canadian government issued an RFP that began the process of defining and building 3 “Joint Support Ships.” The aim was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current Protecteur Class oiler and resupply ships. In addition to being able to provide at-sea support (re-fueling and re-supply) to deployed naval task groups, the new JSS ships were envisioned as ships that would also be capable of sealift operations, as well as amphibious support to forces deployed ashore.

JSS
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This was expected to be a C$ 2.9 billion (USD $2.58 billion) project. DID describes the process, the 4 pre-qualified industry teams participating, and some of the issues swirling around Canada’s very ambitious specifications.

Specifications that ultimately sank the whole project, in a manner that was predictable from the outset. Leaving Canada’s navy with a serious problem…

• JSS: The Procurement Process
• JSS: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: DID Op-ed/Analysis – June 30, 2006
• Appendix B: Additional Readings [updated]
  
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Guam
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DID has covered a number of base improvement efforts and other contracts related to the USA’s pacific territory of Guam, including construction of an RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV complex for the Pacific Rim, and extensive base improvements/ expansion for Guam’s airfield, harbor, et. al. DID will use this post to shine a bit of a spotlight on contracts related to that territory from the beginning of FY 2007 onward. Military.com offers a broader article detailing the build up; it’s useful as a frame for activities to date, and also a a context reference for our ongoing coverage (hyperlink below added to enhance context):

“The 2006 agreement between the United States and Japan to shift 8,000 U.S. Marines from bases in Japan to the island of Guam by 2014 is likely to have more far-reaching implications than just a change of address for some units of the Marine Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). The move is accelerating the return to prominence of Guam in the U.S. defense posture and fostering a higher level of cooperation among the U.S. armed forces in the Pacific region….

Congress authorized $193 million in military construction funds for Guam in the fiscal year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, a $31 million increase over 2006 funding. “Guam is likely to see between $400 million and $1 billion in military construction in military construction each year for a period of six to 10 years,” [Guam’s representative in Congress, Madeleine Z. Bordallo] said.”

Our latest update involves a new set of housing units – earthquake resistant units that double as typhoon shelters…

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C-23B Sherpa
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DID’s coverage of the WALRUS super-heavy cargo airship’s cancellation noted complaints from combat commanders that C-130s were not able to get equipment close enough to the front lines due to short airfield restrictions. Delays in buying a small cargo aircraft to fill that role, replace aging C-23 Sherpas et. al., and ferry troops, supplies, and/or small vehicles within a theater of operations were making that problem worse. “The JCA Program: Key West Sabotage?” looked at the different levels of urgency and priority in the US Army and US Air Force and the resulting Congressional SNAFUs, and covered early-stage developments leading up to the award.

JCA could be worth up to $6 billion before all is said and done, and the finalists were a familiar duo. After EADS-CASA’s CN-235 and a shortened version of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J were disqualified for failing to meet requirements, JCA became yet another international competition between EADS-CASA’s C-295M vs. Alenia’s C-27J. The decision was expected in March 2007, but it seems we now have a clear winner: the C-27J team. Oddly, we can’t quite tell yet how much they’ve won – and if you thought the joint decision and contract announcement would end the inter-service and Congressional politicking, think again. The contractor side of the equation has bee equally fractious, with Boeing pulling out of the partnership and EADS North America commenting on rumors of talks with Alenia Aerospace.

Two rare bright spots come from US SOCOM, who is about to turn a C-27J into a “Baby Spooky” gunship, and the US DoD’s recent SAR report…

• Canned Feud: The Transport of Seville vs. the Spartan Salesmen
• Hello, My Baby, Hello, My Honey…
• A Great Big Bunch Of You: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Stop, Look, and Hasten: Additional Readings
  
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Afghanistan drop-off
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In December 2005, “Canada Purchases $200M in Equipment for Operation ARCHER in Afghanistan” noted 2 things: the wide variety of emergency equipment that Canada was buying prior to its second Afghan deployment, and the critical omission of battlefield support helicopters from that list. Canada’s absence of helicopter support capability would prove costly in the field, and was discussed again during Canada’s delayed RFP for 16 CH-47F helicopters.

This issue was also discussed in Parliament. The January 2008 Manley Report [PDF] recommended that Parliamentary approval for Canada’s continued participation in the Afghan mission should hinge on having Canadian battlefield transport helicopters available by February 2009. Since Stephen Harper’s current Conservative Party government is a Parliamentary minority government, that recommendation became a de facto requirement.

In order to be useful, however, any helicopters bought would need to deliver useful loads despite Afghanistan’s performance-sapping hot weather season and consistent high altitudes. Which led to the problem: where to get the helicopters? The problem was simple. Available helicopters weren’t adequate. Adequate helicopters weren’t available.

Hence the current solution set, which was clarified in a recent political speech…

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C-5 Galaxy
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When it was introduced, back in 1970, the C-5 Galaxy was the largest plane in the world. A second construction program in 1981-1986 delivered 50 more; 4 have been lost in crashes, for a total fleet of 126. Each C-5 aircraft can carry 265,000 pounds of cargo for 4,000 miles (roughly double that of the newer C-17A), or 125,000 pounds for 8,000 miles. Its hinged nose can even be raised to make loading or unloading easier, and the Galaxy’s ability to lift even the heaviest main battle tanks into theater made it a critical part of the transatlantic air bridge that would reinforce Europe in the event of a Russian attack.

During the 2003 run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom I, C-5s proved their worth again as they helped clear logistics bottlenecks in Europe. Even so, the fleet is not without its issues. The C-5 has the highest operating cost of any Air Force weapon system, and those costs stem from extremely high maintenance demands as well as poor fuel economy. Availability rates routinely hover near 50%. To add insult to injury, the Russians not only built a bigger plane (the AN-124), they sold it off at the end of the Cold War to semi-private operators, turning it into a commercial success whose customer list now includes… NATO.

Sunrise? Sunset?
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Meanwhile, the USA needs long-range, heavy load airlift. The AN-124’s commercial success may get its production line restarted, but the C-5 has no such hope. C-17s cost more than $200 million per plane, which isn’t far from the cost of a 747-8 freighter, but is still a lot of money. The US Air Force believed it could save money by upgrading the older C-5s to renew their avionics (AMP) and engines (RERP). Their hope was that this would eliminate the problems that keep so many C-5s in the hangar, cut down on future maintenance costs, and grow airlift capacity without adding new planes. Unfortunately, the program is program experiencing major cost growth, and a battle is ongoing between C-5M and C-17 supporters in Congress.

DID’s FOCUS Article explains why the C-5 AMP/RERP program is such a challenging project, and covers developments on the political and contracting fronts – including the apparent removal of C-5A aircraft from the program, and a testing milestone at Lockheed…

• The C-5’s AMP/RERP Changes
• The AMP/RERP Program
• Contracts & Key Events, 1999 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Tejas LCA
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India’s fighter strength has been declining in recent years, as the MiG-21s that form the largest component of its fleet are lost in crashes, or retired due to age and wear. Some MiG-21s are being modernized to MiG-21bis ‘Bison’ configuration, while other current fighter types are undergoing modernization programs in order to maintain the fighter force until replacements can arrive. On which note, an ongoing tender has Russian, French, American, Swedish and European manufacturers dueling for a multi-billion dollar, 126+ plane light-medium fighter sale.

This still leaves India without a low-end solution to the twin problems besetting its overall fleet: numbers, and age. The MiG-21bis program adds years of life to those airframes, but that extended lifespan is still quite finite; by 2020, it is very unlikely that any MiG-21s will remain in service. As for the MMRCA program, it may replace some of India’s mid-range fighters – but that still leaves replacement of the MiG-21 fleet unfulfilled. In this environment, the status of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project matters a great deal to the Indian Air Force’s future prospects, as their level of confidence in its longer-term success will affect their immediate buys. The choices made in the LCA’s design will also affect the lightweight fighter’s export potential, which in turn feeds back into the overall program’s costs and viability for India over its lifetime.

The latest additions to this article include a whirlwind of developments around the indigenous Kaveri engine. As some predicted, the project’s performance failures have finally killed Kaveri as a fighter engine. A foreign partnership to produce a replacement has reportedly been selected, and other vendors are reportedly canvassed to provide interim engines. Meanwhile, Kaveri engines may find an unexpected use within India’s military…

• LCA Tejas: India’s Lightweight Fighter, or Just a Lightweight?
• The Kaveri Engine: Keystone, or Killer? [updated]
• Updates and Events [updated]
• Appendix A: DID Analysis & Op/Ed (2006)
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Old as the hills…
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In January 2007, the big question was whether there would be a competition for the USA’s KC-X proposal, which will cover 175 production aircraft and 4 test platforms. The cost for this first phase alone is likely to reach $35+ billion spread over about 20 years, but the USAF believes that adding new plane types to America’s 40-50 year old aerial tanker fleet is its #1 priority, lest unpredictable age or fatigue issues like the ones its F-15A-D fleet is experiencing ground its aerial tankers – and with them, a substantial slice of the USA’s total airpower. KC-Y and KC-Z contracts will follow in subsequent decades, in order to replace all 530 KC-135s/ Boeing 707s (195 active; ANG 251; Reserve 84) that were delivered until 1965, as well as the USAF’s 59 larger KC-10 tankers delivered from 1979-1987.

“US Debating Aerial Tanker Types, Mix” offers in-depth coverage of the lead-up to the KC-X RFP, explaining many of the military & policy issues in play as the USA contemplates its own choices. Then came the contractor decisions, and responses. What would Boeing propose? The KC-767, the KC-777, or both? Would Northrop and EADS elect to play, bringing their Airbus KC-30/A330 MRTT?

In the end, it was Team Boeing’s KC-767 Advanced (767-200 derivative) vs. the Team Northrop Grumman KC-30B (Airbus A330-200/200F derivative). Each aircraft system has its strengths, and each system also had risk factors as lobbying continued right down to the wire. Boeing claimed lower KC-767 operating costs, and received a union endorsement. EADS promised to open production of A330F civilian jets in the USA if it won. Most observers correctly pointed out that all this lobbying was important, as the financial stakes involved meant there was going to be a huge political fight no matter which side won.

That has proven to be the case. The Airbus A330 MRTT was picked, but an explosive GAO decision brought the competition to a halt. The Pentagon has taken the decision out of the USAF’s hands, and released a revised KC-X RFP – but the quesrtion is now whether Boeing will bid. Meanwhile, an article in a Seattle newspaper aims to clarify the mathematics driving the Airbus choice…

• The Contenders and The Cargo Factor (i.e. continue reading…) [updated]
• KC-X: Teams & Locations
• KC-X RFP: Key Developments [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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IOTV: key features
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When reading about modern body armor one often hears about small arms protective inserts (SAPI) or Enhanced SAPI (ESAPI) ceramic plate inserts. While these inserts are more fragile than past generations of inserts, they offer a significant improvement over its 1990s predecessors in terms of both weight and protection. After episodic issues with production ramp-up and quality control, this gear is widely fielded with the US Army and several allied militaries. The US Marines replaced it with the MTV. The Army itself has introduced the Improved OTV. Even privately developed body armor like Blackwater Gear use them, as all rely on a “vest and plates” approach that uses a similar set of inserts to give the vests most of their bullet-stopping power.

This DID spotlight article covers the USA’s acquisition efforts in this area – including a recent order through the US military – but probably not for the US military…

• ESAPI, Explained
• Contracts & Key Events, 2004 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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MQ-1C Sky Warrior
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In August 2005, “Team Warrior” leader General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in San Diego, CA won a $214.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of the Extended Range/ Multi Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System (ER/MP UAS). The Warrior was designed to fill both surveillance and attack roles, and the MQ-1C Sky Warrior derived from General Atomics’ famous MQ-1 Predator beat the Hunter II system offered by Northrop Grumman, Aurora Flight Systems, and IAI.

The Sky Warrior ER/MP program is part of the US Army’s reinvestment of dollars from the canceled RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program, and directly supports the Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan. ER/MP could be a $1 billion effort, and recently strengthened its position when a 2007 program restructuring cut the Future Combat Systems Class III UAV competition.

Now, in FY 2008, the MQ-1C Sky Warrior ER/MP prepares to move into production – as the first big “Key West” battle of the 21st century between the USAF and US Army reaches a resolution. But the Sky Warrior and Predator will be merging into a single program. What does that mean, exactly? DID asked. Meanwhile, our readers asked us to explain the differences between the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-1C Sky Warrior, and MQ-9 Reaper. DID is happy to oblige.

The latest news is the acquisition of 3 Block 0 SkyWarriors for use on the front lines…

• The MQ-1C Sky Warrior, and its Band of Brothers
• The Army’s Sky Warrior Program
• ER/MP UAS – Enter the Warrior: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: US Army et. al. vs. USAF Over UAVs
• Appendix B: Additional Readings – Who Controls the UAVs?
• Appendix C: Additional Readings
  
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C-20, ready
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Northrop Grumman Technical Services, Inc., of Herndon, VA received a 4-year, $252.3 million firm-fixed-price C-20 Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) follow-on contract. The U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps all operate C-20 aircraft, which is the military designation for Gulfstream III/IV business jets. The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center at Tinker AFB, OK manages this contract (FA8106-08-C-0010).

Northrop Grumman’s release adds additional members of the team: M7 Aerospace of San Antonio, TX; Jet Aviation subsidiary Savannah Air Center in Savannah, GA; and Rolls-Royce North America in Montreal, Canada. Together they will provide depot maintenance, supplies, flight line maintenance and field team support for the C-20s at Ramstein Air Base in Germany; Hickam Air Force Base and Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii; Sigonella, Italy; and Andrews AFB in MD.

C-20A-D models are Gulfstream IIIs, while C-20G/H models are the longer range Gulfstream IV. They can carry up to 12 passengers, or light cargo. VIPs, including American political figures, are frequent passengers. Past Speakers of the House have used C-20s, for example. The jets briefly made the news in 2007, when current House Speaker Nancy Pelosi [D-CA] tried to pressure the Pentagon to grant her larger planes, and carry “supporters” on her flights. The Pentagon responded with a denial of the aircraft request, and an explicit list of conditions regarding the passengers and purposes that were considered appropriate on these military flights.