RN CVF Concept

Britain’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) announced a big leap forward for the Royal Navy: plans to replace the current set of 3 Invincible Class 22,000t escort carriers with 2 larger, more capable Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) ships that could operate a more powerful force. These new carriers would be joint-service platforms, operating F-35B aircraft, plus helicopters and UAVs from all 3 services. Roles could include ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance), force projection and logistics support, close air support, anti-submarine/ anti-surface naval warfare, and land attack.

The scale of the CVF effort relative to Britain’s past experiences means that the program structure is rather complex. It has passed through several stages already, and is being run and conducted within an industrial alliance framework. There is also a parallel international framework, involving cooperation with France on its PA2 carrier as a derivative of the CVF design. This DID FOCUS article covers that structure and framework, ongoing developments, and the ships themselves as they move slowly through construction, and eventual fielding:

• The CVF Queen Elizabeth Class [updated]
• Program Team: The Aircraft Carrier Alliance
• The CVF Program: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Other CVF-Related Contracts and Events
• Additional Readings & Sources
• Appendix A: CVF Program Management
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KC-135: Old as the hills…

DID’s FOCUS articles cover major weapons acquisition programs – and no program is more important to the USAF than its aerial tanker fleet renewal. In January 2007, the big question was whether there would be a competition for the USA’s KC-X proposal, covering 175 production aircraft and 4 test platforms. The total cost for this first phase alone will exceed $25 billion, but America’s aerial tanker fleet demands new planes to replace its KC-135s, whose most recent new delivery was in 1965. Otherwise, unpredictable age or fatigue issues, like the ones that grounded its F-15A-D fighters in 2008, could ground its aerial tankers – and with them, a substantial slice of the USA’s total airpower.

KC-Y and KC-Z contracts may follow in subsequent decades, in order to replace all 530 (195 active; ANG 251; Reserve 84) active tankers, as well as the USAF’s 59 heavy KC-10 tankers that were delivered from 1979-1987. Then again, fiscal and demographic realities may mean that the 179 plane KC-X buy is “it” for the USAF. Either way, the stakes were huge for all concerned.

In the end, it was Team Boeing’s KC-767 NexGen/ KC-46A (767 derivative) vs. EADS North America’s KC-45A (Airbus KC-30/A330-200 derivative), both within the Pentagon and in the halls of Congress. The financial and employment stakes guaranteed a huge political fight no matter which side won. A fight that ended up sinking, and restarting, the entire program, after Airbus won in February 2008. Three years later, Boeing won the recompete. Now, it has to deliver.

• KC-X: The Program
  • The KC-X Competitions
  • The KC-46A Development Phase
  • The KC-46A Production Phase
• Boeing’s KC-46A, and Its Team [updated]
• KC-X RFP: Contracts & Key Developments [updated]
• Appendix A: KC-X RFP v2.0 – The New Structure
• Appendix B: The Contenders and The Cargo Factor – KC-30B, KC-767… KC-777?
• Appendix C: Airbus KC-30/ KC-45A Team
• Additional Readings
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CH-53K concept
c. Sikorsky

The U.S. Marines have a problem. They rely on their CH-53E Super Stallion medium-heavy lift helicopters to move troops, vehicles, and supplies off of their ships. But the helicopters are wearing out. Fast. The pace demanded by the Global War on Terror is relentless, and usage rates are 3 times normal. Attrition is taking its toll. Over the past few years, CH-53s have been recalled from “boneyard” storage at Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, AZ, in order to maintain fleet numbers in the face of recent losses and forced retirements. Now, there are no flyable spares left.

Enter the Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) program, also known as the CH-53X. It was given the formal designation CH-53K in April 2006, and aims to offer notable performance improvements in a similar-looking package. The question is whether its service entry delay to 2018 will come too late to offset a serious decline in Marine aviation:

• The HLR Program Lifts Off
• The CH-53X / CH-53K
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
• Appendix A: Flying Between Scylla and Charbydis: Navigating The Political Shoals (April 2006)
• Appendix B: Interesting Ideas: The CH-53X Skycrane Concept

CC-130 over BC

The US military has been coming to the realization that its aging aircraft fleet will begin posing serious challenges in the coming years. Canada is experiencing similar problems. In 2005, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier said that:

“Our [CC-130 E/H] Hercules fleet right now is rapidly going downhill. We know that three years and a little bit more than that, the fleet starts to become almost completely inoperational and we will have to stop supporting operations – or else, not be able to start them.”

This Spotlight article offers additional details regarding the Canadian CC-130 recapitalization program, and the thinking behind it; some background that points up the parallels between the issues faced by the Canadians, and the experiences of other air services; and some insight into why the buy took so long, after the C-130J was declared Canada’s preferred choice in an “expedited” process. Canada has begun using the new planes on operations, and is preparing to accept the last “CC-130J.” This will shift its focus to issues of long-term support costs.

• The Transports and the Damage Done: Issues With the Fleet
  • Live Rust: What To Do Until the New Planes Arrive?
• Comes a Time: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A – Someday: Facing the Future, At Last?
  • Bite the Bullet: Canada’s Procurement Approach and Process
  • Are You Ready for the Country: Possible Competitors C-130J, C-130M, A400M… IL-76?
• Walk On: Additional Readings & Sources
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• The US House Budget Committee approved a bill to roll back sequestration through reconciliation and instead offers cuts focused on welfare programs. Getting the Heritage Foundation’s seal of approval was a foregone conclusion, but what is missing is a roadmap for such proposals to get any traction in the Senate, let alone get a signature from President Obama. The window of opportunity will be narrow in the lame duck session at the end of the year, and perilously close to the edge of the fiscal cliff.

• RAND published its latest research on portfolio management for Army programs at the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) stage of the acquisition lifecycle. They have been working to develop a methodology to determine optimal remaining R&D budgets as well as identify which projects to terminate in case of budget cuts.

• The law, and turf wars, stand in the way of clear, updated cyberdefense rules being finalized in the US.
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MSVS MilCOTS 7400

Just before Canada Day 2006, Canada’s minority Conservative Party government outlined a C$ 1.2 billion (USD $1 billion) RFP for new medium-sized logistics trucks and associated equipment. These Medium Support Vehicle System (MSVS) trucks will become the new backbone of the Canadian Forces’ land transport capabilities, replacing the MLVW (really, US M-35/M-36 designs with some modifications) 1950s designs, built by Bombardier in the 1980s.

The MLVWs are reaching the end of their service lives, and can’t carry all of the extra armor required for survival in places like Afghanistan. This may explain why the Canadian forces in Afghanistan are relying on their HLVW heavy trucks instead, a set of 10-ton capacity Steyr vehicles related to the smaller US FMTV medium truck family.

Under the new plan, the Canadian Forces will purchase up to 2,300 new medium trucks. What are the requirements? The configurations and numbers? Is this a welcome arrival that fills a critical gap? A mistake that will leave Canada out of step with shifting trends? Or a politically-driven move that falls into the “something, and hence better than nothing” category? Or all 3? As of 2012, MSVS has made 1 truck purchase, bought containerized modules, and is still waiting on the contract for front-line military trucks…

• If You Could Read My Mind: Medium Truck Requirements [updated]
• Go-Go Round: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: It’s Too Late, He Wins – Issues and Analysis (July 1/06)
• Additional Readings & Sources
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No climbing Mt. Fuji

Back in February 2006, Inside The Air Force (ITAF) reported that momentum was building within the Air Force to sell the ultra-advanced F-22A Raptor abroad to trusted U.S. allies, as a way of increasing numbers and production. One of the most likely export prospects was Japan. The Raptor was discussed at a 2007 summit meeting, and in a number of other venues.

In the end, US politics denied export permission for downgraded export variants of the F-22, even as its production line was terminated. That has left Japan looking at other foreign fighter options in the short term, while considering a domestic fighter option as a long-term project. BAE patiently kept promoting the Eurofighter Typhoon, Boeing introduced a stealth F-15 variant before taking a different tack with its F/A-18 Super Hornet, and Lockheed Martin offered its F-35 models. The F-35A was eventually picked, but will its price cost it in Japan? This article looks at Japan’s current force, future options, and ongoing developments.

• The JASDF: Structure & Choices
  • What They Really Wanted: F-22s
• Japan’s F-X: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
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Bridge to the future?

In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in anti-shipping surveillance-strike complexes, and the need to defend large sea lanes, and dropped something of a surprise. They proposed increasing Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be successors to Australia’s a current fleet of advanced Collins class submarines.

The Collins class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has encountered a number of issues, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines put a huge crimp in the fleet’s usefulness. High-level attention led to 29 recommendations aimed at improving conditions and staffing on Australia’s submarines, and those are now being implemented. Their long term effect remains to be seen. So, too, does the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost:

• Program Structure & Timeline [NEW]
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
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C-5 Galaxy

When it was introduced, back in 1970, the C-5 Galaxy was the largest plane in the world. It also has the highest operating cost of any US Air Force weapon system, owing to extremely high maintenance demands as well as poor fuel economy. Worse, availability rates routinely hover near 50%. To add insult to injury, the Russians not only built a bigger plane (the AN-124), they sold it off at the end of the Cold War to semi-private operators, turning it into a commercial success whose customer list now includes… NATO.

Meanwhile, the USA still needs long-range, heavy load airlift. The AN-124’s commercial success may get its production line restarted, but the C-5 has no such hope. Boeing’s smaller C-17s cost more than $200 million per plane. That’s about the cost of a 747-8 freighter, for much higher availability rates than the C-5. What’s the right balance?

Sunrise? Sunset?

The US Air Force believes that the right balance involves keeping some of the larger C-5s, and thought they could save money by upgrading and renewing their avionics (AMP) and engines (RERP). Their hope was that this would eliminate the problems that keep so many C-5s in the hangar, cut down on future maintenance costs, and grow airlift capacity without adding new planes. Unfortunately, the program experienced major cost growth. In response, the C-5M program wound up being both cut in size, and cut in 2. The C-5A and C-5B/C fleets are now slated for different treatment, which will deliver fewer of the hoped-for benefits, in exchange for lower costs and lower risk:

• The C-5’s AMP/RERP Changes
• The AMP/RERP Program and the C-5 Gamble [updated]
• Contracts & Key Events, 1999 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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67% of the fleet

The prime missions of the new DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer are to provide naval gunfire support, and next-generation air defense, in near-shore areas where other large ships hesitate to tread. There has even been talk of using it as an anchor for action groups of stealthy Littoral Combat Ships and submarines, owing to its design for very low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures. The estimated 14,500t (battlecruiser size) Zumwalt Class will be fully multi-role, however, with undersea warfare, anti-ship, and long-range attack roles.

True, or False?

That makes the DDG-1000 suitable for another role – as a “hidden ace card,” using its overall stealth to create uncertainty for enemy forces. At over $3 billion per ship for construction alone, however, the program faced significant obstacles if it wanted to avoid fulfilling former Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter’s fears for the fleet. From the outset, DID has noted that the Zumwalt Class might face the same fate as the ultra-sophisticated, ultra-expensive SSN-21 Seawolf Class submarines. That appears to have come true, with news of the program’s truncation to just 3 ships. Meanwhile, production continues. DID’s FOCUS Article for the DDG-1000 program covers the new ships’ capabilities and technologies, key controversies, associated contracts and costs, and related background resources.

• Zumwalt Class: Program and Participants
• DDG-1000 Key Technologies and Features
• DDG-1000 Issues and Controversies
• Zumwalt Class: Contracts and Key Events, 1998 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
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