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HMAS Adelaide
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The FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates make for a fascinating defense procurement case study. To this day, the ships are widely touted as a successful example of cost containment and avoidance of requirements creep – both of which have been major weaknesses in US Navy acquisition. The result was a capable 3,600t-4,100t anti-submarine platform, with some secondary air defense and anti-ship capabilities via its SM-1 Standard and RGM-84 Harpoon missiles, that could be bought in large enough numbers to fill the Navy’s needs. The ships’ hull twisting and cracking problems were solved early on, and they proved they could take a hit and stay afloat when the USS Stark was struck by 2 Iraqi Exocet missiles during the Iran/ Iraq war. By FFG-36, the “FFG-7 Flight III (Long)” variant was the sole US production version, with an extra 8 feet of length that let it accommodate larger and more capable SH-60 Seahawk helicopters instead of the SH-2 Sea Sprites.

The bad news was the flip side of the good news. Very little reserved space for growth (39 tons in the original design), and the standard inflexible, proprietary electronics of the time, made updates problematic. So problematic, in fact, that the US Navy gave up on the idea of upgrading their electronics, radars et. al. for new communications realities and advanced missile threats. Instead, they removed the 25 “FFG-7 Short” ships from inventory via bargain basement sales to allies or outright retirement, after an average of only 18 or so years of service. The remaining 30 ships received minor upgrades but had their no-longer standard SM-1 missiles removed – and with them, any air defense role. They do not operate in dangerous areas without cover from high-end AEGIS destroyers and cruisers.

Australia’s 6 ships of this class have served alongside the Navy’s more modern ANZAC Class frigates, which are undergoing upgrades of their own to help them handle the reality of modern anti-ship missiles. With the SEA 4000 Hobart Class air warfare frigates still just a gleam in an admiral’s eye, the government looked for a way to upgrade their FFG-7 “Adelaide Class” to keep them in service until 2020 or so. The A$ 1.46 billion SEA 1390 project has not gone very well… though the new Labor government is working to put a better face on it.

• Australia’s Adelaide Class & Its Upgrade Program
• SEA 1390: The Issues
• Updates and Developments [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Land Rover Snatch
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In the USA, a controversy erupted in early 2008 when USMC whistleblower Franz Gayl’s “The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Case Study” [PDF] blamed a slow military procurement system for delays in fielding mine-resistant vehicles. The USMC had actually been an early purchaser, but the vehicles had remained an tiny portion of the total US vehicle fleet in theater until the MRAP competition began in 2006 – over 3 1/2 years into a war that had featured IED land mines as the primary threat since 2003.

Britain has its own long-running controversy around its vulnerable Land Rover Snatch 2 patrol vehicles, which feature even less armor than the USA’s M1114 Hummers. That controversy has now boiled over into a full-scale political row, after senior SAS commanders have resigned over inadequate equipment that Maj. Morley of 23 SAS has termed “cavalier at best, criminal at worst.” The Land Rovers are at the center of this storm, and Parliamentary government being what it is, a ministerial resignation is not out of the question….

• Land Rovers: Weaknesses and Responses
• 23 SAS, Cpl. Bryant, and Maj. Morley’s Resignation
• Additional Readings
  
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On Oct 14/08, India’s Election Commission announced dates for assembly polls in 5 key batleground states of Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, and Mizoram. The announcement begins the countdown to national Parliamentary elections in 2009, and political positioning has begun. One offshoot of that has hit the defense sector, as DNAIndia reports a new order that changes the status of Israeli firms IAI and RAFAEL within India.

Recent months had seen important progress in India for the 2 Israeli defense firms. In February 2008, RAFAEL signed a long-term joint venture contract with Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) in Bangalore. In August 2008, India’s MoD got fresh “vigilance clearance” to go ahead with the Barak-derived medium-range naval defense missile and land-based MR-SAM program, despite ongoing political allegations and a CBI investigation asking if bribery was involved in the original 1999-2000 Barak missile deal. Meanwhile, the short range IAI/RAFAEL Barak anti-air missile system now equips a number of Indian Navy ships, and the Navy is looking to replenish its stocks. Earlier in October, India’s government had also contracted to buy Spyder air defense systems for the Indian Air Force.

Barak Components
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No indictments have been issued in these matters; nevertheless, under the new government guidance, DNA India reports that the Indian Navy may not purchase additional Barak missiles for the fleet until the new guidance is repealed. The effect on the Spyder deal is less certain, but it is also likely to remain in limbo until the political situation in India sorts itself out after the 2009 elections. Beyond that, the new guidelines specify that neither RAFAEL nor IAI can receive single-vendor RFPs until the cabinet committee on security takes a final decision. Multi-vendor competitions can still issue RFPs to these firms, but eligibility would be withdrawn if the CBI files a chargesheet showing “incriminating evidence” against the companies in the Barak case. A fresh “vigilance approval” will also be required if IAI and/or RAFAEL should win a multi-vendor competition. Existing contracts like MR-SAM will continue, but with their status under periodic review for cancellation if the CBI investigation bears fruit.

UPDATE: A Nov 9/08 India Times article clarifies, noting that the Spyder air defense system purchase is going ahead.

Israeli A-4Ns
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McDonnell Douglas’ A-4 Skyhawk, aka. “Scooter,” has a long and storied career as a carrier-based attack aircraft with the US Navy. It’s old enough that Sen. John McCain was flying one when he was shot down over North Vietnam. It also has a storied land-based career with the Israeli Air Force, however, which used it from late 1967 onward as a versatile attack aircraft with surprising air-air teeth. In one engagement during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk found itself facing 3 MiG-21s. The maneuverable little Skyhawk turned on them and brought 2 of them down, and was reportedly on the 3rd Fishbed’s tail when an IAF Mirage IIIC zipped through and blasted the MiG out of the sky. The A-4’s surprising maneuverability was coupled with an equally surprising ability to take battle damage, but the type took heavy losses in the 1973 war: of 102 aircraft lost, 53 were Skyhawks.

Per mission losses in 1973 were just 0.6%, a lower figure than the previous 1970 War of Attrition with Egypt. Nevertheless, the writing was on the wall. When the F-16 was made available to Israel, the A-4s began to take a back seat. Some did participate in the 1982 Lebanon War, and one even scored a MiG-17 kill. By that time, however, squadron migrations to the F-16 had already begun, and 33 of the Skyhawks had been sold to Indonesia. By the mid 1990s almost all of Israel’s fighter squadrons had migrated, and 2000-2001 saw a handful of Israeli Skyhawks sold to corporate operators in BAE and ATSI. A number of A-4E/H/N aircraft are currently stored at Ovda Air Base, and the “Flying Tigers” of 102 Squadron at Hatzerim Air Base still use their A-4Ns and 2-seat TA-4Js for advanced IAF pilot training.

These surviving aircraft require maintenance, which was being provided by the contractor Kanfei Tahzuka via Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Unfortunately, the little plane that could appears to have finally met its match – thanks to a scandal that has grounded Israel’s Skyhawk fleet…

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On Sept 30/08, “The USA’s National Cybersecurity Initiative” focused on the belated but growing reaction to recent uses of cyber-attacks as an adjunct to warfare, and by the growing rate of attempted intrusions into American systems from countries like China. In June 2008, “Secure Semiconductors: Sensible, or Sisiphyean?” discussed the growing realization within the US military that massive use of commercial electronics, coupled with the complexity of modern chip designs, made it very difficult to be sure that “backdoors” and other security flaws weren’t being inserted into high-end American defense equipment. It’s a difficult conundrum, because commercial chips offer orders of magnitude improvements in cost and performance. Hence DARPA’s “Trust in IC” program, which hopes to crack the problem and offer the best of both worlds.

On Oct 2/08, Business Week’s in-depth article “Dangerous Fakes” claimed that a key component of the silicon security threat might be even simpler:

“The American military faces a growing threat of potentially fatal equipment failure – and even foreign espionage – because of counterfeit computer components used in warplanes, ships, and communication networks. Fake microchips flow from unruly bazaars in rural China to dubious kitchen-table brokers in the U.S. and into complex weapons. Senior Pentagon officials publicly play down the danger, but government documents, as well as interviews with insiders, suggest possible connections between phony parts and breakdowns…. Potentially more alarming than either of the two aircraft episodes are hundreds of counterfeit routers made in China and sold to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines over the past four years. These fakes could facilitate foreign espionage, as well as cause accidents. The U.S. Justice Dept. is prosecuting the operators of an electronics distributor in Texas – and last year obtained guilty pleas from the proprietors of a company in Washington State – for allegedly selling the military dozens of falsely labeled routers…. Referring to the seizure of more than 400 fake routers so far, Melissa E. Hathaway, head of cyber security in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, says: “Counterfeit products have been linked to the crash of mission-critical networks, and may also contain hidden ‘back doors’ enabling network security to be bypassed and sensitive data accessed….”

CGC Sanibel
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DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. On Sept 16/05, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Lockheed Martin/ Northrop Grumman joint venture Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) completed the preliminary design review for the 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRC). “The FRC is being designed to provide the Coast Guard with a state-of-the-art patrol craft that is capable of conducting simultaneous missions,” said ICGS Deepwater’s FRC program manager Mike Duthu.

That success has been followed by delays and failures, on multiple fronts. More than 2 years after the Coast Guard asked ICGS to accelerate the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program timeline by more than 10 years, in order to hasten replacement of their rapidly deteriorating Island Class patrol vessels, the Coast Guard is still waiting for replacements of any type to arrive. The USCG’s 30-year old patrol boats soldier on, less the 8 “upgraded” Island Class ships whose hull cracking has now made them unfit for service. Another 41 Island Class vessels still ply US and international waters.

The Island Class’ replacement program fared little better. In February 2006, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater system-of-systems Program ‘temporarily’ suspended design work on the FRC-A program due to technical risk. That suspension remains in place, and it soon became clear that Congress was unwilling to fund further FRC design work. FRC-A has effectively been canceled, in favor of an off-the-shelf buy. On March 14/07, the Coast Guard took the next step. ICGS’ lost responsibility for the Deepwater Fast Response Cutter-B off-the-shelf acquisition as well, and the FRC project was reassigned to the Coast Guard’s new Acquisition Directorate.

What happened? What will happen next? DID reviews, from the programs, to the outcomes and controversies, to the fate of the Island Class and FRC programs. The latest news is an initial contract for the Coast Guard’s off-the-shelf FRC-B cutter, which could become a $1.5 billion buy…

• Behind the Programs: The Modernization Imperative
• Appendix A: Down on the Islands – The Suspended Modernization
• Appenix B: FRC-A’s Not-So Fast Response: The Catch With Composite Cutters
• March 2007: What Next?
• FRC Plan B: The Sentinel Class [NEW]
• Program Updates & Contracts [updated]
• Additional Readings – Background
• Additional Readings – News, Official Reports & Statements
  
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Is it?
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In February 2007, “2006 Carbine Competition: What Happened, Revealed” discussed an Army solicitation for competitive procurement of 5.56mm carbines, which was withdrawn once sole-source incumbent Colt dropped its prices. The DoD’s Inspector General got involvedwith a critical report, but the Army dissented, defending its practices as a sound negotiating approach that saved the taxpayer a lot of money on the contract. As it turns out, there’s a sequel. A major sequel, that’s only getting bigger with time.

It seemed like a routine request. Order more M4 carbines for US forces in the FY 2007 supplemental, FY 2008 budget, and FY 2008 supplemental funding bills. It has turned into anything but a routine exercise, however – with serving soldiers, journalists, and Senators casting a very critical eye on the effort and the rifle, and demanding open competition. With requests amounting to $375 million for weapons and $150 million in accessories, they say, the Army’s proposal amounts to an effort to replace the M16 as the USA’s primary battle rifle – using specifications that are around 15 years old, without a competition, and without considering whether better 5.56 mm alternatives might be available off the shelf. Meanwhile, the M4/M16 family is both praised and criticized for its current performance in the field.

DID explains the effort, the issues, and the options. The latest developments? The M4 and 3 competitors, including one M4 variant that can be converted from existing rifles, come out of a sandstorm reliability test – and the M4 finishes dead last, with more than 3.5x more jams than the 3rd place finisher. But the US Army publicly says that it doesn’t care. Low-grade political pressure has continued on Capitol Hill, and the Army appears to be backtracking now, with a competition that may even be open to all calibers… but is their latest information request to industry serious, or a replay of the practices cited in the DoD IG’s 2006 report?

• The M4 Carbine
• Nobody Loves Me but My Mother – and She Could Be Jivin’ Too…
• The Cry for Competition: How Much Is That HK In the Window?
• Testing, Testing – Fairly?
• UPDATES: The Tests, Reactions, and Subsequent Developments [updated]
• Any Last Words?
• Appendix A: M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources – News & Developments
• Appendix C: Additional Readings & Sources – Weapons
  
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T-90, backside ollie
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India’s main battle tanks had one been relatively advanced by world standards, but long delays in fielding the indigenous “Arjun” MBT, combined with a successful Pakistani/Ukrainian program for its T-80UD “Al-Khalid” tanks, eroded India’s local advantage. The poor performance of T-72s in combat against modern main battle tanks could not have been comforting, either. In early October 2006, India Defence and Indian papers reported that the Indian Army intended to produce nearly 1,000 T90S ‘Bhishma’ main battle tanks in India by 2020. These would be bought in addition to the 310 T90 MBTs already under contract from Russia. Later that month, news reports noted a follow-on contract for another 330 T-90S tank kits from Russia that would assembled in India. Taken together those 2 firm production agreements reportedly exceed $1 billion.

The modernized T-72 now known as the T-90 has reportedly encountered serious problems in Indian service, from issues with its Thales thermal imaging systems, to difficulties in hot weather, to low readiness rates. Meanwhile, negotiations with Russia over technology transfer issues had shelved the 1,000 tank indigenous production goal, leaving only the 2 firm production agreements. The Arjun project has continued to fade, however, with the Indian Army announcing in July 2008 that production would be capped at just 124 tanks. As the final act in the battle for the core of India’s future tank force, recent reports indicate that the Russians have removed their technology transfer roadblocks, clearing the way for fully indigenous T-90S production in India…

• The T-90 in India: Directions and Delays
• Updates and Key Events
  
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In the 1970s, fighter aircraft began to appear with Head-Up Displays (HUD) that projected key information, targeting crosshairs et. al. onto a seemingly clear piece of glass, so the pilot could keep his eyes on the sky instead of looking down at his instruments. We’ve been wondering when we’d see them in our automobiles ever since. In the 1990s, another innovation appeared: helmet-mounted displays put the HUD inside the pilot’s helmet, providing this information even when the pilot wasn’t looking straight ahead. The Israelis were already using a system called DASH when a set of former East German MiG-29s equipped with HMDs slaughtered USAF F-16s in exercises, and helmet-mounted displays suddenly became must-haves for modern fighters.

The Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) projects visual targeting and aircraft performance information on the back of the helmet’s visor, including aircraft altitude, airspeed, gravitational pull, angle of attack, and weapons sighting, enabling the pilot to monitor this information without interrupting the field of view through the cockpit canopy. The system uses a magnetic transmitter unit fixed to the pilot’s seat and a magnetic field probe mounted on the helmet to define helmet pointing positioning. A Helmet Vehicle Interface (HVI) interacts with the aircraft system bus to provide signal generation for the helmet display. This provides significant improvement for close combat targeting and engagement.

A September 2005 exchange with Boeing enabled DID to gain insights into the rocky past, overall state, and future of a program that has experienced its share of snags and controversy – but gone on to become the #1 helmet-mounted sight in the world today. That information fits nicely with DID’s expansion of our coverage to detail the JHMCS’ game-changing effects on air combat, its production sets and known customers, and all contracts since full-rate production began. The latest item is a contract from Boeing to provide the dual-seat version for use in USAF F-15Es…

• JHMCS: A Combat Multiplier [updated] (i.e. Continue reading…)
• JHMCS: The Program to Date
• JHMCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: JHMCS History & Challenges
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
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NSC 1 Bertholf
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The US Coast Guard’s massive $25 billion Deepwater meta-program (really Deepwater-II given post-9/11 changes) has endured more than its share of ups and downs. Nevertheless, Congressional support remains strong, and efforts are being made to restructure the program and get it back on track. “Voted Off the Island: The USCG’s Deepwater FRC Program” offered an in-depth look into the difficulties faced by the USCG’s Island Class cutter modification program, and by the Deepwater Fast Response Cutter that was supposed to replace it. “US Coast Guard’s Deepwater Effort Hits More Rough Sailing” covers recent program developments more generally.

The Legend Class National Security Cutters are the largest ships in the Deepwater program, and represent the program’s flagship in more ways than one. The 418 foot, 4,300 ton ships will be frigate-sized vessels with a 21 foot draughts¹, and are rather larger than the 379 foot, 3,250 ton Hamilton Class High Endurance Cutters (HECs) they will replace. Controversies regarding durability and potential hull fatigue, as well as significant cost overruns, have shadowed the new cutter’s construction. Nevertheless, the program appears to be moving forward.

This DID FOCUS Article covers recent developments concerning the Legend Class cutters. The latest developments include the christening of the second NSC, WMSL 751 Waesche…

• Quick Background: The Deepwater Program
• The Legend Class National Security Cutters
• The Pitfalls of Being a Legend: NSC Issues & Action
• Legend Class Program: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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