FH-77Bs, Kargil War
via Bharat Rakshak
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India’s $2 billion purchase of about 400 new 155mm self-propelled howitzers is intended to supplement India’s dwindling artillery stocks, while out-ranging and out-shooting Pakistan’s self-propelled M109 155mm guns. It seems simple enough, and BAE Systems Bofors had been competing against systems from Israel’s Soltam and Denel of South Africa.

Unfortunately, the competition has mostly served as a cautionary tale, a years-long affair filled with legal drama, accusations of corruption, and more than one re-start. Meanwhile, India’s stock of operational 155mm howitzers has dwindled to around 200. In 2007, a new RFP was issued, and the competition was expanded. Is there an end in sight? Or a potential winner?

No. India’s Byzantine procurement processes have defeated operational needs yet again, as the competition stalls out one more time, and its existing artillery continues to decay…

• Competition Background
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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Scratch one flag…
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In April 2005, South Africa’s Public Enterprises Minister Alec Erwin expected the cost of the SAAF’s 8 planned Airbus A400M medium-heavy military transport aircraft to be EUR 830 million. That converted to R 6.5 billion at those exchange rates, or about $177.75 million per plane in American dollars. South Africa reportedly intended to take delivery of 8 of the A400Ms from 2010-2014, with a further 6 on option. Ordering those additional 6 aircraft would reportedly have pushed the total contract value to EUR $1.5 billion, or about R11.9 billion at those exchange rates. When the deal was signed in December 2006, the price for 8 aircraft and initial fielding had risen to R 17.646 billion, or almost $2.5 billion: about $308 million per plane.

Meanwhile, South Africa bit the bullet and decided to upgrade its 8-9 aged C-130B Hercules planes. The first SAAF C-130Bs were delivered in 1963, and badly needed additional upgrades and refurbishment.

Subsequent delays to the A400M program were set to either extend the C-130Bs’ service, or force reliance on charters, even as the A400M’s likely costs grew. That SAAF aerial uncertainty has only grown, now that South Africa has become the first country to pull out of the A400M program…

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Nimrod MR2 – incoming!
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On Sept 3/06, an RAF Nimrod MR2 sea control aircraft was flying near Kandahar, Afghanistan, using its advanced sensors and long endurance in support of NATO ISAF forces on land. The aircraft moved to take on additional fuel from an aerial tanker, in order to remain on station longer. That’s when the trouble began. Alerts soon began to sound, and the crew remained professional and businesslike as they steered their ailing plane toward Kandahar for an emergency landing. They never arrived. RAF Nimrod #XV230 exploded in mid-air over Afghanistan, killing all 14 crew members.

“Nimrod Was Actually a Fine Hunter: Upgrading Britain’s Fleet (updated)” details Britain’s current and future Nimrod sea control aircraft fleet, which first entered service in 1969. In the aftermath of the inquests and enquiries that have followed the September 2006 explosion, however, serious questions have been raised concerning the Nimrod’s fleet’s ongoing fitness, and the measures taken to maintain these aging aircraft.

The problems have continued to pile up for the RAF. Beyond a scathing coroner’s report, a set of High Court filings by the UK MoD admit to failures in the RAF’s duty of care. Those are weighty legal words, and now an official independent review has delivered its verdict…

• Nimrod #XV230: What the Coroner Said
• Updates and New Developments
  
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“Former Iraq Security Contractors Say Firm Bought Black Market Weapons, Swapped Booze for Rockets” says the ProPublica headline. They’re talking about a firm called Triple Canopy, a security contractor who replaced Blackwater (now Xe) as the US diplomatic service’s bodyguards in Iraq, and also had other contracts in theater to protect allied bases and installations, some of which were covered here.

Allegations and legal depositions state that the firm traded booze for weapons, and bought weapons and vehicles on the black market in Iraq between 2003-2004. At least one of those employees have expressed concern that the money used to buy these items may have ended up in the hands of Iraq’s Islamists, who were connected to criminal enterprises in Iraq at a number of different levels.

The article itself turns out to be more balanced than its headline might indicate, and the detailed accusations are linked to detailed responses; both are worth reading. Beginning with the revelation that significant responsibility for this state of affairs traces right back to the US State Department…

• State Department Self-Inflicted?
• Triple Canopy: Allegations & Approach
• Policy Issues
  
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In the 1970s, fighter aircraft began to appear with Head-Up Displays (HUD) that projected key information, targeting crosshairs etc. onto a seemingly clear piece of glass. HUDs allowed pilots to keep their eyes in the sky, instead of looking down at their instruments. Ever since, we’ve been wondering when we’d see them in our automobiles. In the 1990s, another innovation appeared: helmet-mounted displays (HMDs) put the HUD inside the pilot’s helmet, providing this information even when the pilot wasn’t looking straight ahead. The Israelis were already pioneering a system called DASH when a set of former East German MiG-29s equipped with Soviet HMDs slaughtered USAF F-16s in NATO exercises. Suddenly, helmet-mounted displays became must-haves for modern fighters – and a key partnership positioned Elbit to take DASH to the next level.

This DID Spotlight article offered insights into the rocky past, overall state, and future of a program that has experienced its share of snags and controversy – but went on to become the #1 helmet-mounted sight in the world today. It also details the JHMCS’ game-changing effects on air combat, its production sets and known customers, and all contracts since full-rate production began.

The latest item is a some aditional gear for the US Navy…

• JHMCS: A Combat Multiplier [updated] (i.e. Continue reading…)
• JHMCS: The Program to Date
• JHMCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: JHMCS History & Challenges
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
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On Oct 15/09, the US Congress’ GAO audit office published report #GAO-10-163T, “Defense Management: Widespread DCAA Audit Problems Leave Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Vulnerable to Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Mismanagement.” An excerpt:

“The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is charged with a critical role in contractor oversight by providing auditing, accounting, and financial advisory services in connection with DOD and other federal agency contracts and subcontracts. However, last year GAO found numerous problems with DCAA audit quality at three locations in California, including the failure to meet professional auditing standards. In a follow-up audit issued this September, GAO found that these problems existed agencywide.

Today’s testimony describes widespread audit quality problems at DCAA and provides information about continuing contract management challenges at DOD, which underscore the importance of DCAA audits that meet professional standards. It also discusses some of the corrective actions taken by DCAA and DOD and key GAO recommendations to improve DCAA audit quality.”

Policeman, Sabari
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Readers may recall “AEY’s Ammunition: Ain’t An April Fools, Alas”, which detailed a $300 million contract to a Miami company, who delivered ammunition that was not up to standard and is charged with sourcing its stock illegally. Now, more established firms like ATK and General Dynamics are stepping into the breach.

They are not the only firm receiving contracts for “non-standard” ammunition. By “nonstandard,” the military means non-NATO standard, such as the 7.62×39mm caliber used by rifles like the AK-47 and its copies around the world. Other common options include the 7.62×54mm (used in Dragunov sniper rifles and PKM machine guns), and 12.7×108mm (as opposed to NATO’s .50 BMG 12.7×99mm). Even RPG-7 rocket rounds have been specified in these contracts.

The latest developments include $150 million in contracts for Afghan and American forces…

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All they’re ready for?
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On Sept 12/06, The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Australia’s A$ 400 million ALR2002 project, aimed at putting radar and infared missile warning systems (RWRs) in Australia’s helicopters, transports and F/A-18s, had ended in at least partial failure with the scrapping of F/A-18 integration under the HUG 2.3 upgrade program. Sticking with the offering from
BAE Systems Australia’s electronic warfare division, they said, would deliver the project at least 2 years late and A$ 200 million over budget.

In response, a decision was formally announced on Nov 13/06. RAAF F/A-18A/B fighters would not use “Project Echidna’s” system, but its helicopters and C-130s would. More than 4 years after the original Phase 2A award, the scope of fielding for “Project Echidna” is about to be reduced again…

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HMAS Adelaide
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The FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates make for a fascinating defense procurement case study. To this day, the ships are widely touted as a successful example of cost containment and avoidance of requirements creep – both of which have been major weaknesses in US Navy acquisition. On the other hand, compromises made to meet short-term cost targets resulted in short service lives and decisions to retire, sell, or downgrade the ships instead of upgrading them.

Australia’s 6 ships of this class have served alongside the RAN’s more modern ANZAC Class frigates, which are undergoing upgrades of their own to help them handle the reality of modern anti-ship missiles. With the SEA 4000 Hobart Class air warfare frigates still just a gleam in an admiral’s eye, the government looked for a way to upgrade their FFG-7 “Adelaide Class” to keep them in service until 2020 or so. The A$ 1.46 billion SEA 1390 project has not gone very well… but the new Labor government has just officially accepted the last frigate.

• Australia’s Adelaide Class & Its Upgrade Program
• SEA 1390: The Issues
• Updates and Developments [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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SSN 777 construction
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On May 14/09, a welding inspector at Northrop Grumman’s Newport News, VA shipyard did the right thing, and complained that a fellow inspector was signing off on ship welds without actually inspecting them. The inspector’s admission of wrongdoing created an extremely serious situation. He had supervised over 10,000 welds, on 8 Virginia class nuclear fast attack submarines (SSN 777-783, and SSN 785) and on the new nuclear aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush [CVN 77]. About 10% of the submarine welds were SUBSAFE joints involving critical parts or hull integrity.

The final report has now been released…

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