The USCG’s Legend Class National Security Cutters

WMSL-750 Bertholf

The US Coast Guard’s massive $25 billion Deepwater meta-program (really Deepwater-II given post-9/11 changes) has endured more than its share of ups and downs. Nevertheless, Congressional support has remained strong, and efforts are being made to restructure the program and get it back on track. Yet the USCG’s Island Class cutter modification program, and the Deepwater Fast Response Cutter supposed to replace it, have faced many difficulties.

The Legend Class National Security Cutters are the largest ships in the Deepwater program, and represent the program’s flagship in more ways than one. The 418 foot, 4,400 ton ships will be frigate-sized vessels with a 21 foot draughts [1], and are rather larger than the 379 foot, 3,250 ton Hamilton Class High Endurance Cutters (HECs) they will replace. Controversies regarding durability and potential hull fatigue, as well as significant cost overruns, have shadowed the new cutter’s construction. rhe program has survived, and is pushing toward its end in a few years – but will the number of ships bought be enough to help the USCG? This DID FOCUS Article covers the Legend Class cutters’ specifications, program history, and key events.

JHMCS: Fighter Pilots’ “Look & Shoot” Helmets Changing Aerial Warfare

(click to view larger)

In the 1970s, fighter aircraft began to appear with Head-Up Displays (HUD) that projected key information, targeting crosshairs etc. onto a seemingly clear piece of glass. HUDs allowed pilots to keep their eyes in the sky, instead of looking down at their instruments. In the 1990s, another innovation appeared: helmet-mounted displays (HMDs) put the HUD inside the pilot’s helmet, providing this information even when the pilot wasn’t looking straight ahead. The Israelis were already pioneering a system called DASH (Display And Sight Helmet) when a set of former East German MiG-29s, equipped with Soviet HMDs, slaughtered USAF F-16s in NATO exercises. Suddenly, helmet-mounted displays became must-haves for modern fighters – and a key partnership positioned Elbit to take DASH to the next level.

This DID Spotlight article offers insights into the rocky past, successful present, and competitive future of a program that has experienced its share of snags and controversy – but went on to become the #1 helmet-mounted sight in the world. It also details the game-changing effects of Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems on air combat, its production sets and known customers, and all contracts since full-rate production began.

Algerian Arms Deal Brings Russia $7.5 billion, Gas Market Leverage

Yak-130

A February 2006 report noted that a $4 billion arms sale was brewing between Algeria and Russia involving fighter aircraft, tanks, and air defense systems, with the possibility of additional equipment. Those options came through the following month, as a high-level Russian delegation in Algeria closed up to $7.5 billion worth of arms contracts. The Algerian package remains post-Soviet Russia’s largest single arms deal. As an instructive comparison, annual Russian weapons export orders from all customers were just $5-6 billion per year in 2004 and 2005.

Reuters South Africa quoted Rosoboronexport chief Sergei Chemezov as saying that “Practically all types of arms which we have are included, anti-missile systems, aviation, sea and land technology.” The actual contents of that deal were murky, though DID offers triangulation among several sources to help sort out the confusion. A number of these deals have evolved over time, and other public-source information has helped to sharpen the picture a bit. The subsequent crash of Algeria’s MiG-29 deal, and its ripple effects, are also discussed.

C-40 Clippers Hitting Their Stride, Despite Past Controversy

C-40A Clipper

The 737 based C-40 Clipper represents a substantial upgrade over the 1970s-era, DC-9 based C-9 Skytrains and 727-based C-22Bs that have performed its transport roles to date. The C-9s are still in service with the US Naval Reserve and USAF, but they’re expected to be be phased out as the C-40s take up the load. Meanwhile, concern has been expressed about the funding levels for this replacement program, as well as the USAF and US Navy C-9 fleet’s continued durability. The USAF’s C-9A models are of particular concern.

The C-40 comes in 3 variants; the C-40A is a Navy aircraft, while its counterpart C-40C and executive/ VIP C-40Bs are USAF planes. The USAF’s C-40 leasing contracts have been a source of some controversy, but the program has continued, alongside Air Force and Navy buys.

Syria’s Russian Weapon Buys

MiG-29SMT

In June 2007, Russian newspapers claimed that Russia had begun delivering 5 MiG-31E Foxhound aircraft to Syria, under a deal that was reportedly negotiated in autumn 2006. The Russian newspaper Kommersant added that part of the deal was being financed by Iran as a back-door purchase. A series of other deals have been announced since, for items that include advanced anti-ship missiles and air defense systems.

To call these deals opaque would be an understatement, and the lack of transparency exists in several layers. Russia has been Syria’s main arms supplier for decades, and both regimes are very secretive about their activites. Russia’s growing relationship with Israel, especially in the oil and gas fields, adds another layer of opacity to decisions, and appears to have delayed or canceled some sales. The third layer was created by Syria’s civil war, which has been raging since April 2011. This article covers public reports of new arms sales to Syria, though we also welcome any conclusive IMINT or inside information readers wish to refer our way.

Baby Come Back: Iraq is Buying Russian Weapons Again

Pantsir-S1

In October 2012, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki signed a deal with Russia’s Rosoboronexport, variously estimated at $4.2 – $5.0 billion. The deal is characteristically murky, but is reported to include 30 Mi-28NE attack helicopters, and 42-50 mobile SA-22 Pantsir low-level air defense systems. Their combined cost is unlikely to approach $4 billion, unless very extensive long-term support arrangements are included. There has also been discussion in the press concerning MiG-29M2 fighters or armored vehicles as follow-on options.

The deal does fill some important military and political holes for Iraq. Even with a signed contract, however, completing the deal won’t be as easy as it was back in Saddam Hussein’s day.

Slovenian Army’s New APCs: Patria’s AMVs

Slovenian “Svarun”

In June 2006, the Slovenian Ministry of Defence picked Patria’s 8×8 wheeled Armored Modular Vehicle (AMV) as the preferred choice for its 135 vehicle armored personnel carrier program. The APCs would come in 4 different versions, including a variant with Patria’s new unmanned NEMO 120mm mortar turret. The deal was worth over EUR 275 million, with deliveries to take place from 2007-2013.

An ongoing bribery investigation led to the resignation of Patria’s President and CEO, and eventually to his arrest. A long-running controversy became a continuous distraction, and there were issues with sub-contractor performance along the way. In 2011, a new government cabinet unanimously voted to try and cancel the deal. In 2012, they succeeded.

Procurement Nadir: India’s Murky, Messed-Up Howitzer Competitions

FH-77Bs, Kargil War

India has marked over $4 billion worth of artillery projects to purchase several hundred new 155mm howitzers. They are intended to supplement India’s dwindling artillery stocks, while out-ranging and out-shooting Pakistan’s self-propelled M109 155mm guns. It seemed simple enough, and in the main towed artillery competition, BAE Systems Bofors had been competing against systems from Israel’s Soltam and Denel of South Africa.

Unfortunately, India’s 2 towed howitzer competitions, and its 2 self-propelled artillery procurements, have mostly served as cautionary tales. If the stakes weren’t so high, they’d qualify as farce. The simple process of buying off-the-shelf artillery guns has become a decades-long affair filled with legal drama, accusations of corruption, and multiple re-starts – but not one new gun. Competitions are declared, and canceled, again and again. One is on its 5th iteration. Another is on its 3rd. Meanwhile, India’s stock of operational 155mm FH77 howitzers has dwindled to around 200, and their last successful artillery buy was over 2 decades ago. Is there an end in sight to any of these competitions? Or a potential winner?

The USA’s M4 Carbine Controversy

An M4 – or is it?

The 5.56mm M-16 has been the USA’s primary battle rifle since the Vietnam war, undergoing changes into progressive versions like the M16A4 widely fielded by the US Marine Corps, “Commando” carbine versions, etc. The M4 Carbine is the latest member of the M16 family, offering a shorter weapon more suited to close-quarters battle, or to units who would find a full-length rifle too bulky.

In 2006 an Army solicitation for competitive procurement of 5.56mm carbine designs was withdrawn, once sole-source incumbent Colt dropped its prices. The DoD’s Inspector General weighed in with a critical report, but the Army dissented, defending its practices as a sound negotiating approach that saved the taxpayers money. As it turns out, there’s a sequel. A major sequel that has only grown bigger with time.

The M4/M16 family is both praised and criticized for its current performance in the field. In recent years, the M4 finished dead last in a sandstorm reliability test, against 3 competitors that include a convertible M4 variant. Worse, the 4th place M4 had over 3.5x more jams than the 3rd place finisher. Was that a blip in M4 buys, or a breaking point? DID explains the effort, the issues, and the options, as the Army moves forward with an “Individual Carbine” competition. But will it actually replace the M4?

Australia’s SH-2G Seasprite Helos: (Mis)Fortune Down Under

SH-2G: rocky shoals

In 1997, Australia signed an $A 667 million contract with Kaman to purchase 11 upgraded SH-2G(A) “Super Seasprites,” with modernized avionics. This compact helicopter design was thought to be well suited to operation from the RAN’s ANZAC Class frigates, and even from patrol boats with helicopter decks. The first SH-2G(A) was unveiled in 2003, but by 2005 up to 40 deficiencies had been identified, including inability to operate in bad weather and low-light conditions, and inability to meet Australian airworthiness certification standards. Placing modern avionics into a 1960s airframe proved challenging indeed: the helicopters were restricted to “passenger and supply transport in good weather” in 2005, then grounded entirely in May 2006.

By 2007, the project was 6 years behind schedule, costs had risen over 50% to $A 1.1 billion (about $900 million) for 11 helicopters, and the program was being used as a negative case study in the Australian Defence College’s leadership and ethics course. It was estimated that at least $A 45 million more and 29 months of work would be required to make them serviceable, with full operational status unlikely until at least 2010. In 2007, Australia’s Liberal Party government elected to continue the Super Seasprite program – but their successor Labor government reversed that decision in 2008, and come to an interesting agreement with Kaman. Who now has 11 helicopters and associated infrastructure to sell. Six year later, in 2013, they finally made that sale. And the winner is…