ASDS
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Private sector to the rescue? (Feb 23/10)

In a program that began with great promise but soon spiraled out of control, Northrop Grumman has been building ASDS “Advanced SEAL delivery System” mini-subs as successors to the previous SDV (SEAL/Swimmer Delivery Vehicle) carried on US modified Benjamin Franklin Class [SSBN-640] special warfare submarines.

In the end, however, technical, reliability, and 400% cost overrun issues proved insuperable. The ASDS program was canceled for all intents and purposes on April 6/06, but the existing boat was retained and improvements attempted. That was cut short with the destruction of ASDS-1, and a less ambitious replacement program is beginning to take shape… even as the private sector steps in to help.

• What’s Next? The SWCS/JMMS
• To Davy Jones’ Locker & Back: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: DID Op/Ed, December 2005
• Appendix B: The ASDS Program & Mission
• Appendix C: ASDS Taking on Water
• Appendix D: Additional Readings and Sources
  
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LPD-17 cutaway
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Up to $249.4 million to Northrop Grumman to provide LCE&S services for the LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault ships. (Feb 16/10)

LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are just entering service with the US Navy. Between 10-12 scheduled ships of this new class are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships. Much like their smaller predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. What changes are the ships’ size, their cost, and the capabilities and technologies used to perform those missions. Among other additions, this new ship is designed to operate accompanying platforms like the Marines’ MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle amphibious armored personnel carrier.

While its design incorporates notable advances, the San Antonio Class has also had its share of teething problems. So, too, has the New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract has been assigned. The number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The initial ships have been criticized for sub-standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered and accepted before any ship of class was sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain due to oil leaks. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts at over $1.7 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPD classes, and more than 10 times as much as Singapore’s 6,600 ton Endeavour Class LPD.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This is DID’s FOCUS Article for the San Antonio Class, detailing the ships’ unique features and capabilities, its program innovations and issues, ship timelines, and related contracts throughout the program’s history. As has become DID custom, the most recent additions are highlighted in green type...

• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Capabilities and Features
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Process & Issues
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Program, Budgets & Timelines
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Contracts and Events (1996-Present) [updated]
• Appendix A: Additional Readings & Sources – LPD-17 Ship Class
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources – News and Views
  
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P-8A Poseidon
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FY 2011 budget request, the US Navy’s self-inflicted 6-month delay, P-8i may have air-air surveillance capability. (Jan 29/10)

Maritime surveillance and patrol is becoming more and more important, but the USA’s P-3 Orion fleet is falling apart. The P-8A emerged from the ashes of the P-7 Long Range Air ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) Capable Aircraft program that was begun in 1988. That program originally envisaged an improved P-3, but cost overruns, slow progress, and interest in opening the competition to commercial designs led to cancellation for default in 1990. The successor MMA program was begun in March 2000, and Boeing beat Lockheed’s “Orion 21” with a design based on the ubiquitous 737 passenger jet.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article concerning the P-8A Poseidon Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft, and it will be updated as events and contracts are announced. Filling the P-3 Orion’s shoes is certainly no easy task. What missions will the new P-8A Poseidon face? What do we know about the platform, the project team, and ongoing developments? Will the P-3’s level of global customer coverage give its successor a comparable level of export opportunities? Australia and India have already signed on, but has the larger market shifted in the interim?

• The Controversy: Turboprop, or Turbofan Jet?
• P-8A Poseidon: Platform & Capabilities
• The P-8’s BAMS Companion: Kicking It Up a Notch
• P-8A Poseidon: History, Program, and Industrial Players
• P-8A Poseidon: Contracts & Events [updated]
• News & Analysis: India’s Interest, and Broader Export Potential
• Additional Readings & Sources: Platforms & Program Background
• Additional Readings & Sources: News & Updates
  
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E-737 Wedgetail
over New South Wales
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Successful C2 test, 5-year support contract for Thales. (Feb 2/10)

The island continent of Australia faces a number of unique security challenges that stem from its geography. The continent may be separated from its neighbors by large expanses of ocean, but it also resides within a potential arc of instability, and has a number of important offshore resource sites to protect. Full awareness of what is going on around them, and the ability to push that awareness well offshore, are critical security requirements.

“Project Wedgetail” had 3 finalists, and the winner was a new variant of Boeing’s 737-700, fitted with an MESA (multirole electronically scanned array) radar from Northrop Grumman. That radar exchanges the traditional AWACS rotating dome for the E-737’s stationary antenna and its “top hat” look. That design, and the project as a whole, have run into severe turbulence, creating problems for Boeing earnings, the ADF, and other export orders for the type. DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This one covers contracts, events, and key milestones within Australia’s E-737 program, from inception to the current day.

• Project Wedgetail: Program and Participants
• Contracts & Key Events, 1997 – Present [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
  
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NPOESS (click to view full)

Latest update covers events from 2007 to January 2010.

The National Polar-orbiting Observing Satellite System (NPOESS) is a joint program of the Department of Defense, Department of Commerce and the NASA that will help develop 3-7 day weather forecasts for civilian and military purposes, replacing less sophisticated satellites that are expected to fail over the next several years. Those forecasts include weather like hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. Unfortunately, it now appears that NPOESS could be as much as $3 billion over budget, and that it is not expected to be launched until 2012 – 3 years later than the previous program plan, and at least 6 years later than earlier projections. Some gaps in coverage are possible during that time, if enough older satellites fail.

In November 2005 testimony given at a House of Congress Science Committee hearing, the Administrator of NOAA and the Undersecretary of the Air Force promised new cost and schedule estimates and policy options, as well as fuller and more rapid information. Nor are these the only changes underway in NPOESS, which was openly described as “a program in crisis.” Now, there are even rumors that the Pentagon may pull out of the program.

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CC-130 over BC
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The US military has been coming to the realization that its aging aircraft fleet will begin posing serious challenges in the coming years. Canada is experiencing similar problems. In 2005, Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier said that “Our [CC-130 E/H] Hercules fleet right now is rapidly going downhill. We know that three years and a little bit more than that, the fleet starts to become almost completely inoperational and we will have to stop supporting operations – or else, not be able to start them.”

The CC-130s are used in a wide variety of roles, from tactical transport to aerial refueling and even search and rescue. The Canadian Forces do not own any other aircraft in a similar class, which makes replacement essential. EADS tried to remain in the running with its Airbus A400M, and other alternatives were proposed, but the specific requirements set by Canada’s Department of National Defense (DND) tended to exclude alternatives. In December 2008, a program worth almost C$ 5 billion got underway to buy 17 of Lockheed’s privately-developed C-130J “Super Hercules” planes.

In this updated Spotlight article, DID can offer additional details regarding the Canadian procurement program, and the thinking behind it; some background that points up the parallels between the issues faced by the Canadians, and the experiences of other air services; and some insight into why the buy took so long, after the C-130J was declared Canada’s preferred choice in an “expedited” process. That initial buy has now added a large fleet support contract…

• The Transports and the Damage Done: Issues With the Fleet
• Live Rust: What To Do Until the New Planes Arrive?
• Bite the Bullet: Canada’s Procurement Approach and Process
• Comes a Time: Key Developments and Contracts [updated]
• Someday: Facing the Future, At Last?
• Appendix A: Are You Ready for the Country – Possible Competitors C-130J, C-130M, A400M… IL-76?
• Appendix B: Walk On – Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Hydras & Hellfires
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The versatile Hydra 70mm rocket family is primed for a new lease on life, thanks to widespread efforts underway to convert these ubiquitous rockets into cheap laser-guided precision weapons.

The benefits would be considerable, which explains why strong competition has emerged from all points of the compass. America’s “Advanced Precision-Kill Weapon System (APKWS)” is one of those efforts, and after numerous delays and false starts since its inception in 1996, an “APKWS-II” program finally entered System Design and Development (SDD) in 2006.

The program is now closing in on a Milestone C decision, and Operational Assessment, following a series of recent firings. NAVAIR is also preparing initial sole-source buys…

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Galileo concept
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The European Union is cooperating with a number of outside investors to replace the USA’s free Global Positioning System service with an alternative under their own control. In addition to civilian GPS (the Open Service), services to be offered include a paid Commercial Service (with accuracy greater than 1 meter), and a Public Regulated Service (PRS)/ Safety of Life Service (SoL) for use by security authorities (police, military, etc.) and safety-critical transport applications (air-traffic control, automated aircraft landing, etc.). PRS/SoL aims to offer Open Service quality, with added robustness against jamming and the reliable detection of problems within 10 seconds.

Organizational issues and shortfalls in expected progress pushed the “Galileo” project back from its originally intended operational date of 2007 to 2014 – and doubts persist in several quarters about its economic model, even as security issues arise regarding China’s COMPASS project. After a public-private partnership model failed to agree among themselves or with the EU’s desired terms, the organization gained initial-stage approval for its plan to finance the program with tax dollars instead of the expected private investments. Political issues were overcome, albeit with some protest, by raiding other EU accounts for over EUR 3 billion (about $5.35 billion) in funds, rather than asking for more money from member states.

The latest set of updates cover developments in Galileo, and in related programs like GIOVE and EGNOS. While the project’s base funding is now more secure, its ability to remain within budget will be tested. Recent events include over EUR 1 billion in contracts…

• Galileo: Goals, Structure & Costs
• “Eppur, Si Bloccare”: Trials & Tribulations [updated]
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: The EU Proposal – Going Forward (2007)
• Appendix B: Additional Readings [updated]
• Appendix C: Additional Readings – The Security Dimension
  
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NH90: TTH & NFH
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The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AugustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow. The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points.

While battlefield damage to composite airframes can be more difficult to repair in the field, the combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Orders currently stand at 507 machines, on behalf of 14 nations.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article, offering an in-depth look at the multi-national NH90 program, its customers, and its chronology from 1995 to the present day. The most recent additions cover developments, timelines, and controversies in Australia; and plans for qualification of the naval NFH version…

• The NH90 Platform(s)
• The NH90 Production Program
• Contracts & Key Events, 1995-present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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All they’re ready for?
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On Sept 12/06, The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Australia’s A$ 400 million ALR2002 project, aimed at putting radar and infared missile warning systems (RWRs) in Australia’s helicopters, transports and F/A-18s, had ended in at least partial failure with the scrapping of F/A-18 integration under the HUG 2.3 upgrade program. Sticking with the offering from
BAE Systems Australia’s electronic warfare division, they said, would deliver the project at least 2 years late and A$ 200 million over budget.

In response, a decision was formally announced on Nov 13/06. RAAF F/A-18A/B fighters would not use “Project Echidna’s” system, but its helicopters and C-130s would. More than 4 years after the original Phase 2A award, the scope of fielding for “Project Echidna” is about to be reduced again…

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