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DID » Projects » Project Failures  

Galileo GPS Project Faces More Certain Future

Feb 06, 2012 20:48 EST

Latest update (Feb 2/12)

2nd large contract series; EC: We want another EUR 7 billion; New build site opened; 1st operational launch; Major article updates.

Satellite Galileo System Concept
Galileo concept

The USA’s Global Positioning System service remains free, but the European Union is spending billions to create an alternative under their own control. In addition to civilian GPS (the Open Service), services to be offered include a Safety of Life Service (SoL) for civil aviation and search and rescue, a paid Commercial Service with accuracy greater than 1 meter, plus a Public Regulated Service (PRS) for use by security authorities and governments. PRS/SoL aims to offer Open Service quality, with added robustness against jamming and the reliable detection of problems within 10 seconds.

Organizational issues and shortfalls in expected progress pushed the “Galileo” project back from its originally intended operational date of 2007 to 2014/15. After a public-private partnership model failed, the EU gained initial-stage approval for its plan to finance the program with tax dollars instead of the expected private investments. Political issues were overcome in 2007 by raiding other EU accounts for the billions required, but by 2011, it became clear that requests for billions more in public funds were on the way. Meanwhile, doubts persist in several quarters about Galileo’s touted economic model. Security concerns regarding China’s involvement, and its Beidou-2/Compass project overlap, have been equally persistent. On a European political level, however, Galileo is now irreversible.

This article offers background, players, developments, contracts, and in-depth research links for Galileo, as well as linked EU programs like GIOVE and EGNOS:

P-8 Poseidon MMA: Long-Range Maritime Patrol, and More

Feb 05, 2012 15:00 EST

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P-8 MMA, changed wing
P-8A Poseidon
DII

1st full sim & WTT delivered; $227M for certification. (Feb 1/2)

Maritime surveillance and patrol is becoming more and more important, but the USA’s P-3 Orion fleet is falling apart. The P-8A emerged from the ashes of the P-7 Long Range Air ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) Capable Aircraft program that was begun in 1988. That program originally envisaged an improved P-3, but cost overruns, slow progress, and interest in opening the competition to commercial designs, led to the P-7’s cancellation for default in 1990. The successor MMA program was begun in March 2000, and Boeing beat Lockheed’s “Orion 21” with a design based on their ubiquitous 737 passenger jet.

Filling the P-3 Orion’s shoes is certainly no easy task. What missions will the new P-8A Poseidon face? What do we know about the platform, the project team, and ongoing developments? Will the P-3’s level of global customer coverage give its successor a comparable level of export opportunities? Australia and India have already signed on, but has the larger market shifted in the interim?

LPD-17 San Antonio Class: The USA’s New Amphibious Ships

Dec 07, 2011 15:16 EST

LPD-17 labeled
LPD-17 cutaway
DII

Up to $111M for LPD 26/27 electronics. (Nov 22/11)

LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are just entering service with the US Navy. Between 10-11 scheduled ships of this new class are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships. Much like their smaller predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. What changes are the ships’ size, their cost, and the capabilities and technologies used to perform those missions. Among other additions, this new ship is designed to operate accompanying platforms like the Marines’ MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and amphibious armored personnel carriers like the AAV7 Amtracs.

While its design incorporates notable advances, the San Antonio Class has encountered more than its share of teething problems. So, too, has the New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract was assigned. The number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The initial ships have been criticized, often, for sub-standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered before any of them could be sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain, due to oil leaks. It has not been the only ship of this class to encounter serious mechanical issues. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts, reaching over $1.7 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPDs like the Rotterdam Class, and more than 10 times as much as Singapore’s 6,600 ton Endeavour Class LPD...

NPOESS Weather Satellites: From Crisis to Program Splits

Nov 28, 2011 12:23 EST

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Satellite NPOESS
NPOESS

NPP interim satellite; DWSS testing; NPP Launch and data transmission. (Nov 21/11)

The National Polar-orbiting Observing Satellite System (NPOESS) was a joint program of the Department of Defense, Department of Commerce and NASA to replace less sophisticated weather satellites that are expected to fail over the next several years. It would help develop 3-7 day weather forecasts for civilian and military purposes, including weather like hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. Unfortunately, the program ended up billions over budget, and 6 or more years late. Some gaps in coverage are possible during that time, if enough older satellites fail.

In November 2005 testimony given at a House of Congress Science Committee hearing, the Administrator of NOAA and the Undersecretary of the Air Force promised new cost and schedule estimates and policy options, as well as fuller and more rapid information. NPOESS was openly described as “a program in crisis.” Just under 5 years later, that crisis came to an end with a program split into civilian (JPSS) and military (DWSS) systems, and a 5-year NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite that will test key instruments and serve as a capability bridge…

NGC Footing the Bill for LHD 8 Makin Island Ship Fix

Nov 16, 2011 12:47 EST

LHD-8 construction
LHD 8 construction

Happy endings. Mostly. (Nov 14/11)

USS Makin Island [LHD-8] was built in Pascagoula, MS, as the last ship of America’s Wasp Class amphibious assault carriers. The keel was laid in February 2004, but all of the changes from the LHD-1 Wasp Class meant that about 67% of the previous line drawings, and 75% of the test procedures, needed to be modified for Makin Island. Then Hurricane Katrina hit the in-progress ship. The labor pool also took a hit, with up to 1/3 of the Gulf Coast personnel leaving the area and the company. The pool of electrical professionals was especially hard hit, and 55-60% of the LHD 8’s final labor force was under the 4-5 year threshold to be considered experienced workers.

Even so, Katrina hit back in August 2005. Which is why Northrop Grumman was surprised at the slowness of its integration and testing progress during final construction in 2008, as part of the ship’s preparation for sea trials. That led to a comprehensive review and audit – and a bill of $320-360 million to fix the ship, which was footed by Northrop Grumman:

NH90: Europe’s Medium Helicopter Contender

Nov 08, 2011 13:11 EST

NH90 TTH and NH90 NFH
NH90: TTH & NFH
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French NH90 NFH “Caiman” operational; 1st Fremch Army NH90 TTH delivered. (Dec 9/11)

The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AgustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow. The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points.

While battlefield damage to composite airframes can be more difficult to repair in the field, the combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Orders currently stand at 507 machines, on behalf of 14 nations.

Voted Off the Island: The USCG’s Deepwater FRC Program

Sep 25, 2011 14:14 EDT

CGC Sanibel Island Class
CGC Sanibel
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Contract for 4 more FRCs. (Sept 22/11)

On Sept 16/05, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Lockheed Martin/ Northrop Grumman joint venture Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) completed the preliminary design review for a program to buy 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRC). “The FRC is being designed to provide the Coast Guard with a state-of-the-art patrol craft that is capable of conducting simultaneous missions,” said ICGS Deepwater’s FRC program manager Mike Duthu.

That success was surrounded, and eventually overwhelmed, by delays and failures on multiple fronts. More than 2 years after the Coast Guard asked ICGS to accelerate the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program timeline by more than 10 years, in order to hasten replacement of their deteriorating Island Class patrol vessels, the Coast Guard was still waiting for replacements of any type to arrive. Hull cracking in the first 8 refurbished Island Class ships had made that stopgap unfit for service. Even as delays and technical problems tossed the FRC program about.

When the Island Class refurbishment program was terminated in June 2005, 41 Island Class vessels still plied US and international waters. Their time is running out, but their initial replacement program fared little better. In February 2006, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater system-of-systems Program ‘temporarily’ suspended design work on the FRC-A program due to technical risk. FRC-A was eventually canceled in favor of an off-the-shelf buy, and on March 14/07, ICGS lost responsibility for the Deepwater Fast Response Cutter-B off-the-shelf acquisition as well. What happened next? DID discusses the programs, their outcomes and controversies, the fate of the Island Class and FRC programs, and the work underway to replace them…

ASDS Mini-Sub Program Sinks, As Replacements Rise

Jul 11, 2011 16:05 EDT

ASDS Surfacing
ASDS
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Self-funded Proteus; SWCS development contract. (July 6/11)

Northrop Grumman’s ASDS “Advanced SEAL Delivery System” aimed to build mini-subs as successors to the current SDV (SEAL/Swimmer Delivery Vehicle). It began with great promise. The SDVs, carried on US modified Benjamin Franklin Class [SSBN-640] special warfare submarines, as well as new Ohio Class SSGNs, were old – and cold. ASDS would offer a modern, dry alternative, with advanced sensors besides.

In the end, however, technical and reliability issues proved insuperable. The program spiraled out of control, with cost overruns of 400+%. In its place, a less ambitious SWCS replacement program is beginning to take shape, even as the private sector begins to step in with options of its own. This DID FOCUS article chronicles the ASDS program’s history, its designated successors, and emerging privately-funded alternatives…

APKWS II: Laser-Guided Hydra Rockets in Production At Last

Feb 10, 2011 14:33 EST

Hydra-70 rockets Hellfires
Hydras & Hellfires

Tests on UH-1Y with new warhead. (Nov 9/11)

The versatile Hydra 70mm rocket family is primed for a new lease on life, thanks to widespread efforts underway to convert these ubiquitous rockets into cheap laser-guided precision weapons.

The benefits would be considerable, which explains why strong competition has emerged from all points of the compass. America’s “Advanced Precision-Kill Weapon System (APKWS)” is one of those efforts, and after numerous delays and false starts since its inception in 1996, an “APKWS-II” program finally entered System Design and Development (SDD) in 2006. In 2010, it finally entered low-rate production…

Australia’s Troubled E-737 “Wedgetail” AWACS Program

Feb 03, 2011 08:43 EST

E-737 NSW
E-737 Wedgetail
over New South Wales
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New cost overruns for Boeing. (Jan 28/11)

The island continent of Australia faces a number of unique security challenges that stem from its geography. The continent may be separated from its neighbors by large expanses of ocean, but it also resides within a potential arc of instability, and has a number of important offshore resource sites to protect. Full awareness of what is going on around them, and the ability to push that awareness well offshore, are critical security requirements.

“Project Wedgetail” had 3 finalists, and the winner was a new variant of Boeing’s 737-700, fitted with an MESA (multirole electronically scanned array) radar from Northrop Grumman. That radar exchanges the traditional AWACS rotating dome for the E-737’s stationary antenna and its “top hat” look. That design, and the project as a whole, have run into severe turbulence, creating problems for Boeing earnings, the ADF, and other export orders for the type. DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This one covers contracts, events, and key milestones within Australia’s E-737 program, from inception to the current day.

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