LPD-17 cutaway
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LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are a new class of ship which is just entering service with the US Navy. Much like their predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. What changes are the capabilities and technologies incorporated to perform that mission. This new ship class includes significant internal technology and design upgrades, and is designed to operate accompanying platforms like the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle amphibious armored personnel carrier.

Between 10-11 scheduled ships of this class are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships, including the USA’s older LSD-36 USS Anchorage class dock landing ships (all decommissioned as of 2004, LSD-36 and LSD-38 transferred to Taiwan) and its LPD-4 USS Austin Class ships (12 built and serving, LPD 14 Trenton now India’s INS Jalashva). The San Antonio class ships may also replace 2 classes of ships currently mothballed and held in reserve status under the Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP): the LST-1179 Newport class tank landing ships, and LKA-113 Charleston class amphibious cargo ships.

Welcome to Norfolk…
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Replacing that many existing ships is already a very tall order. While its design incorporates notable advances, the San Antonio Class has also had its share of teething problems. So, too, has the New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract has been assigned. The number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The initial ships have been criticized for sub-standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered and accepted before any ship of class was sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain due to oil leaks. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts at over $1.7 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPD classes, and more than 10 times as much as Singapore’s 6,600 ton Endeavour Class LPD.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. This is DID’s FOCUS Article for the San Antonio Class, detailing the ships’ unique features and capabilities, its program innovations and issues, ship timelines, and related contracts throughout the program’s history. As has become DID custom, the most recent additions are highlighted in green type. The latest developments include a contract to Raytheon that could be worth over $175 million, and the imminent commissioning of the LPD 21 New York, which contains steel from the destroyed World Trade Center…

• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Capabilities and Features
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Process & Issues
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Program, Budgets & Timelines [updated]
• LPD-17 San Antonio Class: Contracts and Events (1996-Present) [updated]
• Appendix A: Additional Readings & Sources – LPD-17 Ship Class
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources – News and Views
  
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General Dynamics Team
Trimaran LCS Design
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Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $30+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan several times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams, without escaping any of its fundamental issues.

The latest additions include completion of LCS-2 builder tests, and plans to deploy LCS-1 ahead of schedule…

• LCS: Concept & Needs
• LCS: The Competing Teams
• LCS Solution = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules
• LCS: Controversies & Cautions
• LCS: Budgets and Program Structure
• LCS: Export Potential
• LCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events
• Additional Readings & Sources [updated]
  
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RN CVF Concept
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In 1998, Britain’s Strategic Defence review (SDR) announced plans to replace the current set of 3 Invincible Class 22,000t escort carriers with 2 larger, more capable Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) ships that could operate a more powerful force. These new carriers would be joint-service platforms, operating aircraft and UAVs from all 3 services (Navy, RAF, Army) in roles that could include ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance), force projection and logistics support, close air support, anti-submarine/ anti-surface naval warfare, and land attack.

The scale of the CVF effort relative to Britain’s past experiences means that the program structure is rather complex. It has passed through several stages already, and is being run and conducted within an industrial alliance framework. There is also a parallel international framework, involving cooperation with France on its PA2 carrier as a larger derivative of the CVF design.

This DID FOCUS article covers that structure and framework, ongoing developments, and the ships themselves as they round toward final design, construction, and fielding. The latest addition involves a report that one of the 2 carriers has been quasi-canceled, and Britain’s F-35 buy will be severely slashed…

• The CVF Queen Elizabeth Class (“continue reading…”)
• Program Team: The Aircraft Carrier Alliance
• CVF Program Management
• The CVF Program: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• CVF-Related Contracts and Events
• Additional Readings & Sources: The Program
• Additional Readings & Sources: The Ships
  
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NH90: TTH & NFH
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The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AugustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow. The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points.

While battlefield damage to composite airframes can be more difficult to repair in the field, the combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Orders currently stand at 507 machines, on behalf of 14 nations.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article, offering an in-depth look at the multi-national NH90 program, its customers, and its chronology from 1995 to the present day. The most recent additions cover developments, timelines, and controversies in Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Germany since January 2009…

• The NH90 Platform(s)
• The NH90 Production Program
• Contracts & Key Events, 1995-present [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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Class 1 MAV
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In October 2005, “Four FCS UAV Sub-Contracts Awarded” tended to focus on the larger Class II company and Class III battalion-level options, while a FOCUS Article covering the MQ-8B Fire Scout addresses the Class IV brigade-level UAV for the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. The smaller “Class I” platoon-level UAV options were addressed only in passing, largely because that aspect of the program wasn’t yet at the same level of development. That has changed.

The FCS Class I UAV will be used for reconnaissance, security and target acquisition operations in nearly all terrain, including urban environments. Each system of 2 vertical take-off and landing air vehicles, a dismounted control device, and associated ground support equipment will be carried by selected platforms and dismounted soldiers, and will use autonomous flight, navigation, and recovery.

This is DID’s FOCUS Article for the Class I effort, which survived the 2007 reorganization of the FCS program. It’s now known as the RQ-16 T-Hawk. The USA and Britain continue to place orders, and ongoing research may even give them GPS targeting capabilities one day…

• The Class I MAV [updated]
• The MAV Program [updated]
• Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
  
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AP-3C over Darwin
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In November 2005, the Australian Government, Tenix Defence and Eurocopter subsidiary Australian Aerospace (AA) have signed the P3 Accord Master Agreement to provide capability upgrades and Through Life Support (TLS) for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) AP-3C Orion maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The three parties have established a Joint Management Office (JMO) to supervise all Accord activities under a unique risk-sharing contractual arrangement. The JMO will develop and implement all RAAF AP-3C capability upgrades and TLS solutions through to the aircraft’s planned withdrawal date – at which point it will likely be replaced by the 737-based AP-8A MMA.

The combined value of the TLS and block upgrades to the aircraft is expected to be more than A$ 1 billion, and the project is moving on to a new phase – even as some of the efforts that led to the most recent announcement win Australian awards…

• Australia’s AP-3C Programs [updated]
• The AP-3 Accord
• AP-3 Accord Updates [updated]
  
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NETFIRES concept
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The basic concept of NETFIRES (a Future Combat Systems program) is to develop a family of artillery-like precision attack missiles based upon a vertical launcher design. Yet the idea goes far beyond that simple description. The NETFIRES CLU box launcher is intended to be be fully autonomous, meaning it can be dropped off anywhere and operate on its own without a support vehicle. The launch unit includes power generation and control systems as well as a total of 15 missiles, each with a warhead similar in size and capability to a 155mm artillery shell.

The system is also known as Non Line-Of-Sight, Launch System, or NLOS-LS, and remains one of Future Combat systems’ most promising programs, slated for early fielding to the Army and even for integration with US naval forces.

This will be DID’s focus article for the NETFIRES program, and it will be updated as new events and contracts enter the picture. The latest news involves key tests, as it gears up to be part of FCS Spinout Phase 1.

• The NETFIRES Concept
• NETFIRES Missiles
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: Lockheed’s Successful Design Improvement Workshops
• Appendix B: Additional Readings & Sources
  
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FRES-U finalists:
There can be… none?
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Many of Britain’s army vehicles are old and worn, and the necessities of hard service on the battlefield are only accelerating that wear. The multi-billion pound “Future Rapid Effects System” (FRES) aims to recapitalize the core of Britain’s armored vehicle fleet over the next decade or more, filling many of the same medium armor roles as the Stryker Family of armored wheeled vehicles and/or the Future Combat Systems’ Manned Ground Vehicle family. Current estimates indicate a potential requirement for over 3,700 FRES vehicles, including utility and reconnaissance variants. Even so, one should be cautioned that actual numbers bought usually fall short of intended figures for early-stage defense programs.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. The FRES program was spawned by the UK’s withdrawal from the German-Dutch-UK Boxer MRAV modular wheeled APC program, in order to develop a more deployable vehicle that fit Britain’s exact requirements. Those initial requirements were challenging, however, and experience in Iraq and Afghanistan led to decisions that changed a number of requirements, and raised the acceptable weight limit. The UK MoD has taken some criticism for its selection of wheeled APCs as its FRES-U infantry fighting vehicle finalists, and even more criticism for making the Boxer MRAV one of those finalists after spending all that time and sterling on FRES development. In the end, GD MOWAG’s Piranha V won the utility vehicle competition.

FRES-U is not the end of the competition, however, or the contracts. In fact, FRES has just seen the winning bidder’s preferred status revoked, and that entire phase will now take a back seat to the FRS-SV scout version. For which the MoD has now issued 2 Invitations to Tender…

• FRES: The Program (Continue reading…)
• FRES: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings [updated]
• Appendix 1 – The British Army’s Armored Vehicle Fleet, late 2006
• Appendix 2 – A New Procurement Approach: System House Challenges
• Appendix 3 – FRES: Key Challenges for the Contractors
• Appendix 4 – FRES Experiments: Electronic Architecture Contracts
• Appendix 5 – FRES Experiments: Vehicle-Related Contracts
  
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Raytheon: C4ISR Future?
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As video communications is integrated into robots, soldiers, and UAVs, and network-centric warfare becomes the organizing principle of American warfighting, front-line demands for bandwidth are rising faster than the US military can add it. The Transformation Communications Satellite (TSAT) System is part of a larger effort by the US military to address that need, and close the gap.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record – and TSAT is certainly significant. The final price tag on the entire program has been quoted at anywhere from $14-25 billion through 2016, including the satellites, the ground operations system, the satellite operations center and the cost of operations and maintenance. Lockheed Martin and Boeing each won over $600 million in risk reduction contracts to develop key TSAT SS satellite system technologies, and TSAT’s $2 billion TMOS ground-based network operations contract was already underway.

The TSAT constellation’s central role in next-generation US military infrastructure makes it worthy of in-depth treatment – but its survival was never assured. There was always a risk that outside events and incremental competitors could spell its end, just as they spelled the end of Motorola’s infamous Iridium project. This FOCUS article examines that possibility, even as it offers an overview of the US military’s vision for its communications infrastructure, how TSAT fits, the program’s challenges, and complete coverage of contracts and significant events. New additions are highlighted in green for your convenience.

The latest developments revolve around the end of the program. Despite a positive recent report from the GAO, key components of TMOS/TSAT are being canceled outright as part of the program’s planned termination…

• Key Background – Why TSAT Is Thought to be Necessary (i.e. continue reading…)
• Key Background – The Big Picture: TSAT and the Transformational Communications Architecture
• Briefing – What Is TSAT?
• Briefing – TMOS: TSAT’s Ground Component
• Briefing – TSAT: Issues & Decisions
• Briefing – The AEHF Alternative, and Lessons Learned for TSAT
• Briefing – TSAT: Program
• Analysis – TSAT’s Competitors – and Its Fate
• News – TSAT: Timeline and Ongoing Developments [updated]
• Appendix A – Additional Readings & Sources
  
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NSC 1 Bertholf
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The US Coast Guard’s massive $25 billion Deepwater meta-program (really Deepwater-II given post-9/11 changes) has endured more than its share of ups and downs. Nevertheless, Congressional support remains strong, and efforts are being made to restructure the program and get it back on track. “Voted Off the Island: The USCG’s Deepwater FRC Program” offered an in-depth look into the difficulties faced by the USCG’s Island Class cutter modification program, and by the Deepwater Fast Response Cutter that was supposed to replace it. “US Coast Guard’s Deepwater Effort Hits More Rough Sailing” covers recent program developments more generally.

The Legend Class National Security Cutters are the largest ships in the Deepwater program, and represent the program’s flagship in more ways than one. The 418 foot, 4,300 ton ships will be frigate-sized vessels with a 21 foot draughts¹, and are rather larger than the 379 foot, 3,250 ton Hamilton Class High Endurance Cutters (HECs) they will replace. Controversies regarding durability and potential hull fatigue, as well as significant cost overruns, have shadowed the new cutter’s construction. Nevertheless, the program appears to be moving forward.

This DID FOCUS Article covers recent developments concerning the Legend Class cutters. The latest developments involves final Coast Guard acceptance of the first ship of class…

• Quick Background: The Deepwater Program
• The Legend Class National Security Cutters
• The Pitfalls of Being a Legend: NSC Issues & Action
• Legend Class Program: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings
  
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