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Comanche’s Child: The USA’s New Armed Scout Helicopter

YRH-70 test
YRH-70 test, 2005
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AAS budget realities; Article updates. (Jan 30/12)

The US Army’s ARH (Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter) program aimed to replace around 375 Bell Textron OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters, after the $14.6 billion RAH-66 Comanche program, was canceled in 2004. Instead, the Army would buy a larger number of less expensive platforms, with reduced capabilities. Bell Helicopter Textron initially won the ARH competition with a militarized version of its highly successful 407 single-engine commercial helicopter, but despite significant private investment after Army funding stopped in March 2007, spiraling costs killed the ARH-70 in October 2008.

What hasn’t changed is the battlefield need for on-call, front-line aerial surveillance and fire support. With its existing OH-58D stock wither wearing down, or shot down, the Army needs to do something. But what? This will serve as DID’s FOCUS Article for the ARH program, and its potential successor the Armed Aerial Scout. It includes updated background, coverage of contracts and key events, and additional research materials:

nEUROn UCAV Project Rolling Down the Runway

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Saab concept
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Official presentation of the demonstrator; Project updates. (Jan 20/12)

In November 2005, a Forecast International report on the future UAV market saw trouble coming for the proposed 6-nation nEUROn Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) project. In the end, however, Sweden signed on and the project got rolling, with committed funding of EUR 535 million and counting. The French DGA (Délégation Générale pour l’Armement) procurement agency is acting as program executive.

The Neuron project joins Britain’s Taranis UCAV, Russia’s MiG SKAT, Boeing’s X-45 Phantom Ray, and the US Navy’s X-47 UCAS-D program as UCAV projects with fighter-substitution potential. This FOCUS article explains the Neuron program’s 3-fold goals, the envisioned platform, the program structure, and its schedule:

Britain’s Future CVF Carriers: the Queen Elizabeth Class

CVF Concept
RN CVF Concept
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Vigilance radar pod for AEW?; American EMALS for CVF; Commons PAC report. (Dec 21/11)

Britain’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) announced a big leap forward for the Royal Navy: plans to replace the current set of 3 Invincible Class 22,000t escort carriers with 2 larger, more capable Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) ships that could operate a more powerful force. These new carriers would be joint-service platforms, operating F-35B (now F-35C) aircraft, plus helicopters and UAVs from all 3 services. Roles could include ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance), force projection and logistics support, close air support, anti-submarine/ anti-surface naval warfare, and land attack.

The scale of the CVF effort relative to Britain’s past experiences means that the program structure is rather complex. It has passed through several stages already, and is being run and conducted within an industrial alliance framework. There is also a parallel international framework, involving cooperation with France on its PA2 carrier as a derivative of the CVF design. This DID FOCUS article covers that structure and framework, ongoing developments, and the ships themselves as they round toward final design, construction, and fielding…

The USA’s New Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)

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Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
General Dynamics Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

Class services from each builder; LCS 3 post-production support; Mine-hunting ancillaries. (Dec 19/11)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $30+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan several times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, and contracts.

LPD-17 San Antonio Class: The USA’s New Amphibious Ships

LPD-17 labeled
LPD-17 cutaway
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Up to $111M for LPD 26/27 electronics. (Nov 22/11)

LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are just entering service with the US Navy. Between 10-11 scheduled ships of this new class are slated to assume the functional duties of up to 41 previous ships. Much like their smaller predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. What changes are the ships’ size, their cost, and the capabilities and technologies used to perform those missions. Among other additions, this new ship is designed to operate accompanying platforms like the Marines’ MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and amphibious armored personnel carriers like the AAV7 Amtracs.

While its design incorporates notable advances, the San Antonio Class has encountered more than its share of teething problems. So, too, has the New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract was assigned. The number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The initial ships have been criticized, often, for sub-standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered before any of them could be sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain, due to oil leaks. It has not been the only ship of this class to encounter serious mechanical issues. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts, reaching over $1.7 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPDs like the Rotterdam Class, and more than 10 times as much as Singapore’s 6,600 ton Endeavour Class LPD...

NPOESS Weather Satellites: From Crisis to Program Splits

Satellite NPOESS
NPOESS

NPP interim satellite; DWSS testing; NPP Launch and data transmission. (Nov 21/11)

The National Polar-orbiting Observing Satellite System (NPOESS) was a joint program of the Department of Defense, Department of Commerce and NASA to replace less sophisticated weather satellites that are expected to fail over the next several years. It would help develop 3-7 day weather forecasts for civilian and military purposes, including weather like hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. Unfortunately, the program ended up billions over budget, and 6 or more years late. Some gaps in coverage are possible during that time, if enough older satellites fail.

In November 2005 testimony given at a House of Congress Science Committee hearing, the Administrator of NOAA and the Undersecretary of the Air Force promised new cost and schedule estimates and policy options, as well as fuller and more rapid information. NPOESS was openly described as “a program in crisis.” Just under 5 years later, that crisis came to an end with a program split into civilian (JPSS) and military (DWSS) systems, and a 5-year NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite that will test key instruments and serve as a capability bridge…

AW159 Wildcat: Britain’s Billion-Pound Future Lynx Helicopter Program

Future Lynx Concept Naval
Future Lynx naval
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1st landing on a ship; Timeline added. (Nov 7/11)

In 2006, Finmeccanica subsidiary AgustaWestland received a GBP 1 billion (about $1.9 billion at 02/07 rates) contract from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 70 Future Lynx helicopters. The Lynx is an extremely fast helicopter that entered service in the 1970s and has seen several versions and upgrades over the decades. Lynx helicopters have been used in a number of British Army [AH7 & AH9] and Fleet Air Arm [Mk 8] roles, from reconnaissance and attack to casualty evacuation & troop transport, logistical support, anti-submarine operations; and even command post functions.

The Future Lynx program reflects that. The original goal was 40 Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopters (BRH) for the British Army, and 30 Surface Combatant Maritime Rotorcraft (SCMR) for the Royal Navy, with an option for another 10 helicopters that could be split in any way desired. At present, contracts have been issued for 34 AW159 BRHs, and 28 AW159 SCMR naval helicopters. This is DID’s FOCUS Article for the AW159 Lynx Wildcat Program, describing its improvements, schedules, and related contracts…

Canada’s C$ 2.9B “Joint Support Ship” Project, Take 2

HMCS Protecteur and USS Wisconsin 1991
1991: HMCS Protecteur &
USS Wisconsin battleship

HMCS Preserver damaged in collision. (Nov 4/11)

The Canadian supply ships and oilers HMCS Protecteur, and HMCS Preserver have contributed to humanitarian aid missions in Florida and the Bahamas, peace-making off Somalia and East Timor, and have been poised for the evacuation of non-combatants from Haiti, to name but a few of their recent endeavors.

As part of its spate of military modernization announcements issued just before Canada Day (July 1) 2006, the Canadian government issued an RFP that began the process of defining and building 3 “Joint Support Ships.” The aim was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current Protecteur Class oiler and resupply ships. In addition to being able to provide at-sea support (re-fueling and re-supply) to deployed naval task groups, the new JSS ships were envisioned as ships that would also be capable of sealift operations, as well as amphibious support to forces deployed ashore.

Canada JSS Concept Profile
JSS v1.0
(click to view larger)

This was expected to be a C$ 2.9 billion (USD $2.58 billion) project. This article describes the process, the 4 pre-qualified industry teams participating, and some of the issues swirling around Canada’s very ambitious specifications. Specifications that ultimately sank the whole project, in a manner that was predictable from the outset. Leaving Canada’s navy with a serious problem. Will a second go-round in 2012-13 help any?

NH90: Europe’s Medium Helicopter Contender

NH90 TTH and NH90 NFH
NH90: TTH & NFH
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French NH90 NFH “Caiman” operational; 1st Fremch Army NH90 TTH delivered. (Dec 9/11)

The NH90 emerged from a requirement that created a NATO helicopter development and procurement agency in 1992 and, at almost the same time, established NHIndustries (62.5% EADS Eurocopter, 32.5% AgustaWestland, and 5% Stork Fokker) to build the hardware. The NATO Frigate Helicopter was originally developed to fit between light naval helicopters like AW’s Lynx or Eurocopter’s Panther, and medium-heavy naval helicopters like the European EH101. A quick look at the NFH design showed definite possibilities as a troop transport helicopter, however, and soon the NH90 project had branched into 2 versions, with more to follow. The nearest equivalent would be Sikorsky’s popular H-60 Seahawk/ Black Hawk family, but the NH90 includes a set of innovative features that give it some distinguishing selling points.

While battlefield damage to composite airframes can be more difficult to repair in the field, the combination of corrosion-proofing, lower maintenance, greater troop or load capacity, and the flexibility offered by that rear ramp have made the NH90 a popular global competitor. As many business people discover the hard way, however, success can be almost as dangerous as failure. NH Industries has had great difficulty ramping up production fast enough to meet promised deliveries, which has left several buyers upset. Orders currently stand at 507 machines, on behalf of 14 nations.

Rapid Fire: 2011-09-27 | Design for Reliability; Green Energy; US Senate Stopgap Deal

  • Job cuts: 540 layoffs coming at Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, as part of corporate plans to reduce their workforce ahead of budget squeezes. Meanwhile the BBC has new details about BAE’s cuts in the UK.
  • Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test & Evaluation within the US DOD, listed key issues in reliability growth [PDF]. He writes: “most programs fail to get on their planned growth curves” because they take a reactive approach to reliability management. Among programs that took a “Design for Reliability” (DfR) proactive approach: Raytheon’s SDB-II, GDLS’ Stryker NBCRV, and BAE+GDLS’ GCV.
  • Boeing and AAR Aircraft Component Services – Amsterdam announce a letter of intent to cooperate on support for Dutch CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift and AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, as part of a larger MRO initiative.
  • Russia to sell China 140-150 Saturn AL-31F turbofan engines, which can be used in China’s SU-27 derivative and J-10 fighters. The Russians are reportedly trying to include clauses that force all engines to be deployed in aircraft, not sent for copying. Good luck with that.
  • While the US Air Force and Navy test biofuels, some lawmakers are becoming more skeptical and question whether defense “green energy” projects are worth the money, remain viable under budget pressure, or really contribute to energy security.
  • Barely functional? The US Senate came to an agreement last night that should avoid a government shutdown. The House will look at the Senate’s measure on Thursday. Now Congress can shift its focus beyond the next 6 weeks. Politico has the HASC Republican Staff memo on what worst-case DoD funding scenarios would look like. It is unlikely that the Super Committee won’t reach a deal, but given the behavioral pattern shown in Congress this year between the debt ceiling and the continuing resolution, expect drama until the 11th hour.
  • Meanwhile Senator John McCain (R-AZ, Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee) is not happy about how appropriations work (or don’t).