ITAR Announcements: Venezuela, Libya
DID has covered the USA’s ITAR restrictions on weapons exports before, especially as applied to countries like Iran and Venezuela. Our article concerning the blocked upgrade of that country’s F-16s noted that spare parts deliveries were continuing, but that appears to have just changed. Venezuela has better hope those SU-30s arrive quickly. Meanwhile, Libya illustrates a different dynamic – a country whose cooperation is slowly edging them out of the restricted zone. But not yet.
We’ll begin with the US Department of State’s August 2 missive RE: Venezuela, which reads (and translates) as follows:
Notice is hereby given that the United States will no longer authorize the export of defense articles and defense services to Venezuela.
Note in particular the second paragrah:
Furthermore, all licenses and approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles and defense services to Venezuela pursuant to section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) are revoked. The use of exemptions from licensing as provided for in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) also are revoked with regard to Venezuela with the exception of the license exemptions at section 123.17 for use in connection with certain temporary exports of firearms and ammunition for personal use.
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 17, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stephen J. Tomchik, Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy, Department of State, Telephone (202) 663-2799 or FAX (202) 261-8199.
The next paragraph would appear to clinch matters:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: It is the policy of the U.S. Government to deny all applications for licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles and services to Venezuela until further notice. In addition, U.S. manufacturers and exporters, and any other affected parties (e.g., brokers) are hereby notified that the Department of State has revoked all licenses and approvals authorizing the export of or other transfers of defense articles or services to Venezuela.
Revocation extends to the deletion of Venezuela from any manufacturing license or technical assistance agreement involving Venezuela, including any agreement that has Venezuela as a sales territory. This action also precludes the use in connection with Venezuela of any exemptions from licensing or other approval requirements included in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120-130), with the exception of the license exemptions at section 123.17 of the ITAR for exports of firearms and ammunition to Venezuela when for personal use by individuals (not for resale or retransfer, including to the Government of Venezuela) and the firearms will be returned to the United States.
Translation: hunting trips to Venezuela are still allowed, just be prepared for a fair bit of paperwork.
This action has been taken pursuant to Section 38 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778) and relevant provisions of the ITAR in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States.
Dated: August 2, 2006.
Robert G. Joseph,
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Department of State.
[FR Doc. E6-13583 Filed 8-16-06; 8:45 am]
Meanwhile, the July 24, 2006 entry regarding Libya acknowledges progress. That country’s ITAR status has one more hurdle to go before it can come off the banned list, however:
“On July 14, 2006, the Secretary of State announced the rescission of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, Libya remains proscribed for the export of defense articles and services. Until there is a Federal Register notice announcing a change in Libya’s status as a proscribed destination under Section 126.1 of the ITAR, it will continue to be the policy of the United States to deny all export applications for defense articles and services to Libya.”
Libyan leader Moamar Khadafy and his son Seif-al-Islam have been moving Libya toward a less hostile foreign policy and economic engagement with the West, beginning with the revelation and ending of Libya’s surprisingly-advanced hidden WMD program. The end of its a status as a proscribed ITAR destination is likely to be an important indicator of the country’s future progress along that route.
