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RAAF C-130J-30, flares
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Most American planes rely on the US market as their base, then seek exports. The privately-developed C-130J “Super Hercules” was different. Australia, Britain, Denmark, and Italy were all ahead of the curve, and have been operating this heavily redesigned upgrade of the popular C-130 Hercules transport aircraft for several years. By the time the C-130J finally reached “initial operating capability” for the US military late in 2006, these faster-moving foreign customers were already banding together to create a common upgrade set for their serving fleets. A number of variants are currently flying in transport (C-130J), stretched transport (C-130J-30), aerial broadcaster (EC-130J), coast guard patrol (HC-130J), aerial tanker (KC-130J), and even hurricane hunter weather aircraft (WC-130J).

Canada, India, Norway and Qatar recently moved to join the global C-130J customer base. In America, meanwhile, some momentum is building. C-130J purchases are taking place under both annual budgets and supplemental wartime funding, in order to replace a US tactical transport fleet that’s flying old aircraft and in dire need of major repairs.

The C-130J program has been the focus of a great deal of controversy in America – and even of a full program restructuring in 2006. Some early concerns from critics were put to rest when the C-130J demonstrated in-theater performance on the front lines that represented a major improvement over its C-130E/H predecessors. A valid follow-on question might be: does it break the bottleneck limitations that have hobbled a number of multi-billion dollar US Army vehicle development programs?

This DID FOCUS Article describes the C-130J, examines the bottleneck issue, covers global developments for the C-130J program, and looks at present and emerging competitors. The latest news is the addition of the Gulf Emirate of Qatar to the global C-130J customer list…

• The (Private) Labors of Hercules: the C-130J
• The C-130J and the 20-ton Bottleneck
• Turbulent Flight: The C-130J Program
• Contracts and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings & Sources, incl. emerging competitors & Special Operations requirements
  
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JCM

The Joint Common Missile (JCM) was seen as the next-generation, multi-purpose, air-to-ground precision missile that will replace AGM-114 Hellfire family, AGM-65 Maverick family, and airborne *GM-71 TOW missiles with a single weapon usable by the airplanes, helicopters and UAVs of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was also being considered for use on some ground vehicles.

In May 2004, Lockheed Martin was picked over Raytheon and a Boeing-Northrop Grumman team to conduct JCM’s 4-year system development and demonstration (SDD) phase, which was to be worth as much as $1.6 billion. The long-term U.S. production estimate of 54,000 missiles would have brought the program to $5 billion, and the United Kingdom had expressed interest in the new weapon and participated in the development process. Tests were underway, and going well.

A 2005 program cancellation derailed that effort, but JCM has risen from the procurement grave – as the JAGM (Joint Air-Ground Missile) program, with contracts to 2 vendor teams. While Raytheon has nothing to say at this point concerning its team or its proposed design, Lockheed Martin has just provided more details regarding its own team…

• The JCM/JAGM Program
• Contracts and Key Events
• Appendix A: The Road Less Taken – JCM’s Program History
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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KC-135 & RNoAF
F-16, Afghanistan
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While Team Boeing and EADS Airbus/Northrop Grumman duke it out for the USA’s $20-30 billion KC-X order of about 175 aerial tankers with secondary cargo capacity, the existing KC-135 fleet still needs to be maintained. Based on the 707 airliner’s initial designs, the KC-135s first entered service in 1954, and they were delivered until 1965. Despite their age, they remain the mainstay of the USA’s aerial tanker fleet as it helps fighters make long-distance flights, keeps US and foreign combat air patrols on station, refuels transports on their way to remote destinations, and generally makes long-range force projection possible.

Unforseen mechanical issues and the accompanying fleet groundings would create a crippling bottleneck in this defining array of American airpower capabilities, which is why KC-X was designated as the USAF’s highest procurement priority. Meanwhile, the KC-135s need to be well and carefully maintained in order to avoid that bottleneck. Which is why Boeing has just received a $1.1 billion, 10-year contract to maintain the USAF’s KC-135 fleet. It doesn’t follow the advanced “we pay for flying planes” model being implemented for Britain’s 707-based E-3D Sentry AWACS fleet, its VC10 aerial tankers, et. al.

Even so, this contract’s size, the American fleet’s importance, and the convoluted contract history that led to the first GAO ruling overturning the award, all make attention to its details worthwhile. The USAF eventually awarded the contract to Boeing again, and this time the GAO sustained it. But Pemco/AAII took its case to Federal Court – and won…

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F-35A test flight
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The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter/ Lightning II program is reaching a critical nexus. In order to keep costs under control and justify the industrial ramp up underway, participating countries need to sign order agreements within the next year or so. The F-35 is not a proven fighter design that has demonstrated a baseline of performance in service, however; it is a developmental aircraft in the early days of its test program, which is scheduled to continue until 2013.

As one might expect, that status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. The USA is looking at its budgets, and has concluded that it can afford about half of the annual aircraft buy it had planned during the program’s early years. Its fellow Tier 1 partner Britain is reportedly re-evaluating its planned F-35B order in light of rising costs and problematic defense budgets. Sharp controversy has erupted in Tier 2 partner the Netherlands over long-term costs and industrial arrangements, leading to political pressure for a competitive bid. Tier 3 partners Norway and Denmark have both traveled down that same road, and are holding open competitions that pit the F-35 against Saab’s modernized JAS-39NG Gripen.

Australia hasn’t yet reached that point, but September 2008 has featured a very public set of controversies around the F-35’s performance. In the current environment, the altercation in Australia has become a controversy with implications, and responses, that have reached well beyond that continent’s shores.

Recent additions to this article take a much closer look at the RAND study that triggered the controversy – a study whose implications did not specifically address the F-35, but which reach beyond to go to the heart of the USAF’s current fighter force concept…

• F-35: September 2008’s Australian Altercation
• Australian Altercation: The RAND Study [NEW]
• F-35: Air to Air Analyses [updated]
• F-35: The Air-Air Controversy and Program Success
• Additional Readings
  
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F-16B & X-35
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In an exclusive June 2006 interview, Israeli Air Force (IAF) chief procurement officer Brigadier-General Ze’ev Snir told Israel’s Globes publication that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was a key part of their IAF recapitalization plans, and that Israel intends to buy over 100 of the fighters to replace their F-16s over time. The 100-plane deal will cost at least $5 billion by Israeli estimates, and will be the F-35A conventional take-off Air Force version. Snir added that “The IAF would be happy to equip itself with 24 F-22s but the problem at this time is the US refusal to sell the plane, and its $200 million price tag.”

As it turned out, Israel’s request for its first 75 F-35s would make Israel the aircraft’s first firm customer outside of the United States, and end up costing them about $200 million per plane…

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CGC Sanibel
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DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. On Sept 16/05, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Lockheed Martin/ Northrop Grumman joint venture Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) completed the preliminary design review for the 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRC). “The FRC is being designed to provide the Coast Guard with a state-of-the-art patrol craft that is capable of conducting simultaneous missions,” said ICGS Deepwater’s FRC program manager Mike Duthu.

That success has been followed by delays and failures, on multiple fronts. More than 2 years after the Coast Guard asked ICGS to accelerate the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program timeline by more than 10 years, in order to hasten replacement of their rapidly deteriorating Island Class patrol vessels, the Coast Guard is still waiting for replacements of any type to arrive. The USCG’s 30-year old patrol boats soldier on, less the 8 “upgraded” Island Class ships whose hull cracking has now made them unfit for service. Another 41 Island Class vessels still ply US and international waters.

The Island Class’ replacement program fared little better. In February 2006, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater system-of-systems Program ‘temporarily’ suspended design work on the FRC-A program due to technical risk. That suspension remains in place, and it soon became clear that Congress was unwilling to fund further FRC design work. FRC-A has effectively been canceled, in favor of an off-the-shelf buy. On March 14/07, the Coast Guard took the next step. ICGS’ lost responsibility for the Deepwater Fast Response Cutter-B off-the-shelf acquisition as well, and the FRC project was reassigned to the Coast Guard’s new Acquisition Directorate.

What happened? What will happen next? DID reviews, from the programs, to the outcomes and controversies, to the fate of the Island Class and FRC programs. The latest news is an initial contract for the Coast Guard’s off-the-shelf FRC-B cutter, which could become a $1.5 billion buy…

• Behind the Programs: The Modernization Imperative
• Appendix A: Down on the Islands – The Suspended Modernization
• Appenix B: FRC-A’s Not-So Fast Response: The Catch With Composite Cutters
• March 2007: What Next?
• FRC Plan B: The Sentinel Class [NEW]
• Program Updates & Contracts [updated]
• Additional Readings – Background
• Additional Readings – News, Official Reports & Statements
  
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MQ-1C Sky Warrior
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In August 2005, “Team Warrior” leader General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in San Diego, CA won a $214.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of the Extended Range/ Multi Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System (ER/MP UAS). The Warrior was designed to fill both surveillance and attack roles, and the MQ-1C Sky Warrior derived from General Atomics’ famous MQ-1 Predator beat the Hunter II system offered by Northrop Grumman, Aurora Flight Systems, and IAI.

The Sky Warrior ER/MP program is part of the US Army’s reinvestment of dollars from the canceled RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program, and directly supports the Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan. ER/MP could be a $1 billion effort, and recently strengthened its position when a 2007 program restructuring cut the Future Combat Systems Class III UAV competition. Now, in FY 2008, the MQ-1C Sky Warrior ER/MP prepares to move into production – as the first big “Key West” battle of the 21st century between the USAF and US Army reaches a resolution. But the Sky Warrior and Predator will be merging into a single program. What does that mean, exactly? DID asked. Meanwhile, our readers asked us to explain the differences between the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-1C Sky Warrior, and MQ-9 Reaper. DID is happy to oblige.

The latest news is the acquisition of 3 Block 0 SkyWarriors for use on the front lines, where Predator family flight hours continue to increase; and a contract to continue development and integrate Hellfire missiles. Recent news also includes a GAO decision re: Lockheed Martin’s BAMS UAV contract protest. It cites and details issues with General Atomics’ contractor performance, as the primary factor in Lockheed’s loss…

• The MQ-1C Sky Warrior, and its Band of Brothers
• The Army’s Sky Warrior Program
• ER/MP UAS – Enter the Warrior: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• Appendix A: US Army et. al. vs. USAF Over UAVs
• Appendix B: Additional Readings – Who Controls the UAVs?
• Appendix C: Additional Readings
  
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Raytheon: C4ISR Future?
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As video communications is integrated into robots, soldiers, and UAVs, and network-centric warfare becomes the organizing principle of American warfighting, front-line demands for bandwidth are rising faster than the US military can add it. The Transformation Communications Satellite (TSAT) System is part of a larger effort by the US military to address that need, and close the gap.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record – and TSAT is certainly significant. The final price tag on the entire program has been quoted at anywhere from $14-25 billion through 2016, including the satellites, the ground operations system, the satellite operations center and the cost of operations and maintenance. Lockheed Martin and Boeing have each won over $600 million in risk reduction contracts for the TSAT SS satellite system, and their respective bids are in. Both teams continue to await a decision, which was supposed to have been made in late 2007. TSAT’s $2 billion TMOS ground-based network operations contract is already underway.

The TSAT constellation’s central role in next-generation US military infrastructure makes it worthy of in-depth treatment – but its survival is not assured. Outside events and incremental competitors could spell its end, just as they spelled the end of Motorola’s infamous Iridium project. This FOCUS article examines that possibility, even as it offers an overview of the US military’s vision for its communications infrastructure, how TSAT fits, the program’s challenges, and complete coverage of contracts and significant events. New additions are highlighted in green for your convenience.

The latest item is an announcement from Lockheed Martin regarding a new satellite cooling technology that could have applications far beyond TSAT…

• Key Background – Why TSAT Is Thought to be Necessary (i.e. continue reading…)
• Key Background – The Big Picture: TSAT and the Transformational Communications Architecture
• Briefing – What Is TSAT?
• Briefing – TMOS: TSAT’s Ground Component
• Briefing – The AEHF Alternative, and Lessons Learned for TSAT
• Analysis – TSAT Program: Issues & Decisions
• Analysis – TSAT’s Competitors – and Its Fate
• News – TSAT: Timeline and Ongoing Developments [updated]
• Appendix A – Additional Readings & Sources
  
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In December 2005, “UK Warns USA Over ITAR Arms Restrictions” and “ITAR Fallout: Britain to Pull Out of F-35 JSF Program?” seemed to herald a very difficult period in Anglo-American defense relations. Despite the promises of 2 successive American Presidents, the ITAR exemptions that Britain had sought remained blocked in America’s legislature – and European initiatives to resume defense exports to China were not improving the situation. Meanwhile, MPs in Britain were becoming very insistent on a fix. DID’s articles explained the nature of America’s ITAR arms export restrictions, the issues at play, and the stakes.

In time, many of these issues were worked out. In August 2006, the US and UK reached a technology transfer agreement concerning the F-35 fighter – an agreement that would serve as a model for other F-35 industrial partners. By December 2007, Tier 1 partner Britain had signed the F-35’s Production, Sustainment & Follow On Development MoU.

A broader fix was still on the agenda, however, and in July 2007 it materialized as a a treaty that would change the way the American and British defense firms cooperate on defense programs. The treaty is progressing toward ratification in Britain, but some key details remain to be worked out. Those details are likely to matter a great deal to the American side in particular.

This Spotlight article aims to act as a one-stop briefing that explains the treaty’s motivation, key terms, and outstanding issues; keeps track of ongoing developments; and links to the key documents. The latest is a release from the AIA industry association, lamenting the US Senate’s failure to consider the UK and Australian treaties during the current (110th) Congress’ term…

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The entire fleet
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DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. The prime missions of the new DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer are to provide naval gunfire support and next-generation air defense in near-shore areas where other large ships hesitate to tread, possibly even as the anchor for an action group of stealthy Littoral Combat Ships and submarines. The estimated 14,500t (cruiser sized) Zumwalt Class will be fully multi-role, however, with undersea warfare, anti-ship, and long-range surface attack roles. As such, the DDG-1000 is also envisioned as a “hidden ace card” that can use its overall stealth to create uncertainty for enemy forces.

At over $3 billion per ship for construction alone, and just 2-8 ships to be built in the class, the program faces significant obstacles as it tries to avoid either “technology demonstrator” status, or the fulfillment of Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter’s fears for the fleet. A follow-on CG (X) cruiser is currently contemplated, and the success of the DDG-1000 Program will have a significant influence on whether and how it comes to fruition.

DID’s FOCUS Article for the DDG-1000 program covers the new ships’ capabilities and technologies, key controversies, associated contracts and costs, and related background resources. From the outset, DID has noted that the Zumwalt Class might face the same fate as the ultra-sophisticated, ultra-expensive SSN-21 Seawolf Class submarines. That appears to have come true, with news of the program’s cancellation at 2 ships.

The latest news involves approval of $2.5 billion as “full” funding for a 3rd ship in the FY 2009 budget, along with a clause that could redirect it to build more Arleigh Burke Class destroyers. Meanwhile, the Navy’s statements concerning the Zumwalt Class’ air defense and anti-submarine capabilities and deficits are coming under critical scrutiny…

• Zumwalt Class: Program and Participants (i.e. “Continue reading…”)
• DDG-1000 Key Technologies and Features [updated]
• DDG-1000 Issues and Controversies
• Zumwalt Class: Contracts and Key Events
  • FY 2009 [NEW]
  • FY 2008 [updated]
  • FY 2007
  • FY 2006
  • FY 2005
  • FY 1998 through 2004 [new]
• Additional Readings & Sources
  
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