Morocco’s Air Force Reloads: And Now, The Training…

French Mirage F1s

Morocco’s combat air force currently flies 2 squadrons of old F-5 fighters, and 2 squadrons of only slightly newer Mirage F1s. T-37 light jets serve as high-end trainers. Their neighbor and rival Algeria flies MiG-23s of similar vintage, but the Force Aérienne Algérienne also flies SU-24 Fencer and SU-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft, plus even more modern and capable MiG-29s, and is receiving multi-role SU-30MKAs as part of a multi-billion dollar weapons deal with Russia.

Morocco can’t beat that array. Instead, they’re looking for replacement aircraft and upgrades that will prevent complete overmatch, and provide a measure of security. Initially, they looked to France, but key reversals have handed most of this modernization work to the United States.

Canada’s CH-148 Cyclones: 4th Time Lucky?

CH-148 Cyclone

Canada’s Maritime Helicopter Replacement Program has been a textbook military procurement program over its long history. Unfortunately, it has been a textbook example of what not to do. While Canada’s 50-year old Sea King fleet aged and deteriorated to potentially dangerous levels, political pettiness and lack of concern turned a straightforward off-the-shelf buy into a 25+ year long odyssey of cancellations, lawsuits, rebids, and more. Eventually, the Canadian military settled on Sikorsky’s H-92 Superhawk as the basis of its new CH-148 Cyclone Maritime Helicopter, which will serve from the decks of Canada’s naval ships and bases.

The civilian S-92 has gone on to some commercial success. To date, however, Canada has been the H-92′s only military customer – with all of the associated systems integration and naval conversion burdens that one would expect. After a long series of badly missed milestones and delivery delays, there are also deeper questions being raised concerning both the machines’ fitness, and DND’s conduct of the program as a whole. This article covers the rationale for, history of, and developments within Canada’s Maritime Helicopter Program.

CMC Program Defining Future SSBN Launchers for UK, USA

SSBN Vanguard Class
(click to view larger)

The USA’s Ohio/ Henry M. Jackson Class and Britain’s Vanguard Class SSBNs (i.e. nuclear missile submarines) will begin experiencing age-related risks by the late 2010s, and military programs of this type can easily take 15-20 years from concept to fielding. The Common Missile Compartment (CMC) sub-program will help to define one of the next-generation SSBN’s most important constraints.

CMC aims to define the missile tubes and accompanying systems that would be used to launch new ballistic missiles, successors to the current Trident II/ D5 missile fleet used by the USA and Britain. Key options under consideration include a widened diameter for each tube from 2.21m – 3.04m, and the potential for flexibility beyond nuclear missiles.

Desert Leopards: Germany Selling Heavy Armor to the Saudis?

Leopard 2A7+

In mid-2011 reports surfaced that Saudi Arabia was preparing to buy around 200 German Leopard 2A7+ main battle tanks. Those reports stirred serious controversy in Germany, and indirectly confirmed the existence of a sales request.

Saudi Arabia would hardly be the first recipient of new or refurbished German tanks; indeed, Germany has displayed a consistent policy of selling cheap used tanks to countries all around Europe, and far beyond. Saudi Arabia is a somewhat surprising customer, because of its traditional “dual buy” structure for its land forces equipment, but there are strong reasons for Germany to be very interested in closing a Saudi sale. At the same time, the concerns expressed by opposition members are not without foundation.

The USA’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Program: Dead Aim, Or Dead End?

67% of the fleet

DID’s FOCUS Article for the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class “destroyer” program covers the new ships’ capabilities and technologies, key controversies, associated contracts and costs, and related background resources.

The ship’s prime missions are to provide naval gunfire support, and next-generation air defense, in near-shore areas where other large ships hesitate to tread. There has even been talk of using it as an anchor for action groups of stealthy Littoral Combat Ships and submarines, owing to its design for very low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures. The estimated 14,500t (battlecruiser size) Zumwalt Class will be fully multi-role, however, with undersea warfare, anti-ship, and long-range attack roles. That makes the DDG-1000 suitable for another role – as a “hidden ace card,” using its overall stealth to create uncertainty for enemy forces.

True, or False?

At over $3 billion per ship for construction alone, however, the program faced significant obstacles if it wanted to avoid fulfilling former Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter’s fears for the fleet. From the outset, DID has noted that the Zumwalt Class might face the same fate as the ultra-sophisticated, ultra-expensive SSN-21 Seawolf Class submarines. That appears to have come true, with news of the program’s truncation to just 3 ships. Meanwhile, production continues.

LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships

Austal Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. Now, the program looks set to end early. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts.

APKWS II: Laser-Guided Hydra Rockets in Production At Last

Hydras & Hellfires

The versatile Hydra 70mm rocket family is primed for a new lease on life, thanks to widespread programs aimed at converting these ubiquitous rockets into cheap laser-guided precision weapons. Conversion benefits include cost, use on both helicopters and fighters, more precision weapons per platform, low collateral damage, and the activation of large weapon stockpiles that couldn’t be used under strict rules of engagement.

Firms all over the world have grasped this opportunity, which explains why strong competition has emerged from all points of the compass. America’s “Advanced Precision-Kill Weapon System (APKWS)” is one of those efforts, but the road from obvious premise to working weapon has been slow. After numerous delays and false starts since its inception in 1996, an “APKWS-II” program finally entered System Design and Development (SDD) in 2006. In 2010, it entered low-rate production, and it was fielded to the front lines in 2012. That date will still put APKWS on the cutting edge of battlefield technology, as a leading player in a larger trend toward guided air-to-ground rockets.

US Navy Decommissions USS Miami

USS Miami

The nuclear-powered Improved Los Angeles Class (SSN-688i) submarine USS Miami (SSN 755) was ordered in 1983 and built by General Dynamics Electric Boat. She was commissioned in 1990, is homeported in Groton, CT, and was the focus of Tom Clancy’s 1993 non-fiction book Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship. In May 2012, a civilian shipyard worker in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard caused a fire, which quickly spread through its forward compartments. It took the efforts of more than 100 firefighters to save her. The cost of the necessary facelifts and fixes was so high that the Navy eventually decided to retire the boat.

WON By Default: Korea’s E-737 AWACS

ROKAF E-737

Other countries have criticized the USA’s ITAR policy for being as much about unfair trade competition as it is about genuine security. August 2006 events in Korea would certainly appear to strengthen their case… and a Nov 8/06 KOIS report put the final nail in by announcing a $1.6 billion contract “win” for 4 Boeing E-737 early-warning aircraft. Yet Boeing was always the ROK’s second choice, and its “win” came about by default.

A pair of December 2005 articles covered the $1.8 billion competition for South Korea’s E-X airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) aircraft, designed to detect incursions into ROK airspace and act as a sort of air traffic control for the air war. At the time, South Korea had no AWACS assets, relying solely on its allies; by 2012, it wanted at least 4 aircraft. In response, there were 2 main competitors…

Hydra, Awakened: Guided Air-Ground Rockets

(click to view larger)

Sen. Leahy’s [D-VT] worked in the mid-2000s to keep the Hydra 70mm rocket family alive through special appropriations, just in time for the Hydras’ potential on the battlefield to rise again. The key was the addition of low-cost precision guidance, which would expand the number of precision weapons carried by helicopters, aircraft, and even UAVs.

Over the last few years, the US Army’s 2nd attempt at an APKWS 70mm guided rocket had a near-death experience, before righting the program with Navy funding. Meanwhile, private development efforts from Lockheed Martin, Thales TDA, and a raft of international partnerships involving major defense firms and partners in Korea, the UAE, Canada/Norway, and Israel are introducing new competitors into the precision-guided rocket space. This DID FOCUS article covers the most prominent competitors within the guided rocket trend. Their products will sit between full anti-armor missiles like Hellfire, TOW, and Brimstone, and an emerging class of ultra-small precision attack weapons like Northrop Grumman’s Viper Strike, Raytheon’s Griffin, etc.