TPQ-53 Counterfire Radars: Incoming… Where?

EQ-36 concept

Firefinder radars track the path of incoming shells, rockets, mortars, etc., and calculate the point they were fired from. Raytheon’s TPQ-36 radar is specifically designed to counter medium range enemy weapon systems out to a range of 24 kilometers, while the TPQ-37 can locate longer-range systems, and even surface launched missiles, out to 50 kilometers. Michael Yon, embedded with 1-24 (“Deuce Four”) in Mosul, offered a first hand description of counter-battery radars’ effect on enemy tactics in 2005.

Better radar technologies offer a number of potential advantages for this role, including wider fields of view and less maintenance. Not to mention fewer disruptive, time-sucking false positives for deployed troops. In September 2006, Lockheed Martin began a contract to deliver their “Enhanced AN/TPQ-36″ (EQ-36) radars. Despite the close official name and designation, this was a wholly new radar system, from a different company. Orders have begun to accumulate, along with deployments – and, finally, a less confusing designation change to AN/TPQ-53.

Alone, If Necessary: The Shield of Poland

In the wake of events in Georgia and Crimea, Poland has emerged as NATO’s key eastern bastion. The Tarcza Polski (Shield of Poland) aims to give it an advanced air defense system to match.

Poland’s military rise has been slow, but steady. Smart economic policies have created growth, and a willingness to finance national defense is slowly improving their equipment. Combat deployments abroad to Iraq and Afghanistan have both sharpened training, and highlighted areas that still need fixing. Missile proliferation in the Middle East, American fecklessness, and a rearming Russia have all led Poland to the conclusion that they can no longer depend on old Soviet-era air defense equipment. They need their own advanced national air defense system, which can benefit from allied contributions without being dependent on them.

Don’t Touch Their Junk: USAF’s SSA Tracking Space Debris

Space Fence concept

Space is big. Objects in space are very dangerous to each other. Countries that intend to launch objects into space need to know what’s out there, in order to avoid disasters like the 2009 collision of 2 orbital satellites. All they need to do is track many thousands of man-made space objects, traveling at about 9 times the speed of a bullet, and residing in a search area that’s 220,000 times the volume of Earth’s oceans.

The US Air Force Materiel Command’s Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts leads the USA’s Space Fence project. It’s intended to improve space situational awareness by tracking more and smaller objects, while replacing legacy systems in the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) as they retire. With a total anticipated value of around $6.1 billion over its lifetime, Space Fence will deliver a system of 2-3 geographically dispersed ground-based radars to provide timely assessment of space objects, events, and debris. International cooperation will supplement it, as part of overall Space Situational Awareness efforts. Failure is not an option. Or is it?

Flexible G/ATORs: The USMC’s Multi-Mission AESA Ground Radars

G/ATOR diorama

The US military’s long run of unquestioned air superiority has led to shortcuts in mobile land-based air defenses, and the US Marines are no exception. A December 2005 release from Sen. Schumer’s office [D-NY] said that:

“Current radar performance does not meet operational forces requirements… consequences could potentially allow opposing forces to gain air and ground superiority in future operational areas.”

One of the programs in the works to address this gap is the AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR mobile radar system. It’s actually the result of fusing 2 programs: the Multi-Role Radar System (MRRS), and Ground Weapons Locator Radar (GWLR) requirements. When the last G/ATOR software upgrade becomes operational, it will replace and consolidate numerous legacy radars, including the AN/TPS-63 air surveillance, AN/MPQ-62 force control, AN/TPS-73 air traffic control, AN/UPS-3 air defense, and AN/TPQ-36/37 artillery tracking & locating radar systems.

Along Came A Spider: The XM-7 RED Mine

XM-7 Spider System

The 2004 National Landmine Policy directed the Pentagon to end the use of persistent landmines after 2010, and introduce self-destructing and self-deactivating alternatives. The XM-7 Spider is the successor to the Matrix system deployed in Iraq, and part of the USA’s Non-Self-Destructing Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternatives (NSD-A) program.

Spider is more of a “remote explosive device” than a typical lay-and-forget land mine. It’s detonated by soldier command, and that soldier can even load non-lethal canisters if the mission calls for it. Unlike conventional land mines, the XM-7 Spider always has a known location, so it can be safely and easily recovered and re-deployed. If that isn’t possible for some reason, XM-7 units deactivate after a set time period, so they won’t become a future threat. It sounds good, and its capabilities are badly needed in places like remote fire bases, and along Korea’s dangerous DMZ. Unfortunately, the program has run into difficulties and delays.

Iraq’s New Integrated Air Defense System

The US may have left Iraq in 2012, but that country is a long way from being able to police its own airspace. The country’s air defenses involve just 2 airspace surveillance radars and 3 air-traffic-control radars, plus some Saddam-era anti-aircraft guns. In addition shoddy maintenance jeopardizes a small air fleet, though Iraq’s only armed aircraft are Cessna AC-208Bs.

Their first serious defensive systems will be short-range Pantsir S1 systems from Russia, but now an official export request outlines the backbone of Iraq’s future air defense architecture. If it’s installed, it would give them “a baseline tactical radar and threat intercept capability” with missiles, and eventually with their F-16IQ fighters.

Aces High: USA Developing New 3DELRR Long-Range Ground Radar

AN/TPS-75

The US Air Force’s AN/TPS-75 radar has been in service since 1968. Threats have evolved, and they want to replace it as their main long-range, ground-based radar for detecting, identifying and tracking aircraft and missiles, then reporting them through the Ground Theater Air Control System. The US Marines are considering a similar move, to replace their own AN/TPS-59s. Hence the USA’s Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR, pron. “Three Dealer”).

3DELRR is intended to provide long-range surveillance, control of aircraft, and theater ballistic missile detection. It will correct AN/TPS-75 shortfalls by being easier to maintain, thanks to AESA technology, and by detecting and reporting highly maneuverable and/or stealthy targets. Its improved resolution may even allow it to classify and determine the type of non-cooperative aircraft that cannot or do not identify themselves – a trait that allows faster engagement of hostile planes, and reduces the odds of friendly fire incidents. As long as the program itself can avoid friendly fire from the USA’s budget wars.

No Tanks: Iraq’s “Etcetera” American Armor

M88 and M1

It takes more than tanks to make up an armored division. Iraq’s purchases of M1 Abrams tanks has attracted a lot of attention, and SIGIR reports of a deal for M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles were noteworthy. But Iraq’s DSCA export requests for its tanks also included a wide variety of other necessary accompaniments: tracked APCs, artillery, heavy transport trucks, and transport. Most were sold as “Excess Defense Articles”, and Iraq received additional equipment beyond those requests.

That equipment is necessary to round out Iraq’s armored formations, and make them a viable force. All of it has be checked out, refurbished as necessary, and then supported in the field. Other items, like M1135 Stryker vehicles for detecting weapons of mass destruction, occupy their own special niches. DID covers the associated requests, contracts, and developments.

Overlander is On! Australia’s A$ 3+ Bn Vehicle Program

Out with the old…

LAND 121 – also known as Project Overlander – is the largest land project in Australia’s Defence Capability Plan. Overall, this is currently estimated as an A$ 7.5 billion (USD $7.6 billion) investment in the Australian Army to replace its fleet of Army trucks, patrol vehicles, trailers and modules. Australia’s “Hardened and Networked Army” meta-program needed to pay attention to these vehicles as well, given an existing fleet that was bought between 1959-1994. As Defence Minister Hill said in 2005:

“Our current fleet is ageing and is becoming more costly to maintain and upgrade. The vehicles will range from lightweight four-wheel drives to heavy trucks and prime movers with interchangeable modules to increase operational flexibility.”

This article looks at Project Overlander, with a particular focus on the major vehicle buys from Phase 3 onward. Some parts of Overlander are even linked to America’s JLTV program, though Australia is also preparing a domestic competitor.

Algerian Arms Deal Brings Russia $7.5 billion, Gas Market Leverage

Yak-130

A February 2006 report noted that a $4 billion arms sale was brewing between Algeria and Russia involving fighter aircraft, tanks, and air defense systems, with the possibility of additional equipment. Those options came through the following month, as a high-level Russian delegation in Algeria closed up to $7.5 billion worth of arms contracts. The Algerian package remains post-Soviet Russia’s largest single arms deal. As an instructive comparison, annual Russian weapons export orders from all customers were just $5-6 billion per year in 2004 and 2005.

Reuters South Africa quoted Rosoboronexport chief Sergei Chemezov as saying that “Practically all types of arms which we have are included, anti-missile systems, aviation, sea and land technology.” The actual contents of that deal were murky, though DID offers triangulation among several sources to help sort out the confusion. A number of these deals have evolved over time, and other public-source information has helped to sharpen the picture a bit. The subsequent crash of Algeria’s MiG-29 deal, and its ripple effects, are also discussed.