MQ-8 Fire Scout VTUAV Program: By Land or By Sea

A helicopter UAV is very handy for naval ships, and for armies who can’t always depend on runways. The USA’s RQ/MQ-8 Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial Vehicle has blazed a trail of firsts in this area, but its history is best described as “colorful.” The program was begun by the US Navy, canceled, adopted by the US Army, revived by the Navy, then canceled by the Army. Leaving it back in the hands of the US Navy. Though the Army is thinking about joining again, and the base platform is changing.

The question is, can the MQ-8 leverage its size, first-mover contract opportunity, and “good enough” performance into a secure future with the US Navy – and beyond? DID describes these new VTUAV platforms, clarifies the program’s structure and colorful history, lists all related contracts and events, and offers related research materials.

Britain’s A330 Voyager FSTA: An Aerial Tanker Program – With a Difference

Back in 2005, Great Britain was considering a public-private partnership to buy, equip, and operate the RAF’s future aerial tanker fleet. The RAF would fly the 14 Airbus A330-MRTT aircraft on operational missions, and receive absolute preferential access to the planes. A private contractor would handle maintenance, receive payment from the RAF on a per-use basis – and operate them as passenger charter or transport aircraft when the RAF didn’t need them.

The deal became politically controversial, and negotiations on the 27-year, multi-billion pound deal charted new territory for both the government, and for private industry. Which may help to explain why a contract to move ahead on a “Private Financing Initiative” basis had yet to be issued, and procurement had yet to begin, over 7 years after the program began. In March 2008, however, Britain issued the world’s largest-ever Defence Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contract. This FOCUS Article describes the current British fleet, the aircraft they chose to replace them, how the new fleet will compare, the innovative deal structure they’ve chosen, and ongoing FSTA developments.

The USA’s Spearhead-class, expeditionary fast transports

When moving whole units, shipping is always the cheaper, higher-capacity option. Slow speed and port access are the big issues, but what if ship transit times could be cut sharply, and full-service ports weren’t necessary? After Australia led the way by using what amounted to fast car ferries for military operations, the US Army and Navy decided to give it a go. Both services leased Incat TSV/HSV wave-piercing catamaran ship designs, while the Marines’ charged ahead with very successful use of Austal’s Westpac Express high-speed catamaran. These Australian-designed ships all give commanders the ability to roll on a company with full gear and equipment (or roll on a full infantry battalion if used only as a troop transport), haul it intra-theater distances at 38 knots, then move their shallow draft safely into austere ports to roll them off.

Their successful use, and continued success on operations, attracted favorable comment and notice from all services. So favorable that the experiments have led to a $3+ billion program called the Joint High Speed Vessel. These designs may even have uses beyond simple ferrying and transport.

US Navy on the T-AKE As It Beefs Up Supply Ship Capacity

Warships get a lot of attention, but without resupply, an impressive-looking fleet becomes a hollow force. The US Navy’s supply and support fleet has been aging, and needed new vessels. T-AKE is part of that effort, and the ships have also found themselves performing “naval diplomacy” roles.

The entire T-AKE dry cargo/ ammunition ship program could have a total value of as much as $6.2 billion, and a size of 14 ships, as the US looks to modernize its supply fleet. How do T-AKE ships fit into US naval operations? What ships do they replace? What’s the tie-in to US civilian industrial capacity? How were environmental standards built into their design? And what contracts have been issued for T-AKE ships to date?

The C-27J Spartan Joint Cargo Aircraft

When the WALRUS super-heavy cargo airship was canceled, combat commanders complained that front-line airfields were often too short for the C-130 Hercules that make up the USAF’s tactical transport fleet. Delays in buying a small cargo aircraft to fill that role were making that problem worse. Starved of useful help due to USAF-sponsored delays, and the lack of appropriate aircraft in the USAF, the Army carried on with its aging C-23 Sherpas, and repurposed aircraft like the unprotected C-12 Hurons, in order to ferry troops, supplies, and/or very small vehicles within its theaters of operations.

The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) could have been worth up to $6 billion before all was said and done, and the finalists were a familiar duo. After EADS-CASA’s CN-235 and a shortened version of Lockheed Martin’s C-130J were disqualified for failing to meet requirements, JCA became yet another international competition between EADS-CASA’s C-295M & Alenia’s C-27J. The C-27J team eventually won the delayed decision in June 2007, and prevailed in the subsequent contract protests from their rivals. What remained unclear was exactly what they had won. The joint-service decision and contract announcement didn’t end the inter-service and Congressional politicking, and the contractor side was equally fractious. This FOCUS article covers the JCA competition, and subsequent developments – including the Pentagon’s 2012 push to end the program, and sell its planes.

Space Based Space Surveillance: Follow On Needed

In January 2001, a commission headed by then US Defense Secretary-designate Donald Rumsfeld warned about a possible “space Pearl Harbor” in which a potential enemy would launch a surprise attack against US-based military space assets, disabling them. These assets include communications satellites and the GPS system, which is crucial for precision attack missiles and a host of military systems.

“The US is more dependent on space than any other nation. Yet the threat to the US and its allies in and from space does not command the attention it merits,” the commission warned.

One of the systems that grew out of the commission’s report was the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) project, which is developing a constellation of satellites to provide the US military with space situational awareness using visible sensors. After a slow start, SBSS Block 10 reached a significant milestone in August 2012 with its Initial Operational Capability, followed by full operational capability less than a year later. But lack of funding casts as shadow on whether this capability will be maintained beyond 2017. By 2014/15 the Air Force worked on a stopgap project as well as an effort to obtain proper funding for follow on satellites to be launched at the start of next decade.

Apache Helicopter Pilots Take Aim with Arrowhead

For much of the post-WWII era, US helicopter pilots have been trained to fly “low and fast.” This was based on combat experience in Korea and Vietnam. In the urban environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, however, flying low and fast has made helicopters more vulnerable to a number of threats: terrain, wires/powerlines, rocket propelled grenades, small arms fire, and shoulder-fired missiles.

Enter the Arrowhead system. Arrowhead is an electro-optical and fire control system that AH-64 Apache helicopter pilots use for combat targeting of their Hellfire missiles and other weapons, as well as flying in day, night, or bad weather missions. The system also provides accurate targeting at high altitudes, a practice that also has its drawbacks. This free-to-view Spotlight article covers the Arrowhead’s characteristics, components, contacts, consequences, and contracts.

Halliburton/KBR Contracts Under Fire from Congress, DCAA

Headed for Iraq

Pentagon auditors are questioning more than $108 million in costs claimed by Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown Root (KBR) under its $875 million “Task Order 5” contract to provide fuel in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) also faulted KBR for the quality of the records it delivered to the investigation, citing discrepancies between reported actual costs and accounting records. Halliburton is asserting that no wrongdoing was involved, claiming that the costs stemmed directly from the strictures it was working under and the challenges of getting shipments into a war zone without fail. Company officials also point out the firm’s estimating and purchasing systems have recently received a nod of approval from the Pentagon’s Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

A Pentagon spokeswoman said the audit was conducted to determine whether “fair and reasonable” prices were charged, and that DCAA (Defense Contract Audit Agency) auditors believe that KBR paid an unreasonable price for the fuel in some cases. “The major issues in this audit report have not been resolved,” she said, without providing details. Halliburton spokeswoman Wendy Hall said the company was cooperating fully with auditors, and would work with the Pentagon to resolve the issue. Army Corps spokeswoman Carol Sanders said the Corps was looking at a series of audits before starting final negotiations with KBR over final prices and potential payment adjustments. Meanwhile, Congressional pressure shows no signs of letting up.

‘Fat Leonard’ Procurement Scandal Takes Down Three Rear Admirals

The Secretary of the Navy
issued letters of censure to three rear admirals – all of whom are retiring – for involvement in the “Fat Leonard” scandal that involved officers steering ships to particular port facilities in return for gifts and sexual favors. A review concluded that the three admirals improperly accepted gifts between 2006 and 2007 and that their improper familiarity with Leonard “Fat Leonard” Francis “cultivated an unacceptable ethical climate within the respective commands.”

Rear Admirals Michael Miller, then a commander serving on the USS Ronald Reagan; Terry Kraft, CO of the same carrier; and David Pimpo, the Reagan’s supply officer, have all asked to retire. The Navy’s issuance of reprimands does not preclude criminal charges. Secretary Mabus promised to set up an ethical disciplinary process to follow up with Navy officers who are not charged criminally, or whose ethical lapses aren’t addressed directly in criminal proceedings. Navy officials previously indicated that the scandal will grow wider as leads are followed up.

Francis, proprietor of a Malaysian naval resupply and refit firm named Glenn Defense Marine Asia Ltd. pleaded guilty to various corruption charges, having been successfully lured to the U.S. in a San Diego hotel sting, and after finally losing the services of a bribed senior official in the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, who had previously been tipping him off. Francis’s firm aggressively sought Navy business, bribed officials for secret ship movement information and for favorable contracting decisions and overcharged for services. Allegations have been made as well that Francis was effective in changing the schedules and destinations for certain Navy deployments.

Francis has been cooperating in recent weeks, according to the Washington Post.

Francis has agreed to pay back $35 million in money made through the scheme, and awaits sentencing of up to 25 years in prison.

Navy captain Daniel Dusek pleaded guilty to giving Francis secret information in exchange for money, prostitution services and travel services around the Pacific. Dusek was relieved of his relatively new command of the Bonhomme Richard in 2013 when he was first suspected of involvement. Dusek is one of five navy officials to plead guilty, and the most senior so far.

He has admitted to, in at least one instance, to change the movements of a carrier and strike group to ensure that they stopped at Francis’s Port Klang facility in Malaysia.

A couple months before Dusek’s arrest, a former commander of the USS Mustin, Michael Vannak Khem Misiewicz, was arrested for bribery, about the same time that Naval Criminal Investigative Service supervisory agent John Bertrand Beliveau II was arrested.

Misiewicz allegedly attempted reschedule port visits to include Francis’s firms facilities, adopting routes that included Sepangar, Malaysia, and Laem Chebang, Thailand.

Already, several mid-level officers have been found guilty, including one who pleaded guilty only last week.

In documents presented to the court using Francis’s own words, the scheme was designed to “drive the big decks into our fat revenue” facilities.

The US Navy’s Mobile Landing Platform Ships (MLP)

MLP concept

The Montford Point Class Mobile Landing Platform is intended to be a new class and type of auxiliary support ship, as part of the US Navy’s Maritime Prepositioning Force of the Future (MPF-F) program. They’re intended to serve as a transfer station or floating pier at sea, improving the U.S. military’s ability to deliver equipment and cargo from ship to shore when friendly bases are denied, or simply don’t exist. That’s very useful in disaster situations, and equally useful for supporting US Marines once they’re ashore.

It’s an interesting and unusual concept, one closely connected to the au courant concept of “seabasing”. The final MLP design changed substantially from the initial requirements, which lowered the platform’s cost along with its capabilities. Time will tell if the initial choices and tradeoffs were well-conceived or not. With contracts to build the ships underway, the remaining question is whether the ships can be built to meet the more limited promises that are being made now.