Trident II D5 Missile: Keeping Up with Changing Times

Nuclear tipped missiles were first deployed on board US submarines at the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, to deter a Soviet first strike. The deterrence theorists argued that, unlike their land-based cousins, submarine-based nuclear weapons couldn’t be taken out by a surprise first strike, because the submarines were nearly impossible to locate and target. Which meant that Soviet leaders could not hope to destroy all of America’s nuclear weapons before they could be launched against Soviet territory. SLBM/FBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile/ Fleet Ballistic Missile) offered shorter ranges and less accuracy than their land-based ICBM (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile) counterparts, but the advent of Trident C4 missiles began extending those ranges, and offering other improvements. The C4s were succeeded by larger Trident II D5 missiles, which added precision accuracy and more payload.

The year that the Trident II D5 ballistic missile was first deployed, 1990, saw the beginning of the end of the missile’s primary mission. Even as the Soviet Union began to implode, the D5’s performance improvements were making the Trident submarine force the new backbone of the USA’s nuclear deterrent – and of Britain’s as well. To ensure that this capability was maintained at peak readiness and safety, the US Navy undertook a program in 2002 to replace aging components of the Trident II D5 missile called the D5 Life Extension (LE) Program. This article covers D5 LE, as well as support and production contracts associated with the American and British Trident missile fleets.

Scorpene’s Sting: Malaysia’s Bribery & Murder Scandal

The Franco-Spanish Scorpene diesel-electric attack submarine competes on the global market against an array of competitors, especially ThyssenKrupp HDW’s U209/212/214 family. In June 2002, the Malaysian government signed a EUR 1 billion contract with Armaris (now DCNS) and Spanish naval shipbuilder Izar (now Navantia) for 2 SSK Scorpenes and associated support and training. Both submarines have been delivered to Malaysia, though there have been some technical problems. Which pale in comparison to the deal’s other problems.

Within Malaysia, the sale has been compromised by an ongoing trial and set of legal actions around the public kidnapping and private execution of Mongolian modeling student, translator, and paramour Altantuya Shaariibuu. Full and impartial accountability for public figures is not a prominent feature of Malaysian justice, but French Journalist Arnaud Dubus added to the pressure with a March 5/09 report in France’s Liberation, “Un cadavre très dérangeant: L’étrange affaire du meurtre d’une interprète mongole qui gène le pouvoir en Malaisie” (Page 30-31). It named very prominent names, offered details, and revealed the contents of documents that Malaysian courts had refused to admit. A subsequent bribery investigation by French authorities has led to the emergence of even more documents, and the scandal is becoming a significant presence in Malaysian politics.

Astute Buy? Britain Spends Big on its Next Fast Submarines

Britain retired its nuclear-powered 4,900t SSN Swiftsure Class fast attack boats in 2010, and has begun phasing out its follow-on 5,300t SSN Trafalgar Class, before the effects of the ocean’s constant squeezing and release start making them dangerous to use. The last Trafalgar Class boat is expected to retire by 2022, and replacements were required. Submarines are considered to be a strategic industry in Britain, which remains committed to nuclear-powered submarines for their entire fleet. As such, there was never any question of whether they’d design their own. The new SSN Astute Class were designed to be stealthier than the Trafalgars, despite having 39% more displacement at 7,400t submerged.

Britain’s 6 Swiftsure and 7 Trafalgar Class boats will eventually find themselves replaced by 7 of the new Astute Class. The new submarine class has had its share of delays and difficulties, but the program continues to move forward with GBP 2.75 billion in contracts over the past week.

Virginia Pivot: The USA’s Multi-Year Block IV Sub Deal

A 5-year, $17 billion deal will build 10 Virginia Class Block IV fast attack submarines for the US Navy, bringing production to 2 boats per year at long last. The USA’s nuclear submarine fleet gives it unmatched flexibility, but it’s confronted with rising submarine numbers in China and around the Pacific, even as its Los Angeles Class submarines are beginning to exit the fleet. Aircraft carriers may dominate in peacetime, but as anti-ship missiles gain longer reach and greater lethality, and sensors improve, some analysts are coming to see submarines as the key to wartime naval power…

Vietnam’s Restocking: Subs, Ships, Sukhois, and Now Perhaps F-16s and P-3s?

Kilo Class cutaway

In April 2009, reports surfaced that Vietnam had agreed in principle to a deal with Russia for 6 of its diesel-electric Kilo/ Project 636 Class fast attack submarines. By December 2009, it was an inflection-point deal for a capability that Vietnam has never had before. By November 2013, the new submarines had begun to arrive.

Nor is that the only change in Vietnam’s military capabilities these days, courtesy of their long-standing relationship with Russia. There have been some outside deals for items like maritime surveillance floatplanes, and a Dutch deal will provide high-end frigates. For the most part, however, Vietnam’s new combat power in the air, at sea, and on land is coming from Russia. China’s displays of naval might are only part of the mosaic influencing Vietnam’s decisions in these matters.

SSBN-X Subs: Congressmen Promote Refresh, Have Sub Bases in Districts

SSBN-X concept

The US Navy needs new SSBN nuclear missile submarines. Their existing Ohio Class boats will begin to retire at a rate of 1 hull per year, beginning in 2027, as they reach the end of their 42-year operational lifetimes. Hence SSBN-X, also known as the Ohio Replacement Program for now.

The first step toward recapitalization involved a new Common Missile Compartment and Advanced Launcher for current and future nuclear missiles. The next step involves finalizing a design that can serve effectively to 2080, without destroying the US Navy’s shipbuilding budget in the process. Good luck with that one, but they have to to try. The maintenance of the USA’s nuclear deterrent is too important, in a world where nuclear weapons are proliferating.

Norway May go Dutch with Poland on Subs

S304, KNM Uthaug

Norway’s 6 Ula Class/ U210 diesel-electric submarines were commissioned from 1989-1992, and play an important role in their overall fleet. The 1,150t design combined German design, sonar, and torpedoes with a French Thomson-CSF (now Thales) Sintra flank array sonar. Integration happens through a Norwegian Kongsberg combat system, which has become a mainstay for German submarine types. The U210s are a bit on the small side compared to more modern diesel-electric boats, but they remain well suited to Norway’s long coasts and narrow fjords.

The Ula Class has received a number of upgrades since 2006. A new combat system, added cooling for warm water operations, upgraded periscopes, sonar improvements, TADIL-A/Link 11 communications, etc. Even so, the continuous cycle of compression and release inherent in submarine operations will make operations past 2020 a risky proposition. Norway wants to keep a submarine fleet, and by the end of 2014 decided it would need new boats to do so.

The US Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion Contracts

Basic Nuclear Propulsion
(click to expand)

This DII Spotlight article covers American nuclear propulsion industrial base contracts since the beginning of FY 2006. The USA has had an all-nuclear submarine fleet for over 50 years, a policy that dates back to the visionary Admiral Hyman Rickover. On the surface, America’s aircraft carriers became an all-nuclear fleet with the retirement of the USS Kitty Hawk [CV 63], and FY 2008-09 spending legislation pushed the US Navy to use nuclear power in its future CG (X) cruisers and new amphibious ship classes. At present, however, carriers are the only nuclear-powered American surface ships on the drawing board.

The civilian nuclear sector has seen major advances over the last 2 decades, and so has the military sector. The commitment to a nuclear fleet includes funding for those technical advances, as well as work to maintain both the reactors on board American ships, and the industrial base that supports them.

Australia’s Next-Generation Submarines

Bridge to the future?

In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in ship killing surveillance-strike complexes, and at their need to defend large sea lanes, as key drivers shaping future navies. These premises are well accepted, but the White Paper’s conclusion was a surprise. It recommended a doubling of Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be a new successor design that would replace the RAN’s Collins Class submarines.

The surprise, and controversy, stem from Australia’s recent experiences. The Collins Class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has had a checkered career, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature and propulsion, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines. High-level attention led to a report and recommendations to improve the force, but whether they will work remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost – remain unclear, with estimated costs in the A$ 36-44 billion range. This FOCUS article covers Australia’s options, decisions, and plans, as their future submarine program slowly gets underway.

India’s Project 75 SSKs: Too Late to Save the Submarine Force?

Scorpene cutaway

India’s submarine fleet currently consists of 16 boats: 10 Russian SSK Kilo (Sindhugosh) Class, 4 locally built SSK U209 (Shishumar) Class, a leased nuclear-powered Improved Akula Class SSN from Russia (INS Chakra), and its own INS Arihant SSBN. Most of the Kilos have been modernized, but readiness rates for India’s existing submarine fleet sits below 40%, and the U209s will have trouble lasting much beyond 2015. With Pakistan acquiring modern submarines, and Chinese submarine building exploding, expanding India’s submarine fleet became an obvious national priority.

In 2005, India confirmed that it would buy 6 Franco-Spanish Scorpene diesel submarines, with an option for 6 more and extensive technology transfer agreements. Unfortunately, 7 years after that deal was signed, “Project 75” has yet to field a single submarine. A poor Indian procurement approach, and state-run inefficiency, are pushing the country’s entire submarine force toward an aging crisis. This DID FOCUS article covers the Scorpene deal and its structure, adds key contracts and new developments, and offers insights into the larger naval picture within and beyond India.