LPD-17 San Antonio Class: The USA’s New Amphibious Ships

LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are just entering service with the US Navy, and 11 ships of this class are eventually slated to replace up to 41 previous ships. Much like their smaller predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. The difference is found in these ships’ size, their cost, and the capabilities and technologies used to perform those missions. Among other additions, this new ship is designed to operate the Marines’ new MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, alongside the standard well decks for hovercraft and amphibious armored personnel carriers.

While its design incorporates notable advances, the number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract was assigned appears to be part of the problem. Initial ships have been criticized, often, for sub-standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered before any of them could be sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain, due to oil leaks. It hasn’t been the only ship of its class hurt by serious mechanical issues. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts, reaching over $1.6 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPDs like the Rotterdam Class, and more than 10 times as much as Singapore’s 6,600 ton Endurance Class LPD. This article covers the LPD-17 San Antonio Class program, including its technologies, its problems, and ongoing contracts and events.

US Navy on the T-AKE As It Beefs Up Supply Ship Capacity

Warships get a lot of attention, but without resupply, an impressive-looking fleet becomes a hollow force. The US Navy’s supply and support fleet has been aging, and needed new vessels. T-AKE is part of that effort, and the ships have also found themselves performing “naval diplomacy” roles.

The entire T-AKE dry cargo/ ammunition ship program could have a total value of as much as $6.2 billion, and a size of 14 ships, as the US looks to modernize its supply fleet. How do T-AKE ships fit into US naval operations? What ships do they replace? What’s the tie-in to US civilian industrial capacity? How were environmental standards built into their design? And what contracts have been issued for T-AKE ships to date?

Canada’s C$ 2.9B “Joint Support Ship” Project, Take 3

As part of its spate of military modernization announcements issued just before Canada Day (July 1) 2006, the Canadian government issued an RFP that began the process of defining and building 3 “Joint Support Ships.” The aim was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current Protecteur Class oiler and resupply ships. In addition to being able to provide at-sea support (re-fueling and re-supply) to deployed naval task groups, the new JSS ships were envisioned as ships that would also be capable of sealift operations, as well as amphibious support to forces deployed ashore.

This was expected to be a C$ 2.9 billion (USD $2.58 billion) project. This article describes the process, the industry teams participating, and some of the issues swirling around Canada’s very ambitious specifications. Specifications that ultimately sank the whole project, twice, in a manner that was predictable from the outset. Leaving Canada’s navy with a serious problem, as its existing ships were forced into retirement. Will another go-round in 2012-13 help any? And what will Canada do in the meantime?

The USA’s Spearhead-class, expeditionary fast transports

When moving whole units, shipping is always the cheaper, higher-capacity option. Slow speed and port access are the big issues, but what if ship transit times could be cut sharply, and full-service ports weren’t necessary? After Australia led the way by using what amounted to fast car ferries for military operations, the US Army and Navy decided to give it a go. Both services leased Incat TSV/HSV wave-piercing catamaran ship designs, while the Marines’ charged ahead with very successful use of Austal’s Westpac Express high-speed catamaran. These Australian-designed ships all give commanders the ability to roll on a company with full gear and equipment (or roll on a full infantry battalion if used only as a troop transport), haul it intra-theater distances at 38 knots, then move their shallow draft safely into austere ports to roll them off.

Their successful use, and continued success on operations, attracted favorable comment and notice from all services. So favorable that the experiments have led to a $3+ billion program called the Joint High Speed Vessel. These designs may even have uses beyond simple ferrying and transport.

UK OPVs: Bridge Over the River Class

The UK’s forthcoming Ocean Class 90m+ Offshore Patrol Vessels stem from a shipbuilding sector agreement that the UK MoD signed with BAE in November 2013. Britain needed to find an affordable bridge-buy that kept its naval shipyards running in-between completion of existing ships, and delayed construction of the new Type 26 frigates. Rather than paying termination and industrial costs to keep the shipyard idle, the UK government decided to buy 3 OPVs, for delivery by 2017. This would also allow the Royal Navy to retire or gift out the existing River Class OPVs HMS Tyne, HMS Severn and HMS Mersey.

As of August 2014, the contract for these new open-ocean patrol vessels is complete…

Floatin’ Smokey: The USA’s SBX Radar

As rogue state proliferation by the likes of North Korea made missile defense a growing priority for nations including the USA, Japan, and Israel, the USA began to look at the linchpin of any defense: powerful radars that could both track ballistic missiles, and guide interceptors. The USA has its BMEWS tracking system, but that would not serve. America’s Safeguard ABM system was dismantled long ago – though Russia still maintains its counterpart System A-135 network around Moscow. Something new would be needed.

Enter Raytheon’s new XBR radar, based on an SBX-1 platform that looks a lot like a mobile oil drilling rig. Basing the radar at sea offers numerous advantages. One is the obvious ability to move the radar as threats materialize, allowing much greater coverage with fewer radars. Another is the ability to protect allies, without having to invest in expensive systems whose regional capabilities and value to the USA could be put at risk by the decisions of a single foreign government. In exchange for this freedom from political interference, of course, the designers must contend with nature’s interference in the stormy Pacific.

Boeing SBX system is linked to its land-based GMD (Ground-based Mid-course Defense) missile system but can also operate with other naval and land elements.

Britain’s Tide Class: Supplies are From MARS

RFA Bayleaf, 1982-2011

Britain’s Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) program was begun in 2002, and aimed to buy up to 11 supply ships for the Royal Navy’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Unfortunately, all the project could produce was studies, MoD planning delays, and slow progress. In 2007, MARS was broken up into a series of smaller buys, with an initial focus on the critical state of the RFA’s fuel carriers. Even that effort ran into delays, but the last 3 years have seen Britain’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary retire 3 of its 4 Leaf Class replenishment oilers. Another 3 of its remaining 5 oilers were commissioned in 1984 or earlier, and their single-hull design no longer complies with MARPOL regulations for fuel-carrying ships.

Replacements are urgently needed, in order to keep the Royal Navy supplied around the world. In February 2012, Britain finally placed a MARS order for 4 oilers, which will measure over 200m long and around 37,000t apiece. It has been expected for some time that these ships would be built outside of Britain, and that has held true.

‘Fat Leonard’ Procurement Scandal Takes Down Three Rear Admirals

The Secretary of the Navy
issued letters of censure to three rear admirals – all of whom are retiring – for involvement in the “Fat Leonard” scandal that involved officers steering ships to particular port facilities in return for gifts and sexual favors. A review concluded that the three admirals improperly accepted gifts between 2006 and 2007 and that their improper familiarity with Leonard “Fat Leonard” Francis “cultivated an unacceptable ethical climate within the respective commands.”

Rear Admirals Michael Miller, then a commander serving on the USS Ronald Reagan; Terry Kraft, CO of the same carrier; and David Pimpo, the Reagan’s supply officer, have all asked to retire. The Navy’s issuance of reprimands does not preclude criminal charges. Secretary Mabus promised to set up an ethical disciplinary process to follow up with Navy officers who are not charged criminally, or whose ethical lapses aren’t addressed directly in criminal proceedings. Navy officials previously indicated that the scandal will grow wider as leads are followed up.

Francis, proprietor of a Malaysian naval resupply and refit firm named Glenn Defense Marine Asia Ltd. pleaded guilty to various corruption charges, having been successfully lured to the U.S. in a San Diego hotel sting, and after finally losing the services of a bribed senior official in the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, who had previously been tipping him off. Francis’s firm aggressively sought Navy business, bribed officials for secret ship movement information and for favorable contracting decisions and overcharged for services. Allegations have been made as well that Francis was effective in changing the schedules and destinations for certain Navy deployments.

Francis has been cooperating in recent weeks, according to the Washington Post.

Francis has agreed to pay back $35 million in money made through the scheme, and awaits sentencing of up to 25 years in prison.

Navy captain Daniel Dusek pleaded guilty to giving Francis secret information in exchange for money, prostitution services and travel services around the Pacific. Dusek was relieved of his relatively new command of the Bonhomme Richard in 2013 when he was first suspected of involvement. Dusek is one of five navy officials to plead guilty, and the most senior so far.

He has admitted to, in at least one instance, to change the movements of a carrier and strike group to ensure that they stopped at Francis’s Port Klang facility in Malaysia.

A couple months before Dusek’s arrest, a former commander of the USS Mustin, Michael Vannak Khem Misiewicz, was arrested for bribery, about the same time that Naval Criminal Investigative Service supervisory agent John Bertrand Beliveau II was arrested.

Misiewicz allegedly attempted reschedule port visits to include Francis’s firms facilities, adopting routes that included Sepangar, Malaysia, and Laem Chebang, Thailand.

Already, several mid-level officers have been found guilty, including one who pleaded guilty only last week.

In documents presented to the court using Francis’s own words, the scheme was designed to “drive the big decks into our fat revenue” facilities.

The US Navy’s Mobile Landing Platform Ships (MLP)

MLP concept

The Montford Point Class Mobile Landing Platform is intended to be a new class and type of auxiliary support ship, as part of the US Navy’s Maritime Prepositioning Force of the Future (MPF-F) program. They’re intended to serve as a transfer station or floating pier at sea, improving the U.S. military’s ability to deliver equipment and cargo from ship to shore when friendly bases are denied, or simply don’t exist. That’s very useful in disaster situations, and equally useful for supporting US Marines once they’re ashore.

It’s an interesting and unusual concept, one closely connected to the au courant concept of “seabasing”. The final MLP design changed substantially from the initial requirements, which lowered the platform’s cost along with its capabilities. Time will tell if the initial choices and tradeoffs were well-conceived or not. With contracts to build the ships underway, the remaining question is whether the ships can be built to meet the more limited promises that are being made now.

US MSC Charters Westpac Express Catamaran

Westpac, Expressin’

The Westpac Express fast ferry ship has been instrumental in changing the way the US Navy approaches sealift in the Western Pacific. It’s fast enough to substitute for airlift in many cases, and large enough to move a Marine battalion with its gear. Early trials went very well, and the innovative designs and performance of Australian shipbuilders Austal and Incat laid a foundation of manufacturing experience and customer comfort that led to the innovative GD/Austal trimaran design for the new Independence Class “Flight 0” Littoral Combat Ship, while spawning a major acquisition program in the Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV).

HSV Westpac Express isn’t a Navy-owned ship; technically, it’s a chartered vessel. In July 2005, we noted an 18-month extension to its charter. In 2006, that service period was extended still further via a new charter, lasting up to 5 years. During that charter’s period, a bankruptcy in Hawaii created an opportunity to buy the Austal-built catamaran Superferry MV Huakai, which will replace Westpac Express in the Pacific. Until then, the USMC needs one more contract extension.