Victoria Class Submarine Fleet Creating Canadian Controversies

SSK-876 HMCS Victoria
HMCS Victoria
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Canada’s aging fleet of Oberon class submarines had become simply too old to put in the water. In July 2000, their de facto retirement became official. The question was: what, if anything, would replace them? With long coastlines, and a significant portion of its iced-in northern seas used as running grounds for foreign submarines, Canada’s military believed that giving up its submarine capability was not a viable option for a country that wished to maintain its sovereignty.

Unfortunately, the country’s purchase of 4 second-hand diesel-electric Upholder Class submarines from Britain ran into controversy almost from its inception. In early 2008, controversy flared again as the submarines’ C$ 1.5 billion Victoria Class In-Service Support Contract (VISSC) became an issue. Subsequent revelations concerning spiraling costs, boats in poor condition, and few to no actual submarines in service have kept the fleet controversial to the present day.

The Victoria Class Program

Victoria Class Cutaway
Victoria Class
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Canada paid about $690 million (C$ 750 million) for the initial purchase, and the submarines were delivered between 2000-2004. Whereupon Canada discovered that key welds needed to be redone, at least one hull dent had to be fixed, some diesel exhaust valves needed replacing, and the British had stored the subs with water in their fuel tanks.

The British had chosen to retire their Upholders rather than upgrade them, so the job of performing the submarine’s first deep refit was left to Canada. Canada also wanted compatibility with its store of Mk48 torpedoes, rather than replacing the weapons with the British Spearfish torpedoes that the subs had been built for. The resulting work included replacing some Upholder systems with fire control devices from the defunct Oberon Class, a decision that was meant to be economical.

It didn’t work out that way. Unsurprisingly, refit and refurbishment costs for the renamed Victoria Class skyrocketed well past the initial GBP C$ 750 million estimate. Beyond the costs involved, the need for refits, and their slow pace have left Canada fielding the equivalent of training submarines for about a decade. At more than one point, problems have left the entire fleet of commission.

Canada’s Navy defines full operational capability as a weapons-ready sub available “in each of the ocean spaces in which we base,” which means the east and west coasts. They’ve yet to field even 1 submarine to that standard, but the program is aiming for FOC by 2013 – more than a decade after the first submarine was delivered.

Bringing HMCS Chicoutimi Home
Taking Chicoutimi home
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The rising importance of the Pacific Rim is causing calls for 2 submarines to be based at CFB Esquimalt. This is not yet reflected in Navy plans, but HMCS Chicoutimi has been shipped to Esquimalt to join HMCS Victoria for repairs, and circumstances placed HMCS Corner Brook there, too.

HMCS Victoria, SSK 876: Commissioned in 2000. Entered her Extended Docking Work Period (EDWP) at Esquimalt, BC in 2005, and was supposed to become operational again by 2009, but wasn’t even undocked until April 18/11. The submarine’s crew are conducting personnel training and exercises, as part of a tiered readiness program. Camber dive took place on Sept 26/11, a torpedo firing test is due in early 2012, and full readiness is expected in 2012. The Navy expects 4 years of service after that, followed by another EDWP. By 2018, the submarine will have had 4 years of full operational capability, 6 years of below-standard readiness, and 8 years of maintenance.

HMCS Windsor, SSK 877: Commissioned in 2003, and has been one of the more active submarines. Sailed from June 2005 – December 2006, and spent 146 days at sea in 2006 alone. The boat participated in a number of large US-Canadian exercises, and trained for special operations capabilities, including the first ever parachute rendezvous at sea practiced with Canada’s Pathfinder paratroopers.

Entered EDWP in 2007 at Fleet Maintenance Facility Cape Scott in Halifax, NS. Will not leave until 2012, and will not be declared fully operational until 2013. That will be followed by 5 years of service, and then a 2-year maintenance period.

HMCS Corner Brook, SSK 878: Commissioned in 2003. Spent 463 out of 1769 days at sea (26%) between October 2006 and mid-June 2011, engaging in various NATO, CAN/US exercises as an “opposing” sub, supporting Operation NANOOK near Baffin Island in August 2007 and August 2009, and Operation CARIBBE around the Caribbean Basin and Eastern Pacific in March 2008 and March 2011.

Corner Brook was taken in for a short maintenance period after deployments in 2008 and 2009, and was expected to become operational again in spring 2010. Unfortunately, she hit the seabed during a training exercise off the BC coast on June 4/11, removing Canada’s only serving submarine. She is currently in an “Extended Limited Maintenance Period at Esquimalt, BC, to be followed by an EDWP from 2013-2015, once Chicoutimi is done. That requirement adds more risk to the timeline, but if all goes well, Corner Brook would become operational again in 2016, then serve 6 more years before her next 2-year maintenance period begins in 2022.

HMCS Chicoutimi, SSK 879: Commissioned in 2004. On Oct 5/04, HMCS Chicoutimi was sailing from Falsane, Scotland when it was disabled by a fire caused by the entry of seawater. One sailor died, 2 others were injured, and the boat had to be rescued by British frigates before being shipped home on a cargo vessel. In response, Canada conducted a full inquiry, and the entire submarine fleet was docked until May 2005.

Chicoutimi was later shipped all the way over to Esquimalt, BC, on the west coast, but she was laid up for over 5 years before the EDWP deep maintenance formally began. It’s supposed to end in 2012, with a return to service due in 2013, but inside sources suggest that serious mistakes at the shipyard may make 2016 a more realistic date. It’s also possible that she may never become a fully operational boat. See Sept 23/11 entry, below.

SHIP SSK-876 HMCS Victoria Dry-Dock CFB Esquimalt
HMCS Victoria
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Even delays to Chicoutimi’s repairs will allow the Canadian Navy to achieve full operational capability in 2013, with HMCS Windsor on the east coast, and HMCS Victoria on the west coast. If they can remain in service until a fully-operational submarine is available to replace them, Canada will finally begin to have the submarine force it was looking for.

The Canadian Navy aren’t the only ones looking forward to having working submarines in the water. The US Navy needs to train against diesel-electric subs, but doesn’t operate any. Canada’s next-door fleet will be an oft-requested partner for naval exercises.

Contractors also have an interest, as a working fleet means a transition from upgrades to support work. The process of awarding that contract began in 2006, but quickly ran into its own set of delays. The Canadian government had finally pushed through a decision on the fleet’s under the Victoria-class In-Service Support Contract (VISSC) in January 2008 – but implementation ran into another lawsuit filed by the losing bidder, as well as strong pressure from a member of the Prime Minister’s own party. Who also happened to be the Canadian Parliament’s recognized authority on its submarines…

The Submarine Support Contract Controversy

SSK-877 HMCS Windsor Alan Rowlands
HMCS Windsor
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The VISSC contract is seen as an important final stage in getting the Victoria Class into active service at last. It was put out for tender in September 2006, and 3 consortia bid. In January 2007, Canadian Submarine Management Group (CSMG) of British Columbia was deemed “most compliant” due to its points rating, and picked as the preferred bidder. A lawsuit by Irving Shipbuilding caused the government to break off negotiations, however, stalling the deal.

In November 2007, it was reported the government might cancel the deal, which represents about 150 of jobs in Victoria over 15 years. That drew outrage from local BC politicians. In January 2008, however, a decision was taken to re-start those negotiations with CSMG to get the deal done. DND spokesman David Martin told the Canadian Press news agency that those negotiations are underway, adding that a final contract was expected in a few months.

The decision reportedly went all the way up to Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s desk. Even so, the signing of that contract faced waters yet again.

Independent-minded Canadian MP Bill Casey of Nova Scotia [Cons - Cumberland Colchester Musquodoboit Valley] is known as the Canadian Parliament’s foremost authority on the Victoria Class submarines, and his investigations began long before the HMCS Chicoutimi incident. He blasted the contract award, noting that HMCS Victoria experienced problems transiting the Panama Canal because the class is not designed to operate in warm waters, and lacks adequate cooling. Barring a sharp speed-up of ice melting that clears the Northwest Passage sooner than expected, or the use of Russia’s Northern Sea Route, a deficiency of that kind would make shuttling the subs between the maintenance yard in British Columbia and their base in Nova Scotia a difficult exercise at best.

On the contractor end, one of the rival groups was led by BAE Systems (Canada) Ltd., and included the politically-connected east coast shipping giant Irving Shipbuilding, whose share of the work has been estimated at 50% if their consortium had won. Irving company Fleetway, Inc. was the 3rd member of this consortium.

Irving Shipbuilding did more than just file a formal protest when the consortium lost – they made a public case about the costs to the taxpayer of shuttling the subs from the Atlantic to the Pacific for maintenance. VP Kevin Hudson called the award a “travesty,” and said that “We are proceeding with our court action and believe our case is very strong.” The firm had already been involved in 2 court actions over this contract.

Other Irving spokespeople called on the government to re-bid the contract.

Irving spokespeople point out that CSMG partner Weir Canada Inc. drew up initial plans for the contract’s statement of work and evaluation criteria, and cite that as “a grave conflict of interest and use of insider knowledge.” The company added that the winning bid failed to meet the necessary requirements, and the total estimated value of the contract’s scope of work was not included in the price evaluation.

For its part, Canada’s Navy was unwilling to re-bid, given delays to date and the needs of its submarine fleet. One “senior defence source” put it bluntly to CP: “Going back out to tender and getting it totally put to bed means three years. We can’t afford that.”

This time, the contract stuck. Irving was out of luck, and the Victoria-class In-Service Support Contract (VISSC) went to Victoria Shipyards in Esquimalt, BC. In addition to fleet maintenance, the contract will also cover Extended Docking Work Period (EDWP) deep refit work to HMCS Chicoutimi and HMCS Corner Brook.

Contracts & Key Events

Windsor and Montreal
Windsor and HMCS Montreal
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April 30/13: Readiness. 3 serviceable boats? Not so fast. CBC News:

“The Royal Canadian Navy has confirmed that HMCS Windsor – fresh from a $209 million refit – is unable to perform as expected because of a broken mission-critical diesel generator…. Windsor will only be able to operate in Canadian coastal waters [on 1 generator] until the diesel generator – a huge 16 cylinder engine – is removed from the submarine and replaced… the navy has been forced to withdraw the sub from planned exercises off the southern U.S. coast.”

That leaves just 1 operational submarine, HMCS Victoria. HMCS Chicoutimi “may become operational” by the end of 2013, but if the warnings in the Sept 23/11 entry are true, it will never be truly operational. HMCS Corner Brook won’t be ready in 2013, and still needs repairs from her 2011 collision with the sea bottom.

April 14/13: Readiness. A Toronto Sun article reports that within a month, HMCS Victoria will be joined in service by 2 more boats. Wasn’t one of those boats supposed to be ready in 2012? After that, the next submarine released from dry dock will be 2015.

The article also points to the rise of submarine fleets all around the Pacific Rim. The question is whether Canada’s submarines have the range and support structure to offer much presence in that theater. Toronto Sun.

July 19/12: Torpedo firing. HMCS Victoria has fired its first actual MK-48 torpedo, sinking a decommissioned ship USNS Concord off of Hawaii during the RIMPAC 2012 exercises. RCN | Ottawa Citizen.

March 19/12: Torpedo firing. HMCS Victoria, Canada’s only active submarine, becomes the 1st ship of class to prove that it can use a weapon. The boat fired a MK48 exercise torpedo in waters off Nanoose Bay, BC.

When Canada elected not to buy the British Spearfish torpedoes along with the submarines, all of the submarines’ torpedo tubes have to be modified, and the fire control systems had to be removed and replaced. HMCS Victoria is said to be the only submarine that has completed those efforts so far. CBC.

Oct 28/11: Faced with rumors that the government intends to follow Denmark’s lead and scrap their submarine force, the Canadian DND releases a full briefing on the Victoria Class boats, their accomplishments, and their maintenance schedules. This information is incorporated above.

The intended message is that the Navy is close to success, with submarines coming up to par in 2012 and 2013. Canada DND.

Oct 27-28/11: Scrap the subs? Defence Minister Peter MacKay is asked whether Canada should scrap its current submarine fleet due to rising costs and non-performance. His answer includes this aside:

“There was a decision taken some time ago to go with diesel electric… But you know, in an ideal world, I know nuclear subs are what’s needed under deep water, deep ice.”

This aside is simple truth for arctic under-ice patrols, and was recognized at the time. Canada’s Liberal Party government decided, for political reasons, that Canada would not operate any nuclear powered vessels. Modern Air-Independent Propulsion systems offer the possibility of limited under-ice patrols by diesel-electric subs, but that wasn’t an option in the 1990s. Hence the Upholder Class buy. Conservative House leader Peter Van Loan moves quickly to quash speculation of an SSN buy with the words: “There is no plan to replace the diesel-electric fleet purchased by the Liberals.” Note, however, that these words could be consistent with scrapping the fleet – and not replacing it at all. CBC | Ottawa Citizen | Vancouver Sun.

Sept 23/11: Chicoutimi. Nova Scotia’s Chronicle Herald reports that government promises of a 2013 return to service by HMCs Chicoutimi in 2013 are untrue/misleading, based on the word of a former submariner aboard that boat:

“When HMCS Victoria was taken to the West Coast, local dockyard workers were told to take out the pieces that needed fixing, he explained in a phone interview. However, the parts were thrown in the garbage. As a result, when Victoria was eventually reactivated, the parts needed to get it operational were taken from Chicoutimi, he said. “Chicoutimi will be nothing more than a harbour training sub,”… The navy may be able to get Chicoutimi running again, the former crew member said. But that would involve stripping parts from HMCS Corner Brook, [which means]… at least 2016 before Chicoutimi would be ready… because there are differences between systems on the two subs, he said.”

He adds that 2/3 of the submarine’s crew have had to be discharged for medical reasons following the fire, and other Canadian submariners have left for civilian jobs – including refit-related jobs at CSMG. He estimates only 80 medically fit submariners remaining, which would only crew 2 slightly under-strength subs, or 1 submarine, with a crew swap ready. If there were any subs to sail, of course.

Sept 4/11: No subs. Canadian media confirm that with HMCS Corner Brook dockside, Canada has no operational submarines. HMCS Corner Brook will be repaired and overhauled during a planned maintenance period, but that will keep it out of service until 2016. Canadian Navy Lt.-Cmdr. Brian Owens said that:

“The navy is focused on HMCS Victoria and HMCS Windsor and returning both to sea in early 2012… Trials are already underway with Victoria in anticipation to her returning to sea.”

Canada has a majority government, so there’s no immediate pressure on the Prime Minister, but it does leave the submarine program exposed if the government decides to step up its deficit-fighting efforts. Denmark faced a similar decision some years ago, and abandoned submarines in favor of a bigger surface navy. Investment in ice-capable ships like their Thetis Class has since strengthened their position in the Arctic, rather than weakening it as some had feared.

No operational subs

June 4/11: Crash. HMCS Corner Brook hits bottom while on a 12-day advanced submarine officer training exercise, under Lt.-Cmdr. Paul Sutherland. There were no major injuries, but it was reportedly Canada’s only operational submarine at the time.

A Board of Inquiry is looking into the incident. Meanwhile, a team of submariners and civilian defence workers at CFB Esquimalt have now begun preparing the vessel for extended maintenance in 2012 – an operation whose costs and duration are not known. Goldstream News Gazette, July 26/11.

HMCS Corner Brook crashes

March 23/11: The US DSCA announces [PDF] Canada’s request for 36 MK-48 Mod 7 Advanced Technology (AT) Torpedo Conversion Kits for their existing MK-48 Mod 4 stocks, plus containers, spare and repair parts, weapon system support & integration, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, and other forms of U.S. Government and contractor support. The estimated cost of the torpedo upgrade is $125 million, but the actual price will be finalized once a contract is signed. That may not happen very soon, as a federal election has just been forced by the minority Conservative Party government’s fall over its proposed budget.

$3.5 million per torpedo does seem rather high for conversion kits, but it is in line with the Netherlands’ July 29/10 DSCA request for the exact same thing. The DSCA states that Canada intends to use the MK 48 7ATs on their Victoria Class diesel submarines, and that no technical issues are expected, as the country already has some torpedoes of this type in stock, has significant experience with the MK 48 Mod 4/4M and MK 46 5A(S)W, and has good infrastructure for maintaining these weapons. All true, but what about the submarines using them? The CASR think tank notes that the original Upholder Class wasn’t designed to work with Mk 48s:

“The Mk 48 Mod 4s are hold-overs from the retired Oberon class SSKs and obsolete by the time Canada bought the Victorias… Royal Navy subs were armed with a completely different torpedo. So the question is why didn’t DND dump the obsolete Mk 48 Mod 4 in favour of the British Spearfish torpedoes that armed the Victorias while they were still Upholder class?… The Submarine Capability Life Extension Project of 1998 was supposed to result in Victoria class subs operational early in 2004. Instead, these SSKs have undergone near-endless refits – HMCS Victoria, for example, has spent nearly 6 years in dry dock with only a little over 100 days on sea trials.”

The question is whether the existing combat systems and other elements of the submarine have been made compatible with the American Mk.48s. Canada has attempted to refit its submarines with some systems taken from the Upholders, to ensure this compatibility. Torpedo firing trials will reveal their success.

DSCA request: Mk48 torpedo upgrades

Feb 23/11: Windsor. A CBC News access to information request reveals that Canada spent C$ 45 million on repairs to HMCS Windsor alone in 2010, almost 3x the C$ 17 million budget. The refit which started in 2007 and was supposed to be done in 2009, bow looks like 2013 at the earliest. The documents also show that HMCS Victoria has only been at sea for 100 days since its 2000 delivery. CBC adds that:

“It appears that every system on the British-built submarine has major problems, according to the documents, including bad welds in the hull, broken torpedo tubes, a faulty rudder and tiles on the side of the sub that continually fall off… Because [HMCS Windsor] has been in drydock in Halifax for so long, it has become a bird sanctuary. The navy spent thousands of dollars just trying to keep the pigeons from roosting in the vessel.”

Dec 23/10: Victoria. Canada’s DND confirms to Post Media that HMCS Victoria’s delivery date following its C$ 195 million refit in Esquimalt, BC has been delayed again, to mid-2011:

“According to the Defence Department, the Victoria is the first of the submarines of its class to undergo such a retrofit and that parts, infrastructure and technical expertise initially were lacking… The valuable lessons learned from HMCS Victoria have proven useful and are being applied to other vessels in the class.”

That would put the submarine in dry dock for about 6 years, and make its re-entry into service about 2 years late. Montreal Gazette.

Nov 5/09: Transparency? No. The CBC reports that despite their freedom of information requests, Canada’s defense department refuses to reveal the cost of carrying HMCS Chicoutimi from Canada’s east coast, through the Panama Canal, and around to Victoria for repairs. Former Nova Scotia MP Bill Casey had estimated that it would cost C$ 16 million, but:

“In a 130-page document released by the Department of National Defence under an access to information request by CBC News, every reference to costs was blacked out. The department said it cannot release the numbers because of third party privacy rules.

…The documents revealed that the Victoria-based company awarded the submarine refit and maintenance contract for the submarines had not finished its preparation to do the work at the time it was given the contract… The documents say the decision to locate the submarine maintenance program on one coast was to enhance efficiencies, streamline maintenance and create a centre of excellence. They state that should offset the cost of the Chicoutimi transfer.”

April 3/09: Chicoutimi. The Victoria Times reports that HMCS Chicoutimi is being carried around to Canada’s west coast, aboard a heavy-lift ship. It will arrive in Victoria during the beginning of May 2009, about 9 months earlier than previously scheduled.

The submarine will be brought directly to shore and placed on a temporary stand, then undergo “essential preservation work” prior to a refit. Meanwhile, HMCS Victoria is currently undergoing work at Esquimalt’s HMC dockyard.

July 3/08: Support. The Government of Canada announces that it has awarded the Victoria Class submarine maintenance contract to the Canadian Submarine Management Group (CSMG) of British Columbia, who were the original winners of the 2006 RFP solicitation.

The 5-year, C$370 million (currently $363 million) contract covers project management oversight to plan and organize the submarine refits; material acquisition; repair and overhaul; engineering services; and provides for scheduled refit and maintenance activities. Subject to continuing satisfactory performance, a number of extension options can be exercised to expand this work to provide for an additional 10 years of submarine fleet support that could bring the contract to a potential total value of C$1.5 billion (currently $1.47 billion). Canadian government release | Reuters.

Maintenance contract awarded

June 18/08: Medical fallout. Tests performed by the National Research Council concluded that significant amounts of carbon monoxide, perdite, and other chemicals were released by the fire, and that it is reasonable to conclude the crew was exposed to carcinogenic material in the smoke. That is hardly surprising; the question is how much carcinogenic material, what the future risks may be, and whether there may be other health consequences.

The NRC report adds that It also states that any long-term health effects would probably manifest within hours or days after exposure to a 1-time event, which usually has a minimal cancer risk. At the briefing, Cmdr. Jeff Agnew said the report shows the chances of long-term health effects of inhaling smoke from the fire are “slim to none… But you can never say never.” The Canadian Forces recommends periodic monitoring of the submarine’s crew members.

Media reports do not appear to address the issue of subsequent health complaints by submarine crew members, except to note them. Canwest News | CTV | UPI

June 17/08: Medical fallout. After the HMCS Chicoutimi’s fire in October 2004, many of the submarine’s 55-member crew had to breathe in the smoke and live in the ash for days as a mater of course, as they struggled to save and return their stricken submarine. Since that date, some of the crew members have reported breathing troubles and variety of neurological disorders. claims to Veteran’s Affairs have been held up, or even rejected due to lack of information.

A report covering exactly what the sailors were exposed to was expected in the 2005 board of inquiry, but the tests were not completed until just recently. The Canadian Press news service reports that a briefing on the subject is scheduled for June 18/08 in Halifax, involving Canadian vice-admiral Drew Robertson.

June 4/08: Just 1. A Minister’s briefing that admits Canada will have just one operational submarine until 2009, in order to cover 3 oceans and one of the world’s longest coast lines, has put the Victoria Class submarine program back in the spotlight. Th briefing reportedly states that:

“If pressed on submarine availability [the Minister should focus on] a maintenance regime that plans for at least one submarine to be available for operations until steady state is achieved in late 2009, after which two or more submarines will usually be operational and available at all times… and to repair Chicoutimi as part of that submarine’s already scheduled maintenance period in 2010-2012.”

A return to service in 2012 would b 2 years later than originally planned, and involve a total sideline period of about 8 years. CanWest News | CTV | Victoria Times | UPI

Additional Readings & Sources: The Victoria Class

Additional Readings: News & Events

Categories: BAE, Canada, Contracts - Intent, Issues - Political, Legal, Lobbying, Other Corporation, Submarines, Support & Maintenance

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