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Land-based SM-3 concept
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In July 2008, Aviation Week reported that the US Missile Defense Agency was considering a land-based variant of the SM-3 Standard missile – largely due to specific requests from Israel.

Israel currently fields the medium range Arrow-2 land-based ABM system, supplemented by Patriot missiles for point defense. The Arrow has performed well in tests, however, and an order for more was placed as recently as February 2008. What could Israel’s rationale be?

DID discusses some possible rationales, and also discusses developments. Which includes a big role for land-based SM-3s in the USA’s future missile defense architecture…

• The SM-3 Option [NEW]
• Israel’s Possible Rationales [updated]
• Updates and Developments [updated]

The SM-3 Option

SM-3 seeker: target!
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With a maximum range of about 300 miles/ 500 km, the Standard Missile 3 Block I (SM-3) has a longer range than mobile options like THAAD. SM-3 has 4 stages. The booster motor and initial stage launch the missile, and take it out of the atmosphere. Once it goes “exo-atmospheric,” the 3rd stage is used to boost the missile higher, and also corrects its course by referencing GPS/ INS locations.The final stage is the LEAP kill vehicle, which uses infrared sensors to pick out the target, and guides itself to ram it. That target is expected to be an enemy ballistic missile, but America’s shoot-down of its own ailing satellite showed that the same technology can also be used against low earth orbit objects.

The introduction of the SM-3 Block II variant,which increases missile diameter from 13.5” to 21”, will extend the missile’s range even further, while increasing speed to boost the its effective range against fast-moving incoming missiles. It is currently expected to debut circa 2015, and at present the program is on schedule.

A land-based SM-3 option is likely to be attractive to several countries. Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic, whose geographic location and land mass cannot be properly defended by naval SM-3 Block 1s, and would require many THAAD batteries for proper coverage, are currently slated to begin receiving meaningful missile defense via land-based SM-3s around 2015. Even SM-3 Block 1s can be useful from land bases, but the Block II weapon will add the ability to handle longer-range, higher-flying IRBM, and even give them some capability against global-strike missiles like ICBMs.

In the Pacific, Japan is already deploying SM-3s at sea, and may find land-based counterparts useful. Its neighbor South Korea also worries about North Korea’s evil and semi-stable regime; the ROK has stated an interest in loading shorter range SM-2 Block IV variants on its AEGIS destroyers, is buying and deploying Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ missiles, and has contracted with Israel for “Green Pine” air and missile defense radars. Its KDX-III AEGIS destroyers could be modified for a ballistic missile defense role, but land-based SM-3s linked to air and naval systems offer an option that doesn’t require naval upgrades.

The other country that’s linked to land-based SM-3s has a more complicated set of choices, and possible rationales.

Israel’s Possible Rationales

Arrow test concept
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Statements from Raytheon indicate that Israel is already doing research into a land-based SM-3, despite its existing Patriot PAC-2 GEM+ and Arrow-2 architecture. Several possibilities exist that would justify Israel’s retention of an active Arrow missile program, and still deploy the SM-3s.

One is the naval defense option. While Israel has apparently decided on a different direction, its proposed LCS-I frigates would have possessed the ability to fire SM-3 missiles, and their proposed MEKO derivatives might still have it if they’re equipped with strike-length Mk. 41 VLS launchers.

The second revolves around linkage and command-and-control developments. Like the LCS-I, any new Israeli frigates would need to link to an anti-ballistic capable radar for guidance. Israel already fields ABM-capable land radars like its “Green Pine” system, and the USA has reportedly moved manned AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars into Israel as additional insurance. Linkage of a naval missile’s guidance to those kinds of land platforms would involve many of the same modifications required by a fully land-launched and controlled SM-3, and statements by America’s General Cartwright say that the USA’s land-based anti-missile command and control systems that will work with land-based SM-3s are being developed to include the Arrow as well.

Third is range. The SM-3 boasts a range about 5x longer than the Arrow-2, at 300 miles vs. 50-60 miles. A tripartite system of SM-3, Arrow-2, and Patriot missiles would effectively cover the 3 layered tiers required by a country Israel’s size: national defense/ first line of defense, defense of key regions/ second shot, and defense of specific sites/ final attempt.

Fourth, deployment would coincide with a growing shift in the USA to focus on “ascent-phase intercept” of medium (MRBM) and intermediate-range (IRBM) missiles. If the launchers are deployed close enough to the firing missile, interceptions become possible some time between the boost and mid-course phases during the entry into space, right before the target missile can begin deploying decoys. The Middle East’s compressed distances are a threat, due to low warning times and the resulting hair-triggers, but might also be an opportunity with sufficiently capable defensive missiles.

Finally, the SM-3 is an active production item for the USA and Japan, which leverages the infrustrature created by a large-scale, full-rate production set of programs. This means that SM-3s can be produced far faster than additional Arrow missiles. If developments in Iran are leading Israel to conclude that it needs to deploy many more theater-range defensive missiles within a short period of time, the THAAD and Arrow-2 programs are unlikely to be able to handle that request due to the stage they’re at, and the industrial framework around them. That leaves the SM-3 as Israel’s only realistic rapid plus-up option.

Time will tell whether this remains a mere research subject, or becomes an active buy for the Israelis. Israel’s maintenance of its focus on an improved “Arrow-3” interceptor, and American agreement to support it in the FY 2010 budget, probably dim the SM-3’s chances in Israel.

Updates and Developments

SM-3 Evolution:
next step, land?
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Nov 17/09: Northrop Grumman announces a 3-month $4.7 million task order from the US Missile Defense Agency, under an indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity Joint National Integration Center Research and Development Contract. Under the Sept 29/09 task order, the firm will help the MDA integrate and demonstrate an early-intercept capability using existing SM-3 and GBI missiles. This kind of capability is especially relevant for forward-based SM-3s.

The Early Intercept effort aims to address renewed focus by the U.S. Department of Defense on dealing with large raids and countermeasures. Early Intercept will demonstrate an integrated architecture of early warning sensors, including space, airborne, land and sea; regional fire control and battle manager systems; and secure communications. This integrated architecture will enable current systems to engage threats earlier in the battle space to improve protection against large raids and facilitate “shoot-look-shoot” opportunities.

Northrop Grumman will begin by assessing existing sensor and battle management systems’ ability to support missile interception in the difficult boost phase, including technology developed for programs like the now-canceled Kinetic Energy Interceptor and battle management projects. The firm will plan demonstration experiments, leading toward the design and development of an experimental, plug-and-play architecture for battle management, command and control.

Sept 17/09: The Obama administration announces revised plans for its European missile defense architecture. Instead of positioning Boeing’s Ground-Based Interceptors, which could intercept even the longest-range ballistic missiles, they choose an architecture based around the SM-3.

According to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, the new plan begins with the current deployment of Patriot PAC-3 point defense systems in Europe, which may be adjusted. Those adjustments will bear watching, as early indicators of seriousness.

• In 2011, the US Navy is expected to have naval SM-3 Block 1A missiles and ships fully in place, on an expanded fleet of BMD-capable ships versus the 2 Atlantic Fleet destroyers available today. Unfortunately, naval SM-3 Block 1 missiles cannot cover the Czech Republic at all, and can offer only limited coverage for Poland. This will be the only option until 2015, which is beyond the Obama administration’s current term of office.

• 2015 would see progress on 2 fronts. One is SM-3 Block 1B missiles, and an improved AEGIS BMD system that will expand the range of coverage for American ships. The other would be land-based SM-3s in an easily-deployable configuration, based in Europe, instead of the longer-range Boeing Ground Based Interceptors. Political support for the land-based deployment is likely to be a political flash point again.

• The final iteration would take place in 2018 or so, with deployment of the much larger SM-3 Block II missile, on ships and (if deployments have been accepted) on shore. Gen. Cartwright stated that no more than 3 SM-3 Block II locations would be able to cover all of Europe, but cautions that it’s an earlier-stage R&D effort, with all the expected implications for dates and certainty of capabilities.

Cartwright and Gates also added several additional considerations that affected their decision. One was Russian concerns about having large X-band BMD radars that could peer deeply into Russia, and more significantly their concern that the GBI missile was powerful enough to be fitted with a nuclear warhead, and become an offensive MRBM with very low warning time. American denials did little to dissuade the Russians of this belief, but the concept becomes technically ridiculous with an SM-3. By using shorter-range, directional TPY-2 radars deployed in the Caucasus, Iranian aggression can also be hedged without covering Russia – something that allies like Poland may not necessarily see as a plus.

Another issue was cost and flexibility. Gen. Cartwright cited a cost-per-missile of $3.3 million for a Patriot PAC-3, about $9 million for THAAD v1, $9.5-10 million for SM-3 Block I, about $13-15 million estimated for SM-3 Block II… and $70 million for the GBI interceptors. In a global environment that was seeing rapid growth of medium-range offensive missiles, that cost disparity had implications for strategic flexibility, as well as budgets. According to Gates and Cartwright, the GBI deployment was really designed to deal with 3-5 incoming intercontinental missiles, rather than larger salvos of medium-range missiles that are now possible. GBI is also silo-based and so immobile, as opposed to mobile ships and redeployable land-based SM-3s. The question is whether the USA will actually increase its planned buys of SM-3 in response, something that Information Dissemination’s report suggests hasn’t really been thought through yet. The US Navy’s next 5-year budget plan will tell the tale.

With that cost and architecture change comes a 3rd consideration: greater capacity for allied burden-sharing. Several other nations deploy and will deploy AEGIS ships that could be upgraded to SM-3 BMD capability, including Japan (Kongo class, being upgraded), South Korea (KDX-III), Spain and Australia (F100), plus the non-AEGIS F124 frigates fielded by Germany and the Netherlands. The SM-3 missile has already been exported, and could easily be exported more widely. Gen. Cartwright cited the potential for development of a common architecture linking land and naval systems, which would be deployed in Europe, Asia, Israel, and elsewhere. The architecture is being developed to incorporate non-American systems, and Israel’s IAI/Boeing Arrow was specifically cited. Gates added that talks along these lines had begun with Arab Gulf states, who are already developing their own missile defense preparations based on regional command and control systems, Patriot missiles, and possibly THAAD and MBDA’s comparable Aster-30 SAMP/Ts.

Meanwhile, THAAD missiles are still scheduled to deploy to Europe in 2009, as part of operational testing, and the system is still planned for roll-out as the Army’s area-defense weapon. The USA is also still interested in adding 2-stage capability to its GMD/GBI interceptors in Alaska and California, in order to improve their speed and increase their range. The big winner in these changes, however, is unquestionably Raytheon’s SM-3. Pentagon: Gates/ Cartwright press conference | Pentagon: DoD/ Czech MoD press conference | Aviation Week | Aviation Week Ares | Defense Tech called it early | Information Dissemination | Lexington Institute.

August 18/09: In a presentation at the 2009 Space and Missile Defense Conference & Exhibition in Huntsville, AL, Raytheon announces that it is developing a land-based system SM-3 system that would work with THAAD’s Raytheon-made AN/TPY-2 long range radar, and could be ready as early as 2013.

The presentation states that this solution could provide Israel a near-term solution to counter ballistic missiles from Iran, given the deployment of TPY-2 radars in Israel by the US government. It is also reportedly under consideration for use in Europe as the missile component of planned deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.

It’s no accident that this comes just as Boeing announces a “mobile GMD” proposal for Europe by 2015, and Lockheed Martin has gone farther by submitting a modified THAAD proposal to the US Missile Defense Agency for consideration in the 2011 budget. Lockheed Martin has already invested privately funded R&D into a 21” wide THAAD variant that would nearly double the Army interceptor missile’s range. Current SM-3s are 13.5” in diameter, current THAADs are 14.5”, and the proposed SM-3 Block II being developed in partnership with Japan will also be 21” in diameter. It would appear that a competition for the forward-deployed theater defense role may be brewing. Arutz Sheva | Reuters | Aviation Week re: shifts in doctrine | Aviation Week re: THAAD | Jerusalem Post re: Boeing’s “mobile GBI”.

April 27/09: Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun reports that the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has started studying a new missile defense system capable of launching the Standard Missile-3 from the ground.

Aug 4/09: Colin Clark of DOD Buzz publishes a short video interview with Raytheon VP of advanced missile defense and directed energy Mike Booen. The interview took place at the 2009 Paris Air Show, and the topic is the $50 million FY 2010 US military budget request to study land-based SM-3 deployment.

July 17/08: Aviation Week reports that the US Missile Defense Agency is considering a land-based variant of the SM-3 Standard missile, at Israel’s request:

“SM-3 prime contractor Raytheon is examining a range of options—including a moveable, but not highly mobile, system that could fill Israel’s needs. Very few modifications would be needed for the missile and some tweaks would be required in the command and control system. The system would employ the same vertical launch modules, in an eight-pack configuration, used in the Aegis ship-based system.”