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F136 Prototype
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In January 2006, DID ran “Reports: Cuts on the way to F-35 JSF R&D, Engine Programs,” covering Pentagon attempts to remove FY 2007 funding from the F-35 Lightning II’s second engine option, the GE/ Rolls Royce F136. As DID predicted, protests from fellow Tier 1 partner Britain followed at the highest levels of government. Many in the US Congress, meanwhile, were openly skeptical of handing Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engine the keys to the entire F-35 fleet. In the end, the Pentagon’s “program risk with the F135 is so low that R&D spending on F136 development is a waste” argument failed. Congress re-inserted funding to the tune of $340 million, and F136 development has continued on schedule.

Fast forward to the FY 2008 budget, now that key partners like Britain have committed to the F-35 Production MoU. For the second year in a row, the Pentagon has removed funding for the GE/RR F136. The USAF argues that killing the F136 would free up $1.8 billion. GE is counter-arguing on the basis of sunk costs to date, which is weak. Former Senate Armed Services Committee chair Sen. John Warner [R-VA], however, is counter-arguing on the basis of sole-sourcing’s effects on the total cost of the engines and their maintenance over the F-35 family’s lifespan….

Given the positive results from dual-sourcing the P&W F100 and GE F110 engines for the global F-16 (and now F-15) fleets, and the appeal of district jobs, the Pentagon would appear to have an uphill battle on its hands. They appear to be willing to try, however, which means the F136 will need another resurrection. See DID’s previous coverage, and Inside Defense’s recent article, for more information and background.

UPDATES:

From Top: F-35A, C, B
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Feb 13/08: GE and Rolls Royce announce “GE/RR F136 Jet Engine Passes Critical Design Review.”

March 22/07: The US Government Accountability Office releases report #GAO-07-656T: “Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program” An excerpt:

“Continuing the alternate engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter would cost significantly more than a sole-source program but could, in the long run, reduce costs and bring other benefits. The current estimated life cycle cost for the JSF engine program under a sole-source scenario is $53.4 billion. To ensure competition by continuing to implement the JSF alternate engine program, an additional investment of $3.6 billion to $4.5 billion may be required. However, the associated competitive pressures from this strategy could result in savings equal to or exceeding that amount. The cost analysis we performed suggests that a savings of 10.3 to 12.3 percent would recoup that investment, and actual experience from past engine competitions suggests that it is reasonable to assume that competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that much. In addition, DOD-commissioned reports and other officials have said that nonfinancial benefits in terms of better engine performance and reliability, improved industrial base stability, and more responsive contractors are more likely outcomes under a competitive environment than under a sole-source strategy. DOD experience with other aircraft engine programs, including the F-16 fighter in the 1980s, has shown competitive pressures can generate financial benefits of up to 20 percent during the life cycle of an engine program and/or improved quality and other benefits. The potential for cost savings and performance improvements, along with the impact the engine program could have on the industrial base, underscores the importance and long-term implications of DOD decision making with regard to the final acquisition strategy solution.”

The USAF’s hill just became a bit steeper.