In January 2006, “Reports: Cuts on the way to F-35 JSF R&D, Engine Programs” covered Pentagon attempts to remove FY 2007 funding from the F-35 Lightning II’s second engine option, the GE/ Rolls Royce F136. As predicted, protests from fellow Tier 1 partner Britain followed at the highest levels of government. Many in the US Congress, meanwhile, were openly skeptical of handing Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engine the keys to the entire F-35 fleet. In the end, the Pentagon’s argument that low program risk made R&D spending on F136 development a waste, failed. Congress re-inserted funding, and F136 development has continued on schedule.

Fast forward to the FY 2008 budget. For the second year in a row, the Pentagon removed funding for the GE/RR F136, arguing that killing the F136 would free up $1.8 billion. Politicians disagreed, and the USA’s GAO auditors backed them up. Funding was reinstated. Again. So far, that process has been repeated every year. Now it’s 2009, and the 2010 budget is in progress. Once again, the USAF is trying to kill the F136.

This time, there’s lukewarm Senate support for the Pentagon – but strong House of Representatives opposition, which was recently reiterated as cost estimates for the incumbent F135 engine rise 24%, and reports of other issues surface. The latest developments include reinsated funding in the signed FY 2010 defense budget, and the need for a minor engine part redesign by the F136 team after a testing failure…

• The F136 Program
• The F136: Detractors and Defenders
• Updates and Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings

The F136 Program

As of September 2009, GE Aircraft Engines says that the F136 has attracted about $2.5 billion in allocated funding to date, including $50 million in private funding from GE and Rolls Royce.

Pratt & Whitney’s F135, which received a head start on development thanks to a $4.8 billion System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract on Oct 26/01, has received over $1 billion in additional funding plus-ups since. It is already powering F-35 test aircraft, and will equip initial American production models as the sole-source engine until the F136 is ready.

The F136 is at an earlier stage; development was launched in earnest by a $2.47 billion SDD contract in August 2005, after almost $600 million in pre-SDD funding. The first complete new-build F136 engine began testing earlier in 2009. If all goes well, the first production F136s would be available in 2012. The project is said to be on schedule at the moment, but additional engine costs and rework are always a risk once stress testing begins in earnest.

F-35 fighter production is scheduled to step up considerably in 2010, but the planes’ SDD phase and associated testing isn’t expected to be complete before 2014, well after production deliveries have begun. The F-35B STOVL with Rolls Royce’s lift fan system will be the first variant to become operational, followed by the standard F-35A and then the carrier-borne F-35C. While earlier is certainly better from an economic point of view, the F136 definitely wants to be ready in time for testing during the end of the F-35’s SDD phase. The other influential date for the F136 team is 2015 or so, when Britain’s 65,000t HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier, which is expected to carry F136-equipped F-35Bs, is currently scheduled for delivery.

F136 engine development is being led by GE Aviation in Evendale, OH near Cincinnati suburb; and by Rolls-Royce in Indianapolis, IN. GE Aviation is responsibility for 60% of the F136 program, developing the core compressor, coupled high-pressure/low-pressure turbine system components, controls and accessories, and the augmentor. Rolls-Royce is responsible for 40% including the front fan, combustor, stages 2 and 3 of the low-pressure turbine, and gearboxes. International participant countries are also contributing to the F136 through involvement in engine development and component manufacturing.

Rolls Royce’s LiftSystem fan for the F-35B STOVL will be common to F135 and F136 engines.

The F136: Detractors and Defenders

The Pentagon’s argument for canceling the F136 boils down to 2 main pillars. One is that the F135’s derivation from the F-22A Raptor’s F119 engine reduces its development risks. The second contention is that The F135 is working well, which means any funds given to the F136 subtract from the total number of fighters in the F-35 program.

The Lockheed F-16, which currently flies with either P&W’s F100 or GE’s F110 engines, is an illustrative example of how a dual-source engine program can work. In program terms the F110 was introduced even later, fully 4 years after F-16s with P&W’s F100 began front-line operations in USAF units. Nevertheless, the strategy was a success. It created more competition, sustained the American industrial base by leveraging a popular fighter program in 2 ways, and led to a raft of technology improvements, from higher thrust engines to maintenance improvements. With 2 competitors available for American and foreign buys, each knows that complacency would lead to rapid replacement as the F-16’s engine of choice. Although the P&W F100 was the F-16’s original engine, and is still chosen by some foreign customers, GE’s F110 currently powers over 80% of USAF F-16 fleet.

Competition is even bleeding into the F-15 program. F-15s almost all carry variants of the F100, though some of Saudi Arabia’s F-15S and Korea’s F-15Ks, and all of Singapore’s F-15SGs, are breaking that mold by selecting GE’s F110.

Given the positive maintenance and performance results from dual-sourcing the P&W F100 and GE F110 engines for the global F-16 and F-15 fleets, and the appeal of district jobs, the Pentagon has had an uphill battle on its hands in Congress. They remain willing to try, however, which means the F136 engine keeps requiring resurrection.

Those efforts have been helped by support from the US Congress’ Government Accountability Office, whose auditors have consistently supported the long term financial and operational benefits of a dual-engines program. In 2007, they estimated that sole-source lifecycle cost for the entire F-35 engine program at $53.4 billion, while the alternate engine program would require another $3.6 – $4.5 billion. They believe that actual experience from past engine competitions suggests that it is reasonable to assume savings of at least that much, while improving contractor and engine performance, and acting as a hedge against fleet-wide risk.

The F136 has also enjoyed bipartisan support from Armed Services committee members.

One consequence of a single-engine program would be a major win for United Technologies, as it would be the engine supplier for the backbone of the US tactical fighter fleet and a potential export star. They would also inherit a very lucrative aftermarket of spare parts and support lasting until 2050 at least, and possibly beyond. Back on Feb 5/07, Senate Armed Services Committee chair Sen. John Warner (R-VA) grilled Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Pentagon Comptroller Tina Jonas over concerned that eliminating the F136 would be the equivalent of handing Pratt & Whitney sole engine development right:

“If we have but a single engine, then we’re in effect giving a sole-source contract to one contractor, which could amount to $100 billion…. I’ve calculated that out. It’s extraordinary.”

In 2009, House Armed Service Air-Land Subcommittee chair Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) added the fleet reliability issue, stating that it simply was not prudent to have 80-90% of the USAF, Navy and Marine Corps’ fighter fleet dependent on one engine type, from one manufacturer, which can ground all of those fleets if mechanical flaws or difficulties surface.

Other long term issues arise as politicians debate the merits of a dual-sourcing program. The Lexington Institute believes that GE probably would exit the tactical engine business at that point, in line with its famous ”#1, #2, or gone” approach. While GE would still have the contract for the F414 engine in the Navy’s F/A-18 Super Hornets and Saab’s JAS-39NG, it would have no toehold in the future fighter market. Under those circumstances, a spinoff and sale of its fighter engine assets to focus on helicopter and commercial engines would not be unthinkable.

Then there are the potential consequences for the JSF program as a whole. Britain has invested $2 billion in the F-35 as the only other Tier One partner, and the participation of Rolls Royce with GE in the aircraft’s F136 engine is an important industrial spinoff. The UK’s F-35 participation has been questioned and technology transfer issues. Budget issues remain a threat to the program as a whole, and the question of related industrial spinoffs remains part of Parliament’s concerns.

The Dutch are also involved in F136 production, even as that Tier 2 partner considers alternative platforms like the JAS-39NG. Nedtech and DutchAero (formerly Philips Aerospace) have contracts with Rolls Royce for F136 backup motors and blisks, while Stork-Rheinmetall has testing contracts, and is leveraging its strong expertise in fan blades.

Dealing a serious blow to the program’s industrial spinoff potential for the UK would create risks for the program as a whole, especially with Britain facing a serious budget crisis in the wake of 2009’s Great Recession. Dutch involvement in the F136 is far smaller, but until production orders are placed, anything that might tip the balance against the F-35 requires sober second thought.

Updates and Key Events

Nov 2/09: GE and Rolls Royce announce that they will redesign a diffuser that directs air into the combustor for the engin, after a nut came loose during testing.

Rick Kennedy, a GE spokesman, tells Reuters the companies expects to have the reworked F136 engine “up and running before the end of the year.” He also disputes a comparison of the F135 and F136 engines at similar life-cycle stages, published by Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute. Reuters.

Oct 28/09: President Obama signs the FY 2010 defense budget into law. That budget provides full funding for 30 F-35 aircraft (16 USMC F-35Bs, 12 USAF F-35As, and 4 Navy F-35Cs), and continues the F136 alternate engine program. White House | Cincinnati Business Courier.

Oct 6/09: House and Senate conferees rejected the approach taken by US Secretary of Defense Gates and the Obama administration, and fully funded the F136 in the reconciled FY 2010 defense budget. Military.com reports that:

“The authorization conferees agreed to fund the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter F136 alternate engine at $560 million, with no restriction or certification requirements – House and Senate related provisions (H 218 & 242; S 211) dropped. The conferees also agreed to fully fund the $6 billion requested for procurement of 30 F-35 aircraft, which includes 16 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps and 4 F-35Cs for the Navy and 10 F-35As for the Air Force. The conference report is expected to be taken up in the House [on Oct 7/09].”

Looks like Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee chair Sen. Inouye [D-HI] knew what he was doing (q.v. Sept 9/09 entry). See also Aviaiton Week’s article: “
Levin Happy to Lose on Alternate JSF Engine.”

Sept 15/09: Pratt & Whitney responds with an offer of its own:

“Pratt & Whitney has offered to provide the F-35 Joint Program Office with a firm fixed price proposal for the F135 engine if requested…. [Meanwhile,] The company’s F135 engine Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 4 contract proposal reflects confidence in the aggressive cost reductions actions underway by providing the Joint Program Office special protections against cost growth and incentives for significant cost reduction….

Pratt & Whitney’s LRIP 4 contract proposal covers production, sustainment, spare parts and engineering support for 37 F135 engines, consisting of 20 conventional take-off and landing (CTOL)/carrier variant (CV) and 17 short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL) engines for F-35 aircraft. The same methodology that Pratt & Whitney and the U.S. Government used to achieve a 30 percent cost reduction on the F119 engine is being employed on the F135 engine.”

There are 2 likely reactions to this announcement. One will say that the fixed-price offer makes sole-sourcing the F135 much less risky, and argue that sole sourcing should proceed. The other will note that the proposal was prompted by a competitive offer, and say that rather than being an argument against the dual-engine program, the F135 fixed-price offer serves as an excellent illustration of dual-sourcing’s benefits and importance.

Sept 14/09: GE and Rolls Royce put out a release, offering a fixed price F136 engine, fleshing out Rep Driehaus’ [D-OH-1] statement in the April 23/09 entry:

“In response to cost overruns and schedule delays in major weapon programs, The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 was signed into law to mandate competition through the entire life of major defense programs – including funding competing sources. To drive head-to-head engine competition and predictable costs, the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team has submitted an unsolicited fixed-price contracting approach [emphasis DID’s] for the JSF program office – a unique approach for the early production years of the JSF F136 engines.

The approach covers initial F136 engine production, beginning with the F136 second production lot, shifting significant cost risk from taxpayers to the Fighter Engine Team until head-to-head competition begins between the F136 and the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine in 2013…. The financial risk for early production engine lots would be shared between the government (which manages the engine configuration) and the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team (which is responsible for the engine program execution). “

The release also reminds readers that Pratt & Whitney’s F135 contract is reimbursed as “cost plus” an agreed percentage, while citing House Armed Service Committee figures that place F135 development $1.9 billion over plan since 2002, with a 47% rise in per-engine costs.

Sept 13/09: Aviation Week Ares reports that an F135 engine had been damaged and shut down about 2,455 cycles into a 2,600-cycle durability ground test. The precise cause remains under investigation, and there is a possibility of loose objects in the damaged engine. Damaged components included the integrally bladed rotors of the 1st and 2nd fan stages, and the compressor. A subsequent Sept 18/09 report from Military.com questions subsequent characterizations of the problems as minor:

“The investigation found that a worn bushing is the “potential cause, which tells us this issue can be addressed with little or no impact on cost or schedule.” But a congressional aide, told of Pratt’s comments, dismissed them, saying that…. a Sept. 14 Pentagon fact sheet about the incident says that the engine damage was “significant.”... [The] aide also noted that this is the third failure the F135 has experienced, adding that caution is warranted given that significant problems with the F100 engine that powers most F-15s and F-16s “didn’t really show themselves until two years after initial operational capability.” The OSD document says that “an approximately 1 inch by 1.5 inch piece separated from a blade on Rotor 1 of the fan. At the time the separation occurred, High Cycle Fatigue sweep tests were being conducted, but high loads at this location on the fan blade were not expected.”

This was a new F135 IBR design, intended to succeed the already-tested first-generation design that currently flies on the F-35 test fleet.

Sept 9/09: Military.com reports that the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee’s markup of the FY 2010 defense spending bill contained no F136 money, which is surprising because its chair Sen. Inouye [D-HI] has always been a supporter:

“After the subcommittee’s brief markup of the bill Wednesday morning, Inouye had quite a twinkle in his eye when he told several reporters that the engine was now a matter for conference and acknowledged that he worried about a fight on the Senate floor over the engine’s funding if the money had been n the defense appropriations bill. Making it a matter for conference may well ensure that the engine funding has a smoother sail than it would have if Inouye had included it in his bill.

General Electric and Rolls Royce made it very clear that they are not worried about the engine’s fate. “There is strong and broad support for an engine competition for the Joint Strike Fighter. In fact, both Inouye and (Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee) Ranking Member Cochran, along with a number of the members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, are longtime supporters of the F136 engine. In addition, the competitive engine received strong endorsement in the House on an overwhelming 400-30 vote,” said GE spokesman Rick Kennedy in an email headed “Joint GE/RR statement.”

Aug 31/09: At a press conference, Secretary of Defense Gates explains his case for the F135 as the global F-35 fleet’s sole engine:

“First of all, we have looked at the business case a number of times in terms of an alternative engine to the F135. The general conclusion is that it would cost several billion dollars in addition; that it would, just by the nature of things, be three or four or more years behind the F135 engine. And there’s no reason to believe that it would not encounter the same kinds of development challenges that other new engines have encountered along the way.

And so at this point, where we’re trying to count every dollar and where a dollar from one program – added to one program takes away from another program that we think is more important, we feel strongly about the fact that there is not a need for a second engine….The final decision [on a veto], obviously, is up to the president…. every dollar additional to the budget that we have to put into the F-35 is a dollar taken from something else that the troops may need. So it’s as important to watch the costs here as it is on everything else.”

Readers may note that while Gates’ rationale revolves around immediate costs, it does not address the issues of long-term costs, fleet readiness, and allied participation that have been raised elsewhere. Full transcript | Pentagon AFPS article.

Aug 28/09: Aviation Week Ares hosts a guest article by USMC Lt. Gen. Michael A Hough
(Retired):

“As the former Director/ Deputy Director of the Joint Strike Fighter Program (1997-2001) and Deputy Commandant of Aviation (2002-2006), I have watched with disappointment over the last few months as those advocates of sole-sourcing the F-35 with only the Pratt & Whitney engine have attempted to spin a tale of myth and innuendo to deliberately muddy the waters around the issue of the competition of the engine for the F-35. Let me set the record straight…”

Aug 24/09: Military.com reports that the JSF program manager has been ordered not to discuss issues with Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engine:

”...source with access to Joint Strike Fighter officials says that Marine Maj. Gen. David Heinz, PEO for the program, was recently called onto the carpet by Defense Secretary Gates. The message: stop talking about problems with the Pratt & Whitney engine and how second engine programs have proved themselves in the past. “They have hammered Heinz to say nothing more about this,” our source says.”

Aug 24/09: The right-wing Heritage Foundation maintains its support for the F136 project in “Why Congress Cares About Engine Competition for the Joint Strike Fighter”:

“Should Congress fail to fund the alternate engine, there will be only one type of engine available for a plane – the JSF – that will constitute 90 percent of all U.S. fighters in 2035. Because it is a single-engine plane as opposed to dual-engine, if something goes wrong with the engine, it could lead to a system-wide grounding of every aircraft until the problem is identified and fixed—unless there is an alternative available. Such a scenario constitutes an unacceptably high risk. Further, Congress just passed a new acquisition reform law that demands competition for all major subsystems – including fighter engines. Consequently, Congress must keep JSF alternate engine funds intact when the final defense bills are signed into law later this year.”

Aug 12/09: Congressional Quarterly reports that Senate Appropriations Committee chair Daniel Inouye [D-HI] is holding firm on support for the F136, even against a veto threat. He’ll be joined by House Appropriation Committee chair Jack Murtha [D-PA], whose amendment stripped F-22 funding from the final House defense bill:

“Inouye’s refusal to back down from his support of a two-engine program is noteworthy, given that he relented in his support of the F-22 fighter jet under circumstances similar to those at play on the F-35 engines.”

Aug 3/09: Aviation Week DTI reports that the F-35’s Joint Project Office raised its estimate total program costs, because Pratt & Whitney is not achieving the projected learning curve for F135 engine production. Tolerance and yield issues with manufacturing parts have raised the estimated average cost from $ 6.7 – $8.3 million (24%).

July 30/09: The US House passes its “H.R. 3326: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010” by a crushing 400-30 vote. The bill contains a number of provisions that challenge official Pentagon decisions, including $560 million of continued funding for the F136 alternate engine program.

As House members prepare for negotiations with the Senate on a single, final bill to send to the President, the contrast between the overwhelming recorded House vote, and the Senate voice vote, leaves the F136 in a very strong position. See also: GE/Rolls Royce release | Cincinnati.com | Cincinnati Business Courier | Flight International.

July 28/09: Military.com’s DoD Buzz reports that:

“In other JSF news, the program’s top officer, Marine Brig. Gen. David Heinz, took Pratt and Whitney to task for quality control problems with its F-135 engine that have resulted in up to 50 percent of parts being thrown away because they do not meet the high standards required by the JSF program. “I am pushing very hard on Pratt to do better,” Heinz told me when I asked him about cost increases in the engine program. He said he expects Heinz to improve to the point where 80 percent of parts meet his standards…. Heinz would not be drawn on whether he supported a second engine program.”

July 23/09: The Senate adopts, by non-identifying voice vote, an amendment to S.1390, the Senate’s version of the FY 2010 defense budget. Sen. Joseph Lieberman’s [I/D-CT] amendment removes program funds for the F136, and requires certifications from the Pentagon in order to continue the program. The amendment’s stated criteria are that the F136 must reduce the total life-cycle costs of the F-35 program, and improve fleet operational readiness, while not disrupting the F-35 program during any phase, or resulting in fewer fighters over the program’s life cycle.

Since the Pentagon has been trying to kill the F136 for several years, however, the content of those certifications is irrelevant because they would never happen. Sen. Lieberman represents rival engine maker Pratt & Whitney’s home state.

The amendments must eventually be reconciled with H.R. 2647, the House of Representatives’ FY 2010 bill, which funds the F136. Preserving the Lieberman Amendment through reconciliation could be a difficult hurdle, given the lack of “political skin” involved in a voice vote. Senatus blog has the amendment | CQ Politics | Aviation Week | DoD Buzz.

July 16/09: Aviation Week reports that political gamesmanship is leading the Obama administration to issue veto threats if the F136 alternate engine program is canceled. The threats are weaker than the ones issued over the F-22, and are being issued as “the President’s advisers will recommend a veto” rather than a direct Presidential threat.

A defense bill veto is a major step, and both GE and congressional backers would be able to marshal strong resistance in creating a backlash. United Technologies, who makes the F135 and currently holds an engine monopoly for the JSF, is trying to head that backlash off, and strengthen its hand, by paying for ads advocating F136 termination.

June 26/09: The House votes 389-22 to reauthorize the Joint Strike Fighter Competitive Engine Program as part of H.R. 2647, the FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, with $603 million in funding. Rep. Steve Driehaus [D-OH] release | Cincinnati Business Courier.

June 12/09: House Armed Service committee Air & Land subcommittee Chairman Neil Abercrombie [D-HI] issues his statement regarding the committee’s changes to H.R. 2647, the proposed FY 2010 budget. He is quite emphatic concerning the F136 program:

“This issue is not about contractor ‘A’ or contractor ‘B.’ The issue is that we do not believe that it is prudent for up to 80 to 90 percent of the fighter fleet to be dependent on a single engine type, provided by one manufacturer.

Being tied to one engine is too high an operational risk to take. This is what happened to the F-15 and 16 fleets in the ‘70s when those aircraft were dependent on one engine type. This also happened to the AV-8 ‘Harrier’ fleet when it was grounded for 11 months due to engine problems. In the cases of the F-15, F-16, and AV-8, none represented a large fraction of the existing fighter force.

With all services depending on one aircraft and one engine type for the vast majority of its capability, the potential is for the entire F-35 fleet to be grounded, if there is similar problem, as has been experienced in the past.

Therefore the mark includes an increase of $603 million for the competitive engine, reduces the JSF procurement request by one Marine Corps and one Air Force aircraft and the overall U.S. fiscal year 2010 procurement from 30 to 28 aircraft. “

May 20/09: The GAO issues report #GAO-09-711T: “Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase.” With respect to the F136 engine, the GAO adds that:

“To date, the two contractors have spent over $8 billion on engine development – over $6 billion with the main engine contractor and over $2 billion with the second source contractor… In each of the past 2 years we have testified before this committee on the merits of a competitive engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter. As we reported last year, a competitive strategy has the potential for savings equal to or exceeding that amount across the life cycle of the engine. Prior experience indicates that it is reasonable to assume that competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that much…. Results from past competitions provide evidence of potential financial and nonfinancial savings that can be derived from [dual] engine programs.”

April 23/09: In reponse to renewed Pentagon efforts to cancel the F136, Rep. Steve Driehaus [D-OH-1] sends a bipartisan letter with 24 House signatures, including House Minority Leader Rep. John Boenher’s [R-OH-8], to President Obama. The letter goes beyond simple support for the F136, and proposes a new agreement for both engines – while revealing that GE/RR is willing to offer a fixed price deal for remaining F136 development and production:

“The shortsightedness of the budgetary requests by the DOD fail to recognize the long-term benefits and cost savings that are widely projected with the development of a competitive propulsion system…. It would be prudent for the DOD to revisit the current contract for the JSF propulsion system to address questions of operational risk, cost savings, responsible government action, and relations with key allies…. Unlike other recent attempts to renegotiate defense contracts, it is proposed that a new agreement be settled to develop and then fund engines for the JSF by both Pratt and Whitney and the General Electric/Rolls-Royce team….”

Feb 5/09: Aviation Week reports that the forthcoming Pentagon budget will try, for the 3rd year in a row, to kill funding for the GE/Rolls-Royce F136 engine.

Feb 13/08: GE and Rolls Royce announce – “GE/RR F136 Jet Engine Passes Critical Design Review.”

July 9/07: Aviation Week quotes Jean Lydon-Rogers, president of the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine team, as saying that “Heat dissipation is a huge problem” for JSF. The team is reportedly still brainstorming approaches, in order to manage internal heat without using air-cooling external vents that create detectable thermal hot spots. The idea is to cycle heat from the engine, electronics and power systems into the fuel.

The team also tells Aviation Week that because their F136 engine was designed after the F-35 had its weight growth issues and subsequent modifications, their design takes advantage of the aircraft’s larger inlet. The team claims that single-digit thrust percentage increases could be accomplished with a software change, and claims that even “double-digit increases are feasible without a major redesign.”

March 22/07: The US Government Accountability Office releases report #GAO-07-656T: “Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program” An excerpt:

“Continuing the alternate engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter would cost significantly more than a sole-source program but could, in the long run, reduce costs and bring other benefits. The current estimated life cycle cost for the JSF engine program under a sole-source scenario is $53.4 billion. To ensure competition by continuing to implement the JSF alternate engine program, an additional investment of $3.6 billion to $4.5 billion may be required. However, the associated competitive pressures from this strategy could result in savings equal to or exceeding that amount. The cost analysis we performed suggests that a savings of 10.3 to 12.3 percent would recoup that investment, and actual experience from past engine competitions suggests that it is reasonable to assume that competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that much. In addition, DOD-commissioned reports and other officials have said that nonfinancial benefits in terms of better engine performance and reliability, improved industrial base stability, and more responsive contractors are more likely outcomes under a competitive environment than under a sole-source strategy. DOD experience with other aircraft engine programs, including the F-16 fighter in the 1980s, has shown competitive pressures can generate financial benefits of up to 20 percent during the life cycle of an engine program and/or improved quality and other benefits. The potential for cost savings and performance improvements, along with the impact the engine program could have on the industrial base, underscores the importance and long-term implications of DOD decision making with regard to the final acquisition strategy solution.”

The USAF’s hill just became a bit steeper.

May 22/06: The DID article’s title says it all: “GAO Slams F-35 Dual-Engine Program Cancellation.” In fairness, the British Financial Times notes that the US Department of Defense criticized the GAO report as “misleading in a number of respects,” while contending that the F135’s derivation from the F-22A Raptor’s F119 engine reduces its development risks, and makes reliance on it acceptable. Read GAO-06-716R: [HTML abstract | full PDF version].

Additional Readings

• GE Rolls Royce Fighter Engine Team – Official F136 Site

• Pratt & Whitney – F135 Engine site

• DID FOCUS – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: 2009-2010

• DID Spotlight – F-35: I am Fighter, Hear Me Roar. Thus far, the F135 is a very noisy engine, which creates problems with local residents around military airfields. Could noise levels become a future focus for engine competition?

• Aviation Week (July 17/09) – War of Words Erupts Over F-35 Engines

• US GAO (May 20/09, GAO-09-711T) – Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase

• US GAO (March 22/07, GAO-07-656T) – Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program”

• US GAO (May 22/06, GAO-06-717R) – Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis

• Heritage Foundation (Aug 24/09) – Why Congress Cares About Engine Competition for the Joint Strike Fighter

• DID (Feb 27/06) – P&W, Rolls Royce Define Cooperation on F135 Jet Engine. That’s a necessity, since Rolls Royce will produce all F-35B lift fan modules. P&W also hopes to take some of the sting out of the F136’s possible cancellation.

• DID (Aug 24/05) – $3.43B for F-35 JSF Engine Development. The contracts cover both engines.