Britain Ordering More Chinooks
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As part of a significant re-balancing of Britain’s immediate-term defense spending, Gordon Brown’s Labour Party government plans to buy 10 new CH-47 Chinook helicopters for delivery in 2012-2013, with the intent to buy another 12 Chinooks later. The RAF’s Chinook fleet would increase in size from 48 – 70 airframes, including 8 “Mk3 Chinooks” will finally enter service after a costly and controversial program, plus purchased replacements for 2 Chinooks destroyed during operations.
The 22 new Chinooks would reportedly displace the Medium Helicopter Replacement project, which aims to field successors to 46 or so H-3 Sea Kings that are still operated by the British Army and Royal Navy, as well as Britain’s 34 Puma HC1 medium helicopters, when that type goes out of service in 2022. The Sea Kings will be phased out of service early. Britain’s decisions to buy the Chinooks, and make a number of other immediate adjustments to planned defense spending, stem from 2 difficult imperatives facing its defense establishment…
Britain’s Helicopters: Fuss and Futures
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One is the criticism they have received from both official and unofficial source over the shortage of battlefield support helicopters in Afghanistan. That country’s difficult terrain, poor roads, and a growing threat from enemy land mines all place a premium on larger helicopters that have the lifting capacity to operate in high-altitude and/or hot conditions.
The British government, like their counterparts the Canadians, have been slow to react to this reality. Events and politics have made that approach less tenable, however, and the October 2009 death of Lt. Col. Rupert Thorneloe, MBE, after he had written a series of scathing reports decrying lack of helicopter support, made helicopter support a major public controversy. In recent years, as this pressure has built, Britain has taken an escalating series of steps in an attempt to improve its battlefield helicopter inventory.
One temporary fix involved buying 6 operational Danish EH101 helicopters in June 2007, and paying the cost of refitting them for British use and replacing the Danes’ machines with future production models. In October 2007, it was revealed that this effort cost about GBP 176 million total, or GBP 29.33 million (about $47.7 million) per helicopter. Those helicopters have reportedly been held up by shortfalls in RAF C-17 heavy aerial transport capacity, and reportedly have yet to reach Afghanistan.
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After much to-ing and fro-ing, which even included an RFI for privatized battlefield helicopter services, Britain decided in September 2009 to spend about GBP 300 million upgrading its existing fleet of about 34 AS330 Puma HC1 medium utility helicopters, and lengthening that fleet’s safe service life to 2022.
Engines on its existing Lynx and Chinook fleets are being improved, under a pair of independent programs.
The RAF is trying to extend the flying times of its existing helicopter fleet, which will wear them out faster and is made difficult by their platforms’ low readiness rates.
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The net effect of these particular decisions is that Britain will eventually have a helicopter fleet made up of just 4 helicopter types after 2022, with fleets of 65-75 each:
The heavy CH-47 Chinook. Up to 70 in the fleet, under current plans. Confirmed buys bring it to 58. The 10-22 added Chinooks will replace 34 Puma HC1s and about 25 RAF Sea Kings. Replacement of the 25 Navy Sea Kings, often used by Royal Marine Commandos, is a question mark.
It is not yet clear whether the new Chinooks will be CH-47F equivalents, with British communications equipment. Meanwhile, a broad GBP 408 million upgrade program now underway will upgrade the existing fleet’s engines to that standard, however, while improving their avionics.
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The medium-heavy EH101 Merlin in its HC3 transport (28) and HC1 naval helicopter (44) variants.
The transport HC3s are already serving beside the Sea Kings and Pumas, however, so the net effect if the MHP program is canceled will be a long-term reduction in helicopter transport capability for the Navy and Army. The Army substitutes fewer heavy-lift Chinooks for rather more Pumas and Sea Kings, which might still offer advantages if they can evolve doctrines based on those added capabilities. The trend toward mine-protection, and hence heavier vehicles, does give Chinooks added value.
At sea, meanwhile, the Navy’s 25 Sea Kings are compatible with a number of existing Royal Navy ships. Chinooks are compatible with none, except in “lily pad” roles from the decks of larger ships, and are not “navalized” to withstand salt water well. This might be alleviated slightly if the 65,000t Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers are used to embark Chinooks for the Navy, but the navalization issue would remain.
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The AW159 Wildcat/ Future Lynx – about 62 in naval helicopter (28), army light utility (34), and armed scout (all) functions. Replaces the existing fleet of about 163 (64 navy, 99 army) Lynx helicopters in these functions.
British AH-64D Apache Longbow heavy attack helicopters (67), known as AH Mk.1 in Britain. In effect, the successor and sharp upgrade to about 98 Gazelle light utility and armed scout helicopters, which are being retired.
Despite statements that the Sea King fleet will be retired early, the unique fleet of 13 Royal Navy Sea King ASaC7 Airborne Early Warning helicopters, with their bulbous sidearm mounted radars, have no immediate substitute, and cannot be dispensed with. Until a substitute is found, they will remain in service.
The Silent Influencer
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The other imperative facing Britain is a looming budget crisis. According to the National Audit Office, it could add up to a GBP 36 billion shortfall between programs the Ministry of Defense was committed to, and what it could fund unless given more money.
Of course, the NAO’s 2009 Major Projects Report does note that Parliament bears its share of that responsibility, since it often elects to economize by stretching production out rather than canceling programs. The result is higher fixed costs, which means higher lifetime costs for the programs Parliament targets to “save money.” This complicates acquisition planning for future projects, which are needed to replenish other key assets as they wear out, but have their potential budgets eaten into by stretched major programs from the past.
None of these dynamics are unique to Britain. On the other hand, these problems are sharply exacerbated by the combination of large-scale, expensive foreign wars; and a deep economic crisis that stems from, but reaches well beyond, the 2008 financial crisis.
Britain would likely have ended up paying more for a larger number of medium helicopters, bought in a competition that emphasizes cost-raising proprietary requirements and accompanying R&D, than it will for a smaller number of large helicopters bought under an existing design set. It also ends up addressing a critical battlefield and political weakness sooner rather than later.
Could Britain’s MoD have spent less on some of its helicopter upgrades and emergency buys, taken an American approach and supplemented with chartered helicopters for less dangerous tasks in Afghanistan over the next few years, and delivered extra capabilities into the Afghan theater faster? Possibly. The Daily Mail certainly thought so in October 2009, when it wrote that:
“Only last month the Ministry of Defence turned down another offer of helicopters which could double Afghanistan flying hours for British troops fighting the Taliban. The Mail has independently confirmed that former RAF pilots offered to supply 25 helicopters within three months to back up the Chinook fleet which is stretched to breaking point.
The deal would have cost the MoD just [GBP] 7million a month – a relative drop in the ocean – but the offer was rejected because the RAF did not want to share a role with private contractors.”
What the UK MoD could have had is a matter for proper debate and examination, within an accountable and democratic polity. Clearly, however, a bought fleet of 10 Chinooks, at a likely cost of several hundred million dollars, is what Britain will have now. If the other 12 Chinooks survive the coming budget crises, following a likely change of government after the next election, Britain may have those, as well.
Contracts an Key Events
Spin Ghar delivery
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Dec 15/09: Gordon Brown’s Labour Party government and the British Ministry of Defence announce plans to buy 10 new CH-47 Chinook helicopters for delivery in 2012-2013, with the intent to buy another 12 Chinooks later. Note that this is not a formal contract yet. UK MoD re: purchase plan | UK MoD re: overall defense budget changes.
Nov 9/09: Defense News reports that Britain is planning to cancel its Future Medium Helicopter competition, and order Boeing Chinooks instead. The proposed move is part of a Ministry of Defence helicopter strategy called “Vision 2020,” which still requires approval by government ministers.
Additional Readings
- UK Prime Minister’s Office (Dec 14/09) – Statement on Afghanistan & EU Council
- UK MoD (Nov 30/09) – RAF Merlins begin operating in Afghanistan. Reportedly not the Danish aircraft.
- UK MoD (Oct 15/09) – Gray Report of UK defense procurement. See also accompanying release.
- UK MoD (Dec 11/08) – More helicopter capacity for Afghanistan in rebalanced equipment programme. Refers to Lynx Mk9 engine upgrades, and the promised deployment of new Danish Merlin airframes.
- Britain’s NAO (June 4/08) – Ministry of Defence: Chinook Mk3 Helicopters
- DID (May 22/06) – British Search-and-Rescue: A Billion Pound Partnership? A public-private partnership to replace the Sea King mk5s in the search-and-rescue role.
