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Used to be ours…
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Back in 1991, Canada’s Mulroney government sold the country’s CH-47 Chinook medium-lift helicopter fleet to the Dutch. They cost a lot to maintain and operate, and Canada didn’t need them anyway. Or so they thought. Fast forward to 2002, then 2006. Canada has had boots on the ground in Afghanistan for several years now, but doesn’t have any helicopters capable of operating in the hot and/or high-altitude environment of southern Afghanistan. Its CH-146 Griffons (Bell 412s) can’t carry useful loads in that environment, its ancient CH-124 Sea Kings are falling apart, its CH-148 Cyclones (H-92 Superhawks) are ordered but not yet manufactured, and its 14 new search-and-rescue CH-149 Cormorants are few in number, are based on the EH101’s civil model rather than its military model, and were consuming spares at a torrid rate before suffering through a fleet-wide grounding period due to maintenance & safety issues. To support its 2,000 or so troops in Afghanistan, Canada has to rely on favors from US, British, Australian, Polish, and – irony of ironies – Dutch pilots flying CH-47 Chinooks.

When DID covered Canada’s “emergency” purchases for Operation Archer back in November 2005, DID made a strong point of noting the absence of medium-lift helicopters from that list. It should have come as a relief, therefore, to learn in June 2006 that the Canadian government had announced a CDN$ 4.7 billion program to purchase 16 “medium-heavy” helicopters for military and “disaster response” roles.

It should have, but it didn’t. DID explains the Afghan situation on the ground, the RFP, the options – and the problem. Now, almost 2 years after the program was announced, a sole-source RFP has been issued… but even as negotiations are reportedly wrapping up for a helicopter that isn’t quite a CH-47F, the delays have created a very vulnerable situation for this purchase.

• Cemetary Sideroad: On the Ground in Afghanistan
• Bring It All Back: The New Helicopter Competition
• Looking for a Place to Happen: The Problem [updated]
• We’ll Go Too: Updates [new]
• Escape Is at Hand for the Travellin’ Man: Additional Readings & Sources [updated]

Cemetary Sideroad: On the Ground in Afghanistan

ISAF, S. Afghanistan
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Canada is still operating as part of NATO’s ISAF force, as part of a group under British command tasked with the south-western provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan. Canadian Task Force Orion is based in Kandahar, and in 2006 its commander Lt. Col. Ian Hope was quoted by Canadian defence think-tank CASR as saying that:

“It is quite possible [this lack of transport helicopters] has cost limbs, if not more, because we have had to sustain [resupply troops in remote areas using vehicles] on the ground,” said Lt-Col Ian Hope, who commands [Task Force Orion]. “That has produced a risk that would be reduced if we could take helicopter flights. It does not take a military tactician to know this. We have mitigated the risks. Losses have been reduced, but not yet to zero.”

CH-47 Chinook

Canada’s senior logistician in Kandahar Lt. Col. John Conrad added that Canada’s Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are located along roads and dirt tracks where the Taliban and its commanders in Quetta, Pakistan often send suicide bombers, or places mines and other explosives because American, British, and Dutch Chinook transport helicopters are seldom available for such missions:

“The convoys are now in harm’s way almost daily because supplies have to follow the infantry and we have had to send those supplies by land…. We bid on [available coalition helicopter support], but it is like coming to a potluck. Everyone brings a dish and, instead of potato salad, we come with a jug of water. [our allies] help us when they can, but we are at the end of [their priority] list [unless the requirement is close air support or MEDEVAC].”

Indeed, the government’s own June 2006 announcement recognized this when it stated that:

“To date Canada has relied on allied or coalition forces to provide this type of helicopter transport while deployed. This limits the Canadian Forces’ ability to conduct independent operations, and also means when unavailable, troops must opt for ground transportation, placing them at greater risk of ambushes, land mines and improvised explosive devices.”

Bring It All Back: The New Helicopter Competition

Dutch CH-47
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According to the broad DND announcement, The estimated total project cost for this aircraft acquisition is C$ 2 billion (USD $ 1.78 billion at current conversion), plus an estimated contract value of C$ 2.7 billion (USD $2.4 billion) for 20 years of in-service support – a contract to be competed by the winning contractor, with work largely to be done in Canada by Canadian mechanics and contractors. As with other contracts in the series, the winning contractor will be expected to provide total industrial offsets equal to at least 100% of the contract value.

The Canadian DND also seem to have a specific platform in mind, as they’re using a competitive process known as an Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN):

The ACAN process permits the Government to identify an intended contract award winner (in this case, the Boeing CH-47 Chinook) based on the mandatory capabilities and detailed market research conducted by the Department. Industry is then given the opportunity to respond, should they feel they have an aircraft that meets this criteria. If no supplier submits a statement of capabilities that meets the requirements set out in the ACAN during its posting period of 30 calendar days, then the competitive requirements of the government’s contracting policy have been met and the government’s choice is bought. If a valid statement of capabilities is received then a fully competitive process will be run.

So, what are those required capabilities?

• Internal – Cabin space to accommodate an infantry platoon (30 soldiers) with full combat equipment, including weapons, body armour, rucksacks, rations and communications (4,763 kg/ 10,550 lbs.).

• External – Lift multiple loads, including a lightweight field howitzer (Canada recently bought the M777) and associated equipment (minimum of 5,443 kg/ 12,000 lbs.).

• Hot and High – Accomplish the lift and range parameters defined above, at altitudes and temperatures up to 1,220 m/ 4,000 ft above sea level and 35 C / 95 F degrees.

• Range – Minimum of 100 km/ 60 miles with either the internal or external load described as above and at the temperatures and altitudes defined.

• Aircraft certification – Aircraft must be certified to aviation certification standards recognized by Canada by the contract award date.

• Fleet size – Minimum fleet of 16 aircraft, sufficient to sustain a minimum of three deployed helicopters in addition to maintenance, test and evaluation, and training at two main operating bases.

• Delivery – Delivery date of first aircraft must be no later than 36 months after contract award and final aircraft delivery no later than 60 months after contract award.

The Canadian Department of Public Safety is also part of the purchasing process, as they expect the aircraft to be used to respond to natural or man-made disasters. This is not exactly a vote of confidence in the EH101/CH-149 Cormorant Search and Rescue helicopters, though the fleet of 15 is a small number for a country Canada’s size.

Looking for a Place to Happen – The Problem

Afghan Mi-17 Hip
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The issue is simple – the last clause re: delivery. With troops on the ground right now who need these capabilities, delivery in 36-60 months will not meet the needs of Canada’s fighting men and women in harm’s way. A need their commanding officers have openly stated as a priority. Contrast Canada’s approach to Australia’s more proactive stance, for instance.

Worse, the DND has found that delivery of the CH-47F Chinooks will not be complete until 2012.

Canadian defense think-tank CASR points out that two potential solutions exist to this dilemma. One is the possible solution DID covered in November 2005 – buy Mi-17 helicopters, the same type used by the Afghan Air Force. A Russian trade delegation made that precise offer during their March 2006 visit to Canada, and a Canadian company named Kelowna Flightcraft is already cooperating with the Mil factory in Kazan to produce Mi-17KF Kittiwakes with fully Westernized avionics and rear loading ramps.

Mi-17KF

The Mi-17s aren’t a substitute for the Chinook. Their load is 24 fully-equipped troops, with an external sling load of 3,000 kg, vs. the stated Canadian requirement of 30 troops and 5,443 kg. On the other hand, their cost is about 1/8 that of a new CH-47 Chinook and deliveries would be rapid. They would create a temporary solution, one which could later be repurposed later to other military or even civilian rescue or disaster-related roles as Chinooks become available.

The second potential solution is advocated by Lt-Col James Dorschner (US Army Reserve, Ret.), a Special Correspondent for Jane’s Defense Weekly. The deal involves Boeing’s CHAPS (Cargo Helicopter Alternate Procurement Strategy) program, which is associated with the US Army’s new CH-47F buy:

”...the CHAPS program allows third parties to buy US Army CH-47Ds (already earmarked for ‘remanufacture’ into advanced CH-47Fs) for roughly US $15 M each. This amount is about half the price of a new-build CH-47D and much less than a ‘new-build’ CH-47F. This more modern Chinook, is selling for about US $35 to 40 million each.

Under the CHAPS arrangement, the money from US Army CH-47D-model aircraft, sold by Boeing, can be used to ‘top up’ the Army funding which has already been budgeted for CH-47F remanufacture. The added revenue will allow the Army to buy a brand new CH-47F for each ‘D sold. An aircraft purchased under CHAPS will, of course, be overhauled and upgraded to the latest CH-47D-model standards by Boeing prior to delivery…. all ‘Third Party’ purchases are handled as a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS), rather than the usual Foreign Military Sale (FMS).”

In other words, much faster, less complicated, win/win for both militaries. Dorschner notes that Egypt was the first customer to sign up for CHAPS CH-47s, with Australia expected to follow shortly. The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain may be next.

Using CHAPS as a starting point, Dorschner contends that Canada could field a small force of 4-5 Chinooks to Afghanistan before the end of the current NATO deployment, eventually growing its CHAPS fleet to 9-12 aircraft before the new Chinooks arrive in numbers. At that point, the CHAPS Chinooks could be sent back to be refurbished as CH-47Fs themselves.

The question is, can CHAPS be invoked by a country that doesn’t already have earlier-version CH-47s – and if they don’t, are any airframe available on the global market?

Either near-term option could work. What’s clear, however, is that the usual bureaucratic response of yawning or snarling won’t be enough. Unless some kind of near-term option is found and implemented, this USD $4.2 billion program risks facing more intense hostile fire than the Canadian boots or hearts on the ground showing courage in the fight.

We’ll Go Too: Updates & Timeline

HH-47 Concept
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Dec 15/08: Quebec’s Le Devoir reports [Google translation from French] that negotiations are nearly complete, and a Canadian contract for CH-47F helicopters can be expected early in 2009.

The report mentions the strong support for this purchase within the Canadian Forces, but the delays have created a situation in which political problem may kill the deal. Canada has committed to leave Afghanistan by 2011, but the helicopters would not arrive until 2012. This removes one of their biggest raisons d’etre, and makes them vulnerable to cancellation. The other issue is the status of Parliament, which is currently prorogued until January 2009. When it returns, it may dissolve on a motion of no confidence, a move that is very likely to precipitate another election. Parliamentary dissolution would be likely to stall any contract until mid-2009, and if the government changes, it could easily decide to cancel the purchase altogether.

Sept 24/08: Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper adds to reports that Canada’s Chinooks will not be standard CH-47Fs, and claims Canada is offering Boeing a limited risk-reduction contract to build a couple of prototype aircraft. A contract is expected by the end of 2008.

The helicopter variant Canada wants will reportedly add more armament, defensive systems, additional range via larger tanks and/or aerial refueling, and combat search and rescue equipment. The result would be a mix and match between the CH-47F, the special forces MH-47G, and the HH-47F that won the USA’s first CSAR-X combat search and rescue competition. Globe and Mail via The Torch.

April 21/08: Canada makes a separate official request for 6 CH-47D Chinooks from the USA, with a total price tag of up to USD$ 375 million. See “Let’s Stay Engaged: CH-47D Chinooks for Canada’s Afghan Mission.”

Afghanistan drop-off
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April 7/08: Canada’s Ministry of Public Works and Government Services announces a March 2008 RFP to Boeing for 16 CH-47F Chinook helicopters, plus 20 years of associated in-service support (ISS), with an extension option for the life expectancy of the aircraft. The Government expects to award a contract for the medium-to-heavy lift helicopter in fall 2008, and the usual rules concerning 100% industrial offsets apply.

In the wake of Parliamentary reports and political pressure, Canada’s ongoing involvement in Afghanistan is predicated in part on the acquisition of medium battlefield support helicopters. The CH-47F Chinooks’ delivery time will not meet that need, however, and so the release adds that:

“This procurement is not being undertaken to meet the government’s short-term requirements in Afghanistan – this is being done through a separate process – but rather to re-equip the Canadian Forces over the longer-term…. “

April 1/08: Flight International reports that:

“A contract is expected to be signed with Canada by year end for 16 new-build helicopters. These are expected to be a unique configuration combining features of the F and the G, although Canada is negotiating for accelerated delivery of an initial six aircraft by taking US Army-standard CH-47Fs straight off the assembly line. These are urgently needed for operations in Afghanistan.”

On April 21/08, it became clear that the initial 6 aircraft would be taken from serving US Army CH-47Ds. Conversions to Canada’s CH-47F/G configuration may be possible later, as the US Army’s CH-47F orders are a mix of new-build and remanufactured helicopters.

March 20/08: Jane’s Defense Weekly reports that Canada has negotiated the purchase of 6 ex-US Army Boeing CH-47D Chinook medium-lift helicopters for use in Afghanistan, but has no way of supporting the aircraft in theatre. “The Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) declined to comment on the acquisition negotiations, stating only that “the department is currently examining a number of options.”

July 16/07: Defense Minister O’Connor is interviewed on CFRA radio, and sates that he expects a contract for CH-47Fs within a couple of months. The Torch.

June 28/06: Canada’s government announces the Medium-to Heavy-Lift Helicopter initiative. DND release.

Escape Is at Hand for the Travellin’ Man: Additional Readings & Sources

• DID FOCUS – US Army in Flight on Production of (Re)New H-47 Chinooks – updated. Covers the CH-47F.

• “The Manley Report” (January 2008) – Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan [PDF]. This was an independent panel, but it was called by the Parliament of Canada.

• Canadian Parliament (June 2007) – CANADIAN FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN: Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence [PDF, 174 pages].

• CASR (April 6/08) – The Burden-Sharing Summit Begets a NATO Helicopter Trust Fund: Gordon Brown’s Dating Service for Available Medium-Lift Helicopters. Britain and France propose a scheme where allies who aren’t sending troops or equipment pay money to refurbish and send other medium helicopters instead, which would be a NATO pooled asset. The target machines are believed to be East Bloc Mi-8/17s in storage, and 10 nations have apparently signed on.

• CBC (March 28/08) – Harper plays down Afghan expectations ahead of NATO Summit in Bucharest. Includes notes re: the need to have battlefield transport helicopters in theater by February 2009, per the Manley Parliamentary report.

• StrategyPage (March 5/08) – Chinook Replaces Blackhawk in Combat. “For the last two decades, the U.S. Army used the its UH-60 “Blackhawk” helicopter for combat assault missions, while the larger CH-47 “Chinook” was used just for moving cargo. But the army found that, in the high altitudes of Afghanistan, the more powerful CH-47 was often the only way to go in the thin mountain air. While doing that, the army found that the CH-47 made an excellent assault helicopter. In many ways, it was superior to the UH-60, mainly because the CH-47 carries more troops and moves faster and farther.”

• CASR (March 2008) – Canadian Soldiers need Transport Helicopters This Summer Not Next Year – Time to Chat with Our New Czech Mates? Mi-17s in exchange for help with Challenger jets?

• CASR (March 2008) – Afghan Medium-Lift – Searching for Available NATO Mil Helicopters

• CASR (February 2008) – Poland will deploy Helicopters, UAVs, and Troops to S. Afghanistan. They have offered to make 2 Mi-17s available to Canada.

• National Post (June 26/06) – Allies stunned Canadian troops lack helicopters—Choppers save lives, insists U.S. commander

• CTV (March 14/06) – Canada loans Dutch comrades armoured vehicles. Canada has loaned its Dutch comrades five heavily-armoured Nyala patrol vehicles for use in southern Afghanistan…. While there is no specific exchange outlined in the memorandum between the two countries, the Dutch Defence ministry noted Canadian troops need help getting around the far-flung desert battlefield and have put forward routine access to CH-47 Chinook helicopters. [Maj. Luc] Gaudet was asked whether it was a formal exchange. “Yes and no,” he replied.