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Australia’s Next-Generation Submarines

Jan 23, 2012 14:06 EST
Related Stories: Americas - USA, Australia & S. Pacific, Contracts - Awards, Engines & Propulsion - Naval, Europe - France, Europe - Other, Issues - Political, Official Reports, Other Corporation, Policy - Procurement, Submarines, T&C - RAND Corp.
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HMAS Waller
Bridge to the future?
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Kokoda report published – objectivity, conclusions, seriousness all questioned. (Jan 19/12)

In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in anti-shipping surveillance-strike complexes, and the need to defend large sea lanes, and dropped something of a surprise. They proposed increasing Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be successors to Australia’s a current fleet of advanced Collins class submarines.

The Collins class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has encountered a number of issues, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines put a huge crimp in the fleet’s usefulness. High-level attention led to 29 recommendations aimed at improving conditions and staffing on Australia’s submarines, and those are now being implemented. Their long term effect remains to be seen. So, too, does the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost…

Updates and Key Events

U214 cutaway
U214 cutaway
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Jan 19/12: The Kokoda Foundation releases its study “Sub Judice: Australia’s Future Submarine,” written by former ASC employee Brice Pacey. It concludes that no off-the-shelf conventional submarine can meet Australia’s requirements, and that a nuclear submarine program is unaffordable and unmanageable. Instead, it recommends “an evolution of the Collins design,” and claim that “the cost of building the submarine will be markedly less than some published estimates… there is no cost penalty for an Australian build.” These statements are from the foundation’s release; the full document itself is a for-fee publication.

While there is widespread agreement that nuclear-powered SSN fast attack boats are not a realistic option for Australia, the foundation’s other 3 conclusions draw fire. First, submarine-builder ASC’s sponsorship of the paper has led several observers to question the study’s seriousness and objectivity. The critics add that requirements themselves are arbitrary, unless the gaps involving current state-of-the-art submarines create serious mission problems, and the cost to field a 100% solution is acceptable. Given the demonstrated capabilities of submarines like the U214, they see the capability gap as too small, and the price gap as too large.

On which topic, reports indicate Kokoda estimates of just A$ 18 billion for the 12 boats, which is, indeed, significantly less than other published estimates. The history of the Collins Class, with respect to both build costs and performance, is not overly encouraging, and the credibility of this estimate has been deeply doubted. ASPI analyst Andrew Davies summed up this view with a Carl Sagan quote: ‘’Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.’’ Kokoda Foundation release [PDF] | Canberra Times | Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Report
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Dec 13/11: Studies & Contenders. The Phase 1 Coles Review into the Collins Class’ difficulties is released, and goes as far as calling Australia’s approach to managing submarines “unfit for purpose.” The same day, Australia’s DoD releases RAND’s requested report of lessons learned from US, UK, and Australian submarine programs, and discusses the class options they’re investigating:

“Options for the Future Submarine range from a proven fully Military off the Shelf design through to a completely new submarine. All options are being considered, other than nuclear propulsion which the Government has ruled out…. The Government has approved the release of Requests for Information to three overseas submarine designers… [to] provide a better understanding of the capabilities of off-the-shelf options.”

The list deals a blow to recent reports, as it’s made up of France’s DCNS (Scorpene), Germany’s TKMS HDW (Type 214), and Australia’s biggest shipbuilding partner, Spain’s Navantia (S-80). TKMS’ Swedish Kockums subsidiary, who worked with Australia to design the Collins Class, didn’t see its developmental A26 Class make the list.

The government isn’t stopping there. Australia’s DoD has signed a contract with Babcock Australia to study a land-based propulsion systems test facility, and the Defence Materiel Organisation has been ordered to develop a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan, in consultation with Australia’s defense industry. Meanwhile, the Government refers to the discussions and agreement with the USA at AUSMIN 2010, regarding Australian-United States cooperation on submarine systems, which “will extend into future submarine acquisition program.” That could add one more advantage to Navantia, whose S-80 uses a number of American technologies. Australia DoD | RAND Report | Coles Review, Phase 1 [PDF].

Oct 15/11: The Labor Party government’s leader in the Senate, Chris Evans, indicates that components and possibly modules of Australia’s future submarines are expected to be built beyond South Australia, and even overseas. This is not a surprising plan, given the history of the Collins Class, but it creates political sparks. ASC, of course, is lobbying to keep everything it can in-house. The Australian | Adelaide Now.

Oct 15/11: Australian media report on the Collins Class’ annual costs, and future sub competition:

“Figures obtained by the Herald Sun, show the six Collins subs cost about $630 million a year – or $105 million each – to maintain, making them the most expensive submarines ever to put to sea…. A US Navy Ohio Class nuclear attack submarine – more than three times the size of a Collins boat – costs about $50 million a year to operate.

The cost figures are revealed as Defence officials say at least two possible contenders for the navy’s new submarine fleet – the Spanish S-80 and French-Spanish Scorpene class boat – have been ruled out of the future submarine project.”

If true, one wonders what’s left. Sweden is just beginning to design a new A26 Class, and Germany’s HDW has its U214. Russian designs aren’t a realistic option. The other possibility is that Australia might seek, once again, to design its own submarine. Herald Sun | Courier Mail, incl. infographic | Australia’s Daily Telegraph.

July 25/11: The Australian reports that Australia’s DoD:

”...will seek US help with Australia’s plan to build 12 big conventional submarines to replace the navy’s six troubled Collins-class boats…. After initial problems with the Collins fleet a decade ago, the US provided a state-of-the-art combat system and the latest technology to improve the subs’ propulsion systems and make them less noisy.”

July 19/11: Labor Party Defence Minister Stephen Smith admits that there are “long-term difficulties” with the Collins Class submarine fleet, and announces a full independent review led by British private sector expert John Coles. The Minister cites too many stretches where only 1-2 submarines have been available, and there are reportedly doubts that the subs’ diesel engines are robust enough to last until 2025 as planned:

“These problems are significant and highly technically complex. At times we have seen as few as one Collins Class submarine available for operations. This situation is unacceptable but will not be addressed simply by continuation of the status quo…. As a consequence, the Government will conduct a review into the optimal commercial framework for the conduct of Collins Class Submarine sustainment…. My ambition is that the Coles Review will do for the Collins Class Submarine what the Rizzo Report has done for our amphibious fleet capability: a clear sighted path to improve the sustainment and availability of the Collins Class Submarines…. Without having confidence in our capacity to sustain our current fleet of submarines, it is very difficult to fully commence, other than through initial planning, the acquisition program for our Future Submarine. This is consistent with the absolute necessity to work very hard in the early days to get projects right and thereby avoid, reduce, and minimise project difficulties down the track.”

The Coles Review has been asked to provide an interim report by December 2011, and a final version by March 2012. The key questions are how long this will delay Australia’s future submarine program, and whether the review will include political-structural weaknesses in the program, or confine itself to procedures. Minister for Defence ASPI transcript | ASC release | Adelaide Now | Australian Broadcasting Corp. and ABC AM radio | Canberra Times | Queensland’s Courier-Mail | Sydney Morning Herald | The Australian.

May 15/11: Australia’s Kokoda Foundation releases “Under the Sea Air Gap: Australia’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Challenge. The study “attempts to identify issues surrounding Australia’s Anti Submarine Warfare capabilities that will require greater scrutiny in the period leading up to the 2014 Defence White Paper.”

Author Brice Pacey is concerned that the design for Australia’s next-generation submarines might not be complete until 2019, and the first boat might not be ready until 2030. With the Collins Class scheduled to begin retiring in the mid-2020s, that would present a problem. Australia would need to either extend the lives of a class that has not performed well or reliably, or accept a vestigial submarine fleet even as it neighbors build up their capabilities. See also Adelaide Now.

April 14/11: Australia’s ASPI think-tank releases “The once and future submarine – raising and sustaining Australia’s underwater capability.” Based on past acquisitions, beginning the future submarine program immediately would only deliver the 1st boat in 2025; further delays would create timing issues with the Collins Class’ retirement. On which subject:

”...the boats have spent so little time in the water due to maintenance and crewing problems that the hulls have not been pressure cycled anywhere near to the extent anticipated. However, a life-of?type extension for the Collins is not an especially appealing prospect for a number of reasons. To start with, the drive train in the Collins has been problematic since day one, and attempts to keep the fleet going into the late 2020s would almost certainly require work to replace the highly problematic diesel engines (which are already ‘orphans’ in the world of maritime diesels). That alone is an undertaking requiring major engineering work, not to mention a lot of money. It is a simple fact of geometry that the engines can only be removed by cutting the pressure hull. Given that less complex mid-cycle dockings are taking 100 weeks to complete (against an anticipated 52 weeks), this exercise would result in considerable downtime. It could be that every five years of additional life would come at the cost of one or two extra years out of the water and/or conducting sea trials for each boat being upgraded. This would further exacerbate the already disappointingly low availability of the fleet.”

Collins Class SSK
Collins Class
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Jan 27/10: Australian DoD:

“There have been inaccurate reports today that the Rudd Government was reconsidering its decision to build our future submarines in Adelaide[, Australia]. These reports are false. The Rudd Government is fully committed to building our new future submarines in Adelaide.”

Jan 25/10: The Collins Class submarine HMAS Farncomb encounters a generator failure, which reduces Australia’s operational Collins Class submarine fleet to 1 boat in 6. The cost of repairs is not yet predictable, and the mechanical issue could extend beyond HMAS Farncomb.

Continuing issues with the class also lead to questions concerning the feasibility of, and proposed strategy for, Australia’s next-generation submarine program. Read “Australia’s Submarine Program in the Dock” for full coverage.

Nov 5/09: Acting Minister for Defence Greg Combet highlights the major challenges facing Australia’s next generation submarine project in a speech to the Sydney Institute. Excerpts of “From Collins to Force 2030: The Challenge of the Future Submarine”:

”...the White Paper recognises that the aim of establishing sea and air control in our primary operating environment does not entail a purely defensive or reactive approach. Rather, we must be able to conduct proactive combat operations at a distance from our shores. This demands a mix of intelligence, defensive and strike assets to ensure both deterrence and, if that were to fail, an ability to impose unacceptably high costs…. Put simply, we need to be able to take warfare to an adversary’s front door. Submarines are able to stop an adversary from deploying its’ fleet by maintaining sea denial. By imposing disproportionate costs on an adversary, submarines represent an asymmetric threat well suited to Australia’s defence.

....In planning for the future submarine, we need to consider a range of engineering and production solutions, ranging from the acquisition of a Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) design, options consistent with the Kinnaird/Mortimer reforms, to a developmental solution designed indigenously…. Electric Boat have a rule known as the ‘law of 1:3:8’, that is, a task that takes an hour in module construction takes 3 hours when the hull has been assembled and 8 hours when the submarine is in the water. In other words, make sure the design is mature before you start cutting steel.

...Studies have shown that 90 per cent of the discretionary decisions that affect the outcome of a project are made in the first 7 to 12 per cent of the project’s life. There are three things that we must get right… adequately define the operating concepts and requirements for the future submarine…. develop a sophisticated acquisition strategy [which may include rolling production or batch buys].... understand the interaction between capability and the acquisition strategy. It is often the interaction between these two processes that leads to trouble.
 
One of the matters that we will need to tackle early in the project is the need to invest in and develop a sustainable industrial base that is capable of designing, constructing and maintaining 12 large submarines [which will include cooperation with US Navy facilities].”

Nov 3/09: The Sydney Morning Herald quotes Acting Defence Minister Greg Combet, who says that the USA’s RAND Corporation will be conducting a study related to the submarine project, due in February 2010:

”(Defence) is undertaking a number of studies to identify and explore all the options to ensure we have the appropriate design capability to support our submarines throughout their life.”

See also SpaceWar article.

Oct 29/09: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute releases “Strategic Insights 48 – How to buy a submarine: Defining and building Australia’s future fleet.” ASPI projects an $A 36 billion (currently about $32.6 billion) cost to field 12 built-in-Australia diesel-electric submarines – a sum comparable to buying 12 of the USA’s most advanced SSN-774 Virginia class nuclear fast attack submarines. OIt adds:

“As described, the resultant boats are likely to be the largest, most complex and, at $3 billion each, the most expensive conventional submarines ever built. The industrial capacity and capability to produce these vessels does not exist in Australia at the moment. By the time construction commences, it will be over fifteen years since the last Collins-class submarine was launched. Hard-earned lessons from that process will need to be re-learned in many cases and the required engineering and construction skills will have to be built up to the required level…. This paper, authored by Sean Costello and Andrew Davies, surveys the complexities that have to be negotiated and suggests a way ahead that makes best use of the resources available to government.”

See also Full report [PDF].

May 2/09: Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper is released. One of its goals is a fleet of 12 non-nuclear diesel-electric submarines with Air-Independent Propulsion, capable of launching land attack cruise missiles, to be assembled in South Australia. Design to be determined. ASC is not guaranteed the contract, however, something Fitzgibbon had pledged during the election.

The subs could be upgraded versions of the existing Collins class, or a foreign partnership around a sub like Spain’s S-80, which will already be designed to launch Tomahawk missiles.

The Collins class will also receive sonar and other upgrades during their lifetime.

Additional Readings

  • Kokoda Foundation (January 2012) – Sub Judice: Australia’s Future Submarine [PDF, Release]. A number of observers weren’t impressed, questioning its seriousness, objectivity, and conclusions – see Jan 19/12 entry.
  • Australian Defence magazine (April 1/10) – Size Matters, by Rex Patrick. A wide-ranging and educational look at trends in submarine warfare.
  • The Australian (Feb 9/11) – Nuclear or not, we’ll need prefab subs. Amidst calls for SSN nuclear-powered fast attack subs, the article looks at the shortcomings of existing diesel-electric SSKs – and of Australian submarine experiences to date.
  • Australia DoD (July 1/99) – Mcintosh-Prescott report. Covering the shortcomings and issues with Australia’s Collins Class submarine program.

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