Australia’s Future ASW Frigates: Warfare Down Under

As Asia-Pacific nations invest in submarines, serious regional players also need to invest in anti-submarine capabilities. Aircraft like the P-8A Poseidon are great, but nothing really replaces dedicated and capable ASW ships. Their opponents’ anti-ship missiles are also experiencing a jump in capability, so a secondary air defense role isn’t optional. Australia’s 2 remaining FFG-7 Adelaide-class frigates have finished an expensive and somewhat rickety systems upgrade, but they fall short of what’s needed, and won’t last all that much longer. The Adelaide-class will soon be succeeded by 3 new Hobart-class AWD. The RAN’s 8 ANZAC-class frigates are receiving much smoother ASMD air defense upgrades that will make them quite useful, but their service life will begin ebbing around 2024. Hence Australia’s SEA 5000 Future Frigate program, which may receive an early push from issues with Australia’s naval industrial base…

SEA 5000 Future Frigate Options

Made in Australia: Hobart Lite

Given the number of jobs involved, any government’s preferred choice would be to build the next set of anti-submarine warfare frigates in Australia at ASC. The current preference is to place Australian CEAFAR/ CEAMOUNT radar systems on the same hull used for the 7,000t Hobart Class high-end air defense destroyers, backed by the same Saab 9LV Mk3E combat system used in the upgraded ANZAC Class, and using medium-range Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles for air defense instead of advanced long-range SM-6s.

While ship construction is usually only 40% or so of a warship’s cost, size will affect costs for both construction and operations, and that in turn could affect the goal of fielding 8 ships. 7,000t is quite large for an anti-submarine frigate. Even with some equipment cost reductions from the Hobart Class, Australia would be very hard pressed to build 8 ASW ships, when it struggled to build just 3 air defense destroyers.

Nor is Sen. Johnston altogether correct that the 6,391t F105 used as Hobart’s base was designed to be an anti-submarine ship. The F100s were designed to be high-end air defense ships with potential future growth to ballistic missile defense, but as multi-role ships, they’re also expected to have anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Australia made their own ASW choices with their multi-role Hobart Class derivatives, and SEA 5000 could simply adopt the same equipment set.

A better question might be whether better ASW capabilities could be created at lower cost, using a different design. Navantia’s smaller and derivative F-310 Fridtjof Nansen Class 5,290t frigates, for instance, were explicitly designed for Norway with a focus on anti-submarine warfare. They retained the AEGIS combat system, but made different compromises, using a smaller SPY-1F radar to create solid but secondary air defense capabilities based around the same Evolved Sea Sparrow missile planned for SEA 5000. Their design and configuration also appears to lend itself much better to CEAFAR/ CEAMOUNT. Costs in 2000 for Spanish-built ships using the American AN/SPY-1F radar and AEGIS combat system were about $326 million per ship.

On the other hand, one of the Hobart Class’ big problems has involved issues with translating Navantia’s designs into production, and the SEA 4000 program is still facing serious issues. If those issues can be solved, Australia’s government could argue that it’s best to use a design that has finally been worked out for SEA 5000, rather than going through the same cycle of overruns and build issues in Australia with a new Navantia design.

Plan B: Buying Abroad

The current Liberal government has said that if ASC cannot improve productivity measures like their 150 man-hours per tonne, and bring them close to global standards like 60 man-hours per tonne, the ships may have to be built elsewhere. This is a marked policy difference from the Labor Party, but it’s worth stressing that carrying out this threat would mean that attempts to put the Air Warfare Destroyer program back on track had failed. That certainly isn’t what the Liberal government wants.

Nevertheless, it’s possible that the the cost of their “big ASW” frigate solution, or marginal but barely-acceptable performance at ASC, could force a rethink.

“Elsewhere” still gives the government options. For starters, Australia could cushion the local cost and risk premium by building 1-3 ships abroad in their home shipyards, with Australian shipbuilders working there on exchange programs as a way of improving their proficiency and productivity. The rest of the ships could then be built back in Australia.

In terms of technical options, a number of global vendors have already begun talking to Australia.

Nansen Class (Spain’s Navantia). If the government wanted to stick with Navantia, and possibly even with ASC, it’s noted above that their F-310 Nansen Class design may offer Australia additional savings and performance, at the price of some extra risk if all frigates are built in Australia. They would still have to substitute CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT for the SPY-1 radar, and the 9LV combat system for AEGIS, but that’s what they’re already researching anyway for the Hobart hull.

FREMM (Franco-Italian DCNS/ Fincantieri). The French Aquitaine Class offers ASW plus advanced radar, missile, and air defense capabilities, at a reasonable price, with proven service thanks to home country programs and exports to Morocco. The problem for Australia is that adopting it would prevent the use of their preferred weapons and force new buys, unless Australia changed almost all of the ship’s mission systems: DCNS SYLVER VLS instead of Lockheed’s MK.41 VLS, MBDA Aster-15 vs. Raytheon ESSM, MBDA Exocet vs. Boeing Harpoon or Kongsberg NSM/JSM, Oto Melara 76mm gun vs. BAE’s Mk.45 127mm. Not likely.

Type 26 (UK’s BAE). Britain has already begun talking to Australia about involvement in the UK’s future frigate program, whose cost target of GBP 350 – 450 million would make them thinkable options for an 8-ship buy. Britain is also a long-standing ally with close relations, and BAE Australia is already a shipbuilder.

The Type 26’s mission systems aren’t finalized yet, and that would likely be the main point of contention with Australia. It could be possible for each party to end up with their own customized design, but there comes a point where that’s almost as expensive as designing your own ship. If the design is common, on the other hand, it means that Britain will probably have to accept some extra costs, without shielding Australia from needing to invest their own R&D. Britain has already picked the Type 997 Artisan rotating radar, for instance, while Australia would want a CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT staring array that would force a redesign of the Type 26’s mast and superstructure. Australia wants the Saab 9LV Mk3E combat system used on its upgraded ANZACs, while Britain would prefer to reuse technologies from the PAAMS system aboard its Type 45 Daring Class air defense destroyers. That could be an area where Australia might get their way, but Britain would have to pick the American Mk.41 vertical launch system, instead of the French SYLVER A50 VLS on its Type 45 Daring Class air defense destroyers, in order to ensure compatibility between Britain’s MBDA CAMM-M air defense missiles and Australia’s chosen RIM-162 ESSM. That choice would shut Britain out of using the same Aster-15 missiles on board its Daring Class as the Type 26’s high-end defense, unless it pays to integrate Aster-15 with the Mk.41 and/or combat system. Etc.

Contracts & Key Events

November 28/18: Saab Swedish company Saab will collaborate with BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin to develop and integrate the new combat system for Australia’s Hunter-class frigates. Australia will procure a total of nine frigates under its SEA 5000 future frigate program. The Hunter-class is based on BAE’s Type 26 frigate, one of the world’s most advanced anti-submarine warships. Hunter-class ships will mount an indigenous CEA Phased-Array Radar, integrated with the Aegis combat management system used by the US Navy. Equipped with a Mk 41 VLS the vessels will be able to shoot ESSMs and SM-2s. BAE is responsible for the design, integration, testing and activation of the combat system; Lockheed will manufacture and deliver the Aegis weapon system, while Saab Australia will build an advanced tactical interface. “The fact that BAE Systems Australia has selected Saab as partner is further proof of our world-class combat system integration capabilities,” Anders Carp, head of Saab’s business area surveillance, said in a company announcement on Friday. “The extensive skills and experience that we bring to this project will complement those of BAE Systems.”

September 03/17: GE’s Marine Solutions’ LM2500 gas turbine modules will be manufactured by Australian RJE Global for the Royal Australian Navy frigate program. A Memorandum of Understanding signed by both firms will also see RJE Global manufacture a number of components for the gas turbines. The LM2500 gas turbines will be for the RAN’s nine-ship SEA 5000 Future Frigate Program, as the turbines are operational on two of the short-listed, qualified ship designs for the new vessels—Fincantieri’s FREMM and Navantia’s F100 frigates. The new frigates will replace the navy’s ageing Anzac-class frigates.

April 19/16: Proposals submitted by BAE Systems, Fincantieri and Navantia have been shortlisted for the Australian government’s program to build nine new frigates for the Royal Australian Navy. France’s DCNS of and TKMS of Germany’s offering were eliminated from the $27 billion program which will see the ships built in Adelaide, South Australia. The first steel expected to be cut in 2020 and will be fitted with phased array radar systems being developed by Australia’s CEA Technologies. Designs remaining are BAE Systems’ Global Combat Ship, based on the Type 26 frigate; Fincantieri’s anti-submarine warfare FREMM (Fregata Europea Multi-Missione) and a redesigned version of Navantia’s Álvaro de Bazán (F100) class vessel.

June 6/14: Initial Studies. Australia’s new Liberal government has some announcements to make, including funding for initial studies around the SEA 5000 future frigate program. The announcement is made at CEA Technologies, so it shouldn’t surprise that the CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT radar combination will be part of these frigates. The initial commitment is A$ 78.2 million, for design & engineering studies around installation of the CEAFAR/ CEAMOUNT radar faces and associated electrical & cooling systems on the same Navantia 7,000t hull used for the Hobart Class air defense destroyer. The active-array radar faces are likely to be larger than the comparable system deployed on Australia’s upgraded 3,600t ANZAC Class, which would give the Australians additional power and growth margin to deal with more advanced future threats. As Minister Johnston puts it:

“The hull was originally designed by Navantia to be an anti-submarine warfare hull, so I’m reasonably confident that with the right construction, the right noise-suppression systems, it will be a very suitable hull…. the essence of the Future Frigate program is the CEAFAR Active Phased Array Radar used in conjunction with the Evolved Sea Sparrow and the Saab 9LV [Mk3E] Combat Management System, now that is all Australian product and I must say I am extremely proud…. We have seen a way forward for us to – for the first time – have an almost totally indigenous Command and Control structure that is world-class on frigates.”

The goal is “at least eight ships….” Unfortunately, the timing isn’t likely to help Australia’s industrial base, which is very concerned about the gap between finishing the current LHDs and destroyers, and beginning construction of the next set of ships or submarines. This contract for white-collar design work makes it easier to keep the design staffs going, as the AWD and LHD programs don’t need them very much any more. With respect to the core manufacturing staff:

“If we were going to have a solution to the ‘Valley of Death’ decisions needed to be made two or more years ago [during the previous Labor government], I don’t have the magic wand that is required to say ‘here are the designs, here are the ships, set about the task of building them’. What I am seeking to do today is to mitigate the problem that I have inherited as best I can with limited finance.”

With that said, recall the Minister’s threats re: buying abroad if ASC can’t improve its productivity, which the Minister says stands at 150 man-hours per tonne instead of the global benchmark of 60. Sources: Australian DoD, “Minister for Defence – Transcript – Naval shipbuilding announcement, CEA Technologies, Canberra” and “Minister for Defence – Boosting Australia’s maritime capabilities”.

June 4/14: ASC On Notice. Australia’s new Liberal Party government announces another Air Warfare Destroyer program restructuring, “dealing with a range of unresolved structural and systemic issues that have remained unaddressed for too long.” The overall project is 21 months behind, with Hobart delayed to 2016, and delivery of the 3rd ship shifted to March 2019. Defense minister Johnston reminds reporters that this is the program’s 3rd remediation cycle, and patience seems a bit thin. In the wake of former US Secretary of the Navy Don Winter’s report (q.v. Nov 18/13), and an ANAO review (q.v. March 6/14), SEA 4000 is now on Australia’s “Projects of Concern” list. In addition:

“…the reform strategy that Professor Winter has recommended to the Government will seek to improve ship building productivity at the Air Warfare Destroyer Ship Builder ASC and its sub-contractors. It will include the urgent insertion of an experienced ship building management team into ASC [emphasis ours] and after we have been able to augment ship building capacity, we will seek to pursue the reallocation of blocks between ship yards to ensure that the program is sustainable and that productivity levels are maximised….”

Johnston delivered a 2nd major shot across ASC’s bow. Submarines may be considered to be a top-tier strategic industrial capability, but:

“Now we’ve got potentially another 8 future frigates that we would like to build in Australia, but I am sending a very clear message out today. If we can’t fix this, that is something that will certainly be in jeopardy, because I don’t believe the Government will support an enterprise that cannot deliver productively.”

The next step is a lot of complex negotiations, especially given the legal issues around existing contracts. The government is saying that these negotiations are why they won’t release Winters’ full report now. Sources: Australia DoD, “Minister for Finance and Minister for Defence – Joint Media Release – Putting the Air Warfare Destroyer program back on track” | “Minister for Defence – Air Warfare Destroyer added to Projects of Concern list” | “Minister for Finance and Minister for Defence – Joint Press Conference – Review of the Air Warfare Destroyer program”.

Feb 3/14: Hobart Class hull? ASC in Adelaide holds a ceremony for destroyer #2 Brisbane. There are a number of questions swirling around reports of large cost overruns, the inquiry the government announced last year, etc. The Minister’s response:

“I don’t believe it is government policy for a 4th Air Warfare Destroyer at this time because we have a White Paper coming. Those issues are very important to inform the White Paper and there is a possibility that this hull can be used for the SEA 5000 [DID: future ASW frigate] programme but we are a long way from finalising that. So, let’s just not try and speculate too much before we put everything together in a White Paper…”

Sources: Australia MoD “Minister for Defence – Transcript – Keel-laying ceremony for Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) HMAS Brisbane, Techport Australia, Adelaide” and “Minister for Defence – Transcript – Doorstop at Keel-laying ceremony for Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) HMAS Brisbane, Techport Australia, Adelaide”.

Additional Readings

* Australia DMO – SEA 5000.

* DID – Australia’s Hazard(ous) Frigate Upgrades: Done at Last. Sort of. SEA 5000’s most urgent replacement task.

Background: Preferred Choices

* DID – Hobart Class Ships: Aussie Anti-Air Umbrella. The hull of these 7,000t ships is Australia’s initial choice as a base for their future frigates.

* Saab – 9LV CMS Combat Management System. Very popular worldwide; Australia’s variant on their ANZAC Class is the Mk3E, while Saab is up to Mk.4.

* DID – Australia and USA Collaborating on New Small-Ship Radars. The CEAFAR/CEAMOUNT set of X-band active array radars.

* DID – Naval Swiss Army Knife: MK 41 Vertical Missile Launch Systems (VLS). Handles most of the ship’s important weapons.

* DID – RIM-162 ESSM Missile: Naval Anti-Air in a Quad Pack. Preferred air defense choice for SEA 5000; likely to be the Block 2 with an active seeker head. Good air defense that can be loaded 4 per cell in the Mk.41 VLS, but no ballistic missile intercept capability.

* DID – Australia’s MH-60R Maritime Helicopters. This is the RAN’s future naval and ASW helicopter, and sits in the medium class between larger offerings like AgustaWestland’s AW101 and compact ASW options like the AW159 Lynx Wildcat.

Background: Other Possibilities

* Navantia – F-310 “Fridtjof Nansen” Frigate [PDF]. Easiest alternative if cost or other issues sink the “Hobart ASW” plan.

* DCNS – FREMM Aquitaine. France’s standard FREMM variant, more focused on anti-submarine warfare than the air defense and land attack FREDA design.

* DID – Britain’s Future Frigates: Type 26 & 27 Global Combat Ships.