Advertisement

A400M rollout, Seville
(click to view full)

Airbus’ A400M is a EUR 20+ billion program that aimed to repeat Airbus’ civilian successes in the military market. A series of smart design decisions were made around capacity (35-37 tonnes/ 38-40 US tons, large enough for survivable armored vehicles), extensive use of modern materials, multi-role capability as a refueling tanker, and a multinational industrial program; all of which leave the aircraft well positioned to take overall market share from Lockheed Martin’s C-130 Hercules. If the USA’s C-17 is allowed to go out of production, the A400M would also have a strong position in the strategic transport market, with only Russian IL-76 and AN-124 aircraft as competition. To date, orders have been placed by Germany (60), France (50), Spain (27), Britain (25), Turkey (10), South Africa (8), Belgium (7), Malaysia (4), Chile (3, to finalize), and Luxembourg (1).

Right now, the firm’s biggest issue is timing. In November 2007, “Airbus A400M Program Delayed 6-12 Months” covered ongoing issues with Airbus’ new military transport. Those issues escalated, and project is currently under moratorium as all parties decide what to do. Cancellation is not a realistic option, but late deliveries can be refused. This DID Spotlight article (which will soon become members-only content) covers the latest developments as the A400M project slides toward production.

A key multinational agreement has now extended the program’s moratorium, even as Airbus and Thales book significant losses related to the project…

• The A400M Program: A Snapshot
• The A400M Program: Airbus’ Dilemmas
• Updates & Key Events [updated]
• Additional Readings

The A400M Program: History

A400M concept
(click to view full)

The original EUR 16 billion A400M contract was signed in December 2001 for development and production of 196 aircraft. That contract scheduled the first flight for 2006 and initial deliveries for 2008. A EUR 20 billion contract was signed in 2003, and the original dates have now slipped to 2009 or even 2010 for first flight; 2013 is now being discussed as the realistic initial delivery date.

Without flying aircraft, and with a backlog of almost 200 planes, Airbus has already lost potential opportunities in Norway, Canada, and India; even as Lockheed Martin uses that time to solidify the MC/HC-130J variant’s position as a Special Operations aircraft. June 26/08 saw the first A400M aircraft rolled out at the final assembly line in Seville, Spain, but aircraft weight growth is being reported as a critical issue, testbed issues are slowing engine certification, and first flight has now been moved back again from summer 2008 to some time in 2009 – 2010.

The key milestone remains the beginning of deliveries, which has escalated into a significant contractual issue at Airbus. In September 2008, EADS CEO Louis Gallois has reportedly sent a letter to the governments of 7 countries who have ordered the A400M, asking them to waive the contract’s built-in penalties for late delivery. Their alternative was a freeze in production from Airbus. They chose not to change the existing agreement. Those production delays came to pass, and EADS has now submitted a proposal to OCCAR that would both revise the procurement agreement, and make some changes to the aircraft.

A400M cockpit
(click to view full)

According to the February 2009 report from the French Senat, serious development problems and delays have arisen in the aircraft’s digital engine controls, navigation and low-level flight systems, horizontal tail surfaces, and the definition of the wing design. Airbus’ current proposal apparently includes an interim standard that would not be capable of the more sophisticated flight modes, until avionics issues have been resolved.

The key specifications change to date involves base weight estimates that have risen by 12t/ 26,500 pounds. Airbus is not proposing to change the aircraft’s 37t carrying capacity, which implies a new maximum landing weight of 134t instead of 122t. That means the most likely performance changes will be to speed (300 knots target), unrefueled range (3,450 nm target for 20t C-130J class payload; 1,780nm target at maximum 37t), and to the length of runway required for takeoff (914 m/ 3,000 feet target) and landing (822 m/ 2,700 feet target) when fully loaded. Some customers and potential customers may have issues if those new lengths extend too far, and begin to exclude a number of bases currently in use by Lockheed’s competing C-130 family.

The 2009 Senat report report estimated that A400M production would ramp up only in 2014, and that it would take until 2020 to clear the backlog introduced by development delays, assuming acceptable settlement of contractual and development issues. Current costs per A400M aircraft are placed at at EUR 145 million, vs. 110 million in 1998 Euros. At 2%-3% inflation per year, EUR98 100 million turns into about EUR09 120 million, so the rise in price is about 21% in real terms over the past decade.

The A400M Program: Airbus’ Dilemmas

A350XWB
(click to view full)

EADS CEO Louis Gallois has been quoted as saying all expected profits from the initial 180 orders are already invested, adding that the A400M is “a heavy lossmaker” which is creating problems for EADS’ financial performance. He reportedly added in September 2008 that the present position could become “untenable” within months, unless a deal is agreed that “keeps everyone happy.” Based on reports in the French and German press, price escalation of around EUR 700 million for the total program could add cost renegotiation to the impending discussions, as well as the waiver of penalty clauses.

EADS is currently facing several major investment sinks. One is the ongoing effort to address issues with its A380 super-jumbo, which has cost the firm billions of euros. Another is the decision to develop the A350XWB as a major new technology project, after existing customers told Airbus that its plan for incremental improvements to existing designs would not be able to compete with Boeing’s 777. Then there’s the market for “single-aisle” airliners like Airbus’ A320 family, which makes up the bulk of Airbus’ orders. With Boeing working on a 737NG project to bring the next generation of aircraft to market in that class, Airbus must continue to invest billions of its own or face the prospect of a serious strategic setback.

The A400M’s issues leave the project flying directly into this financial storm. Project delays are already costly in that situation, and a November 2007 release from EADS reported a EUR 1.2 – 1.4 billion charge to earnings flow (up to $2 billion) as a result of the existing delay. Payment of significant penalty clauses on its first 180 aircraft would exacerbate that problem sharply, by slashing profitability on what could still turn out to be a majority of the A400M’s total lifetime orders.

A400M: airdrop
(click to view full)

With anticipated A400M profits already invested, every dollar of profitability slashed would have to be replaced with investment dollars, during a major downturn for the airlline industry, at a time when multiple investment projects are already straining Airbus’ capacity. The A400M must compete for funding and industrial effort with the recently-released A380 super-jumbo, the A350XWB wide-body that’s currently on the drawing board with committed orders, and a future successor for Airbus’ biggest segment: the A320 single-aisle jet family. All without any assurance that the A400M’s initial margin issues would be made up with enough subsequent orders at full rate to create an acceptable average return.

Worse, Airbus’ classic resort to government subsidies for investment dollars is constrained by a trade dispute with the USA over that exact issue, at a time when a $35 billion aerial tanker contract that Airbus originally won hangs in the balance.

Outright cancellation is not possible without customer unanimity, and that will never be forthcoming. Liquidated damages may be possible to individual governments, however, if they refuse to accept late aircraft. So far, Britain appears most likely to use that remedy, but France is now making similar noises. Germany’s position has been that that “financial concessions” from the customer countries should only be discussed upon receipt of the planes. That creates a long-term financial risk for EADS, which could potentially stretch beyond 2020.

At present, however, the biggest challenge will be funding the aircraft’s remaining development and integration. Since a contract already exists, the ball is now firmly in EADS’ court. A situation EADS appears to have accepted, as it kicks the project down field and looks for an opening. At present, OCCAR has declared a moratorium on the program, to give all parties time for sober consideration of their options.

Updates & Key Events

Final design?
(click to view full)

July 28/09: EADS announces its first half 2009 results. On the bright side, the 1st A400M development aircraft is being prepared for engine fitting, the 2nd aircraft is assembled and has entered systems testing, and final assembly has begun for the 3rd. The C-130 flying test bed for the Europrop engine has successfully performed 12 flights with more than 35 flight hours, and a first version of the revised engine software FADEC is showing good initial results in testing.

July 24/09: The A400M partner nations relax the negotiation timeline, and move the decision back from end of July to the end of December 2009. Britain’s change of mind is key to that agreement, and is partly influenced by a major “root and branch” review planned for all defense programs. That review could not possibly be complete by the end of July, and a first draft is due in early 2010. That fits far better with the proposed French and German end of 2009 timeline. Agence France Presse | BBC | BBC re: UK defence review | Deutsche Welle | NY Times | Seattle Post-Intelligencer. EADS release.

June 22/09: The Ministers of Defence of the 7 program partner nations (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Spain, Turkey) met to receive and analyze the “Group of Experts” report analyzing the A400M program and its way forward. The official release notes that:

“A number of issues still need to be resolved, before a negotiation phase can be entered. Therefore, in order to ensure ourselves that the conditions offered by industry fully satisfy the Nations, it has been decided to allow, in agreement with industry, an extension to the standstill period, with a decision being taken by Partner Nations by the end of July.”

Defense-Aerospace reports that France and Germany had been pressing for an extension of the moratorium period to the end of 2009, but Britain vetoed that proposal. In the end, the moratorium was extended only to the end of July 2009. A technical committee will now examine all aspects of the aircraft’s production plans, which will lay the groundwork for key decisions, and re-negotiation on production, delivery and financial schedules. Defense-Aerospace | Joint A400M partners release: PDF format [in English] Spanish Ministry of Defense [in Spanish].

June 13/09: Defense-Aerospace reports on a Le Bourget 2009 briefing by EADS CEO Louis Gallois, Airbus CEO Tom Enders, and other EADS executive. Gallois said that EADS has already spent all EUR 5.7 billion in A400M development funds, and has lost EUR 2.8 billion on the initial contract for 180 aircraft, with an ongoing burn rate of “over 100 million euros” of its own money every month.

EADS is reportedly betting on future exports beyond the initial European nations, in order to justify the program. EADS North America CEO Ralph Crosby reportedly confirmed that the A400M had been offered to the US Air Force, though those rumors were mostly tied to a special operations contract won by the MC-130J Super Hercules.

Operationally, EADS has launched an initiative, overseen by Airbus COO Fabrice Bregier, to enhance program management throughout the group. The A400M’s first flight is tentatively scheduled for late December 2009, but could slip slightly into early January 2010. EADS CEO Louis Gallois hopes that can coincide with the end of contract re-negotiations. He adds that Britain is taking part, saying:

“We need the UK, we want to have the UK with us… but I don’t think it would kill the contract if the UK withdrew.”

June 5-15/09: With a fleet of aging C-160 and Lockheed Martin C-130H tactical transports that continue to see heavy demand, France is looking at the one option its government had said would not be considered. French Defense Minister Herve Morin is quoted as saying that the government has expanded its stopgap options to include lease or purchase of some C-130Js; and Bloomberg reports that France has officially requested C-130J availability and performance data for review. France has also approved the modernization of its 10 newest C160 Transalls so they can remain in service until the first A400Ms arrive, which is now expected to happen in 2014-15.

Other possibilities for France include stepped up per-hour leasing of Russian AN-124s under NATO’s SALIS pool, per-hour C-17 leasing under NATO’s SAC pool, acquisition or lease of EADS’ smaller C-295Ms, or advancing their planned Airbus 330 MRTT aerial tanker & transport buy.

These interim options group themselves by tradeoffs. Some contenders (C-295M, A330 MRTT) lack the reinforced floors required for dense tactical loads like armored vehicles. Others (AN-124, A330 MRTT, C-17s to lesser extent) require longer runways, which removes some of their utility as front line delivery aircraft. Range and refueling capability are potential issues for some (C-295M, some C-130Js), while maintaining overall fleet strength and front line airlift availability is a concern in other cases (AN-124, C-17, A330 MRTT to some extent). The C-130J offers less capability than the A400M, but it sits in the middle of many of these tradeoffs, which may be why it has climbed back into interim consideration. Aviation Week | Defpro | Bloomberg News.

A400M wing cover
(click to view full)

March 30/09: Airbus CEO Thomas Enders sits down for a feisty interview with Germany’s Der Spiegel, and talks about the A400M. The firm later issues a release reiterating its commitment to the A400M, which is obvious from reading the interview but bears repeating in these situations. Key excerpts:

“Objection! If we can manage to get the program back on course now, the A400M will be a success story. That is what we want—but not at any price. In any case, we cannot build the plane under the conditions that we’ve had up to date…. Our American competitors would never have accepted such conditions. We’ve made big mistakes, and errors have also been made on the customer side. We should now rectify these together.

....We submitted a few proposals back in December. This basically concerns three issues. First, ...the risks and opportunities are appropriately shared by the customer and the industry…. Airbus will no longer carry the risks alone of engineering the engine…. Engineering, flight tests and the start of production have to be optimized… to minimize the risks of series production. And third, studies need to be conducted…. It could save everyone a great deal of time if [some promised capabilities] were only introduced step by step….”

Enders also stresses the “enormous financial and industrial challenges” presented by the A350 XWB and A380 super-jumbo programs, as a key consideration when deciding how much A400M program risk Airbus is willing to accept. Full Der Spiegel interview | EADS release.

March 17/09: Laurent Collet-Billon, the DGA’s recently appointed Director General, says that France is looking at the possibility of leasing or buying alternative transport aircraft to meet the shortfalls created by late A400M delivery. The DGA is also contemplating refusing at least some of the late A400M aircraft. Collet-Billon:

“It is one of the alternatives which we have to examine. We have not yet finished examining the capacity gap and that could lead to a reduction in the target (of 50 aircraft).”

That is partly because France has multi-year military budgets, so paying for bridging capabilities means subtracting money from something else. While Lockheed Martin’s C-130J is completely ruled out as a bridging solution, France does have options that include buying more flight hours of Russian AN-124s and IL-76s under NATO’s SALIS program, joining NATO’s SAC pool of C-17s, or accelerating buys of Airbus tanker-transport aircraft to pick up some of the load.

Meanwhile, a 3-month program moratorium imposed by OCCAR will allow all parties re-visit the technical specifications, the schedule, price, and project organization. Reuters | Aviation Week.

March 5/09: Britain’s RAF is under strain, trying to sustain an aerial supply bridge for 8,000 deployed troops in Afghanistan. With its 20 C-130Ks (C1/C3) being forced toward retirement, Aviation Week reports that Britain is looking at the possibility of leasing 5 C-130Js as a potential “bridge” until the A400Ms can begin to arrive, and/or finding ways to add to their 6-plane C-17 fleet.

Senior British Defense Ministry officials are believed to have met on March 4/09 to examine proposals for the ministry’s next “Planning Round 09.” Airlift and budget issues would have been prominent within those discussions.

Feb 10/09: France’s Senat release a full report [in French] detailing their investigation into the A400M program, and their recommendations. They recommend that the EUR 20 billion euro contract be renegotiated, in order to preserve a program they see as critical to Europe’s aerospace industry. They also cite life expectancy issues with France’s current C160 Transall fleet, and reveal that the A400M faces a number of challenges which have not previously been made public.

The report faults EADS for failure to grasp the project’s complexity. It faults participating governments for rushing into a program whose structure made failure likely; and for relying on the EU’s OCCAR for oversight it lacked the authority or resources to perform, instead of appointing one of their national procurement agencies to lead the project. France’s own DGA has performed this role for other multi-national projects, notably the stealthy nEUROn UCAV.

With respect to the A400M program’s problems, blame is cast widely, but the core problem is identified as the 2001 contract, which was amended in 2003. The Senat report believes that the A400M program was almost guaranteed to fail, thanks to its call for simultaneous development of a new airframe, a new engine and new avionics; without the EUR 500 million risk reduction studies recommended by industry; and with tight timelines that left no allowance for delays. French Senat report [HTML, in French] | French Senat Report [PDF, in French] | Defense-Aerospace highlights [English].

Feb 9/09: Britain’s Financial Times reports a “major row” over the integration of Airbus Military in Spain, and the parent company’s efforts to bring the A400M project under direct control. It adds that “There have been mounting tensions between Tom Enders, Airbus chief executive, and Carlos Suarez, head of the military division,” and hints at accompanying national political complications. Mr. Enders declined comment when asked about this, but the Financial Times article also quotes an EADS statement:

“EADS is not aware of any political issues with the Spanish government over the integration of the military division. Carlos Suarez is still fully in charge. We are still in the process of integrating our military division into Airbus.”

Meanwhile, Reuters UK reports that first delivery will not happen before the end of 2012, and quotes a report from Le Figaro that places the expected overall cost to Airbus at EUR 5 billion total (about $6.45 billion). It could be higher, according to French Senator Jean-Pierre Masseret, who notes that the terms of the initial contract contain a release clause that allows the governments to pull out if the plane hasn’t flown 14 months after a stipulated milestone. EADS’ reported plans for first flight in 2010 would miss that April 2009 deadline.

France’s Senat is issuing a report which argues that the program is critical to Europe’s aerospace industry. That argument is likely to fly with major customers like France, Germany, and Spain, though it offers a strong opportunity for expanding NATO’s SAC C-17 pool as a interim step. It may carry less weight with customers like Britain, however, who already fly their own C-17As and competing C-130J-30 Hercules, and who might see a contractual exit as a cost-savings measure. Financial Times | CNN | Reuters UK | EADS general release re: A400M program.

Jan 24/09: An EADS release formally denies any intent to withdraw from the A400M program.

Jan 14/09: Defense Aerospace’s “EADS Draws Battle Lines for A400M Negotiations” discusses key elements of the firm’s position, based on statements made during EADS annual press conference. Referring to John Hutton’s statements, EADS CEO Louis Gallois states that:

“We share his frustration…. We signed the contract, and have our share of responsibility, but we were not alone to have underestimated the program…. [the governments and EADS] thought [the A400M] was a flying truck, but in fact it is a civil aircraft certified by civil aviation authorities and a military aircraft, with full military capabilities…. it is more complex than Rafale or Eurofighter…. We have to discuss risk sharing [and a split of costs over expected amounts] with our customers.”

In return for joint sharing of financial consequences, the article also reported that EADS would offer affected governments a partial bridging solution involving other Airbus aircraft. The A330s mentioned could not carry tactical vehicles, but they could serve to ferry personnel long distances.

Jan 12/09: Reactions. British Defence Secretary John Hutton tells Parliament that:

“We cannot accept a three to four year delay in the delivery of these aircraft. It is going to impose unnecessary and unacceptable strain on our air assets and we, along with all of our partner nations, will have to consider very carefully indeed what the right response now to this problem is as we go forward…”

For Britain, the most likely course of action would involve additions to its fleet of 6 C-17s, involving either additional purchases or participation in NATO’s SAC C-17 pool. A speedup of its FSTA public-private partnership involving 14 Airbus A330 MRTT aerial tanker/transporters is another likely response. Britain also operates Lockheed Martin’s C-130J, however, and could decide to augment that fleet instead if other options prove difficult to execute, or too expensive for its budget. A report in The Guardian quotes Lockheed Martin representatives as saying that the A400M’s delays could spur sales of “dozens more” C-130Js to various nations.

The markets also reacted poorly, as EADS shares fell 5% on the news. Evolution Securities analyst Nick Cunningham is quoted as saying that Airbus could face as much as $6 billion in total cost overruns on the program, a figure that could rise further if the company has to pay damages to customers over the late deliveries. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch analyst Charles Ermitage estimates that EADS may have to take an additional writedown of EUR 2.6 – 3.9 billion, which produces a figure of EUR 4.3 – 5.6 billion (about $5.8 – 7.5 billion) when added to the EUR 1.7 billion 2008 writedown. Reuters UK | Marketwatch | defpro op-ed and analysis | The Guardian re: Lockheed Martin.

Jan 9/09: A New Deal? Airbus Military and EADS have proposed a new program approach for the A400M, as well as “changes to other areas of the contract including in particular certain technical characteristics….” Outside reports are pointing to likely changes in aircraft rage and lifting capacity. Range has some room for movement, given the plane’s installed mid-air refueling capability. Payload could become very problematic if payload falls below 33 tonnes/ 36 tons, as a number of armored vehicle programs are already in motion that will depend on this capability.

Negotiations are taking place with the respective governments through Europe’s OCCAR joint procurement agency, which manages the A400M program. With respect to costs, Airbus Military and EADS will not commit to figures until a finalized industrial plan, “including the availability of systems,” is complete and OCCAR has reacted to this proposal. EADS also continues its public friction with the Europrop consortium by adding:

“Airbus Military is still working with the engine consortium to firm up a date for the first flight.”

Airbus continues to hold to its position that series production should resume only when “adequate maturity is reached, based on flight test results.” This prevents future contract issues around upgrades of the initial aircraft to production configuration, but delays delivery. Indeed, EADS itself admits that first delivery of the A400M would not occur for 3 years after first flight – a flight that has yet to happen.

The net result of these changes is that the A400M project is effectively in limbo until these issues are resolved. Analysts are beginning to see 2013 as the likely first delivery date, a date that will stress the aging tactical transport fleets of many of the A400M’s partner countries.

A400M asembly
(click to view full)

Nov 14/08: EADS releases its Q3 2008 results, which include considerable discussion of the A400M. Key excerpts:

“The pressure on the A400M programme remains…. EADS is more determined than ever to get this complex programme under control…. In the A400M programme, the unavailability of a committed and reliable schedule for the propulsion system, which compounds unresolved issues with certain equipment supplies as well as equipment and systems integration, will lead to further delays…. EADS has started to discuss with its main customers to define next steps. Once a schedule update is achieved, EADS will resume the milestone accounting and further update the A400M charge, for which [EUR] 341 million have been recorded in the third quarter of 2008… [an additional revenue boost of EUR] 803 million resulting from the move to the early stage accounting methodology in the A400M programme applied in Q3 2008…. revenues include the A400M Power-On milestone revenue recognition – shifted from 2007 and worth around [EUR] 400 million.”

“As the outcome of the A400M construction contract cannot be estimated reliably, EADS can currently not comply with all requirements to account for the contract under the estimate-at-completion accounting methodology…. EADS has suspended the application of estimate at completion methodology accounting [“milestone accounting” for the A400M project] and has then recognised contract costs incurred to date as an expense directly in the income statement as well as corresponding revenues as far as such contract costs incurred are expected to be recoverable under the “early stage” method of accounting. The loss-at-completion provision was then updated only to cover additional losses under the contract which EADS was able to estimate reliably.”

Nov 4/08: Reuters relays a report from the French newspaper Les Echos that Airbus Military has suspended A400M production, and the first flight. A new planning schedule for the project is not expected before December 2008.

At present, 2 planes have been assembled, a 3rd is mostly complete, and some plane sections have been built or are undergoing assembly. The French newspaper quoted a source close to the program, which translates as:

“If the rate isn’t slowed down, the problem is one will end up with lots of aircraft parked up that risk having to be taken back [to fix the issues that one always finds in flight testing].”

See: Les Echos [Francais] | De Tijd [Dutch] | Reuters.

Oct 29/08: In the wake of cabinet approval for France’s 6-year defense planning law, Reuters quotes French defense minister Herve Morin:

“I told (EADS CEO Louis) Gallois I agreed to look at things with regard to penalties. With the explicit condition that if one day we were ready to close our eyes to a certain number of penalties, EADS commits itself to a precise, firm and definitive delivery date.”

slow starter?
(click to view full)

Sept 25/08: Safran Group, part of the EuroProp International consortium building the A400M’s TP400-D6 engines, issues a release in response to EADS. It says:

“SAFRAN, along with its partners in EPI, the European consortium in charge of the engines for the A400M military transport, would like to clarify the following points.

2) The control software for these engines, also covering control of the propeller and the nacelle, which are the responsibility of Airbus Military, are currently in the final phase of compliance with civil aviation standards. However, prior to the first flight of the A400M, this software will integrate adjustments following the completion of engine test flights on a C-130. These tests, which are under the responsibility of Airbus Military, have not yet started; EPI delivered the test engine in late 2007, and received flight readiness approval for the engine and associated software on the C-130 in April 2008.”

Translation: if there are program delays look to EADS Airbus, not EPI.

Sept 25/08: An EADS release confirms that the A400M’s first flight will be delayed, but will not commit – yet – to early 2009:

”...because of the unavailability of the propulsion system. The first flight actually depends on the results of the test campaign to be done on the flying test bed, which should start in the coming weeks, and on the readiness of the propulsion system. Only after this and further discussions with customers, the financial, technical and schedule implications can be reliably assessed. The 2008 guidance of the group is not changed at this point.”

Additional Readings

• Financial Times, London (Sept 21/08) – Berlin snubs EADS plea. “The reply from Berlin, which officials said was made after consulting with partner governments including France and the UK, is bad news for Mr Gallois, who has said the A400 will never make a profit under the seven-year-old contract.”

• Agence France Presse, via Yahoo! (Sept 20/08) – EADS could freeze A400M production amid late-delivery row

• Reuters (Sept 20/08) – UPDATE 1-EADS pleads not to be fined for A400M delay -FTD

• South Africa’s Engineering News (Sept 19/08) – SA aviation company admits to challenges with A400M. Cites weight growth issues, and adds: “South African aircraft components manufacturing and aircraft assembly company Denel Saab Aerostructures (DSA) has had to redesign some of the components it is producing for the multinational Airbus Military A400M transport aircraft project, owing to a number of critical factors affecting the basic design. DSA is also considering joining the [DID: C-130 sized] Embraer C390 military transport aircraft project…”

• Flight International (Sept 17/08) – A400M gets a boost, as TP400 engine hits full power. First time achievement on the testbed aircraft. The engines are designed to generate 11,000 shp.

• Aviation International News (Sept 16/08) – Testbed Problems Add To A400M Delay. “AIN understands that the problems have included vibration in the fuselage from the eight-blade propellers, and the need to protect the C-130’s rear wing and flap from the much greater heat produced by the TP400….In the 14 weeks since the TP400 was first ground-run on the C-130, only six hours have been logged. Program officials previously said that 30 hours of ground running would be required before the testbed could fly, and 50 hours of flight time would be required before the A400M could make its first flight.”

• EADS (June 26/08) – First A400M Military Transporter Rolled Out

• DID (Nov 5/07) – Airbus A400M Program Delayed 6-12 Months. Expected first flight moved from January 2008 to summer 2008. It will later be moved again.

• domain-b (May 28/03) – EADS signs [EUR] 20-billion contract for A400M military aircraft. Also a contract between Airbus military and OCCAR.

• Defense Daily (Dec 19/01) – $16 Billion A400M Contract Signed by Airbus Military and Klaus von Sperber, the director of Europe’s Joint Organization for Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR).

• Flight International (April 12/01) – French twist partners’ arms on A400M contract

• DID Spotlight – SALIS’ Sibling: NATO’s C-17 Pool Inaugurates In-House Heavy Lift