French Mirage F1s
(click to view full)

Morocco’s combat air force currently flies 2 squadrons of old F-5s, and 2 squadrons of only slightly newer Mirage F1s; T-37 light jets serve as key transitional trainers. Their neighbor and rival Algeria flies MiG-23s of similar vintage, but adds far more modern and capable MiG-29s. The Force Aerienne Algerienne also flies SU-24 Fencer and SU-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft, and is set to receive 36 multi-role MiG-29SMTs and 30 multi-role SU-30MKs as part of a multi-billion dollar weapons deal with Russia. Morocco is looking for replacement aircraft that will prevent a complete overmatch, and provide it with a measure of security.

Initially, they looked to France. France’s Rafale is part of a set of European 4+ generation fighters that were developed and fielded during the 1990s-early 21st century, with the aim of surpassing both existing offerings among America’s “teen series” fighters, and Russia’s Mig-29 Fulcrum and SU-27/30 Flanker family. “Dogfight at the Casbah: Rafale vs. F-16” discussed the French sales slip-ups that cost Dassault its first export order for the 4+ generation fighter. That outcome is now official. Just to make things worse, the final multi-billion dollar deal involves new-build F-16s, at a price comparable to the rumored figures for the Rafale. Not to mention an accompanying request to replace their T-37 trainer fleet…

Contracts and Key Events

Dec 19/07: The US DSCA announces [PDF] Morocco’s formal request for 24 F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft as well as associated equipment and services – but not weapons. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $2.4 billion. The proposed sale includes:

• 24 F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft with either the F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines (IPE), and APG-68v9 radars;
• 24 Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs);
• 5 F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 IPE spare engines;
• 4 APG-68v9 spare radar sets;
• 30 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems (CMDS)
• 30 AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receivers (RWR)
• 60 LAU-129/A Launchers;
• 30 LAU-117 Launchers;
• 6 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems;
• 12 AN/AAQ-33 Sniper ATP, or AN/AAQ-28 LITENING advanced surveillance and targeting pods. Even the choice is surprising, as Northrop Grumman’s LITENING was jointly developed with RAFAEL of Israel; DID predicts a Sniper ATP purchase.
• 5 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Systems (TARS) or DB-110 Reconnaissance Pods (RECCE); Goodrich’s DB-110 is already integrated into Poland’s F-16s.
• 4 AN/ARC-238 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios with HAVE QUICK I/II;
• 4 Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT);
• 2 Link-16 Ground Stations;
• 4 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/ Inertial Navigation Systems (INS);
• 4 AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Systems;
• 28 AN/ALQ-211 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites (AIDEWS); or 28 AN/ALQ-187 Advanced Self-Protection Integrated Suites (ASPIS II); or 28 AN/ALQ-178 Self Protection Electronic Warfare Suites (SPEWS)
• 1 Unit Level Trainer
• Associated support equipment, software development/integration, tanker support, ferry services, CAD/PAD, repair and return, modification kits, spares and repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.

The principal contractors (and some of their key offerings) will be:

• Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company in Fort Worth, TX (F-16 prime)
• Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control in Dallas, TX (Sniper ATP)
• BAE Advanced Systems Greenlawn, New York (Electronic Warfare & IFF)
• Boeing Corporation Seattle, Washington
• Boeing Integrated Defense Systems (three locations) St Louis, MO; Long Beach and San Diego, CA
• Raytheon Company (two locations) Lexington, MA; Goleta, CA
• Raytheon Missile Systems in Tucson, AZ
• Northrop-Grumman Electro-Optical Systems in Garland, TX (LITENING)
• Northrop-Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD (AN/APG-68v9)
• Pratt & Whitney in East Hartford, CT (F100 engine)
• General Electric Aircraft Engines in Cincinnati, OH (F110 engine)
• Goodrich ISR Systems in Danbury, CT (DB-110)
• L3 Communications in Arlington, TX

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Morocco involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, program management, and training over a period of 15 years.

T-6A JPATS
(click to view full)

Dec 19/07: The DSCA release [PDF] notes that:

“The Royal Moroccan Air Force’s (RMAF) fleet of T-37 aircraft was produced in the early 1960s. The T-37s high fuel and maintenance costs, and low mission-capable rates led to the RMAF’s decision to procure new trainer aircraft. The T-6B aircraft will reduce fuel requirements by 66%. The RMAF will use these new aircraft to modernize its air force and to improve operational capability in coalition operations and exercises, and contribute to a modern air defense network for the legitimate defense of Morocco.”

Hence Morocco’s official request for 24 T-6B Texan trainer aircraft with very secondary light attack capability. Associated equipment will include Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with CMA-4124 GNSSA card and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS) spares, ferry maintenance, tanker support, aircraft ferry services, site survey, unit level trainer, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Morocco involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, program management, and training over a period of 15 years. The estimated cost is $200 million, and the principal contractors would be:

• Hawker Beechcraft Corporation in Wichita, KS (aircraft)
• Pratt & Whitney Corporation in Quebec, Canada and Bridgeport, WVA (engines)
• Martin Baker in Middlesex, United Kingdom (ejection seat)
• Hartzel Propeller in Pique, OH
• Canadian Marconi in Broken Arrow, OK
• L-3 Vertex in Madison, MS

Why The F-16? DID Analysis

Dassault Rafale
(click for cutaway view)

Defence Aerospace claims that France’s Rafale offers were 18 jets for EUR 1.8 billion (currently $2.6 billion), or 24 jets for EUR 2.4 billion (currently $3.45 billion), along with MBDA’s Mica air-air missiles and AASM laser-guided bombs:

“Contrary to earlier reports, Morocco is buying new F-16s, and not surplus US Air Force aircraft. The price it is paying is broadly comparable to that offered by France for the Rafale, giving the lie to reports that Moroccan authorities were swayed by a cut-rate offer made by the United States.

France made two offers, one for 18 Rafales for 1.8 billion euros ($2.6 billion), and one for 2.2 billion euros ($3.2 billion) for 24 aircraft. The French offers included a full weapons suite (MICA air-to-air missiles and AASM laser-guided bombs) as well as an extensive ground environment, that Morocco will have to buy separately for the F-16s.”

There is little transparency in these sorts of negotiations, so the public may never know the exact answer to Defense Aerospace’s implicit questions. Few would dispute that the Rafale is a significantly better plane, offering Morocco a level of quality overmatch that the F-16C/Ds cannot promise against neighboring Algeria’s MiG-29s and SU-30s. The F-16s’ potential winning edge thus comes down to some combination of the most likely explanations: price, network effects, strategic leverage… and pride.

When comparing the offers, the first thing any analysis must note is that a reasonably extensive support network is in fact built into the American offer. Equivalent weapons like the AIM-120 AMRAAM and Paveway II/III kits were not included, but they are unlikely to add more than $200 million to the price of 24 aircraft. An American dollar discount of 45% can still make that an attractive offer; indeed Morocco’s “equivalent choice” actually involves a 33% discount of 24 F-16C/Ds for the price of 18 Rafales, assuming a budget of around $2.6 billion for the aircraft and basic weapons.

Depending on relative in-service rates, the difference in aircraft that are actually available for use at any given time could widen further. That’s a significant consideration when the numbers neck down to under 24 aircraft, in order to cover an entire country against a potential opponent who can field over 60 aircraft of comparable or better quality.

TuAF F-16s
(click to view full)

The second factor to consider is “network effects,” in which the value of a military platform increases with the number of associated choices in weapons et. al. F-16s do have the advantage of offering a much wider set of choices in weapons, targeting pods, engines, and other related equipment. This expands Morocco’s weaponry options to handle a variety of strategic scenarios, and avoids the Rafale’s limiting choices of either accepting supplier lock-in, or pursuing expensive local integration projects. The F-16’s network effects could well be more attractive to a country who values flexibility highly, and understands that flyaway aircraft cost, like the cost of a new car from a dealer, is only the beginning of the real expense of ownership.

The 3rd factor to consider is that the F-16 sale may also be set in the context of a wider security relationship with the USA, which would offset Morocco’s aircraft quality differential in a different way. The US DSCA adds that:

“The proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by enhancing Morocco’s capacity to support U.S. efforts in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), as well as supporting Morocco’s legitimate need for its own self-defense. Morocco is one of the most stable and pro-Western of the Arab states, and the U.S. remains committed to a long-term relationship with Morocco.”

That relationship undoubtedly had a role to play getting the American F-16 in the door as an alternative. Many people think that countries sell arms to people they wish to befriend; that is only very partially true. It is more true to say that countries tend to buy arms from nations whom they wish to be their friends, when the potential for a strategic relationship is a factor at all. This helps to explain why the F-16 became Morocco’s #1 alternative instead of (for instance) Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen. Or cheap Russian fighters, which would be fatally compromised by Russia’s near-certain choice of Algeria and its gas reserves over Morocco in the event of a crisis.

While these security relationship dynamics always apply to global weapon purchases, it is very unlikely that they were decisive in winning the deal. If Morocco desires a relationship with the USA that extends to military support in times of crisis, that relationship cannot be dependent on a single minor aircraft sale; given the way America works, it either exists in any event, or it does not exist at all.

The last factor to consider is pride. Past reports have indicated that France’s initial sales efforts quoted one price, while a later call to the DGA concerning France’s price per aircraft gave a much lower figure. Negotiations went very cold after that, and serious discussions began with the Americans that would eventually lead to the F-16 sale. In a part of the world known for holding pride and honor in very high esteem, that kind of gaffe tends to have serious consequences. Not serious enough to break Morocco’s relationship with France entirely, of course; France is valued for strategic reasons. It was serious enough, however, that if the French reports are true and Morocco could find a “good enough” alternative, pride and the satisfaction of honor alone could explain the denouement we have seen:

Buy American jets to exact redress and serve as a warning to France not to do that again, while improving relations with another powerful ally. Couple that with a EUR 500 million order for a French FREMM frigate to shore up another need, and demonstrate to France that relationship still exists and honor has been satisfied.