New RFP provokes questions, sonar solicitation, “water wings” for LCS 1. (Feb 25/10)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $30+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan several times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, and contracts.

• LCS: Concept & Needs
• LCS: The Competing Teams
• LCS Solution = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules
• LCS: Controversies & Cautions
• LCS: Budgets and Program Structure [updated]
• LCS: Export Potential
• LCS: Contracts & Key Events [updated]
• LCS Ancillaries: Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events
• Additional Readings & Sources [updated]

LCS: Concept & needs

Ultimately, the US Navy is trying to replace 30 FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, 14 MCM Avenger Class mine countermeasures vessels, and 12 MHC-51 Osprey Class coastal mine hunters (TL = 56), with about 55 Littoral Combat Ships.

The LCS requirement has been identified as part of a broader surface combatant force transformation strategy, which recognizes that many future threats are spawning in regions with shallow seas, where the ability to operate near-shore and even in rivers will be vital for mission success.

That requires the ability to counter growing “asymmetric” threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. It also requires intelligence gathering and scouting, some ground combat support capabilities, and the ability to act as a local command node, sharing tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units.

At the same time, however, the US Navy needs ships that can act as low-end gap-fillers in other traditional fleet roles, and operate in the presence of missile-armed enemy vessels and/or aerial threats.

Given the diversity of possible missions in the shallow-water and near-shore littoral zones, and the potential threats from forces on land, any ship designed for these tasks must be both versatile and stealthy. Meanwhile, the reality of ships that are expected to remain in service for over 30 years gives rise to a need for electronic longevity. As the saga of the USA’s cost-effective but short-lived FFG-7 frigates proved, “future-proofing” and upgradeability for key systems, electronics, and weapons will be critical if these small surface combatants are to remain useful throughout their mechanical lives.

LCS: Designs & Teams

There are currently two different LCS designs being produced and procured as part of the competition. The General Dynamics team is offering a futuristic but practical high-speed trimaran, based on Austal designs and experience with vessels like the US Marines’ Westpac Express high-speed transport and the Army and Navy’s TSV/HSV ships. It offers an especially large landing area (7,300 square feet) and internal volume (15,200 square feet mission bay) for its size, with a 3,500 square foot hangar. The hull is aluminum, but the trimaran design offers additional stability options, and may help with hits to the ship’s sides.

It will carry a General Dynamics designed combat system, and standard LCS weapon fittings. If the LCS should require a full suite of naval weapons in future, export designs based on the Independence Class tout “tactical-length” vertical launch cells that are limited to shorter weapons like ESSM and SM-2 air defense missiles, and VL-ASROC anti-submarine missiles.

The General Dynamics LCS team is led by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipbuilder as prime integrator, with Austal of Mobile, AL (a subsidiary of Austal Ships of Australia) currently specified as the main design partner and ship-building site. That alliance may be fraying, however, owing to the requirements of the 2010 RFP for a second builder that is unaffiliated with the first.

GD subsidiaries General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products Division in Burlington, VT; General Dynamics Electric Boat Division in Groton, CT; General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems in Fairfax, VA; and General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Ontario are also involved under the General Dynamics banner. Other key participants include:

• Boeing in Seattle, WA
• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD
• L3 Communications Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA
• Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD
• Maritime Applied Physics Corporation in Baltimore, MD
• GE (LM 2500 gas turbines)
• MTU (8000 Series dielsel engines)
• Saab (Sea Giraffe radar)
• Wartsalia (water jets)

The ships will have an open-architecture combat system based on existing market offerings. Bofors (gun) and Ericcson (radar) are among the minor partners whose equipment will be featured on the GD Team’s proposed design.

Team Lockheed Martin, meanwhile, offers a proven high-speed semi-planing monohull based on Fincantieri designs that have set trans-Atlantic speed records. The design will use the firm’s COMBATSS-21 combat system as the fighting electronic heart of the ship, has shock-hardened the engine systems, and uses a steel hull. USS Freedom has required additional bolt-on buoyancy fittings, however, and there have been persistent reports of weight and stability issues.

The ship has a smaller flight deck than the Independence Class at 5,200 square feet, but a larger 4,680 square foot hangar. The Freedom Class’ LCS mission bay is under half the size, at 6,500 square feet. If the ships need weapon upgrades to add vertical launching systems, however, it’s worthy of note that export designs stemming from the Freedom Class tout full strike-length cells that can go all the way up to SM-3 air defense and Tomahawk precision attack missiles.

Lockheed’s core team includes various Lockheed divisions, plus naval architects Gibbs & Cox of Arlington, VA; shipbuilder Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA; and shipbuilder Marinette Marine of Marinette, WI.

It also includes a host of niche providers and related partnerships including:

• Angle Incorporated
• Blohm + Voss
• Data Links Solutions
• DRS Technologies
• EADS (TRS-3D radar)
• Fairbanks Morse (diesel engines)
• Fincantieri (diesel generators)
• Izar (now Navantia)
• L-3 Communications
• MAAG Gear AG
• MacTaggart Scott
• Raytheon
• Rolls Royce (MT30 gas turbines, Kamewa waterjets)
• Sensytech
• Sperry
• Terma
• Unidynamics
• United Defense, now BAE Systems

LCS = Standard Equipment + Mission Modules…

At 115 – 127 meters in length and 2,800 – 3,100 tons of displacement, the USA’s competing LCS ship designs are almost the size of a Britain’s Type 23 frigates. They might well be classified as frigates, were it not for their shallow water design and employment. For whatever reason, high speed has also been identified as an important ship characteristic. As such, both the GD/Austal trimaran and Lockheed’s racing-derived monohull offer potential top speeds of 40-50 knots.

While a ship’s hull and design makes a number of its performance parameters difficult to change, the Americans believed they may have a solution to the problem of affordable upgrades to sensors and key systems. Denmark’s Standard Flex 300 corvettes pioneered a revolutionary approach of swappable mission modules based on ISO containers. That approach has the potential to radically changes the ships’ capabilities, by creating the option to swap in a full breadth of excellent equipment focused on a particular need. As opposed to the traditional approach, which is to cram a wide-ranging set of bolted-in compromise equipment into fixed installations.

Swappable modules also gives the Navy new options over time. One option is technology-based, via spiral development that focuses on rapid insertions of new equipment. This creates a long series of slight improvements in the mission modules, and hence the ship’s capabilities. Over time, the cumulative effect can be very significant. The 2nd benefit is cost-related, since upgrades require far less work and cost to install when mission technologies evolve. The 3rd benefit is risk-related. The ability to do low-cost, spiral upgrades encourages frequent “refreshes” that remain within the existing state of the art, rather than periodic upgrade programs that must stretch what’s possible, in order to handle expected developments over the next 25 years.

No matter which mission modules are loaded, the ship will carry a BAE Systems Mk110 57mm naval gun with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute, and Mk 295 ammunition that allows the system to perform against aerial, surface or ground threats. The ship will also carry .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine guns, plus defensive systems including automated chaff/flare dispensers and a Raytheon RIM-116 RAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) launcher integrated into an upgraded version of the MK 15 Phalanx gun system’s radar & IR sensors.

The ships will also rely on their onboard MH-60 helicopters and/or RQ-8B Fire Scout helicopter UAVs, plus other robotic vehicles including a variety of Unmanned Underwater Vessels (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV). UUVs currently being tested for use with the LCS include the Bluefin 21 advance surveyor, WLD-1 which tows the AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar, and others. These systems will actually be part of mission modules: integrated packages of weapons, sensors, robotic vehicles, and manned platforms that can be switched in and out depending on the ship’s mission.

The ships’ first and most important mission module is not officially listed. It consists of a small but very cross-trained crew, plus the flexibility to accommodate small complements of specialists. The most obvious example is Special Forces missions, given the ships’ low draught, high speeds, flexible mission spaces, advanced communication systems, and ability to launch ancillary craft. Beyond the human element, the LCS program will initially draw upon module sets for Mine Warfare (MIW: 24 planned), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW: 16 planned) and Surface Warfare (SUW: 24 planned).

The LCS Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) packages a variety of technologies, many of which are produced by other program offices and delivered as elements of a particular mission module. As of August 2008, The Mission Package Program was led by PMS-420 PEO Capt. Mike Good. Northrop Grumman serves as the Navy’s mission package integrator.

The MIW module brings together several systems developed by the Mine Warfare program office (PMS 495): the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting UUV System; the AN/AQS-20A towed mine-detecting sonar and sensors; the Organic Airborne Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS); the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (AES-1 ALMDS); the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS); and the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS) 30mm cannon with its “supercavitating” ammunition. See DID’s in-depth coverage of the MH-60S Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) program for more details.

The Anti-Submarine Warfare module has experienced more turbulence. The Advanced Deployable System (ADS) had been at the heart of the ASW anti-submarine module, and was intended to be a fast-deploying underwater sensor net developed by Lockheed Martin under the Maritime Surveillance Systems program office (PMS 485). Unfortunately, the ADS program was terminated. The next mainstay was expected to be Lockheed’s WLD-1 sub-surface USV towing the AN/AQS-20A, but that was relegated to mine warfare only in late 2009. What’s left is a new General Dynamics USV, and acoustic sensors such as Lockheed’s Sea Talon multifunction towed array and remote towed active source. Other detection systems and weapons are designed for use aboard the MH-60 helicopter and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) like the Spartan. New technologies like the revolutionary “Sea Sparker” active sonobuoy may also find their way into this mix.

The SUW attack module makes use of 4 weapon stations. In addition to the 57mm naval gun, firepower could include the same 30mm cannon used in the Mine Warfare program’s RAMICS mine-disposal system, and in the Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Another option is a version of the US Army’s Non Line-of-Sight – Launch System (NLOS-LS), aka. NETFIRES. Each of the on-board weapon stations are sized to carry 4 Netfire “missile in a box” modules, each of which packs 15 cells, for 60 missiles total per station.

These cheap precision attack missiles (PAM) roughly duplicate the effects of a 155mm shell, and have a range of up to 40 km/ 24 miles. A NETFIRES-equipped Littoral Combat Ship could offer inshore naval fire support, if the ship is willing to come within artillery range of the coast. This missile array would also prove very suitable for engaging swarms of fast-moving targets like small boats. On the other hand, they would be badly outclassed by common anti-ship missiles, with ranges of 150 – 300 miles and warheads that pack 200 or more pounds of explosives.

Other missions that have reportedly been studied for the LCS, including a configuration with medical/humanitarian modules, SEAL and special forces support missions, troop transport for Marines, or Naval Fire Support employing a variant of the Army/Marine Corps’ 227mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

The Danish Absalon Class multi-mission frigates have shown that reconfigurable bays can be adapted to carry troops and vehicles, in a manner reminiscent of the 1930s-era APDs adapted from World War 1 destroyers. With respect to mounting MLRS modules on ships, the option poses fewer engineering problems than programs like Germany’s MONARC 155mm howitzer, due to the absence of recoil. If the USA’s LCS ships field MLRS modules, they will become the first ships to do so. The new German F125 Sachsen Class frigates were also supposed to carry MLRS modules, but navalization challenges caused them to drop that option. A packaged solution from the USA that required no German research and development funds could change that calculus, and draw interest from other countries as well.

LCS Controversies

The cost and size of LCS ships are now comparable to other countries’ high-end naval frigates. As the US Navy’s primary low-end vessels in the future fleet, they will be expected to perform many of the same roles. The cargo hold’s size has created some challenges in fitting all of the required equipment into the mission modules, without compromising high-end performance at the modules’ particular tasks. Even so, LCS ships can be expected to perform the mine countermeasures role very well, and the frigates’ traditional anti-submarine role reasonably well, thanks to their helicopters, array of robots, and rapidly upgradeable systems.

Other traditional roles for frigate-sized vessels are more controversial. The biggest controversy surrounds the ships’ one area of severe inflexibility: their weapons fit.

Present LCS designs don’t even carry torpedo tubes, or vertical-launch systems (VLS) that could accommodate present and future attack and/or defensive missiles. Even with the Surface Warfare module installed, LCS ships will carry a very light armament set for a major naval vessel: a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system; RIM-116 SeaRAM short range defensive missiles; up to 4×15-missile launchers for light short-range NETFIRES missiles, each with striking power equal to a 155mm shell; 30mm cannons that would replace NetFires launchers on a 1-for-4 basis if installed; 12.7mm machine guns; plus any missiles or 70mm rockets carried by its accompanying helicopters (up to 2 H-60 slots or up to 4 MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV slots).

That armament is closer to a support vessel than a naval surface combatant, and larger high-speed support designs like the JHSV would offer far more mission module space, if the US Navy wished to build reconfigurable specialty support ships. Naval analyst Raymond Pritchett has pithily described the current compromise as:

”...3000 ton speedboat chasers with the endurance of a Swedish corvette, the weapon payload of a German logistics ship, and the cargo hold of a small North Korean arms smuggler.”

Even the tiny Danish Flyvefisken Class, whose swappable “flex ship” modules helped pave the way for the LCS idea, has a Mk 48 vertical launch system that can handle longer-range air defense missiles, and mounts launchers for Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The LCS weapon array also compares unfavorably with corvettes like Israel’s US-built, $260 million Sa’ar 5 Eilat Class, and Sweden’s ultra-stealthy Visby Class. In naval combats, even some small Fast Attack Craft classes of missile boats would have a significant firepower advantage. So, too, would comparable-sized frigates that can perform the full array of anti-submarine, fleet air defense, and naval combat roles; like the new Franco-Italian FREMM Class, or even Britain’s much older Type 23/Duke Class.

It’s telling that brochures for the International LCS versions offered by each team feature a major radar capability boost via the small SPY-1F AEGIS system, and are armed with torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and vertical-launch system (VLS) cells. General Dynamics’ trimaran offers 16 tactical length VLS cells for up to 64 RIM-162 ESSM anti-air missiles, and adds torpedo tubes. Lockheed Martin’s international version, which attracted some interest from Israel before cost issues intervened, has 16 strike length VLS cells that could also accommodate anti-ship missiles, land attack missiles, and anti-submarine weapons like ASROC.

The emerging scenario in the USA, meanwhile, is a cost for the base ships that continues to hover around $450-550 million each, plus mission modules that bring the price per equipped ship to $600 million or more. That is no longer a cheap corvette class price tag. It’s a price tag that places the USA’s LCS at the upper end of the international market for full multi-role frigate designs. Even as future procurement trends will make LCS ships the most common form of US naval power.

In that environment, unfavorable comparisons are inevitable. A versatile surveillance and special forces insertion ship whose flexibility doesn’t extend to the light armament that is its weakest point, and isn’t flexible enough to deal with anything beyond token naval or air opposition, won’t meet expectations. Worse, it could cause the collapse of the Navy’s envisaged “high-low” force structure if the DDG-1000 destroyers and CG (X) cruisers are priced out of the water, and built in small numbers. That has already happened to DDG-1000/ DD (X), now that production has been capped at just 2-3 ships. As Vice-Admiral Mustin (ret.) and Vice-Admiral Katz (ret.) put it in a 2003 USNI Proceedings article:

“Because the Navy has invested heavily in land-attack capabilities such as the Advanced Gun System and land-attack missiles in DD (X), there is no requirement for [the Littoral Combat Ship] to have this capability. Similarly, LCS does not require an antiair capability beyond self-defense because DD (X) and CG (X) will provide area air defense. Thus, if either DD (X) or CG (X) does not occur in the numbers required and on time, the Navy will face two options: leave LCS as is, and accept the risk inherent in employment of this ship in a threat environment beyond what it can handle (which is what it did with the FFG-7); or “grow” LCS to give it the necessary capabilities that originally were intended to reside off board in DD (X) and CG (X). Neither option is acceptable.”

Especially if the low end has grown to a cost level that makes it equivalent to other countries’ major surface combatants, while falling short on key capabilities that will be required in the absence of higher-end ships.

LCS: Budgets & Program Structure

The USA’s Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports that the US Navy’s 2009 shipbuilding plan still envisions building 55 littoral combat ships between 2005 – 2019. Because those ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the Navy would need to begin procuring their replacements in 2032. The current plan also expects to buy 64 mission modules for the 55-ship program, or about 1.2 modules per ship, down from the originally-envisaged 3-4 modules.

The CBO currently estimates LCS shipbuilding costs at around $30.2 billion, a figure that seems likely to rise as the program moves forward. Mission modules would be bought separately at about $100 million per module. This contrasts with the original hope of $22 billion at $400 million per ship, which included just $220 million for construction, and 3 mission modules at $60 million each.

The LCS program’s budgets have been a mess. In that respect, they have simply reflected their underlying program structure.

Under the original vision, Team Lockheed and the General Dynamics/Austal consortium would each produce a number of fully operational, competing Flight 0 ships. The idea was that experience with these ships is the best teacher and evaluator, ensuring that the Navy selects the right winning team for the overall program. It would also begin an immediate expansion of the US Navy’s falling numbers, since all of the Flight 0 ships would be available after the testing phase was complete. The design approach for the winning team’s second generation Flight 1 LCS ships would be flexible, and was envisioned as changing somewhat in light of the experience gained with the Flight 0 designs. Initially, 4 Flight 0 ships and 9 Flight 1 ships were contemplated, along with a purchase of various mission modules.

LCS budgets are not suitable for inclusion as a table, because the program’s structure has changed repeatedly, and several years had appropriated funds that were not spent due to prgram turmoil. As such, each year’s budget can only be understood in light of the program’s shifting plans.

In FY 2005, Congress approved the Navy’s plan to fund the construction of the first 2 competing LCS sea frames, funded LCS-1, required LCS-2 to be built to a different design when funded in FY 2006, and added other basic stipulations.

The FY 2006 budget was $1.054 billion ($470.3M procurement, $584.1M RDT&E). The Navy had initially asked for LCS-2, but shipbuilding supporters in Congress funded LCS 2-4. As the program progressed, however, new Navy shipbuilding standards, and other shifts in specifications, caused LCS ship prices to rise sharply. As ship costs doubled, and then continued to rise, political scrutiny grew. In response, legislators inserted an adjusted $220 million cost cap on LCS 5-6, and made that buy and any others contingent on Navy certification of a stable LCS design.

The FY 2007 budget was $926.6 million ($597.2M for ships & mission modules, $329.4M RDT&E). Congress funded LCS-5 and LCS-6. Austal’s Dec 11/06 press release even implied that more early-build ships might enter US Navy plans:

“Recent Navy reports have speculated on an expanded acquisition strategy, from 4 to a possible 17, for the Flight 0 fleet of LCSs that also includes an alternate monohull ship design. Commenting in September, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Dr Delores Etter, told Reuters, ‘The U.S. Navy hopes to finalize its acquisition strategy for a new class of shore-hugging combat ships by mid-December [2006].’ “

In March 2007, however, the US Navy canceled Team Lockheed’s LCS-3 due to cost growth. In November 2007 (technically, FY 2008), the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS-4 joined it. A Navy policy of requesting fixed-price contracts, coupled with specifications and designs they could keep changing at will, created a gap too large for negotiations to bridge. Contracts for LCS 5 & 6 were never issued.

Under the Navy’s revised approach, planned FY 2007-2008 procurements would be channeled into getting LCS 1 & 2 built, rather than buying additional ships. Instead of buying 3 more LCS ships in 2008, and then ramping up to 6 ships per year in 2009 – 2012, amended procurement plans proposed to buy 1 ship in 2008 and 2 ships in 2009. Under that Plan B, the 2 consortia would compete for orders, with 2 ships contracted to the winning builder and 1 for the loser. A down-select to 1 design would take place in 2010.

The FY 2008 request was set at $1.208 billion ($990.8M for 3 ships + 2 mission modules, $217.5M RDT&E); but the Navy’s cancelations and revised procurement strategy led to $337.1 million in funding for a single LCS – a contract the Navy never issued. Meanwhile, Congress had raised the per-ship cost cap to $460 million, and required fixed-price-type contracts for LCS ships bought from here on.

The FY 2009 request was $920 million, for 2 LCS ships. The final 2009 defense bill increased that funding to $1 billion. Once again, however, the Navy’s LCS procurement plan changed. Now, it planned to buy 2 LCS ships in 2009, with an option for Phase II that could involve up to 3 more LCS Flight 0+ Class ships on the same terms in 2010. Those Phase II ships would likely be split between the contractors, but could be issued for just 1 design.

Congress added some relief by delaying the implementation of the LCS cost cap to FY2010, but contract negotiations must have been interesting. Neither manufacturing team had demonstrated the ability to deliver an LCS ship for $500 million, and the Navy was insisting on fixed-price contracts that transfer all risk to the shipbuilders. Both contracts (LCS-3 and LCS-4) were eventually signed in 2009, but the Navy decided that their terms needed to be kept secret.

That seems likely leave just 2 Flight 0 LCS ships in the water before the revised LCS program was supposed to pick one final design. Or not. Under terms that remained unclear.

First came reports that that final selection might even feature a design competition that would be separate from the build competition, which means the ship’s design team may not be the final builders. That kind of competition is called “build to print,” in which the government buys the blueprints and then contracts for construction separately. Of course, handing a new ship design to a firm that hasn’t built it before carries cost-inflation risks of its own. The question is whether the potential threat of switching suppliers creates enough added incentives to keep costs down, in order to justify the increased time, overhead, and added program risk inherent in running 2 serial competitions instead of 1.

The FY 2010 budget requested $1.877 billion ($1.38 billion for 3 more ships, $136.7M for mission modules, plus $360.5M RDT&E which includes $75.5 million to cover cost growth on LCS 1-2). The program ended up with $1.616 billion: $1,193.6 million for all procurement, and $422.7 million for RDT&E.

In September 2009, while the House and Senate were working on reconciling their FY 2010 defense bills, another major change to the program’s structure was announced. There would be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

Assuming that this program remains intact, the FY 2011 request is for $1.818 billion. RDT&E would be $226.3 million, while $1.592 billion for procurement would fund 2 ships ($1.2 billion), advance orders for FY 2012-14 major hull and propulsion components ($280 million), and mission modules (remainder, about $112 million).

LCS: Export potential

Once one steps beyond small patrol craft, growing capabilities have made frigate-sized vessels the most common naval export around the globe. With many nations confronting challenges in the world’s littorals, which include the globe’s most important shipping choke points, one would expect some interest in the Littoral Combat Ship beyond the USA. A Dec 11/06 Austal release claimed 26 potential buyers worldwide for the ship and its companion equipment, “with two near-term contenders and four others that have expressed active interest.”

In July 2008, Israel stepped up and confirmed its request for an LCS-I based on Team Lockheed’s design. Israel’s variant was very different from LCS 1 Freedom, however; it featureed a fixed set of weaponry rather than full mission module spaces, and is weapons and AEGIS radar give it a far higher capability ceiling in critical roles like air defense and ship to ship warfare. These changes have been a common theme among international LCs offerings, but an estimated ship cost of over $700 million eventually pushed Israel to rethink its plans. That country is now pursuing cheaper options based on Blohm + Voss’ MEKO family of corvettes and frigates.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has reportedly expressed interest in a fixed armament version of the General Dynamics/Austal design.

At present, however, LCS is not a serious contender for any major naval buy. Even as designs like the German MEKO family, the multi-role Franco-Italian FREMM, the modular-construction Dutch Sigma class, and refurbished 1980s-era NATO frigates continue to find buyers around the world.

LCS: Ship Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

Feb 25/10: US Sen. Sessions [R-AL] questions criteria for Littoral Combat Ship RFP, pointing out the RFP’s cost as sole determinant approach, despite capability differences. The Navy responds that they consider both ships to be equivalent, though AL.com | YouTube video.

Jan 25/10: FBO solicitation #N6660410R0675 for a variable-depth towed sonar to equip the LCS:

“The Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport has a requirement to develop and field a high search rate tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability in the form of a Variable Depth Sonar (VDS) for installation on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). A major component of the VDS System is the Towed Active Subsystem (TAS) consisting of a hydro-dynamically stable tow body, tow cable, handling and stowage equipment and acoustic transmit assemblies. The TAS shall be an existing product that is modified to meet the LCS integration and installation constraints identified in the performance specifications. The objective of this procurement is to fabricate, install, test and support the TAS and its integration with the VDS system.”

Feb 19/10: Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Kim Martinez says that the Fort Worth [LCS 3] “is being assessed to preclude the same tank design,” and may be modified to avoid the need for USS Freedom’s bolt-on rear “water wings.” Gannett’s Navy Times blog Scoop Deck adds:

“Neither LockMart nor the Navy will say the original LCS 1 design included too little reserve buoyancy, but Martinez stressed that Freedom “meets all the Navy’s requirements, including for reserve buoyancy.” So does that mean the Navy discovered problems with its own requirements after accepting delivery of the Freedom? “That’s a question best answered by the Navy,” Martinez said.”

Feb 16/10: Gannett’s Navy Times’ blog “Scoop Deck” notes an interesting change to USS Freedom [LCS 1]:

“There is one big change, however: In a yard period late last year, Freedom acquired two large oblong metal boxes on its transom, on either side of the stern gate its crew uses to launch and recover boats. The sailors call these “buoyancy tanks,” although they look almost like a baby’s water wings for the pool… Do water wings added after the fact mean the Freedom – and Lockheed Martin’s design for the LCS 1-class – suffered from too little reserve buoyancy? “I can’t really talk much more about that,” [Gold Crew skipper, Commander Randy] Garner said.”

Feb 2/10: The US Congress’ GAO submits official report GAO-10-257: “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.” Key excerpts:

“GAO’s analysis of the Navy’s 2009 estimates showed that the [LCS] operating and support costs for seaframes and mission packages could total $84 billion (in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) through about 2050 [divided $64.1 billlion seaframes, $20.8 billion packages]. However, the Navy did not follow some best practices for developing an estimate…. The costs to operate and support a weapon system can total 70 percent of a system’s costs…. With a decision pending in 2010 on which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program, decision makers could lack critical information to assess the full costs of the alternatives. The Navy has made progress in developing operational concepts for LCS, but faces risks in implementing its new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that are necessitated by the small crew size…. an average of 484 days of training is required before reporting to a [LCS] crew, significantly more than for comparable positions on other surface ships. Moreover, the Navy’s maintenance concept relies heavily on distance support, with little maintenance performed on ship. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new concepts…. If the Navy cannot implement its concepts as envisioned, it may face operational limitations, have to reengineer its operational concepts, or have to alter the ship design. Many of the concepts will remain unproven until 2013 or later, when the Navy will have committed to building almost half the class…. Navy officials from two divisions within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – the Surface Warfare Division and the Assessments Division – said they were unaware of any analysis supporting the total planned quantities for either the surface warfare package or its maritime security module. Also, Navy officials said that the Navy has not performed a force structure analysis on the antisubmarine package because the contents are under development.”

GAO’s core recommendation, among several:

“To improve decision making, we are recommending that the Navy conduct a risk assessment and consider the results before committing to buy LCS ships in order to link procurement with evidence that the Navy is progressing in its ability to implement its new operational concepts.”

Jan 27/10: The US Navy releases the revised Littoral Combat Ship RfP. See Sept 16/09 and Jan 11/10 entries; the winner will receive contracts for 10 ships over the next 5 years, and another competition will be held in 2012 for a 2nd shipyard. The 2nd shipyard will build 5 ships of the same design over 3 years, but can’t be associated with the winning shipyard. FedBizOpps Solicitation #N0002410R2301:

“For the requirements synopsized herein, the LCS team members are the only sources, with the requisite knowledge of LCS design, construction, systems, and extensive knowledge of, and experience with, mission module interface requirements to efficiently and effectively construct these additional follow-on ships within the required construction period, and perform the associated services. The requirement contemplated is for up to ten (10) ships with two (2) ships in Fiscal Year 2010 and for two (2) ships per year in Fiscal Years 2011 through 2014; up to five (5) additional Select Ship Systems to be provide to a Second Source in FY12; integration of up to five (5) sets of Select Ship Systems for a Second Source in FY12. The contract will be awarded through a limited competition pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2304©(1), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. Companies interested in subcontracting opportunities should contact the LCS teams directly.”

The RfP lists 3 primary bid items (basic seaframe/ ship; combat & non-combat equipment; and the systems to handle the integration and testing. Technical and management factorsin order of preference are: affordability and production approach; management; technical data package adequacy, and rights in technical data and computer software; design change impact; past performance; and life-cycle cost reduction initiatives. Navy statements strongly indicate, however, that this will almost exclusively be a cost-driven competition. Defense News | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Jan 20/10: In an exclusive report, Reuters offers conclusions the Pentagon’s director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Key conclusions include the failure of either design to meet Level I survivability criteria except among some sub-sections, and that neither ship could be expected to “be survivable in a hostile combat environment.”

Lockheed Martin’s Freedom Class monohulls had problems in early air target tracking tests, which revealed deficiencies in the TRS-3D radar’s power supply and reliability, and serious problems with the combat system. The report added that the ship could face stability problems when fully loaded. Lockheed Martin spokeswoman Jen Allen claims that stability is no longer a problem for this class, and Reuters reports that the Navy plans to install external tanks to effectively lengthen the ship’s stern, and increase its buoyancy.

General Dynamics/ Austal’s Independence Class trimaran had its builders trials delayed due to reported leaks at the gas turbine shaft seals, and more testing identified deficiencies in the main propulsion diesel engines. Reuters

Jan 16/10: The trimaran USS Independence [LCS 2] is commissioned. Austal | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Jan 11/10: Defense News reports that General Dynamics and Austal are set to break up their LCS partnership, which has GD Bath Iron Works as the prime contractor but most of the structural shipbuilding work done by Austal in Mobile, AL. Under the new procurement rules, the US Navy will require a second-supplier shipyard for the winning design, that can’t be associated with the primary builder. Before they take any final actions, however, the GD/Austal team is waiting to see the Navy’s latest RFP, which is a bit behind schedule but is still expected in January 2010.

General Dynamics had reportedly seen Bath Iron Works as the logical shipbuilding facility to take on shipbuilding work if their team’s trimaran design won, but there is some speculation that this may shift to T-AKE shipbuilder GD NASSCO in California, instead.

Dec 18/09: The General Dynamics Littoral Combat Ship Team delivers Independence [LCS 2] to the US Navy. USN Commanding Officer Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair Captain Dean Krestos officially accepted custody of Independence in Mobile, AL, where the ship will remain before its commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/10. That date will mark the first time a US Navy ship has been commissioned in Mobile since 1945. The ship will then prepare for its next set of trials, in the summer of 2010. US Navy | GD release.

Dec 17/09: A brief keel laying ceremony is held in Mobile at Austal USA’s Assembly Bay 4 to record completion of the first major construction milestone for Coronado [LCS 4]. As one might expect, the centerpiece of the ceremony was the ship’s keel module, a large outfitted section of the aluminum center hull. GD release.

Dec 3/09: The US Navy finally releases the cost data for recent Littoral Combat Ship contracts. Note that the cost of a fully-outfitted ship would add about $100 million for the installed mission module, in addition to other “government furnished equipment”. As such, actual costs to field operational ships are likely to end up above $600 million:

“As a result of the Navy’s change in acquisition strategy for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the Navy can now release the pricing…. The total value of the LCS 3 contract, awarded to Lockheed Martin Corporation on March 23, was $470,854,144 which includes ship construction, non-recurring construction and additional engineering effort, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support.

The total value of the LCS 4 contract, awarded to General Dynamics – Bath Iron Works on May 1, was $433,686,769 which includes ship construction, non-recurring construction and additional engineering effort, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support.

The contract values do not include government costs which include government furnished equipment, change orders, and program management support costs. The contract values do not include the cost of continuation work and material used from the terminated original contract options for LCS 3 and 4. The value of the continuation work and material from the terminated LCS 3 was $78 million for Lockheed Martin Corporation and $114 million from the terminated LCS 4 for General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works.”

Nov 13-21/09: USS Freedom [LCS 1] also conducts independent ship deployment training and certification at sea, operating with ships from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower [CVN 69] Carrier Strike Group during their Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX). That was part of the Maritime Security Surge certification for the ship’s Gold Crew, which will deploy aboard Freedom in early 2010 to U.S. Southern Command.

Nov 19/09: The US Navy announces that LCS 2 Independence has successfully completed acceptance trials, after completing a series of graded in-port and underway demonstrations for the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV).

Acceptance trials are the last significant milestone before delivery of the ship to the Navy. Ship delivery is expected to occur with the ship’s commissioning as USS Independence on Jan 16/09 in Mobile, AL.

Oct 18/09: LCS 2 Independence successfully completes builder’s trials in the Gulf of Mexico. The trials included more than 50 demonstration events in preparation for final inspection by the Navy, including stable flight deck performance and ship control in Beaufort Sea State 5 conditions, sustained speeds of 44 knots, tests of the ship’s open architecture OPEN CI electronic backbone, and detection and engagement of a simulated cruise missile fire by an small jet aircraft. Austal release | GD release | Gannett’s Navy Times.

Oct 14/09: The Navy announces the decision to deploy the USS Freedom (LCS 1) in early 2010 to the Southern Command and Pacific Command areas ahead of her originally scheduled 2012 maiden deployment (see also June 9/09 entry). Military.com says that:

“In evaluating options for deploying the Freedom earlier than originally scheduled, the Navy took into consideration several key factors including combat systems testing, shakedown of the ship systems and overseas sustainment with a new concept of operations and crew training. To facilitate the early deployment, the Navy adjusted the Freedom testing schedule, prioritized testing events needed for deployment and deferred others not required for the missions envisioned during this deployment.”

Sept 16/09: The Pentagon reiterates its commitment to 55 LCS ships, but changes the LCS program’s acquisition structure, again. There will be no Phase II for the FY 2009 buy. Instead, selection of the final design would occur in FY 2010, before operational trials of both ships could take place. Both industry teams would submit proposals under a new solicitation. The winner would receive a 10-ship contract running from FY 2010-2014, and provide the combat systems for their 10 ships, plus 5 more. They would also deliver a technical data package, allowing the Navy to open a “build to print” competition for a second builder of the chosen design, beginning in FY 2012. That “build to print” order would be for up to 5 more ships.

This timeline would not give the Navy enough time to fully evaluate the ships relative merits before it makes its selection, essentially removing the entire rationale for building 2 types of Flight 0 ships. It would also leave the ships’ overall operational utility an open question.

Colton Company’s Maritime Memos adds that the envisioned structure may face challenges, dependng on which design wins. It sees Team Lockheed’s steel hull as biddable to Northrop Grumman Pascagoula, GD Bath Iron Works, and GD NASSCO, plus VT Halter Marine; and possibly Todd, Bollinger in a break-away bid, or anyone who buys Bender in liquidation. The GD Bath Iron Works/Austal aluminum-hull design requires a more specialized set of skills, however, and those ships are too wide to be built on the Great Lakes and shipped out through the seaway. Colton believes a shipbuilder would have to invest in a new yard, or partner with an established aluminum boatbuilder, such as Swiftships or megayacht builder, such as Trinity Yachts. Colton adds:

“In essence, there might not be any credible competition for a second-source contract. Since almost everyone now agrees that the Austal design is clearly superior to the Marinette design, this could give the Navy a new problem.”

It could certainly give the Austal/GD team a new problem. US DoD | The Hill magazine | Alabama Press-Register | Associated Press | Reuters | Information Dissemination op-ed: “The LCS is Still a Mess.”

July 30/09: At the House Armed Services Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee’s “Hearing on Efforts to Improve Shipbuilding Effectiveness,” Chair Gene Taylor [D-MS] states in his opening remarks that:

“The LCS program is still a disaster, there is no way to sugar coat it, the program is still a disaster. Those first vessels were constructed in the most inefficient manner possible, just like my house construction analogy, and now we are being told by both the contractors that the cost of these ships really is in excess of a half a billion dollars. I am not sure the Congress is willing to go forward with that program unless significant progress is made on cost control, and I do mean significant.

With the challenges being faced by all the Services in trying to reset from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Navy cannot count on additional funding for ship construction. We all need to figure how to rebuild our Fleet with the procurement dollars available. To do that all costs must come under control. Hard decisions need to be made. Soon.”

July 20/09: The latest update of the Congressional Research Service report #RL33741: “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress.”

June 15/09: Inside the Navy, Vol. 22, No. 23:

“The House Armed Services seapower and expeditionary forces subcommittee has proposed to restructure the congressionally mandated $460 million cost cap for the Littoral Combat Ship to solely include the price of each vessel [DID: and not its weapons, radars, and “mission equipment”], but if shipbuilders cannot meet the cost cap, lawmakers would require the Navy to rebid the ship.”

June 10/09: Austal announces “light off” of LCS 2 Independence’s 4 propulsion engines: 2 GE LM2500 22,000kW gas turbines, and 2 MTU 20V 8000 M71 9,100kW diesels. The light off followed fuel loading and testing of all 4 generators.

Activation and testing of the combat and other systems onboard Independence is continuing at Austal’s US facility in Mobile, AL. The beginning of sea trials is expected within a few weeks.

June 9/09: The Military Officers’ Association of America’s “Inside the Headquarters” blog says that the US Navy is thinking of deploying the LCS early:

“According to a source at Lockheed Martin, the Navy wants the USS Freedom (LCS 1) to deploy soon and well ahead of schedule. Apparently the chief of naval operations himself, Adm. Gary Roughead, has called for the move. Currently, the Freedom is not scheduled to deploy until 2012.”

The Somali coast would be the most likely destination. Efforts to move endangered weapons programs to the front lines, in order to secure a program’s future, have a long history in the US military.

June 9/09: Alion Science and Technology Corp. in Washington, DC received an $8.6 million modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-09-F-B008) for support to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program office. This will include program planning and management, business and financial management planning and execution, systems engineering, test and evaluation engineering, life cycle engineering and support, logistics and operation support, configuration and data management engineering, and combat systems development.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC, and is expected to be complete by September 2009.

June 1/09: Gannett’s Navy Times reports that based on FY 2010 budget justfication documents, the price to build, outfit and deliver Team Lockheed’s USS Freedom (LCS 1) now is $637 million, up from last year’s estimate of $631 million. The price tag for the GD/Austal ship Independence (LCS 2), however, rose from $636 million to $704 million. Most of the cost growth on the LCS 2 is listed under Basic Construction Cost.

May 22/09: The USS Freedom wasn’t able to perform a number of key Navy acceptance tests on Lake Michigan, where she was built. A 2nd round of INSURV testing was required, and the US Navy PEO Ships release states that:

“There were no major safety issues or operational restrictions determined during the trial, although the ship must complete a number of scheduled system certifications before it can conduct unrestricted operations.”

INSURV inspectors noted that since the August 2008 lake trials, the ship has made improvements to its propulsion plant, machinery control system, communication systems, and information systems. The new salt water tests allowed inspectors to check the ship’s cathodic protection, degaussing, and reverse osmosis system. Ocean conditions let them test surveillance and identification systems at a sufficient distance from land without border issues. And stepping out of a lake used for drinking water let them demonstrate the ship’s fire suppression and waste discharge systems. Other major systems and features demonstrated for INSURV this time included aviation support, small boat launch handling and recovery, fin stabilizers, in addition to the full-power run.

May 15/09: Aviation Week reports that US Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway is working with his Navy counterpart, Adm. Gary Roughead, to expand the concept of using the LCS as a naval fire support option for Marine landings.

Conway is quoted as discussing “a box of rockets” as the Marnes’ preferred option, which would seem to indicate the LCS surface warfare module’s planned NLOS-LS/NETFIRES “missile in a box” system. On the other hand, the report adds that:

“The services are still examining storage and elevator capacity aboard LCS, and Conway said “we don’t have [the] box we need.”

May 1/09: “US Navy Sinks LCS-4 Construction” chronicled the crash of the original program’s acquisition plan, and cancellation of the 2nd ships from each manufacturing team. Now, General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME has received a FY 2009 contract to build the USS Coronado [LCS 4]. The contract includes construction, class design services, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support. Phase II could involve up to 3 more LCS Flight 0+ Class ships.

What the US Navy will not do, is reveal those terms of Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics’ contracts, even though the original excuse that the Navy was in negotiations with General Dynamics for its part of the 2-phase buy no longer applies. The Navy simply says that “the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time.” The LCS program’s cost overruns have been significant contributors to the program’s political troubles, and it certainly is convenient not to have to discuss that any more. One source of inference is that the award represents the 2nd half of the 2-vessel, $1.02 billion FY 2009 budget appropriation for the LCS program, but past LCS contracts and budgets have had little predictive value with respect to final outlays.

Austal had remained optimistic regarding the LCS program, but recently laid off 62 employees in Mobile, AL, due to slower work in the commercial ferry sector. There is no word yet on whether they will be rehired as a result of this contract. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50%); Bath, ME (17%); Pittsfield, MA (14%); California, MD (1%); Baltimore, MD (1%); Leesburg, VA (1%); Burlington, VT (1%); Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (2%); and various locations of less than 1% each totaling 13%. Work is expected to be complete by June 2012 (N00024-09-C-2302).

Meanwhile, sea trials of Austal’s first LCS, the 127m Independence [LCS 2], are scheduled for mid-2009, with delivery expected later in the year. Austal | General Dynamics | Mobile, AL Press-Register | Mobile, AL Press-Register re: layoffs.

April 6/09: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announces his FY 2010 budget recommendations, which include 3 LCS ships. Despite issues with the program, and concern about the ship’s combat capabilities, Gates reiterates the goal of eventually buying 55 of these $500+ million specialty support ships. The announcement bolstered confidence at Austal, which had been watching the budget deliberations closely.

March 23/09: US NAVSEA awards Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD an undisclosed sum for “LCS FY09 Flight 0+ ship construction, class design services, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies and post delivery support.”

The Navy cancelled Lockheed Martin’s original LCS-3 contract in 2007, but new negotiations reportedly arrived at an acceptable arrangement for a fixed-price contract with incentives. The Fort Worth’s [LCS-3] price tag is reported to be in the $500 million range, which would represent a price drop relative to LCS-1.

NAVSEA is still negotiating with General Dynamics for LCS-4, so the award amount is classified source selection information under Federal Acquisition Regulations 2.101 and 3.104. Under the Navy’s FY 09/10 strategy (see Oct 17/08 entry), the Navy will attempt to buy 2 LCS ships in FY 2009, with option for up to 3 ships in 2010. Earlier acquisition strategies had focused on FY 2010 as the down-select date; that is still possible, but the Navy reportedly has the option of choosing another split for the FY 2010 buy.

Work will be performed in Marinette, WI (63%); Moorestown, NJ (12%); Washington, DC (11%); Clearwater, FL (4%); Baltimore, MD (4%); Arlington, VA (3%); Brunswick, GA (2%); and Eagan, MN (1%), and is expected to be complete by December 2012 (N00024-09-C-2303). See also: Reuters report.

March 12/09: US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter announces that LCS 4 will be named USS Coronado. A 4th LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been aloocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships. The Navy’s release has a picture of the GD/Austal trimaran design next to the announcement, but the announcement does not confirm that type as LCS 4.

Coronado, near San Diego, CA is home to Naval Air Base North Island (NASNI) and Naval Amphibious Base (NAB), Coronado, and has been home to the Navy since 1917. Coronado hosts 2 aircraft carriers, the west coast’s major SEAL special forces facility, and over 120 tenant commands between the 2 bases. US Navy.

March 11/09: Bill Sweetman of Aviation Week reports that one logical corollary of a “build to [blue]print” aproach is that foreign shipyards might become eligible to compete for LCS construction:

”[Taylor] also noted to the conference that he’s visited other shipyards – Hyundai in Korea, Maersk in Finland – and concluded that “our yards have to get up to their [DID: highly automated] standards.” So if LCS goes to open bidding, would those shipyards be eligible to bid? “Traditionally the House has preferred to build our weapons domestically,” Taylor said, “but we’ve had a hard time getting it past Senator McCain. If I had my way I’d limit it to American shipbuilders. But I often don’t get my way.”

That statement can fairly be described as cryptic. Sweetman’s conjecture re: foreign construction is unlikely, for a variety of political reasons. Government funding for shipyard improvements, meanwhile, did not appear in the “stimulus” bill, and would be most likely to be funneled to the larger military shipyards if it was granted.

March 10/09: MarineLog reports that the Littoral Combat Ship program receives another bi-partisan rough ride at the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces. Chairman Gene Taylor [D-MS]:

“When I look at the plan from just two years ago, we should by now have at least 4 ships delivered, 3 more nearing completion from a fiscal year 2008 authorization, 6 under contract from a fiscal year 2009 authorization, and today we should be discussing the authorization of 6 more ships for fiscal year 2010. That would be a total of 19 ships. So instead of having 13 delivered or under contract with another 6 in this year’s budget, we have one ship delivered that will likely tip the scales well above two and a half times the original estimate and one ship that might finish this summer, with similar if not higher cost growth… Everyone should understand that the current situation of these vessels costing in excess of a half billion dollars cannot continue…. There are too many other needs and too little resources to pour money into the program that was designed to be affordable.”

With respect to Taylor’s desire for a “build to print” approach, the answer appears to be that the government owns the rights to the ship’s physical design, but integration of all the sub-systems like the radar, Mk110 naval gun etc. is another matter. Rep. Todd Akin [R-MO] was critical of the Navy’s acquisition strategy, from the repeated changes over the last 2 years to the current strategy’s sustainability:

“We cannot reasonably expect the industry teams to make the investments in facilities and designs for affordability we demand, if we cannot articulate what we want to buy. Further, we cannot reasonably expect the taxpayers to continue to fund ships that we cannot definitively say we want…. We need to be very cautious about increasing capacity for which the Navy lacks the volume to support…. We must ensure that we are not creating two additional shipyards who rely on a sole customer for support. The strategy for building LCS at mid-tier yards was explicitly to avoid this phenomenon, since these yards had commercial work. Now, we hear that these yards may have turned away commercial work and are considering capital investments with the intent of constructing LCS only.”

See: MarineLog | Information Dissemination.

March 6/09: US Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announces 6 that the LCS 3 will be named USS Fort Worth. A 3rd LCS ship had not been ordered yet when the announcement was made, though some funds had been aloocated in the FY 2009 budget for 2 ships.

The Navy says that the announcement continues the practice of naming the agile LCS vessels after American midsized cities, small towns and communities. Fort Worth, TX, near Dallas, is an epsecially important hub of aerospace manufacturing, but a number of other defense-related activities go on there. US Navy.

March 2/09: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-03-C-2311) for “LCS program continuation efforts necessary to preserve production capability at its industry team shipyard facility.” Work is expected to be complete by April 2009, and will be performed in Marinette, WI (56%); Moorestown, NJ (13%); Clearwater, FL (11%); Brunswick, GA (10%); Washington, DC (8%) and Baltimore, MD (2%) under contract (N00024-03-C-2311).

Lockheed Martin has already delivered USS Freedom [LCS 1] to the Navy, and the Navy’s prior cancellation of LCS 3 has left that shipyard with a work gap. General Dynamics and Austal, meanwhile, continue to build LCS 2 Independence at their Gulf Coast shipyard. This award must be at least $5 million, or the Navy would not have announced it at all, but no figure was given. With respect to this award, the US Navy cites this justification for its lack of transparency:

“As this award represents efforts integrally related to Phase I of a competitive two-phased acquisition approach to procure FY09/FY10 LCS, with Phase II including potential award of up to three additional LCS Flight 0+ Class ships, the award amount is considered source selection information (see FAR 2.101 and 3.104) and will not be made public at this time.”

That translates as “we’re still negotiating with Lockheed Martin and with General Dynamics for fixed-price awards, and are appropriating these funds to buy advance materials and avoid layoffs at Marinette.”

Feb 24/09: Senators McCain and Levin, who have authored legislation to reform the US military’s procurement system, single out the LCS program in their comments. CNN:

“Levin said the ships are “way beyond” their projected construction time of two years, and the program has grown from a cost per ship of about $220 million to more than $500 million, according to a November report from the Congressional Research Service. “We can’t have a ship that’s a small ship that’s supposed to be built in two years run completely out of control to double or triple or quadruple its original cost estimates,” McCain said.”

Jan 28/09: General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received a $37.75 million basic ordering agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) of the USS Independence [LCS-2]. Work will include the ship’s PSA efforts, testing, and materials, from program management to advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List, and required fixes.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%); Norfolk, VA (24%); and Mobile, AL (23%), and is expected to be complete by December 2012. This contract was not competitively procured (N00024-09-G-2301).

Dec 29/08: The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) in Houston, TX is a congressionally recognized agent of the government, and ertification to set standards is oe of their services. They receive a $55 million cost no fee, indefinite-delivery/ indefinitely-quantity contract to provide for ship classification and classification-related services using Naval Vessel Rules (NVR), which form the core of the certification process for surface ships bought by US NAVSEA.

New construction contracts require the ships to be designed and constructed in accordance with ABS Rules for Building and Classing Naval Vessels, and other referenced ABS Rules and Guides as necessary to comply with the designated class notations. Readers of this brief will recall that the switch to NVR rules during LCS construction was one of the key factors that inflated the costs of the first ships, and raised costs across the board for the class. On the other hand, ships built to NVR standards can be expected to survive damage better than comparable non-NVR ships.

Approximately 46% of ABS’ services will be performed in support of new DDG ships in Bath, ME (GD-BIW); Pascagoula, MS; and Gulf Port, MS (NG-SS) and approximately 46% in support of future LCS new construction ships in locations to be determined. The remaining 8% of services will be performed in Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; and various worldwide points as specified in task orders to be issued. Work is expected to be completed by December 2013. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in Washington, DC (N00024-09-D-4208)

Dec 17/08: Information Dissemination relays an Inside the Navy report hat covers ongoing platform issues in “LCS Weight Issue Revisited”. From Inside the Navy:

“In October, Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss confirmed that initial tests by the Navy were showing the vessel to be six percent overweight, but maintained that it was not cause for concern…. “There’s stuff on board that I don’t think we need,” Gabrielson said. “There’s some pretty big things on board that I think we could live without.”

Nov 8/08: LCS 1 Freedom is commissioned during a 10 a.m. EST ceremony at Veterans Park in Milwaukee, WI. Upon completion of the ceremony, she becomes USS Freedom. US Navy PEO Ships advance notice | USS Freedom Comissioning Committee.

Oct 31/08: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Baltimore, MD received a $37.5 million Basic Ordering Agreement for Post-Shakedown Availability (PSA) on the Littoral Combat Ship, USS Freedom [LCS-1]. The orders to be issued will encompass services include, but are not limited to program management, advance planning, engineering, material kitting, liaison, scheduling and participation in PSA planning conferences and design reviews, and preparation of documentation as required by the Contract Data Requirement List. The orders will also encompass material and labor to perform the PSA for LCS 1, all testing, including post repair trials required to verify the accuracy and completion of all shipyard industrial work, non-standard equipment when approved, and technical manuals for non-standard equipment.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA (53%) and Norfolk, VA (47%), and is expected to be completed by January 2011. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, D.C. (N00024-09-G-2300).

Oct 24/08: The Freedom [LCS 1] sails away from the Marinette Marine Corp. shipyard in Marinette, WI, en route to Duluth, MN for a four-day port visit beginning Oct. 27. This will be the first leg in the ship’s voyage of commissioning and transit to Norfolk, VA, where she will undergo fleet testing and evaluation away from the Great Lakes’ ice buildups. Maritime Reporter and Engineering News.

Oct 17/08: The NY Times’ International Herald Tribune reports that the U.S. Navy has canceled plans to buy a 3rd new combat ship in FY 2008 from either Lockheed Martin Corp. or General Dynamics Corp., citing budget shortfalls. The article adds that:

“The Navy now plans to award one ship to each contractor under the fiscal 2009 budget, and hold a competition for another three vessels with funding in fiscal 2010 to keep competitive pressure between the two companies. Each of the 2009 contracts will come with options for future ships. However, the Navy said it will evaluate pricing of the fiscal 2010 ships before making a decision, and envisions awarding two ships to a winning contractor and one ship to a losing bidder, the same as its original plan.”

Oct 4/08: The Austal/General Dynamics ship LCS 2 Independence is christened in a ceremony at Austal’s Mobile, AL shipyard. US Navy PEO Ships release | Austal release.

FY 2008

Sept 30/08: R. A. Burch Construction Co., Inc. in Ramona, CA received $6.5 million for a firm-fixed-price task order under a previously award multiple award construction contract (N62473-08-D-8607, #0005). They will be responsible for upgrading Building 57 for the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) squadron administrative headquarters at Naval Base San Diego. The task order also contains one option, which if exercised would increase cumulative task order value to $8.7 million.

Work will be performed in San Diego, CA, and is expected to be complete by April 2010. Contract funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year, and 3 proposals were received for this task order by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest in San Diego, CA.

Sept 18/08: The Lockheed Martin-led LCS team delivers LCS 1 Freedom to the U.S. Navy. The delivery milestone marks the Navy’s preliminary acceptance of LCS 1.

Sept 4/08: WIRED Danger Room’s post “Navy Already Shifting Away from Shallow Waters?” forwards an analysis by Bob Work, naval analyst at the respected, nonpartisan CSBA think tank in Washinton. He sees the same pressures that turned the Navy against the DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer program impinging on the future of the Littoral Combat Ship:

“The maritime area over which a strong coastal power can now influence with multidimensional, combined-arms naval reconnaissance-strike complexes is expanding. The combination of space-based sensors, over-the-horizon radars, maritime [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance], patrol and strike aircraft, nuclear and [Air-Independent Propulsion] submarines armed with wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles, and now anti-ship ballistic missiles, poses severe threats to any surface ship. Under these circumstances, the Navy has to improve its ability to fight from range, in the open ocean.”

July 31/08: In testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee, Dr. Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office discusses the LCS program to date [PDF format]:

“The Navy’s 2009 shipbuilding plan envisions building 55 littoral combat ships between 2005 and 2019. Because those ships are assumed to have a service life of 25 years, the Navy would need to begin procuring their replacements in 2032…. The Navy expects to buy 64 mission modules for the 55-ship program.

....Originally, each sea frame was expected to cost about $260 million (in 2009 dollars, or $220 million in 2005 dollars). The Navy’s 2009 budget would allow the purchase of 18 LCSs during the 2009–2013 period, at an average cost of about $450 million per sea frame. That is 11 fewer than the 2008 plan envisioned…. In the 2009 budget, the Navy estimates the cost of LCS-1 at $631 million and LCS-2 at $636 million…. using the lead ship of the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate as an analogy…. The first FFG-7 cost about $670 million to build (in 2009 dollars), or about $250 million per thousand tons, including combat systems. Applying that metric to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $600 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module…. CBO estimates that the first two LCSs could cost about $700 million each, including outfitting and postdelivery costs…. As of April 27, 2008, LCS-1 was 87% complete and LCS-2 was 72% complete. So, additional cost growth is possible….”

July 30/08: Naval Technology’s article “Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground” offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state. In brief, it states that: “Distilling the story yields the following guide to botching development projects in five steps…”

1. Make the goal as difficult as possible
2. Impose a management style ideally suited for commoditised products
3. When sourcing, be penny-wise and pound-foolish
4. Design and build simultaneously
5. When you’re in a hole, keep digging

”....Perhaps the moral of the LCS story is this: the US can produce better ships, or produce ships better – but it can’t do both at the same time.”

July 28/08: LCS 1 Freedom begins builder’s trials on Lake Michigan. US Navy release | Reuters Aug 12/08 follow-up.

July 21/08: General Dynamics Robotic Systems announces a contract from the USA’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) to develop the LCS’ Common Launch and Recovery System (CLRS) for unmanned boats and other watercraft. The firm is already designing and building the 11m USV that is slated for use as part of the ships’ anti-submarine mission module.

July 15/08: Israel requests 4 LCS-I ships. The contracts with Lockheed Martin et. al. could be worth up to $1.9 billion, and would be the first LCS export sale. The design will be very different from the American Freedom Class LCS, however; mission modules will be replaced with vertical launch systems and fixed weapons, and the ship will sport an AEGIS radar system. See “A Littoral Combat Frigate For Israel” for details.

April 28/08: Austal USA’s Mobile, AL shipysrd launches LCS 2 Independence. The ship will be moored alongside the Austal USA facility for activation and testing of combat and other onboard systems is completed. Sea trials are expected to commence in late 2008. Austal release.

April 7/08: Cost growth for the LCS program lands it on the Pentagon’s Selected Acquisition Reports for this period:

“Program costs increased $909.7 million (+46.9 percent) from $1,938.9 million to $2,848.6 million, due primarily to a revised estimate in Seaframe pricing that reflects substantial cost growth and post delivery work (+$496.1 million) and a revised estimate for Mission Module development and phasing due to maturation of the definition of the Mission Modules (+$271.2 million). Costs also increased due to a lengthening of the Flight 0 schedule to incorporate additional effort (+$71.3 million), a revised estimate for program development of Flight 0 and Flight 0+ planning and execution (+$42.3 million), and additional scope for Mission Module development (+$40.7 million).”

March 14/08: The odds don’t look good for the US Navy’s FY 2009 request of 2 Littoral Combat Ships. The house Armed Services Committee’s Seapower & Expeditionary Forces subcommittee took testimony regarding that request, and the LCS request came under fire from both sides of the aisle. See “US Navy’s 313-Ship Plan Under Fire in Congress” for full links etc. Chairman Rep. Gene Taylor [D-MS], a strong proponent of more naval shipbuilding:

“So, instead of being asked to fund programs that are building ships on time and at projected cost, we are asked to fund programs which are not…. [the LCS] will go into the textbooks to train future acquisition officials how not to run a program. The LCS will be at least twice as expensive as advertised, it has taken twice as long to build the lead ships, neither vessel has been underway on its own power, and the Navy cancelled two contract options last year, which were already funded, because of cost overruns.

Yet this year we are asked to authorize two more ships – why? What has changed between then and now that indicates that this program is in any way ready to build more ships? We have been told the answer to this question is that there is an ‘emergent need’ for these ships in the fleet. If that is true why did the Navy cancel two of the ships? At some point we must stop throwing money at this program until the Navy can prove that at least one of the ships can get to sea and do its mission.”

Ranking minority member Roscoe Bartlett [R-MD] was equally skeptical:

“And how much risk are we buying down if we procure two more Littoral Combat Ships, the year after we cancelled two, and the year in which the Navy plans to conduct an operational evaluation and possible downselect of LCS-1 and 2? Even if there is no downselect, the Navy has stated that there will be design changes made to the Flight One ships. So the two we buy now will be different than the remaining 50. Is that worth it, if those funds could keep a stable program like LPD-17 alive?”

Feb 4/08: FY 2009 budget documents released by the Navy give the expected final cost for its LCS-1 and LCS-2 ships: $631 million and $636 million, respectively. First-of-class ships usually cost more – but recall that prescient July 24/07 estimate of $630 million from the Congressional Budget Office.

Nov 1/07: The US Navy cancels construction of LCS-4 by the General Dynamics/Austal team, leaving its LCS acquisition strategy adrift amidst deep proposed funding cuts from Congress in the FY 2008 budget. There was also the minor problem of a second contractor who refused to accept a “deal” that let the Navy make any number of design changes, while the contractor was solely responsible for costs, and would pay for overruns above the proposed fixed-price contract.

Oct 11/07: Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that the Israeli Navy “has launched a second study regarding the potential acquisition of the United States Navy’s (USN’s) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) focused on Lockheed Martin’s semi-planing monohull design known as LCS-I (Israel). “That design appears to be the most suitable for our needs,” a senior IN source told Jane’s…”

See “An LCS For Israel?” for full coverage.

FY 2007

Sept 27/07: Small business qualifier ALCOA Inc. in Alcoa Center, PA received an $8.3 million indefinite-delivery/ indefinite-quantity, cost-plus-fixed-fee completion contract to provide engineering services in support of the re-design of existing aluminum structures to improve performance and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) via weight reduction of selected assemblies or components. Work will be performed in Alcoa Center, PA (84%); Johnstown, PA (11%); Columbus, OH (3%); and various shipyards (2%), and is expected to be complete in September 2010. Contract funds in the amount of $3.7 million will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The contract was not competitively procured by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, West Bethesda, Md., is the contracting activity (N00167-07-D-0010).

This contract will fund the Alcoa Collaborative Design Approach (ACDA), a phased program approach in which the following tasks will be applied to the LCS: selection of candidate assemblies and components; development of conceptual designs and down selection of design concepts; evaluation of design concepts and final selection; development and evaluation of prototypes; and ship integration. The components for improvement may include hull sections, doors/hatches, load floors, foundations, large apertures or similar structures.

Alcoa has considerable expertise in this area, having worked closely with Lockheed Martin on a very similar effort re: the F-35B Lightning II STOVL fighter.

Still, one wonders why, exactly, this has become a priority for the LCS program? See the Dec 17/08 entry, above for clues.

Sept 24/07: Newhouse News Service reports that “Navy inspectors have documented numerous problems with construction of a next-generation vessel known as the littoral combat ship, or LCS, according to government records obtained under the federal Freedom of Information Act.” They are referring specifically to the General Dynamics/ Austal ships, and proceed to detail these issues in “Navy Inspectors Find Numerous Problems With Ship Project.”

Some of these items are “normal” issues that inspectors exist to catch, others are less so. Note, especially the time frames of the issues raised, as many date from 2006 and predate subsequent reports.

Sept 21/07: Gannett’s Navy Times reports that the US Navy and General Dynamics are expected to meet next week to discuss the LCS program:

“GD spokesman Kendall Pease confirmed the Navy had asked for the meeting but provided no further details, other than to say a specific date had not been set. Other sources, however, said the meeting was to discuss slowing construction on LCS 4, the second ship GD is building at its Austal USA shipyard in Mobile, Ala.”

The Navy was forced to reimburse Team Lockheed for a number of expenses after canceling LCS-3, and they are reportedly trying to restructure the deal with the GD/Austal team to avoid paying those costs in the event that LCS-4 is canceled. If the parties cannot agree, the Navy could always choose to cancel LCS-4 on those grounds, and pay the minor reimbursement fees that would be involved at this early stage. The downside is that a second cancellation decision would leave the entire LCS program in tatters, either turning it into a 1-ship each “sail off” competition, or throwing the entire program back to the drawing board.

Aug 8/07: US Navy acquisition chief Dolores Etter said in an interview with Reuters that General Dynamics is about 54% done with its first ship [LCS-2], which is due to be delivered in mid-2008. She also stated that “We … continue to see challenges with the program and with each platform, specifically with the propulsion system on LCS-1 and systems integration on LCS-2.”

With respect to the GD/Austal team’s effort to rein in costs, she said that “We do have points at which our concern will go up. You can’t predict what will happen, but things are moving forward in a good direction” in terms of the firm’s efforts to rein in costs.

Meanwhile, Reuters adds that US Navy officials have asked lawmakers to approve a 55% increase in a cost cap for the 5th and 6th LCS ships, to $460 million. They also said costs for the first Lockheed ship and GD’s LCS-2 could be up to 75% higher than expected. Reuters article: “US Navy sees progress on General Dynamics LCS ship.”

July 24/07: In a statement before the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Congressional Budget Office representatives testify that [PDF format]:

“Experience had suggested that cost growth was likely to occur in the LCS program. In particular, historical cost-weight relationships – using the lead ship of the Oliver Hazard Perry class of frigates (FFG-7) as an analogy – indicated that the Navy’s original cost target for the LCS was optimistic. The first FFG-7, including its combat systems, cost a total of about $650 million (in 2008 dollars) to build, or about $235 million per thousand tons. Applying that per-ton estimate to the LCS program suggests that the lead ships would cost about $575 million apiece, including the cost of one mission module (to make them comparable to the FFG-7). In this case, looking at cost-weight relationships produced an estimate less than the apparent cost of the first two LCSs but substantially greater than the Navy’s original estimate.

As of this writing, the Navy has not publicly released an estimate for the LCS program that incorporates the most recent cost growth, other than its request to raise the cost caps for the fifth and sixth ships. CBO estimates that with that growth included, the first two LCSs would cost about $630 million each, excluding mission modules but including outfitting, postdelivery, and various nonrecurring costs associated with the first ships of the class. As the program advances, with a settled design and higher annual rates of production, the average cost per ship is likely to decline. Excluding mission modules, the 55 LCSs in the Navy’s plan would cost an average of $450 million each, CBO estimates.”

DID background: The FFG-7 frigates are still widely touted as a successful example of cost containment. The Oliver Hazard Perry Class met their budget and performance targets and served successfully. The USS Stark even survived a hit from an Iraqi Exocet missile while patrolling the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. The ships paid a price in lower capability and lack of space for capability growth, however, and many were sold to other countries or retired early because upgrading them was too difficult. That experience was one of the inspirations for the LCS’ open-architecture, mission modules approach.

Mach 14/07: Navy Cancels Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, warns General Dynamics. The Navy explains that they couldn’t reach agreement on a new contract. Lockheed Martin expressed “disappointment,” and says: “We believe that our proposal was fully consistent with the Secretary’s stated desire to bring the benefits of increased competition to shipbuilding while holding the Navy’s industrial partners accountable for cost performance within their control”. Note especially those last 3 words, given the role played by Navy specification shifts in that cost growth.

Mach 14/07: Navy revises LCS program plan. Based on a comprehensive two-month review of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition program, Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter announced that he is prepared to lift a previously issued stop work order for construction of Lockheed Martin’s LCS 3 – under a renegotiated contract.

The new decision will also affect the General Dynamics/ Austal team. Under the restructured Littoral Combat Ship program plan, the Navy will recommend deferral of FY 2007 LCS procurement, and use those funds to complete the construction of LCS 1-4 by the Lockheed and General Dynamics teams.

This is part of a wider package of efforts aimed at controlling program costs… before those costs raise comparisons, questions, and dilemmas that begin to control the program. For full coverage, see “Cost Growth Leads to Stop-Work on Team Lockheed LCS-3 Construction (updated)”.

Feb 28/07: Reports surface that the General Dynamics/ Austal LCS design is also expected to face cost overruns, although the scope of the increases is not yet clear. Navy acquisition chief Delores Etter had said the first General Dynamics LCS ship would cost $350 million or more, but Lt. Cmdr. John Schofield, Etter’s spokesman, said in an e-mail that:

“Etter mistakenly characterized the cost of LCS 2 to be $350 million or more. The estimated cost range of LCS 1 is $350 million-$375 million, as previously testified. That estimate is based on the best information to date. There is insufficient information to know precisely the final cost range of LCS 2…. Although we anticipate some cost growth, it is premature to discuss specific numbers as they are unavailable at this time.”

Etter described Team Lockheed’s LCS-1 Freedom as 75-80% complete, and the GD/Austal team’s LCS-2 Independence as about 33% complete. Reuters report | Defense News report (March 20/07).

Jan 29/07: Firings will continue until costs improve. Capt. Donald Babcock, the Navy’s LCS program manager, is relieved of his duties by Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton – who is also being reassigned.

Jan 12/07: Stop Work issued to Team Lockheed. “The Navy issued a stop work order Jan. 12 to Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors unit, Moorestown, N.J., for the construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This stop work order will take effect immediately, and is for a period of 90 days. The stop work order was issued because of significant cost increases currently being experienced with the construction of LCS-1 and LCS-3, under construction by Lockheed Martin…”

The US Navy says they are “working closely with the contractor to identify the root cause of the costs growth… [and] reviewing the overall acquisition strategy for the LCS program…” At this point, the GD/Austal team’s trimaran design and build-out of LCS 2&4 are unaffected. See full DID coverage with all updates, not to mention the Lexington institute’s predictive December 2006 report “Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy.”

Dec 8/06: 2nd GD-Austal Flight 0 Ship. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $208.1 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/ award-fee modification under previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310, exercising an option for construction of the 4th Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the second by the GD-Austal team. Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (55%); Pittsfield, MA (24%); and Bath, ME (21%), and is expected to be complete by August 2009.

The associated General Dynamics release trumpets its trimaran design as having “one of the largest usable payload volumes per ton of ship displacement of any U.S. Navy surface combatant afloat,” and notes its ability to carry even the CH-53 medium-heavy transport helicopter if the mission requires it.

Austal’s associated release discusses potential US Navy plans that could include an extended buy of the Flight 0 version ships, and adds that its workforce in Mobile is slated to grow to 1,200 by the end of 2007.

Oct 17/06: The FY 2007 defense budget is signed. LCS funding is not cut, but remains at $520.67 million

FY 2006

Sept 23/06: The US Navy christens and launches LCS 1 Freedom, the nation’s first littoral combat ship, at the Marinette Marine shipyard in Wisconsin. The ship will continue to undergo outfitting and testing at Marinette Marine; it will be commissioned in 2007 and eventually homeported in San Diego, CA. The ship’s sponsor is Birgit Smith, wife of the late Medal of Honor recipient U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul Ray Smith.

July 26/06: The US Congressional Research Service releases its report “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): Background and Issues for Congress.” Meanwhile, as negotiations in Congress go forward, The House-reported version of the FY2007 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5631) recommends approval of this request. The Senate reported version recommends a 2-ship cut by funding just one LCS in FY 2007, and rescinding funding for one of the three LCSs procured in FY 2006.

June 26/06: 2nd Lockheed Flight 0 Ship. Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ receives a $197.6 million cost-plus-incentive-fee/ award-fee modification under a previously awarded contract, exercising an option for construction of one Flight 0 monohull Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Work will be performed in Lockport, LA (63%); Moorestown, NJ (36%); and Arlington, VA (1%), and is expected to be complete by January 2009. See corporate release.

April 13/06: Israel Considering Lockheed’s Littoral Combat Ship Design. Specifically, they’re considering Lockheed’s monohull design as a potential replacement for their Saar Class corvettes and missile boats. A funded initial study is underway to assess feasibility, and integration with Israeli systems and weapons is critical.

April 4/06: Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter has named LCS 2, the first Flight 0 ship of the General Dynamics/Austal trimaran design. She will be the USS Independence. This Navy release notes the backgrounds of other ships who have borne that name. It’s all part of a speech on the future of Navy shipbuilding that DID covered extensively.

Jan 19/06: GD/Austal Lays Keel for LCS 2. Austal USA hosts a traditional US Navy keel-laying ceremony to signify the start of construction on the first Flight 0 General Dynamics/Austal LCS trimaran. The keel laying follows on the heels of the official November 17, 2005 opening of Austal USA’s ship construction facility in Mobile, AL. See also See US Navy release.

Oct 7/05: LCS 2, the 1st GD-Austal Flight 0 Ship, is ordered. General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received a $223.3 million cost-plus-award-fee/ incentive-fee modification to exercise an option under contract N00024-03-C-2310 for detail design and construction of one Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Work will be performed in Mobile, AL (50) – note that this represents Austal’s component, and is the company’s largest-ever individual contract. Work will also be performed in Pittsfield, MA (33%); Bath, ME (15%); and Baltimore, MD (2%), and is expected to be complete by October 2007. This award is one of the potential options described in the May 27, 2004 contract award.

FY 2005 and Earlier

June 2/05: Lockheed Lays Keel for LCS 1, USS Freedom. Thhis is the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design, and the ceremony was attended by numerous dignitaries. This event is related the Dec 15, 2004 shipbuilding contract, of course.

May 9/05: Secretary of the Navy Gordon England has named LCS 1, the first Flight 0 ship of Team Lockheed’s design. She will be the USS Freedom. See DefenseLINK release.

April 11/05: Bath Iron Works prepares for construction. Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME receives a $16 million cost-plus-fixed-fee option to previously awarded contract N00024-03-C-2310 for the advance procurement of required Long Lead Material for the first “Flight Zero” models of General Dynamics’ trimaran Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design. The contract award for Long Lead Material includes a description of the items to be procured, the supplier, the required ordering date, supplier lead-time, in-yard need date and a breakout by month of the dollar amounts required. Work is expected to be complete in September 2005.

Dec 15/04: Lockheed awarded first Flight 0 shipbuilding contract for LCS 1. Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ received a $188.2 million cost-plus award-fee/ incentive-fee option to contract N00024-03-C-2311 for detail design and construction of the first Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Work will be performed in Moorestown, NJ (38%); Marinette, WI (57%); and Arlington, VA (5%), and is expected to be complete by December 2006. This is one of the potential options described in the May 27, 2004 contract award.

June 6, 2004: Lockheed unveils latest version of its LCS design.

May 27/04: Downselect and Initial Contracts. Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors in Moorestown, NJ, and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME received cost-plus-award-fee contract modifications to previously awarded contracts for final system design, with options for detail design and construction of up to two Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS):

• Lockheed Martin received $46.5 million contract modification for a 7-month final system design, which could go as high as $423.4 million if options for detail design and construction of up to two LCS Flight 0 ships are excercised. Work on the final system design is expected to be complete by December 2004. See corporate release for further details re: Team Lockheed’s design & objectives.

• General Dynamics received a $78.8 million cost-plus-award-fee contract modification to N00024-03-C-2310 for a 16-month final system design. The award could go as high as $536 million if options for detail design and construction of up to two LCS Flight 0 ships are exercised ($536,020,688 including all options). Work on the final system design is expected to be complete by September 2005. Corporate release for further information re: the GD team’s design goals.

July 17/03: Preliminary Design. The following three companies out of six offers won firm-fixed-price contracts for Flight 0 Littoral Combat Ship Preliminary Design: General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, ME (N00024-03-C-2310 – $8.9 million); Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems, Surface Systems in Washington, DC (N00024-03-C-2311 – $10 million); Raytheon Company Integrated Defense Systems in Portsmouth, RI (N00024-03-C-2312 – $10 million). Each contractor will perform a preliminary design effort to refine its proposed Littoral Combat Ship concept. Work is expected to be complete in February 2004.

The three losing teams include Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Gibbs and Cox (who would join the Lockheed team), John J McMullen Associates, and Textron Systems Marine & Land Operations.

Interestingly, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems was working from an already-proven littoral ship design from Swedish company, Kockums AB and its German parent company, Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG. Kockums AB designed and is building Sweden’s VISBY Class littoral warfare corvettes, and Northrop Grumman planned to use the stealthy carbon fiber mono-hull as the baseline for its LCS program.

May 21/03: Lockheed Martin holds an Industry Day to solicit potential members for its LCS team. Its base design concept is then known as “Sea Blade.”

March 4/03: Lockheed lays foundation for LCS team. Lockheed Martin, naval architects Gibbs & Cox, Bollinger Shipyards and shipbuilders Marinette Marine formally partner on the LCS program. The Lockheed release contains details of their respective areas of reponsibility and past work.

September 2002: US Navy finishes studying Norway’s Skjold (“Shield”) Class air cushion catamaran littoral fast patrol boats. The ship completed a 13-month deployment in the USA, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea. The ship participated in a series of naval exercises and a number of tests with US Navy research establishments NAVSEA and the Office of Naval Research.

March 25/02: Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel participates in naval exercise. The vessel participated as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons, as does this GlobalSecurity.org Sea SLICE profile.

LCS Ancillaries: Equipment, Mission Module & Weapon Contracts & Key Events

Unless otherwise noted, all contracts are issued by the USA’s Naval Sea Systems Command in Washington, DC.

Feb 9/09: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY received a $16.6 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311). They will continue to provide integration services for the ships’ mission module packages.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (47%), Washington, DC (26%), Panama City, FL (12%), Hollywood, MD (12%), San Diego, CA (2%), and Dahlgren, VA (1%) and is expected to be complete by September 2009. Contract funds in the amount of $3.3 million will expire on Sept 30/09.

Sept 19/08: The Navy rolls out its new Anti-Submarine Warfare mission module package in a ceremony at Naval Base Point Loma Naval Mine & ASW Command Complex in San Diego, CA. US Navy release

Aug 13/08: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., in Bethpage, NY receives a $16.1 million modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311). This continues funding for mission module integration services, jusing a spiral development approach of rapid, incremental improvements.

Work will be performed in Bethpage, NY (32%); Washington, DC (26%); Panama City, FL (15%); Hollywood, MD (15%); San Diego, CA (5%); Dahlgren, VA (5 percent); and Newport, RI (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2009.

Aug 10/08: Northrop Grumman Corporation announces that the NGC/US Navy team has completed the successful installation of the Mission Package computing environment into LCS-1 Freedom in June 2008. Northrop Grumman employees installed and tested the computing environment itself, which comprises 4 racks of processing hardware and the classified and operational software that runs the package. A system check indicated that the computing environment was operating properly, and that communication with the ship’s infrastructure was complete.

Each mission package needs only 15 personnel, plus 23 aviation detachment personnel for the helicopters.

Oct 22/07: Defense News reports that Lockheed Martin is testing the LCS-1 Independence’s ability to load containerized mission modules and other equipment into the mission bay area. On Oct 10/07, their Moorestown, NJ facility ran a successful test of their COMBATSS-21 combat system’s ability to load the mine warfare mission package software. NAVSEA is continuing work on software for the other 2 initial mission packages: anti-submarine, and anti-surface warfare.

The article also covers Israel’s ongoing interest in the Lockheed Martin LCS design. See “An LCS For Israel?” for more details regarding that spin-off program.

Oct 12/07: The US GAO audit office has some news re: the mine warfare module, the LCS’ first mission module. It seems some changes will be required:

”...For example, operation of mine countermeasures systems is currently expected to exceed the personnel allowances of the [Littoral Combat] ship, which could affect the ship’s ability to execute this mission. In addition, the Littoral Combat Ship will have only limited capability to conduct corrective maintenance aboard. However, because the Navy recently reduced the numbers of certain mission systems from two to one per ship, operational availability for these systems may decrease below current projections. Moreover, the mine countermeasures mission package currently exceeds its weight limitation, which may require the Navy to accept a reduction in speed and endurance capabilities planned for the Littoral Combat Ship. It is important that the Navy assess these uncertainties and determine whether it can produce the needed mine countermeasures capabilities from the assets it is likely to have and the concepts of operation it can likely execute.”

Sept 26/07: Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, N.Y. receives a $15.4 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This modification supports the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Module Program Office (PMS 420), Program Executive Office, Littoral and Mine Warfare.

Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by September 2008. Contract funds in the amount of $113,338, will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

Sept 25/07: The Navy announces that it is moving forward with development of the LCS Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package, which it describes as “designed to combat small, fast boat terrorist threats to the fleet.” The announcement lists the components as:

“electro-optical/infrared sensors mounted on a vertical take off unmanned air vehicle to provide over-the-horizon detection; 30mm guns to kill close-in targets; four [4] non-line-of-sight launching system (NLOS-LS/ “NetFires”/ “missile in a box”) container launch units, with each system containing 15 offensive missiles; and the MH-60R armed helicopter for surveillance and attack missions. The SUW mission package has software that interfaces with the LCS command and control system to maintain and share situational awareness and tactical control in a coordinated SUW environment…. The first two SUW mission packages assembled for developmental and operational testing use the Mark 46 30mm gun made by General Dynamics Amphibious Systems.”

The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren division is the technical direction agent for the SUW mission package, with NSWC Port Hueneme division providing integrated logistics and testing support. NAVSEA release.

April 2/07: BAE Systems in Minneapolis, MN announces its second contract from General Dynamics to supply a 57-mm Mk 110 naval gun system as the main gun fitted to the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship [LCS 4]. The contract is worth $7.2 million, and includes options such as spare parts and training. The gun is scheduled to be delivered in 2008.

The gun’s Mk 295 ammunition allows the system to perform against aerial, surface or ground threats, with a firing rate of up to 220 rounds/minute. The Mk 110 is designed to have minimal deck penetration, and can be operated directly or by remote control. BAE Systems has now received 3 contracts from the LCS program contenders, for a total of 4 gun systems. See full DID coverage.

Jan 5/07: General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems has delivered the Littoral Combat Ship Open Data Model to the U.S. Navy for inclusion in the Software Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository, with unrestricted rights for re-use by any other Navy program.

The Open Data Model is a critical open architecture component of the General Dynamics LCS computing environment. By using the Open Data Model, any company’s products can be integrated into the General Dynamics LCS quickly and efficiently, creating ease of integration and upgrade, as well as a continuous competitive environment that improves capabilities, lowers costs, and avoid’s platform lock-ins.

With this delivery, the SHARE repository now provides a vehicle for any company interested in bringing their technology to the General Dynamics LCS to gain access to the Open Data Model. In addition, the Open Data Model is now available as the basis of a published open architecture solution for any other Navy programs looking to reap the benefits afforded by open architecture, advancing the Navy’s growing focus on open architecture ship systems. EE Times report.

Oct 20/06: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors (MS2) Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY received a $13.2 million cost-plus-fixed-fee, firm-fixed-price modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-05-C-6327) for in the development, demonstration and integratiion of the Remote Mine-hunting Vehicle (RMV) with the anti-submarine warfare systems mission module, and for production of 4 installation and checkout kits with supporting equipment for 4 RMV units. This module will is part of the Littoral Combat Ship ASW mission package, and the RMVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91-96 and LCS Class ships.

The RMV is also known as the the WLD-1, a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines; with slight adjustments, the system can perform active anti-submarine scans as well. Work will be performed in Syracuse, NY (80%) and Riviera Beach, FL (20%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington in Washington, DC issued the contract.

Oct 19/06: a $12.7 million contract for 4 Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), for the Littoral Combat Ship’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Module. General Dynamics Robotic Systems will develop them. This contract follows a similar May 1, 2005 contract for up to 4 USVs; see below for further details, or just flip to DID’s dedicated coverage of this contract – and some of GDRS’ competitors in the USV field.

Oct 13/06: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation in Bethpage, NY receives a $15.5 million cost-plus-award-fee modification under previously awarded contract (N00024-06-C-6311) to exercise an option to provide integration services for mission packages that will deploy from and integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The US Navy’s plan is to use spiral development to improve mission capability on an ongoing basis, which is much easier since LCS mission packages can be developed and acquired separately from the ship itself. Work will be performed in Washington, DC (43%); Bethpage, NY (32%); Panama City, FL (19%); Hollywood, MD (2%); San Diego, CA (2%); and Dahlgren, VA (2%), and is expected to be complete by January 2008. See also DID’s Jan 5/06 entry.

Aug 25/06: Netfires LLC of Grand Prairie, TX received a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for $54.8 million as part of an estimated $1.15 billion contract to procure the NLOS-LS Naval Littoral Combat Ship Integration, System Development and Demonstration. Work will be conducted in Tucson, AZ and Baltimore, MD, and will be complete by Aug. 31, 2010. The U.S. Army Aviation & Missile Command issued the contract (W31P4Q-04-C-0059). See also Raytheon’s Aug 29 release.

Aug 22/06: Rolls Royce announces that its Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines will power LCS 3, the second Lockheed Martin-designed Littoral Combat Ship. The order also includes 4 of its Kamewa waterjet systems. These systems were also installed in Team Lockheed’s LCS 1 Freedom.

July 31/06: Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems and Sensors Electronics Park in Syracuse, NY receives $23.4 million as part of the remote minehunting system (RMS) program (N00024-05-C-6237) to service 3 WLD-1 remote minehunting vehicle (RMV) UUVs. As noted above, the WLD-1 is a UUV that works with the AQS-20A towed array sonar to scan ahead for mines. The RMV/UUVs will be incorporated into the DDG 91 through DDG 96 Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, as well as the LCS. See full DID coverage.

April 10/06: Lockheed Martin announces a $5.2 million NAVSEA study studied Team Lockheed’s LCS hull, mechanical, and engineering systems’ ability to accommodate the systems and weapons the Israelis want, while avoiding the need for major redesign of the USA’s basic configuration.

The final answer was that it could, with some obvious modifications to accommodate better radars and vertical launch systems for missiles. See “A Littoral Combat Frigate For Israel?” for more.

April 4/06: Raytheon Company announces that it will Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 1A Helicopter, Aircraft, and Surface (HAS) guided missiles. Raytheon will work with General Dynamics to integrate SeaRAM with the LCS combat management system.

April 2006: The Navy’s Sea Talon Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) system successfully completes a series of testing milestones offshore from Lockheed Martin’s Riviera Beach, Fla., facility.

Sea Talon is part of the LCS the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission module. Using 2 Remote Minehunting Vehicle (RMV) semi-submersibles developed under the AN/WLD-1 Program, Sea Talon creates an unmanned, distributed, underwater sensor network that uses unmanned vehicles for sensor deployment and sensor data communications. For Sea Talon, the RMVs are being fitted with the Remote Towed Active Source (RTAS) and the Remote Towed Array (RTA). Once fitted with these sensors, Sea Talon rapidly detects, tracks, classifies and localizes quiet diesel submarines in littoral waters, while conducting above-water persistent situational awareness and transmitting real-time data to U.S. Navy ships.

Sea Talon involves no new major technology development, but leverages already developed technologies from the AN/WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System, the AN/SQQ-89A(V)15 surface sonar program, towed array sonar development, and common software baselines. The April tests demonstrated that the RTA and RTAS could be towed at multiple depths, and that the RMV’s stability was not affected during the towing of the active source and passive source receiver at various speeds and depths. July 15/06 PEO-LLMW release.

Jan 5/06: Mission modules integrator chosen. Northrop-Grumman Systems Corp. in Bethpage, NY is awarded a 10-year, cost-plus award-fee/ award-term contract serve as mission package integrator for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Modules program. The contract has a potential dollar figure of $159 million, and the FY 2006 portion of the contract award is $4.5 million. DID covers N-G’s mission modules integration contract in more depth.

July 6/05: Lockheed Martin completes COMBATSS-21 combat management software system. COMBATSS-21 supports the FORCEnet initiative within the USA’s Seapower 21 doctrine, and uses an open architecture system that reuses proven components from Lockheed Martin, the US Navy, domestic industry and international industry. By leveraging off-the-shelf components, Lockheed Martin claims to have achieved greater than 95% software reuse, completing the Flight 0 COMBATSS-21 software well ahead of ship installation and below budget. Through the use of an open business model, Lockheed Martin will continually evaluate new components for COMBATSS-21, which Lockheed will use for the Navy’s LCS, Deepwater program, and other US and international ships as well.

May 1/05: similar award for up to 4 USVs. An $8.5 million contract covers the first 2 vehicles, with options raising that contract to 4 vehicles and $11.3 million. The USVs will be used as part of the LCS Anti-Submarine Warfare module, employing towed arrays, dipping sonar sensors and acoustic sources as payloads.

General Dynamics Robotic Systems is a subsidiary of General Dynamics Land Systems. The company plans to adapt its land robotics command and control system for the new USVs; indeed, Scott Myers President Scott Myers cited this expertise as a key reason the Navy chose them.

June 29/04: GD announces core missions systems & software team. General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems announces the open-architecture core mission systems team for the General Dynamics design of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Core mission systems infrastructure is a flexible information technology backbone for operating the ship as a whole that allows “plug and play” integration of custom-designed software modules for specific functions. GD AIS’ focus is on making it easy to integrate new modules by using non-proprietary standards and commercial middleware software as the key interface:

• BAE Systems in Rockville, MD is responsible for the ship’s internal and external communications systems, as well as topside antenna modeling and mission module interface coordination.

• CAE USA Inc. Marine Systems in Leesburg, VA, is responsible for the ship automation and control system. Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems in Baltimore, MD is responsible for the Integrated Combat Management System (ICMS).

• General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products in Charlotte, NC is responsible for “all of the weapons and effectors.”

• General Dynamics Canada in Ottawa, Canada is responsible for the above- and below-water sensors.

Additional Readings & Sources

The Littoral Combat Ships: Basic Program & Ship Background

• U.S. Navy LCS site

• FedBizOpps.GOV (Jan 27/10, #N0002410R2301) – 19—Fiscal Year 2010 through 2014 Littoral Combat Ship Construction. The current RFP.

• Naval-Technology.com – Littoral Combat Ship LCS High-Speed Surface Ship

• GlobalSecurity.org – Littoral Combat Ship. See also Globalsecurity.org’s page covering Littoral Combat Ship mission modules, which offers more detail regarding the goals & objectives for each module.

• Information Dissemination (July 10/07) – The US Navy’s PF-109 “Patrol Frigate” Program. Which led to the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Class frigates, as the low end of US surface combatant force structure during the 1970s and 1980s. Says the LCS program isn’t imitating the FFG-7’s successes. Then again, compare this contention with the CBO’s July 24/07 testimony, which compared the first-of-class ships of each type in FY 2008 dollars, and found that LCS was cheaper.

• NDIA’s National Defense Magazine (March 2010) – Builders of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Pull Out All the Stops. Offers a good side-by-side comparisons of the 2 ship types.

• DID (March 19/07) – Cost Growth Puts the Brakes on the USA’s Littoral Combat Ship Program. And causes both cancellation of Team Lockheed’s LCS 3, and a revised LCS program plan. Not to mention a continued threat to the overall program, if costs remain near $400 million while weapon capabilities remain so limited and inflexible.

• International Hydrofoil Society (Sept 23/04) – NAVSEA Presentation re: Littoral Combat Ship Program [PDF format]. Includes visuals ad information related to mission modules, program structure & timelines, and the two competing teams.

• DefenseLINK (May 28/04) – Special Department of Defense Briefing re: Littoral Combat Ship Program. Good discussion of the program as a whole and procurement approach, as well as how the modules are envisioned to work.

• US Naval Institute, Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS. But note esp. Vice-Adm. Mustin & Katz’ warnings about the possibility of a failed “high-low” force mix.

LCS Exports

• General Dynamics – LCS Summary Page and Site. See also their international variant brochure [PDF format, 303k].

• Lockheed Martin Team LCS Site. See esp. their video covering the LCS concept and various aspects of the design: “A Day in the Life of an LCS.” See also their LCS-Israel brochure [PDF format, 4.27 MB], offering a design that removes the Mk110 gun while adding a 30mm gun system like the Typhoon, Harpoon missiles, Barak anti-air missiles, and strike-length Mk41 vertical launch cells.

• DID Spotlight – A Littoral Combat Frigate for Israel? The Israelis are taking a very different approach. No mission modules. Full fleet defense capabilities, including vertical launch cells and a SPY-1F AEGIS radar. Anti-ship missiles, and torpedo tubes.

• Aviation Week Ares (Oct 18/08) – Lockheed Martin Pushes Export LCS. With a long list of offered and potential changes to armament, layout, and even propulsion. Market demand in the rest of the world appears to be delivering some design verdicts.

Official Reports

• US GAO (#GAO-10-257, Feb 2/10): “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts.”

• Information Disemination (Jan 11/10) – Streetfighter 2010: The New Navy Fighting Machine. See also full study GoogleDoc. NNFM is an ONA funded study in which 9 members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty attempted to develop a force structure that reflected the vision in the USA’s “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” by building an illustrative fleet on paper.

• US Congressional Research Service (July 20/09 update, #RL33741) – Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress.

• US GAO (#GAO-08-13, Oct 12/07) – Report to the US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces: Overcoming Challenges Key to Capitalizing on Mine Countermeasures Capabilities” [PDF]

• US House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces (July 24/07) – Congressional Budget Office, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security and Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst: The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs [PDF format]

• US GAO (#GAO-07-943T, July 24/07) – Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs.

• US GAO (#GAO-07-406SP, March 30/07) – Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. LCS is one, and this study is an annual release. Here is the March 30/06 version.

• US GAO (#GAO-06-587T March 30/06) – Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range Shipbuilding Plans

LCS Program: Analysis and Stories

• Naval Technology (July 30/08) – Littoral Combat Ship Runs Aground.” Offers a look at the program workings and assumptions that have led the program to its current state.

• G2mil – Diesel Electric Corvettes. Highly critical of the LCS program. Core of the criticism: “The LCS is the size of modern frigate and bigger than destroyers of World War II, yet has the armament of a patrol boat in order to accommodate the mysterious ultra high-speed requirement…. The US Navy should scrap the current LCS plan in favor of slower, smaller, and more capable DE [diesel-electric] corvettes based on the Visby class corvette design and supported by tenders [vid. Yellowstone Class AD-41]”

• Information Dissemination – Evolving towards a 21st Century Surface Action Group. He suggests a set (LPD/LSD Mothership + DDG-51 + T-AKE + 2 frigates/ 4 corvettes + 2 LCS as support for the flotilla) derived in part from some of the principles laid down by Sir Julian Corbett. “Ultimately, I do not see the LCS as is capable of meeting the requirements the Navy is demanding from it. The LCS is too expensive to buy the number of littoral ships needed to dominate that battlespace. The LCS is too big to be risked in the littorals during wartime, not to mention having survivability problems if thought of or treated as a warship. The LCS is too small to deploy the number of unmanned vehicles necessary to be effective, and cannot repair those systems when they break. That does not make the LCS a poor addition to the flotilla, rather it would be a smart addition, if utilized in a way that supported a credible approach to littoral warfare.”

• Reuters (Jan 20/10) – EXCLUSIVE: Early tests show Lockheed LCS problems-report. The Pentagon’s testing reports say that neither LCS design will meet requirements for survivability in a combat environment. The report also details other class issues.

• Defense News (Jan 17/10) – Failing the Littoral Challenge: LCS Capabilities, Cost Miss the Boat. By Charles W. Robinson. “To counter these limitations, we urge testing of a littoral mission unit (LMU) by activating a military transport, the Cape Mendocino, which, with minor modifications, could transport four or more Street Fighters to areas of threat. This vessel would also serve as their mother ship.”

• Defense News (Jan 8/10) – Aluminum Glitters Inside 2nd Littoral Combat Ship Variant. Chris Cavas takes a tour.

• Information Dissemination (Sept 29/09) – The Day the LCS Was Promoted to Warship With AEGIS ships sliding toward missile defense roles, but naval action groups needing protection, the current LCS leaves the US Navy with no in-between options that ca pick up the slack.

• Information Dissemination (July 17/09) – May 10th, 2019: Missing Nelsons Cruisers. Scenario illustrates the hole in US Navy force planning.

• Mobile, AL Press-Register (April 15/09) – LCS could be a pirate’s nightmare. But the article adds appropriate caveats.

• WIRED Danger Room (Nov 9/08) – Rosy Future for Navy’s Troubled Shoreline Fighters? Based on conversations with CSBA’s Bob Work.

• Information Dissemination (Sept 13/07) – Littoral Combat Ship: 2 + 2 +3 – 4 = 2 plus 1

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral combat ship could slip behind schedule as price tag nears $500 million. “As Congress battles over the Defense Department’s budget, lawmakers have signaled their displeasure at LCS cost overruns and delays. The number of littoral combat ships that policymakers allow the sea service to buy in 2008 could portend whether the program uprights itself in the next few years, say analysts.”

• Lexington Institute (Nov 28/06) – Modularity, the Littoral Combat Ship and the Future of The United States Navy [PDF format]. Washington think-tank offers an in-depth look at the LCS as the Navy’s most transformational program, and the key program challenges that must be overcome in order for the LCS program to be successful.

• National Defense magazine (August 2007) – Littoral Combat Ship Troubles: Opportunity for Small Boat Companies? “The Navy’s really trying to think, ‘do we need a vessel in between the LCS and the riverine,’ and I think in the end, they’re going to say, yes they do,” says Robert Work, senior naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” The Stiletto experimental ships are cited as one likely gap-filler.

• DID (April 12/06) – The Lion in Winter: Government, Industry, and US Naval Shipbuilding Challenges. US Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter discusses US shipbulding plans and challenges. The LCS is referenced as an important trend and exemplar.

• The Fourth Rail (April 27/05) – Of Pirates and Terrorists

• Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (June – Sept 1992) – The Value of Warship Attributes in Missile Combat

LCS Ancillaries & Auxillaries

• Anthony G Williams – Naval Armament: The MCG Problem. MCG = medium-caliber gun. There has been a global divergence of views re: what 55mm-155mm naval guns should be for, and therefore which characteristics should be stressed. BAE’s 57mm gun, which will equip the LCS, falls firmly on one side of this debate.

• DID – MH-60S Airborne Mine Counter-Measures Continues Development. DII Spotlight article.

• DID – Cheap, Fast, Deadly: The NETFIRES “Missiles in a Box” Program (updated). DII FOCUS article.

• DID – RAM Missiles: FY 2006 Contracts & Events (updated). DII Spotlight article covers SeaRAM, the new system that will provide the LCS’ primary defense against aircraft and missiles.

• Lockheed Martin – COMBATSS-21 Combat Management System

• Military.com (Nov 1/07) – LCS to Carry Marines?

• Lockheed Martin (July 10/06) – Lockheed Martin Sea Talon Program Achieves Key Milestones Toward Deployment As Littoral Combat Ship ASW Mission Module

• DID (May 4/06) – $8.5M for 2 Littoral Combat Ship Anti-Submarine USVs.

• DID (Jan 9/06) – N-G Gets $159M Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Integration Contract. Covers the mission module program’s structure, and the MIW, ASW, and SUW modules.

• Seapower Magazine (December 2005) – Navy Custom Tailors Crew Training for Littoral Combat Ship.

• DID (Dec 2/05) – Sub-Finding Sensor Nets Get A Step Closer. Covers the ADS, or Advanced Deployable System.

• DID (Oct 20/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. Updated to include a number of related anti-submarine warfare technologies, most of of which will find their way onto the LCS fleet or will interface with it.

• DID (Oct 17/05) – The Fire Scout UTUAV Program: By Land and By Sea (updated)

• DID (Sept 23/05) – Navy Launches Final Development of Bluefin 21 UUV

• DID (Sept 20/05) – WLD-1 UUV and AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar

• DID (Sept 15/05) – $124.5M for 3 Airborne Laser Mine Detection Systems (Updated). These will be carried on the LCS, which will become an operational center for up to five MH-60S helicopters equipped with the AN/AES-1 ALMDS system.

• DID (May 18/05) – Spartan USVs for Singapore’s Navy

• C4ISR Journal (July 2004) – Design Work Proceeds on LCS Mission Modules: Suites will allow quick switches for pressing threat

Related American and International Programs

• Danish Navy – Flyvefisken Class (1989-), aka. Standard Flex 300

• Naval Technology – Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) Multi-Role Vessels, Denmark

• Danish Navy – Absalom Class (2004-). These multi-role ships can act as frigates, minelayers, command ships, hospital ships, or even as small roll-on/ roll-off landing ships thanks to their “Flex-Deck” and other features.

• Naval Technology – Skjold (“Shield”) Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats, Norway. One of these air cushion catamaran ships completed a 13-month deployment in the USA before the LCS program got underway, allowing the US Navy to study the Skjold class concept and shape thinking about the LCS idea.

• Naval Technology – Visby Class Corvettes, Sweden

• DID FOCUS – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward

• US Navy PEO Ships – FAQ: JHSV vs. LCS

• DID – Dead Aim, Or Dead End? The USA’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Program. FOCUS Article.

• DID – Russia & China Building Littoral Warships. The Chinese Type 022 wave-piercing catamaran fast attack craft is a potential littoral opponent. The Russian Project 2038 Steregushchiy (“Guarding”) Class, on the other hand, may well represent a true export competitor.

• Boston Globe (April 19/09) – The (smaller, faster, cheaper) future of sea power. Which may be significantly smaller and cheaper than the LCS.

• Defense News (Oct 25/05) – Ship Shows Off Danish Navy’s ‘Transformation’ Re: Absalom Class ships.

• DID (March 4/05) – U.S. Navy Exploring New Concepts, Procurement Priorities for ASW. The proliferation of quiet diesel submarines is forcing doctrinal changes, as well as new technology programs. Quite a few of these new programs will find their way onto the LCS, or interface with it.

• Sea Classics, via FindArticles (November 2004) – Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Contracts Awarded – What Does It Mean To The US Navy?

• Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey (Dec 2003) – “Sea Swat”: A Littoral Combat Ship for Sea Base Defense

• Proceedings magazine (February 2003) – All Ahead Flank for LCS

• Melana Zyla Vickers at FOXNews (Oct 14/03) – High Seas Robbery. Covers the need for the LCS program.

• Melana Zyla Vickers at TechcentralStation (May 6/02) – Naval Overkill. She thinks the DD (X) is, but the LCS and Streetfighter programs aren’t.

• Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine (November 2003) – Sea Power 21 Series, Part VIII – Sea Trial: Enabler for a Transformed Fleet. Gives good background re: the releationship of the links that follow to the LCS program, and how that kind of effort fits in with the US Navy’s new naval doctrine.

• GlobalSecurity.org – HSV Program for high speed troop carrier vessels (incl. WestPac Express and TSV ships TSV-1X Spearhead and HSV-2 Swift). Given that “HSV-2” is also a designation for a variety of Herpes Simplex STD, it is possible that this designation will change to a TSV variant once the ship class is firmly established.

• DID (Nov 24/05) – JHSV Fast Catamaran Transport Program Moves Forward

• DID (Sept 27/05) – UAVs, Blimps, and HSV-2, Oh My! It would not surprise us at all if the semi-autonomous, long-endurance ScanEagle surveillance UAV were to find itself added to the LCS’ onboard options in future. These UAVs are valued very highly by the US Marines as combat surveillance UAVs, and testing them on the HSV-2 seems explicitly designed to pave the way for LCS integration.

• DID (July 22/05) – U.S. Marines Extend Westpac Express TSV Ship Charter. The success of Austal’s HSV 4676 has also helped to shape US military thinking about potential LCS designs. The article also discusses Austal’s new Mobile, AL facility, which will be a key participant in LCS construction for the General Dynamics team.

• Naval Sea Systems Command (April 2004) – HSV-2 proving to be Prototype for Littoral Combat Ship Program

• US Navy Fact File – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel

• HowStuffWorks.com – How the FSF-1 Sea Fighter Works

• Navy Marine Corps News (June 4/05) – “Seafighter” Experimental Vessel: Initial Deployment News Video

• Lockheed’s Sea SLICE X-vessel. The vessel participated in a US naval exercise as a littoral warfare combatant, and tested a number of weapons including the 35mm “Millenium Gun,” NETFIRES missiles, and a simulated torpedo strike. The Lockheed release contains more information about Sea SLICE and the tested weapons.

DID appreciates the assistance provided by our readers to date, and welcomes further information, corrections, and updates concerning the LCS program. Please send emails to editorial (at) defenseindustrydaily.com.

Tag: LCSFOCUS